D O U B T AND DOGMATISM �
Studies in Hellenistc Epistemolog
Edited by MAL CO COL L M S CH CHOFI OFIELD ELD MYLES BURNYEAT JONATHAN BARNES
CLARENDON PRESS, OXFORD 1980
Doubt n Dogmtsm were re, ctu obects But ther phenomenoogy ws per erte for wht s trgey but portry n metre of the suerngs of men who stn me t etern thngs (Epct D 46) We ony free oursees from one presentton by submttng to nother Longus pstor oers us not the nsght gne from trgey,, but the trnqu trgey trnquty ty of the ex oto n pce of the psson of the House o f Atreus Atreus t presents n empe, borrowe perhps perhps from the toc Do Chry Chrysostom, sostom, of n nitton nto oe whch knows no scor n no jeousy The gtton of the oers s ste by the course of the sesons they ern the mor from the ocks commtte to ther cre he st prgrph ets us see tht physc theory hs been teste gnst the pthoogy of oe n the gmes of shephers Wth the st sentence of the nrrtie, the ntton comes to n en the oers he gen the emon strton ther se of ppro
6
61 See W Schmd nd Stahln, Gchichte der grechischn Literatur ( Munich 920) 361-7 Do Chrysostom ws Stoc, pupl of Musonus nd one of the ledng eesenttves of the Second Sophstc; he comosed a Eboikos, psng the vtous smplcty of rstc fe
THE ORIGINAL NOTON OF
CAUSE*
Mchae Frede INTRODUCTON
Howeer mue our noton of cuse my be t s cer tht we wou he cutes n usng the term cuse for the kns of thngs Arstote Arstote cs cuses We mght een n t mseng to tk of Arstoten cuses n woner whether n trnstng the reent pssges n Arstote we shou not o the term cuse together For n en, form, or mtter o not seem to be the rght kns of tems to cuse nythng, et one to be cuses cuse s t s much ess cer wht our cutes re ue to We might thnk tht cuses re eents ometmes ths s regre s most trusm An, nee, phosophers snce Hume, who stt est n hs nguges werng on the mtter, he tene to thnk of cuses s eents But oubt tht our cuty wth Arstoten cuses s ue to the fct tht ens, forms, n mtter cery re not eents or nythng ke eents For prt from the fct tht one my he oubts bout the gener thess tht cuses re eents, we o not he ny cuty n unerstnng Knt, eg , when he tks s f substnce, n obect, cou be the cuse of somethng n nother object Crtque Pue Reason B s f the sun cou co u be s to be the cuse of the wrmng up of the stone or the metng of the butter. butter. An the reson why we o not he ny cuty n unerstnng ths kn of nguge seems to me to be the foowng physc object ke the sun or br-b cn nterct wth other thngs, t cn ect them n ct on them so s to prouce n eect n them Qute genery our use of cus terms seems to be strongy cooure by the noton tht n custon there s something whch n some sense oes somethng or other so s to prouce or brng bout n eect Een f we o thnk of cuses s eents the prgms we ten to * I would lke to thnk the membes of the coference fo he useful comments comments m ptcully gteful to Robet Bolton Myles Bunyet, Doothe Fede, Thoms Rosenmeye, nd Rchd Sobj who wee knd enough to pode me wth wtten comments whch wee vey helpful n evsng ths e.
