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POLITICAL LAW
(STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT) I. IN GENERAL A. Political Law Defined POLITICAL LAW has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with
the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants1 of its territory People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922] DEFINITION / EFFECTIVITY Case : Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. The complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that: Article 14 - The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties: 1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney. xxxx 5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.
Rule : It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges. Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922….Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence. It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
1
This includes not only citizens a s there are rights protected by the Constitution for Inhabitants
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Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that: By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899). While municipal of the acquired not in conflict withconqueror, the, laws ofthe thepolitical new sovereign continue in forcelaws without thenewly express assentterritory or affirmative act of the laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said: On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State. Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated” There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Macariola vs . As uncion- 114 S CR A 77, - A.M. No.
133-J May 31, 1982
Hence, As To Laws Which Are Not Political In Nature;
Rule: As to whether the Indeterminate Sentence Act was in force during the occupation, the answer is in the affirmative. A proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces of January 2, 1942, directed that "so far as the military administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past." This was nothing more than a confirmation of the well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. (Kim Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not a political law. It does not affect political relations. In fact, it is a part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system directly related to the punishment of crime and the maintenance of public peace and order, which Article 43 of Section III of the Hague Political Law 1
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Regulations of 1907 compels the belligerent occupant to take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure as far as possible. G.R. No. L-1352 April 30, 1947 ALFONSO MONTEBON vs. THE
DI RE CTO R OF PRISONS
Case : On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and his then prospective and eventual bride By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees. Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962. Years later, the donation was questioned by the Petitioner as allegedly it did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument. The issue to be threshed out is whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is required.
Rule : It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. This Court specifically held that during the Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case. G.R. No. 122134 October 3, 2003 ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and
CONSTANC IA L. VALENCIA vs. B
ENITO A. LOCQU IAO
B. Scope of Political Law:
a. The law ofofPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. deals with the organization and management the different branches of theThis government b. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Deals with the guaranties of the constitution to individual rights and the limitations on governmental action c. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Deals with the exercise of executive power in the making of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights d. The law on PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. Deals with the governmental agencies for local government or for other special purpose C. Constitutional Law defined
Constitutional law is a term used to designate the law embodied in the constitution and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and application made by courts of the constitution in specific cases. (Sinco, Phil. Political Law) It “is a body of rules resulting from the interpretation by a high court of cases in
which the validity, in relation to the constitutional instrument, of some act of government, has been challenged.” (Bernas) Political Law 1
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Constitutional law consist not only of the constitution, but also of the cases decided by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, i.e., every case where the ratio decidendi is based on a constitutional provision. (Defensor-Santiago) Constitutional law is the study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority represented by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. (Cruz, Constitutional Law) D. Constitution Defined
A constitution is both a legal document and a political plan. It, therefore, embodies legal rules as well as political principles. And so when we speak of constitutional law in the strict sense of the tern, we refer to the legal rules of the constitution.2 It is defined by Judge Story to be a fundamental law or basis of government. It is established by the people, in their srcinal sovereign capacity, to promote their own happiness, and permanently to secure their rights, property, independence, and common welfare. (McKoan vs. Devries, 3 Barb., 196, 198 [quoting 1 Story, Const., secs. 338, 339]; Church vs. Kelsey, 7 Sup. Ct., 897, 898; 121 U. S., 282; 30 L. ed., 960.) A constitution is delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed. It contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land. It is paramount to the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it. (Vanhornes's Lessee vs. Dorrance, 2 U. S. [2 Dall.] 304, 308; 28 Fed. Cas., 1012;1 L. ed., 391.) A constitution is an act of extraordinary legislation by which the people establish the structure and mechanism of their government, and in which they prescribe fundamental rules to regulate the motions of the several parts. (Eakin vs. Raub [Pa.] 12 Serg. & R., 330, 347.) A constitution is the written charter enacted and adopted by the people of a state through a combination of representatives, or in any way the people may choose to act, by which a government for them is obtained and established, and by which the people give organic and corporate form to that ideal thing, a state, for all time to come, or during the life of the state. (Lynn vs. Polk, 76 Tenn. [8 Lea], 121, 165.) It is a law for the government, safeguarding individual rights, set down in writing. (Hamilton)
It may be more specifically defined as a written instrument organizing the government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights of the People (Tañada and Fernando) 2
Mendoza Notes
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According to Schwartz, “it is seen as an organic instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.” Such stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is fundamental in American theory. “T he office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity.” (Fernando)
Comprehensive Definition: That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised. (Cooley) –This covers written and unwritten constitutions. (Cruz, Constitutional Law) American sense: A constitution is a written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited, and defined and by which these powers are distributed among several departments, for their more safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of the body politic. (Justice Miller) With particular reference to the Philippine Constitution: That written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 6) E. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board ,3 the Court held that, "It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution." In Sabio v. Gordon4, the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the ‘basic and paramount law (to which all other laws must conform.’"
In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections5, the Court held that, "The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, the Court held that: Rule: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes 3
G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, 3 November 2008, 570 SCRA 410 G.R. No. 174340, 17 October 2006, 504 SCRA 704. 5 453 Phil. 586 (2003). 4
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the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. G .R . No. 12 2156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
S YS TE M - quoting 8 Wall. 603 (1869).
“…When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern” Art 7, New Civil Code’’
Rule: As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive. CIR v. Sa n
R oque Power Corp., G .R . No. 187485 , 8 Octob er 2013
F. Foreign Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law
Rule : American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, (227 SCRA 100 (1993).)"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution canthe trace its srcins to that the United States, their paths development since In colorful words of of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cutof the umbilical have cord."long G.R. No.diverged. 160261
November 10, 2003 FRANCIS CO, J R. vs THE HOU SE OF R EP R ES ENTATIVE S
Rule Foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others. G .R . No. 167614 March 24 , 2009 S E R R ANO vs. .GA LLANT MARITIM E G. Types of Constitution
1. In relation to the amendment process:
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RIGID CONSTITUTION - is one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process. This may not be amended except through a special process distinct from and more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws. The constitution is rendered difficult to change and thereby acquires a greater degree of stability; FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION - is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation. (Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5). It may be changed in the same manner and through the same body that enacts ordinary legislation. Example: British Constitution. 2. As to its adaption: WRITTEN CONSTITUTION - is one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents. The provisions have been reduced to writing and embodied in one or more instruments at a particular time6. UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION - consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statues of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 4-5) Such has not been committed to writing at any specific time but is the accumulated product of gradual political and legal development.7 3. As to its enactment ENACTED or CONVENTIONAL CONSTITUTION - is enacted, formally struck off at a definitive time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler; CUMULATIVE OR EVOLVED - is the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by systematic method. (Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5) 4. Others: NORMATIVE - adjusts to norms, those that function more truly as prescriptive documents, such as the Constitution of the United States, are called normative constitutions. NOMINAL – not yet fully operational. Constitutions such as that of the former Soviet Union are called nominal constitutions. The Soviet Constitution claimed to 6
They have been also called conventional or enacted because they are given definite form by a steadily constituted body, the constitutional convention, at a particular time. Example: U.S. and Philippine Constitution 7 They are also known as cumulative or evolved because they are not formulated at any definite time but are rather the outcome of a political evolutionary process. Example: English Constitution
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guarantee Freedom of Speech, press, and assembly, but in practice the Soviet government continually repressed those who sought to express those freedoms. SEMANTIC – A Fundamental law for the perpetuation of power. (“pseudoconstitution”), enforced to formalize and legalize the monopoly of power in
authoritarianism or even totalitarianism. What is the Philippine Constitution? The Constitution of the Philippines is written, conventional and rigid. H. Qualities of a Good Constitution
BROAD. Because it provides for the organization of the entire government and covers all persons and things within the territory of the State and also because it must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 5-6)
Case : A constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static. G .R . No. 196271 February 28, 2012 DATU M ICHA E L A B A S K IDA vs .
S E NA TE OF THE PHILIP PINE S
Case: Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist explains: “The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the
base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.”Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No.
118295 May 2, 1997
BRIEF. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 4-5) DEFINITE. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in confusion and divisiveness among the people. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 45)
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I. Essential Parts of a Good Constitution
Constitution of GOVERNMENT. The series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration and defining the electorate. (ex. Art VI, VII, VIII and IX) Constitution of LIBERTY. The series of proscriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. (Ex. Article III) Constitution of SOVEREIGNTY. The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about. (Ex. Art XVII) J. Philosophical View of the Constitution
Case: The Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FER DIN AND E. M AR COS vs. H ONO R AB LE R AUL M ANGLA PUS
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION A- Precedents Treaty of Paris: (signed December 10, 1898; became effective on April 11, 1899)
The Philippines was ceded by Spain to the U.S. Spain relinquished its sovereignty over the Philippines Islands, and with this,
All laws of political nature were automatically abrogated. It provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the islands were to be determined by the US Congress. The US Constitution did not apply to the Philippines unless the US Congress expressly enacted its provisions.
McKinley’s Instructions: (issued by Pres. McKinley on April 7, 1900 as “Letter of Instruction to the Second Philippines Commission”under Taft) It set up a “divided civil and military government” with the existing Military governor
as the Executive and a Philippine Commission, created on September 1, 1900, as the Legislative. Both represented the US President as Commander-in-Chief.
It extended to the Philippines all the rights in the Bill of Rights of the US Federal Constitution except
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the right to bear arms8 and the rights to a trial by jury9.
This was the first Organic Act (a law which establishes the structure and limitations of the government) of the Philippines. What it lacked, as a constitution, were the ratification by the people and the right of amendment which was reserved solely to the US President) The judiciary was subsequently established on 11 June 1901, with a Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, and Justice of Peace Courts
Spooner Amendment:
July 4, 1901: The Spooner Amendment, was actually a rider to the “Army and Navy Appropriation Act.”
It changed the then “divided military and civil government” into a fully civil
government under the US Congress. All acts of the Philippines Commission would now begin: “Be it enacted by the authority of the US government,” and
no longer by authority of the US President. Philippine Bill of 1902: (Philippines’ organic act from 1902 to 1906)
The Governor-General retained all executive power, including the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus upon recommendation of the Philippine Commission. The Philippine Commission was the upper house. It established an elective lower house called the Philippines Assembly, composed entirely of Filipinos. It defined for the first time who are the citizens of the Philippines. They were all the inhabitants of the Philippine islands who were subjects of Spain as of April 11, 1989, who continued to reside therein, and all the children subsequent thereto.
(or the Philippine Autonomy Act): (passed on August 29, 1916 by the US Congress) Jones Law
It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was the prototype of our present set-up. o
8 9
The executive power was in the hands of an American GovernorGeneral, who was independent of the Legislature, and who was given the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and impose martial law without the recommendation of the Legislature. The Legislature was composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, all composed of Filipinos. The judiciary continued to be made up of the Supreme Court, the CFIs and Justice of Peace Courts.
The Philippines was then in rebellion Due to the distrust of the US to Filipinos
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Under this set-up, while the Filipinos has all the legislative power, the Americans had all the executive power and thus, also the control of the government
Tydings-McDuffie Law:
(not an organic act)
It is an enabling statute that provided the mechanism whereby the constitution of an independent Philippines could be adopted. This provided for: 1. The calling of Constitutional Convention to draft our Constitution. 2. The adoption of a Constitution that established a republican government, with a Bill of Rights and a separation of Church and state. 3. Submission of the draft to the US President for certification that the Constitution was in conformity with the condition set by the Tydings-McDuffie Law. 4. Its ratification by the people in a plebiscite. Complete independence was to take place ten (10) years after its effectivity. 1935 Constitution: (took
effect on November 15, 1935)
This served as the charter of the Commonwealth and upon withdrawal of US sovereignty, of the Republic. It provides for a tripartite government, with the executive lodged in the President who had a 6-year term, the legislative in a unicameral National Assembly and the judiciary in a Supreme Court, CFI’s, and Justice of Peace
Courts. Amendments: 1. 1940. Provided a bicameral Congress, a term of 4 years for the President with re-election, and establishment of Commission on Elections 2. 1947. Included Parity Rights Agreement which stated that Congress acting as constituent body, needed ¾ vote to propose an amendment to the Constitution 3. 1967. Provided the amendment of the Constitution by a Convention 1973 Constitution:
This was ratified by the citizens’ assembly (January 10 -15, 1973 which was called
by Pres. Marcos during the Martial Law. After the ratification, Proclamation No. 1102 on 17 January 1973, certified and proclaimed that the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 had been ratified by the Filipino people and thereby come into effect. Relevant Law: PROCLAMATION NO. 1102 ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
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WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people; WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary; WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues; WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January theConstitution? following questions posed before thetoCitizens Assemblies or new Barangays: Do you approve 5, of 1973, the New Do youwere still want a plebiscite be called to ratify the Constitution? WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite; WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventythree. (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS "President of the Philippines "By the President: "ALEJANDRO MELCHOR "Executive Secretary"
Amendments: 1. 1976. Gave the President legislative powers even if the Interim Batasang Pambansa was already operating. 2. 1980. Raised the retirement of justices from 65 to 70.10 10
To extend the terms of presidential allies
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3. 1980. Changed the form of government from Parliamentary to Presidential. 4. 1984. Provided for a Vice President. B- The 1986 Revolution and proclamation of the provisional Constitution
The alleged electoral fraud in the “snap presidential election” in February 7, 1986,
sparked demonstrations with the demands for the ouster of Marcos. Then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Armed Forces Vice-Chief of Staff command of Fidel V. Ramos, who barricaded themselves at Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo, withdrew their support from the Marcos government and called for the resignation of the late president. With the support of the church and mass media, thousands of Filipinos to march the street of EDSA. 1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution. a. Proclamation No. 1 – February 25, 1986 (Provisional Government) Announced the assumption of power of Aquino and Laurel This supposed to have established the Provisional Government but Proclamation No. 3 seemed to suggest that it was a revolutionary government since in its preamble, it announced that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces ,”
referring to the EDSA revolution. The popular view was that the Aquino government was not an offshoot of the 1973 Constitution for under that Constitution a procedure was given for the election of the President – proclamation by the Batasan – and the candidate proclaimed was Marcos. Was the Aquino Government legitimate? This was said to be not a justiceable matter. This view was affirmed in Lawyers League v Aquino where the legitimacy of the Aquino government is questioned on the ground that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution Case: The SC ruled that petitioners had no personality to sue and their petition states no cause of
action. "For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto11 government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
11
Kinds of de facto government: 1. The government that gets possession and control of or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter. 2. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. 3. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war and which is denominated as a government of paramount force, like the 2nd Republic of the Philippines established by the Japanese belligerent. Characteristics: a. Its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government. b. During its existence, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
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government. All the eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government." The Aquino government was a result of a "direct state action." It was not as if a small group revolted and succeeded in wresting power in the end. Rather, the entire state revolted and overthrew the government, so that right from the beginning, the installation was already lawful and the government was at all times de jure12. - Lawyers Leag ue v A quino (G R Nos. 73748, 73972 & 73990 , May 22,
1986
Case: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of 8 the entire country so that is not merely de facto fact and oflaw de jure government. Moreover, theit community of anations hasgovernment recognized but the in legitimacy thea present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis 13, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines for the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, G .R . No. 76180 Oct ober
24, 1986 IN R E : S A TUR NINO V. B E R MUDE Z
b. Proclamation No. 3 – March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution), announced the promulgation of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution, pending the drafting and ratification of a new Constitution. It abrogated the legislative provisions of the 1973 Constitution, modified the provision regarding the executive department, and totally reorganized the government. It adopted certain provisions in the 1973 Constitution, contained additional articles on the executive department, on government reorganization, and on existing laws. It provided for the calling of a Constitution Commission composed of 30 to 50 members appointed by the President within 60 days. C- Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution
1. Adoption of the Constitution.
Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of 50 members
12
In this regard, it must be noted that there is no such thing as a constitutional right of revolution. A revolution, from the point of view of a State, is always lawful since a State can never go wrong; it can change its government in whatever way the sovereign sees fit. But this right of revolution, inherent in sovereignty, cannot be recognized in a Constitution, for this would be self-destructive. The nature of a Constitution is to set-up a government and provide for an orderly way to change this government. A revolution contradicts this nature. 13 With necessary changes in points of detail (Black’s Law Dictionary)
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October 15, 1986 - Approval of the draft Constitution by the Constitutional Commission February 2, 1987 - Plebiscite held for the present constitution
2. Article V of the Provisional Constitution Provisional Const., Art. V Section 1: Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be appointed by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than thirty (30) nor more than (50) natural born citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors of society. Section 2: The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be consistent with the need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional government and to draft a document truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people. Section 3: The Commission shall conduct public hearings to insure that the people will have adequate participation in the formulation of the New Constitution Section 4: The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and recorded. Section 5: The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President who shall fix the date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite which shall be held within a period of 20 days following its submission to the President.
3. Section 27. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution “This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the twelfth day of October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and accordingly signed on the fifteenth day of October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six at the Plenary Hall, National Government Center, Quezon City, by the Commissioners whose signatures are hereunder affixed.”
4. Proclamation No. 58 – February 11, 1987 - proclaiming the ratification of the Constitution Rule: The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof By virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.
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So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite. DE LE ON v s . E S G UER R A G .R. No. 7 8059 Aug ust 3 1, 1987 (As compared to the effectivity and the Publication of laws: Taňada vs. Tuvera 136
SCRA 27 - 1985) Context:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (New Civil Code)
Rule: Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. (Taňada vs. Tuvera G .R . No. L-63915 April 24, 19 85)
Rule: After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the is public although it unquestionably does apply directly to allpolitic the people. The subject of such law a matter of public interest which anynot member of the body may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
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vires14 act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and to the public as a whole. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. It is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. Taňada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 Dec ember 29, 1986
14
Beyond the powers or if within the powers are not binding due to lack of consent of stakeholders
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Law: E.O. 200 June 18, 1987 Amending Article 2 of the Civil Code “Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.”
III. Judicial Elaboration of the Constitution A. Construction - IN CASE OF DOUBT, THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SELFEXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING
Case : The controversy arose when respondent GSIS, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC (Manila Hotel). In a close bidding only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad and subsequently sent a manager's check Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, which respondent GSIS refused to accept. Hence, the case. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
Rule: Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII15 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general as those found in thebecomes 1987 Constitution, is usually executing. But aprinciple, provisionsuch which is complete in Art. itselfII of and operative without thenotaidselfof 15
“In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.” (NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY)
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supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision forbe a remedy for enforcing a right or aliability is not necessarily indication that itdoes was not intended to self-executing. The rule is that self-executing provision an of the constitution not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. (G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs.
GOVERNMEN T SER VICE INSU RA NCE S YSTEM)
Also the case of GAMBOA VS TEVES* reiterates the ruling of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
Case: Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, thus: x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of selfexecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that — . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-selfexecuting. . . .Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, later Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing. Justice Puno stated that ”Courts as a rule consider the provisions of theConstitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional
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inaction should not suffocate them.”G .R . No. 176 579, J une 28, 2011 , WILSON P. GAMBOA FIN ANCE SE CRE TARY MARGA RITO B. T EVES
vs.
Also, the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, that the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not selfexecuting. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. Case: Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods." Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II,
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Rule: Declaration of Principles, Not Self-Executing By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The 16
17 in the 1935 Constitution counterpart of this article called the "basictopolitical creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article IIisare not intended be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.18 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,19 the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII 20 are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Case: Petitioner questions his being declared a nuisance candidate 16
Also entitled "Declaration of Principles." The nomenclature in the 1973 Charter is identical with that in the 1987's. Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116. Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent case of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that "A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing." 19 246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and consolidated cases, August 25, 1995. 20 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 17 18
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Rule :
Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of theconstitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. G .R . No. 1618 72 Apri l 13, 2004
PAMATONG vs. COM MISS ION O N ELE CTIONS
Rule: As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that — . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-selfexecuting . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. G .R . No. 193459 February 15, 2011 MA. M E R CE DITA S N . GUTIE R R E Z vs.
THE HO USE OF RE PR ES ENTATIVE S COMM ITT EE ON J USTICE. et al OTHERS;
There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction: First, VERBA LEGIS, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed; LEGIS EST ANIMA Second, there is ambiguity, , meaning that words of where the Constitution should be RATIO interpreted in accordance with the intent of the its framers; and
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Third, UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, meaning that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.21 1. The Constitution has to be Interpreted as a Whole (UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT)
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.22 Rule: Economic Nationalism should be read with other constitutional mandates to attain Balanced Development of Economy. It isal., true in the recent Manila Prince vs.ofGovernment Service Insurance System, et thisthat Court held that case "Sec.of10, second par.,Hotel Art. XII the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions 23 in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are. All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Rule: x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document . C hiong bian v. De Leon 82 Phil 771 (1949).
21
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991). 23 Secs. 1 and 13 Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human an d natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . . xxx xxx xxx Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. 22
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Rule : It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
Ci vil Libert ies Union v . E xecutive S ecretary, 194 SC R A 317 (1991) 2. Plain Meaning Rule. Whenever Possible the Words Used in the Constitution Must Be Given their Ordinary Meaning Except When Technical Terms are Employed. (VERBA LEGIS)
Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.24
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction however is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba legis prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 25 Rule: “In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed." G .R . No. 196271 February 28, 2012 DATU M IC HAE L A B A S K IDA
vs. SENATE OF TH E PHILI PPINES
Rule: We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration 31 SCR A 413 (1970)
24
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010 C YNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS. Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 338-339, Ju ne 26, 2001, per Panganiban, J., citing JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. LTA, 31 SCRA 413, 422 -423, February 18, 1970, a s cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990), pp. 311 and 313. 25
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Case: Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
Allegedly, counting, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent lacks the one (1) year residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
Rule : Records show that petitioner's domicile of srcin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention26. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's srcinal domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. G .R . No. 134015 J uly 19, 1999 J UAN DOMINO vs . COMMISS ION
ON ELEC TIONS 26
Verba Legis - P lain meaning rule. Whenever possible the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed.
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3. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers (RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA)
Still, it is a basic principle in statutory construction that the law must be given a reasonable interpretation at all times27. The Court may, in some instances, consider the spirit and reason of a statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.28 Applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of the constitution may render its provisions meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or an injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be made to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.29 Following the verba legis doctrine, (a) law must be applied exactly as worded (if) it is clear, plain and unequivocal.30 Interpretation according to spirit. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers. Rule: Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators. G .R . No. 1 80050 April 1 2, 2011 RODOL FO G .
NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO E RMIT A 31
Rule: Truly, law must be understood not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life."
Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic abstraction nor even for the sake of logical symmetry but always in context of pulsating social realities and specific environmental facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice." Fr ivaldo vs . Comelec, G .R . No. 1202 95, p. 56, J une
28, 1996 Rule:
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
27
Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002. People v. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962, citing Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294 29 Navarro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010 30 G.R. No. 183880 January 20, 2014 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. TOLEDO POWER, INC. 31 Citing League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 636, 644-645 28
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However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect. Atty. R omulo A.
Macalintal v. P res idential Electoral Tribunal, G.R . No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 S CR A 783, 797-799. cited in G.R . No. 2 02242 April 1 6, 2013 FR AN CIS CO I. C HA VE Z vs. J UDICIA L AND B A R COUNC IL , S E N. F R A NC IS J OS E PH G . E S CUDE R O and RE P. NIE L C . TUP A S , J R . - OTHER CASES
Case: Petitioners allege that the Health Sector Reform Agenda should be declared void, since it
runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement
violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded.
Rule: As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.
In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non-self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented:
By its very title, Article II ofIIthe a "declaration of principles andready statefor policies." x x x. These principles in Article areConstitution not intendedis to be self-executing principles enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as nonself-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non-self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara. Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached,
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petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non-self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.
The rationale for this is givenCommission: by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.. G .R. No.
167324 J uly 17, 2007 TONDO MEDICA L CE NTER E MPLOYE E S A SS OCIA TION vs. THE COURT OF APPEA LS B. Theory of Judicial Review
1. The Theory and the Basis Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.32 As such, the law provides therefore that “…When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern”33 Judicial review guarantees that all laws, or governmental actions must conform to the Constitution. Otherwise, they may be struck down due to the contradiction. The power of judicial review is an aspect of judicial power that allows this Court every opportunity to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.34 32
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRIN CE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM Art 7, New Civil Code 34 G.R. No. 138268 May 26, 1999 JURRY ANDAL, RICARDO ANDAL and EDWIN MENDOZA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 33
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Mostly, Judicial Review is sparingly used by the courts because of deference or respect for the other branches of government. It finds its basis from the Constitution; “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.” (Article VIII Section 4 (2)
2. Judicial Review and Separation of Powers Case : Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.
Rule : The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."1 Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. 710 SCRA 1 . G .R . No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA et.al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PA QUIT O N. OCHOA e t. al, G .R. No. 208493 S OCIA L J USTICE S OCIE TY (SJ S ) PR E S IDE NT S AMS ON S . A LCANTAR A, vs . HONOR A B LE FR ANK LIN M. DR IL ON et.al. G .R . No. 209251 PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and S E CR E TA R Y FLOR E NCIO B UTC H A B AD, DE PAR TME NT O F B UDG E T A ND MA NA G E ME NT
Case : For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP. This followed after Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito including Estrada delivered a privilege speechaninadditional the Senate of Million the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, himself, had been allotted P50 each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
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The DBM issued a public statement explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. DBM cited that this had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations and 2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National Government. At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the Constitution transfer funds out of savings augment the of officesbywithin the 1987 Executive Branchtoof the Government. But thetochallenges areappropriations further complicated the interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive. Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed. All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary restraining orders.
Issue: Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP),
Rule: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other department; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. x x x What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution? The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to latter lack does or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality Government, even if the not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.of the Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. Political Law 1
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Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the law to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances. G .R . No. 209287 J uly 1, 2014, MAR IA C AR OLINA P.
AR AULLO vs . B E NI G NO S IME ON C . AQUINO III
Case: In the elections of September 17, 1935, petitioner was proclaimed as member elect of National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. He took his oath of office on November 15, 1935. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a Resolution No. 8 confirming the election its members against whom no on protest had thus far been hand, electoral of commission adopted a resolution December 9, 1935 fixingfiled. said On datethe asother the last day the for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made. Prior to December 9, or on December 8, 1935, respondent Ynsua, a defeated candidate, filed a “motion of protest”, being the only protest filed after the passage of resolution No. 8, asking for the nullification of petitioner’s election. The ‘motion to dismiss the protest' filed by petitioner was denied.
Hence, this present petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
Issues : 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, 2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Rule : Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution provided an elaborate system checks andForbalances coordination in the has workings of thefor various departments of theofgovernment. example,tothesecure Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or Political Law 1
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three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to theand executive, theof legislative and duties the judicial departments the government. The overlapping interlacing functions and between the severalofdepartments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.. G .R . No. L-4508 1 J uly 15, 19 36
J OS E A. A NG A R A vs . THE E LE CTOR AL C OMMIS S ION, PE DR O Y NS UA , MIG UE L C AS TILLO and DIONISIO C . MAYOR Rule : The cardinal postulate explains that the three branches must discharge their respective
functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision-making. Political Law 1
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In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the Court added; x x x [A] court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. In Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation, the Court elucidated the co-equal status of the three branches of government: Considering the co-equal status of the three branches of government, courts may not tread into matters requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and legislative branches, unless its discretion. x x xit is clearly shown that the government official or office concerned abused his or Furthermore, "x x x courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisions." Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that the courts will DEFER to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them. Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. The only instance when the Courts ought to interfere is when a department or an agency has acted with grave abuse of discretion or violated a law. G.R. Nos. 177857-58 September 17, 2009 PHILIPPINE COCONUT PR ODU CE R S FE DER ATION, INC. (COCOFED) vs. RE PUBLIC OF T HE
PHILIPPINES
While each branch of government is governed by the Separation of Powers, the supremacy of the Constitution may allow the Courts to look into transgressions of the Fundamental Law in the carrying out of their official mandates. Rule : There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court…. have no
choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic. In Social Justice Society, the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed." In Sabio, the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is ‘the basic and para mount law to which x x x all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.’" In Bengzon v. Drilon, the Court held that, "the three
branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution." In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that, "The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no
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choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed." Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule is basic. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., the Court held that, "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution." In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Court held that, police power "is ‘the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the constitution.’" In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court held that, "police
power, as to anmake, inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested the Constitution in the legislature ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome andby reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the Constitution." When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio, the Court held that, "A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles." The effect of Section 47 violates the Constitution, thus, it is void. In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, the Court held that, "This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution." In Bengzon, the Court held that, "The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees." In Mutuc, the Court held that: “The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for e thvalidity of
any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.” G .R. No. 16 6471 March 22 , 2011 TAWA NG MULTI-PU R POS E COOP E R ATIVE vs. LA TRINI DAD WATER DISTRICT
In the absence of any transgression of the Constitution by the other branches of government, Courts must respect the boundaries established by the Fundamental Law Rule : The courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess Political Law 1
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of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. G.R. No. 191567 March 20, 2013 MARIE CALLO-
CLAR IDAD v s. PHIL IP RONALD P. ES TEBA N and TEODO RA ALYN ES TEB AN
Rule: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. x x x Metropolitan B ank & Trus t Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III G .R .
No. 177780 J anuary 25, 2012
3. Judicial Review and Presumption of Constitutionality When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.35 Note the following: 1. It is disputably presumed that official duty has been regularly performed Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; xxx Rule 131 (Rules of Court)
2. Interpretation of laws: The New Civil Code provides; Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
3. Passage of laws: A Bill before becoming a law passes the necessary readings as well as the assessment of the President. Hence, the presumption of Constitutionality. 4. As to government actions: Sovereignty belongs to the people, and the Constitution is the written instrument through which the people entrust to 35
G.R. No. 169364 September 18, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL
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government a measure of its own sovereignty and no more., What is entrusted to government is limited power. Hence every act of government must conform to the terms of the empowerment (Bernas) Case: Petitioner Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that the law relied upon in convicting him and the sentence imposed is cruel and therefore violates SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION, considering that there was already payment of the shortaged amount.
Rule : First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation. Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes. It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional. He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail. G .R . No. 16476 3 Februa ry
12, 2008 ZENON R . PER EZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and SA NDIGANB AY AN
Rule: To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on xx x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. G .R . No. 204429 February
18, 2014 S MAR T COM MUNICA TIONS, INC., vs. M UNICIPA LITY OF M AL VAR , B ATA NG AS
Should there be no transgression, the Court shall not declare a law to be “constitutional” as it enjoys that presumption, It shall only declare the same to be “not unconstitutional” Further reference: Annotation: Judicial Review, 583 SCRA 142 C. Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review
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Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. - A rticle VIII, 1987 Cons titution 1. Judicial Power
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" also "to determine whetheroforjurisdiction not there on hasthe been abuse of discretionbut amounting to lack or excess parta ofgrave any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.36 By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 37 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."38 Rule: Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants Mus krat vs. United States, 219 U.S . 346 (1911). Rule: Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such right. G.R. No. L-25716 July 28, 1966 FERNANDO LOPEZ vs. GERARDO
ROXAS and PR ES IDENTI AL E LECTORA L TRIBUNAL 2. Grave Abuse of Discretion
Rule:
“We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.” G. R. No. 174350 August 13, 2008 BALANGAUAN vs. THE HON ORAB LE COU RT
OF APPEALS
36
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, and 179461, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146, 175. 38 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 450. 37
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Rule: " Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." S ing ian, J r. v.
S andig anbayan, G .R . Nos . 195011-19, S eptember 30, 2013 3. Actual Case and Controversy
In People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial review can only be exercised in an actual case and controversy. According to Fr. Bernas; The Court cannot pass upon issues of constitutionality through advisory opinions Courts cannot resolve feigned or hypothetical constitutional problems Courts cannot resolve friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests
Moot cases, as they have no more “flesh and blood”
The following must be avoided: (i) political questions, (ii) advisory opinions, (iii) moot and academic issues, and (iv) no standing. is apowers? definition of Constitution the powers ofitself government. Whoforis the to determine the nature, Rule scope: The and Constitution extent of such The has provided instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.. G .R . No. L-450 81
J uly 15, 1936 JOS E A . ANG AR A vs . THE E LE C TOR A L COMMI S S IO N, PE DR O YNS UA , MIG UE L CA S TILLO, a nd DIONISIO C. MAY OR Rule: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to Political Law 1
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an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. J ames M. Imbong v. Hon. P aquito N. Ochoa,
J r., G .R . No. 204819, 8 April 2014
An ACTUAL CASE AND CONTROVERSY requires the following;
(1) a PARTY with a PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST, (2) an APPROPRIATE CASE, (3) a CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION raised at the EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME, and (4) a constitutional question that is the VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE, i.e. an unavoidable question. To elaborate;
(1) A PARTY WITH A PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST General Concept: A party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to be benefited if the case is resolved in his favor, and he stand to be really injured if it is decided against him. Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act being questioned, or his status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement. The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure such concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.39 A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.40 A person has standing to challenge the governmental act only if he has a personal and substantial interest
39
Baker v Carr 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 [1962] G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION vs. JOSE O. VERA 40
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in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.41 Case : This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005) which intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Rule : The Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication42. A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 43 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.44 In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They to show personal of this or an injury to themselves. AB AKare A DAunable vs . HON. C E SaAR V. PURstake IS IMAinGthe .R . outcome No. 166715, A ugcase us t 14, 2008
GENERAL THE ELEMENTS OF STANDING: Rule: Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when 1. He can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; 2. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and 3. The injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy brought about by the party. G .R . No. 13 2922 April 21, 1998 TE LE COMMUNIC ATIONS B R OA DC A S T A TTOR NE YS OF THE PHI LIP PINE S , INC vs. THE COMM ISS ION O N ELE CTIONS
Case : Petitioners, holders of permits, contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit, 41
Mendoza Cruz, Isagani, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1995 edition, p. 23. 43 Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 edition, pp. 848-849. 44 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 (2000). (Vitug, J., separate opinion) 42
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as in the case of the questioned law (Act 2706) before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government.
Rule: None of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955 PHILIPPINE
AS S OC IA TION O F C OL LE G E S AND UNIV E R S ITIE S vs . S E C R E TA R Y OF E DUCA TION
Case : All thirty-five (35) art lovers, petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential on Good Government proceeding with the and auction scheduled onCommission 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New(PCGG) York of from the Old Masters Paintings 18th sale and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank, the same being part of Filipino heritage.
Rule : The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993,
J OY A vs . PR E S ID E NTIA L C OMMI S S ION ON G OOD G OV E R NME NT (PCG G )
Standing of Taxpayers, Voters Legislators, and Citizens, GENERALLY
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo45, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thus: If in cases involving constitutional issues; 1.) For TAXPAYERS, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 2.) For VOTERS, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; 45
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.
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3.) For CONCERNED CITIZENS, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and 4.) For LEGISLATORS, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators. Case: In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention, in questioning the composition of the JBC,
as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful purposes. According to petitioner, "since the JBC derives financial support for its functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the Constitution."
Rule: Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal conflict of rights and duties from the issues presented before the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (522 Phil. 705 in 2006), the Court summarized the rules on locus standi as culled from jurisprudence. There, it was held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and can be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Clearly, petitioner has the legal standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake in the outcome of this controversy. The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because
he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a "personal stake" on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s
ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time, armed with issues of transcendental importance to society. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee
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to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal and societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.
G .R. No. FR ANC IS RCO Z vs.PAS J UDICIAL FRA NCIS202242 J OSEPJ Huly G.17, ESC2012 UDER O and EP.I. CHAV NI EL C.E TU , JR . A ND B AR COUNCIL, S E N. Case : Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing laws. Based on the findings of the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises that "officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices," the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs]." Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled "Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes." EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Rule : Petitioner lacks locus standi. – To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he "stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers to fix and determine his standing compensation." The claimsthat thatlaws he has standingwho as aare member of the bar in good who has an petitioner interest inalso ensuring and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.
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In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional adjudication. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the present
petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of government and(IBP) validlyv.issued. This supposed been branded bythe thePhilippine Court in Integrated Barare oflegally the Phils. Hon. Zamora, "as too interest generalhas an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry." Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case G .R . No. 1 93978 February 28, 2 012 J E LB E R T
B . GALIC TO vs. H. E. PR ES IDENT BE NIGNO SIMEON C. AQUI NO I II
- As Legislators: Rule : In Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato (246 SCRA 540 [1995]), we held that members of Congress
may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government only upon showing that the assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators.
G.R. No. 138298 June 19, 2001 RAOUL B. DEL MAR vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND G AMIN G COR POR ATION, ET. AL (OPIN ION o f MEL O, J. Rule To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislator G.R. No. 1 92935 December 7, 2 010 LOUI S " B AR OK " C. B IR AOG O, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMIS S ION OF 20 10
- As Taxpayers: A taxpayer has a standing to sue if 1. He has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation 2. He will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.
Rule: Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of Political Law 1
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the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIA vs. ALB A
Case : For consideration of the Court is an srcinal action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision. The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition: PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder– P 8,327,000,000.00 xxxx
Special Provision 1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sumsMembers to individual senators to and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual of Congress propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the
expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy. Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court. Political Law 1
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Issues : Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disburse d and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. G.R. No.
164987 April 24, 2012 LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE
S E CR E TA R Y OF B UDG E T A ND MA NA G E ME NT Case: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 89-299, which lifted its system of pre-audit of government financial transactions. The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; and, second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while continuing to preserve and protect the integrity of these transactions. As a taxpayer, Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.
Rule: Standing - This Petition has been filed as a taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money. G .R . No. 180989 Februa ry 7, 2012 G ualberto
J . Dela Llana vs . The C hairpers on, Commis s ion on A udit, The E xecutive S ecretary and the National Treasurer Case : Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.
1. August 28, 2013, petitioner Alcantara, Social Justice Society, filed forOn Prohibition, seeking that the "Pork BarrelPresident System" of bethe declared unconstitutional, andaaPetition writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation
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appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto. 2. On September 3, 2013, petitioners Belgica et.al. filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of -sum, discretionary funds, such 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents who are the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have of activity their PDAF andrecipient VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, of the funds, the availed project or and the entities or individuals, and allspecifying pertinent the datause thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lumpsum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 3. On September 5, 2013, petitioner Nepomuceno filed a Petition dated, seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Aquino and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development Authority. The three cases were consolidated.
Issues : Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue; Rule : Locus Standi. - Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases. Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental
law by theUS enforcement anICinvalid G .R . No. 208566 November RECO ANTONIO B E DA B . BofE LG A et.al.statute. vs . HONOR AB LE E XE CUTI VE S E C R 19, E TA2013 R Y PAG QUITO N. OCHOA e t. al, G.R . No. 208493 SOCIA L JUSTICE S OCIE TY ( SJ S) PRE SIDE NT SA MSON S . ALCANTA R A, vs . HONOR AB LE FR ANK LIN M. DR IL ON et.al. G.R . No. 209251 PE DR ITO M.
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NEPOMUCENO, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORE NCIO BUT CH AB AD, DEPAR TMENT OF BUDGET A ND M ANAG EMENT
- As Citizens 1. When the issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public 2. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing . Section 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
3. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law. (Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution ) Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves . G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON
GOOD
Case : This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the
Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic Act No. 913646 (EPIRA). Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. After a post- bid evaluation, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water. As such, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction was filed by The Petitioners Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it disregarded and violated the people’s right to information guaranteed under the Constitution, as the
same was granted sans any transparency. Petitioners reiterate their legal standing to file the present suit in their capacity as taxpayers, or as Filipino citizens asserting the promotion and protection of a public right, aside from being directly injured by the proceedings of PSALM.
Issues: Legal standing of petitioners;
46
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 - Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner
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Rule: We rule that petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and taxpayers.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. Moreover, we have held that if the petition is anchored on the people’s right to information on matters
of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in the result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested in the faithful execution of the laws. G.R.
No. 1 92088 Oct ober 9, 2 012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOG UE A ND E MPOWER MENT THR OUGH
ALTE R NAES TIVE LE G AEMENT L S E RCORPORA VIC E S , IN C.TIO (IDE A LS , INC.) vs . POW E R S E CTOR AS S E TS A ND LIABILITI MANAG N (PSALM)
- More cases, and instances on standing; a. “Transcendental Importance” and “Paramount Public Interest”
Case : This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO executed by the latter and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Tañadaand andconcerned Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of CongressWebb and asand taxpayers citizens of the Philippines.
Rule : We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counterproductive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. G .R . No. 113375 May 5, 1994 KIL OS B AY AN vs .
GUINGONA
Rule: We rule that petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and taxpayers. "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." This Court, however, has adopted a liberal attitude
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on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. Thus, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is one of paramount importance to the public. That the continued availability of potable water in Metro Manila might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric power plant in the Angat Dam Complex confers upon petitioners such personal stake in the resolution of legal issues in a petition to stop its implementation. G .R . No. 1 92088 October 9, 20 12 INITIATIVE S FOR
DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPOR ATIO N (PSA LM)
Rule: The Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "asapplied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. J ames M. Imbong
v. Hon. Paquit o N. Ochoa , J r., G .R . No. 2048 19, 8 April 2014
Case : Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the on Responsible and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 Law), was enacted by Congress DecemberParenthood 21, 2012. Shortly after the President placed his (RH imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces this controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and two petitions- in-intervention, persons and entities in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; on behalf of the generations unborn as members of the Bar, and as one as an accredited political party. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS: • • • •
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The RH Law violates the constitutional princ iple of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). • The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution • The RH Law violates Natural Law. Political Law 1
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• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54 It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal RH Law of the petitions for the principal reasons that some petitioners lack standing to question the The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Rule: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing. Transcendental Importance. Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "asapplied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion Political Law 1
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and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action. The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences. J ames M. Imbong v. Hon. P aquito N.
Ochoa, J r., G .R . No. 20 4819, 8 Apri l 2014
b. “Intergenerational Responsibility”
Rule : This case, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. G .R. No. 101083 Jul y 30, 1993 OPOS A VS . FA CTOR AN
Case: Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu Among others, Petitioners collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Ramos and Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Incidentally, recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws: SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.( A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, effective April 29, 2010 RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES..)
Rule: Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental · Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. Political Law 1
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In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition. RE SIDENT M AR INE M AMM ALS OF T HE PROTECTED SE AS CAP E
TAÑON S TR AIT V. ANG E LO R EY E S , ET AL . G.R . NO. 180771 & 181527, 21 AP R IL 20 15
Concurr ent opinion: The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of
succeeding based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation'sgenerations access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources. To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is dangerous for three reasons: First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into. question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter. The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments" on behalf of those they represent. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE
PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180771 & 181527, 21 APR IL 2015
(2) AN APPROPRIATE CASE Political Question. An issue is a political question when it does not deal with the interpretation of a law and its application to a case, but with the very wisdom of the law itself. When a judge attempts to resolve a political question, he is not exercising a judicial function, but is rather supplanting his conscience to that of the political branch of the government. Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) has attempted to formulate some guidelines for determining whether a question is political or not. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found;
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- a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department; - or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; - or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; - or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; - or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Case : Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.
Issues : Whether or not (the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review
Rule : Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine. The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government." Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nondiscretion." against this light, respondentsreforms submitbut thatalso theto"the political branches arejudicial in the best position Cast not only to perform budget-related do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage." 1 Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. G .R . No. 208566 November 19, 2013 G R E CO
ANTONIO US B E DA B . B E LG IC A et.al. vs . HONOR AB LE E XE CUTI VE S E C R E TA R Y PA QUITO N. OC HOA et. al,
Advisory Opinion. A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and demands construction for its resolution. It is not wisecontroversy for the courtthat to engage in constitutional an advisory opinion because: a) This only leads to dialectics or contentions, to abstract legal arguments and sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting Frankfurter) Political Law 1
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b) The judicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that draw out the meaning of the law. Advisory Opinion vs. Declaratory Relief Declaratory Relief. Section 1, Rule 63 (Rules of Court) Declaratory Relief By whom? Any person who; 1. Has interests in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or 2. Has rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may When? Before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate RTC Reason: To determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. Now, an action for declaratory relief is only proper when the following requisites are present: 1. There must be a justiciable controversy; 2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; 3. The person seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; Rule : the appellant not being one of the contracting parties to the deed of sale executed by the appellees spouses but took part only as notary public before whom they acknowledged
the execution thereof is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. G.R. No. L16474 January 31, 1962 TOMAS B. TADEO vs. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PANGASINAN
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. Read: G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010, SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK , IN C. vs . ANTI-TE R R OR IS M COUNC IL
(3) A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME Ripeness. A constitutional question may come to the court either too early or prematurely, so that it is still abstract (advisory opinion), or too late, so that the court's decision would no longer affect the parties (mootness). The court must resolve constitutional issues only when they come to it at the right time. Rule: “The general rule is that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. A PE X MINING CO., INC ., vs .