Doubt and Dogmatism thnk of, and certanly the paradigms Hume and ant thought of, are events in which something does something or other; and we fee that we have to expain that it is ony in a very metaphorica sense that an event could be sad to produce an eect Thus, though we may want to get away from such a noton, there s a strong tendency to conceve of causes as somehow actve. And t seems that our dcuty wth the Arstotean causes s due to the fact that they cannot even be conceved of n ths way. A good part of the unfortunate history of the notion of a nal cause has ts origin in the assumption that the na cause, as a cause, must act and in the vain attempt to expan how t coud do so. It s ony with Arstotles moving cause that we thnk that we readiy understand why t shoud be caed a cause. But t woud be a mstake to thnk that Arstotle with hs noton of a movng cause tres to capture our noton of cause or at least a noton we would readily recognize as a notion of cause, though t is signicant that peope have tended to think that among the Aristotean causes it is ony the moving cause which s a cause reay. For Arstotle n more theoretca contexts wl tel that it is not the scuptor workng on his scupture who s the movng cause, but the art of scupture And with the art of sculpture we have the same pro bems as with ends, forms, and matter. Arstotes noton of cause, then, s quite derent from ours. But it s by no means pecular to Aristotle. The same dcuties we have wth Arstotle and the Perpatetics we also have with Pato or Epicurus deas do not seem to be the knd of thng that coud cause anythng, nor does the vod (cf. Epicurus n DL X But how dd t come about that peope got to thnk that a cause has to be the knd of tem whch can do something or other so as to brng about an eect ? From a remark n Sextus Empiricus t is clear that t was aready in later antiquity that the notion of a cause had been narrowed down to t the notion of an actve cause For in his discusson of causaty Sextus tes us P II 1 that dspte al the derences among phlosophers concernng causalty we st mght assume that they � agree on the following genera characterzation of a cause the cause is that because of which in virtue of its being active the eect comes about1 Sextus, then, caims that t s generaly agreed that causes are items whch 8
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The Orignal Noton of Cause somehow are actve and through their actvty brng about an eect Ths clam would be puzzng, indeed, gven what we have sad earier about Plato, Arstotle, and picurus, unless it re ected a genera shift in the noton of cause. But we have good reason to accept Sextus cam Frst of a Sextus shows hmsef to be qute aware of the fact that even nonactive tems get called causes For in the precedng paragraph he tels us that he now wants to turn to a consideraton of the actve cause in general to enerkon aton There woud be no point n adng the adectve actve f Sextus were not aware that non-active items, too, are caed causes So Sextus must assume that though phiosophers go on to cal such tems as Platonic ideas or Arstoteian causes causes, they nevertheless are agreed that, strctly speakng, ony active tems are causes. Secondy, there is ndependent evdence that Sextus had good reason to thnk so. Cement, eg., tels us Strom I 17, 82, 3 we say that the cause s conceved of as producing, as active, and as dong something (cf. also Strom VII 9 2 5, 5 . As we earn from Simplcus commentary on the Cateores 32, 6 ., ambchus explained a passage in Patos Plebus teng us that it s that whch s producng somethng to pooun which s, strctly speaking, the cause, whereas matter and form are not causes at al, but auxiaries sunaa, and the paradgm and the end only qualedy are causes. We nd siiar remarks throughout the eoplatonic tradtion Damascius, eg., tels us that every cause is dong somethng drastron, n Pleb I, 6 W The Perpatetic distinction of knds of causes s adapted to the shft by claimng that t is the moving cause whch is most stricty speakng the cause aton to kurtaton leomenon, as we can see from a passage in Smplcus n Ps 3 26, 5 .. The shft n termnoogy from causa movens to causa eciens may be another reection of the change in noton cf. eg Smp n Ps 326, 25 vdence of ths knd is easly mutipied, and thus we have good reason to beleve that the notion of a cause by Sextus time had changed n such a way as to be restrcted to items which can do s omethng or oher and thus cause something. t aso seems to be fary cear how this change in the notion of a cause dd come about. Seneca Ep XV ; cf 2 . sti criticzes Pato for assuming the ve knds of causes we ust saw Iambichus takng about on the grounds hat there s ust one 2 v . - ·nov € T 7Otev K €vepyeiv K pv ve8c
Doub and Dogas knd of cause, ha whch acs so as o produce he eec: The Socs ake he vew ha here s jus one cause, ha whch does soehng act) (LXV 4). In general s he Socs who nss ha causes are acve, and so sees o be her nuence whch has brough abou he change n queson Bu Soc nuence on hough abou causes s no resrced o hs pon hen we look, e.g., a Sexus' dscusson of causes n he Ounes ofPyrronsm urns ou ha he dsncons of knds of auses Sexus akes are all of Soc orgn. And hence gh be worh whle o revew our evdence concernng he Soc docrne of causes, no jus n order o nd ou why he Socs would nss ha causes have o be acve, bu n he hope of geng soewha clearer on he hsory of he noon of a cause n general. Before we go no he deals, hough, should be poned ou ha he Socs see o dsngush a leas hree uses of cause' of ncreasng narrowness There s rs of al a very general use of cause'. I sees o be hs use we have o hnk of when Sobaeus (E , p. 3 8, 2 3) says Chrysppus says ha a cause s a because of whch (d o) Jus ke he Engsh preposon because of' and he Geran ween he Greek da wh he accusave can cover such a varey of explanaory relaons ha would raher coforably accoodae anyhng ha had been called a cause, n ordnary dscourse or by phlosophers, ncludng he Arsoelan causes (cf Ps 98 5 . One ay, of course, doub wheher Chrysppus' characera on of a cause s supposed o be so generous as o allow us o call all he hngs causes whch acuay are called causes In hs case one would have o assue ha da here s used n a narrower echncal sense Bu here s evdence ha he Socs were wlng o allow for such a generous use of cause', hough, a he sae e hey also nssed on a narrower use. hen, hen Cleen (VIII 9 2 3) says s he sae hng, hen whc s a cause and whch s producve; and f soehng s a cause and pro ducve nvarably also s a because of whch; bu f soehng s a because of whch s o nvarably also a cause' and hen goes o n o gve aneceden causes as exaples of hngs whch are because of whch, bu no causes n hs sense, s naural o assue ha he s relyng on a conras beween a ore general noon of a cause accordng o whch any because of whch 0
he Orgnal Noon of Cause couns as a cause, and a narrower noon whch he wans o adop, accordng o whch a cause no ony has o be a because of whch, bu also producve Hence sees ha when Chrysppus characeres he cause as he because of whch he allows for a very general noon of a cause Then here s he narrower noon of a cause, whch Cleen n he passage quoed refers o, accordng o whch causes are resrced o hose hngs whch acually do soehng or oher o brng abou an eec I s hs noon of an acve cause of whch Sexus clas ha al phlosophers are agreed on I s no us he because of whch, bu he because of whch hrough whose acvy he eec coes abou, o use Sexus' characer aon Bu even hs narrower noon of an acve cause covers deren knds of causal relaons whch he Socs wl dsngush by dsngushng varous knds of causes And aong hese knds hey wl sngle ou ha whch s he cause, srcly speakng, aely he perfec (autotees) or conanng (sunektkon) cause Snce he os general noon of a cause s no speccally Soc I wll n he followng dscuss rs he general Soc noon of an acve cause and hen he varous knds of causes dsngushed, n parcular causes n he narrowes and srces sense THE GENERAL NOTION OF AN ACTIVE CASE
e sad ha one had o explan n wha sense Arsoelan causes could be called causes. Ends or fors do no see o be he rgh knds of es o be causes. And, as we have seen, one reason for hs ay be ha hey are enes, whereas causes, one gh hnk, are evens, facs, hngs one does, n shor, es of he knd I wl ca proposonal es ( ake all hese es o be proposonal es n soe very narrow sense, bu for ou purposes here wll do o ake he er n a very generous sense Now s rue ha a leas fro he fh cenury Bc onwards such proposonal es, oo, coe o be caled causes, ata Bu hroughou anquy, as far as I can see, s non-proposonal es lke Arsole's causes whch are referred o when causes are dscussed syseacally hs s no o deny ha phlosophers when hey sae he cause of soehng soees refer o pro posonal es (The cause of hs s ha '. n hs hey jus follow he shf n ordnary language enoned above Arsole