S OUTHE AS T MIND ANA O G OL D MIN ING COR P, G .R . Nos . 152613 & 152628 November 20, 2009 Political Law 1
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A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008).) where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Rule: In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.. G .R . No. 1 87883, J une 16, 2009 ATTY. O LIVE R O.
LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES
Case : Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination. Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
thisjudicial case, the Court is of the view that anthat actual controversy exists and that the same Rule is ripeInfor determination. Considering thecase RH or Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
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action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW. J ames M.
Imbong v. Hon. Paqu ito N. Ochoa , J r., G .R . No. 2048 19, 8 April 2014
Mootness. A case becomes moot when there are facts, injuries and heated arguments but for some reason the legal problem has become stale. When a case is moot and academic, it ceases to be a case and controversy. Any decision reached by the court would not be conclusive on the parties. Although moot, the Court may still resolve the issue if the question is capable of repetition and evasive of review; if there exists a mere possibility of collateral legal consequences if the court does not act; if by voluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the defendant, if he is free to return to his old ways. Case : The Sugar Regulatory Administration issued Sugar Orders which provided a lien on all raw sugar quedan-permits, as well as on any other form of sugar in order to fund the Philippine Sugar Research Institute, Inc. Questioning the validity of the Assailed Sugar Orders, Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and injunction. It alleged that the Assailed Sugar Orders are unconstitutional in that: (a) they were issued beyond the powers and authority granted to the SRA by EO 18, s. 1986; and (b) the amount levied by virtue of the Assailed Sugar Orders constitutes public funds and thus, cannot be legally channeled to a private corporation such as PHILSURIN. In response, the SRA and PHILSURIN filed their respective motions to dismiss on the ground of forum-shopping. The SRA alleged that there is a pending case for declaratory relief in the Quezon City-RTC and that the main issue raised in both the Naga and QC Cases is the validity of the Assailed Sugar Orders. The Naga City-RTC denied SRA and PHILSURIN’s motions to dismiss. In a Decision dated April 19, 2013, the CA nullified and set aside the Orders of the Naga City-RTC and ordered the dismissal of the case a quo on the ground of forum-shopping. Hence this Petition. In the interim, during the pendency of the instant petition, the SRA has issued Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014, which revoked the Assailed Sugar Orders. As a result thereof, all mill companies were directed to cease from collecting the lien from all sugar production, effective immediately.
Rule: A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced. In this case, the supervening issuance of Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014 which revoked the effectivity of the Assailed Sugar Orders has mooted the main issue in the case a quo - that is the validity of the Assailed Sugar Orders. Thus, in view of this circumstance, resolving the procedural
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issue on forum-shopping as herein raised would not afford the parties any substantial relief or have any practical legal effect on the case. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate to abstain from passing upon the merits of this case where legal relief is no longer needed nor called for. G.R. No. 208660 March 5, 2014
PEÑAFR ANCIA S UGAR MILL, INC. vs. SU GA R RE GULATORY A DMINI STRA TION
Rule: For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. G.R. No. 185053 February 15, 2012
EUSTAQU IO CANDAR I vs. ROLAND DONASCO Some Cases
Case : Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.
Issues : Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy
Rule : Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy. The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy. For there to be an exercise of the Judicial Power, there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds. As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared 2014 budget, the 2013 PDAFwill Article which, being a distinct subject matter,towards remainsthelegally effectiveand andnot existing. Neither the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be Political Law 1
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done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy. The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been
and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle- blowers, and the government‘s
own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF" demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative
or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA
Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Leonen pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles. Finally, the application of the third exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014." The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging." The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain publicmust fundsnot areevade spent, judicial if not resolved opportuneNovember time, are capable of repetition and hence, review. atGthis .R . most No. 208566 19, 2013 G R E CO ANTONIO US B E DA B . B E LG IC A et.al. vs . HONOR AB LE E XE CUTI VE S E C R E TA R Y PA QUITO N. OC HOA et. al,
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Case : Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing laws.
Rule : We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for having been mooted by subsequent events. The petition has been mooted by supervening events. Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already been rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act. All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as well as its patent formal and procedural infirmities, we no longer see any reason for the Court to resolve the other issues raised in the certiorari petition. G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 JELBERT B. GALICTO, vs.
H.E. PRE SIDE NT BE NIGNO SIMEON C. AQUI NO I II
Case: The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from "any reelection." Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualific ation. Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.
Rule : Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on is no case or controversy a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010, ATTY. EVILLO C.
PORMENTO , vs. JOS EPH " ER AP" EJ ER CIT O ES TRADA and COM MISSION ON ELE CTIO NS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin(K-Water) the sale of the Case Angat: Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136 (EPIRA). Political Law 1
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Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan On after a post- bid evaluation, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water. As such, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction was filed by The Petitioners Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it disregarded and violated the people’s right to information guaranteed under the Constitution, as the same was granted sans and transparency. Petitioners reiterate their legal standing to file the present suit in their capacity as taxpayers, or as Filipino citizens asserting the promotion and protection of a public right, aside from being directly injured by the proceedings of PSALM.
Issues: Mootness of the petition; Rule:
PSALM’s contention that the present petition had already been mooted by the issuance of the
Notice of Award to K-Water is misplaced. Though petitioners had sought the immediate issuance of injunction against the bidding commenced by PSALM -- specifically enjoining it from proceeding to the next step of issuing a notice of award to any of the bidders -- they further prayed that PSALM be permanently enjoined from disposing of the AHEPP through privatization. The petition was thus filed not only as a means of enforcing the State’s obligation to protect the citizens’ "right to water" that is
recognized under international law and legally enforceable under our Constitution, but also to bar a foreign corporation from exploiting our water resources in violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution. If the impending sale of the AHEPP to K-Water indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to annul the contract award as well as its implementation. As this Court held in Chavez v. Philippine Estates Authority, "supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution." G .R. No.
192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTE R NA TIVE LE G AL S E R VI C E S , INC . (I DE ALS , IN C.) vs . POWE R S E C TOR AS S E TS A ND LIABILITI ES MANAG EMENT CORPORA TIO N (PSALM)
Case: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, Dennis A. B. Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and accordingly prays that a judgment issue "declaring the unconstitutionality" of the appointment. Villar, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position. Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Rule : A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or when it ceases to of present a justiciable controversy the onset of supervening events, a resolution the case or a declaration on theowing issue to would be of no practical value or use.soInthat such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition. As a general rule, it is not within Our charge
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and function to act upon and decide a moot case. However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, We acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus: The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: FIRST, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, SECOND, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, THIRD, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and FOURTH, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David, namely: there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The situation presently obtaining is definitely of such exceptional nature as to necessarily call for the promulgation of principles that will henceforth "guide the bench, the bar and the public" should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar future situations would be smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced in the instant case are resolved straightaway and settled definitely. There are times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be addressed. To borrow from Javier v. Pacificador, "Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint in the future." G .R . No. 192791 April 24 , 2012 DE NNIS A. B . FUNA
vs. THE CHAIR MAN, COM MISS ION ON AUDIT , RE YNALDO A . VILLAR
Case : In the 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. Petitioner Renald F. Vilando, as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong’s citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of
the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy. For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack. HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando Political Law 1
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Rule : The petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic. It should be noted that Limkaichong’s term of office asRepresentative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30,
2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime. For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. The question on Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 RENALD F. VILANDO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. S PE AK E R PR OS PE R O NOG R A LE S
(4) A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION THAT IS THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE, I.E. AN UNAVOIDABLE QUESTION. In constitutional law terms, this means that we ought to refrain from resolving any constitutional issue "unless the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case." The constitutional challenge must be squarely addressed and threshed out in its entirety because the constitutionality of the law itself is the very lis mota of the case. In People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56 (1937).), this court first presented the idea of lis mota: It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented . (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)30 Case: Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto, and Certiorari and/or
Prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed by General. The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of Urro, de Guzman and Escueta as NAPOLCOM, and to prohibit then Executive Secretary and Department of Interior and DILG Secretary from enforc ing the respondents’ oath of office. Particularly, the petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in office.
Rule: Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action." This last requisite of judicial review
is simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers. Given the presumed validity of an executive act, the petitioner who claims otherwise has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the constitutional question he raised is determined by the Court. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondent s’ appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner – a warranto, has a causeUrro. of action to institute maintain his thiscause present petition quo warranto against respondent If the petitioner failsand to establish of action for quo a discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is rendered completely unnecessary. The inclusion of the grounds for certiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the essential character of the petitioner’s action since he does not even allege that he has a personal and substantial interest
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in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other respondents are concerned. G .R . No. 191560 March 29, 2011 HON. LUIS MA R IO M. G E NE R AL, Commis s ioner, National Police Commis s ion vs. HON . ALE J ANDRO S. U R RO
Rule: As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be settled on other grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved. The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and specific performance. The Court of Appeals correctly thattoPNB's to render an accounting issue, can be determined, withoutruled having rule onobligation the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.is Inanfact therewhich is nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNB's intransigence in refusing to give an accounting. The governing law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners' agent. In other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. G .R . No. 12 8448 February 1, 2 001 SP OUSE S . MIRA S OL vs. THE C OURT OF APPE ALS 4. Judicial Discretion and the Power to Review
Case : Petitioner, an association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines assails the validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets. Whether or not this Court should take cognizance of the present case;
Rule: Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied: (1)the there must actual case calling(3) forthe theperson exercise of judicialthe review; question before court mustbebeanripe for adjudication; challenging validity(2) of the the act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.47 Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case. According to them, there is no actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power and it is not yet ripe for adjudication because [petitioner] did not allege that CREBA, as a corporate entity, or any of its members, has been assessed by the BIR for the payment of [MCIT] or [CWT] on sales of real property. Neither did petitioner allege that its members have shut down their businesses as a result of the payment of the MCIT or CWT. Petitioner has raised concerns in mere abstract and hypothetical form without any actual, specific and concrete instances cited that the assailed law and revenue regulations have actually and adversely affected it. Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion, any discussion on the constitutionality of the MCIT or CWT on sales of real property is essentially an academic exercise. Perceived or alleged hardship to taxpayers alone is not an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not really settle legal issues.
47
Jumamil v. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, 21 September 2005, 470 SCRA 475, 486-487. Citations omitted.
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An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims which is susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. On the other hand, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Contrary to respondents’ assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioner’s mem bers have shut down
their operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed provisions are already being implemented. As we stated in Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun: By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time than the present to settle such question once and for all. Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal standing to sue: Petitioner is an association of some of the real estate developers and builders in the Philippines. Petitioners did not allege that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not allege any material interest or any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of [the assailed provisions]. Legal standing or locus standi is a party’spersonal and substantial interest in a case such that it has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case, ripeness or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. The questioned MCIT and CWT affect not only petitioners but practically all domestic corporate taxpayers in our country. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and their overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take cognizance of this petition. G.R.
No. 160756 March 9 , 2010 CHAMBE R OF R EA L E STA TE A ND B UIL DER S' A SS OCIATIONS, INC. vs. THE HON. EXECUTI VE S EC RE TARY A LBE RTO ROMU LO D. Functions of Judicial Review
1. Checking - invalidating a law or an executive act that is found to be contrary to the Constitution. Rule : The acts complained of in this case pertain to theHRET’s exercise of its discretion, an exercise which was well within the bounds of its authority. The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action. In the exercise of its checking function, the Court should merely test whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a different view. G.R. No. 185401 July 21, 2009 HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR. vs. HOUSE OF
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2. Legitimating (legitimizing) - upholding the validity of the law which results from a mere dismissal of a case challenging the validity of that law. When the Court exercises this function, it uses the double negative by declaring that the law is "not unconstitutional". This is no mere semantics. The Court cannot declare the law constitutional for it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, so that a declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more constitutional. On the other hand, anyone who challenges the validity of a law has the burden of proof to show its invalidity. Declaring that the law is not unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the challenger has not met the burden required.48 3. Symbolic - to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on matters of great public importance Rule: The petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc. The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner the private of whom haveare gone their separate ways-could bebea convenientand justification for respondent-both dismissing this case. But there larger issues involved that must resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986 EVELIO B. JA VIER vs. THE COMM ISS ION O N ELE CTIONS a nd AR TUR O F. PACIFICA DOR
Rule:
“A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the 48
Mendoza
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exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review, none of which are present in the instant case. Hence, since what is sought to be done by COMELEC has been accomplished, there is nothing else that the Court can order the COMELEC to perform.” G .R. No. 177927 February 15, 2 008 FL OR ANTE S . QUIZON vs HON . COMM ISS ION ON ELE CTIONS
Case : On April 21, 1998, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc issued Resolution No. 98-1419 to wit;
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make an exit survey for the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy before us.
Issue : Whether or not the case is moot. The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Paño, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees."49 Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.50 G .R . No. 1334 86 J anuary 28, 2000
AB S -C B N B R OA DC A S TING COR POR A TION, vs . COMMIS S ION ON E LE C TIONS E. All Courts Can Exercise Judicial Review
According to Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 49
134 SCRA 438, 463, February 18, 1985; per Gutierrez Jr., J. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, ... Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 is sued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. 50
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Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of lower courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts have srcinal jurisdiction over constitutional cases although they decide the case only at first instance, their decision being always reviewable by the SC. Rule:
“Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” G.R. No. L-18128
December 26, 1961 J . M. TUASON & C O., INC. vs. COURT OF
AP PE AL S
In Ynot v to IAC, SCRA 659, of theEOSC626-A, reversed the RTC's holding that had no authority rule148 on the validity banning the transporting of itcarabaos from one province to another. The Court pointed out, that since it has jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in constitutional cases, then the lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. Rule: “This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures.”
INT ER MEDIATE APPE LLATE COU R T
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 YNOT vs.
However, such decisions of the lower courts only bind the parties. Only decisions of the Supreme Court becomes part of the legal system of the Philippines. Case : For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP. This followed after Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that Political Law 1
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some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or any act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the President in violation of the principle of separation of powers; and that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving the DAP and NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion that no court can validly render The respondents argue that it is the application of thethat DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in the COA; if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts by petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
Rule : The respondents’ arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories of judicial power. However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative power. Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the Rules, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances. Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chief Executive’s power. G .R. III No. 209287 J uly 1, 2014, MAR IA C AR OLINA P . AR AULLO vs . BE NIGNO Sspending IME ON C. AQUINO
Other Cases;
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Case This case srcinated from a complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner on
Regional Office of the MOLE, Region XI, Davao City for non-compliance with the provisions of Wage Order No. 5. After due healing the Regional Director rendered a decision dated November 16, 1984 in favor of private respondents. Judgment having become final and executory, the Regional Director issued a Writ of Execution whereby some movable properties of the hospital (petitioner herein) were levied upon and its operating expenses kept with the bank were garnished. The levy and garnishment were lifted when petitioner hospital paid the claim of the private covering the period from June 16 to October 15, 1984. After making said payment, petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with Wage Order No. 5 and likewise, failed to comply with the new Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on November 1, 1984, prompting private respondents to file against petitioner another complaint, which is now the case at bar. Issues having been joined, the Regional Director rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in favor of the complainants (private respondents herein) declaring that petitioner (respondent therein) is estopped from questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because its appearance in the hearing is in itself submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of a previous case where the hospital already willingly paid its obligations to the workers on orders of the Regional Office. On the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, the Regional Director declared that only the court can declare a law or order unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the Office of the Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order.
Rule Anent the issue involved in the instant case, petitioner's contention that the constitutionality of Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 should be passed upon by the National Labor Relations Commission, lacks merit. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to ultimately declare a law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains operative and can be the source of rights and duties especially so in the case at bar when petitioner complied with Wage Order No. 5 by paying the claimants the total amount of P163,047.50, representing the latter's minimum wage increases up to October 16, 1984, instead of questioning immediately at that stage before paying the amount due, the validity of the order on grounds of constitutionality. The Regional Director is plainly without the authority to declare an order or law unconstitutional and his duty is merely to enforce the law which stands valid, unless otherwise declared by this Tribunal to be unconstitutional. On our part, We hereby declare the assailed Wage Orders as constitutional, there being no provision of the 1973 Constitution (or even of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution) violated by said Wage Orders, which Orders are without doubt for the benefit of labor. G.R. No. 74621 February 7, 1990 BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. vs. THE
HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT AND BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPIT AL E MPLOYEE S AND WORK ER 'S UNI ON- FFW
Case : Due to the imposition of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, Respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was the “Municipal Revised Revenue Code." The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees for stalls. The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market. This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders at the municipal public market, to file before the RTC a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent.
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The RTC ruled for the respondents Upon the appeal of the losing party, The Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ resort to a petition for prohibition was improper, since respondent’s acts in question herein did not involve the exercise
of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as required under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Also, the filing by petitioners of the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC was premature, as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior thereto.
Rule : The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve interpretation and application of laws,Court constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is the exclusively allocated to the Supreme and such lower courts the Legislature may establish. In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve. Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the srcinal jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphases ours.) In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. G.R. No. 182065 October 27, 2009 EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA vs HON. MARIANO M.
MA LONE S
F. Effect of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Civil Code, Art. 7. - When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Rule: Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative Political Law 1
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or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the American Supreme Court stated: "The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter, much less, this Court, has power under the Constitution to act contrary toand its terms. is to that extent unwarranted null. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its provisions The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative attitude of the emerging concept that a declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which the more orthodox view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive order, or ordinance was in "actual existence" appears to be indisputable. What is more appropriate and logical then than to consider it as "an operative fact." G .R . No. L-211 14 Nov ember 28, 196 7 FE DE R ICO
FER NANDEZ, vs. P. CUER VA an d CO.
The effect of a declaration that a law is unconstitutional is to make the law either void or voidable. First View (Orthodox view) GENERAL RULE - It is void if on its face, it does not enjoy any presumption of validity. As such, it produces no effect whatsoever, creates no right or office, it imposes no duty. Whatever penalty was paid during the period of its operation must be remitted. Rule : An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity. G.R. No. 102232 March 9, 1994 Violeta Aldovino, et al. vs. Rafael
Alunan III, et al.
Second View (Unorthodox view) - But a law declared unconstitutional is only voidable if, on its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity. In this case, it becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the invalidation produces no retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold that the law did not produce any effect at all prior to its nullification. From the time the law was promulgated to the time it was declared invalid, people would have entered into various transactions and relations, expecting and in fact compelled to presume that the law is valid. Thus, to now hold that the law never produced any effect would penalize those who in faith believed the laws passed by their representatives to be in accordance with their solemn duty under the Constitution.
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Case : Plaintiff obtained the loan from defendant Bank, secured by real estate mortgage duly
registered covering her land. Subsequently, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with her suit against both defendants on the main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. She sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. : The period from not 1945 theforlaw promulgated, to 1953 when it was declared Rule unconstitutional should be when counted thewas purpose of prescription since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law made him lose his right to collect. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. S errano de Ag bayani v PNB , 38 SCR A 429 (1971),
Case : The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)51, is challenged in this srcinal petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office
Rule: Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: “No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”
51
Respondent Gordon appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA is questioned here
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As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323)." G .R . No. 104732 June 22, 1993 ROB E R TO A. FLOR E S ,
DANIEL Y. FIGUER OA, ROG ELIO T. ALO, DOM INGO A. J ADLOC, CA R LITO T. CR UZ and MANUEL P. REYES vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J . GO RDON “THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE”
Rule: Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action null and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect ––with respect of subsequent ruling as to invalidity may haveand to be considered in various aspects, to the particular relations, individual and corporate, particular conduct, private and official." xxx
That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive acts ––in this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution. The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with. G .R. No. 1 71101 Jul y 5, 2011 HAC IE NDA LUIS ITA INCOR POR ATE D
vs. PR ES IDENT IAL AGR AR IAN REFOR M COU NCIL
However, in another case; Rule:
In Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management (G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011), the Operative
Fact Doctrine was discussed in that: As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no it creates no 7office; is inoperative asprovides: if it has not been passed at all. The general ruleprotection; is supported by Article of theitCivil Code, which Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. Political Law 1
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The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we held: The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R.
No. 179532, May 30, 2011)
…. the Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would be
iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of law. (See e.g. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011) The Court had the following disquisition on the concept of the Operative Fact Doctrine in the case of Chavez v. National Housing Authority (G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235.): The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus: As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive. Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. In thealanguage of an [of American Supreme Court "The existence of a statute, prior to such determination unconstitutionality], is andecision: operative factactual and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." This Political Law 1
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language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (Emphasis supplied.) The principle was further explicated in the case of Rieta v. People of the Philippines, thus: In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit: The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree…. It is quite
clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects –with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. Moreover, the Court ruled in Chavez that: Furthermore, when petitioner filed the instant case against respondents on August 5, 2004, the JVAs were already terminated by virtue of the MOA between the NHA and RBI. The respondents had no reason to think that their agreements were unconstitutional or even questionable, as in fact, the concurrent acts of the executive department lent validity to the implementation of the Project. The SMDRP agreements have produced vested rights in favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles over said land, and the agencies and investors who made investments in the project or who bought SMPPCs. These properties and rights cannot be disturbed or questioned after the passage of around ten (10) years from the start of the SMDRP implementation. Evidently, the "operative fact" principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the hands of the buyers can no longer be invalidated. From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB shares. Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on statutory provisions that are found to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public RA purpose. Nos.COFED) 177857-58 24,OF2012 PHILIPPINE COCONUT, PRODUCERS FEDE TIO N, I G.R. NC. (CO vs. REJanuary PUBLIC THE PHILIPPIN ES
Case. The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the operative fact doctrine. As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects. Political Law 1
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However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification of the P144.378 Billions worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and practices under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot sustain the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners. MA R IA CAR OL INA P. A R AULLO, E T A L. V.
B E NIG NO SIMEON C . AQUINO III, ET AL ., G.R . NO. 209287, FEB R UAR Y 3, 2 015 IV. THE PHILIPPINESS AS A STATE A. State Defined
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. 52 A state is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory and possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. (Garner, Introduction to Political Law, 41) The elements of a state are: territory, people, sovereignty, government. a. TERRITORY is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the State. b. PEOPLE refers simply to the inhabitants of the State. c. SOVEREIGNTY is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is governed. d. GOVERNMENT is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and realized. “State” vs “Nation”
Is there a difference between the terms “State” and “Nation”? The term “State” is a legal concept. On the other hand, “Nation” is an ethnic or racial concept. However,
the distinction, according to Fr. Bernas, is of little significance for the study of Constitutional Law. The word nation has been found and used in the 1987, 1973 53
and 1935 Constitutions. 52
G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971 THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA “Patrimony of our nation; national assembly; The 1935 Constitution make the :”State of the Nation” a duty of the President. The word ”national” appears in many instances in the 1987 Constitution. 53
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The Philippines, a Republican State: Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
Opinion A democratic form of government requires that political rights be enjoyed by the citizens regardless of social or economic distinctions. Such is our government. Clearly and solemnly, our citizenry have thus been given the supreme guaranty of a democratic way of life, with all its freedom and limitations, all its rights and duties. G .R . No. L-24 761 S eptember 7, 196 5 LE ON G . MAQUE R A ,
vs. J UAN BOR R A (B ENG ZON, J .P., J ., concurrin g .)
All governmental authority from our electorate people. Noduring unreasonable restrictions of the Rule: fundamental and preferred right toemanates expression of the political contests no matter how seemingly benign will be tolerated. R ev. Bi s hop Vicent e M. Navarra v. COME LE C and Atty.
Marvil V. Majarucon, G .R . No. 205728, J anuary 21, 2015
Rule: The first and the foremost state principle announced in our Constitution is that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." Our people express their mighty sovereignty mainly thru the election ballot where they decide, free from any fetter, who will represent them in government. In a representative government, the choice by the people of who will be their voice is nothing less than sacred, hence, its desecration is unpardonable. G .R . Nos. 15 4218 & 154 372 Aug ust 28 , 2006 PE OPL E OF THE
PHILI PPINES vs. HO N. J UDGE J OSE R . HER NANDEZ B. Territory (Archipelagic Doctrine)
NATIONAL TERRITORY islands and waters “The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and . (Article 1) dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines”
Philippine territory consists of: (1) The Philippine archipelago; and (2) All territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. SOVEREIGNTY, JURISDICTION and TERRITORY Rule: Sovereignty is the possession of sovereign power54, while jurisdiction is the conferment by law of power and authority to apply the law55.
54 55
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1523 (9th ed. 2009) See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 2009).
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From the text of EDCA itself, Agreed Locations are territories of the Philippines that the U.S. forces are allowed to access and use56. By withholding ownership of these areas and retaining unrestricted access to them, the government asserts sovereignty over its territory. That sovereignty exists so long as the Filipino people exist57. G .R . No. 212426 J anuary 12, 2015, R E NE A .V. S AG UISA G ,
WIGBE RTO E. TANADA vs. EXECUT
IVE SE CR ETAR Y PA QUITO N. OCHO A
Territorial, Personal, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the manifestation of sovereignty. 58 The jurisdiction of the state is
understood as both its authority and the sphere of the exercise of that authority59. a. Territorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State to have all persons and things 60
within its territorial limits to be completely subject to its control and protection . Chief Justice Taney, in an 1857 decision, affirmed the fundamental principle of everyone within the territorial domain of a state being subject to its commands: "For undoubtedly every person who is found within the limits of a government, whether the temporary purposes or as a resident, is bound by its laws." It is no exaggeration then for Justice Brewer to stress that the United States government "is one having jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly upon each [individual found therein];" The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction." After which came this paragraph: "All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source."61
jurisdiction b. Personaland is thewithin authority of the state over its62.nationals, their persons, property, acts, whether or outside its territory When jurisdiction is exercised on the basis of the status of the persons affected, independent of their presence or absence in the territory of the state, it is known as personal jurisdiction. (Sinco 26.) The personal jurisdiction of the state is exercised over all its citizens within or without its territory. It affects their person, property, and even some of their acts performed abroad. The authority of the state to which they owe permanent allegiance follows them at all times wherever they might reside and as long as their membership of the state subsists. (Sinco 28.)
56
EDCA, Article 1(1 )(b ). Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 ( 194 7). 58 Mendoza 59 Sinco 26.) 60 Example – Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (New Civil Cod e) 61 G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969 W ILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 62 Example - Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (New Civil Code) 57
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c. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State over persons, things or acts, outside its territorial limits by reason of their effects to its territory63. TERRITORY, SOVEREIGNTY JURISDICTION AND TREATIES Criminal Law: Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (New Civil Code)
Art. 2. Application of itsthe provisions. as provided in the treaties andwithin lawsthe of preferential application, provisions—ofExcept this Code shall be enforced not only Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. (Revised Penal Code)
Civil Law Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
63
Example - Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Island s; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. (Revised Penal Code)
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However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a) Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their customs acts or property, those which have, for object, public order, public policy and good shall notand be rendered ineffective by their laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
While the rule of lex loci celebrationis generally governs forms and solemnities of contracts under Article 17 of the Civil Code (Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1986 First ed., p. 11), the principle of lex rei sitae generally applies with respect to formalities for the acquisition, encumbrance, and alienation of real and personal property (1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines annotated, 1989 12th ed) Treaties and Jurisdiction Rule : Sec. 25 of ARTICLE XVIII (TRANSITORY PROVISIONS) of the Constitution expressly provides that after the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except; a. under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, b. when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, c. and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the United States military bases in the country. It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of independence, the United States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the United States retained for itself. This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US.
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Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate. Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines. To prevent a recurrence of this experience, Sec. 25 of ARTICLE XVIII was adopted in the 1987 Constitution. The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the upon termsusand governing presence of 17588 foreign8 armed forces in our territory were binding butconditions not upon the foreign the State. G .R . No. February 11, 2009,
S UZE TTE NICOL AS y S OMB IL ON vs. ALB E R TO R OMULO 1. The Philippine Archipelago
a. Treaty limits 1. Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898 - Article 364 defines the metes and bounds of the archipelago by longitude and latitude, degrees and seconds. Technical descriptions are made of the scope of the archipelago as this may be found on the surface of the earth 2. Treaty of Washington of 7 November 190065 between the United States and Spain - Ceding Cagayan, Sibuto and Sulu. 66
3. 2 January 1930 between the United States and Great Britain. - Ceding theTreaty Turtleofand Mangsee Islands. b. Method of determining the baselines
64
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line: “A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, … . thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000 ) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.” 65 Spain relinquishes to the United States all title and claim of title, whic h she may have had at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines described in Article III of that Treaty and particularly to the islands of Cagayan, Sulu and Sibutu and their dependencies, and agrees that all such islands shall be comprehended in the cession of the Archipelago as fully as if they had been expressly included within those lines. The United States, in consideration of this relinquishment, will pay to Spain the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) within six months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.” 66 Convention Between the United States of America and Great Britain Delimiting the Boundary Between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo [1930]
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1. In June 17, 1961, Congress passed REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AN ACT TO DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES, demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. (This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea", the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.)
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3046 provided the method in defining the baseline to wit; determine appropriate points of the outermost Islands of the archipelago, then connect them by means of a straight line until all islands are surrounded or enclosed by the imaginary straight lines. “WHEREAS, the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago;”
Section 2. All waters within the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are considered inland or internal waters of the Philippines.
2. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446 was passed in 8 September 1968 correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo. In RA 5446 the definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.67 3. In March 2009, Congress enacted RA 9522. The change was prompted by the
need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) ), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. 68 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. RA 9522 - March 10, 2009, AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES “Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic 67 68
Section 2 G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011 PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et. Al. vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA
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of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 69 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.”
Case: This srcinal action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the
baseline regime of nearby territories.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators," as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters
landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine -free policy, and damaging sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal.
Rule a. RA
9522 is Not Unconstitutional RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations d submarine members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans an areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
69
Article 121. Regime of islands 1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 3. Rocks which cannot sustain h uman habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
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contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer: Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). b. RA 9522’s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty Over
these Areas The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522,
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding e KIG, assuming that baselines RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over th
are relevant for this purpose. Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA
9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial
sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.
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Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations: What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago. Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents: 70
c. Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained 70
How did the Sultan of Sulu acquire sovereignty and ownership over North Borneo (Sabah)? In the early 17th century, the Sultan of Brunei ceded North Borneo to the Sultan of Sulu for having helped him quell a rebellion. Since then, the Sultan became the effective and legal sovereign over Sabah and the Sulu archipelago. The historical ties between Sabah and Sulu are so close that in fact, a former Chief Ministry of Sabah served as one our guerrilla leaders in Sulu during the resistance movement in the last war. How close is Sabah to the Philippines and to the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur? The nearest distance from the Philippine boundary to Sabah is 18 miles which is nearer than the distance from Manila to Malolos. On the other hand, Sabah is a thousand miles away from Kula Lumpur and is not connected by any land mass to the Malayan peninsula. Why is the territory now in the possession of Malaysia? In 1878, as evidenced by a lease contract, the Sultan of Sulu leased the territory to Australian Gustavus Baron de Overbeck who, together with his British partner, Alfred Dent, paid the rentals to the Sultan. When they ran out of money they organized the British North Borneo Company which continued to pay the rentals until 1946. The agreed annual rentals was initially 5,000 Mexican dollars and/or British pounds but increased to 5,300 in 1903. Then on July 14, 1946, just after the Philippines had gained its independence from the US, Britain annexed Sabah as part of its dominion. Still, Britain continued to pay the rentals to the Sultanate. In 1963, the British government turned over Sabah to Malaya to become part of the new Federation of Malaysia. Since 1963 the Malaysian government through its embassy in Manila has been the one paying rentals to the Sultanate. Why does Malaysia say that what it has been paying is not rentals but cession money? The lease contract of 1878 between the Sultan of Sulu and Overbeck was in the Malay language but written in Arabic. The contract was called in Arabic as “Padjak” which means lease and described in contemporary Spanish documents as “Arrendamiento” which also means lease. This document has been translated by a Dutch scholar, an American scholar and by Spanish scholars. All these authoritative translations translated “Padjak” as lease. The British, on the other hand , had its own version. They simply referred to it as cession.
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Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim
over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah: Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and G .R No. 187167 Aug ust 16, 2011 PR OF. MER LIN M. M AG AL LONA et. Al.
vs. HO N. EDUARDO E R MITA
Uses of the baseline: a. Determine what is internal water (all waters inside the baseline b. Determine the 200 mile EEZ. c. Archipelagic Doctrine - The basic concept of an archipelago is that body of water studded with islands, or the islands surrounded with water, is viewed as a unity of islands and waters together forming one unit. The main purpose of the archipelagic doctrine is to protect the territorial interests of an archipelago. According to the doctrine, even these bodies of water within the baseline, regardless of breadth, form part of the archipelago and are thus considered as internal waters. The Philippine Government adopted the archipelagic doctrine as a national policy to safeguard its territorial integrity and of its sovereign right to explore and exploit, convert and manage its marine resources. Thus, the archipelagic doctrine has a two-fold purpose: Was there any subsequent acknowledgment of the Sultan’s continuing sovereignty in Sabah by the British North Borneo Company? Yes. In 1903, the British North Borneo Company asked the Sultan to execute a confirmatory deed to confirm the lease agreement in consideration of the increase in rentals beginning that year. When the British government annexed Sabah in 1946 did it not acquire sovereignty over it as against the Sultan of Sulu and consequently, the Philippines? No, because it acquired Sabah from the British North Borneo Company which did not exercise sovereignty over the territory. Britain could not have acquired a better right than the company which was only a lessee. Therefore, it had no power to give (to Malaysia) what it did not own. Thus, Malaysia did not acquire sovereignty over Sabah either. Does the Philippine government have a right of dominion over the territory and therefore, a duty to lay a claim? Yes. A series of acts and transactions created the cumulative effect of transferring dominion and sovereignty to the Philippine government. In 1962, a formal instrument of transfer of sovereignty was executed by the Sultanate in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. However, a proviso in the 1962 document states that “Should the Republic of the Philippines fail to recover North Borneo (Sabah), after exhausting all peaceful means, this transfer document shall, ipso facto, become null and void and the Sultan of Sulu shall be free to assert his sovereignty over North Borneo by other means available to all sovereign claimants.” So, has the Philippines laid claim on Sabah? Yes. On September 4, 1950, when the Federation of Malaysia was not yet existent, the Philippines advised the British government that a dispute over North Borneo existed. This position was reiterated by the Department of Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy on 22 June 1962. Then on 12 September 1962, the Philippines sought the holding of talks with the United Kingdom regarding the dispute. This led to the holding of a Ministerial Conference in London in 1963. - Legal basis for the Sabah claim By Rita Linda V. Jimeno | Posted on Apr. 08, 2013 at 12:01am - Manila Standard Today 2013/04/08
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(1) Economic reasons; (2) National security. The archipelagic doctrine is the principle that it is an integrated unit; everything within it comprises the archipelago.71 The Constitutional provisions embodying this doctrine are: 1. "…archipelago, with all the island and waters embraced therein". 2. "…the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of the breadth and dimensions, form part of internal water" 3. "…terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains"- (although superfluous to mention
because land, water and air space already form part of an archipelago 4. "…territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves, other submarine are as"
"Territorial sea" means water outside the baseline extending up to 12 nautical miles. "Internal water" refers to water within the baseline. "Insular shelf" means the land which is submerged under water which may extend beyond 12 miles as long as it is not more than 300 ft. deep. It is also known as intercontinental shelf. 2. Other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
a.) Law: PD No. 1596 – June 11, 1978 (Kalayaan Islands) The Philippines claims the Kalayaan group of islands as part of Philippine territory or the basis of historic rights and legal title. (PD 1596, June 11, 1978) The claim was made "by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in accordance with international law. xxx" b.) Article: Kalayaan Islands by: Amb. Pacifico Castro, Lawyer’s Review page 4,
December 31, 1999 3. The territorial sea, the sea bed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine areas
71
Mendoza
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4. Exclusive Economic Zone
a. PD 159972 (11 June 1978). There is established an exclusive economic zone extending "to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured." (Sec. 1 thereof.) Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the Philippines over its territorial sea and continental shelf, it shall have and exercise in the exclusive economic zone the following73; a. Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources, whether living or non-living, both renewable and non-renewable, of the sea-bed, including the subsoil and the superjacent waters, and b. with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the resources of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; c. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and structures, the preservation of the marine environment, including the prevention and control of pollution, and scientific research; d. Such other rights as are recognized by international law or state practice. Other states are prohibited from using the zone to74: a. Explore or exploit any resources; b. Carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations: c. Conduct any research; d. Construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal, installation or other structure or device; or e. Perform any act or engage in any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction herein provided. Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to75; a. Navigation and overflight, 72
ESTABLISHING AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 2 74 Section 3. Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement entered into with the Republic of the Philippines or of any license granted by it or under authority by the Republic of the Philippines, 75 Section 4. 73
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b. The laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and c. Other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and communications. In case of overlapping of EEZs, the common boundaries are to be determined by76 i. Agreement and ii. International rules on delimitations. b. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (30 April 1982.) The exclusive economic zone which shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines, from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, is recognized in the UNCLOS, of which the Philippines is a signatory. Its concept is that although it is not part of the territory, exclusive economic benefit is reserved for the country. The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans." (Merlin M. Magallona, A Primer on the Law of the Sea, 1997, p. 1.)The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification. The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum).77 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law.78 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located. Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. 79 76
Section 1 Bertrand Theodor L. Santos, "Untangling a Tangled Net of Confusion: Reconciling the Philippine Fishery Poaching Law and the UNCLOS' World Bulletin, Vol. 18: 83-116 (July-December 2002), p. 96. 78 Anne Bardin, "Coastal State's Jurisdiction Over Foreign Vessels" Rev. 27, 28 (2002) 79 Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014 77
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Case: Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect nearby provinces which events theirforconstitutional to aadministrative balanced andand healthful ecology. seek a directive from violate this Court the institutionrights of civil, criminal suits forThey actsalso committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Issue : Whether or not respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian. Rule: During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea. According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the Reagan oceans" and as codified UNCLOS, can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Clinton,inand the US as judiciary. In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions: Article 30 - Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State. If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately. Article 31. Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes. The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law. Article 32. Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.
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A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US? An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it. We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while our internal waters. Much less can wethe comprehend a Government exercising leadership in transiting international affairs, unwilling to comply with UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz: Article 197. Cooperation on a global or regional basis. States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features. In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31. G .R . No. 206510 S eptember 16, 2014 MOS T R E V. PE DR O D. AR IG O,
Vi car Apos tolic of Puert o Pri ncesa e t.al. vs. S CO TT H. S WIF T in his capacity as C ommander of the US. 7th Fleet et.al.
Summary: Body of Water
Measurement
Remarks
Internal Waters
Within the baselines
Territorial Sea
Water outside the baseline, extending up to 12 n.m. from the baseline
Contiguous Zone
24 nautical miles from the baselines (or Not part of our territory but we up to 12 n.m. from the edge of the have the jurisdiction to enforce territorial sea) customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws therein
EEZ
200 n.m. from the baseline
Article 48 of UNCLOS III
We have here the right to exploit the living and non-living resources
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1. Three meanings of the word "People"
The word "people" is used in at least three senses in the Constitution: a. "People" as Inhabitants Art. XIII, Section 1. “The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.” Art. Section 15. “The State shall them.” protect and promote the right to health of the people and instillII,health consciousnes s among Section 16. “The State shall protect and advance theright of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Art. III, Section 2. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, xxx”
Rule: . The right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Qua C hee G an v Deport ation B oard, 9 S C R A 27 (1963), b. “People” as Citizens Preamble: “We, the sovereign Filipino people imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.” Art. II, Sec. 1. “The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.” Art. II, Sec. 4. “The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all "citizens" may be required to render personal military or civil service.” Art. III, Sec. 7. “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertinent to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizens subject to limitations provided by law.” c. “People” as Electors Art. VII, Sec. 4. “The President and Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people xxx.” Political Law 1
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Art. XVI, Sec. 2. “The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national
anthem, or a national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national referendum .” Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. “After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Congress requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting party.”
2. Citizenship
A. Who are citizens (Art IV) Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and80 4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
These citizens are classifiable into (i) natural-born citizens (covering nos. 1, 2, and 3) and (ii) naturalized citizens (covering no. 4). The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis (right of blood). Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli (right of the soil) which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community. 81 The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.82 Historical Background83
80
Under the 1935 Constitution- ARTICLE IV Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:… 4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution - ARTICLE III Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:.. 3 Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty -five. 81 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, 2009 Edition, p. 629. 82 id pp. 629-630 83 G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER
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There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; however, three royal decrees were indisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws. It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. (a) Persons born in Spanish territory, (b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain, (c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers, (d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact. The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. The Treaty came into effect on April 11, 1899 when the documents of ratification were exchanged. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry Political Law 1
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on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus – "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States. The term "Citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902 (enacted by the United States Congress on July 1, 1902), also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred andbetween ninety eight."
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. In 1912,Bill theofCongress to 23 theMarch Philippine 1902 - of the United States made the following amendment "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not Political Law 1
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come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 "That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto,and shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country. While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship "Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution "(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. "(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. "(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. "(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil provisions at the time, which provided automatically theirlaw Filipino citizenship and acquire that of that theirwomen foreignwould husbands, resultedlose in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Political Law 1
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Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns "Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines: "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. "(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. "(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five. "(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that – "A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution. Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides: "The following are citizens of the Philippines: "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. "(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. "(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and "(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Case: On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President84 of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the then forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
84
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No person may be elected President unless he is a n aturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election”
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Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that – 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; 2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; 3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and 5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The certificate Lorenzo Pou wouldItindicate that he on 11 that September theborn age of 84death years, in San of Carlos, Pangasinan. could thus be died assumed Lorenzo1954, Pou at was sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.85 Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo (20 SCRA 562, Paa vs. Chan 21 SCRA 753) Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him. The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There
85
Note Philippine Bill of 1902 – “ that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands”
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utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided. In Sum - In ascertaining whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. 1. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been place of residence death, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en massehisFilipinization" that thebefore Philippine Billsuch had that effected in 1902. 2. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. 3. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the foregoing action. G .R . No. 1614 34 March 3, 2004 MAR IA J E A NE TTE C . TE C S ON and FE LIX B . DE S ID E R IO, J R . vs.The COMMISSION ON EL EC TION S, R ONALD ALLA N K EL LY P OE (a .k. a. FER NANDO POE, J R .) and VICTORINO X . FORNIER
Citizenship Proceedings and Res Adjudicata86 In Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration SCRA that: 292 [1971]) in Lee vs.Moy Commissioner of Immigration, this Court (41 declared “Everyand time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.”
Exception;
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz: “We declare it to be a sound rule that
1. where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, 2. after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and 86
A rule that a final judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to a suit
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3. this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by the Supreme Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.”
Some cases: Rule: Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Indeed, if the issue of one’s citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not be precluded from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has
never been threshed out by any tribunal. Citizenship proceedings, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: 1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party; 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court. One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus
soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We agree. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s citizenship.
However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right Political Law 1
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appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. 598 S C R A 266 S eptember 4, 2009 GO S R . vs. RAMOS
Rule : We agree with petitioners that the issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not
attained finality. In Go v. Ramos, the Court ruled that citizenship proceedings are a class of its own and can be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: 1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party; 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing the findings of the BI. Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. G .R . No. 169958 March 5, 2010 G ONZAL E Z vs. PENNISI*
B. Election of Philippine Citizenship The following are citizens of the Philippines xxx "(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution) COMM ONWEA LTH AC T No . 625 - AN AC T PR OVIDING THE MANNE R IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT PHI LIPPIN E C ITIZENSHIP SHALL B E DE CLAR ED B Y A PER SON WH OSE MOTHER IS A F ILIPINO CITIZ EN Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), section 1, Article IV, of the (1935) Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein authorized before any officer of the Government of the United States authorized to administer oaths, and he shall forward such statement together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of Manila.
(A pprove d, J une 7, 194 1.)