Doubt and Dogatis soeties even refers to propositiona ites when he gives exapes of his kinds of causes. But in other passages it is cear that when he dstinguishes kinds of causes he has entities, non propositiona ites in ind. And the ater tradition quite denitey treats Aristotean causes as nonpropositona Siary Epcurus treats causes as non-propositona when he regards the atos and the void as the utiate causes of everythng (DL X The sae is true of the ve causes of the Midde Patonists (Sen. Ep LXV 78) and of the six causes of the Neopatonists (cf. Sip n P 23 Oyp n Paed 207 27 . ; Phiop. De ae mund I 9, . . And it is certainy true of the Stoics who require a cause to be a being, an entity, a status they deny to propositiona ites. The facts of the atter becoe cearer if we take into account a ternoogica dstinction which Stobaeus attributes to Chrysippus E I, p 3 9 3 f. W. . This ditinction has a basis n the origina use of the word cause' which distinguished between an aon and an aa But this distinction is not preserved by Aristote; and as a resut it is uch ess cear than t woud otherwise have been whether we are consdering propositiona or nonpropositiona ites when we tak about causes Chrysippus' distinction is the foowing Having expained that an aon, a cause, according to Chrysippus is an entty, Stobaeus goes on to say, But an aa he says, i s an account of theaon or the account about the aon as aon) We ght have doubts as to the precise eaning of this short characterzation of an aa, if we did not hav a fragent of Dioes of Carystus (frag. Welann preserved by Gaen. Dioes discusses aetioogy, expanaton, n edicine, and in this discussion he uses the account about the aon interchangeaby wth the aa in the sense of the reason' or the expanation' Obviousy the idea is that the aa the reason or expanaton, is a oo a proositiona te of a certan kind, naey a stateent or a truth about the aon, the cause, or rather the reevant truth about the cause, the truth n virtue of whch it s the cause. And this sees to be exacty the characterization o an aa Stobaeus is attrbuting to Chysippus. By Chrysippus' tie ordinary usage of aon and aa no onger foowed that dstinction. But there was soe bass for the
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The Origina Notion of Cause ternoogca distinction in the origina use of these words. on is ust the neuter of the adective ao whch originay eant cupabe, responsbe, bearing the bae', whereas the aa is the accusation, what soebody is charged with having done such that he is responsbe for what happened as a resut. And if we ook at Pato's rearks on expanation in the Paedo we see that such a stinction in use between aon and aa is st preseved. In spite of its ape use both of the adjective and the noun the passage resees the adective for entities ke Anaxagoras' Nous and Socrates' bones and sinews, whereas an aa throughout sees to be a propositiona ite, the reason or expanation why soething is the way it is. It is true that Aristote does not preserve the ternoogica distinction. And Gaen in one pace tes us explcity that he uses aon and aa nterchangeaby (IX 8 , 7 But even if the terinoogica dstinction was not generay accepted, the stinction itsef between causes on the one hand and reasons and expanations, the truths about causes i n vrtue of which they are causes, on the other, was generay accepted. n fact, for the very reasons for which the Stoics reected, e. g., Aristotelan na causes as causes, propery speakng, they aso had to reject propositiona tes as causes. Since, on the Stoic vew, propositona tes are not entities, but ony eka, soethings, they are not ites of the right kind to cause anythng. How woud an event go about causng soething? So there woud be genera agreeent that causes are non propositona tes. And there woud be genera agreeent that the notion of a cause is cosey tied to the notion o f an expanation For an te is a cause ony in so far as soething is true of it in virtue of which it is the cause. f Brutus is a cause of Caesar's death h is a cause insofar, e.g., as it is true of hi that he stabbed Caesar And it is exacty these truths about the causes of soe thing which wil be regarded as aordng an expanaton of what the causes are causes of t s at this point, though, that the disagreeent aong ancient phiosophers wl start. For reasons which w becoe apparent, the question wl arise to whch of the two notions, cause or expanation, we shoud gve priority. t sees fairy cear that the opponents of the Stoics give prority to the noton of expanation They are ooking for an account of soething and they wi just