Note: The right of election permitted under the 1987 Constitution is available only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, had that charter not been changed, would have been able to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining majority age. That right is retained for them under Article IV, Section 1 Political Law 1
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(3). Obviously, election is not necessary in the case of the child to a Filipino mother under the present constitution as she would be considered a Filipino citizen at birth. Case: : Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. On July 17, 1998, Ching after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a resolution of this Court, he was allowed to take the Bar, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. Ching passed the bar but because of his questionable citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath.
Issue : Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Sec. 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. (Ching has inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority.) CA No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election. However, the 1935 Constitution and CA No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made...Jurisprudence dictates that this must be done within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of majority . In Cuenco v. Sec. of Justice87 It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that 3 years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. (In Cuenco, petitioner was allowed to elect 7 years after attaining the age of majority.) The span of fourteen years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing “upon reaching the age of majority. Moreov er, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. B A R MATTE R No. 91 4 Oct ober 1, 1999
RE : AP PLICATIO N FOR ADMISSION T O TH E P HILI PPINE B AR , VI CENTE D. CHIN G
Case: The case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933. Therein, among others, she claims that her nationality was entered in her records as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
87
G.R. No. L-18069 May 26, 1962
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The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
Rule: Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate considering that her father and Filipino motherrequirements were never married. As such, she was child, not required to comply withChinese said constitutional and statutory to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. G .R . No. 1 53883 J anuary 13, 2 004 R E PUB LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , vs. CHULE Y . LIM
Case : Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
Rule: We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners’ case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. is only means of confirming 183133 J ulyIt26, 20 10aMA vs. FER NANDEZ , Jthe R . fact that citizenship has been claimed. G.R. No.
Case : Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine Political Law 1
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citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
Rule :
As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial declara tion of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: xxxx (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless
upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate childrenoffollow the citizenship of her the nationality. father and An thatillegitimate illegitimatechild children are under parental authority the mother and follow of Filipina need the not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered
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a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. Furthermore, election of Philippine accepted registration under C.A.Alien No. 625 unless thenoparty exercising the rightcitizenship of electionshall has be complied withforthe requirements of the Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records indisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiance
suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. G.R. No. 187567 February 15, 2012 The Republic of the Philippines
vs. Nora Fe S ag un
C. Natural Born Citizens Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Section 1, “3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;” (Art IV)
What offices under the Constitution require the official to be “Natural Born”?
1. President
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Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. (Art VII)
2. Vice –President – Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. (Art VII)
3. Members of Congress – Section 3. No person shall be unless years he is aofnatural-born of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is ata Senator least thirty-five age, able tocitizen read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. (Art VI) Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Art VII)
4. Justices of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts – Section 7. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (VIII)
Case: Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong (as as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court) through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and
his mother was also Chinese. Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Rule: It is clear, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, asmade petitioners correctly submit, substantial correction in an entry in a civil register can be without a judicial order,no and, under thechange law, a or change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, this Court held that:
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Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. G .R . No. 177721
J uly 3, 2007 K IL OS B AYAN FOUNDA TION AND B ANTAY K ATA R UNG AN FOUNDATION, vs . EXECU TIVE SE CRE TARY E DUARDO R. ER MITA; SA NDIGANBAYA N JUSTI CE G RE GORY S. ONG
5. Ombudsman and his deputies – Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (Art XI)
6. Constitutional Commission Members – Section 1. The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. (Art IX-B) Section 1. There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Art IX –C) Section 1. There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession. (Art IX-D)
7. Central Monetary Authority Members – Section 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose governing boardofmust natural-born citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority whombeshall come fromFilipino the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be provided by law Political Law 1
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over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions. (Art XII)
8. Commission on Human Rights Members – Section 17. The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law. (Art XIII)
Case : Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares Grace Poe was a main contender in the 2016 Presidential elections. This case intended to clarify her citizenship qualification, among others. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner’s name be changed from “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar” to “Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616 On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony. On 18 October 2001, petitioner became 2001. a naturalized American citizen.14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father’s candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father’s deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father’s funeral
arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there. On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on Political Law 1
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10 July 2006. As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner’s petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner’s name and in the na mes of her three (3) children. Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006. She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport. On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said stopped affidavit using to the BI took herpassport oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner herand American On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an “Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a Certificate “ of Loss of Nationality of the United States”effective 21 October 2010. On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections.56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen.
Rule : There is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner ’s parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos. The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 12888: The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975 is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face. There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos . The Court, quotes the Solicitor General; To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust . It just doesn’t make 88
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters – Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no¬existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
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any sense. Given the statistical certainty – 99.9% – that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. During on this provision, Rafolsofpresented an amendment to of include as Filipino citizensthe thedebates illegitimate children with aDelegate foreign father a mother who was a citizen the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment. We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the “State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,” Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to “give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x” and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the “right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.” Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status. Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad. Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02 -6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all ngs as among Filipino children who may be expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundli adopted. Under Article IV, Section 2 “Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” In therstfi place, “having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this
instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the Political Law 1
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parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principlesRelating of international law. The first is Article of thewhich 1930a Hague Convention on Certain Questions to the Conflict of Nationality Laws14under foundling is presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth.
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 “United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness” merely “gives effect” to
Article 15(1) of the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the “International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.” Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a “generally accepted principle of international law.”Razon
v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States. Petitioner’s evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found. Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court’s Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to “Filipino children.” In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who
could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption
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that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty. In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General’s warning in his opening statement is relevant: …the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or toAR accord second-class March 2 016 NATIVID aAD nd S . POE LLAMANZ ES v them CO MMISSION O Ncitizenship. ELECTION GS RA 221697 ND ESTRE LLA8C. ELAMPARO GR 21698-700 NA TIVID AD S. POE -LLAMA NZA R E S v C OMMI S S ION ON ELE C TIONS , FR ANC IS C O S . TA TA D, A NTONIO P. CONTR E R AS AND AMA DO D. V A LDE Z
D. Naturalized Citizens Among those listed in the 1987 Constitution as citizens are those who are Filipinos by naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a citizen. Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of thethe disqualifications required by law, the courtthereof may order the issuance of proper naturalization certificate and competent the registration in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and issue a certificate of naturalization. In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation. A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is found under Section 15 of CA 473, is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. 1. ACT NO. 9139 June 08, 2001 - "The Administrative Naturalization Law of REPUBLIC 2000"
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Under RA 9139, Aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings subject to certain requirements dictated by national security and interest.
Qualifications. (a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth; (b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition; (c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is living; (d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or private educational institution duly recognized by the Department of Education, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools; (e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship; (f) The applicant Philippines; and must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the (g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
The following are NOT QUALIFIED to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act: (a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; (b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas; (c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; Political Law 1
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(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos; (g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and (h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. 2. COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473 - "Revised Naturalization Law." Any person having the following QUALIFICATIONS may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization: a. AGE: age of majority in the country - He must be of majority age on the day of the hearing of the petition89;
b. RESIDENCE: 10 years, 5 years in certain cases - He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years. The ten years of continuous residence required shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the following qualifications: o
o
o
Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof; Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines; Being married to a Filipino woman90;
89
CA 473, Sec.2; RA 6809, amending Art. 234 of the Family Code making 18 the majority age. Effective December 18, 1989 90 If it were an alien woman who married a Filipino man, she would only need an administrative proceeding for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration, upon proof of marriage and according to the holding in Moy Yam Lim, proof of non-disqualification. These are the only requirements because ipso facto, she became a Filipino herself by marriage. Accordingly, thus; “Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition”. G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971 MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
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o
Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years; Having been born in the Philippines. (refer also to REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139
June 08, 2001, "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000" as earlier stated) c. CHARACTER: good moral character and the usual disqualifications as provided for by law: polygamy, bigamy, and violence for overthrow of government He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. d. PROPERTY: He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Rule: Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support
in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the
object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to livethe with reasonable comfort, in accordance withofthe standard of living, and consistently with demands of human dignity, at this stage ourprevailing civilization." Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should not be includedin the assessment. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial "for under the lawhe t petitioner should be the one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation’ to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant’s qualifications
must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition. G.R. No. 175430 June 18, 2012
RE PUBLIC OF T HE PHILI PPINES vs. KE R RY LAO O NG
e. EDUCATION: education requirement is not with respect to the petitioner alone, but also to his minor children. With respect to the petitioner, it only refers to the language requirement, that he must have known and spoken any of the Philippine languages. With respect to the children, they must have to study in Philippine schools, not solely for the foreigners and for the grade schools – must teach Phil. government and Constitution.
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He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish 91 and any one of the principal Philippine languages; and He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Who are DISQUALIFIED? - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos; Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war; Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Case: Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under C.A.No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law with the RTC. During the hearings, petitioner testified to prove his compliance with all the requirements for naturalization and presented, as witnesses, Dr. Joseph Anlacan, Dr. Edward C. Tordesillas, Silvino J. Ong, Teresita M. Go ,and Juan C. Go.
91
The language requirement now is the applicant must be able to speak and write Filipino or E nglish and any Philippine dialect. Art XIV, Section 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched on the basis of e xisting Philippine and other languages. Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the educational system.
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Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he conducted on petitioner, he had no psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test. Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that petitioner’s medical examination results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioner’s family, stated that
being their neighbor in Sto. Cristo Street, he had known petitioner since childhood through his association with the family in times of celebration. Teresita claimed that she had personally known petitioner since birth because he was the son of her brother-in-law. She described him as a peaceloving person who participated in activities sponsored by his school and the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner personally and that he had executed an Affidavit of Support in his favor. After trial was conducted, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization ruling that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth by law. Among these were petitioner’s lack
of a derogatory record, his support for an organized government, his being in perfect health, his mingling withRTC Filipinos sincefound birth and ability to presented speak theirconvincing language, and his being lawwas abiding citizen. The likewise thathis petitioner evidence thatahe not disqualified for naturalization as provided for under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. On appeal to the CA, the OSG raised the following arguments: - Petitioner failed to prove that his witnesses were credible; - Petitioner’s character witnesses failed to prove that he had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the grant of Philippine citizenship; and - Failure to state all former places of residence was fatal to petitioner’s application for naturalization. In its assailed decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed, without prejudice, the petition for naturalization. According to the CA, while there was sufficient evidence from which petitioner’s ability to write English or any of the principal Philippine languages, may be
inferred, he failed to adduce evidence to prove that his witnesses were credible. He was not able to prove that the persons he presented in court had good standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word could be taken at face value, as a good warranty of his worthiness.
Rule: In judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and formal compliance with
C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations92. In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines,93 the Court listed the requirements for character witnesses, namely: 1. That they are citizens of the Philippines; 2. That they are "credible persons"; 3. That they personally know the petitioner; 4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by law; 5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute; 6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable; 7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines; 8. That he "isand not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law. 92 93
Section 7. Petition for citizenship 103 Phil. 964 (1958). 111 Phil. 211(1961).
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In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a witness, for purposes of naturalization, must be a "credible" person as he becomes an insurer of the character of the candidate. The "law requires that a vouching witness should have actually known an applicant for whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein to give him the necessary competence to act as such. The reason behind this requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the character of petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled to rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative that he be competent and reliable. And he is only competent to testify on his conduct, character and moral fitness if he has had the opportunity to observe him personally, if not intimately, during the period he has allegedly known him."94 The law, in effect, requires that the character witnesses be not mere ordinary acquaintances of the applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to be competent to testify of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of the requisite qualifications and none of the statutory disqualifications. The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioner’s witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence proving that the persons he presented were credible. While there is no showing that petitioner’s witnesses were of doubtful moral inclinations, there was likewise no indication that
they were persons whose qualifications were at par with the requirements of the law on naturalization. Simply put, no evidence was ever proffered to prove the witnesses’ good standing in the community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a consequence, their statements about the petitioner do not possess the measure of "credibility" demanded of in naturalization cases. This lack of "credibility" on the part of the witnesses, unfortunately, weakens or renders futile petitioner’s claim of worthiness. Further, petitioner’s witnesses only averred general statements without specifying acts or events that . would exhibit petitioner’s traits worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding that the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses only
proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos. While almost all of the witnesses testified that they knew petitioner since birth and that they had interacted with petitioner’s family in times of celebration,
this did not satisfy the other requirements set by law, that is, a genuine desire to learn and embrace the Filipino ideals and traditions. Besides, both the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt on petitioner’s alleged social interaction with Filipinos. The background checks done on petitioner yielded negative results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members of his household. In fact, petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents. To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals. Finally, it is noteworthy that the OSG was correct in arguing that petitioner's failure to state his former residence in the petition was fatal to his application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Differently stated, the inclusion of present and former places of residence in the petition is a jurisdictional requirement, without which the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial G .R. No. 202809 J uly 2, 2014 DE NNIS L. G O vs. R E PUB LIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Procedure: a. Declaration of intention filed with the OSG one year before actual application. 94
Lim Ching Tian v. Republic
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DECLARATION OF INTENTION: One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the (Office of the Solicitor General) a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines95
b. Filing of petition96 for naturalization with the RTC of the province in which the applicant is a resident for at least one year97. c. Hearing, except within 30 days before an election. The State is represented by the Solicitor General or by the fiscal in his behalf. Two witnesses to testify on the character of the applicant are presented. d. Decision. Appeal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court may be made to the Court of Appeals (Under BP 129). e. Decision becomes final but not executory, thirty (30) days after notice of the decision is received by the parties. The notice of the decision must be received by the OSG; copy furnished to the fiscal is not sufficient to start the running of the 30day period. A favorable decision becomes executory only after 2 years from the finality of the decision. It shall become executory only after the period of 2 years during which the petitioner shall continue to be under probation, as it were, so the government can be doubly sure he is entitled to be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines. (Republic Act 530, Section 1) Sec. 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship shall be by heard courts aftergranting six months from the publication of the application required law,by northe shall any until decision the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.98
95
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually n aturalized. 96 Section 7 97 Section 8 98 Republic Act No. 530 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 - AN A CT MAKING ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR NATURALIZATION
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f. Summary hearing after two years, which is really a continuation of the previous proceedings, to prove that: i) He did not leave the country during the 2-year period of probation; ii) He devoted himself to lawful calling; iii) He was not convicted of any offense of violation of government rules. iv) He did not commit an act prejudicial to national interest or inimical to a government announced policy. g. Oath before the Regional Trial Court. h. Issuance of a Certificate of Naturalization issued by the Court. (Only a certification is given because the decision two years before has granted him his citizenship.) i. Cancellation of ACR before the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Effect of Naturalization on the Wife
Rule: "It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family." It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests in property and business activities reserved law to citizens should not her formown partefforts of thebut conjugal and be denied to the wife, nor thatby she herself cannot, through for thepartnership benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. G .R. No. 18 3110 October 7, 20 13 RE PUB LIC OF THE PHILIP PINE S vs.
AZUCE NA S AA VE DR A B A TUG A S
If the wife is (i) legally married to the naturalized husband, and (ii) she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications in Sec. 4, she is entitled to be declared a citizen as well. What is required is only an administrative proceeding before the Bureau of Immigration for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration on the ground that her husband has been recently naturalized. According to Moya Lim Yao vs. The Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292) ruling, she need not prove the qualifications, but only that she is not disqualified. The proceedings may even be with the Department of Natural Resources in relation to a grant of concession requiring citizenship, where the wife proves that her husband has become a Filipino. "Derivative Naturalization” -In its latest pronouncement on this question, the Supreme Court held that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" should be interpreted to mean only that the alien woman must not be laboring under any of the disqualifications prescribed by law. Moreover, she can establish her claim Political Law 1
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to Philippine citizenship in administrative proceedings before the immigration authorities only and will not have to file a judicial action for this purpose. She is no longer required to prove that she possesses the qualifications for naturalization. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.99
Effect of Naturalization on the Children Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof. A foreign born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age. A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parents, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the Philippine Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance. Hence, to simplify the effect of naturalization on the children; I. If the child is of age, no effect. II. If the child is a minor: A. If born inofthe Philippines - automatically becomes a citizen upon the naturalization the father.
99
G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013 REPUBLI C OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS
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B. If born abroad 1. If before the naturalization of the father. a. If residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization - automatically becomes a citizen. b. If not residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization --- considered citizen only during his minority, unless he takes permanent residence in the Philippines before reaching majority age. In other words, he continues to be a Filipino after reaching 18 years old only if he decides to reside here permanently before reaching that age. 2. If after the naturalization of the father - Considered citizen on the condition that upon reaching the age of majority, he takes an oath of allegiance in the Philippine consulate of the place where he may be. If he fails to register his intent to continue as Filipino within one (1) year upon reaching 21 years, he ceases to be a Filipino citizen. DENATURALIZATION Com. Act No. 473, Sec. 18 Section 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificate issued.-- Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Registry: (a) If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally; (b) If the person naturalized shall, within the five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, that the fact of the person naturalized remaining for more than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up permanent residence in the same; (c) If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention; (d) If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private high schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree cancelling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Office of the President and the Solicitor-General; Political Law 1
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Not when they dropped out because of scholastic performance (e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the Constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship, as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. Procedure: Filed by the Solicitor General before the same Regional Trial Court that granted his naturalization, regardless of where he may be residing at that time. BURDEN OF PROOF Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the government’s favor and against the
applicant. (Republic v. Hong, 520 Phil. 276, 285 (2006); Ong Chia v. Republic, 385 Phil. 487, 498 (2000).) The applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance with the requirements of law.(Republic v. Hong,520 Phil. 276, 285 (2006); Tiu v. Republic, 158 Phil. 1137, 1138 (1974); Que Tiac v. Republic, 150 Phil. 68, 86 (1972).) Rule : The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest
public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law. G .R . No. 175430 J une 18, 2012 RE PUB LIC OF
THE PHILIPPIN ES , vs. KER RY LAO ON G
Rule: In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and requirements. G .R . No. 1 97450 March 20, 2 013 R E PUB LIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE KENG 3. Loss of and re-acquisition of Citizenship
Under the 1987 Constitution Article IV, Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. Article IV, Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.
Under the law Republic Act No. 9225 "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."-
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Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: "I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizen of the Philippines. Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, that they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
Case: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225. Petitioner avers that it is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Political Law 1
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Rule: From the excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting stillnot hasconcerned to enact the oncitizenship dual allegiance. Sections and 3 of Rep. Actprovision. No. 9225,The the legislature framers were withlaw dual per se,Inbut with the2 status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of srcin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. G.R. No. 160869
May 11, 2007 AAS J S (A DV OC ATE S AND A DHE R E NTS OF S OC IA L J US TICE FOR S C HOOL TEACHER S AND ALLIED WO RK ER S) M EMBE R - H EC TOR G UMANGA N CALILU NG, vs. THE HONOR A B LE S IMEON DA TUMAN ONG , in his official capacity a s the S ecretary of J ustice
Case : Petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions…
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not
enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before public officer authorized to provision administerofan oath. that will show that any respondent complied with the R.A. No.There 9225.is no evidence presented While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. G.R. No. 182701 July Political Law 1
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23, 2008 E US E B IO E UG E NIO K . LOP E Z vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA Case: Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. Subsequently, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. –Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: xxxx (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In his Answer dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship. The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
Rule : This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified. Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens or of aretain foreign must take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire theircountry, Philippine citizenship: By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might Political Law 1
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arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. G .R . No. 17 9848
November 27, 2008 NE S TOR A. J A COT vs. ROG EN T. DAL a nd COM MISS ION ON ELE CTIONS Case : Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. Private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Mercado v. Manzano, that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
Rule : We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship. R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Contrary to petitioner’s claims,the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a
renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements. Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, the Court ruled that a candidate’s oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the Political Law 1
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requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. G .R . No. 180 048 J une 19, 2009 R OS E LLE R DE G UZMA N vs. COMM ISS ION O N ELE CTIONS a nd ANGE LINA DG . DELA CRUZ
Case : The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents in 1944. In 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in 2005. In 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued in, 2006 an order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. The petitioner ran for Vice-Mayor in Caba, La Union and obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Soon thereafter, private respondents all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
Rule : Under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. The year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office. G .R . No. 1 98742 A ugus t
10, 2012 TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. B AUTISTA, ROB EL ITO V. PICAR and WILM A P. PA GA DUA a. Loss of Citizenship
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 63 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED100 A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: 100
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost
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(1) By naturalization in a foreign country; Read: G .R. No. 167824 J uly 2, 2010 GE R AL DINE G AW G UY and G R AC E G UY CHE U vs. AL VIN AG US TIN T. IG NA CIO
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship or expatriation; Expatriation is a constitutional right (Go Gullian v Government). No one can be compelled to remain a Filipino if he does not want to. Case : Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before proper consular officer. Despite hisinnaturalization as a Philippine citizen in 1978, hethe applied forPortuguese and was issued a Portuguese passport 1981. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.
Rule : The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioner vs Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Yu, with full knowledge and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. Yu v Defe nsor-San tiago (169 SC R A 364)
Case: Emelito Osmena ran for Governor of Cebu in the Jan. 18, 1988 elections. Aznar as Cebu Chairman of LDP-Laban filed with COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmena on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a US citizen, as evidenced by Osmena's application for his alien certificate of registration, permit to re-enter the Philippines, immigration certificate of clearance etc. Osmena on the other hand maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio Osmena, that he is a holder of a valid Phil passport, that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth & has not gone out of the country for more than 6 months and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. The Comelec decided for Osmena.
Rule: Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Fromby theany evidence, it is mentioned clear that private respondent not of lose his Philippine citizenship of the three hereinabove or by Osmeña any otherdid mode losing Philippine citizenship.
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In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo) Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied". Aznar v Os mena,
COME LE C, 185 S CR A 703 (M ay 1990)
Rule: An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a Filipino citizen. It is obtained only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains a declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and physical details that identify the applicant. It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.
Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less like other public recordsthat referred 23, Ruleof 132, alien certificate of registration is not a public document wouldtobeunder primaSection facie evidence thean truth of facts contained therein. On its face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to registration. Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. This is especially so where the declarant has in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her status as such. Political Law 1
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Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her srcinal
citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 RENALD F. VILANDO vs.
HOU SE OF RE PR ES ENTATIV ES E LECTORA L TR IBUNAL, J OCELYN SY LIM KA ICHO NG AND HON. SPE AK ER PR OSPER O NOGR ALES
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country upon reaching the age of majority; Provided, however, that a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Philippines is at war with any country. Case: Appellant Pedro Manayao together with others were charged with the high crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court.. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay fine and indemnity of to the heirs of each of the victims In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason.
Rule: It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him from punishment. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service.. G .R. No. L- 322 Jul y 28, 1947 THE PE OPLE OF THE P HILIPP INES
PEDR O MANAYA O, ET AL., PEDRO MAN AYA O
vs.
(4) By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present: (a) The Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or (b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine territory with the consent of the Philippines; Provided that the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed Political Law 1
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forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen; (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; (6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; (7) (Under the Art. IV, Sec. 4. 1987 Constitution) Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens, who by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced their Philippine citizenship. Note:
Art. XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. b. Reacquisition Modes of re-acquiring Philippine Citizenship
(1) Naturalization (CA 63, now CA 473) (2) Repatriation REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: provided, that the applicant is not a: (1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government; (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas; (3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. Political Law 1
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Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) Legislative Act - Which is both a mode of acquiring and reacquiring citizenship. Some Cases: Case : Three petitions involving the same issues and parties were consolidated. Said cases
questioned the readmission of Juan Frivaldo as a Filipino citizen under CA 63 or the Revised Naturalization Law as amended by CA 473. Frivaldo became a US citizen allegedly due to the pressure from the Marcos regime. He came back here, ran for Governor of Sorsogon and won.
Rule : DISQUALIFIED. Frivaldo must vacate his office and surrender the same to the Vice- Governor. A former citizen who opts to reacquire Philippine citizenship through naturalization under CA 63 is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by said law, and it is not for him to decide and select the requirements which he believes are inconvenient. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never a citizen. Failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the law rendered null and void the proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken. The Trial Court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. Under the law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, the publication and the posting must be in its full text for the Court to acquire jurisdiction. The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations under Secs. 2 and 6 of the law: (1) that petitioner is of good moral character; (2) he resided continuously in the Phil. for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) he will reside continuously in the Phil. from date of filing of petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition. A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from promulgation, counted from the date of receipt by the OSG of his copy of the decision. Sec. 1 of RA 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after 2 years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if the applicant has: (1) not left the country; (2) dedicated himself continuously to lawful calling; (3) not been convicted of any offense or for violation of government promulgated rules; (4) not committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.
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The proceedings in the Trial Court were marred by irregularities. The hearing was set ahead of the scheduled date upon request of Frivaldo so he could catch up with the last day for filing his certificate of candidacy, without publication; the petition was heard within 6 months from last publication; Frivaldo was allowed to take his oath of allegiance even before the finality of judgment and without waiting for the 2 year waiting period. G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994 REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILI PPINES vs. HO N. ROS ALIO G. DE LA R OSA, PRE SIDING JUDGE OF THE RE TRIA L COURT, BR ANCH 28 , MANILA an d JUAN G . FRIVA LDO
GIONAL
Rule: In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registrat ion,
and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been include d as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that
respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. G.R. No. 137000 Aug us t 9, 2000 C IR IL O R . VA LLE S vs . COMMIS S IO N ON ELE CTIONS and R OS ALIND YB A S CO LOPEZ
Case : Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630101. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Issue : Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
101
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
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Rule : The petition is without merit. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are
those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. In Angat v. Republic, we held: xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the srcinal. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the srcinal nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was srcinally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In respondent Cruz'sStates. case, he lost hishe Filipino citizenship when hePhilippine rendered citizenship service in the Armed Forces of the United However, subsequently reacquired under R.A. No. 2630, to wit;
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Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his srcinal status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his srcinal status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. The term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows: Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship. The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not naturalborn citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. G .R . No. 14 2840
May 7, 2001 ANTONIO B E NG S ON III, vs . HOUS E OF R E PR E S E NTA TIVE S E LE CTO R AL TR IB UNAL a nd TEODOR O C. CR UZ Case: Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his
citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act Political Law 1
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No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630. The court ruled in its favor and as such the petitioner was ordered to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A 8171. Finding merit in the Motion of the OSG, the court subsequently, set aside its orders and the herein petition was ordered DISMISSED
Rule: The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's order was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account or political or economic necessity Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. Parenthetically, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. G .R . No. 132244 Sept ember 14, 1999 GE R AR DO A NG AT
vs .RE PUBLIC OF T HE PHILIPPIN ES
Case : Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? He does not. To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born means that if a parent who hadunder renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or Filipinos. economicThis reasons later decides to repatriate RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship Political Law 1
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and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his paren t’s and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation. In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, G.R.
No. 125793 August 2 9, 2006 JOE VANIE AR ELLA NO TAB AS A, vs. HON. COU R T OF APP EA LS , B URE AU OF IMM IGR ATION a nd DEP ORTA TIO N and WILSON S OLU R EN 4. Dual Citizenship
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. (Art XVI, 1987 Constitution) Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: xxx (d) Those with dual citizenship; (Republic Act No. 7160 October 10, 1991 – Local Government Code)
Case: The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under Section 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously Political Law 1
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considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of srcin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. .R . No. 135083 MayON 26,E1999 E R NE S TO S . ME R CA DO vs. EDU ARDO BAR RIOS MA NZA NO andGthe COMMIS S ION LE C TIONS
Case: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Rule: What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of srcin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. G.R. No. 160869
May 11, 2007 AAS J S (A DV OC ATE S AND A DHE R E NTS OF S OC IA L J US TICE FOR S C HOOL TEACHER S AND ALLIED WO RK ER S) M EMBE R - H EC TOR G UMANGA N CALILU NG, vs. THE HONOR A B LE S IMEON D ATUMANON G , in his officia l capacity a s the S ecretary of Jus tice D. Sovereignty
“Sovereignty” is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by
which it is governed. There are two kinds of sovereignty; 1. Legal sovereignty - the authority or the power to issue final commands.
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2. Political sovereignty - is the power behind the legal sovereign, or the sum total of the influences that operate upon it. Sovereignty may also be; 1. Internal sovereignty refers to the power of the State to control its domestic affairs. 2. External sovereignty, which is the power of the State to direct its relations with other States, is also known as independence. xxx" (Cruz.) "The supreme power of the State to govern persons and things within its territory” and “AUTO LIMITATION”.
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty. It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. 102 That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction."103 A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.
Dominium and Imperium
"Imperium refers to the State's authority to govern. It covers such activities as passing laws governing a territory, maintaining peace and order over it, and defending it against foreign invasion. When the State act in this capacity jure imperii, it generally enjoys sovereign immunity. This governmental function includes services that only the government does, such as restaurant inspection, animal control, health and safety permits and licenses, sanitation, , and related functions.
102
G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969 WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent 103 Jellinek as quoted in Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty, p. 35 (1937).
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Dominium refers to the capacity of the State to own property. It covers such rights
as title to land, exploitation and use of it, and disposition or sale of the same. The Regalian doctrine whereby all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and anyone claiming title has the burden to show ownership, comes within this concept. In this capacity jure gestium, the State descends to the status of ordinary persons and thus becomes liable as such." (Mendoza notes.) A proprietary function is one that a private entity can perform, and is not uniquely for the benefit of the general public. Rule: As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the the concept of further. sovereignty, and itscomes capacity to own acquireofproperty, is not inappropriate to pursue matter The former under the or heading imperiumit and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium." As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine srcin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown...." That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972 PEDRO LEE HONG HOK vs.
ANI ANO DA VID
1. Sovereign Immunity a. Basis
Constitutional Support - ARTICLE XVI, Section 3. “The State may not be sued without itsconsent104”
Theoretical support105– (Positivist and Sociological): The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution. It is as well a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.106 It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and 104
The constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty . G.R. No. 186192 August 25, 2010 THE HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN AND ROMANA vs. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE 105 G.R. No. 155504 June 26, 2009 PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC., vs. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 106 Positivist theory
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dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government.107
Case : On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued dated June 26, 1969, .... On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, especially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Controller,..." . The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: " Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.
Rule : It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable it must be so. In the classic formulation Holmes: sovereign is exempt from suit, not becausewhy of any formal conception or obsolete theory,ofbut on the"A logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined." "The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversionof public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law."Republic
v. Villa s or, 54 S CR A 83 (1973 .) 107
Sociological Theory
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Availability to foreign States Rule : In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal) G .R. No.
108813 December 15, 1994 JUS MAG P HILIPP INES , vs. THE NA TIONAL LA B OR R E LA TIONS COMM IS SION (S econd Divis ion) and FLOR E NCIO S AC R AME NTO, U nion Pre siden t, J PFC E A
Rule: As things stand in the international sphere, the immunity of the state (and by extension, its agents, in the performance of their governmental functions Jure imperii) must stand against even serious violations of international law, including breaches of international environmental law (which is an aspect of human rights law as well). The ICJ concluded that x x x [U]nder customary international law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of armed conflict. In reaching that conclusion, the Court must emphasize that it is addressing only the immunity of the State itself from the jurisdiction of the courts of other States; the question of whether, and if so to what extent, immunity might apply in criminal proceedings against an official present case. This does not mean that the act of the state is to be considered lawful. However, this also does not mean that state immunity is waived in the context of an international breach of even a jus cogens108 norm, as explained in this manner: The rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They do not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful. That is why the application of the contemporary law of State immunity to proceedings concerning events which occurred in 1943-1945 does not infringe the principle that law should not be applied retrospectively to determine matters of legality and responsibility (as the Court has explained in paragraph 58 above). For the same reason, recognizing the immunity of a foreign State in accordance with customary international law does not amount to recognizing as lawful a situation created by the breach of a jus cogens rule, or rendering aid and assistance in maintaining that situation, and so cannot contravene the principle in Article 41 of the International Law ICTIONAL ARGUMENTS Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. CONCLUSION OF JURISD AND IMMUNITY. What the Court is left to work with is a process by which jurisdiction and immunity can be determined by answering several questions, summated thusly:
108
Jus cogens (from Latin: compelling law; English: peremptory norm) refers to certain fundamental, overriding principles of international law, from which no derogation is ever permitted. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed., Oxford, 1998). That body of peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted; those norms recognized by the international community as a whole as being fundamental to the maintenance of an international legal order. Elementary rules that concern the safeguarding of peace and notably those that prohibit recourse to force or the threat of force. Norms of a humanitarian nature are included, such as prohibitions against Genocide, Slavery, and racial discrimination. Jus cogens may, therefore, operate to invalidate a treaty or agreement between states to the extent of the inconsistency with any such principles or norms.
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1. Is the act of the foreign national or entity an act Jure imperii, such that it can be considered an act of state entitled to immunity, or an actjure gestionis, in which case it is to be considered a private act? 2. In respect of the above question, has the executive branch, in the exercise of its political power, determined whether absolute diplomatic immunity is applicable? 3. If it is an actjure imperii and thus entitled to sovereign immunity, does an exception apply to withdraw the immunity privilege of such acts? G .R . No. 2065 10 Sept ember 16, 201 4 MOST R E V. PEDRO D. ARIGO vs. S COTT H. S WIFT
b. When is a suit against the State? Regardless of who is named as the defendant, when it produces adverse consequences to the public treasury in terms of disbursement of public funds and loss of government property. It cannot prosper unless the State has given its consent. Case : PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated contract with PROVI. On December
29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed and executed their "Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID Card Issuance" (the Contract Agreement) for the provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVC cards. According to PROVI, it delivered the items subject to the agreement to TESDA. PROVI alleged that out of TESDA’s liability of P39,475,000.00, TESDA paid PROVI only P3,739,500.00, leaving an outstanding balance of P35,735,500.00, as evidenced by PROVI’s
Statement of Account. Despite the two demand letters dated March 8 and April 27, 2001 that PROVI sent TESDA, the outstanding balance remained unpaid. PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA. The RTC granted PROVI’s prayer and issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of TESDA not exempt from execution in the amount of P35,000,000.00. TESDA responded on July 24, 2001 by filing a Motion to Discharge/Quash the Writ of Attachment, arguing mainly that public funds cannot be the subject of garnishment. The RTC denied TESDA’s motio n. Faced with these rulings, TESDA filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to question the RTC orders. The CA set aside the RTC’s
orders
Rule: TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental functions. Its funds are public in character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment. Under these terms, both constitutional and statutory, we do not believe that the role and status of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman, for the performance of governmental functions – i.e., the handling of formal and non-formal education and training, and skills development. As an unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it. TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution. It is as well a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the Political Law 1
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practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: 1. a suit against the Republic by name; 2. a suit against an unincorporated government agency; 3. a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agency’s performance of governmental functions; 4. and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government agency covered by its own charter. As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies – i.e., the public policy reason that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions. In Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, we said: [A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known on the part of our against people to gosuits, to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time andpropensity energy required to defend law in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined. PROVI argues that TESDA can be sued because it has effectively waived its immunity when it entered into a contract with PROVI for a commercial purpose. The PVC cards purchased by TESDA from PROVI are meant to properly identify the trainees who passed TESDA’s National Skills Certification Program – the program that immediately serves TESDA’s mandated function of developing and establishing a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. How the mandated certification is to be done, however, lies within the discretion of TESDA as an incident of its mandated function, and is a properly delegated authority that this Court cannot inquire into, unless its exercise is attended by grave abuse of discretion. That TESDA sells the PVC cards to its trainees for a fee does not characterize the transaction as industrial or business; the sale, expressly authorized by the TESDA Act, cannot be considered separately from TESDA’s general governmental functions , as they are undertaken in the discharge of these functions. Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. G.R. No. 155504 June 26, 2009 PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC. vs . TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
AUTH OR ITY
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Case: Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land was being used as
part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office. They agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents’ affected portion for use of theLoakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had
been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
Issue : The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent.
Rule : An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business. ATO is an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been
rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008 abolished the ATO and established in its place the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP). Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP, including the power to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts of every class, kind and description, to construct, acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and lease personal and real properties, and to settle, under such terms and conditions most advantageous to it, any claim by or against it. With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP. G .R. No. 1 59402 Feb ruary 23 , 2011 AIR TRA NSP OR TATION OFFIC E , vs.
S POUS E S DA VID * E LIS E A R A MOS
Rule : This Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario (G.R. No. 101949, 1 December 1994), to wit:
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There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz (221 Phil. 179 -1985) The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. The parties executed the Contract Agreement for the purpose of constructing the Luzon Railways. The Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002 shows that CNMEG sought the construction of the Luzon Railways as a proprietary venture. Also, that CNMEG, and not the Chinese government, initiated the Northrail Project was confirmed. Thus, the desire of CNMEG to secure the Northrail Project was in the ordinary or regular course of its business as a global construction company. The implementation of the Northrail Project was intended to generate profit for CNMEG. The use of the term "state corporation" to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did s. not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latter’s sovereign function
G.R. No. 185572 February 7, 2012 CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GR OUP), v s. HON . CES AR D. SANTAM AR IA
Case: With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the National Parks Development Committee, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner terminated their verbal lease agreement with General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park.
The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner, GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent.
Rule: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for
acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state
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itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. The complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as of the NPDC, but did not categorically state that is being in that GE capacity. G.R. No.chairman 102667 February 23, 2000 AMADO J. LANSANG, vs.heCOU RT OFsued APPEALS, NERAL AS S E MB LY OF THE B LIND, INC ., and J OS E IG LE S IA S *
Case : A vehicle, was apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements. It was loaded with forest products Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.
Issue : Is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?
Rule : Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent. G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000 FELIPE
CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, , vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T.
B AB ALC ON, and CONSTANCIO AB UGANDA Rule : The suit is to the mind of this court a suit against the state. At times, it would be teasingly obvious, even from the moment of the filing of the complaint, that the suit is one against the State. A cursory examination of the caption of the complaint can sometimes betray such proscribed intent, as Political Law 1
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when the suit is directly initiated against the Republic of the Philippines, any foreign government, or an unincorporated government agency as the named respondents. In such cases, obviously there is need for immediate caution, although if it is somehow established that those respondents had given their consent to be sued, the suit may nonetheless prosper. The present action was denominated against Lichauco and the unknown awardee, Lichauco was identified in the complaint as "acting Secretary of the [DOTC]." The hornbo0ok rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his/her duties. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. G.R. No. 142362 May 3, 2006 PHILIPPINE AGILA
S ATE LLITE INC. and MIC HA E LC. U. DE G UZMA N vs . J OS E FINA TR INI DA D-LIC HA UC O Undersecretary for Communications, Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Case: On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued
Administrative Order No. 27, Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products On May 9, 2000 and May 29, 2000, respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Based on the schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of and release of the result of respondent’s request were due on September 2000, ethlast month of the quarter following the date of its filing. Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine . Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s request for inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. When the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies participated, submitting lower bid at P82.24 compared of to Cathay/YSS Laboratories’with bid respondent of P95.00 per unit. In the view, however, of the per non-unit, accreditation respondent’s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS. Respondent thus filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages Political Law 1
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Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion (motion to dismiss) praying for the outright dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. By Order of December 8, 2003, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Order. Hence, the instant petition for review which raises the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the denial of petitioners’
motion to dismiss.
Rule : The petition fails. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official
concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party. In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of the land. While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them. The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. Shauf v. Court of Appeals elucidates: It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al., ‘ Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional actthe or under an assumption of that authority which he not doesbenot have, is notitsa suit against the State within constitutional provision the State may sued without consent.’ The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
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Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of "illegal[ly] abus[ing] their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law" is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally. G.R.
No. 169304 March 13, 2007 THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. vs. PHIL. DAYRIT, USEC. MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ PHAR MAWEA LTH , INC. c. Consent to be Sued How consent is given.
1. Express consent: Generally: The consent to be sued, in order to be effective, must come from the
State, acting through a duly enacted statute. Waiver of state immunity can only be made by an act of legislative body. Rule : A contract entered into by the Rice and Corn Administration stipulating that in the event of
breach, action may be filed by the parties, cannot be the basis of a money claim against the RCA, a government entity under the Office of the President, since the RCA had no authority to bind the government to be sued. Only a statute could. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. “The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted
statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority. G.R . No. L36084 Aug us t 31, 1977 R E PUB LIC OF THE PHI LIP PINE S , vs. HONORABLE AMANTE P.
PURISIMA
Rule : The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued
under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the by other to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule,Not relied upon thecontracting NLRC andparty the and private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. Political Law 1
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In the Unites States of America vs. Ruiz, where the questioned transaction dealt with improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay, we held: The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary act ( jure gestionisis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe. xxx xxx xxx The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for not dedicated to commercial or business purposes. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus, in Carabao, Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission, we ruled: (C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed." When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus — The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted as appropriated by law.by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED G .R . No. 104269 November 11, 1993 DE PA R TME NT OF AG R IC ULTUR E , vs. THE NA TION AL LAB OR R EL ATIONS C OMMISS ION, e t al. Political Law 1
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1) Money claims arising from contracts, express or implied.
ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED Section 1. Complaint against Government. — Subject to the pr ovisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has presented his claim to the Insular Auditor and that the latter did not decide the same within two months from the date of its presentation. Sec. 3. Venue. — Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province were the claimant resides, at the option of the latter, upon which court exclusive srcinal jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions. Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both srcinal and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties. Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of srcinal jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between private parties. Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense, either himself or through delegates. Sec. 7. Execution. — No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government of which the Philippine undershall the provisions of this a copy thereof duly certified by the five clerkdays of the Court in judgmentIslands is rendered be transmitted byAct; suchbut clerk to the Governor-General, within after the same becomes final. Sec. 8. Transmittal of Decision. — The Governor-General, at the commencement of each regular session of the Legislature, shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him, and if said body determine that payment should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay, including the same in the appropriations for the ensuing year. Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval. Approved: March 16, 1923.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327 - AN ACT FIXING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE AUDITOR GENERAL SHALL RENDER HIS DECISIONS AND PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF APPEAL THEREFROM Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him. With respect to the accounts of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act on the same within one hundred days after their submission, Sundays and holidays excepted.
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In case of accounts or claims already submitted to but still pending decision by the Auditor General on or before the approval of this Act, the periods provided in this section shall commence from the date of such approval. Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account for claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: XXX (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity. If there are more than one appellant, all appeals shall be taken to the same authority resorted to by the first appellant. From a decision adversely affecting the interests of the Government, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of the department or in case of local governments by the head of the office or branch of the Government immediately concerned. The appeal shall specifically set forth the particular action of the Auditor General to which exception is taken with the reasons and authorities relied on for reversing such decision. Section3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved: June 18. 1938.
Sec. 2 of CA 327 has been amended by Sec. 50 of PD 1445 and by Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of the Philippines, as follows: Sec. 50. Appeal from decisions of the Commission.-- The party aggrieved by any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling adversely affects the interests of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (PD 1445.) Sec. 35. Appeal from Decision of the Commission.-- Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order or ruling adversely affects the interest of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (Subtitle B, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of the Philippines.)
Case : Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the
government, for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be shown hereunder, the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State . In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 ... which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed". Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him." Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party Political Law 1
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aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity." With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act the on the matter. What Stranspired butRthat. quite obvious then that it does not have imprint of validity ays on v. was S inganything s on, 54 SC A 282It is (1973) Before the 1987 Constitution
With the effectivitiy the 1987 Constitution
Act 3038 and CA 327 allowed suit only for money claims arising from contract, and providing a special procedure.
All money claims are to be filed with COA, which has 60 days within which to act.
The claim must be filed with the Auditor General (now, COA). If the Auditor does not act within 60 days, then the claimant could file his claim with the RTC.
If COA fails to so act, the claimant must wait anyway. Once a decision has been made, he has, within 30 days to appeal by certiorari to the SC
But if the Auditor decision, then therenders appeala could be made to the SC, unless the claimant was a public official in which case appeal was to the President.
(2) Quasi-delicts committed by special agents Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. XXX The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what Is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict … Political Law 1
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Case : The Plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was struck by the General Hospital ambulance, which turned suddenly and, without having sounded any whistle or horn. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was severely injured. Plaintiff was allowed to sue the Government of the Philippine Islands by virtue of Act No. 2457
Rule : By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. That the state is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 (now Art. 2180) The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. The responsibility of the state is limited by articlethese 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a speciala agent (and special agent, in the sense in which words are employed, is one who receives definite anda fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ. ,389, 390.) The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent Merritt vs . G overnment. of the Philippine Is lands, 34 Phil 311
(3) Incorporation of government-owned or controlled corporation.
When the government creates a corporation, it invariably provides this corporation a separate entity and with the capacity to sue and be sued. If the government entity is given the capacity to be sued, the suit encompasses any kind of action, including one from tort. Rule : The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action
"only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. G .R . No. 154411 J une 19, 2003 NATIO NA L HOUS ING A UTHOR ITY, ,vs. HEIRS OF
ISIDR O G UIVELONDO
Rule: "With srcinal charter" means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a Political Law 1
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subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is exluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case. G .R. No.
98107Augus t 18, 1997 B E NJ AMIN C. J UCO, vs. NATIONAL LA B OR R EL ATIONS C OMMISS ION
2. Implied consent: (1) When the government enters into business contracts
Important to note - When the government is in the performance of governmental function (jure imperii), even if it enters into a contract with private persons, it cannot be sued without its consent. States v Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985 a contract for the repair of Thus in United wharves and piers at the naval base in Subic was ). held to be in line with the governmental function of the US Government and so the immunity existed.
But when the government enters into commercial contracts and descends to the status of ordinary persons (jure gestioni), it can be sued like any other person. In Malong v PNR, 138 SCRA 63 (1985), it was held that when the state organized the Philippine National Railway, it divested itself of its sovereign capacity, and so became liable for damages that arose from the death of one who fell from an overloaded train. Case : In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid. The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation. The petitioners' filed with the trial court their motion to dismiss which was denied by the latter.
Rule: The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity suit itself with its consent. We Waiver is also the government files a complaint, thus from opening to implied a counterclaim. have held implied that notwhen all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts.
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It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz, where the transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos: The traditional rule oforimmunity from being consequence sued in the courts of another State without its consent waiver. exempts This rulea State is a necessary of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United kingdom and other states in Western Europe. xxx xxx xxx The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. In this case, by entering into an employment contract [a proprietary function] with the respondents, the US impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity. The state could therefore be sued since such contracts are commercial in nature. WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows: In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED. G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990 UNITED STATES OF
AME R IC A vs . HON. E LI ODOR O B . G UINTO
Case : Allegedly that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought the disputed lot from Claro Oñate, respondent’s grandfather, and since then it had continually occupied said lot openly and publicly in
the concept of an owner until 1988 when the Municipality donated the school site to petitioner DECS; thus asserting that it could also claim ownership also through adverse possession. Respondent instituted a Complaint for Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of Title with Recovery of Possession of the Lot The threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can sued be without its consent. A supplementary issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines. Political Law 1
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Rule: We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State. The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is likewise resolved in the negative. While it is true that petitioner is an unincorporated government agency, and as such technically requires the Republic of the Philippines to be impleaded in any suit against the former, nonetheless, considering our resolution of the main issue below, this issue is deemed mooted. Besides, at this point, we deem it best to lift such procedural technicality in order to finally resolve the long litigation this case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said issue, we will arrive at the same ruling. The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant considering that it impliedly gave its approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving a contract between a government department and a third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such department to enter into such contract carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its name. G.R. No. 161758 June 8, 2007 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its SCHOOL’S Division
S uperintendent vs. C E LS O OÑA TE ,. Also Read: PTA vs. PGDEI 668 SCRA 406
(2) When it would be inequitable for the state to invoke its immunity, or when it takes private property for public use or purpose. Ministry of Works units. and Highways forged individual contracts withcontracts, herein petitioners Case for the:: The construction ofPublic the housing After complying with the terms of said and by reason of the verbal request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary that additional funds would be available and forthcoming, petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations and written contracts to cover subsequent expenses for the "additional constructions." Thus, the money claims of petitioners. Respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims prompting herein petitioners to file a Petition for Mandamus. Hence, this petition where the core issue for resolution focuses on the right of petitioners-contractors to compensation for a public works housing project
Rule : The Court found the instant petition laden with merit and upheld, in the interest of substantial
justice, petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated for the "additional constructions" on the public works housing project, applying the principle of quantum meruit. Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the instant case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
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Respondent's argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State Immunity finds no application in the case before us. Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. Thus, in Amigable vs. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud which shields the State from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of Ministerio vs. CFI of Cebu that "the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen." It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the State's immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated property, this Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the instant controversy, considering that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the State's immunity from suit. To be sure, this Court — as the staunch guardian of the citizens' rights and welfare — cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated — on the basis of quantum meruit — for construction done on the public works housing project. . G.R. No. 131544
March 16, 2001 E PG CONS TR UC TION CO. vs . HON. G R E G OR IO R . VIG IL A R
Case: The Petitioner BOC Commissioner was ordered to pay respondent the commercial value of
the goods based on the prevailing exchange rate at the time of their importation. The same was due to the loss of some confiscated items in BOCs custody, pending the determination of the shipper’s
compliance with the law. Petitioner argues that a money judgment or any charge against the government requires a corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by mere judicial order.
Rule:
Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on
the government, and that, under the political doctrine of "state immunity," it cannot be held liable for governmental acts (jus imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The circumstances of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine. As previously discussed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC’s ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping of respondent’s goods.We are not likewise unaware of its lackadaisical attitude in failing to provide a cogent explanation on the goods’ disappearance, considering that they were
in its custody and that they were in fact the subject of litigation. The situation does not allow us to reject respondent’s claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it. In Department of of Health v. C.V. rights Canchela & Associates, we enunciated that so thispatent Court,in as staunch guardian the people’s and welfare, ca nnot sanction an injustice its the face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient and contrary to reason is not allowed in law. Justice and equity now demand that the State’s cloak of in vincibility against suit and liability be Political Law 1
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shredded. G .R . Nos. 16 6309-10 March 9, 2 007 RE PUB LIC OF THE PHIL IPP INE S , represen ted by the COMM IS S IONER OF CUS TOMS, vs. UNIMEX MICRO-ELE CTR ONICS .
(3) If the government files a complaint, defendant may file a counterclaim against it
In Froilan vs Oriental Pan Shipping, GR L-6060 (Sept. 30, 1950), the Court held that when the State itself files a complaint, the defendant is entitled to file a counterclaim against it. This is based on equitable grounds. The Court ruled that the state impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting a claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to wit, recovery of a vessel. Case: Froilan purchased from Shipping Commission a vessel for P200,000 paying P50,000 as down payment. A Chattel Mortgage was executed to secure the payment of the balance. For various reasons including non-payment of installments, the Commission took possession of the vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to Pan Oriental. Froilan appealed from the action of the Commission and he was restored to all the rights under the srcinal contract. However, Pan Oriental retained the possession of the vessel. Froilan filed a complaint to recover possession of the vessel. A writ of replevin was issued. The Government intervened alleging that Froilan failed to pay the balance to the Commission; that the intervenor was entitled to the possession of said vessel under the terms of the srcinal contract or in order for it to effect the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Pan Oriental answered the complaint in intervention praying that if Government succeeded in obtaining the possession of the vessel, to comply with its obligation of delivering it to Pan Oriental pursuant to their contract of bareboat charter with an option to purchase. Complaint in intervention was dismissed upon Froilan's payment of his account to the Government. Government filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim which Pan Oriental had filed against it in view of the court's order dismissing the complaint in intervention. Counterclaim of Pan Oriental. against the Republic of the Philippines was dismissed. Hence, this appeal. Government raised, among others, as ground for the dismissal of Pan Oriental 's counterclaim, the State's immunity from suit.
Rule : By filing its complaint in intervention, the Government in effect waived its right of non-suability. Stated otherwise, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the State surrendered its privileged position and came down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the State. Froila n vs Or iental Pan S hipping, 12 S CR A 276, G R L-6060 (S ept. 30, 1950) Summary Note: Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute Not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. As for the filing of a affirmative complaint relief by the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming from the defendant.
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(1) Under Act No.3083 Sec. 1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippines hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
When a money judgment is given against the government, the ordinary rule for execution would not apply, for the consent of the government to be sued is only up to the point of judgment. If it does not pay, it cannot be compelled to pay by attachment or otherwise Although Government, plaintiff in expropriation itself to the Rule: jurisdiction of thethe Court and therebyas waives its immunity from suit,proceedings, the judgmentsubmits that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the award determined as just compensation for the condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized upon execution. The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the legislature to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award determined in the judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of Public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. G .R. No. L-3 0098 February 18 , 1970 THE COMM IS S IONER OF PUB LIC HIG HWAY S vs.
HON . LOU RDE S P. SA N DIEGO
(2) Under a charter When consent to be sued is provided by the charter, the consent does not stop with the rendition, but goes up to the satisfaction of the judgment. If an incorporated agency has a charter of its own, it has a separate and distinct personality. If the agency is incorporated, the basis for its suabilty is found in its charter. "with srcinal charter" means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is exluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. G.R. No. 98107August 18, 1997 BENJAMIN C. JUCO, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
R EL ATIONS COMM ISS ION Case: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had
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become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued.
Rule: The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." According to US Chief Justice Marshall: "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. One of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. Since then such a principle has been followed with undeviating rigidity. It is an entirely different matter if, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That is what happened in this case. PNB v CIR , 81 S CR A 314 (1978)
(3) Execution Rule: It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily
consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. In Republic v. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus— . . . The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only up to the completion of proceedings anter ior
to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. A.M. No. vs. J UDG E VI CE NTE A. RTJ-05-1959 December 9, 2005 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HIDALGO
4. Suability vs. Liability Rule: The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powers —one of them is the power to sue and be sued.
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Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not . Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment. G .R . No. 16828 9 March 22, 2010 THE MUNIC IP A LITY OF HA G ONOY , B ULA CAN vs. HON. SIMEON P . DUM DUM, J R .
Case: A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can bestate held has liable if it does nottofirst consent to bethe sued. is notits conceded byimmunity, the mere fact never that the allowed itself be sued. When stateLiability does waive sovereign it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660) G .R . No. L-52 179 April 8, 1991 MUNICIP A LITY OF S A N
FER NANDO, LA UN ION, vs. HO N. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME E. Government 1. Government
In modern political science, the term government, is that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. (Bacani v. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468, 471-472 (1956)) By a dministration, again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments). (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891) The Administration in Government may change, the latter being more permanent than the former. But the terms "government" and "administration" are not always used in their strictness, and that "government" is often used for "administration." 1.a Classifications -
As to its LEGITIMACY
De Facto – While without any legal title, one which actually exercises power or control
Kinds: 1. The government that gets possession and control of or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter.
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2. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. 3. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war and which is denominated as a government of paramount force, like the 2nd Republic of the Philippines established by the Japanese belligerent.
De Jure – A government which is placed in power following the legal processes
1.b Functions
Two kinds of functions of Government, to wit, The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent (jure imperii) and proprietary or ministrant (jure gestionis). The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.109 a. Constituent (jure imperii) - constitutes the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature.110 b. Ministrant (jure gestionis) - The ministrant functions, are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interest of society which are merely optional, such as, public works, public charity, health and safety regulations, and other functions of similar nature. The ministrant functions are exercised by organization, like the Social Security System and other government-owned and controlled corporations, created to promote certain aspects of the economic and social life of our people.
109
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].) 110
President Wilson enumerated the constituent functions as follows: (1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery. (2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children. (3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or crime. (4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. (5) The definition and punishment of crimes. (6) The administration of justice in civil cases. (7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens. (8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers; the preservation of the
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Rule:
“Petitioner was created to "undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power
and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis." Pursuant to this mandate, petitioner generates power and sells electricity in bulk. Certainly, these activities do not partake of the sovereign functions of the government. They are purely private and commercial undertakings, albeit imbued with public interest. The public interest involved in its activities, however, does not distract from the true nature of the petitioner as a commercial enterprise, in the same league with similar public utilities like telephone and telegraph companies, railroad companies, water supply and irrigation companies, gas, coal or light companies, power plants, ice plant among others; all of which are declared by this Court as ministrant or proprietary functions of government aimed at advancing the general interest of society G.R. No. 149110 April 9, 2003 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, vs. CITY OF CABANATUAN”
— ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has The long "constituent been repudiated.
In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. 1.c Government and Parens Patriae Parens patriae (father of his country), doctrine refers to the inherent power and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juries. Under that doctrine, the state has the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability. Thus, the state is considered the parens patriae of minors. (67 C.J.S. 624; Government of the P. I. vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728, 747; 31 Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, Per. Ed., pp. 99-100). “A basic postulate that "those who have less in life must have more in law.” The
Constitution thus provides: Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. (Article II) Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. (Labor, Article XIII) Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. (Article II) Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick,care elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical to paupers.
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Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health manpower development and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems. Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons for rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society. (Health, Article XIII) Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation. (Women, Article XIII) Section Urban or with rurallaw poor not be evicted nor their except in10. accordance anddwellers in a justshall and humane manner. (Art XIII)dwelling demolished,
This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.111 It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves, as for example;
Minors - A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. - G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007 MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO vs. PEOPLE, also stated in G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013 CHRISTIAN CABALLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The state, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for such institution. G.R. No. L-35785 May 29, 1974 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMICIANO BAYLON
Labor - Social justice commands that the State, as parens patriae, and guardian of the general welfare of the people, afford protection to the needy and the less fortunate members of society, meaning the working class. This
111
PUNO, J.: Opinion G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000 ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
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command becomes all the more urgent in labor cases where security of tenure is an integral issue. VELASCO, JR., J. Opinion G.R. No. 156766 April 16, 2009 ROSARIO A. GATUS vs. QUALITY HOUSE, INC. and CHRISTOPHER CHUA
Women - Rape is chilling, naked sadism. It is marked by the savagery and brutality of the assault on the helpless victim's person and privacy. Thus, a severe penalty is meted our by the State, as parens patriae, for this abhorrent crime, revealing the clear legislative intent to "protect women against the unbridled bestiality of persons who cannot control their libidinous proclivities. People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672, 682, May 17, 1980.
The Family - "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974 MELCHORA CABANAS vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL
The Public - As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation. G.R. No. 159751 December 6, 2006 GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
2. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Under EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292 - "ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987"
Section 2. General Terms Defined. - Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning: (1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. (2) National Government refers to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local governments. (3) Local Government refers to the political subdivisions established by or in accordance with the Constitution.
The term "national government" has an established meaning in statutory and case law. Under the statute governing Philippine bureaucracy, the Administrative Code Political Law 1
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of 1987, "national government" refers to "the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local government.112 Jurisprudence has interpreted this provision of the Administrative Code to encompass "the three great departments: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial." The institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised113. V. THE STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT A. Legislative Department (Congress) 1. Composition, Qualification, Terms of Office a. SENATE
Article IV Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected
COMPOSITION - 24 Senators elected at large by qualified voters QUALIFICATIONS Citizenship Age Education Registered voter
Natural-born citizen 35 on the day of election: Able to read and write In the Philippines
112
Section 2(2), Executive Order No. 292 (emphasis supplied). More specialized statutes, such as Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989) substantially hews to the Administrative Code’s definition: "The term "government" refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. x x x" 113 Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, 11 September 1996
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Residence:
2 years immediately preceding the election
TERM OF OFFICE - Six (6) years. To commence unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on June 30 next following the election. (Art. VI, Sec. 4) No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected b. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Article IV Section 5. 1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. 2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. 3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. 4. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. Article IX –C. Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article. Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution. Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards
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of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law. Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Art VI) Article XVII. Section 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article V1 of this Constitution.
Reference: REPUBLIC ACT 9006 February 12, 2001 AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES. "Fair Elections Act." QUALIFICATIONS Citizenship Age Education Registered voter Residence:
Natural-born citizen 25 on the day of election: Able to read and write In the district, if district representative 1 year in the district immediately preceding the election
TERM OF OFFICE - 3 years. To commence (unless otherwise provided by law) at noon of June 30 next following the election. (Art. VI, Sec. 7) No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. COMPOSITION - Not more than 250 Members (*unless otherwise fixed by law) elected from: Legislative districts (80% of the seats shall be allotted to district representatives.) The districts are to be determined according to the following rules: [200 districts or 80%] 1. The districts are to be apportioned among the provinces, cities, and Metro Manila. [Sec. 5(1)] 2. The apportionment must be based on the number of inhabitants, using a uniform and progressive ratio. Within 3 years following the return of every census, Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts, based on the standards herein provided (to make it representative and more responsive to the people). [Sec. 5 (4)] 3. Each legislative district must comprise as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory (to avoid gerrymandering, or putting together of areas where a candidate is strong, even if these are not contiguous). [Sec. 5 (3)] 4. Each city with a population of at least 250,000 must have at least one representative. [Sec. 5(3)] Political Law 1
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5. Each province, regardless of population must have at least one representative. [Sec. 5(3)] CASES : DOMICILE VS. RESIDENCE
Rule: “Residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time. Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. G .R . No. 19 1124 April 27 ,
2010 LUIS A. AS IS TIO vs . HON. THE LMA C ANL AS TR INID AD-PE AG UIR R E
Case: At the heart of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas. During but the lost. 2007The elections, petitioner ran for includes the position Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, 4th District of Batangas LipaofCity. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Rule : To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers’ qualifications and fitness for the job they
aspire for. Petitioner’s actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the pre sence of a place
(Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain. Petitioner ’s substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration, but also his participation in the community’s socio-civic and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident thereof.
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In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner sufficiently established his compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law. We also recognize that "(a)bove and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred. G .R. No. 193261 April 2 4, 2012 ME YNA R DO S AB ILI, vs. C OMMIS S ION
ON ELE CTIO NS a nd FLORENCIO LIB RE A
Case : (Acting on a Motion for Reconsideration) On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately
misrepresented his Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents’ evidence failed to sufficiently controvert. Specifically, the private respondents’ evidence failed to show that Mitraremained a Puerto Princesa City resident.
In this regard, took note thefollowing: "incremental moves" Mitra intent undertook to establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as we evidenced byofthe (1) his expressed to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion of his house. Thus, we found that under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan. We also emphasized that the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC concerning his residence
was indeed a misrepresentation. In sum, we concluded that the evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra indeed transfered his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law.
Rule : While it is undisputed that Mitra’s domicile of srcin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009. As our Decision discussed and as repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence. To convince us of their point of view, the private respondents point out that we (1) totally disregarded the other evidence they submitted, which the COMELEC, on the other hand, properly considered; (2) disregarded the import of the effectivity of the lease contract, which showed that it was only effective until February 28, 2010; and (3) disregarded the evidence showing that Mitra failed to abandon his domicile of srcin. In contrast, we found in the present case that Mitra did not deliberately misrepresent his Aborlan residence to deceive or mislead the Palawan electorate since he in fact adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents failed to sufficiently controvert. In this regard, we noted with emphasis that Mitra undertook "incremental moves" to his new domicile in Aborlan as evidenced by the following: (1) his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya (5)lotthe purchase of a to lotthe forpremises his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a houseFeedmill; on the said which is adjacent he was leasing pending the completion of his house. G.R. No. 191938 October 19, 2010 ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA vs.
COMM ISS ION O N ELE CTIONS
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Rule: As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's srcinal domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. G .R . No. 134015 J uly 19,
1999 J UAN DOM INO vs. COM MISS ION ON ELE CTIONS
Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty candidates in the Case: Municipality of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol. Ugdoracion’s Residnece requirement was questioned Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that Ugdoracion's declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation because Ugdoracion is actually a "green card" holder or a permanent resident of the United States of America. Ugdoracion contends, that he did not lose his domicile of srcin because his acquisition of a "green card" was brought about merely by his sister's petition. He maintains that, except for this unfortunate detail, all other facts demonstrate his retention of residence in Albuquerque, Bohol.
Rule; . Ugdoracion's assertions miss the mark completely. The dust had long settled over the implications of a "green card" holder status on an elective official's qualification for public office. We ruled in Caasi v. Court of Appeals that a Filipino citizen's acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. In short, the "green card" status in the USA is a renunciation of one's status as a resident of the Philippines. We agree with Ugdoracion that residence, in contemplation of election laws, is synonymous to domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return (animus revertendi) and remain (animus manendi). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of srcin, which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of srcin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention. In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties' naturally conflicting perspectives on domicile, we are guided by three basic rules, namely: (1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) remainsoruntil a newatone validlytime. acquired; and (3) domicile, a man canonce haveestablished, but one residence domicile anyisgiven The general rule is that the domicile of srcin is not easily lost; it is lost only when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and Political Law 1
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establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with such purpose. In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion's acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status in the United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of srcin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA. The contention that Ugdoracion's USA resident status was acquired involuntarily, as it was simply the result of his sister's beneficence, does not persuade. Although immigration to the USA through a petition filed by a family member (sponsor) is allowed by USA immigration laws, the petitioned party is very much free to accept or reject the grant of resident status. Permanent residency in the USA is not conferred upon the unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is not bestowed by operation of law. And to reiterate, a person can have only one residence or domicile at any given time. G.R. No. 179851 April 18, 2008 MAYOR J OSE UGDOR AC ION J R . vs COMM IS S ION ON ELE CTIONS an d
EP HRA IM M. TU NGOL
CASE: INTERRUPTION OF TERM Case: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the term limit rule. The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced.This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms;
Rule: As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the
rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years – during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the of ficer’s term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, reiterated that "[T]he term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another." Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the official’s office; the official is reinstated to the Political Law 1
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exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo. Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly differen t aspects of an elective officials’ service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept – interruption of a term – on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service in the context of term limitation, interruption of service during unbroken occurs after there has an been a break iterm n the;term. Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the threeterm limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. To recapitulate, Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s
term. G .R . No. 184836 December 23, 2009 S IMON B. A LDOV INO, J R ., DANIL O B . FAL LE R AN D FER DIN AND N. TALAB ONG vs. COM MISS ION ON ELE CTION S A ND W ILFR EDO F. ASILO
CASE: ELECTIVE VS. APPOINTIVE OFFICER : The resigned. questioned law mandates an appointive Case is deemed It does not applythat to elective officials.official who files his certificate of candidacy COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Rule : In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that
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they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some hold officeofinthe a appointing permanent authority. capacity and are entitled to security of tenure appointive while othersofficials serve at thetheir pleasure Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. G.R. No.
189698 February 22, 2010 ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., vs. COMM ISS ION O N ELE CTIONS Read: G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012 MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA vs.
COMM ISS ION ON EL EC TION S and R ODER ICK A. ALC ALA , 683 SC R A 602
Apportionment of Districts Article VI Section 5. xxx 3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. 4. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Case : These consolidated petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,5 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)." Political Law 1
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In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the COMELEC’s earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanao’s reapportioned first legislative district. Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress’ power to create or reapportion
legislative districts. Under the present well as in past and Constitutions, the power to increase Rule: allowable membership in Constitution, the House ofas Representatives, to reapportion legislative districts,the is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. xxxx (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, we held that the "power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws," and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body . The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is Political Law 1
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clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides: SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) (8) Educational Preservationpolicies; and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. S ema v. COMELE C, G .R. No.
177597, 16 J uly 2008
Rule: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010.
The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected in the Decision, that Congress’ reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City’s population in 2010, is nonjusticiable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of Malolos City’s population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report) and as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July 2008, and Certification of
the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008 ) which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these materials. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit ofthis Court’s judicial review power, then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress.
Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of Constitution on the requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district forthe Malolos City, carving thepopulation city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district. This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent Political Law 1
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territory." It is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s
legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass of constituents. G.R No. 188078 March 15 , 2010 VIC TOR INO B . AL DA B A
CAR LO JOLE TTE S. FAJ AR DO, J ULIO G. M ORADA , and MINERVA ALDAB A MORADA, vs. COMM ISS ION O N ELE CTIONS
Case : The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in Article IV, Section 5 is the minimum population for the creation of alegislative legislative district. The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of requirement a newly created province, each district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid. Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement. The respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.
Rule : The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. G .R . No. 1 89793 April 7 , 2010 SE NATOR
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO vs. COMMISSION ON E LE CTIO NS represen ted by its Cha irman J OS E A.R . MELO an d its C ommis s ioners “Gerrymandering”
Gerrymandering: A name given to the process of dividing a state or other territory into the authorized civil or political divisions, but with such a geographical arrangement as to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose, as, for instance, to secure a majority for a given political party in districts where the result would be Political Law 1
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otherwise if they were divided according to obvious natural lines. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 618). Case: "Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. G .R . No. 18 0050 February 10, 20 10 R ODOL FO G . NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ER MITA
The constitutional check against "gerrymandering," which means the creation of representative districts out of separate points of territory in order to favor a candidate, is found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution. It states that "each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory." It should be noted, however, that this rule is qualified by the phrase "as far as practicable." THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active in the mainstream representative Thus, allowing all participants individuals and groups, includingofthose which nowdemocracy. dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.114 REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act." Section 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
114
G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY vs. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES
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by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system. (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector, (e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system. Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election. Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
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(3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which partylist representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998. The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the party-list system. Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
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For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list. Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any leng th of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization. Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees. Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives. Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act. Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its information campaign on the party-list system.
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Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective. Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Approved, March 3, 1995.
Section. 5(2)] The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. - Art VI
The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the lower house. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution (1987, 1992, 1995), ½ of the seats allocated to the party-list representatives shall be filled by selection or election, as provided by law, form the (i) labor, (ii) peasant, (iii) urban poor, (iv) indigenous cultural communities, (v) women, (vi) youth, and (vii) such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. Until a law is passed, the President may set up posts by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral representatives (Art. XVIII, Sec. 7). Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.
Natural-born citizen of the Philippines, Registered voter Resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election Able to read and write A bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and At least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. o
o
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In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
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NEW PARAMETERS TO BE OBSERVED BY THE COMELEC IN SCREENING PARTIES, ORGANIZATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS SEEKING REGISTRATION AND/OR ACCREDITATION UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the ''marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record or advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. G.R.
No. 203766, April 2, 2013, ATONG PA G LA UM, INC vs. COMMISS ION ON EL E CTION.
Case : Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a
formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
Rule : The Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading: Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
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to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate whoisiscontained more thanin30 election not qualified to beAct, a youth sectorALL nominee. Since this mandate RAonNo. 7941,day theisParty-List System it covers youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats. Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for public respondent’s ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there
was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads: Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization. What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent. The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections. The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007. That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no moment. A party-list organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their qualifications according to law are a different matter. Amo res vs HR E T 622 SC R A 593 (2010) : The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly Case registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in
the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, CIBAC, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be
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chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. Among them was the Petitioner Lokin. Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007 whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin. Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin Abalos, transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled toofa 744,674 second votes. seat and Lokin to a proclamation. The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of
the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007 On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. The COMELEC thus decided to wit; WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007; and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and G alang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804). He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.
Rule: Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states: Section Substitutionisofwithdrawn nominees.by– the A party-list may incapacitated be substitutedtoonly when as he dies, or 13. his nomination party, ornominee he becomes continue such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.
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No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because established entirely new not found the text of provision.already The new ground granted toit the party-listan organization theground unilateral right toinwithdraw itsthe nomination submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC’s withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck
down for lack of legal basis. We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections. G .R . Nos. 1794 31-32 J une 22, 2010 LUIS K . LOK IN, J R ., as the s econd nominee of CITIZENS B ATTLE A G A INS T COR R UP TION (CIB AC ) vs. COMM IS S ION ON
EL EC TION S and the HOU SE OF RE PR ES ENTATIVE S
Case: Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, provides: Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: xxxx (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 – the Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System – which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations Political Law 1
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affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009. PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the PartyList System Act.
Rule : We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a party -list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last that party-list qualified for a seat in theThe House of Representatives, a percentage is lessorganization than the 2%that threshold invalidated in Banat. disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered. To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied.. Phil . G uardians vs . COMEL E C 619. SC R A 585
Case: Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on -list Elections (COMELEC) due to the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Rule : Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather,
petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the LGBT networks:" Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions . In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitionerdoes not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s
principal place of business.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration - Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, Political Law 1
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or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." We thus find that it was grave violation of the nonestablishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. r Registration - Respondent has failed to Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition fo explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into
the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny. As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disap proval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Equal Protection - From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Freedom of Expression and Association - We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community. Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision. Non-Discrimination and International Law - Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
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WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED.. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation. G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010 ANG
LA DLA D LG B T PA R TY rep resented herein by it s Chair, DANTON R EMOTO, vs. COMM IS SION ON ELEC TIONS Read: B anat vs C omelec 586 S CR A 210 (2010) A bayon vs . HR E T 612 S CR A 375 (2010) Layug vs Comelec 667 SC R A 135 (2012) A tong Pag-laum vs Comelec GR . 203766 (2013) (Summary) Qualifications – Congress (Comparative)
c. Synchronized terms of office Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987. The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. (Art XVIII) Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. Of the Senators elected in years the elections 1992, thetwelve first twelve obtaining the highest of votes shall serve for six and the in remaining for three years. (Art XVIII) number
The Senate must be viewed as a collective body. It is an institution quite apart from the Senators composing it. The Senate as an institution cannot be equated to its Political Law 1
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present occupants. It is indivisible. It is not the sum total of all sitting Senators at any given time. Senators come and go but the very institution of the Senate remains. It is this indivisible institution which should be viewed as continuing115. Tenure vs Term Rule: The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by
law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. G .R . No. 1848 36 December
23, 2009 . ALDO VINO,AND J R WILFRE ., DA NILODO B . F.FALLE R A ND FE R DI NA ND N. TALA B ONG vs . COMM ISSSIMO ION N ONB ELE CTIONS AS ILO
"One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing authority, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause." In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and "tenure." "[T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.116 Rule : A "term" is "the time during which the officer may claim to hold office. A "tenure" "represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. Carillo v. Court of A ppeals, N o. L24554, May 31, 1967, 77 S CR A 170, 177
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office.117 2. Election
a. Regular Election
115
Opinion - G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008 (Romulo L. Neri, petitioner, v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers 116 Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 [1946]; Alba v. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683,694 [1957]; Paredes v. Abad, 155 Phil. 494 [1974]; Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 240 [1984] 117 G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991 MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR, citing Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12
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Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. (1987 Constitution Art VI)
b. Special Election Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (1987 Constitution Art VI) Section 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the Commission. (1987 Constitution Art IX C.) Republic Act No. 6645 December 28, 1987 AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: provided, however, that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election. (Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows: “Section 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. - The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election. In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the succeeding regular election.” Approved: November 26, 1991 Republic Act No. 7166 November 26 , 1991 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AND FOR ELECTORAL REFORMS, AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATION S THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PUR POSES)
Section 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.
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Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two newspapers of general circulation. Approved: December 28, 1987
Case
Following Senator Guingona’s confirmation as Vice-President, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004
Respondents Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan ranked 12th and 13th, respectively Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single threeyear term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results.
Issue : Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001. The petition has no merit. Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus: In casetooffillvacancy in the Senate or in theprescribed House of Representatives, a special be called such vacancy in the manner by law, but the Senator orelection Membermay of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in pertinent parts: SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.
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Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows: Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. – x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall simultaneously next election; and (2) to give notice to the votersbeof,held among other things,with the the office orsucceeding offices to beregular voted for. A survey of COMELEC’s resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals
that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions or even in its press releases did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election. The controversy thus turns on whether COMELEC’s failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly rendered Honasan’s proclamation as the winner in that special election void. More precisely, the question is whether the special election is invalid for lack of a "call" for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated below, the Court answers in the negative. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona’s appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. G.R.
No. 148334 J anuary 21, 2004 Ar turo M. Tole ntino, et al. vs . C ommis s ion on E lection, et a l.
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3. Salaries, Privileges, Disqualifications
a. Salaries Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. (1987 Constitution Art VI) Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise… the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives…. two hundred four thousand pesos each….. (1987 Constitution Art XVIII)
Congress, by law determines the salary to be received by its members. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the two houses approving such increase Rule : It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt" (Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867). Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. G.R. No. L-25554 October 4, 1966 PHILIPPINE CONSTITU TIO N A SS OCIATION, IN C. vs ISMAEL MATH AY and JOSE VELAS CO
Case : Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay
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Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term having expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law." On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he never received during his incumbency and which under this Court's above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay could become operative only on December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the full terms of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary. The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-General's decision that petitioner as a Congressman whose term of office expired on December 30, 1969 and qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a minimum of twenty years of government service is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on the salary actually received by him as a member of Congress of P7,200.00 per annum. To grant petitioner's contention that the retirement gratuity of members of Congress; such as himself whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 should be computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum under Republic Act 4134 which could only by operative with incoming members of Congress whose terms of office would commence on December 30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional mandate that such salary increases could take effect only upon the expiration of the full term of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members of Congress were constitutionally prohibited from receiving such salary increase during their term of office) would be a subtle way of going around the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their compensation during their term of office and of doing indirectly what could not be done directly. G.R. No. L-34676 April 30,
1974 BENJAMIN T. LIGOT vs. ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, C ong res s of the Philippi nes
b. Freedom from arrest Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session…(Art VI)
Case: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a nonbailable offense.
Issue: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman.
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Rule : The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department. Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . . Because the broad coverage of accused-appellant, felony and breach ofconvicted the peace,under the exemption applied only to civil arrests. Aofcongressman like the Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal. The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows: Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same. For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit: . . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000 PEOPLE OF
THE P HILI PPINES, vs. ROM EO G. J ALOSJ OS
Case : In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134 -A
of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Political Law 1
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Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"
Rule : The petition is bereft of merit. It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. Petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the
mandate of the people. Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor." The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations. Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case
fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds: x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused- appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. G .R . No. 17 9817
J une 27, 2008 A NTONIO F. TR IL LA NE S IV vs . HON. OS CA R PIME NTE L
c. Speech and Debate Clause Section 11. ….. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. (Art VI)
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the Political Law 1
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public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.118 As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as tothe motives.119 Case :
In his sworn complaint dated, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the following
excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor- Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
118
Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun 109 Phil. 863 (1960); cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 643 (1996). 119 Tenney v. Brandhove, 34 US 367, 71 S. Ct. 7 83786.
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WHEREFORE , the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam DefensorSantiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. A.C . No. 7399 Aug us t 25, 2009 ANTE R O J . POB R E vs . S en. MIR IA M DE FE NS OR -S ANTIA G O Case: This is an ordinary civil action, srcinally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. An open letter to the President, published in several newspapers of general circulation saying that certain members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had been preparing for a coup and working for the candidacy of the Secretary of Defense for the Presidency. The issue: Whether the publication in question is a privileged communication The determination of the the phrase first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision. Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question. The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANO R T. J IMENEZ, ET AL. vs. BA RTOLOM E CAB ANGB ANG
It is important to note that this privilege is not absolute. The rule provides that the legislator may not be questioned "in any other place," which means that he may be called to account for his remarks by his own colleagues in Congress itself, and when warranted, punished for disorderly behavior. d. Disqualifications (1) Incompatible Offices and Forbidden Offices Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. (Article VI)
An incompatible office is a post which a member cannot accept unless he waives or forfeits his seat in Congress. In the contrary sense, if he waives or forfeits his seat, he may accept the other post, since the incompatibility arises only because of his simultaneous membership in both. This is the first part of Section 13, Art. VI; Political Law 1
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“No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employ ment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.”
A forbidden office is one to which a member cannot be appointed even if he is willing to give up his seat in Congress. The effect of his resignation from the Congress is the loss of his seat therein but his disqualification for the forbidden office nevertheless remains. The prohibition lies in the "fiduciary" nature of the relationship involved. Such a member cannot resign in anticipation of the passage of the law creating such office or increasing its emolument as itaisway of circumventing prohibition. However, the prohibition is not forever for the term for which the he was elected. As such; “Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.”
Case:
During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was
elected Chairman of the PNRC. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads: SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat…..
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC (370 Phil. held that and the PNRC a governmentowned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim90), thatwhich in accepting holdingis the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon (223 SCRA 568), which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.
Issue: Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled corporation; Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate; Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution;
Rule: To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter: PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the National Society of the Movement.
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The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. - G.R . No. 1 75352 DANTE V.
LIB AN vs. RIC HAR D J . GOR DON ( 2009)
Rule: National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and its sister Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, have certain specificities deriving from the 1949 Geneva Convention and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement). They are also guided by the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality. A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected component of the Red Cross movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First Geneva Convention, especially in times of armed conflict. These provisions require that the staff of a National Society shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. Such protection is not ordinarily afforded by an international treaty to ordinary private entities or even non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This sui generis character is also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva Convention which holds that an Occupying Power cannot require any change in the personnel or structure of a National Society. National societies are therefore organizations that are directly regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs. In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized by their public authorities as voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field, but also benefit from recognition at the International level. This is considered to be an element distinguishing National Societies from other organizations (mainly NGOs) and other forms of humanitarian response. x x x. No other organization belongs to a world-wide Movement in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other. This is considered to be the essence of the Fundamental Principle of Universality. Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field. x x x. The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a private institution and a public service organization because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State. In carrying out their major functions, Red Cross Societies give their humanitarian support to official bodies, in general having larger resources than the Societies, working towards comparable ends in a given sector. x x x No other organization has a duty to be its government’s humanitarian partner while remaining
independent. - G . R . No. 175352 J anuary 18 , 2011 DANTE V. LIB AN vs . R ICHA R D J . GOR DON
(2011)
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Non - Intervention / conflicts of Interests Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Art VI) Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure (Art XI)
Case: An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation, a private corporation, was held. Those named and elected as Directors on were the Puyat Group; and the Acero Group. The Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
Rule : There has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Puyat v. De G uzman, J r., G .R . No. L -51122 March 25, 1982 Political Law 1
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Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.120 e. Duty to Disclose 1. Declaration Under Oath of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officersthe of Supreme the armedCourt, forcesthe with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. (Art XI)
In the case of the Members Congress, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. A- REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019 ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT - Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or 1. 2. 3. 4.
after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office,
shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, the ff; a. a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, b. including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, c. the amounts of his personal and family expenses and d. the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: B - Under Republic Act No. 6713 February 20, 1989 "Code of CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES." Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. (A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a
120
Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica v. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013
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Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. The two documents shall contain information on the following: (a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value; (b) personal property and acquisition cost; (c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like; (d) liabilities, and; (e) all business interests and financial connections. The documents must be filed: (a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office; (b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and (c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service. All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial connections in previous years, including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any office in the Government. Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or separately. The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by: (1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman; (2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of the President. (3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; (4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the President, and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and (5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission. (B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission. (C) Accessibility of documents.– (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at reasonable hours. (2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they are filed as required by law. Political Law 1
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(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost of certification. (4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation. (D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statementiled f under this Act for: (a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or (b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.
2. Conflicts of Interests All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. (Art VI)
3. Records and Books of Accounts The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall i. be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and ii. shall be audited by the Commission on Audit iii. such shallbooks publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid which to and expenses for each Member Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member. (Art VI) 4. Internal Government of Congress
a. Election of officers Section 16.The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. xxx (Art VI)
A majority vote of all its respective members is the requirement for the election of; a. Senate President and b. Speaker of the House of Representatives Political Law 1
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The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been “ organized” with the
election of the President and the Speaker Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it. Art VI
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. Case : On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority." During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issue : Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? Rule : The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. Political Law 1
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All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, Court On is devoid of any basis upon determine the legalityofofpowers, the actscourts of themay Senate relativethis thereto. grounds of respect for thewhich basictoconcept of separation not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998 SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR
S ANTIA G O and SE N. FR ANC IS C O S . TATA D vs . SE N. TE OF IS TO T. G UING ONA, J R . and SE N. MA R CE LO B . FE R NA N
b. Quorum Section 16. xxx A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide. xxx (Art VI)
The quorum required to conduct business – majority (50% + 1) of all the members.
"Shifting majority" - only the votes of the majority of those present in the session, there being a quorum, are required to pass a law. Sans a quorum, a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent or recalcitrant members in such manner, and under such penalties as to be determined by each house. Case: Disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada. Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued. Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by six other senators, while the rest remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
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Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved. Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved. Senator Cuenco took the oath. Hence, this quo warranto proceeding Were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators? (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Supposing thatathe Court has of jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that Rule: Senator Arranz was continuation the morning session and that a minority of the ten session senatorsunder may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. Avenlino vs . Cuenco 83 Phil 17. 1949
c. Rules of proceedings Section 16. xxx Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings….. xxx (Art VI) Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. (Art VI)
Rule : In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure." Arr oyo vs . De Veneci a G .R . No. 127255 Aug us t 14, 1997
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Rule : The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." The respondents G.R. No. 179275 admit in their in pleadings and even onhad oralbeen argument that the Senate Rules of inProcedure Governing Inquiries Aid of Legislation published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, we said: We find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation: The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for onehalf of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each
term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate. G .R . No. 1703 38 December
23, 2008 VIR G IL IO O . G AR C IL LANO, vs . THE HOUS E OF R E PR E S E NTATIVE S COMMI TTE E S
Case: On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow airport departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately P6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent to P2,970,000.00). On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting them were subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for the investigation it was to conduct on the Moscow incident on October 23, 2008. On October 23,filed 2008, its first denominated hearing. Instead of attending the hearing, petitioners withrespondent respondentCommittee Committeeheld a pleading Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena.
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Dela Paz claim that respondent Committee violated the Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
Rule: The petition must inevitably fail. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings." This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from and interference, except on process a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident usejudicial of thesupervision power as will constitute a denial of due Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its attention by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP general and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him millions which may have been sourced from public funds. The Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in two newspapers of general circulation. (Publication was made in the October 31, 2008 issues of the Manila Daily Bulletin and the Malaya.) The arrest order issued against the petitioners has been rendered ineffectual. In the legislative inquiry held on November 15, 2008, jointly by the respondent Committee and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Gen. Dela Paz voluntarily appeared and answered the questions propounded by the Committee members. Having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Senate Committees, there was no longer any necessity to implement the order of arrest. Furthermore, in the same hearing, Senator Santiago granted the motion of Gen. Dela Paz to dispense with the presence of Mrs. Dela Paz for humanitarian considerations G.R. No. 184849 February 13, 2009 SPOUSES PNP DIRE CTOR E LISE O D. DELA PAZ (Re t.) and MAR IA FE C. DELA PAZ vs. S E NA TE COMMI TTE E
ON F ORE IGN RE LATIO NS a nd the SE NATE SE R GE ANT- AT- AR MS J OSE BA LAJ ADIA, JR .
Case : Before the Court is a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed petitioners. They seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.and Respondent that of there only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee the Senatealleges Committee the is Whole.
Rule: In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77), the Court declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Political Law 1
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Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which mandates: Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly publis hed rules of procedure . The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. The Court explained in the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration: The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly publis hed rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity. Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective. In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al (G.R. No. 193459, 15 February 2011), the Court further clarified: x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categ oric al directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitution’s directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Tañada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution’s intentions as
expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances. The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect . In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise ofits disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides: Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required Political Law 1
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under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected. G .R. No.
187714 March 8 , 2011 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTE L, J R ., MANUEL B . VILLAR , JOK E R P. AR R OYO, FRA NCIS N. PANGILINAN , PIA S. CA YE TANO , and ALAN PE TER S. CAY ETANO vs. SENATE COMM ITT EE OF THE WHOLE
d. Discipline of members Section 16. xxx Each House may … punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. xxx (Art VI)
Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. The penalty may consist of a. censure; b. or upon a 2/3 vote of all the members of the house, suspension, not exceeding 60 days, or c. expulsion. What "disorderly behavior" is, is solely within the discretion of the house concerned Rationale for the provision “…suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days”-
Case: On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any Political Law 1
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means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. G.R. No. 22041 S eptember 11, 1924 ALE J AND R INO vs. MA NUE L L . QUE ZON, E T AL.
However, a different perspective / circumstance was taken under the 1935 Constitution, in 1960 case of OSMEÑA JR., vs. PENDATUN; Case: Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious
imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behavior. Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective." The Jones Law, it must be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator. It is true, opinion in that casethat contained obiter dictumany thatmeans "suspension deprives thevacancy." electoral district of the representation without district an being afforded by which to fill that But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the GovernorGeneral, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair. G .R . No. L-17144 Octo ber 28, 1960 S E R G IO OSME ÑA J R ., vs. S ALIP A DA K . PE ND ATUN
Under the 1987 Constitution, consider the 2001 case of MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, on preventive suspension vs suspension as a punitive act. Case The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as Political Law 1
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amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
Rule : In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the
clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. The order of suspension prescribed byConstitution Republic Actwhich No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the provides that each — "x x x. house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled: "x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives." Republic Act No. 3019121 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. 121
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides: "SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. "In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
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WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001
S ANTIA G O , vs. S AND IG A NB A YAN
e. The Enrolled Bill, Journal and Congressional Records Section 16. xxx Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. (Art VI)
(1) The Enrolled Bill Theory Rule: The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate..., carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. G .R. No. L-2 3475 April 3 0, 1974 HER MINIO A . AS TOR G A vs ANTONIO J . VI LLE G A S If there been any mistake in the—printing of the bill before it was certified the officersthe of Rule: Congress and has approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, withoutby jeopardizing principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. G.R. No. L-29658 February 27, 1969 E NR IQUE V. MORA LE S , vs. AB E LA R DO S UB ID O
Read: Fariñas vs Executive 417 SCRA 503 Abakada vs Purisima 562 SCRA 251 (2) The Journal The journal is only a resume of minutes of what transpired during a legislative session. The duty to keep a journal has two purposes (Bernas); a. To ensure publicity to the proceedings, and correspondent responsibility of the members to their constituents b. To provide proof of what actually transpired in the legislature
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Probative Value of the Journal
Case : Pons was charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium, in violation of Act 2381. He alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.
Rule: It is well settled in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in
determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die 85 at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914. Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination the discussion of all pending to matters. Or,adjournment in other words, the hands of the were stayed inoforder to enable the Assembly effect an apparently within the clock time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.)
US V Pons , 34 Phi l. 729 G .R . No. L-11 530 Aug us t 12, 1916
Note: What gives conclusive right to the journal is that when balanced side by side with extraneous evidence, is the fact that it is an official act of the legislature.
Matters Required to be Entered in the Journal (a) The yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill [Art. VI, Sec. 26(2)];
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(b) Veto message of the President (i.e., his objection to a bill when he vetoes it) [Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)]; (c) The yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President (Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)]; (d) The yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of the members present [Art. VI, Sec. 16(4)] (e) In addition, the journal contains the summary of the proceedings. (3) Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory In Astorga v Villegas, the court, by way of obiter, indicated that the journal might really prevail over the enrolled bill, since a journal is required by the Constitution while the enrollment of a bill is just a legislative practice that is not even mentioned in the Constitution. Further, enrollment does not add to the validity of the bill, for what makes it valid are the votes of the members. But this view is mere dictum. It contradicts the ruling in Morales v Subido that the enrolled copy prevails over the journal. It also contradicts the ratio in Marshall Field & Co. v Clark, 143 US 649 (1891) that the parties were not competent to show from the journal that the bill in the custody of the Secretary of State was against the contents of the journal, because journals are just kept by clerks who could be mistaken, while the certified bill is made by the highest officer of the chamber. To reconcile these two views, it may be said that, as to matters required by the Constitution to be placed in the journal, the journal is conclusive. But aside from these four matters, any other matter does not enjoy such conclusiveness. Case On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Political Law 1
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Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
Issue : Whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows: The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open of an enrolled is an official by thethrough two houses such billofficers, as one that hassession, passed Congress. It is bill, a declaration by attestation the two houses, their of presiding to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute… This argument begs the issue. It
would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires While itthe is true the journalinisthis not case. authenticated andisismerely subjectasked to the to risks of misprinting and otherit.errors, pointthat is irrelevant This Court inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy Political Law 1
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amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the lawmaking body. G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974 HERMINIO A. ASTORGA vs. ANTONIO J .
VILLEGAS
Petitioners charge thatto(1) violation thecall rules House, the Chair, in submitting Case: conference committee report theinHouse, didofnot for of thethe years or nays, but simply asked forthe its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration. Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred
Rule: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary Finance] enrolledthe billJournal embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case "went behind" anofenrolled billthat andthe consulted to determine whether certain provisions of we a statute had been approved by the Senate.
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But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts." This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory: The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the namelegislators, of popular the government. This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee: [W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. §26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." In other cases, this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence. Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court. Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4) provides: Each House shall keep a Journal its proceedings, and from time to time thenays same, excepting such parts as may, in its of judgment, affect national security; and the publish yeas and on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. Political Law 1
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The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules procedure, or to can allowfind those defeated political arena to seekThe a rematch in the forumofwhen petitioners their remedyininthe that department itself. Court has notjudicial been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. G .R . No. 127255 Aug ust 1 4, 1997 J OK E R P. A R R OYO
vs. JOSE DE VENECIA
(4) Congressional Record Section 16. 4. ... Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. (Art VI)
The record is the word-for-word transcript of the proceedings taken during the session, the verbatim transcript of proceedings of the house or its committees. The Constitution is silent as to what the record must contain. But note that Section 3 – xxx
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (Art XI) 5. Sessions
i. Regular -
Once every year on the fourth Monday of July, unless a different date is fixed by law, Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for
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such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. …... (Art VI) Section 5. Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. (Art VI)
Read: G.R. No. L-25577, March 15, 1966 ONOFRE P. GUEVARA vs. RAOUL M. INOCENTES ii. Special Sessions -
General When Congress is not in session, it can only meet in special session called byRule: the President. a) When the President calls for a special session at any time (Art. VI, Sec. 15)
-
Exceptions: Congress convenes without need of a call a) To call a special election due to a vacancy in the offices of President and VicePresident (Art. VII, Sec. 10) in which Congress shall convene at 10 a.m. of the third day after the vacancy, without need of a call. b) To decide on the disability of the President because the Cabinet (majority) has "disputed" his assertion that he is able to dispose his duties and powers. (This takes place not when the Cabinet first sends a written declaration about the inability of the President, but after the President has disputed this initial declaration.) (Art. VII, Sec. 11.) Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within 48 hours, without need of call. c) To revoke or extend thePresidential Proclamation of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (Art. VII, Sec. 18). Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene, without need of a call.
iii. Joint Sessions a. Voting Separately a) When Congress, while acting as the canvasser of votes for the President and Vice President, has to break the tie between two or more candidates for either position having an equal and the highest number of votes (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 5). b) When itthe decides vote)of on question of Sec. the President's discharge powers(by and2/3 duties histhe office (Art. VII, 11, par. 4).inability to c) Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the VP, when it confirms the nomination of a VP by the President from among the members of Congress; such Political Law 1
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person shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the members of both Houses, voting separately (Art. VII, Sec. 9). d) When it declares (by 2/3 vote) the existence of a state of war [Art. VI, Sec, 23(1)]. e) When it proposes to amend the Constitution (3/4 vote of the members) [Art. XVII, Sec. 1(1)]. b. Voting Jointly According to Section 18 Art VII, within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. 6. Electoral Tribunals
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Art VI) Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals …. shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.. (Art VI)
Case : Robert Z. Barbers ("Barbers") and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections ("elections").
On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. NBC 04-005 proclaiming Biazon as "the 12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 10, 2004 national andVI, local elections, for a term years, beginning June 30, 2004 accordance with Article Section IV of to theserve Constitution of of the6 Philippines." The on COMELEC statedinthat after the canvass of the supplemental Provincial COCs from Maguindanao (Cotabato City), Lanao del Sur and one barangay in Nueva Vizcaya, Biazon obtained 10,635,270 votes nationwide. On the other hand, Barbers obtained 10,624,585 votes. Thus, Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. Political Law 1
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The COMELEC stated that this "difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where there was failure of elections." Claiming that Biazon’s proclamation was void,Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of
Biazon as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines with the COMELEC on 7 June 2004. The petition, was assigned to a Special Division of the COMELEC. In his petition, Barbers asserted that the proclamation of Biazon was "illegal and premature being based on an incomplete canvass." Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections.
Rule : Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organization registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides: RULE 12. Jurisdiction. – The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, we ruled that: The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). In Javier v. COMELEC, we interpreted the phrase "election, returns and qualifications" as follows: The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring But if it is necessary to specify, we can to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; " returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction over election of the Senate Electoral Tribunal underscores theauthority contests relating to members of the Senate. The conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint. Political Law 1
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In Pangilinan, we ruled that "where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives." In like manner, where as in the present case, Barbers assails Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th duly elected Senator, Barbers’ proper recourse is to file a
regular election protest with the SET. Certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul the COMELEC’s assailed proceedings. We take pains to emphasize that after the proclamation, Barbers should have filed an electoral protest before the SET. G .R. No. 165691 J une 22, 2005 ROB E R T Z. B AR B ER S vs. COMM ISS ION O N ELE CTIONS
Rule : Construing Section 17, Article VI, in Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections the Court held that: x x x The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). x x x With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
Further, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" has been interpreted in this wise: The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s tle. ti But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. Stated in another manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET. In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives: hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s petition . The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate the canvassing returns and alleged of respondent Unico’s proclamat ion. These are tomatters that are of best addressed to theinvalidity sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico’s proclamation is null and
void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
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x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate. Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato’s election protest against respondent Unico would be to usurp the constituti onally mandated functions of the HRET. Petitioner Chato’s
remedy would have been to file an election protest before the said tribunal, not this petition for certiorari. G .R . No. 172131 April 2, 2007 LIWA YWA Y V INZONS -CHA TO, vs. COMM IS S ION ON
EL EC TION S and R ENATO J . UNICO
Case : Petitioner was proclaimed as the Congressman for the Second Legislative District of Taguig City. Private respondent filed 25% an election with the HRET. After revision ballots in 100%for of the protested precincts and of the protest counter-protested precincts, the caseof was submitted resolution upon the parties' submission of memoranda. However, in its Order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation of ballots for the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Order was denied in a HRET Resolution dated October 21, 2008 which reiterated the Order to continue revision in the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with this Court seeking the nullification of said order of revision, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner labels as grave abuse of discretion the HRET’s assumption of the burden of the costs of
the continued revision. For him, the funds of the HRET should not be used for the benefit of a private party, especially when its only objective was to speculate whether "the failed protestant can win." Also, the HRET’s act amounted to an illegal and unconstitutional disbursement of public funds which
is proscribed under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Rule: The petition has no merit. The Court itself has delineated the parameters of its power of review in cases involving the HRET –
... so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court …. the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise
of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. The acts complained of in this case pertain to the HRET’s exercise of its discretion, an exercise
which was well within the bounds of its authority. The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action. In the exercise of its checking function, Court should merely test whether ornot notthat the itgovernmental branch or agency has gone beyond thethe constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, erred or had a different view. G.R . No. 1 85401 J uly 21, 2009 HENR Y " J UN" DUEÑA S , J R ., Pet itioner, vs.
HOU SE OF RE PR ES ENTATIV ES E LECTORA L TRIB UNAL a nd ANGE LIT O " J ETT" P. RE YE S.
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Case: On July 21, 2009, the Court promulgated a Decision dismissing the petition of Dueñas. Said
Decision became final and executory and the HRET continued the proceeding in the electoral protest case. On February 25, 2010, the HRET promulgated its Decision which declared private respondent as the winner with a margin of 37 votes In the instant petition, the main thrust of petitioner's argument is that since private respondent's margin of votes is merely 37, this shows that the alleged reason for the HRET's order of revision, i.e., that the proclaimed results of the congressional elections in Taguig City have been substantially affected by the results of the initial revision and appreciation of ballots, is baseless. Petitioner then continued to reiterate his arguments raised in his earlier petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the HRET Resolution dated October 21, 2008. He also pointed out that the three Justices of the Court who are members of the HRET took no part in the HRET's Decision and Resolution denying reconsideration. It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or
jurisdiction Such showing of grave abuse of discretion is sorely wanting in this case. Petitioner dwells on his theory that there was no justification for the HRET's Order to continue the revision of ballots in 75% of the counter-protested precincts. Since it was eventually determined that private respondent's margin of votes is only 37, this allegedly shows that the results of the initial revision of ballots really had no substantial effect on the proclaimed results and, thus, the order for continuation of revision of ballots was uncalled for. In petitioner's view, the HRET's continuation of revision of ballots, in addition to the circumstance that none of the Supreme Court Justices who are members of the HRET took part in the Decision, are proof that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court has long declared in Dueñas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, that the HRET was acting well within the rules when it ordered the continuation of revision of ballots. Petitioner cannot resurrect his claims, which had been finally adjudged unmeritorious by this Court, through the present petition. Thus, the fact that the HRET went on with the revision of ballots in 75% of the counter-protested precincts cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the electoral tribunal. G .R. No. 1 91550 May 4, 2010 HE NR Y " J UN" DUE ÑAS , J R ., vs. HOUSE OF
RE PRE SE NTATI VES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL a
nd AN GE LIT O "J ETT " P. REY ES
Case : Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification" before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on Elections. Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC and the latter’s disqualification as a candidate on the
ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District Petitioner 27, 2007. was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Laguna on June Private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Political Law 1
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Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. Private respondent’s main ground for the quo warrantoetition p
was that petitioner lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution HRET ruled in favor of private respondent and DECLARED respondent Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez ineligible for the Office of Representative of [the] First District of Laguna for lack of residence in the district and [ORDERS] him to vacate his office. Petitioner suggests that the matters raised in HRET Case No. 07-034 were already passed upon by the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-046 (PES), thus the HRET should have dismissed the case for forum-shopping.
Issue : Whether the HRET had jurisdiction over the case; : The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides VI, Section thereof that the HRET Rule and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall under be theArticle sole judges of all17contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
G.R. No. 187478 December 21, 2009 DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ, vs. HOUSE OF RE PR ES ENTATIVES ELE CTORAL TRIB UNAL a nd J ES US L. VICENTE
Read: G.R. No. 192984 February 28, 2012 ROLANDO D. LAYUG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIANO VELARDE (alias "BROTHER MIKE") and BUHAY PARTYLIST a. Composition The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. Each shall be composed of Nine Members;
Three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman
The remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, Chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
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The use of proportional representation to fill up the six slots reserved for members of the particular house is different from the rule under the 1935 Constitution, which reserved three seats for the majority party and another three seats for the minority party. In Tanada v Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957), the Court ruled that the slot reserved for the minority party should not be filled up by the majority party, even if there was only one member from the minority party. For to fill it up would offset the balance of the tribunal, and this would defeat its neutrality when acting as the sole judge of all election contests. Rule : We hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof saidexclusive Electoral right Tribunal; that the party havingthree the second largestwho number votes in the Senate hastothe to nominate the other (3) Senators shallofsit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio. Tanada v C uenco, 103 P hil. 1051 (1957)
Can the LEGISLATORS be dispemsed with? No. Case: On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 00287 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.
Rule : We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms
and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall beunder its Chairman. The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity Political Law 1
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which they perceive to be the foundation petition of the questioned obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." The other part, of course, is that the provision just as clearly mandates theCourt. participation in the same process of decision of aconstitutional representative or representatives of the Supreme Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators. To our mind, this is the overriding consideration —that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law. It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively. Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function absent its entire membership of power Senators and adjudication that no amendment of its Rules can conferasonsuch, the three Justices-Members alone the of valid of a senatorial election contest. G .R. No. 8 3767 October 27, 1988 FIR DAUS I SMA IL AB B AS vs. THE S E NATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUN AL
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Can the JUSTICES be dispensed with? No.
Rule : ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance. RE QUEST OF J USTICES
ME LE NC IO HE R R E R A, CR UZ AND FE LIC IA NO TO B E R E LIE VE D AS ME MB E R S OF THE HR E T. March 19, 199 1
Party-List Representatives in the HRET: Case : Petitioners assail the composition of the HRET and the Commission on Appointments.
Petitioners pray that respondents be ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and the CA to include party-list representatives in accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA be enjoined from exercising their functions until they have been reorganized.
Issues : Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the Constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. : The Constitution expressly grantsfrom to the House Representatives prerogative, within Rule constitutionally defined limits, to choose among its of district and party-listthe representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to this
Court is premature. G .R . No. 1 41489 Nov ember 29, 2 002 S E NATOR AQUILIN O Q. PIME NTE L, J R ., vs . HOUS E OF R E PR E S E NTATIVE S E LE CTOR AL TR IB UNAL Political Law 1
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b. Nature of Function The sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, and as such; i. The Electoral Commission is a Constitutional creation ii. Functions are mandated by the Constitution iii. Separate from and independent of the legislature Rule: The then Electoral Commission was an independent body, although attached to Congress, The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of remained members srcinally of the National Assembly, intended to beofas unimpaired as if it had in the legislature. Theisexpress lodging thatcomplete power in and the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution Ang ara vs E lectoral Commis s ion, 63 Phil 134
Case: Three justices asked to be relieved from membership in the HRET. According to them, political factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the case, were blocking the accomplishment of their constitutionally mandated task
Rule : In view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance. RE QUEST OF J USTICES
ME LE NC IO HE R R E R A, CR UZ A ND FE LIC IA NO TO B E R E LIE VE D AS ME MB E R S OF THE HR E T. March 19, 199 1
c. Independence of Electoral Tribunals House of Representatives, at the requestTribunal of the dominant party therein, Case: changeMay that the party's representation in the House Electoral to thwart political the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?
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Rule: To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
“The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and
though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature. xxx xxx xxx The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with the judiciary when and whileCommission acting withinfor the of itsofauthority, but the Supreme Court hasbyjurisdiction over the Electoral thelimits purpose determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the Nat ional Assembly.” (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.) The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power. The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
G .R . No. 97710 Sep tember 26, 1991 DR. E MIGDI O A. B ONDOC vs. MAR CIA NO M. PINE DA
d. Powers Rule: The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with itex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and Political Law 1
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qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. G.R. No. 84297 December 8, 1988 CARMELO F. LAZATIN, vs.THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Case Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the 08th May 1995 elections in Eastern Samar were marred by massive electoral irregularities perpetrated or instigated by respondent Ramirez, as well as his leaders and followers. Ramirez denied the charges. He counter-protested the results of the elections in certain precincts where, he claimed, Libanan engaged in massive vote buying, lansadera, terrorism and tearing of the list of voters to disenfranchise voters therein listed. In its assailed decision, the HRET ruled in favor of respondent Ramirez The HRET, denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Libanan contends that the three hundred eleven (311) ballots (265 of which have been for private respondent Ramirez) without the signature of the Chairman of the BEI, but which had the COMELEC water-marks and/or colored fibers, should be invalidated.
Rule : The Constitutions mandates that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall each, respectively, be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs.HRET, venture into the perilous area of the correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of duecalls process or correctaction. an abuse discretion grave or glaring thatMAR no less than the itself for remedial G .R of . No. 1 29783soDecember 22, 1997 CE LINO C. Constitution LI B AN AN,
vs. H OUSE OF RE PR ES ENTATI VES ELE CTORAL TRIB UNAL a nd J OSE T. RAMIREZ e. Judicial Review of decisions of Electoral Tribunals
Case : The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Rule: Judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide
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a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. Co v. E lectoral Tri bunal of the Hous e
of R epresent atives (199 S CR A 692, July, 199 1)
Case : In the 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. Petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chineseofcitizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong’s citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy. HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET.
Rule : The case may have been already become moot.Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime. For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." The question on Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur if she
would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition. In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.. The HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained srcinally in the legislature. Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible. Evidently, there basis to oblige the Tribunal reopen theA naturalization for aa determination of is thenocitizenship of the ascendant of to respondent. petition for quoproceedings warranto is not means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a blatant violation of due process on the part of the persons who will be affected or who are not parties in this Political Law 1
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case G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 RENALD F. VILANDO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. S PE AK E R PR OS PE R O NOG R A LE S
Rule: We agree with the Solicitor General. Preliminarily, we note the established rule vesting jurisdiction in this Court over the instant petition for certiorari. While the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress, this regime however does not bar this Court from entertaining petitions where the threshold of legitimate review is breached. Indeed, it is well-settled that judicial guidance is appropriate where jurisdictional issues are involved or charges of grave abuse of discretion are presented in order that we may vindicate established claims of denial of due process or correct veritable abuses of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action. G .R . No. 189034 J anuary 11, 2010 CE LE S TINO A. MAR TINE Z III vs. HOUS E OF
RE PRE SE NTATI VES ELECTORAL TRIB UNAL AND BE NHUR L. SALIM BANGON Rule: We held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. G.R. No. 190067 March 9, 2010
RE PRE SE NTATI VE A LVI N S. SANDOV AL vs. H OUSE OF RE PRE SE NTATI VES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOSE PHIN E VER ONI QUE R . LACSON- NOEL, a nd HON . SPEA KE R PR OSPE R O NOGRALES 7. Commission on Appointments
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. Section 19. The … Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
Composition Political Law 1
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President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman Twelve Senators, and Twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
The allocation of political parties in the two Houses must thus be reflected proportionately in the Commission. As membership in the Commission, which performs the fundamentally political function of appointment, is based on party affiliation, a defection from one party to another changes the proportion in the respective houses is a valid ground for the reorganization (unlike an Electoral Tribunal; please read and compare with the case of G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991 BONDOC vs PINEDA ) Case: In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the
Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the Commission on appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen srcinally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority. Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was invalidly constituted. The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held:... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress. G .R. No. L-1 9721 May 10, 1962 CA R LOS CUNANA N, vs. J OR G E TAN,
JR.
Case : The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
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The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided only that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That change fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein. On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. We resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in and the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that not such changesseverance must be permanent do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions involving of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. G .R. No. 8 6344 December 21, 1989 R E P. R AUL A . DAZA vs. R E P. LUIS C. S ING SON - Adapted.
Read: G.R. No. 106971 October 20, 1992 TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD) vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993 TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD) vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION
Functions The Commission shall confirm or approve nominations made by the President of certain public officers named by the Constitution or by law: 1. Heads of the executive departments 2. Ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls 3. Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain 4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution122 Sessions and Procedure 1. The Commission on Appointments shall meet to discharge its powers and functions only while the Congress is in session. 2. The meeting may be called by (a) the Chairman, or (b) a majority of all its members. 3. The Chairman of the Commission does not vote, except to break a tie. 122
a. Chairman and members of 3 Constitutional Commissions b. regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council c. members of the Regional Consultative council(Art. VII, Sec. 16)
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4. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from their submission. 5. The Commission rules by a majority vote of all its members. (Secs. 18 & 19 Types of Appointments a. Regular appointment - When the President appoints an officer whose appointment requires confirmation by the Commission, while Congress is in session. The Commission shall act on the appointment submitted to it within thirty session days from their submission. As the Constitution requires positive action by the Commission, failure to act within the 30 day period amounts to a disapproval of the nomination b. Recess (ad-interim) appointment - Occurs when Congress is not in session. the ad-interim appointment made by the President is complete in itself, and thus temporarily effective at once, even without confirmation. When Congress convenes, the Commission would have to act on the appointment 8. Powers of Congress
The Legislative Power Rule : Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. AB AK ADA
vs. HON. CE S AR V. PUR IS IMA G .R. No. 16 6715, Aug ust 1 4, 2008
1. General Plenary Powers Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (Art VI)
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Case : A Davao City Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the tax-exempt status of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for the years 1992 to 1994 in contravention of the mandate under the Local Government Code of 1992) In this case, GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction scheduling the public bidding of GSIS properties located in Matina and Ulas, Davao City for non-payment of realty taxes for the years 1992 to 1994. The GSIS filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and / or Political Law 1
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Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Davao City. It also sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order. On 28 May 1996, the RTC rendered the Decision now assailed before this Court. It concluded that notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code, the GSIS retained its exemption from all taxes, including real estate taxes. The RTC cited Section 33 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146, the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as amended by P. D. No. 1981, which mandated such exemption.
Rule : Concededly, it does not appear that at the very least, the second conditionality of Section 33 has been met. No provision has been enacted "to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the fund." Yet the Court is averse to employing this framework, in the first place as utilized by the RTC, for we recognize a fundamental flaw in Section 33, particularly the amendatory second paragraph introduced by P.D. No. 1981. The second paragraph of Section 33123 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, especially considering that it is a lawmaker’s act that imposes such burden. Only the
Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws. Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative statutes, and the latter should always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict. It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, "[t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change." Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience. It might be argued that Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, does not preclude the repeal of the tax-exempt status of GSIS, but merely imposes conditions for such to validly occur. Yet these conditions, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. Thus, the same rationale for prohibiting irrepealable laws applies in prohibiting restraints on future amendatory laws. President Marcos, who exercised his legislative powers in amending P.D. No. 1146, could not have demanded obeisance from future legislators by imposing restrictions on their ability to legislate amendments or repeals. The concerns that may have militated his enactment of these restrictions need not necessarily be shared by subsequent Congresses. This legislature cannot bind a future 123
Sec. 33. Exemption from tax, Legal Process and Lien.- It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the System shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the system and/or their employees. . . . Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the System, its assets, revenues including the accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the System as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
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legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. G .R . No. 1 27383 A ugus t
18, 2005 THE CITY OF DAVAO, CI TY TRE AS URE R AND TH E CITY ASS ES SOR OF DAVAO CITY vs. T HE R EG ION AL TRIAL COU R T, B RA NCH XI I, D AVAO CITY AND THE G OVER NMENT S E R VIC E IN S UR ANC E S YS TE M (G S IS )
Case : The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade. A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited or by implication the federal constitution limitedwhen or restrained by its own. cannot bindexpressly itself or its successors byby enacting irrepealable lawsorexcept so restrained. EveryIt legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the srcinal act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum. In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures. G .R. No.
196271 February 28, 2012 DATU MICHAE L A B AS K IDA vs . SE NATE OF THE P HILIPP INES
Rule: The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, isexcept as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. G.R. No. 166052 August 29, 2007 ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST GROUP vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA
Limitations on Legislative Power (1) SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS a. Express Limitations 1. Art. III. Bill of Rights. "NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED…". - abridging the freedom of speech, - of expression, - or of the press, - or the right of the people peaceably
for redress of grievances.
to assemble and petition the government
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a. Section 25. (Art VI) 1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. 2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. 3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. 4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. 5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. 6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. 7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shallbillbeis deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations passed by the Congress.
b. Section 29. (Art VI) 1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. 2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. 3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
General Rule: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
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All appropriation… bills, shall srcinate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Sec 24)
88,
General Appropriation – The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Art VII Section 22) The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. (Art. VI Section 25)
Special Appropriation - A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. Transfer of funds already appropriated - No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. (Art. VI Section 25) In Demetria v Alba, , it was held that Sec. 44 of the Budget Act of 1977 (BP 1177) granting the President the blanket authority to transfer funds from one department to another, with or without savings, is unconstitutional.
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Prohibited appropriation to enforce the Separation of Church and State - No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, EXCEPT when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. Rule : On Section 25(5) Article VI: Legislative history makes it evident that the the Constitutional Commission included Section 25(5), to keep a tight rein on the exercise of the power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the President and the other high officials of the Government named therein. The Court stated in Nazareth v. Villar (G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385, 402-404): In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augmentany item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable. It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice. The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction. Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), in the context of a limitation on the President’s discretion over the appropriations during the Budget Execution Phase. On Section 29(1), Article VI: Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers.
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Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. Its power of the purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength, and underpins "all other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of government." Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to spend the money. Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the Programs Activities or Projects (PAPs) for which public money should be spent. It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the public fiscal administration, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure any public money without legislative authorization." To of conform with the governing principles, theofExecutive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated. G .R. No.
209287, J uly 1, 2014 MA R IA CA R OL IN A P. AR AULLO vs . B E NIG NO S IME ON C. AQUINO I II
Case : (Motion for reconsideration) Respondents contend, that withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations under the DAP are savings that may be used for augmentation, and that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments were made pursuant to Section 38 Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code;1 that Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code are consistent with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, which, taken together, constitute "a framework for which economic managers of the nation may pull various levers in the form of authorization from Congress to efficiently steer the economy towards the specific and general purposes of the GAA;" and that the President’s augmentation of deficient items is in accordance with
the standing authority issued by Congress through Section 39. Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: 5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. xxxx Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide: Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. - Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act except for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees. Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits. — Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular Political Law 1
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appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned In the (Earlier) Decision, we said that: Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated could instances not be indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining whether anyallotments of the three existed. This signified that the DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.
Rule Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with. In this connection, the respondents must always be reminded that the Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform. No act that conflicts with the Constitution can be valid G .R. No.
209287 February 3, 2015 MA R IA CAR OL INA P. A R AULLO vs . B E NI G NO S IME ON C . A QUI NO III
3. TAX laws a. Section 28. (Art VI) 1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Uniformity in taxation says Black on Constitutional Law (page 292) means that all taxable articles or kinds of property, of the same class, shall be taxed at the same rate. It does not mean that lands, chattels, securities, incomes, occupations, franchises, privileges, necessities, and luxuries, shall all be assessed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts, provided the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere, with all people, and at all times. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
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Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class . (Bernas) Taxation is said to be equitable when its burden falls on those better able to pay. Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of the person affected - Fernando Rule: Anent the issue of regressivity, it may be conceded that the assailed law imposes an excise tax on cigarettes which is a form of indirect tax, and thus, regressive in character. While there was an attempt to make the imposition of the excise tax more equitable by creating a four-tiered taxation system where higher priced cigarettes are taxed at a higher rate, still, every consumer, whether rich or poor, of a cigarette brand within a specific tax bracket pays the same tax rate. To this extent, the tax does not take into account the person’s ability to pay. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the assailed law may be declared unconstitutional for being regressive in character because the Constitution does not prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes but merely provides that Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic and political inequalities [Art. XIII, Section 1] or for the promotion of the right to "quality education" [Art. XIV, Section 1]. These provisions are put in the Constitution as Bmoral legislation, notvs as. Jjudicially enforceable rights April 15, 2009 R ITISincentives H AME R ICtoAN TO B A CCO OS E IS ID R O N. C AMA CHOG .R . No. 163583 2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. 3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. 4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
b. Section 4. (Art XIV) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
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4. JURISDICTION of the Supreme Court Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. (Art VI)
Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution had no counterpart in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitution. Its prospective operation was illustrated in Fabian v. Desierto wherein the Court reappraised the mode of review to be taken from orders, directives or decisions in administrative disciplinary cases rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman. It struck down Section 27 of Republic Act No. 677013 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 0714 for having contravened said Section 30, Article VI of the Charter. The statute in question, which was approved on November 17, 1989, provided for an appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari "in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." The Court ruled that, in effect, the statute expanded its appellate jurisdiction without the Court’s advice and concurrence.124
Rule: In Fabian v. Desierto (G.R. No. 129742, 295 SCRA 470), Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasijudicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman - G.R.
No. 1 33715 February 23 , 2000 DOUGLA S R . VILLA VE R T, vs. HON. ANIA NO A. DE S IE R TO.
5. Title of ROYALTY Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted. (Art VI) Sec. 9, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution provided in part: "No law granting a title of nobility shall be enacted ...." This was later amended by Sec. 10, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Sec. 31, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, to read: "No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted."
Opinion: A democracy in its pure state is one where the majority of the people, under the principle
of "one person, one vote," directly run the government. A republic is one which has no monarch, royalty or nobility, ruled by a representative government elected by the majority of the people under the principle of "one person, one vote," where all citizens are equally subject to the laws. A republic is also known as a representative democracy. The democratic and republican ideals are intertwined, and converge on the common principle of equality -- equality in voting power, and equality under the law. - G .R. No. 18 9793 April 7 , 2010 S E NATOR B E NIGNO SIME ON C. A QUIN O III a nd MAYOR
J E S S E R OB R E DO vs . COMMIS S ION ON E LE C TIONS Opi nion of CAR PIO, J . G.R . No. 189793
Rule: The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that titles of royalty or nobility have been maintained
and appear to be accorded some value among some members of certain cultural groups in our society. At the same time, such titles of royalty or nobility are not generally recognized or acknowledged socially in the national community. No legal rights or privileges are contingent upon grant or possession a title of such nobility or royalty and76565 the Constitution forbids the enactment of any lawofconferring a title. G.R. No. November expressly 9, 1988 BULLETIN
PUBLISHING CORP 124
ORATION v s. HO N. J UDGE EDILBE RTO NOEL
G.R. No. 140903 September 12, 2001 HENRY SY vs. COMMISSION ON SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
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b. Implied Limitations 1. PROHIBITION AGAINST DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS Principle: NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS (For all Branches of Government) As a general rule, legislative powers cannot be delegated The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest. This rule is based upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.125 This rule however admits of recognized exceptions such as the grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law; (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Case : Due to massive irregularities during the Nursing Board Exam, on 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 The Review Center Association of the Philippines, an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits
125
Opinion: If we were to accord deference to the rule of delegata potestas delegare non potest, therefore, such srcinal power could not be delegated… for the rule was rooted in the ethical principle that delegated power constituted not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment, not through the intervening mind of another. G.R. No. 170146 HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, , v. ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR (BERSAMIN, J)
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to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers.
Rule : The OSG argues that President Arroyo was merely exercising her executive power to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The OSG further argues that President Arroyo was exercising her residual powers under Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), particularly Section 20, Title I of Book III, thus: Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. Section Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks of other powers vested in the President under the law. The20, exercise of the President’s residual powers under this provision requires legislation, as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be
"provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order
without a prior leg is lation gr anting her s uch power.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. In Ople v. Torres, the Court declared void, as a usurpation of legislative power, Administrative Order No. 308 (AO 308) issued by the President to create a national identification system. AO 308 mandates the adoption of a national identification system even in the absence of an enabling legislation. The Court distinguished between Legislative and Executive powers, as follows: The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their srcinal, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of as thea Executive President is the Chief Heemployees represents government whole and Department, sees to it thatthe all laws are enforced by theExecutive. officials and of the his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has Political Law 1
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the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. x x x. An administrative order is: "Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders." An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. x x x. Just like AO 308 in Ople v. Torres, EO 566 in this case is not supported by any enabling law. The Court further stated in Ople: x x x. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws." Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs. G.R.
No. 180046 April 2, 2009 REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EXECU TIVE S ECR ETARY EDU ARDO ER MITA
Rule: Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule, a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, confronted with an substitute interpretative is free or to (i) forceintermediate of law to the rule; (ii) go to the when opposite extreme and its rule, judgment; (iii)give givethesome degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
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It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law Petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles. G.R.
No. 179579 February 1, 2012 COMMISS IONE R OF C USTOMS and the DIS TR ICT C OLLE CTOR OF TH E POR T OF SUBIC vs. HYPER MIX FEEDS C ORPOR ATIO N
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in concluding that Section 1 of PD 755 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB shares to the coconut farmers
Rule : It is a fundamental … that Congress may not delegate its legislative power…. What cannot be delegated is the authority … to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority…. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. (Edu v. Ericta No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 496-49) Jurisprudence is consistent as regards the two tests, which must be complied with to determine the existence of a valid delegation of legislative power. In Abakada Guro Party List, et al. v. Purisima, We reiterated the discussion, to wit: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test - A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. (2) the sufficient standard test. - It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to
be implemented. In the instant case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. As may be noted, the decree authorizes the PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the farmers Agreement forpay thefrom acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not coconut even state who under are tothe be considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a Political Law 1
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farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency. Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the disposition of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement of the national policy declared under it. To recall, P.D. No. 755 seeks to "accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development." The said law gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals, and converted them exclusively into private property without any restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose G.R. Nos. 177857-58 January 24, 2012 PHILIPPINE COCONUT, PRODUCERS
FEDE RA TIO N, I NC. ( COCOFED) vs R EPUBLIC OF THE P
HILI PPINES
Read: - Fort Bonifacio vs. Cirevenue 602 SCRA 178 - Gutierrez vs DBM 616 SCRA 1 Other Cases; Rule : The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly theConstitution. power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision ofofthe Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Political Law 1
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For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. xxxx (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, we held that the "power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws," and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. Political Law 1
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Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office , and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national offic ial. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a selfevident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Artic le X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers
"[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x." The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that: Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional. Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy, nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since partylist members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces. G .R . No. 177597 J uly
16, 2008 BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN Rule: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:
(1) the completeness test - A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
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(2) the sufficient standard test. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the co nditions under which it is to be implemented. At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest. A B AK ADA vs . HON. C E S A R V. PUR IS IMA G .R . No.
166715, Aug us t 14, 2008
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON THE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS As a general rule, legislative powers cannot be delegated, what can be delegated is the execution of the laws under acceptable standards limiting discretion of the executive. The Constitution, however, provides certain specific exemptions. A. Delegation to the PRESIDENT Emergency Powers Section 23. 1. xxx 2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. (Art VI)
Taxing Powers Section 28. 2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (Art VI) Examples;
Rule: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. The relevant statutes to execute this provision are: 1) The TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE which authorizes the President, in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, to, inter alia, prohibit the importation of any commodity
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2) Executive Order No. 226, the OMNIBUS INVESTMENT CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES which was issued on July 16, 1987, by then President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power under the Provisional Freedom Constitution, empowers the President to approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of any equipment or raw materials or finished products. 3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the "SAFEGUARD MEASURES ACT" , and entitled "An Act Protecting Local Industries By Providing Safeguard Measures To Be Undertaken In Response To Increased Imports And Providing Penalties For Violation Thereof," designated the Secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture, in their capacity as alter egos of the President, as the implementing authorities of THE SAFEGUARD MEASURES, WHICH INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, MODIFICATION OR IMPOSITION OF ANY QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON THE IMPORTATION OF A PRODUCT INTO THE PHILIPPINES. G .R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006. EXE CUTIVE S E CR E TAR Y vs. S OUTHWING
HEAVY IND USTR IES , IN C Read: G.R. No. 158540 July 8, 2004 SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, vs THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURERS CORP
B. Delegation to the PEOPLE Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. (Art VII)
C. Delegation to LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and levy taxes, fees and subject limitations as the may to provide, consistent withcharges the basic policytoofsuch localguidelines autonomy.and Such taxes, fees, andCongress charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments. (Art X)
Rule: In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assume s even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz: "Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments." This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the country’s highly centralized government structure has bred a culture of dependence among local
government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also "dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government leaders." The only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, Section 3 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to Political Law 1
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enact a local government code that will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy , set the guidelines and limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet that: The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is summarized in Icard v. City Council of Baguio : It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris . Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions – all these – have no placesupplied] in the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation. [Underscoring xxxx Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges." Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide." In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal matters. Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by the statute. "Under the now prevailing Constitution , where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute , the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous , the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just." G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015 JOSE J. FERRER, JR. vs. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY
D. Quasi-Legislative Bodies Quasi-Legislative power is the authority delegated by Congress to the administrative bodies to adopt rules and regulations made to implement existing laws and implement legislative policies. Case: Rule; The validity of an administrative issuance, hinges on compliance with the following requisites: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; 2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; 3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; Political Law 1
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4. It must be reasonable. G.R. No. 175220 February 12, 2009 WILLIAM C. DAGAN, vs. PHILIPPINE R AC ING COM MISS ION
2. PROHIBITION AGAINST THE PASSAGE OF IRREPEALABLE LAWS It is axiomatic that all laws, even the Constitution itself, may be repealed or amended. No one can bind future generations to a law. Rule: The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasijudicial… Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. B edol v. Comm is s ion on Elect ions G .R . 179830, Dece mber 3, 20 09, 606 S CR A 554,
569-571. Rule: “It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, "[t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change." Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience”. G .R . No. 127383 Aug us t 18, 2005 THE CITY OF DA VAO, CITY TR E A S UR E R AND THE CITY AS S E S S OR OF DAVAO CITY, vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO CITY AND THE GOVERNMEN T SER VICE INSU RA NCE S YSTEM (GSIS)
(2) PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS Section 26. 1. xxxx 2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. (Art VI) Section 27. 1. Every bill passed by the shall, sign before it becomesheashall law, veto be presented to the President. If he approves theCongress same he shall it; otherwise, it and return the same with his objections to the House where it srcinated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the Political Law 1
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objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it srcinated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. xxxx. (Art VI)
Rule : Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the
absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress. In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of Congress Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. - the following is the procedure for the approval of bills: “A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for
some measures that must srcinate only in the former chamber. The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study. The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill. Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill. The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed. Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference committee representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his consideration. The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers… “ The President’s role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication. Political Law 1
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Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law. From the moment the any law becomes any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play role in theeffective, implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law. AB A K A DA vs . HON. C E S A R V. PUR IS IMA G .R . No. 166715, A ug us t 14, 2008
2. Question Hour Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest Political Law 1
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so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. (Art VI)
The heads of departments shall, appear before, and be heard, by any house, on any matter pertaining to their departments: (i) upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President; or (ii) upon request of either house, as the rules of that house shall provide. Written questions shall be submitted to the presiding officer of the house at least 3 days before the scheduled appearance. The purpose is to enable the cabinet member to prepare. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires, and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. Case : The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) “Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows: SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing other unlawful provisions of the contract the North Rail another Project. Senate President Drilonand received from Executive Secretary Ermita acovering copy of E.O. 464, and letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the North Rail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the
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President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President."
Rule : Section 1 is similar to Section 3126 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately. Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’
possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, 1there is no reference to executive atConstitution all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section is grounded on Article VI, Sectionprivilege 22 of the on what has been referred to as the question hour. Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour. So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its srcinal position as Section 20 in the srcinal draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it. An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed. 126
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
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The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of
its legislative function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes: Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source – even from officials of departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation prevails in a parliamentary system Itsuch as that Britain, a clear separation between which the legislative and executive branches. is this veryinseparation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversig ht function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. . In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power Political Law 1
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of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice. G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R.
ERMITA
3. Legislative Investigations Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. (Art VI)
Limitations: First., the investigation must be in aid of legislation. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress Secondly, the investigation must be in accordance with duly published rules of procedure of Congress And thirdly, the Constitution further mandates that the rights of witnesses appearing in or affected by such inquiries must be respected Each house its committees conduct "inquiries in aid of legislation" according to or its any dulyofpublished rules ofmay procedures. Rule: The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its committees. The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno, a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to
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answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s
certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s
duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry Political Law 1
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conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fallorder, under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this clauses, term figures prominently in the challenged it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464. G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R.
ERMITA
Rule : The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." G .R . No. 1 70338 December 23, 2008 VIR G ILIO O. G AR CIL LA NO,
vs. T HE HOU SE OF RE PR ES ENTATIV ES COM MITT EE S Case All the limitations embodied in : Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is
shattered. Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules. The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that same shall be effective in Gsubsequent or until they amended or repealed to the sufficiently put public on notice. .R . No. 1806Congresses 43 Sept ember 4, 2008 NEare RI vs. S E NA TE C OMMI TTE E (note, there are 2 Neri vs S enate cas es 549 S C R A 77, and 564 S C R A
52)
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Case : As evidenced by Arnault v. Nazareno and Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, among
others, the Court has not shirked from reviewing the exercise by Congress of its power of legislative inquiry. Arnault recognized that the legislative power of inquiry and the process to enforce it, "is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." On the other hand, Bengzon acknowledged that the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not "absolute or unlimited", and its exercise is circumscribed by Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. From these premises, the Court enjoined the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring the petitioners in Bengzon from testifying and producing evidence before the committee, holding that the inquiry in question did not involve any intended legislation. Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus: As discussed in Arnault, in thethe power of inquiry, "withIfprocess to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information legislative process. the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era", however, the right of Congress to conduct inquirites in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s
certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s
duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances… wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive Congress without the President’s consent notwithstanding the officials from testifyingprivilege before to invocation of executive justify such prohibition. The Court did not rule that the power to conduct legislative inquiry ipso facto superseded the claim of executive privilege, acknowledging instead that the viability of executive privilege stood on a case to case basis. Should neither branch yield to the other branch’s assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if Political Law 1
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the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries. Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action should be directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces, the persons who wield authority and control over the actions of the officers concerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any defenses against the same — whether grounded on executive privilege, national security or similar concerns — would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All the constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of government may be raised, assessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply with the decision of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor. Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. This is the fair and workable solution implicit in the constitutional allocation of powers among the three branches of government. The judicial filter helps assure that the particularities of each case would ultimately govern, rather than any overarching principle unduly inclined towards one branch of government at the expense of the other. The procedure may not move as expeditiously as some may desire, yet it ensures thorough deliberation of all relevant and cognizable issues before one branch is compelled to yield to the other. Moreover, judicial review does not preclude the legislative and executive branches from negotiating a mutually acceptable solution to the impasse. After all, the two branches, exercising as they do functions and responsibilities that are political in nature, are free to smooth over the thorns in their relationship with a salve of their own choosing. And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts. G.R.
No. 170165 Aug ust 15, 2006 B/G E N. (RE T.) FRA NCIS CO V. G UDANI vs. LT./ G E N. GE NER OSO S . S E NG A R ead - Philocom s at vs S enate: 673 S CR A 611
Distinction between Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22) and Legislative Investigation (id., Sec. 21)
Persons who may appear Who conducts the investigation Subject-matter: Attendance
Question Hour Only a department head;
Legislative Investigation Any person.
Entire body
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees. Any matter for the purpose of legislation compulsory
Matters related to the department only discretionary
4. Act as Board of Canvassers for presidential and Vice Presidential elections Section 4. xxx
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The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.xxx (Art VII)
5. Call a special election in case of vacancy in the offices of President and VicePresident Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election. (Art VII)
Timeline Day 0
Vacancy occurs
Day 3
Congress convenes without need of call
“The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the
Congress passes the special election law, if it has not passed before this date
“Within seven days, enact a law calling for a
(10 am on the third day)
Day 10 (Within seven days)
Day 55 to 70
morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and VicePresident occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call ” special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call.”
Election is held
(..not earlier than fortyfive days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call) Day 85 to 100
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As the case may be canvassing by Congress, if it has not done so earlier. Under the Constitution then a vacancy is filled by the 100th day from the vacancy at the latest
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Certain Exemptions Certification - The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution Approval by the President - The Bill shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. (There is no president to approve as the position is vacant) Availability of funds - Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. (This is one of the instances when the bill becomes a law even without the signature of the President) Suspension and Postponement - The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. Limitation: No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election. 6. Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus place the Philippines or any partsuspension thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the or proclamation of martial law or the of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
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The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Art VII)
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, the President may
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. 7. Approve Presidential Amnesties Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Art VII)
8. Confirm certain appointments (1) Art. VII, Sec. 9 (By Congress) Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The President shall nominate a Vice-President (in case of the vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected) from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office Political Law 1
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upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately (2) Id., Sec. 16 (By the Commission on Appointments) Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
The Commission shall confirm or approve nominations made by the President of certain public officers named by the Constitution or by law: 1. Heads of the executive departments 2. Ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls 3. Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain 4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; a. Chairman and members of 3 Constitutional Commissions b. regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council c. members of the Regional Consultative council (Art. VII, Sec. 16) 9. Concur in Treaties Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Art VII)
Cross refer with Sec. 25 of ARTICLE XVIII (TRANSITORY PROVISIONS) Case: G.R. No. 175888 February 11, 2009, SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON vs. ALBERTO ROMULO
Sec. 25 of ARTICLE XVIII (TRANSITORY PROVISIONS) of the Constitution expressly provides that after the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except; a. under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, b. wheninthe Congress so requires, ratified by apurpose, majority of the votes cast by the people a national referendum held for that c. and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. 10. Declaration of war and delegation of emergency powers Political Law 1
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Section 23. 1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. 2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. (Art VI)
Declaration of war - The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. Delegation of emergency powers - In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may authorize the President, for a limited period and subject such restrictions as the law may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress, unless sooner withdrawn by its resolution. 11. Be judge of the President's physical fitness Section 11. xxx If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. Xxx (Art VII)
Three ways in which the President may be declared unable to discharge his functions under this article: (1) Upon his own written declaration When the President himself transmits to the Senate President and Speaker of the House his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall discharge such powers and duties as Acting President, until the President transmit to the Senate President and Speaker a written declaration that he is able to discharge his powers and duties. (2) Upon the first written declaration by majority of his Cabinet Upon such transmittal, the Vice-President shall "immediately" assume the office as Acting President. The President can contest this by transmitting to the Senate President and Speaker his written declaration that no inability exists. Upon such transmittal, he shall reassume his office.
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(3) Upon determination by Congress by 2/3 vote of all its members voting separately, acting on the 2nd written declaration by the Cabinet. If the majority of all the members of the Cabinet really believe otherwise, they can contest this "declaration of non-inability" by again sending a second written declaration to the Senate President and Speaker, within 5 days from the time the President transmitted his written declaration of non-inability. It is this second cabinet written "declaration of inability" that brings in the Congress as judge of the President's ability to discharge his office. (The Vice-President in this second instance does not act as President: the President having spoken as against his Cabinet, his declaration entitles him to stay until Congress says otherwise. But if the Cabinet submits the declaration more than 5 days after the President reassumes office, this may be viewed as a new declaration, and so the Vice-President can immediately act as President.) Congress must convene (a) Within 10 days after receipt of the 2nd written declaration by the Cabinet, if it is in session, or (b) Within 12 days after it is required to assemble by its respective presiding officer, if it is not in session.
In a joint session, the Congress shall decide the President's ability. Two-thirds vote by each house, voting separately, is required to declare the President's inability. In other words, if 2/3 of each house vote that the President must step down, the Vice-President shall act as President. But if it is less than 2/3 (of each House), the President shall continue in office.
12. Power of Impeachment (1) Who are subject to impeachment Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Art XI)
a. b. President Vice-President c. Justices of the Supreme Court d. Members of the Constitutional Commissions e. Ombudsman Political Law 1
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(2) Grounds for impeachment a) Culpable violation of the Constitution b) Treason (RPC) c) Bribery (RA 3019) d) Graft and corruption (RA 3019) e) Other high crimes f) Betrayal of public trust (3) Purpose – Not to punish but to remove an officer who does not deserve to be in office (Bernas) (4) Limitation: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. [Art. XI, Sec. 3(5)] (5) Forum: The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. [Art. XI, Sec. 3(1) (6) Procedure for impeachment Section 3. 1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. 2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee three session days thereafter. Committee, aftersixty hearing, and days by a majority vote of allwithin its Members, shall submit its report The to the House within session from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. 3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. 4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. 5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. 6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Art XI) INITIATION STAGE Political Law 1
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1) If initiated by less than 1/3 [Secs. 3(2)-(4)] (a) A verified complaint for impeachment is filed with the House of Representative by: (i) a member of the House of Representatives, or (ii) any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member of the House. (b) The complaint must be included in the Order of Business within 10 session days upon receipt thereof. (the purpose is to prohibit any delay) (c) Not later than 3 session days after, including the complaint in the Order of Business, it must be referred (by the Speaker) to the proper committee (usually, the Committee on Justice and Order). (d) The Committee has 60 session days from receipt of the referral to conduct hearings (to see if there is probable cause), to vote by an absolute majority, and to submit report and its resolution to the House. (e) The resolution shall be calendared for consideration and general discussion by the House within 10 session days from receipt thereof. (f) After the discussion, a vote is taken, with the vote of each member recorded. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the House is needed to "affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or to override its contrary resolution." If the Committee made a favorable recommendation (i.e., it recommended that the complaint be sent over to the Senate), 1/3 of all the members are needed to approve such recommendation. If the Committee made a contrary recommendation (i.e., it recommended the dismissal of the complaint), 1/3 of all the members are needed to disapprove or override this report. In other words, so long as 1/3 of the lower house votes to proceed with the trial, then the case would be sent to the Senate, regardless of the committee recommendation, and regardless of the number who vote (which, could even be as high as 66% of the entire House), that it should not be sent to the Senate for trial. The reason is that the initiation stage does not determine the guilt or innocence of the officer being impeached. It merely determines whether there is a prima facie case against the officer that merits a full blown trial in the Senate. 2) If initiated by 1/3 [Art. XI, Sec. 3(4)] If the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. This means that the entire process is cut short. There is no need for a Committee report and discussion anymore, since the end result is that 1/3 of the members of the House have decided to send the case for trial. B) TRIAL STAGE
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a) The Articles of Impeachment of the Committee is forwarded to the Senate, which has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, for trial. b) When sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment case, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. c) As a general rule, the President of the Senate presides over an impeachment trial. But when it is the President of the Philippines who is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the presiding officer, but he shall not vote. d) To carry out a conviction, the vote of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate (16 Senators) is required. If less than 2/3 vote that the officer is guilty, the effect is acquittal. e) The judgment of the Senate (like thecourt judgment of the House on(Unlike whether to that initiate) political question that cannot be reviewed by the (Romulo v Yniguez). a law can is beareviewed by the courts because of the existence of constitutional standards, this judgment cannot be reviewed, for the Constitution itself has granted the discretion to this co-equal branch to appreciate the case as presented.)
(7) Consequences of Impeachment Section 3. 7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. (Art XI)
Shall not extend further than removal from office and - Disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but - The party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. (Art XI) - The judgment of the Senate (like the judgment of the House on whether to initiate) is a political question that cannot be reviewed by the court (Romulo v Yniguez). Case : Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties’ interpretation, its impeachment complaint could
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(460 Phil. 830 Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco. v. The House of epresentatives R (2003).) states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that "no second verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action" which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint. From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress’ Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings ─ Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V thereof ─ "clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term ‘initiate’ a meaning different from
filing and referral. Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambong’s statements that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint. Petitioner fails to consider the verb "starts" as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the House’s
action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase. G.R. No. 193459 February 1 5, 2011 MA. MER CE DITAS N. GUT IER R EZ vs. TH E HOUSE OF R EP R ES ENTATIVES COMM ITT EE ON JUSTICE Read: Corona vs Senate 676 SCRA 563
13. Power with regard to the utilization of natural resources Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases
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of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on realthe contributions the economic growth andand general welfare of the country. In such agreements, State shall topromote the development use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Art XII) 9. The Legislative Process
a. Requirements as to bills (1) As to titles of bills Section 26 1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. (Art VI)
Case : The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that, among others, its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes
Rule: We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud legislature means of and provisions in bills which the title gives no intimation, and whichupon mightthe therefore be by overlooked carelessly andof unintentionally adopted; and
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(3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith." The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law. G .R . No. 10 5371
November 11, 1993 THE PHILIP PINE J UDGE S A S S OCIA TION, vs. HON. PE TE PR ADO Read: De Guzman vs COMELEC 336 SCRA 188 Banat vs COMELEC 595 SCRA 4777
The weight of the title of Bills / Statutes Case: Petitioners attacked the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84 (prohibition and closure
ordinance) which was anchored on Republic Act No. 938 as amended, entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.
Rule: Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs, to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise.. G .R. No. L-
42571-72 J uly 25, 1983, VICENTE DE L A CR UZ, vs. T HE HONOR AB LE E DG AR DO L. PA R AS Read: Fariňas vs Executive 417 SCRA 503
Tatad vs Secretary 281 SCRA 330 and 282 SCRA 337 Political Law 1
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(2) Requirements as to certain laws a. Origin of Bills Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall srcinate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Art VI)
An appropriation bill is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of funds from the public treasury. revenue bill is one that levies taxes and raises funds for the government, while a A tariff bill specifies the rates or duties to be imposed on imported articles.
A bill increasing the public debt is illustrated by one floating bonds for public subscription redeemable after a certain period. A bill of local application is one involving purely local or municipal matters, like a charter of a city. Private bills are illustrated by a bill granting honorary citizenship to a distinguished
foreigner. Case . Some of the petitioners Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "srcinate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."
Rule: The contention has no merit. In sum, while Art. VI, §24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "srcinate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following: (1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make make and changes in the omitting adding orinaltering language; (3) to endorse anbill entirely neworbill as a sections substitute, which its case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all. (A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950)) Political Law 1
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To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to srcinate in the House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of the srcinal body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made. G .R . No. 11 5455 Oct ober 30, 19 95 AR TURO M. TOLE NTINO
vs. T HE SE CRE TARY OF FIN ANCE
Rule : Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads: Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall srcinate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that srcinated from the House? The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court held, thus: . . . To begin with, it is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to "srcinate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill srcinating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law – must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senat e’s power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, it can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to srcinate in the House.. . . Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively srcinated in the House of Representatives, theit Senate acting within its constitutional to introduce amendments to the House bill when includedwas provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950power amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from Political Law 1
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the House of Representatives is to bring in sizeable revenues for the government G .R . No. 168056 S eptember 1, 2005 AB AK A DA G UR O PAR TY LIS T (Formerly AAS J AS ) OFFIC E R S S AMS ON S . ALCA NTAR A and E D VINC E NT S . A LB ANO, P etitioners , vs . THE HONOR AB LE E XE CUTI VE S E CR E TA R Y E DUA R DO E R MITA
b. Appropriations Bills Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (art VII) Section 25. 1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. 2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. 3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. 4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. 5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President Court, of the Senate, Speaker of the HouseCommissions of Representatives, Chief of the Supreme and the the heads of Constitutional may, bythe law, be Justice authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. 6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. 7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. (Art VI)
Case: Assailed in this petition is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." authorizing the President of the Philippines. "to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department... to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office...."
Rule : The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: Political Law 1
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The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. G .R . No. 71977 February 27 , 1987 DE METR IO G . DE METR IA ,
vs. HO N. MANUEL A LB A
Case : This is a case whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. 1. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. (Here, the budget for education has tripled and the compensation for teachers has doubled. This is a clear compliance with the constitutional mandate giving highest priority to education.) Congress is certainly without any power, onlydebt, by its judgment, an appropriation, that cannot reasonably service our guided enormous thegood greater portion to of provide which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to Political Law 1
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education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional. 2. Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury. The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four major phases as aptly discussed by the Solicitor General: The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases: 1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities into expenditure levels. 2. Legislative authorization. –– At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law. 3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle. 4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs. G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991 TE OF IS TO T. G UING ONA, J R . and A QUILINO Q. PIME NTE L, J R ., vs . HON. GUI LLERMO CARA GUE
Read: - BRILLANTES VS COMELEC 423 SCRA 269 - ATITIW VS. ZAMORA 471 SCRA 329
c. Tax Laws Section 28. ii. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
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iii. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. iv. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, nonprofit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. v. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Art VI) Section 4. xxx 2. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law. 3. Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment. 4. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or co ntributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.ART ( XIV)
Taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. The power to tax, being is inherently legislative. Exceptions; a. Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. b. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments. (Sec 5, Art X) c. The taxing power may also be exercised by the President as part of his emergency powers. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise necessary and proper carry outsuch a declared national policy. Unless soonerpowers withdrawn by resolution of thetoCongress, powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
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Settled is the rule that, in case of doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. This is because taxes, as burdens which must be endured by the taxpayer, should not be presumed to go beyond what the law expressly and clearly declares. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 148 SCRA 315 (1987); Collector of Internal Revenue v. La Tondeña, Inc., 5 SCRA 665 (1962); Manila Railroad Co. v. Collector of Customs, 52 Phil. 950 ( 1929)
However, any question regarding the constitutionality of a tax measure must be resolved in favor of its validity. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. This is as taxation is the very lifeblood of government. Any doubt as to the applicability of a tax exemption granted to a person must be resolved against the exemption. Taxation of religious and charitable institutions - Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. Read: - YMCA vs CA 298 SCRA 83 - Chavez vs PCGG 299 SCRA 744 - Lung Center vs Quezon City 433 SCRA 119 - Executive vs Southwing 482 SCRA 673 Other cases Case : Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," mainly because the Act allegedly did not srcinate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue : Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have srcinated in the House of Representatives.
Rule : Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, srcinate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not srcinate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
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Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should srcinate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance. There, on the matter of therequired Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally to srcinate exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained: . . . To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to "srcinate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill srcinating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. xxx xxx xxx It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. .G .R. No. 11 8303 J anuary 31 , 1996 S E NATOR HEHE R S ON T. AL VAR E Z, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, J R
Read: - Arroyo vs de Venecia 291 SCRA 433 - Tolentino vs Secretary 235 SCRA 433 - Abakada vs Executive
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President’s Veto Power Section 27. (Art VI) 1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it srcinated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it srcinated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. 2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
There is generally no partial veto allowed under the Constitution. However, in appropriation, revenue and tariff bills - President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. Read: - Gonzales vs Macaraeg 191 SCRA 452 - Bengzon vs Drillon 208 SCRA 133 - CA vs Enriques 235 SCRA 506 Legislative veto
Rule : Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically
utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it. Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations law to Congress which, by regulations itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power"of to aapprove or disapprove such before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated Political Law 1
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broad powers G.R . No . 166715 August 1 4, 2008 AB AK ADA G URO PA R TY LIS T vs. HON . CES AR
V. PU R ISIMA
b. Effectivity of Laws See: Taňada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 Taňada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Law: E.O. 200 June 18, 1987 Amending Article 2 of the Civil Code 10. Initiative and Referendum (a) theenact power of the people to propose amendments thepurpose. Constitution or toInitiative" propose is and legislations through an election called fortothe There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. Read: - Garcia vs COMELEC 237 SCRA 279 - SBMA vs COMELEC 262 SCRA 492 - Santiago vs COMELEC 270 SCRA 106 B. Executive Department 1. The President
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a. Qualifications, Election, Term and Oath Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years immediately preceding such election. (Art VII)
Qualifications 1) Natural-born citizen 2) Registered voter 3) Able to read and write 4) 40 years of age on the day of election 5) Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers province or city,ofshall be transmitted to the the Congress, directed to the President of of theeach Senate. Upon receipt the certificates of canvass, President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
TERM – A term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. ELECTION: By direct vote of the people Political Law 1
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Regular - Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. Rule: For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.127 G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986 IN
RE : SATURNIN O B ER MUDEZ
Special - When a vacancy occurs in the offices of President and Vice- President more than eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election, a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President shall be called (Art VII, 10.) In PBA v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455, Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamation and assumption into office by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorize the Batasan to pass a Snap Election Law? The Court could have validly issued an injunction to stop the COMELEC from proceeding with the preparations for the election. But it did not, citing its delay in deciding the case and the sentiments of the people that developed in the meantime as reason for its inaction. According to the court, what at first was a legal question became a political question because it was overtaken by events.128 RE-ELECTION - The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. Read: G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010, ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, vs. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL - The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. Case: Santiago and Ramos were contenders to the Presidential Election on the year 1992. Ramos emerged winner, hence the protest of Santiago. In the interim, Santiago ran and won as senator in the 1995 elections.
Issue : Whether this case had been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995 127
Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.] 128 See BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 883 - AN ACT CALLING A SPECIAL ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER OF THE HOLDING THEREOF, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, in relation to G.R. No. 72915 (Philippine Bar Association, et. al. vs. The Commission on Elections, et. al.)
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Rule: Indeed, it would be entirely different where the protestant pursued the new position through a popular election, as in the case of Protestant Santiago who filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and submitted herself to be voted upon. She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign, she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation. In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of Senator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for which she was elected. area givens whichand are public in full accord principle must enshrined the Constitution that, public These office is public trust, officerswith andthe employees at all in times be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery. The Tribunal, nonetheless, confirmed its power to dismiss an electoral case on technical grounds.… the Rules of the Tribunal allow summary dismissal of election protests even for less important grounds, to repeat, such as the petition filed with the Tribunal or the annexes attached thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and cash deposits were not filed within the periods fixed in the Rules, and the additional provision for dismissal under Rule 61. WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof. Case No . 001 February 13, 1996 MIR IA M DEF E NS OR - vs. FIDE L VA LDE Z
RAMOS
Case On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President 129 of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
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Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No person may be elected President unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philip pines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election”
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Petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads: "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose." The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-PresidentElect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise – "Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines. "Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest. "Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner." The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as Political Law 1
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being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 TE CS ON vs. COMELEC
Case : Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital. However, neither the Protestee’s proclamation by Congress nor the death ofher main rival as a
fortuitous intervening event, appears to abate the present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all. The oracular function of this Tribunal, it would appear, needs to be fully exercised to make manifest here and abroad who is the duly elected leader of the Filipino nation. Needless to stress, this Tribunal cannot shirk its constitutional duty. Yet, neither could it go beyond its mandate under the Constitution and the law. Further, this Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules of Court in a suppletory manner. Considering the transcendental importance of the electoral contest involving the Presidency, a rush to judgment is simply out of the question. Yet decide the matter we must, without further delay, to prevent popular unrest and avoid further destabilization of government at the highest level. Plainly, the issue here is: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case?
It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant / intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. We have held as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest Political Law 1
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proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit We are not unaware that a contest before election tribunals has two aspects. First, it is in pursuit of one’s right to a public office, and second, it is imbued with public interest.
But herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the "paramount public interest" in mind that she desires "to pursue the process" commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is "pursuing the process" to determine who truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on intervention in thetoabsence of such a rule in the Rules. In such intervention, interest allows a person intervene in a suit must bePET in the matter of litigation and ofthe such directwhich and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes. P.E.T. CASE No. 002
March 29, 2005 R ONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FE R NA ND O POE , J R ., vs . G LOR IA MACA PAG ALAR R OY O
Oath or Affirmation: Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
b. Privilege and salary SALARY AND RESIDENCE Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and VicePresident shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American srcin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States. Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold Political Law 1
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information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public." x x x In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege: "The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution130
Case : Petitioners, non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Petitioners Congressmen Tañada and Aguja filed House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA which became the basis of an inquiry subsequently conducted by the House Special Committee on Globalization into the negotiations of the JPEPA. In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested herein respondent to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec. Aquino did not heed the request, The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of srcin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions
Rule: Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations - The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest." Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld in People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.
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Senate v. Ermita G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
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In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information." The Resolution went on to state, thus: The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Although much has been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson: "A complicated negotiation …cannot be carried through without many, many private talks and discussion, manand to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other countries come tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their differences with other countries and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would do under certain circumstances and would not do under other circumstances … If these reports… American Delegations in another should become public… who would ever trust conference? (United States Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282284) There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy. As expressed by one writer, "It can be said that there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War declared that we must have "open covenants, openly arrived at." He quickly abandoned his thought. No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of publicity is possible. In the moment that negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on both sides would quickly lead to a widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for discussion before it is approved.(The New American Government and Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194) Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries, viz: "x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great arguments of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613… G.R . No. 170516 J uly 16, 2008 A K B AY AN CITIZ ENS A CTION PA R TY ("A K B AY AN" ), vs THOM AS G . AQUI NO
Rule: The elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit: 1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
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2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008 NE R I vs. S E NA TE COMMITTE E
c. Prohibitions Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
1. The President, Vice-President i. Shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure. (This includes the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution) Rationale and “Ex Officio Posts
Case : EO 284, allowing Cabinet Officials from holding other offices, is here challenged. Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows: "Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office."
Issue: Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is Political Law 1
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quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
Rule : We rule in the negative. In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle. Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. . . . Political Law 1
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The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. … [T]he prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewiseconferred denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. x x x …[E]x-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition... G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991 CIV IL LIB E R TIE S UNION vs. THE E XECU TIVE S ECR ETARY
Rule: We hold that the position of petitioner is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives. In Civil Liberties Union, we elucidated on the two constitutional prohibitions against holding multiple positions in the government and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees against holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other office, profession, business or financial interest, whether government or private, unless allowed by the Constitution. The NAC ex officio members' representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions. The NAC ex officio members' representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition because there is no law or administrative creating September a new office 8, or position and authorizing additional compensation therefor. G. R. order No. 156982 2004 NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, vs. COMM ISS ION ON AUDIT
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Case: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment.
In a Letter dated May 11, 1995, Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the Department of Labor and Employment designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA in pursuance to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997 After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per
diems to the petitioner The uniform reason for the disallowance was stated in the Notices, as follows: “Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their primary
office and to receive compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. Disallowance is in pursuance to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report No. 509”
Hence, this petition. The issue in this case is whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Rule : We rule in the affirmative. The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary where the Court declared Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government, unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides It must be noted that the petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no separate or special appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. In Dela Cruz v. Commission on Audit., it was held that "The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio is actually in legal banking contemplation theunder primary function of hismember principalthereof, office in he defining policy and in monetary matters,performing which come the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
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other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution." Similarly in the case at bar, we cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal. As the representative of the Secretary of Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the same capacity as his principal. Whatever laws and rules the member in the Board is covered, so is the representative; and whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the representative is, likewise, not exempted. Thus, his position as Director IV of the DOLE which the petitioner claims is not covered by the constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. The petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board at all. G .R . No. 147392 March 12, 2004 BE NEDICTO ER NESTO R. BITON IO, JR . , vs. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT a nd CE LSO D. G ANG AN, CHAIR MAN OF THE C OMMISS ION ON AUDIT Case: This petition assails the Decision rendered by the Commission on Audit (petitioners' appeal
from the Notice disallowed payment to petitioners of their representation allowances and per diems. Petitioners (alternates), numbering 20, were members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority. Accordingly, NHA Resident Auditor Vasquez issued Notice of Disallowance disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of "Cabinet members who were the ex- officio members of the NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective alternates who actually received the payments,"
Rule : Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving "extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals. G .R . No. 138489 November 29, 2001 E LE A NOR
DE LA C R UZ, FEDE R ICO LUCHICO, J R . et al.vs. COMM IS SION ON AUDIT
ii. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. Note: Conflict of interest" arises when a public official or employee is a member of a board, an officer, or a substantial stockholder of a private corporation or owner or has a substantial interest in a business, and the interest of such corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein, may be opposed to or affected by the faithful performance of official duty.131 2. As to the spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President (during his tenure) i. Shall not be appointed as 131
Republic Act No. 6713 - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
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- Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or - The Office of the Ombudsman, or - As Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries a. In comparison to the following; Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. (Art VI) Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art IX A) Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure (art IX B ) Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function. (Art VIII)
b. Exceptions to prohibitions on holding additional positions: 1. Section 3. xxx The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. (Art VII)
2. Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. Xxx (Art VIII)
3. Ex – Officio Positions Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
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instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art IX B)
Any appointive official (including cabinet members) may hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries if allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position
d. Succession 1. At the BEGINNING of the Term Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms. If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified. If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified. If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President. Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified. The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Succession when the President and Vice-President are elected in the regular election; a. If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified. Here, the President was unable to take his oath of office on June 30 b. If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified. As in case of a tie which has yet to be broken by Congress
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c. If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President. Death or permanent disability at the beginning of the term of the president will result to the Vice –President as becoming the president This results to the vacancy in the office of the Vice President hence, the successor (then Vice President) shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. d. Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified. This applies when both the president and the vice president shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled. In case both the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House are unable to act as President, then Congress shall by law, provide for the "manner of selecting" the one who will act as President until a President of Vice-President shall have (been either "chosen" or "elected" pursuant to the special election referred to in VII, 10, and qualified. “The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President
shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph. ”
2. DURING the Term Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified. The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the VicePresident shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President. (Art VII) Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a Political Law 1
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President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election. (Art VII)
In case of the vacancy in the office of President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. As above, this results to the vacancy in the office of the Vice President hence, the successor (then Vice President) shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. In case of the vacancy in the offices of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified. Effect on the term of the vice president as successor The effect of such a term can be similar to what the case of Borja vs., Comelec provides (Only in comparison as to the points that may be similar) Case: Private respondent Jose T. Capco was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1998
for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections, Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on motion of private respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. x x x This Court held that Capco’s assumption of the office of mayor upon the death of the incumbent Rule: may not be regarded as a "term" under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of
R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). He held the position from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a period of less than three years. Moreover, he was not elected to that position. B orja vs
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Comelec 329 Phil. 409 (1996) cited in G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009 SIMON B. ALDO VINO, J R . vs . COMMI S S ION ON E LE C TIONS Further, the law provides that “No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.”132 3. Temporary Disability Temporary Vacancy in the Presidency during the term A vacancy in the Presidency arising from his disability can occur as follows; 1. A written declaration by the President Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. (Section 11, Ph 1, Art VII)
2. Written declaration by the Cabinet Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. (Section 11, Ph 2, Art VII)
3. Finding by Congress by 2/3 vote that the President is disabled Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. (Section 11, Ph 3 -4, Art VII)
Case : In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
132
Section 4, Art VII
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In the heat of people power, at about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. He issued the following press statement: "20 January 2001 STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, civil society.I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY! (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President. Despite all of these, Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.
Issue: Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy: whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President
Rule : Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. Using this totality test , we hold that petitioner resigned as President. We hold that In thethe resignation of the petitionerhis cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. press release containing final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; Political Law 1
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(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The part press tense.release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz: "Sir. By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president. (Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada" To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people.
Iss ue 2: Was Estrada merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII. Considering the operative facts:
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1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House; 2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.; 3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175 4. Also, House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176 stating that expressed its support to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, 5. Further, bills were already sent by the Congress to the Office of GMA as president. 6. Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary. What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court . G .R . No. 1467 10-15
March 2, 2001 J OS E PH E . E S TR ADA, vs . ANIANO DE S IE R TO
4. Serious Illness of the President Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations Chief of Staff such of theillness. Armed(Art Forces access toand the the President during VII) of the Philippines, shall not be denied
e. Removal Section 2. The President, the Vice-President … may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Art XI) Section 3. 1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. 2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee three session days thereafter. Committee, aftersixty hearing, anddays by a majority vote of all within its Members, shall submit its report The to the House within session from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
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3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. 4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. 5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. 6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on be trial, the Chiefwithout Justicethe of concurrence the SupremeofCourt shall preside, shall notofvote. No person shall convicted two-thirds of all thebut Members the Senate. 7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. 8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Art XI)
f. Powers and Functions of the President (1) Executive Power Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art VII) The Petitioners asks Respondents issue traveltheir documents their favor and to Case enjoin: them from carrying outthat thethe President's decision barring return tointhe Philippines.
Issue : The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. xxx xxx xxx Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law
Rule: The Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power " although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e.,
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a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j.
the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the enumerated Constitution powers intend that President shall exercise thosepower"? specific powers and no other? Are these the the breadth and scope of "executive Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated, The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.] Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. G .R. No. 88 211 S eptember 15, 1989 FE R DINAND E. MAR COS , vs .HONORA B LE
RA UL MANGLAPUS
Case : Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution theHgeneral executive power. G .R . No. 88 211 Octo ber 27, 19 89 FE R DINA ND E. M AR COSofvs. ONO RAgrant B LE of R AUL M ANGLA PUS
(2) Control of executive departments
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Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Art VII) The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. However, this precludes such orders that effects to usurp the powers of the other two co-equal branches.
Case: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Rule: As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive.
He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. o
o
This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is: Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
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It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. G .R . No. 127685 J uly 23, 1998 B LA S F . OPLE vs RUBEN D. T ORR ES
Rule : As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. x x x. An administrative order is: "Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders." An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. x x x. Just like AO 308 in Ople v. Torres, EO 566 in this case is not supported by any enabling law. The Court further stated in Ople. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs. G.R.
No. 180046 April 2, 2009 REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EXECU TIVE S ECR ETARY EDU ARDO E RMIT A 133 133
The President, as Chief Executive, has the power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. The power of control refers to the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Under this power, the President may directly exercise a power statutorily given to any of his subordinates, as what happened in the old case of Araneta v. Gatmaitan, where President Ramon Magsaysay himself directly exercised the authority granted by Congress to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to promulgate rules and regulations concerning trawl fishing. We similarly ruled in Bermudez v. Torres when we said that the President, being the head of the Executive Department, can very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority; in so opting, he cannot be said to be acting beyond the scope of his authority. - SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION , BRION, J.
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"Control" is the power to substitute one's own judgment in that of a subordinate. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondono vs. Silvosa to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive". Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency." As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him134 Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executives departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person o[r] the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive". . . . The President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and in the language of Thomas Jefferson, 'should be of the President's bosom confidence' (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453). 'are subject to the direction of the President. Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, 'each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority' (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30: 272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160)."135 134 135
G.R. No. 140717 April 16, 2009 ANNIE L. MANUBAY,vs. HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, G.R. No. L-27524 July 31, 1970 JOSE C. TECSON vs. HON. RAFAEL SALAS
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Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department." 136 Cases: Examples of the extent of the power of control
Case: On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued Executive Order No. 127 establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) Eleven years after, or on January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 191 entitled "Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau." Then the day feared by the EIIB employees came. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 223 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions. Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners now come before this Court invoking our power of judicial review of Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223.
Rule : The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The case in point is Larin v. Executive Secretary In this case, it was argued that there is no law which empowers the President to reorganize the BIR. In decreeing otherwise, this Court sustained the following legal basis, thus: "Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the BIR. We do not agree. xxx
xxx
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that: 'S ec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. – The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. X x 136
Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290, 295-296 (1992), citing Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil, 143 (1955); Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939); Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 (1967); De Leon v. Carpio, 178 SCRA 457 (1989).
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x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.' Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which provides that: 'S ec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. - Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act.'
The foregoing changes provisionincluding evidentlythe shows thatofthe President authorized ortoagency effect organizational creation offices in the isdepartment concerned. xxx
xxx
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states: 'Sec. 20. Residual Powers . – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.' This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees." WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No costs. G.R . Nos . 142801-802 J uly 10, 2001 B UKLOD NG K AWA NING E IIB et al vs. HON . EXECUT IVE S ECR ETAR Y R ONALDO B . ZAMO RA
Case : Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1)issued it is beyond the executive of Presidentnow Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 by former President powers Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners’
security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
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Rule: We dismiss the petition. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprude nce that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President. G .R. No.
166620 April 20, 2010 ATTY . S YLV IA BA NDA VS .ER MITA
Rule: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The obligationtotoconduct see to itinvestigations that laws are into faithfully executed the corresponding power in the President the conduct of necessitates officials and employees in the executive department. Department of Health v. C ampos ano, G .R . No. 157684, Apr il 27, 2005, 45 7 S CR A
438, 450; B iraogo v. Philippine Trut h C ommiss ion, G .R . Nos . 192935 and 193036, Decem ber 7, 2010, 637 SC R A 78, 160. Read: - Angeles vs Gaite 646b SCRA 309 - Secretary vs. Mabalot 368 SCRA 128 - DENR vs DENR Employees 409 SCRA 359 - Constantino vs Cuisia 472 SCRA 505 - Rufino vs Endriga496 SCRA 13 - MMDA vs Viron 530 SCRA 341 - ANAK MINDANAO vs Executive 531 SCRA583 (3) General supervision of local governments and Autonomous Regions
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. (Art X) Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. (Art X)
Case: Can the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, have the power to suspend and/or remove local officials? The 1987 Constitution provides; Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions (Art X) As compared to the 1935 Charter, to wit Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Political Law 1
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The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
Rule: It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government. "Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter. "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. As we held, however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". G.R.
No. 93252 Aug ust 5, 1991 R ODOLFO T. G ANZON, vs. THE HONORA B LE COUR T OF APP E ALS and LUIS T. SA NTOS Rule:
Does the President’s power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which
is not a local government unit? We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, cityof and provincial sanggunians. they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions regular municipal councilors,As citysuch, councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local
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levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILG’s authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of the Liga ’s Constitution and By-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with the Liga ’s own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers. Like the local government Liga ngS mga Barangay is notTHE subject to control theMGA Chief Executive or his alter ego. Gunits, .R . No.the130775 eptember 27, 2004 NA TIONA L LIGby A NG BA RANGA Y vs. H ON. V ICT ORIA ISABE L A. PARE DES
(4) Power of Appointment Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Art VII)
The nature of the power of appointment - The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power.
Case : The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this srcinal petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office
Rule: Petitioners assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.
Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer the Mayor of Olongapo City.of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust," or "[t]he selection or Political Law 1
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designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same. In his treatise, Philippine Political Law, Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office." Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury, J., "the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his appointment," and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion." In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court we held: The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who. . have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power .. Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment. G .R . No. 104732
J une 22, 1993 R OB E R TO A. FLO R E S , DANIE L Y. FIG UE R OA , R OG E LIO T. P ALO, DOMI NG O A. J A DL OC , CAR LITO T. C R UZ and MANUE L P . R E YE S , vs. HON. FR ANK LIN M. DR ILON
1. With the Consent of the Commission on Appointments “The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captai n,.”
a. Heads of the executive departments b. Ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls c. Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,"
a. Chairman and members of 3 Constitutional Commissions Political Law 1
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Civil Service Commission Art IX B Section 1. 2.The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
COMELEC Art IX C. Section 1.2 The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT. Art IX D, Section 1.2The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment
b. Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council Art VIII, Section 8. 2 The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
c. Sectoral representatives Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,Heand other appointments in him in this Constitution. shall alsoofficers appointwhose all other officers ofarethevested Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
Case : This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715. The only issue to be resolved by the Court in the present case is whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Rule : There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
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First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (Section 16, Article VII these appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments) Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The second sentence Sec. 16,provided Art. VII for refers otherthose officers of the whose appointments are not of otherwise by to lawalland whom the government President may be authorized by law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. G .R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992 PE TER J OHN D. CA LDE R ON
vs. BA RTOLOM E CAR ALE
Case : This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a "taxpayer," questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson.
Rule: We dismiss the petition. We call attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani A. Cruz dissenting, where we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. G .R . No. 11124 3 May 25, 1994 J E S US AR MA ND O A .R . TA R R OS A vs. GAB RIEL C. SINGSON
Case : Due to the opposition of some congressmen-member of the Commission on Appointments, the Petitioner and three others were unable to take their seats as Sectoral Representatives, as appointed by the President.
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Issue : The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others, the officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as follows:
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [19871), we construed Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989, TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, vs. THE
COMM IS SION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMM
ISS IONS
2. Upon the Recommendation of the Judicial and Bar Council a. Members of the Supreme Court and all the other courts Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the submission of the list. (Art VIII)
b. Ombudsman and his Deputies Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur. (Art XI)
3. Appointment of the Vice President as member of the cabinet Section 3. …...The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation (Art VII) Political Law 1
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4. Appointment Solely by the President Section 16. …. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. (Art VII) o o
Those appointments not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
More Cases: On the nature of the power to appoint
TheProsecutor validity andoflegality appointment of respondent Quiaoit to the poston of Case: Provincial Tarlac of bythe then President Fidel V. RamosConrado is assailed in this petition the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
Rule : An "appointment" to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority. In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, reiterated in Flores vs. Drilon, this Court has held: The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is isa prerogative of the appointing power. Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof. When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all "executive departments, bureaus and offices." Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. It is the considered view of the Court, given the above disquisition, that the phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary," found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a Political Law 1
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mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. G .R . No. 131429 , Aug ust 4, 1999 OSC AR B E R MUDE Z vs.
EXECU TIVE SE CRE TARY RUBEN TO RR ES
Rule: The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress mayinvolves by law vest in the heads ofofdepartments, agencies, commissions, or boards. with The present case the interpretation Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution respect to the appointment of this fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. G.R. No. 139554, J uly 21, 2006 A R MITA B . RUF INO, vs. BA LTAZ AR N. ENDRIGA
5. Power to remove by the President General Rule: Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. Except: When the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power
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Rule: The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is implied from his Power to Appoint. - Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. G .R . No. 196231 S eptember 4, 2012 E MILIO A . GON ZA LE S III vs . OFFIC E OF
THE PRE SIDE NT OF THE PHI LIPPINES
6. Limitations on the Appointing power of the President Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice anyinother profession,orparticipate in any business, be Government financially interested in any contract with, or any franchise, special privilege granted byorthe or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Art VII) Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (Art VII)
Case: The question presented for resolution in the administrative matter at bar is whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. A corollary question is whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
Rule: The relevant Constitutional provisions being Political Law 1
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Sec. 15, Article VII: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution — "(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term" — the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-called "midnight" appointments As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing President. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the appointments signed by His Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta. A.M. No. 98-5-01-S C November 9, 1998 In Re Appointments dated
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B . Vallarta as J udg es of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City, respectively Case: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term , except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety?
Rule: As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the by14, the15 Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealtpowers with in vested Sections and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the Political Law 1
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provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. In this connection, PHILCONSA's urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of the framers. Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. It will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable.
We rever s e Valenzuela. . Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in
the Judiciary. There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC's prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on "the law of the statute," i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it. Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even Political Law 1
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candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of xxx appointments" to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that "on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission's records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010 AR TUR O M. DE CAS TR O vs. J UDIC IA L A ND B AR C OUNC IL (J B C) and
PRE SIDENT GLORIA M ACAPAG AL - AR ROYO
Case (Motions for Reconsideration) Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice. The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair. The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor theNone present Members of the Court hadcould arranged current situation to happen and to the evolve as it has. of the Members of the Court havethe prevented the Members composing Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their Political Law 1
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occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy. G .R . No. 191002 April 20, 2010 A R TURO M. DE CASTRO vs. J UDIC IA L AND B A R COUNC IL (J B C) and P R E S ID E NT G LOR IA MA C APAG AL -
AR R OY O
Case: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
Rule: PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions. The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva establishedofthe as a involuntary forasthea purpose contemplated in Conventions, the Geneva Convention 27PNRC July 1929. order to organization be recognized National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the National Society of the Movement. The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict.. To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. G .R . No. 175352 DA NTE V.
LIBAN, R EY NALDO M . BER NARDO, a nd SALVADOR M. VI AR I, v s.RICHAR D J . GORDON
7. Interim or Recess Appointment Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it. (Art VI) Section 16. xxx The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (VII)
Appointments requiring confirmation are
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(i) Regular137, when Commission on Appointments / Congress, is in session, or (ii) During Recess138 Case : Petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on December 17,
1988. She took her oath of office and entered into the discharge of her functions and duties. on the same month. However, on January 9, 1989, she was required by the Commission on Appointments to submit documents needed for the confirmation of her appointment. Alleging that appointment was not subject to confirmation, she refused compliance therewith. On January 14, 1989, the President submitted petitioner's ad interim appointment to the CA. However, considering petitioner's refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA, it disapproved her appointment. Hence, this Petition
Iss ue 1 . Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an "independent office" created by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made with or without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (CA, for brevity)
Rule : Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. that is, the confirmation of the Commission Appointments because they are among theVII, officers ofwithout government "whom he (the President) may on be authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. It provides: “(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by
the President for a term of seven years without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.”
Issue 2. Whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17 December 1988, and after petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to which she had been appointed, by taking the oath of office and actually assuming and discharging the functions and duties thereof, could extend another appointment to the petitioner on 14 January 1989, an "ad interim appointment" as termed by the respondent Commission on Appointments or any other kind of appointment to the same office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights that called for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
137
CA Confirmation is required before post is assumed Or ad-interim. Need no confirmation to be effective and is effective until it is disapproved by the Commission or until the next adjournment of Congress 138
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Rule : The Court, with all due respect to both the Executive and Legislative Departments of
government, and after careful deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in the negative. When Her Excellency, the President converted petitioner Bautista's designation as Acting Chairman to a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the President. Ex gratiathe argumenti, the over Executive may voluntarily allowsolely the Commission onConstitution Appointments to exercise power ofthat review an appointment otherwise vested by the in the President. Yet, as already noted, when the President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights with the advice to her that by virtue of such appointment (not, until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments), she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her duties after taking her oath of office, the presidential act of appointment to the subject position which, under the Constitution, is to be made, in the first place, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, was then and there a complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance by Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath of office and actual assumption of the duties of said office, installed her, indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancy in the subject office on 14 January 1989 to which an appointment could be validly made. In fact, there is no vacancy in said office to this day. Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new appointment or re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was an ad interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, can not be ad interim appointments. G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989 MARY
CONCEPCION BA UTISTA, vs. SENATOR J
OVI TO R. SALONGA
8. Temporary Designations Sec. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. - (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy; xxx
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In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.139
9. Limitations of the Appointing power of the ACTING President Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from his assumption or re-assumption of office. Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Section 16. xxx The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Art VII)
(5) Executive Clemencies Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Art VII) Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission (COMELEC). (Art IX, C.)
General Rule: The President may grant clemency:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution. Amnesty may be granted by the President with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. For violation of election laws, rules, and regulations, clemency may be granted by after a favorable recommendation of the COMELEC
A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).
139
Administrative Code of 1987, Book III
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"Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one srcinally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "Pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt. (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). Amnesty commonly denotes the "general pardon to rebels for their treason and
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended by some breach of the law of nations." (1 Bish. Cr. L., sec. 898.) The term "amnesty" belongs to international law, and is applied to rebellions which by their magnitude are properly within international law, but has no technical meaning in the common law. It is a synonym of oblivion, which in the English law is the synonym of pardon. (Bouvier, "Amnesty.") Amnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by government generally to a class of persons who have been guilty usually of political offenses (treason, sedition, rebellion), and who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted, and often conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within a prescribed time. (Black; Brown v Walker, 161 US 602). Distinguished with tax amnesty A tax amnesty is a general pardon or the intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of violating a tax law. It partakes of an absolute waiver by the government of its right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to start with a clean slate.140 Tax amnesty refers to the articulation of the absolute waiver by a sovereign of its right to collect taxes and power to impose penalties on persons or entities guilty of violating a tax law.141 Probation is defined by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 968, the Probation Law142 as "a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence , is
140
Bañas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102967, February 10, 2000, 325 SCRA 259, 273-274,citing Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 196 SCRA 335, 339 (1991); People v. Judge Castañeda, 165 SCRA 327, 338-339 (1988);Nepomuceno v. Montecillo, 118 SCRA 254, 259 (1982). 141 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 178797, 4 August 2009, 595 SCRA 234; and Philippine Banking Corporation (Now: Global Business Bank, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 170574, 30 January 2009, 577 SCRA 366. 142 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 968 July 24, 1976 ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
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released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer." is a conditional release of a prisoner with an unexpired sentence, or suspension of his sentence, without remitting the penalty imposed upon him. ”Parole”
Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Board after serving the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence penalty, without granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended. Its purpose is "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933) a. Pardon distinguished from Probation
Case: Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from each other, both in srcin and in nature. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody — subject to the control of the probation officer and of thewhen court;rearrested, and, he may rearrested upon the non-fulfillment the conditions of imposed probation and, maybebe committed to prison to serve theofsentence srcinally upon him. G .R . No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 THE PE OPLE OF THE PHILIP PINE
ISLANDS vs. JOSE O. VER A
Pardon there must be a final judgment of conviction is granted by the Chief Executive for any crime
Probation is granted by the court after investigation by a probation officer only for cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years and 1 day (prision mayor), where the crime is not against the security of the State, where there was no previous conviction for an offense punished by arresto mayor, and where there was no previous availment of probation.
In absolute pardon, the sentence and its effects, In including accessory penalties, are abolished upon the the grant of pardon.
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the
restoration
of
the
probationer his civil rights places after his finaltodischarge after takes the period of only his probation.
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b. Pardon distinguished from Parole Case : Tesoro, a convict of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, accepted the parole
granted by the governor general. The same included the condition that he shall not commit any crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner. Subsequently, he was charged with adultery. He was arrested and recommitted to prison.
Rule: 1. Appellant contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal authority to
investigate the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive secretary of the board once a month during the first year of his parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of inquiry and investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the government, or even of any individual, to secure the necessary assistance. 2. Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner." It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." 3. Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the conditional parole. HeSeptember, claims that,1937," according to thebyweight of the evidence, violation place, not "in the the latter part of as found the President, but afterthe October 28,took 1937, the date when parole was supposed to expire. But that as it may, where, as in the instant case, the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The petitioner herein having consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 4. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs. Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his srcinal sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the srcinal sentence. (20 R.C.L., p. 570; State vs. Horne [1906], 52 Fla., 125; 42 So., 388; 7 L.R.A. [N.S.}, 719, 725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell [1879], Miss., 282.) G .R . No. L-464 37 May 23, 1939 E UFE MIO P. TES OR O vs. THE
DIRE CTOR OF PR ISONS
Case : 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
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2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. G .R. No . 76872 J uly 23, 1987 WILFR E DO TOR R E S Y
S UMUL ONG , vs. HON . NEPTALI A. G ONZALE S Pardon Parole Only the President can grant a pardon with or It is granted by the recommendation of the without any condition. Board of Pardons and Parole, Exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed It does not result in full restoration of liberty as from punishment which the law inflicts on the the parolee is still in the custody of the law crime committed It can be granted at any time after final judgment There must be a final judgment of conviction. of conviction without any condition (absolute pardon) or subject to some requirements or The release from imprisonment after serving the qualifications as the President may see fit minimum penalty imposed under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103)
c. Pardon distinguished Amnesty Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon. Pardon Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
Amnesty While amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice143.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction
While amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into from the consequences of an offense of which he oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and 143
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x G.R. No. 137891 July 11, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PATRIARCA
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has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code).
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Barrioquinto et al v. Fernandez 82 Phil 642)
d. Effects of Pardon Issue: Is Santos disqualified for his elective public office despite having been pardoned? Rule : It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An abs olute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all dis abilities res ulting from the convic tions . In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." G .R . No. L-4794 1
December 7, 1940 MIGUEL CR ISTOB AL vs. ALE J O LAB R ADOR , ET AL Issue: Is Palatino disqualified from the elective position as Mayor despite having been formerly pardoned and have been restored of his enjoyment of full civil and political rights., the criminal conviction having been made under the then Election Code, and the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office?
Rule : We adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction, and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction, While there may be force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local Political Law 1
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officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
G .R . No. L-48100 J une 20, 1941 Florencio P elobello vs. G reg orio P alatino Case : Despite the interim grant of pardon, Petitioner was disqualified to file his candidacy on the ground of a former conviction for the offense of counterfeiting, and thus the consequent disqualification from suffrage.
Issue : Whether or not a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by both the criminal and electoral codes.
Rule: Certain authorities (67 C.J.S. 578) do hold that a pardon is not retrospective. But the view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effects should not be unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the Constitution (Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 39; Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 4,11; Mijares vs. Custorio, 73 Phil. 507). More specifically, this Court, in Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441, through Justice Laurel, stated: “... Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the benign erogative pr of
mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940 that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. While there may be force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. …. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned herein above and before the date fixed … for assuming office. We see no reason for
defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard that at bottom is a technical objection”
Upon the, authority of the three cases previously cited, we conclude that the pardon granted to appellee Abes has removed his disqualification, and his election and assumption of office must be sustained. G .R. No . L-28613 Aug ust 27, 1968 AMB R OCIO LACUNA vs. B E NJ AMIN H. AB E S
Case:
Was Petitioner entitled as a consequence of Pardon to reinstatement as assistant city
treasurer.
Rule: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that Political Law 1
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pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen. Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing We are in full agreement thenecessarily commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso restore a convicted felon to public with office relinquished or forfeited by reason of facto the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
G .R . No. 782 39 February 9, 1989 S alvacion A . Mons anto vs. F ulg encio S. F actoran, J r.
e. Sanctions for Violations In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) 144 of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.
f. Pardon and Administrative cases Issues: 1. Can pardon be allowed for convictions in Administrative cases? 2. May the Executive Secretary grant clemencies?
Rule: : We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
144
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension of sentence.
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Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her. (Vinena v. Secretary, 67 Phil. 451; Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 108 SCRA 767 [1981]). Replying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General that in the present case, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest. G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991
RODOL FO D . LLAM AS, vs EXECUT IVE SE CRE TARY OSCA R ORBOS
g. Who may avail of amnesty?
Case : Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (395 Phil.690 (2000), citing People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344 (1997). G.R. No. 137891 July 11, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS
PATRIARCA
(6) Powers of the Commander in Chief Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial not orsuspend the operation of the supplant the functioning of the law civildoes courts legislative assemblies, nor Constitution, authorize thenorconferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
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The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Art VII) Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Art III) Section 1. xxx Judicial power the duty of the of justice actualwhether controversies involving rights which areincludes legally demandable andcourts enforceable, andtotosettle determine or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Art VIII) “Commander in Chief Powers”
The commander in chief powers of the president include the power to; CALL OUT SUCH ARMED FORCES
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW OVER THE WRIT OF HABEAS THE ENTIRE PHILIPPINES OR ANY CORPUS PART THEREOF rebellion or invasion, when public safety requires
"STATE OF REBELLION"- In the exercise of this calling out power as Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a "state of rebellion" (or, for that matter, of lawless violence or invasion). The term "state of rebellion" has no legal significance. It is vague and amorphous and does not give the President more power than what the Constitution says, i.e, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As Justice Mendoza observed, such a declaration is "legal surplusage." But whatever the term means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected rights, such as the right to due process, the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances, and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, among others.145
145
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the petitions were filed before the Court. - G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001 PANFILO LACSON, vs. SECRETARY - On May 1, 2001,
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“EXERCISED BY ONE PRESIDENT”- The exceptional character of Commander-in-
Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution: Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s
authority to review the factual basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x. 146 A. Call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
This is intended to suppress disorder. In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, (392 Phil. 618.) the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief: “When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” 146
67 Phil. 451 (1939). G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012 JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI, vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN,
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There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. 147 B. Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines or any part thereof.
Common grounds: 1. There must be an (actual) invasion or rebellion, and 2. Public safety requires the suspension. Limitations: 1. Effective only for 60 days 2. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. 3. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension. 4. Revocation shall not be set aside by the President. 5. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may extend such proclamation or suspension SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS A "writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court commanding a detaining officer to inform the court 1. If he has the person in custody, 2. Of his basis in detaining that person. The herein suspension applies only in cases of persons judicially charged with rebellion or offenses directly or inherently related with invasion. Such persons suspected of the above crimes can be arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest. Further, anyone arrested during the suspension must be charged within three days, otherwise, release must be made. Further detention without the charges made shall hold the detaining person liable under the Revised penal code under Art. 125 or for "delay in the delivery of detained persons. The suspension of the privilege does not make the arrest without warrant legal. But the military is, in effect, enabled to make the arrest, anyway since, with the suspension of the privilege, there is no remedy available against such unlawful arrest (arbitrary detention). The arrest without warrant is justified by the emergency 147
G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012 JAMAR M. KULAYAN vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN
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situation and the difficulty in applying for a warrant considering the time and the number of persons to be arrested. But the crime for which he is arrested must be one related to rebellion or the invasion. As to other crimes, the suspension of the privilege does not apply. The effect of the suspension of the privilege, therefore, is only to extend the periods during which he can be detained without a warrant.148 The right to bail shall not be impaired during the suspension. Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Art. III, Sec. 13.)
In case of imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ shall be directed to him, and shall command him to have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified. In case of imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer, the writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to summon the person by whom he is restrained then and there to appear before said court or judge to show the cause of the imprisonment or restraint. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal
process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the of and the writ of habeas corpus, the of liberty of angrant illegal involuntary deprivation of restraint freedom of action. must be in the nature In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. 148
Adopted (Mendoza)
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While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed149. PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW OVER THE ENTIRE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THEREOF.
Effects of the proclamation of martial law
The President can: 1. Legislate 2. Order the arrest of people who obstruct the war effort.
But the following cannot be done (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 4)
1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution. (The President’s power here in fact emanates from the constitution) 2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the legislative assemblies. 3. Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over civilians, where civil courts are unable to function. 4. Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. HOW IS THE PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION LIFTED: 1) By the President himself 2) Revocation by Congress 3) Nullification by the Supreme Court 4) Operation of law, after 60 days THE ROLE OF CONGRESS. Congressional ratification or approval of the proclamation or suspension is not necessary. However, Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may -
149
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
G.R. No. 190108 October 19, 2010 DAVID E. SO vs. HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR.
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-
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. THE ROLE OF THE COURT The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension150thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. Some Cases: (Commander in Chief Powers) In the case of Lansang vs. Garcia the Court held unanimously that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual basis in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Rule: In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. The issue there raised was whether in suspending the privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing so. The Court, in considering the fact that the President based his decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition in Central Luzon and (b) a closed door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the President did not act arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is without basis. G .R . No. L -33964 Decem ber
11, 1971 IN THE M ATTER OF T HE PE TIT ION FOR HAB EA S COR PUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA vs. BRIGADIER-GENERAL E DUA R DO M. GA R CI A, C hief, Philippine Cons tabulary (and accompanying cases ) .151
This holding is now found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3 150
Using the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the measure. The question is not whether the President or Congress acted correctly, but whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact. i.e. ... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that tile President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily. 151 The noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, the Court said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
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“The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.”
Other Cases: Obedience to the Commander in chief
Case : Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria MacapagalArroyo enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners’ violation of the afor ementioned directive. A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee "in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;" that such directive was "in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command;" and that the two officers "disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x" Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then. In an Investigation Report dated 6 October 2005, the OPMG recommended that petitioners be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, particularly seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners from testifying without her prior approval declaredand unconstitutional; (2) Col. the charges stated before in the Congress charge sheets against petitioners be be quashed; (3) Gen. Senga, Galarpe, Col. Roa, and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against petitioners, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate on 28 September 2005
Rule : The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches and seizures. As earlier noted, we ruled that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander -in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. Political Law 1
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Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to
control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. G.R.
No. 170165
Aug ust 15, 2006 B /G E N. (R E T.) FR A NCIS CO V. G UDANI vs.
LT./G E N.
GENEROSO S. SENGA State of rebellion – National Emergency – Calling out Power Case: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
Allegedly, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;
Rule : Calling-out Power - Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed
forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling -out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President ’s authority to declare
a "state of rebellion and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides: SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
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regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately -owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas. Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is not so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power. The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law." It is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
" Take Care " Power - As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws." In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. The enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain suchand as the customs laws, and property relations, laws on obligations and laws, contracts like. She canlaws onlygoverning order the family military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.. G .R . No. 171396 May 3, 2006 PR OF.
RA NDO LF S. DAVI D vs. GLORIA MACAPAG
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Case: In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion" and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion
Rule: It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law.
In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'" Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. In calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Court's mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion "with due regard to constitutional rights." For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a “state of rebellion”.In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion,
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none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the "theater of war" or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. G .R. No. 159085 February 3, 2004 S ANLA K AS vs E XEC UTIVE SE CR E TAR Y
Is Civilian Authority supplanted when the president acts as commander in chief? According to the Constitution; Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. (Article II)
When the President acts as Commander in Chief, he acts to represent Civilian Authority. His Control over the Military emphasizes the supremacy of Civilian Authority. (7) “Emergency Powers” (In times of war or other national emergency) Section 23. xxx In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. (Art VI)
Distinction between the “Commander in Chief” and “Emergency Powers” (In times of war or other national emergency) The emergency powers of the President is distinct from the Commander-in-Chief clause. -
Under the Commander-in-Chief clause, the President acts under a Constitutional grant of military power, (including the law-making power).
-
Under the Emergency Power, the President acts under a Congressional delegation of lawmaking power.
Distinction between the “declaration of a State of National Emergency” and “Emergency Powers” Section 17. In of national when the public interest by so requires, the State may, during thetimes emergency andemergency, under reasonable terms prescribed it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
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The President could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Rule: Power to Take Over - Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. (Natl Economy and Patrimony (Art.XII) A distinctionand must be drawn between powers. the President’s authority to declare state Section of national emergency" to exercise emergency To the first, as elucidated by the"aCourt, 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads: “SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.”
(2) In times of war or other national emerg ency , the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: Political Law 1
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(1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of owned utilityorornot business affectedmay withexercise public interest," it refers to Congress, notany theprivately President. Now,public whether the President such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer, held: “It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some
provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here.Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities. Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane" and "similar occurrences." This is a limited view of "emergency." Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing are danger life or well-being is accepted as normal. in this definitions the to elements of intensity,beyond variety,that andwhich perception. Emergencies, asImplicit perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national security. Political Law 1
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"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned publiccircumstances utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. G .R. No . 171396 May 3, 2006 PR OF. RA NDOLF S. DAVID vs. GLOR IA
MA C APAG AL-A R R OY O
Case: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) "to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence" in the named places.,
Rule: Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: “SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.”
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. violence springs from the The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppressawless l power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides. “SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander -in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x”
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While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the
above power it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment . G .R . No. 190259 J une 7, 2011 DA TU ZA LDY UY A MPATUA N, ANS AR UDDI N A DIONG , R E G IE S AHA LI-G E NE R A LE vs.
HON. R ONALDO PUNO
(8) Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. (Art VII) Section 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public. Art. XII
Case: This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails said contracts which were entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 ("Financing Program" or "Program"). It seeks to enjoin respondents from executing additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto. It also urges the Court to issue an order compelling the Secretary of Justice to institute criminal and administrative cases against respondents for acts which circumvent or negate the provisions Art. XII of the Constitution.
Issues: Petitioners raise several issues before this Court. First, they object to the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing Program as beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20, Second, according to petitioners even assuming that the contracts under the Financing Program are constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into these contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents.
Rule: 1. For their first constitutional argument, petitioners submit that the buyback and bondconversion schemes do not constitute the loan "contract" or "guarantee" contemplated in the Constitution and are consequently prohibited. The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and change the meaning of the organic act. 2. Petitioners assert that the power to pay public debts lies with Congress and was deliberately withheld by the Constitution from the President. It is true that in the balance of power between the Political Law 1
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three branches of government, it is Congress that manages the country’s coffers by virtue of its taxing and spending powers. However, the law-making authority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing by virtue of which the President is empowered to execute debt payments without the need for further appropriations. Regarding these legislative enactments, this Court has held, viz: “Congress … deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.”
Specific legal authority for the buyback of loans is established under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 240, The afore-quoted provisions of law specifically allow the President to pre-terminate debts without action from Congress. Morebyfundamentally, the debts contextatofa sovereign debts, afurther buyback is simply the purchase the sovereign when issuertaken of itsinown discount. Clearly then, the objection to the validity of the buyback scheme is without basis. 3. Petitioners’ position is negated both by explicit constitutio nal and legal imprimaturs, as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise
of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government.
Cons tantino, J r. v. C uis ia, G .R . No. 1060 64, Octo ber 13, 200 5
(9) Powers over foreign affairs Treaty-making power Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Art VII)
Treaties or International Agreements vs. Executive Agreements Unlike treaties or international agreements, executive agreements entered into by the President need noare concurrence Legislature. same isinby the fact Executive agreements not amongofthose expresslyThe mentioned Section 21.that Distinctions Political Law 1
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1. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate. (Sec 21 Art VII) Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress. 2. International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail, carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.152 Case: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty The core issue in this petition for mandamus whethertothe Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to istransmit theExecutive Senate the copy ofand thethe Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.
Rule : In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with
respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
152
(Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351)
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The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise: The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties. Negotiation may be undertaken These directlyrepresentatives by the head of state but he now assigns this task to his authorized representatives. are provided withusually credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even "collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration. If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state. Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them. The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature. Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with
ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification,
on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Petitioners’ submission that the Philippin es is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify
the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, Political Law 1
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acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the people , is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense. It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate. G .R . No. 158088 J uly 6, 2005 S enator Aquilino Pi mentel, J r., et al. vs .
Offi ce of the E xecutive S ecretary
(10) Deportation of undesirable aliens
Case : Spouses Galang were charged of having purchased and remitted abroad some $130,000.00 Dollarsthe without the necessary permit from CentralofBank. Warrants of Arrest were issued US following charges. They question the the authority the President and the Deportation Borad.
Rule : Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien-which provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. And the, exercise of this power by the chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 Political Law 1
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of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." The first executive order on the subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July 26, 1934), constituting a board to take action on complaints against foreigners, to conduct investigations and thereafter make recommendations. By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29, 1936, President Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and regulations therein provided, and make the corresponding recommendation. Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the President. The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then delegation of that implied power, nebulous it is,freedom must becan rejected asmade inimical to theguarantee liberty of athe people. The guarantees of human rightsasand not be to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation. Qua Chee G an vs . Deportation Board, 9 S CR A
27 (1963)
Case : It was alleged in the complaint that in December, 1963 certain agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) searched an office located at 1439 O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the "Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States" and that among those arrested thereat was Go Tek an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit. It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's possession and that, therefore, he had violated article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and rendered himself an undesirable alien. As deportation proceedings were underway, he filed for the prohibition of the same against the Deportation Board.
Issue : The issue is whether the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not specified in section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the aliens has not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.
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Rule : We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of fake dollar checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla" activities) in spite of the fact that he has not yet been convicted of illegal possession thereof under article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and notwithstanding that act is not the grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens as enumerated in section 37 of the Immigration Law. The charge against Go Tek before- the Board was not premature. The aforementioned obiter dictum the Qua Chee Gan case invoked by Go Tek and relied upon by the trial court, is not of this case. In the Qua Chee Gan case the aliens were with economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under Republic Act No. 503. Under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan vs- Deportation Board,). The President's power to deport aliens derives from Sec. 69 of the Rev. Adm. Code which does not specify the grounds for deportation of aliens but only provides that it be ordered after due investigation. The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation Justice Johnson's is that there the Chief Executive rinds that there are aliens whose continued in the country is injurious to the public interest he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41). G.R. No. L-23846 September 9, 1977 GO TEK vs.
DEPORTATI ON BOAR D
Case : The Department of Foreign Affairs received from the German Embassy in Manila Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995, informing it that the respondent was wanted by the German Federal Police; that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him; and that the respondent will be served with an official document requesting him to turn over his German passport to the Embassy which was invalidated on July 2, 1995. The Embassy requested the Department of Foreign Affairs to inform the competent Philippine authorities of the matter. The Board of Commissioners thereafter issued a Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1997. Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision dismissing the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries. The German Embassy in Manila, thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent. In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed Commissioner Verceles that his passport had been renewed following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his request for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1995 and the restoration of his permanent resident status. At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the respondent in his residence on orders of the petitioner.
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Rule :
In this case, the BOC ordered the private respondent’s deportation on September 27,
1995 without even conducting summary deportation proceedings. The BOC merely relied on the June 29, 1995 Letter of the German Vice Consul and of the German Embassy’s Note Verbale
No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995. It issued the Summary Deportation Order on September 27, 1995 However, as gleaned from the Summary Deportation Order, the respondent was ordered deported not only because his passport had already expired; the BOC speculated that the respondent committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in the Philippines and would not, thus, be issued a new passport. This, in turn, caused the BOC to conclude that the respondent was an undesirable alien. The respondent was not afforded any hearing at all. The BOC simply concluded that the respondent committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan without any evidence. The respondent was not afforded a chance to refute the charges. He cannot, thus, be arrested and deported without due process of law as required by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. In Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, we held that: Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings. G.R. No. 154745 January 29, 2004
COM MISSION ER ANDRE A D. D OMIN GO vs. HER BE RT MAR K US EMI L S CHEER (11) Power over/of legislation (a) Message to Congress
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time. (Art VII)
(b) Prepare and submit the budget Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Art VII)
(c) Veto power Section 27. 1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it srcinated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any Political Law 1
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bill to the House where it srcinated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. 2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.(Art VI)
Case: The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain
provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the assertions that: 1) Theveto subject vetoExecutive is not an is item veto; of the doctrine of separation of powers; 2) The by the violative 3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them; 4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
Rule : The petitioners' contentions are well-taken. The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees. As the guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of government do not go beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people. The essence of this judicial duty was emphatically explained by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139 [1936]) to wit: “The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries it does not assert any superiority over the other department, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. “
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute. The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads: “The President shall have thepower to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue
or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution)”
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, or veto tariff the bills,entire the Administration needscontain the money to run thefeatures. machinery of government and revenue it can not bill even if it may objectionable The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. Political Law 1
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The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990]) We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner: “The termsitem and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different.
An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E. 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281) The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct. 252, 81 L. Ed, 312) declared "that an item" of an appropriation obviously means anhappens item which in put itselfinto is aanspecific appropriation of money, not some general bill provision of law, which to be appropriation bill." ” The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due. An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions. G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992 CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJ O, J OSE L EUTER IO, ET AL. vs HON. FR ANK LIN N. DRILON
(d) Emergency Power Section 23. xxx In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary proper such to carry out ashall declared policy. soonerthereof. withdrawn by resolution of theand Congress, powers ceasenational upon the next Unless adjournment (Art VI)
(e) Fixing of tariff rates Section 28. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (Art VI)
(13) Immunity from suits Case: On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico After Lourdes’ release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed onat least two occasions at different places, i.e., Dasmariñas, Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets, continued. The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was srcinally filed before the Supreme Court. After issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action. Political Law 1
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Rule: In Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of amparo, the Court held; “The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in anythe civildignity or criminal and there is President, no need tothe provide in theifConstitution or law. It will degrade of thecase, high office of the Headfor of itState, he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. xxx And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners’ protected rights. G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010 LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO vs. GLORIA MA C APAG AL-A R R OY O
Case: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency,
Allegedly, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;
Rule: This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (De Political Law 1
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Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, 2004 Ed., p. 302). G .R . No. 171396 May 3, 2006 PR OF.
RA NDO LF S. DAVI D vs. GLORIA M ACA PAG AL-ARR OYO
Case: Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Issues : Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Rule : We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the and Senate by the events that led loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, theprosecutors Senate passed Resolution No.to83his "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."1 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that 'INCUMBENT Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. G .R . No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001 J OS E PH E. E S TR AD A
vs. ANI ANO DESIER TO
2. The Vice- Pr esident
a. Qualifications, election, term and oath Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President. The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. (Art VII)
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Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Art VII) Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.) (Art VII)
b. Privilege and salary Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and VicePresident shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source. (Art VII)
c. Prohibitions
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Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Section 3. xxx The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. (Art VII)
d. Succession Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. (Art VII)
Note here that there is no acting vice president to speak of. e. Removal Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Art XI) Section 3. 1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. 2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. 3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. vote of each Member shall be recorded. 4. In caseThe the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
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5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. 6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. 7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. 8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Art XI)
f. Functions (1) Right of succession Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified. The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the VicePresident shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.
(2)Membership in Cabinet Section 3 The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation (Art VII) C. The Judicial Department
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Art VIII)
1. The Supreme Court A. Composition and mode of sitting Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one S upreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Section 4. Political Law 1
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1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. 2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. 3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. (Art VIII)
The Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Rule: There is but ONE SUPREME COURT
of the Philippine Islands. It is the jurisdiction of this Supreme Court which cannot be diminished. The Supreme Court remains a unit notwithstanding it works in divisions. Although it may have two divisions, it is but a single court. Actions considered in any one of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. G.R.
No. L-32723 October 15, 1930 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs. HER MENEG ILDO TRIA
Although Article VIII, Section of the Constitution gives the Court sit either Rule: en banc or in divisions of three, five,4 (1) or seven Members, the divisions are the not discretion consideredtoseparate and distinct courts. Nor is a hierarchy of courts thereby established within the Supreme Court, which remains a unit notwithstanding that it also works in divisions. The actions taken and the decisions rendered by any of the divisions are those of the Court itself, considering that the divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and the same court G .R . No. 18 8376
December 14, 2011 LAND B ANK OF THE PHILIP PINE S vs . FEDE R ICO S UNTAY CIRCULAR NO. 2-89 February 7, 1989 SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. SUBJECT: GUIDELINES AND RULES IN THE REFERRAL TO THE COURT EN BANC OF CASES ASSIGNED TO A DIVISION. 1. The Supreme Court sits either en banc or in Divisions of three, five or seven Members (Sec. 4[1],Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). At present the Court has three Divisions of five Members each.
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2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3]. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). 3. The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed. 4. At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a case and before a judgment or resolutions of a Division may refer the case en consulta to the Court en banc which, after consideration of the reasons of the Division for such referral may return the case to the Division or accept the case for decision or resolution. 4a. Paragraph [f] of the Resolution of this Court of 23 February 1984 in Bar Matter No. 205 [formerly item 6, en banc Resolution dated 29 September 1977], enumerating the cases considered as en banc cases, states: f. Cases assigned to a division including motions for reconsideration which in the opinion of at least three (3) members merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable by a majority vote if the actual membership of the Court en banc. 5. A resolution of the Division denying a party's motion for referral to the Court en banc of any Division case, shall be final and not appealable to the Court en banc. 6. When a decision or resolution is referred by a Division to the Court en banc, the latter may, in the absence of sufficiently important reasons, decline to take cognizance of the same, in which case, the decision or resolution shall be returned to the referring Division. 7. No motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to take cognizance of a referral by a Division, shall be entertained. 8. This Circular shall take effect on March 1, 1989. February 7, 1989.
Rule: Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy, judicial time, and interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such reasons apply with greater force to final judgments of the highest Court of the land. G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745 September 17, 2009 CITY
GOVENMENT OF T AG AYTAY vs. H ON. ELEUT ER IO F. GUER RE RO
Case: The Respondent sought for the reconsideration of the instant case which was heard by the
First Division of the Supreme Court. The Case heard by the Division was on the propriety of the appointed of the Respondent. During his tenure as Chairman of the PCGG, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional. The Division ruled in to grant the Petition. Significant here is the prayer of the Respondent for the elevation of the case to the Court en banc
Rule : There also is no merit in the respondents’ motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What is in question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent
appointments, and not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement
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Section 4 (par. 2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that: (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. It should be noted that Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that the Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed. G .R. No. 1 38965 March 5 , 2007 PUB LIC INTER E S T CE NTER , INC. vs .
MA G DA NG AL B . E LMA (Third Divis ion Decis ion)
Case: This resolves petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases, which the Third Division decided on September 2, 1999. In said case the state filed a case to annul the certificate of title of Gana et. al. covering forestland Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., support the petition filed by the government through the Office of the Solicitor General for the annulment of OCT No. 4216, recovery of possession and reversion alleging that it is reasonable and logical to defend the government's case because it is upon the success thereof where their fate and fortune depended; that although petitioners as defeated parties The motions for reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending.
Rule: Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993, the following are considered en banc cases: 1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question; 2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty; 3. Cases raising novel questions of law; 4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; 5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit; 6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both; 7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed; 8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en banc; and Political Law 1
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9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention. It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of srcin is incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership — that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and — to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be Resolutions observed. of the Court
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.
G .R. No . 127022 J une 28, 2000 FIR ES TONE CER AMICS vs. COURT OF APPE
ALS
B. Appointment and qualifications Section 7. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (.Art VIII)
Qualifications No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court unless he -
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines
Appointment Section 8, (5) The (Judicial and Bar) Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. Art VIII) Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the submission of the list. (Art VIII)
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Case: Administrative Matter: On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the Supreme Court the appointments of Court Appeals Associate Justices Myra G. Fernandez, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela. The respective appointment papers of Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and AntonioValenzuela bore the following dates and bar code numbers:
Name of A s s ociate J us tice
Date of A ppointment
B ar C ode No.
Justice Fernandez Justice Peralta, Jr. Justice Hernando Justice Antonio-Valenzuela
February 16, 2010 February 16, 2010 February 16, 2010 February 24, 2010
55466 55467 55468 55465
Justice Antonio-Valenzuela disagreed insisted that she is the most senior among the four newly appointed CA Associate Justices pursuant to Section 1, Rule 2 of the 2009 IRCA which provides that seniority of the Associate Justices shall be determined "according to the order of their appointments as transmitted to the Supreme Court." She argued that "the final act in the process of appointing a member of the Judiciary is the transmittal of the appointment to the Supreme Court." She also took "serious exception" to the statement of the CA Committee on Rules that "the foregoing interpretation of the Rule on precedence and seniority should only apply to the above named Associate Justices, in view of the peculiar circumstances which attended the issuance/transmission of their appointment papers." According to her, there was nothing novel or peculiar about the circumstances attending the issuance and transmission of the four newly appointed members of the CA. Who is the most senior?
Rule: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the authority, of designating or selecting an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. Where the power of appointment is absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary andis the formal evidence of the the last appointment, commission, may issue at once. The appointment deemed complete once act requiredthe of the appointing authority has been complied with. For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material. This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot override but must give way to the law they seek to implement. In view of the foregoing, the CA en banc acted correctly when it adopted the view of the CA Rules Committee insofar as the reckoning of the seniority of CA Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and Antonio-Valenzuela is concerned but erred when it declared that the CA Rules Committee’s interpretation applies only to the case of the four aforementioned Justices. A.M. No. 10-4-22-S C
S eptember 28, 2010 R E : S eniority Among the Four (4) Mos t R ecent A ppointments to the Pos ition of As s ociate J ustic es of the Court of Appe als .
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Rule: As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous provisions. They equally would have easily to and written the prohibition made explicit inordering Sectionof 15,the Article VII as being applicable thesurely appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. We reverse Valenzuela. Second. Section 15, Article VII 153 does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC's prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on "the law of the statute," i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it. Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was 153
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (Art VII)
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precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of xxx appointments" to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that "on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission's records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010 AR TUR O M. DE CAS TR O vs. J UDIC IA L A ND B AR C OUNC IL (J B C) and PRE SIDENT GLORIA M ACAPAG AL - AR ROYO .
Case (Motions for Reconsideration) Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice. The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair. The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their were mandatory. is now left with an imperative the Constitution to fillretirements up the vacancies created byYet, suchshe inexorable retirements within 90 duty days under from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy. G .R . No. 191002 April 20, 2010 A R TURO M . DE CA S TR O vs. J UDI C IA L A ND B AR C OUNC IL (J B C) and PR E S ID E NT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO Political Law 1
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C. Constitutional Limitations ”The Supreme Court, is said to be holding neither the "purse" (held by Congress)
nor the "sword" (held by the Executive) but serving as the balance wheel in the State governance, functions both as the tribunal of last resort and as the Constitutional Court of the nation. The independence of the judiciary is fundamentally guaranteed by the State as it is enshrined in the Constitution. As such it is the duty of all its institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that "independent" bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the impairment of their core functions. To maintain the independence of the judiciary, the Constitution provides for certain limitations (Cruz); a. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the manner of its meetings be changed by mere legislation b. The members of the judiciary are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the submission of the list. (Section 9, Art VIII)
c. Members of the Supreme Court may only be removed via impeachment. The xxx Members of the Supreme Court, xxx may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust xxx. (Art XI Section 2) Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in thereon. (Art VIII)
Case: Administrative Matter: The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr.aRaul M. Gonzalez,dated "Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding Mr. JusticeEmployees Marcelo B. Fernan "letter-complaint, 14 December 1987 with enclosure of thetoConcerned of the Supreme Court," together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement. Political Law 1
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The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention.
Rule: It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle may be
succinctly formulated in the following terms. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings. A .M. No. 88-4-5433 Apri l 15, 1988 IN R E
FIRST INDORSEMENT FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONY MOUS LE TTE R -C OMP LAINT
d. (Congressional Power over Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court)- Minimum srcinal and appellate jurisdiction The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. (Section 2, Art VIII)154 154
Courts derive their authority from the Constitution’s recognition that they shall be the sole and exclusive investees of judicial power. This, even as the Constitution leaves to the legislature the authority to establish lower courts, as well
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Section 5 - Exercise srcinal jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. - Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: - All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. - All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. - All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. - All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. - All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
This reinforces the stability of the Court’s jurisdiction considering that the
enumeration in section 5 Art VIII is specific and fundamental. e. (Congressional Power over Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) - The appellate jurisdiction No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. (Section 30, Art VI)
Case: In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that — “In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court” Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman -G .R . No. 133715 February 23, 2000 DOUG LA S R .
VILLAVER T vs. HO N. ANI ANO A. DES IER TO
f. Administrative supervision over all lower courts and their personnel The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. (Section 6. Art VIII)
As such, the SC oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof. As an as "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts[,]"except of this court. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." G.R. No. 187491 FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LILIA S. CHUA
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adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court personnel. g. Exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in thereon. (Art VII Section 11)
Expressing the rule that the Supreme Court is the "sole entity charged with the discipline of judges," Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno articulated her concern over Pres. Duterte’s public enumeration of some members of the judiciary who are involved in the proliferation of prohibited drugs. “Dear Mr. President:
xxx The Court would consider it important to know the source and basis of any allegation that specific judges are involved in the illegal drugs trade in line with its duty to exercise administrative supervision over all lower courts. The Court looks with alarm at the proliferation of drugs, in a consensus shared with you, Mr. President, that dangerous drugs have been destroying Filipino lives and families. We abhor its ability to even destroy public institutions, thus our proactive investigation of any report that judges and court personnel abet the drug trade. We are currently investigating a report on a judge who may be so involved. He is not on the above list. However, Mr. President, a premature announcement of an informal investigation on allegations of involvement with the drug trade will have the unwarranted effect of rendering the judge veritably useless in discharging his adjudicative role. Thus this Court has been careful, all too aware that more often than not, a good reputation is the primary badge of credibility and the only legacy that many of our judges can leave behind. Too many of our judges have been assassinated, 26 since 1999, a large proportion of them reportedly at the behest of crime lords, more specifically, drug lords. Allow me to submit a separate update on this matter. In order not to cause disruption to public service, we have administrative mechanisms in place to ensure that another judge take over the place of a suspended or disciplined judge. As it appears now, the announcement of the names of some judges is expected to cause problems with the scheduled hearings and conferences in their salas. With all due respect, Mr. President, we were caught unprepared by the announcement. It would matter greatly to our sense of constitutional order, if we were given the chance to administer the appropriate preventive measures without the complications of a premature public announcement. Moreover, because of the extrajudicial killings, which you had spoken out against, perpetrated by persons and groups that remain unidentified, our judges may have been rendered vulnerable and veritable targets for any of those persons and groups who may consider judges as acceptable collateral damage in the “war on drugs.” Also, because we do not have the personnel
to protect our judges, we have requested the Philippine National Police to authorize them to carry defensive firearms. We request that you reconsider your reported order that the judges you named, with the above clarification on who these are, continue to bear these licensed selfdefense weapons, if any, until a proper investigation concludes that formal criminal charges should be brought against them. As the sole entity charged with the discipline of judges, the Supreme Court decides when judges are excused from bench duty and report to it. We appreciate your zeal in helping us cleanse the Political Law 1
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ranks of the judiciary of misfits but we assure you, Mr. President, even an informal report from the President or his appropriate alter egos would be sufficient to spur us to action and conduct the investigation immediately without need of requiring them to report physically to any entity and cancel scheduled court activities. To safeguard the role of the judges as the protector of constitutional rights, I would caution them very strongly against “surrendering” or making themselves physically accountable to any police
officer in the absence of any duly-issued warrant of arrest that is pending. Mr. President, the judiciary shares with you and the Filipino people a common desire to see a country that is rid of drugs, in the same manner that you share with the judiciary and the Filipino people a common desire to see a country that is governed by the rule of law. Please my warmest regards and my assurance of continued fervent prayers for your success.accept Chief Justice S ereno's letter to Pres ident Duterte, A ug us t 8, 2016
h. Security of tenure The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. (Art VIII Section 11) Section 2 xxx No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. (Art VIII)
i. To not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.( Art VIII, Section 12.)
Rule:
As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, we point out that the issue in Buac v. COMELEC 155 involved the characterization of the enforcement and administration of a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections. However, petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac which declared, in an obiter, that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive srcinal jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power."
The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads: SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
155
465 Phil. 800, 810 (2004)
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At the higher levels – city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial – exclusive and srcinal jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review – via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party – if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction It is beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, JusticeforJose P. Laurel by enucleated that "itthe would be ofinconceivable if the Constitution had not provided a mechanism which to direct course government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
G .R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010 ATTY. R OMULO B. MACA LINTAL, vs. PR E S IDE NTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUN AL Case: Judge Manzano was was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial / City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request. A.M. No. 88-7-1861-R TC October 5, 1988 IN R E : DE S IG NA TION
OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMM ITT EE ON J USTICE
j. Salaries of judges may not be reduced The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During the continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Art VIII, Sec 10)
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Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, …the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
two hundred forty thousand pesos. (art XVIII)
SEC. 9, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution then provided that. “The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good
behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos”.
Rule: The salaries of judges were not subject to income tax, for such would be a diminution of their salary, in contravention of the Constitution Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the inference is not illogical that in restraining the impairment of judicial compensation the Fathers of the Constitution intended to preclude taxation of the same. G .R . No. L-2348 Februa ry 27, 1950 G R E G OR IO PE R FE CTO vs .
BIB IAN O MEE R
Case: RA 590., was passed which provided that the Constitutional provision against the diminution of salaries of members of the judiciary should not be construed as an exemption from income tax
Rule: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that
taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. We reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs. G .R. No. L-63 55-56 Aug ust 31, 1953 PA STOR M. E NDE NCIA vs .
S ATUR NI NO DA VID
Article XV, Section 6 of the 1973 Constitution however provides that Political Law 1
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“No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax”.
The said provision of the 1973 Constitution is not found in the 1987 Constitution. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During the continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Art VIII, Sec 10)
Hence, are the salaries of judges except again from income tax, in reversion of the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David? Case : In a nutshell, Petitioners submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution." Under the 1973 Constitution, it was provided that;: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office. ... The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the srcinal concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
Rule: The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable We accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably. G .R . No. 78780
J uly 23, 1987 DA VID G . NITA FAN, vs . COMMI S S IO NE R OF INTE R NA L R E VE NUE
k. Fiscal autonomy The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. (Sec 3, Art VIII)
Rule: Administrative Matter: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such Political Law 1
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sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entireCourt, fabricConstitutional of our constitutional system isand based. the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Commissions, the In Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. A.M. No. 01-1-04-S C-
PH IL J A J anuary 31, 2006 R e: Clarifyi ng and S treng thening The Org anizational S tructure and A dmini s trative S et-Up of the Philippine J udici al Ac ademy
Rule: One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. The Court’s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary
is more extensive than the mere automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations, real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or interference. A .M. No. 11-7-10-S C J uly 31,
2012 R e: COA Opinion on the C omputation of the Apprais ed Value of the Properties Purc has ed by the R etired C hief/As s ociate J ustic es of the Suprem e Court
l. Rule Making Power The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx 9. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. xxx (Section 5, Art VIII) Section 14, (2) The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law (Art XII) Section 18, (3) The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Art VII)
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Rule: The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure 156. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial. G.R . No. 132601 J anuary 19, 1999 LE O EC HE G AR AY
vs. SECR ETARY OF JUST ICE, ET AL.
m. Temporary detail of judges The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx 3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. xxx(Section 5, Art VIII)
n. Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx … Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
xxx(Section 5, Art VIII)
o. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx 4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (Art VIII)
D. Jurisdiction (1) Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (VIII) 156
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx 5. Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Xxx (Art X, 1973 Constitution)
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JUDICIAL POWER a. To whom Vested: Supreme Court, and the lower courts as are provided by law Rule: The Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories of judicial power. However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative power. Maria C arolina P . A raullo v.
B enig no S imeon C. Aquino III, G .R . No. 209287, 1 J uly 2014
b. Scope: i. Settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. ii. Determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Section 1, Article VIII) The Expanded Concept of Judicial Power Rule: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable. The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution were laid out during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a former Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the proposed provisions on the Judiciary, where he said:– The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, theydignity." are so personal thatthe to first enforce actualparagraph compulsion would be1 highly derogatory to but human This is why part them of theby second of Section provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable …
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The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also, another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice. Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. Maria Carolina P. A raullo v. B enig no S imeon C. A quino III,
G .R . No. 209 287, 1 J uly 2014
(2) Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. Exercise srcinal jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved … (VIII) The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. (Section 2, Art VIII)157 Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. 157
Courts derive their authority from the Constitution’s recognition that they shall be the sole and exclusive investees of judicial power. This, even as the Constitution leaves to the legislature the authority to establish lower courts, as well as "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts[,]"except of this court. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." G.R. No. 187491 FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LILIA S. CHUA
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The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Section 1. Rule 65) Petition for PROHIBITION. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Section 2. Rule 65) Petition for MANDAMUS. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Section 3 Rule 65) QUO WARRANTO: Action by Government against individuals. — An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against: (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Section 1.Rule 66) When an individual may commence such an action. — A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own name. (Section 5.Rule 66) To what HABEAS CORPUS extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
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is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. (Rule102 Section 1)
Case : Due to the imposition of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, Respondent wrote a letter to
petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants. Municipal Ordinance No. 98- 01 was the “Municipal Revised Revenue Code." The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees for stalls. The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market. This prompted together with other situated stall holders at the municipal public market, to file petitioners, before the RTC a Petition for similarly Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent. The RTC ruled for the respondents
Rule: In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve. Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the srcinal jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. G.R. No. 182065 October 27, 2009 EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA vs HON. MARIANO M.
MA LONE S
Case : This case is about the right of a discharged police officer to reinstatement, back salaries, allowances, regular court.and other benefits after being absolved of a serious crime filed against him before a Respondent Reynaldo Roaquin was a member of the PNP who was charged with murder, but subsequently absolved of the same several years after. Political Law 1
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He asked and was granted reinstatement thereafter. The reinstatement was however ever nullified as purportedly Roaquin could not be entitled to reinstatement since he failed to file a motion for reconsideration within 10 days of being notified of his discharge.
Rule : An issue of fact exists when what is in question is the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, whereas an issue of law exists when what is in question is what the law is on a certain state of facts. The test, therefore, for determining whether an issue is one of law or of fact, is whether the CA could adjudicate it without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is an issue of law; otherwise, it is an issue of fact.
Here the CA needed only to review the records, more particularly, the pleadings of the parties and their annexes to determine what law applied to Roaquin, Section 45 or Section 48 of R.A. 6975. Such question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties since the essential facts of the case are not in dispute. As Roaquin’s superior officers’ appeal involves only questions of law, they erred in taking recourse to the CA by notice of appeal. Hence, the CA correctly dismissed their appeal. G .R . No. 159588 S eptember 15, 2010 P/C HIE F
S UPE R IN TE ND E NT R OB E R TO L . CA LIN IS AN vs . S PO2 R E YNA LDO R OA QUI N y LADE R AS
Rule: The issues presented in this case involve questions of fact which are not reviewable in a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court is not a trier of facts. Section 1 of Rule 45 provides that "[t]he petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts while a question of law exists if the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. There is a question of fact if the issue requires a review of the evidence presented or requires the re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. However, if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence, the question is one of law. All the issues raised by petitioner require a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the evidence presented. G.R. No. 171982 August 18, 2010 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHI LIPPI NES, vs. TRADER S ROYAL B ANK Case : It is a well-established doctrine that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. This Court defined a question of law, as distinguished from a question of fact, to wit: A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. G.R.
No. 160219 J uly 21, 2008 VE CTOR S HIPPING C OR POR ATION v s. ADE LFO B. MACA S A
: Fordated resolution are 4, public Urgent Motion for Reconsideration theSupplemental Resolution of Case this Court January 1990respondents' temporarily restraining the execution of petitionerofand Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
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It is the submission of public respondents that: “the Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on tha t sphere of executive authority”Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
Rule : The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders makebythem conformable law andon justice. this purpose, 6 of Rule 135 provides that to "when law jurisdiction is to conferred a courtFor or judicial officer,Section all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. G .R . No. 13 2601
J anuary 19, 1999 LE O E C HE G AR A Y vs . S E CR E TA R Y OF J US TIC E , ET A L
(3)Section 18. xxx The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (VII)
The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding by anylawcitizen, sufficiency of privilege the factual basis proclamationfiled of martial or the the suspension of the of the writ of or the the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. Prior to the 1987 Constitution, the authority of the Court emanated from jurisprudence. In the case of Lansang vs. Garcia the Court held unanimously that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual basis in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Rule: Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. The issue there raised was whether in suspending the privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing so. The Court, in considering the fact that the President based his decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition in Central Luzon and (b) a closed door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the President did not act arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is without basis. G.R . No. L-3 3964 December 11, 1971 IN THE MATTE R OF THE P E TITION FOR HA B E AS
CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA vs.
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BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary (and accompanying cases) .158
This holding is now found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3 (4)The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Art VII, sec 4, par 7)
Rule: With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
, the task of deciding conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland159 proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. G .R . No. 191618 November 23, 2010 ATTY . R OMULO B . MAC AL INTA L, vs.
PRE SIDENT IAL E LECTO RA L TRIBUNAL
Rule: The great public interest at stake behooves the Tribunal to exercise its power and render judgment free from public pressure and uninterrupted by the parties' penchant for media mileage. Therefore, in view of the foregoing reports where press statements of both parties appeared as an attempt to influence the proceedings, convince the public of their version of facts, and create bias, prejudice and sympathies, the Tribunal resolves to WARN both parties and counsels from making public comments on all matters that are sub judice. B . LEG AR DA, pro testant, vs. NOLI L. DE C AS TR P.E O .T. C as e No. 003 J anuary 18, 2008 LO R E N
Case: In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634. Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads: "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose." The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as "not (being) justiciable" 158
The noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, the Court said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines. 159 McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (Wheat.), 1819.
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controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-PresidentElect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, dislodge candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, i.e., and to Rule 14 of the the winning "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise – "Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines. "Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest. "Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner." The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 MAR IA J E A NE TTE C. TE CS ON vs. The COMM IS S ION ON ELE CTIONS
Case: Santiago and Ramos were contenders to the Presidential Election on the year 1992. Ramos emerged winner, hence the protest of Santiago. In the interim, Santiago ran and won as senator in the 1995 elections.
Rule: The Tribunal, nonetheless, confirmed its power to dismiss an electoral case on technical grounds. … the Rules of the Tribunal allow summary dismissal of election protests evenfor less
important grounds, to repeat, such as the petition filed with the Tribunal or the annexes attached Political Law 1
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thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and cash deposits were not filed within the periods fixed in the Rules,27and the additional provision for dismissal under Rule 61. It must be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible RAMOSB ANC P.E .T. Ca se No. 001 February 13 , 1996 MIRIA M DEFE NSOR - vs. FIDE L VA LDE Z
(5)Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Art IX, A) E. Report on the Judiciary Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary. (Art VIII)
Even if the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy, the annual report is significant due to the system of checks and balances. F. Manner of Sitting and Votes Required Section 4. 1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. 2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. 3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. Political Law 1
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En Banc Cases (Under the Constitution): 1. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law; (sec 4, Art VIII) 2. Those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations; (sec 4, Art VIII) 3. All other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc; (sec 4, Art VIII) 4. Cases or matters heard by a division when the required number is not obtained; (sec 4, Art VIII) 5. When a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed by the court sitting en banc;(sec 4, Art VIII) 6. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal; (sec 11, Art VIII) 7. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing; (sec 18, Art VII) 8. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (sec 4, Art VII)
Rule : Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy, judicial time, and interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such reasons apply with greater force to final judgments of the highest Court of the land. G .R . Nos . 140743 & 140745
S eptember 17, 2009 CITY G OV E R NME NT OF TA G A Y TA Y vs . HON. E LE UTE R IO F. GUERRERO Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion
— Where the court en banc is Civil Procedure: Section 7. Procedure if opinionmajority is equally divided. equally divided in opinion, or the necessary cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the srcinal action commenced in the court shall be dismissed, in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed
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from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Rule 56, Rules of Court) Criminal Procedure: Section 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. — When the Supreme Court en banc is equally divided in opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant, the case shall again be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-deliberation, the judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted. (Rule 125), Rules of Court
Voting A) En banc All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon The quorum of fifteen being eight, the lowest possible votes for a concurrence is thus that of five members. This increases as the number of those who actually participated likewise increases. Members who abstained is deemed to have voted, as abstention is a form of vote casting B) In divisions Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
In a division of 7 members, the majority is
4 if all are present, if if 6 5 are are present, present, the the majority majority is is 4 3 if 4 are present, he majority is 3 if 3 are present, there is no quorum
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In a division of 5 members, the majority is
3 votes are required, although all, or 4 or 3 are present
In a division of 3 members,
All the 3 must vote
Note that in no case shall a decision be without the concurrence of at least three of such Members When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc. G. Requirement as to decisions Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for the decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate court. (Art VIII) Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. (Art VIII)
The conclusions of the Supreme Court shall be reached 1. Consultation 2. Assignment to a ponente who will write the decision expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 3. Issuance of a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice, a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. 4. Statement of the reasons by any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained Case : In its decision, public respondent practically adopted the factual findings of the trial court, and explicitly declared that the latter simply acted "in accordance with the provisions of the rules of
court" andevidence committedexnoparte, reversible error "in declaring the defendants in default, allowing plaintiff to adduce and in finding the defendants-appellants grosslyinand inexcusably negligent (sic)" in view of the latter's failure to make a timely motion for reconsideration of the order of default; appear in court on 16 July 1984 when petitioner was scheduled to present his evidence ex parte; and furnish the trial court with a copy of their petition for certiorari filed with the appellate court Political Law 1
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within a reasonable time. Its was only on 6 August 1984 –– long after the case had been submitted for decision — that the same was filed.
Rule : The challenged decision leaves much to be desired. What was filed before the public respondent was an ordinary appeal from a judgment by default. This necessitated a full-blown decision taking into account the five (5) assigned errors which touch on both substantive and procedural matters. Accordingly, public respondent promulgated its 30 January 1989 decision following a meticulous review of the proceedings had before the trial court and careful re-appraisal of the evidence adduced before it. Thus, that decision faithfully complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the law on which it is based. Now, if such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a resolution or modified decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual and legal foundation upon. The reason obvious: asideoffrom beingit must required by the Constitution, the court shouldrelied be able to justify such aissudden change course; be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn conclusions and pronouncements in the earlier decision. In the instant case, the public respondent miserably failed to do so; this is reflected in the quoted resolution of 12 July 1989 which leaves in limbo the trial court's challenged decision because it is not the latter which is reserved but rather the public respondent's own decision of 30 January 1989. Public respondent simply restore the parties to the status quo obtaining prior to 30 January 1989. Clearly, therefore, an amended decision on the appeal proper or on the merits of the decision of the trial court would be in order. There is more to the confusion. Public respondent ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings, thereby placing the latter in a quandary as to what it was supposed to do. The trial court would not know what "further proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified the order of default nor set aside the evidence received ex parte. Thus, the former would be hard pet at finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented for its resolution. G .R . No. 88954
October 29 , 1992 DATU SA MAD MANGE LE N, v s. THE HONO R AB LE COURT OF A PPE ALS , PEDRO HABALAYUS a nd H AB ALAYUS E NTER PRISE S, INC
Rule: : This brings into focus the question of whether BOI rendered a decision within the meaning of
its own rules which requires that the decision in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. It reads. — Sec. 4. Contents of Decision. — The orders, resolutions and decision determining the merits of the case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. It is readily evident that the issues raised and arguments proffered by petitioner in asking for reconsideration were weighty enough to deserve a full length decision as prescribed by the rules. The manner by which BOI brushed off petitioners reiterative protests did not amount to a decision within the mandate of its own rules, nor that contained in the Administrative Code of 1987 which similarly provides as follows: SEC. 14. Decision. — Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. We have occasion to rule that the constitutional and statutory mandate that "no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
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(Sec 12, ART. VIII, CONSTITUTION, Sec. 1, Rule 36, RULES OF COURT; Naguiat vs. NLRC 269 SCRA 564,577 (1997).) In Malinao vs. Reyes we held that the voting in the Sanggunian in which the majority found the respondent official guilty of the administrative charge was not a decision contemplated in the law, and had no legal effect as such. In the context of what the law and its own rules prescribe, as well as our applicable pronouncements, the BOI Resolution of May 10, 1990, as well as its Letters of August 1, 1990 and March 11, 1991 did not qualify as "decision," absent a clear and distinct statement of the facts and the law to support the action. Lacking the essential attribute of a decision, the acts in question were at best interlocutory orders that did of notappeal. attain finality of a final lapse of the statutory period G .R . nor No. acquire 105014the effects December 18, judgment 2001 PILdespite IPI NAS the K AO , INC ., vs. T HE HONORA BLE COU RT OF APPE ALS
Rule : The resolution of this issue involves another factual finding that Naguiat Enterprises actually
managed, supervised and controlled employment terms of the taxi drivers, making it their indirect employer. As adverted to earlier, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are binding upon the court in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for holding Naguiat Enterprises and its officers jointly and severally liable in discharging CFTI's liability for payment of separation pay. We again remind those concerned that decisions, however concisely written, must distinctly and clearly set forth thefacts and law uponwhich they are based. This rule applies as wellto dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. G .R . No. 116123 M arch 13, 1997 S erg io F . Nag uiat, et
al. vs . National Labor R elations C ommis s ion, et al.
HOWEVER, note the case of Padua vs Ranada
Rule: Petitioner Zialcita faults the TRB for not stating the facts and the law on which Resolution No. 2001-89 is based. Petitioner is wrong. Suffice it to state that while Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based," THIS RULE APPLIES ONLY TO A DECISION OF A COURT OF JUSTICE, not The TOLL REGULATORY BOARD G.R. No. 141949
October 14, 2002 CE FE R INO PADUA, vs. H ON. S ANTIA G O R ANA DA
Case : In the present petition, petitioner contends that: the Honorable Court of Appeals has violated
the Constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Rule : We are not persuaded. The assailed resolution is not the "decision" contemplated under Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution. The mandate embodied in this constitutional provision is applicable only in "cases submitted for decision" i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the present case, the Court of Appeals denied due course and outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner on the grounds that the factual issues had already been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in agreement with the findings of the labor arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals; Political Law 1
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and that the questions raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration. We find these legal bases in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution. The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the court may dismiss a petition for certiorari if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. Furthermore, a reading of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals shows that the main issue raised is factual as it questions the finding of the NLRC that respondent Endaya was illegally dismissed from his employment. Petitioner brought up issues the resolution of which necessarily involves a review of the evidence presented by both parties. It is settled that resort to a judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari underorRule 65 of the Revised Ruleson of the Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction grave abuse of discretion part of the rendering tribunal, board or office. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor official or officer in determining his conclusion. It is not for the appellate court to reexamine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its specialized field. Considering that the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are supported by evidence on record, the same must be accorded due respect and finality. G .R . No. 1568 10 November
25, 2004 GE R MA N MA C HINE R IE S C OR POR ATION, vs . E DD IE D. E NDAYA
Rule: We cannot close our eyes to the failure of the RTC decision to measure up to the standard set by Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, that a decision, judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based. Our Administrative Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988 reiterates this requirement and stresses that judges should make complete findings of facts in their decisions, scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. In Yao v. Court of Appeals, we emphasized: “Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a
paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding “ipse dixit”160. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his ence fellowmen, the judgeofmust ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confid in the justness his decision.”
160
“He, himself, said it”
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The RTC decision did not distinctly and clearly set forth, nor substantiate, the factual and legal bases for its affirmance of the MCTC decision. It contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions. Judges must inform the parties to a case of the legal basis for their decision so that if a party appeals, it can point out to the appellate court the points of law to which it disagrees. Judge Apostol should have known the exacting standard imposed on courts by the Constitution and should not have sacrificed the constitutional standard for brevity’s
sake. Had he thoroughly read the body of the MCTC decision, he would have clearly noted that the "proportion of 1:3," stated in the penultimate paragraph of the decision, meant that the petitioner was entitled to one-fourth, while the respondents were entitled to three-fourths, of the subject property.
G .R . No. 1589 29 Aug us t 3, 2010 R osario P. T an vs . A rtemio G. R amirez, et al. Case : The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police Colonel RolandoAvenue, N. Abadilla ("Abadilla"), who was ambushed in broad driving (PNP), his car along Katipunan Quezon City. The accused in were indicted fordaylight Murder. while Their Motion for Reconsideration was denied and ordered the immediate transmittal of the records of these cases to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review. The trial Court convicted the accused. The same was affirmed by the CA. Appellants assail the wholesale adoption, if not verbatim copying, by the CA of the factual narration, as well as the arguments for and disposition of the merits of the case from the Consolidated Brief for the Appellees, which in turn is based on the memorandum submitted by the private prosecutors to the trial court. This anomaly, according to the appellants, which was aggravated by the insufficient findings of fact and absence of actual discussion of the assignment of errors raised by each appellant before the CA, resulted in the failure of intermediate review without any independent findings and resolution of important issues of the case, thus rendering the CA decision void. Hence, appellants seek not just to overturn or reverse the CA decision but also to declare it null and void, by way of "radical relief" from this Court.
Rule : The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." Judges are expected to make complete findings of fact in their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. Section 2, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, likewise provides: “Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.”
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction, notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written; and even if "there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility," provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or the rendered facts comprising theand elements of the that waspenalty; chargedorinquoted the information, anddiscussed accordingly a verdict imposed the offense corresponding the facts narrated in the prosecution’s memorandum, but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution’s evaluation of the case.
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In the same vein, we have expressed concern over the possible denial of due process when an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, thus depriving the appellant of a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, we held that though it is not a good practice, we see nothing in the act of clearly the trialand court completely copying thefindings memorandum submitted providedillegal that the decision distinctly states sufficient of fact and the lawbyona party, which they are based. In another case where we upheld the validity of memorandum decisions, we nevertheless took occasion to remind judges that it is still desirable for an appellate judge to endeavor to make the issues clearer and use his own perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law. No less importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his judgment. Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction. The principal
arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before this Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What appellants essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the facts narrated, but also the arguments and discussion including the legal authorities, in disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the Office of the Solicitor General’s position, as well as the trial court’s insufficient findings of fact, appellants anchor their claim of failure of intermediate review by the CA.
G .R . No. 182555 S eptember 7, 2010 LE NIDO LUMANOG and AUG USTO S A NTOS , vs. PE OPL E OF THE PHILIPPIN ES
h. Mandatory Period for Deciding on Cases Section 15. 1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. 2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. 3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. 4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay. Art VIII)
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Section 18., par 3 The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Art. VII,) Section 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. (Art XVIII) Section 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable. (Art XVIII) Section 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification. (Art XVIII)
a. Cases or matters must be decided or resolved within - “Upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.”
24 months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, Unless reduced by the Supreme Court, 12 months for all lower collegiate courts, and 3 months for all other lower courts.
b. “Within thirty days from its filing”
The Supreme Court on the appropriate proceeding sufficiency to determine the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof
The Supreme Court has adopted certain measure for the expeditious resolution of cases. Among them are the following; Rules for Small Claims Section 2. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions before the Metropolitan trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts for payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs. Section 5. Commencement of Small Claims Action. - A small claims action is commenced by filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim (Form 1 - SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification of Non-forum Shopping (Form 1-A,SCC), and two (2) duly certified photocopies of the actionable document/s subjects of the claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence to support the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted together with the Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional evidence. No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim described in this Rule, is necessary to initiate a small claims action. Political Law 1
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Section 17. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant. If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense and needs assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to assist that party upon the latter's consent. Section 23. Decision. - After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. 161
Judicial Affidavit Rule – for certain cases (sec 1, 9) Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following: (1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and (2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, xxx162
Justice delayed, is justice denied. As such, the Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of mandatory periods for the resolution of cases in order to reduce the congestion of court dockets and the resulting delay in the resolve of cases. Any delay in the administration of justice dispossesses the all those who come before it of their right to the speedy disposition cases. Delays undermine the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system. Case : The administrative case at bar arose from a sworn letter-complaint dated May 31, 2001 filed with the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) by Esterlina Acuzar, complainant, charging Judge Gaydifredo T. Ocampo of the Municipal Trial Court, Tupi, South Cotabato, with gross misconduct, bias and partiality.
Allegedly, according to complainant, since November 4, 1998, when Civil Case No. 412 was filed, up to the filing of this administrative complaint on May 31, 2001, respondent has not taken any action on the case because his wife is the relative of defendant Cruz. In fact, the latter told her (complainant) that he would just give the amount involved to respondent judge in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Respondent explained that the trial of Civil Case No. 412 had long begun and it is now the turn of the defendant to present his evidence. Although there was delay, it was due to the motions for postponement of either or both opposing counsel. He granted those motions in order to avoid any possible "charge of denial of due process." He further alleged that defendant Cruz is a very distant relative of his deceased first wife, not even within the sixth civil degree.
161 162
A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, November 21, 2000 RE: THE RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
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For our resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision punishable under Section 9 (1) and Section 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, on Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
Rule : Respondent is Guilty. In Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Reinato G. Q uilala, et al. we held that the noble office of a judge is to render justice not only impartially, but expeditiously as well, for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Thus, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in
Section 15 (1) (2), Article VIII of the Constitution, that is, three months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum. This of thedelayed fundamental lawdenied. is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice forrequirement obviously, justice is justice Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess these traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice. We agree with the Court Administrator in holding that a period of a little less than three years to dispose of a simple case for a sum of money (P20,000.00) is an inordinate delay "indicative of inefficiency." However, we cannot go along with his recommendation that respondent be merely warned sternly for his administrative offense. Under Sections 9 and 11 (B) of Rule 140 of the same Rules, undue delay in rendering a decision is a less serious charge punishable by (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. A.M. No. MTJ -02-1396 March
15, 2004 ES TER LINA ACUZ AR vs. JUDGE G AYDIFR EDO T. OCAMPO
Case : Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al.. She claimed that the respondent Judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond the 90 day reglementary period without requesting an extension of time from this Court. She alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on January 27, 2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the handling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation. Respondent explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for the Prosecution - was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted for resolution was issued on September 13, 2005. Respondent further explained that the Decision dated December 12, 2005 was promulgated only on January 27, 2006 because he was on official leave from December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he left for the United States. Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity in the promulgation of the decision even though the complainant and the handling prosecutor, Robert M. Visbal, were not present at that time. He reasoned that the complainant is not entitled to be notified of the promulgation as she is neither the private complainant nor a witness, while the prosecution was duly represented during pointed the promulgation by Prosecutor Sabarre who wasofalso in the RTC. Respondent out that the court had Edgar alreadyA.set the schedule theassigned promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor Visbal opted not to attend, it was for a reason only known to him
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Rule : Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit: (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows: — A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the Rule 3.05periods. required
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory. The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to
disrepute. As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had been submitted for decision. Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts. Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve it. In this case, granting that it was for a justifiable reason to render a decision or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary period, the respondent could have sought additional time by simply filing a request for extension. Respondent, however, did not avail of such relief. Respondent did not proffer any tenable justification for the delay in rendering the decision. He insisted that it was proper and procedural to first resolve the parties' memoranda before the case may be considered submitted for decision. He, thus, would want the Court to consider his Order dated September 13, 2005 resolving the memoranda of the parties and declaring the case submitted for resolution as the starting point of the 90-day period for deciding the case and not on August 10, 2005, the date when the last pleading was filed. Administrative No. issuedcases, by this Courtprovides: on July 3, 1989 regarding the submission of memoranda forCircular purposes of 28 deciding clearly “x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of
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shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier”
A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was still awaiting the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court held: “x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda within the given
periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence - which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of the judge’s personal notes and the records of the case non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver of the privilege.” Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction. Under Section 9(1) Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. In a case, we held the respondent judge administratively liable for gross inefficiency for delay in the disposition of cases and fined him P20,000.00 considering that he failed to act promptly and decide eight (8) cases within the time prescribed by law and it was not the first time that an administrative case was filed against said judge. In another, the respondent judge failed to decide three (3) cases and resolve eleven (11) motions within the reglementary period. Considering that it was the judge's first offense, the Court imposed a fine of P15,000.00. For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and for which he is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Presidential Decree No. 26 for which he is ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of the decision be attached to his personal record. A.M.
NO. RTJ-06-2027 February 27, 2009 MARIETTA DUQUE vs. JUDGE CRISOSTOMO L. GARRIDO 2. LOWER COURTS
a. Qualifications and Appointment Section 7. 1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be
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at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. 2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar. 3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. (Art VIII) Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure fordiminish, the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for of allprocedure courts of the same grade, and shall not increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Art VIII) Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the submission of the list. . (Art VIII)
The following are the lower courts in the Philippines: Regular Courts
Court of Appeals Regional Trial Courts Metropolitan Trial Courts Municipal Trial Courts in Cities Municipal Trial Courts Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Special Courts
Sandiganbayan (Special Court) Court of Tax Appeals (Special Court) Shari'a District Courts (Special Court)163 Shari'a Circuit Courts (Special Court)
Qualifications of members of lower collegiate courts 1. Natural born citizen of the Philippines 2. Member of the Philippine bar 163
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1083 A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE RECOGNIZING THE SYSTEM OF FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
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3. Possesses other qualifications prescribed by Law 4. Person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. Qualifications of judges of lower non-collegiate courts: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Citizen of the Philippines Member of the Philippine Bar Possesses other qualifications prescribed by Law Person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence
b. Salary Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During the continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. . (Art VIII)
c. Congressional Power to Organize and Security of Tenure Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. … (Art VIII) No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.(Section 2, Par 2, Art VIII)
d. Removal Section 11. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in thereon. (Art VIII)
e. Jurisdiction Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Art VIII)
f. Requirements as to Preparations of Decisions Section 15. 1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. 2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
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3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. 4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay. (Art VIII)
g. Mandatory Period for Deciding Section 15. 1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. 2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. 3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. 4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay. (Art VIII) Section 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. (Art VIII) Section 13.period The for legal of the lapse, before ratification of submitted this Constitution, of the applicable theeffect decision or resolution of the the cases or matters for adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable. (Art VIII) Section 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification. (Art VIII)
3. The Judicial and Bar Council Section 8. 1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. 2. The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
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3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings. 4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council. 5. The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. (Art VIII)
Composition Ex-Officio
ChiefSecretary Justice asofex officioand Chairman, The Justice a representative of the Congress ex officio Members
Regular
A representative of the Integrated Bar, A professor of law, A retired Member of the Supreme Court, and A representative of the private sector.
Secretary ex-officio [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(3)]
Clerk of the SC, who shall keep a record of its proceedings
3. COURT MARTIAL
: Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an
Case Information charging Dionisio, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) )with the crime of homicide allegedly committed as follows: “That on or about the 31st day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable motive, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO, by then and there shooting the latter with the use of a gun, .45 caliber pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his neck and on his thorax, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.”
The respondent Judge dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 "for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not the Regional Trial Court, has jurisdiction over the case
Rule : Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 164 provides that "criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts." The principal issue in this case is 164
Sec. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts:Provided, That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been
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whether the term "regular courts" includes the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner maintains that it does not while the respondent Judge and the intervenor-respondent hold otherwise. The resolution of the principal issue hinges on the interpretation of the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 which, in turn, requires an inquiry into the legislative intent and purpose of the law. There can be no doubt that the provisions of R.A. No. 6975 on the PNP are intended to implement Section 6, Article XVI (General Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution which reads: “Sec. 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and
civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
Needless to state, the overwhelming sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution against the martial law regime 22 and the militarization of the police forces prompted them to explicitly direct the establishment and maintenance of one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character. This civilian character is unqualified and unconditional and is, therefore, all-embracing. The Declaration of Policy (Section 2) of R.A. No. 6975 faithfully carried out this mandate when it declared therein that: The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. That civilian character refers to its orientation and structure. It is thus evident that the mandate of Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 is to divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and to return or transfer that jurisdiction to the civil courts. The term regular courts was finally carried into the reconciled bill, entitled "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganization Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes," and incorporated in the Conference Committee Report received by the Office of the Secretary of the Senate on 19 November 1990. Section 46 of the proposed reconciled bill is Section 68 of House Bill No. 23614, with further modifications and amendments. The reconciled bill was approved by such both House of Congress and became R.A. No. 6975. The foregoing considered, we have no doubt that the terms civil courts and regular courts were used interchangeably or were considered as synonymous by the Bicameral Conference Committee and then by the Senate and the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. There could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in the courts within our judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which, as contradistinguished from courts-martial, are the regular courts. Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine judicial system; they pertain to the executive department of the arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, as amended, and Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial:Provided, further, That criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.
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government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power. Otherwise stated, courtsmartial are not regular courts. Regular courts are those within the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law. Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975. In the light then of the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City would be without jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 if the information therein would show that the offense of homicide charged was committed by the accused (private respondent) in relation to his office. The information has failed to do so. The pleadings of the parties are of little help. We can only speculate therefrom that the crime charged might have been committed while the private respondent was in the pursuit of his mission. Under the sub-heading in the petition entitled "Relevant Antecedents," the petitioner merely states: There is no indication at all that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot by the private respondent in the course of the latter's mission. On the other hand, the private respondent asserts in his Comment that he "shot Romeo Sadang in the performance of a lawful duty and in lawful defense of his life." Petitioner ignored this claim in its Reply to the Comment. This claim is an anticipatory defense yet to be proved and its assertion in the Comment does not cure the deficiency, pointed out earlier, of the information. It would appear to us that with respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the parties only took into account the prescribed penalty, relying upon Deloso vs. Domingo, for which reason they did not consider important and relevant the issue of whether the offense charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondent Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, a preliminary hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, G .R . No. L-108208 March 11, 1994 R E PUB LIC OF THE PHILIP PINE S , vs. HON.
MA XIMIA NO C . AS UNCIO N
Courts-martial agencies of has executive character, and one of for the ordering ofare courts-martial been held to be attached to the the authorities constitutional functions of the President as Commander-in-Chief, independently of legislation. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary." Further on, not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, … for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.165 D. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) is the central personnel agency of the (sec 3, IX-B) government.
165
G.R. No. L-25133 September 28, 1968 S/SGT. JOSE SANTIAGO vs. LT. COL. CELSO ALIKPALA, ET AL.
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The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) with its judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative functions is mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of the electoral process The COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) is empowered to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with srcinal charters. I - COMMON PROVISIONS a. As to Restrictions / Qualification Section 13. Par 2. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Art VII)
b. Appointment of Personnel Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. (Art IX A)
c. Salaries Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, …the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each. (Art XVIII) Section 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. (Art IX A)
d. Disqualification Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art IX A)
They may not a. Hold any other office or employment. b. Engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office. Political Law 1
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c. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. e. Impeachment Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Art X)
II - SAFEGUARDS THAT GUARANTEE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS - (Nachura)
THE
INDEPENDENCE
OF
THE
a. They are Constitutionally created, and thus cannot be abolished by statute b. Each is expressly described as “independent” c. Each is conferred with certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute d. The chairmen and the members cannot be removed except by impeachment (Art 10 sec 2) e. The Chairmen and the members are given a fairly long term of 7 years f. The chairmen and members may not be re-appointed or appointed in an acting capacity g. The salaries of the chairmen and the members are relatively high and may not be decreased during their continuance in office. h. They enjoy fiscal autonomy. - Book II, Chapter 5 of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that the Constitutional Commissions enumerated in the Constitution are “independent” and “enjoy fiscal autonomy.” Sec. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. - The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
i. Each commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided that they do not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. j. The chairmen and the members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to strengthen their integrity
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k. The commissions may appoint their own officials in accordance with the civil service law (sec 4, Art IX-A) III - APPOINTMENT AND TERM CSC - Section 1 xxx
2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (Art IX B) COMELEC - Section 1. 2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (Art IX C) COA Section 1. 2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (Art IX D)
Commonalities a. The requirement of appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. No re-appointments are allowed. The Chairmen and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment b. Rotational scheme CSC - Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without COMELEC - Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment COA – Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment Political Law 1
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Appointment to any vacancy in any of the Commissions shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor Early on, in Republic v. Imperial (96 Phil. 770 (1955).) , the Court wrote of two conditions, "both indispensable to [the] workability" of the rotational plan. These conditions may be described as follows: (a) that the terms of the first batch of commissioners should start on a common date; and (b) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term. Otherwise, Imperial continued, "the regularity of the intervals between appointments would be destroyed." There appears to be near unanimity as to the purpose/s of the rotational system, as srcinally conceived, i.e., to place in the commission a new appointee at a fixed interval (every two years presently), thus preventing a four-year administration appointing more than one permanent and regular commissioner,( Seven years under the 1987 Constitution, nine years under the 1935 Constitution.) or to borrow from Commissioner Monsod of the 1986 CONCOM, "to prevent one person (the President of the Philippines) from dominating the commissions." It has been declared too that the rotational plan ensures continuity in, and, as indicated earlier, secure the independence of, the commissions as a body In Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, (G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000, 347 SCRA 655, 662-663; citing Republic v. Imperial) the Court described how the smooth functioning of the rotational system contemplated in said and like provisions covering the two other independent commissions is achieved thru the staggering of terms: “The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions
under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the twoyear interval between the expiration of the terms" and therefore, "the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution."
c. Temporary Appointments In no case shall any Member of the Commissions be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity In G.R. No. L-3452 December 7, 1949 Nacionalista Party vs. Felix Angelo Bautista, et al. a case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which did not have a
provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments to the COMELEC, the Court declared unconstitutional the designation of the Solicitor General as acting member of the COMELEC. The Court ruled that the designation of an acting Commissioner would undermine the independence of the COMELEC and hence violate the Constitution. The Court declared then: "It would be more in keeping with the intent, Political Law 1
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purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to a permanent Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily."
appoint
In Brillantes vs. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990). The Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then President Corazon Aquino of Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that: "A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtfulitsif withdrawal. the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging xxx The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guarantee is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines."
IV - THE CSC, COA, and COMELEC 1. The Civil Service Commission a. Composition and Qualification Section 1 1. The civil service shall be administered bybe thenatural-born Civil Service Commission composed and, of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall citizens of the Philippines at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. xxx (Art IX B)
Composition
a Chairman and two Commissioners
Qualifications
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment b. Functions
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Mandated Functions - Under Executive Order No. 292, (INSTITUTING THE "ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987") the Civil Service Commission shall perform the following functions: • Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit
system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service; • Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of the Civil Service Laws and other pertinent laws; • Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt
plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government; • Formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and
implementation of position classification and compensation and set standards for the establishment, allocation and reallocation of pay scales, classes and positions; •
Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on all head of departments, offices and agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari;
• Appoint and discipline its officials and employees in accordance with law and
exercise control and supervision over the activities of the Commission; • Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations. Any entity or
official in government may be called upon by the Commission to assist in the preparation and conduct of said examinations including security, use of buildings and facilities as well as personnel and transportation of examination materials which shall be exempt from inspection regulations; • Prescribe all forms for Civil Service examinations, appointment, reports and such
other forms as may be required by law, rules and regulations; • Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarily confidential,
highly technical or policy determining; • Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and
retention of qualified and competent work force in the public service; • Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly
or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and action of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of the copy thereof; Political Law 1
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• Issues subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents
and records pertinent to investigations and inquiries conducted by it in accordance with its authority conferred by the Constitution and pertinent laws; • Advise the President on all matters involving personnel management in the
government service and submit to the President an annual report on the personnel programs; • Take appropriate actions on all appointments and other personnel matters in the
Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age; • Inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments,
agencies, bureaus, offices, local government including government-owned or controlled corporations; conduct periodic review of the decisions and actions of offices or officials to whom authority has been delegated by the Commission as well as the conduct of the officials and the employees in these offices and apply appropriate sanctions whenever necessary.
• Delegate authority for the performance of any functions to departments,
agencies and offices where such functions may be effectively performed; • Administer the retirement program of government officials and employees, and
accredit government services and evaluate qualification for retirement; • Keep and maintain personnel records of all officials and employees in the Civil
Service; and • Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency such as
other functions as may be provided by law
c. Appeal Case: On the CSC Caraga Regional Office informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took. According to the CSC, the "person in the picture pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is attached in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)" and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the signature affixed to the PDS. The CSC further informed petitioner that such findings of alleged examination irregularities constituted the offense of dishonesty if prima facie evidence was established. Petitioner contends that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional examinations for police officers to the exclusion of the CSC. Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted on July 28, 2000 was void. Moreover, he alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM. To prevent the CSC Caraga from further proceeding with the conduct of the administrative investigation, PO1 Capablanca filed on January 16, 2002 a Petition for prohibition and injunction with the RTC. A motion to Dismiss was filed by the CSC, but was denied by the court.
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The matter was elevated to the CA, which ruled in favor of the CSC. The Court of Appeals found that PO1 Capablanca prematurely resorted to court intervention when the remedy of appeal to the CSC Central Office was available. Upholding the jurisdiction of the CSC Caraga, the appellate court declared that the subject of t he latter’s preliminary investigation was not with respect to PO1 Capablanca’s acts in the conduct of his dutie s as a police officer, but with respect
to the authenticity of the documents he submitted before the CSC Caraga in support of his application for permanent status as well as the veracity of its contents. It held that pursuant to the CSC's constitutional duty to protect the integrity of the civil service system, it acted within its authority to investigate irregularities or anomalies involving civil service examinations, and to ascertain whether a prospective civil service appointee is qualified in accordance with all the legal requirements.
Issue : The case at bar boils down to the issue of whether the CSC Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity.
Rule: Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the "Administrative Code of 1987," enumerates the powers and functions of the CSC, to wit: SEC. 12. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: (1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service; xxxx (7) Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations. x x x (11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. x x x In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner. However, petitioner contends that a citizen who has complaints against a police officer should bring his complaint before the following, citing Section 41 of RA 6975 to wit: (a) x x x x (1) Chiefs of police, where the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days; (2) Mayors of cities or municipalities, where the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period of not less than sixteen (16) days but not exceeding thirty (30) days;
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(3) People's Law Enforcement Board, as created under Section 43 hereof, where the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period exceeding thirty (30) days; or by dismissal. xxx (c) Exclusive Jurisdiction. - A complaint or a charge filed against a PNP member shall be heard and decided exclusively by the disciplining authority who has acquired srcinal jurisdiction over the case and notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction as regards the offense: Provided, That offenses which carry higher penalties referred to a disciplining authority shall be referred to the appropriate authority which has jurisdiction over the offense. Based on the foregoing, petitioner avers that the CSC does not have the authority to conduct an initiatory investigation of the case, butmentioned. it only has Petitioner appellate jurisdiction review theon decision of any of the disciplining authorities above anchors histoargument the following provisions of EO 292 stating that the heads of departments, agencies, offices or bureaus should first commence disciplinary proceedings against their subordinates before their decisions can be reviewed by the CSC: We are not persuaded. It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 144464, November 27, 2001, 370 SCRA 650, 655-656.) that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations. Thus: Petitioner’s invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is applicable to instances where
administrative cases are filed against erring employees in connection with their duties and functions of the office. This is, however, not the scenario contemplated in the case at bar. It must be noted that the acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in the Civil Service (Subprofessional) examination. The examinations were under the direct control and supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are government employees over whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. x x x Moreover, in Civil Service Commission v. Albao, we rejected the contention that the CSC, under the aforestated Sections 47 and 48 of Book V of EO 292, only has appellate disciplinary jurisdiction on charges of dishonesty and falsification of documents in connection with an appointment to a permanent position in the government service. We enunciated, thus: Pursuant to Section 47 (1), (2) and Section 48 above, it is the Vice President of the Philippines, as head of office, who is vested with jurisdiction to commence disciplinary action against respondent Albao. Nevertheless, this Court does not agree that petitioner is helpless to act directly and motu proprio, on the alleged acts of dishonesty and falsification of official document committed by respondent in connection with his appointment to a permanent position in the Office of the Vice President. It is true that Section 47 (2), Title I (A), Book V of EO No. 292 gives the heads of government offices srcinal disciplinary jurisdiction over their own subordinates. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is only suspension for not more imposed than thirtyexceeds days or fine an amount not exceeding thirtyan days’ salary. It is when the penalty the in aforementioned penalties that appeal may be brought before the Civil Service Commission which has appellate jurisdiction over the same in accordance with Section 47 (1) Title I(A), Book V of EO No. 292, thus:
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SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. x x x The present case, however, partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the integrity of the civil service system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law or the rules of the service. Incidentally, it must be mentioned at this juncture that citizen’s complaints before the PLEB under
RA 6975 pertain to complaints lodged by private citizens against erring PNP members for the redress of an injury, damage or disturbance caused by the latter's illegal or irregular acts, an example being that of a policeman who takes fish from the market without paying for it. G .R . No. 179370 November
19, 2009 EUGE NIO S. CAP AB LANCA vs. CIVIL SER VICE C OMMISS ION
d. Scope of Civil Service Section 2. 1. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with srcinal charters. (Art IX) Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Art XII)
Rule : Certainly, the transfer of the majority of the bank’s voting equity from public to private hands is an inevitable effect of privatization or, conversely, the privatization of the bank would necessitate the opening of the voting equity thereof to private ownership. And as the bank ceases to be government depository, it would, accordingly be coming under the operation of the definite set of laws and rules applicable to all other private corporations incorporated under the general incorporation law. Perhaps the aspect of more importance in the present case is that the bank, upon its privatization, would no longer be subject to the coverage of government service-wide agencies such as the CSC and the Commission on Audit (COA). G .R . No. 173615 Oc tober 16, 2009
PHILI PPINE NATI ONAL BA NK vs. CAY ETANO A. TEJ ANO, J R .
Rule : Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence, Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided: The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations . . . The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided:
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The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides:
The civi l servi ce embraces all branches , s ubdivis ions , ins trumentalities, and ag encies of the G overnment, i ncluding g overnment owned or controll ed corpora tions with ori g inal charter . (Article IX-B, Section 2[1])
In National Service (NASECO) v. National LabororRelations Commission, we had are the occasion to apply theCorporation present Constitution in deciding whether not the employees of NASECO covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, we ruled that the new phrase " with
ori g inal charter" means that g overnment-owned and controlled cor porations r efer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the
Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is exluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case. G .R. No.
98107 August 1 8, 1997 B ENJ AMIN C. J UCO vs NATIONAL L AB OR R ELA TION S COMM ISS ION
2. Commission on Elections The COMELEC was organized under Commonwealth Act No. 607 enacted on August 22, 1940. and The exercised power to through enforce the our Department election lawsof was srcinally vestedtoin Dean the President Interior. According Sinco, the view ultimately that an independent body could better protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement of our election laws, while an executive power, was transferred to the COMELEC. From a statutory creation, the COMELEC was transformed to a constitutional body by virtue of the 1940 amendments to the 1935 Constitution which took effect on December 2, 1940. COMELEC was generously granted the power to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections Then came the 1973 Constitution. It further broadened the powers of COMELEC by making it the sole judge of all election contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the national legislature and elective provincial and city officials. In fine, the COMELEC was given judicial power aside from its traditional administrative and executive functions. The 1987 Constitution quickened this trend of strengthening the COMELEC. Today, COMELEC enforces and administers all laws and regulations relative to the conduct Political Law 1
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of elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls. Election contests involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are under its exclusive srcinal jurisdiction. All contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are under its appellate jurisdiction.166 a. Composition and Qualifications Section 1. 1. There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, be members law for at least shall ten years. xxx (ArtofIXthe C)Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
Composition - A Chairman and six Commissioners Qualifications
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
Case : Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Rule Black defines "practice of law" as: “The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of taken all kinds, and the giving ofconnected all legal advice to law. clients. It embraces all advice clients and all actions for them in matters with the An attorney engages in thetopractice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing G.R. No. 133676April 14, 1999 TUPAY T. LOONG, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
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himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate”. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of clientsofunder the clients law. Otherwise stated, who, a representative capacity, engages in thetheir business advising as to their rightsone under theinlaw, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law”.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated: “The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination . (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions” Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours) The University the Philippines Lawpractice Center of in conducting briefing new lawyers (19741975) listed theofdimensions of the law in evenorientation broader terms as for advocacy, counselling and public service.
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One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312) Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23) G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN
MONS OD
b. The COMELEC is mandated with the following functions:
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of and elections, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Exercise exclusive srcinal jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay official decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purposes of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful credible elections. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, of coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the Commission on Elections. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of elections laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer of employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
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Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
c. Appeal Rule: The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by respondent Empeynado contending that this is a "case" or "matter" cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. The COMELEC resolution cancelling the appointment of Garces as Election Registrar of Gutalac, he argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A. The contention is without merit. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides: “Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members anycase or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the supreme court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof”
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELEC's resolution that triggered this controversy. The "case" or "matter" referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that "decision, rulings, order" of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving "elective regional, provincial, and city officials." In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC's choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational setup of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise srcinal jurisdiction over "all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction over of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." G .R . No. 114795 J uly 17, 1996 LUCITA Q. G AR CE S vs. THE HONORA B LE COUR T
OF APPEALS
3. Commission on Audit a. Composition and Qualification Section 1. 1. There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession. xxx (Art IX D)
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Composition - a Chairman and two Commissioners Qualifications Natural-born citizens of the Philippines Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment
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b. Functions The COA shall have the following functions
The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with srcinal charters, and on a post- audit basis: o
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constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; autonomous state colleges and universities; other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
c. Appeal Political Law 1
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Rule: To begin with, Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment or final order of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission of Audit to this Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution. The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review oncertiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, or COM decision the ON Commission H. R EYruling ES vs. MISSofION AUDIT on Audit. G .R . No. 125129 March 29, 1999 J OS E PH
Summary of Qualifications
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity
THE AMENDING PROCESS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or 2. A constitutional convention. Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Political Law 1
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Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. (ARTICLE XVII)
AMENDMENT - An Alteration of one or a few specific provisions of the Constitution. Its main purpose is to improve specific provisions of the Constitution. REVISION – An examination of the entire Constitution to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. A revision implies substantive change, affecting the Constitution as a whole. a. Proposal Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
By Congress acting as a constituent body (XVII, 1) A vote of 3/4 of all its members is required.
By a constitutional convention (XVII, 1) a) Congress calls a constitutional convention by a vote of 2/3 of all its members, or b) Congress submits to the electorate the question of calling such convention, by an absolute majority vote.
In case of amendments proposed by Congress or by the Convention the same shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
By the people a. Upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of theevery registered voters therein.
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b. No amendment under this section shall be authorized oftener than once every five years thereafter. In case of amendments proposed by an initiative the same shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. (Sec 4, XVII) b. Theories Regarding the Position of the Constitutional Convention in our System of Government See: G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Case : This is a Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
Issue: As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. : Accordingly, arewithout left with no alternative butthis to uphold the jurisdiction Courttoover Rule the present case. ItWe goes saying that We do not because the Court of is the superior the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case. G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
AR TUR O M. TOLE NTINO, vs . COMMI S S ION ON E LE CTIONS ,
c. Judicial Review of the Amending Process The validity of the ratification process was questioned in the case of Javellana v Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973) but the failure of the SC to come up with the necessary votes to declare the act as unconstitutional forced it into the conclusion that "there are no further obstacles to considering the constitution in force and effect Case : The petition is filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered
voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and vo ters similarly situated,”. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in Political Law 1
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implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Rule:
The results of the voting, premised on the individual views expressed by the members of the Court in their respect opinions and/or concurrences, are as follows: 1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasi ar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry." 2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an electi on or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. 3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
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Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution." 4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable." Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions. 5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. G .R . No. L-36142 March 31, 1973 J OS UE J A VE LLA NA, vs .
THE E XECU TIVE SE CR ETARY Read:
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), Lambino v. Commission on Elections, 505 SCRA 160 (2006) Political Law 1
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