Doubt and Dogmatism cal causes those items which have to be referred to in the account If it is the presence of the idea of justice which accounts for the fact that something is just, then the idea of ustice will be a cause It is clear that on this view the notion of a cause competey oses its connotation of responsibility The Stoics, on he other hnd, are not so much interested in explanation as they are in responsibiity Though this is a matter which would need a good deal of eaboration, the following statement by Strabo about Posidonius does seem to me to reect the Stoic attiude in general well enough With him [sc. Posidonius] we nd a lot of aetioogy and a lot of Aristotelizing which the members of our school shy away from because of the obscurity of the causes (I 3 8) According to Strabo, then, the Stoics in genera are hesitant to engage in aetioogy because the rea causes are so hidden and obscure; Posidonius is an excepon, and in this respect he is rather more like a Peripatetic There is abundant evidence to support Strabos testimony. Later Stoic physics, presumaby under the inuence of Posidonius recognizes aetioogy as a separate part of physics (DL VI 32) It in turn is divided into two parts, one whose subject matter the phiosopher shares with the physician, namey physiology and psychology, and another part whose subject matter the philosopher shares with the mathematica sciences, namely natural, in particuar meteoro logical, phaenomena As to the second part of aetiology we not ony know how much of an eort Posidonius made to nd explanations for particuar phaenomena lke the tides The relevant part in Diogenes exposition of Stoic physics (V 5 35 6 ) e.g, refers again and again to Posidonius In fact the only other authority that is mentioned in the whoe section is Zeno But we also know from a passage in Seneca(Ep LXXXVII 26-7) and a precious excerpt from Gemnus Eptome of Posidonius Meteorooca (preserved through Alexanders com mentary on the Pscs by Simpicius, n Ps 29 2 . that Posidonius held views concerning causation and expanation which would deserve separate treatment. He took, e.g., the view that ony the natura philosopher can have knowledge of the true account of the cause of a phaenomenon, whereas the mathematica scientist can ony provide us with hypotheses or possibe explana tions, as Heracides Ponticus provided us with a possible 4
The Original Notion of Cause expanaion of the apparent motion of the sun by assumng a somehow stationary sun and a somehow revolving earth (ibid 292 203) The other part of aetiology which concerns itsef with psychology and physioogy among other things deals with the passions of the soul (cf DL VI 58) Of Posidonius views on this particular topic we are well informed by Galen Galen in his De pacts ppocrats et Patons goes to considerable lengths to criticize Chrysippus views on the matter, and in doing so he reies heaviy on Posidonius criticism of Chrysippus which he aso sets out in some detai. It i s characteristic that it is a recurring complaint that Chrysippus fais to state the cause or caims that the true expanation i s uncertain or too dicult to gure out (cf 348 6 . Mueler; 3 9 5 2 ; 400 2 . 401 9 .; 439 4 to ust mention the Posidonian passages. It is evidence of this kind which supports Strabos testimony that Posidonius is an exception and that Stoics in general were hesitant to concern themseves with aetioogy, with the explanation of particular phaenomena Hence it woud seem that the Stoic interest in causes does not arise from an interest in actual expanation. The evidence rather suggests that the Stoic interest in causes arises from their interest in responsibity For when we ook at the actual use to which the Stoics put their theory of causes it always seems to be a matter of aotting and distributing responsibiity For example, whatever things do is determined by fate, but fate is a mere heping cause (suneron The real cause, the things which really are responsible, are the things themseves ; they do what they do out of their own nature or character Or the wise man may say what is fase. But if, as ·a resut, somebody beeves it, it is not the wise man who is the cause, but the person who beieves it has ony himsef to bame Ony dumb and wicked peope beleve fasehoods. t is i n contexts of this sort that the Stoics introduce their doctrine of causes. Moreover, as we wi see later, the Stoic distinction of various kinds of causes is a renement on an ordinary intuitive distinction of various kinds of responsibiity. So for the Stoics the notion of a cause still has a connotation, however tenuous, of responsibility. But for the notion of respon sibilty to have any content at all that which is responsible must in some sense or other have done something and thus become responsibe t is utimately for this reason, take it, that the Stoics insist that causes are acive, that they must be the kinds of
Dout and Do gmatsm tems that can cause somethng. But n estctng causes to actve tems the Stocs seem to loosen the te etween causes and explanaton Fo to state the causes of somethng wll no longe e a matte of statng all the eevant tuths aout a the elevant factos whch have to ente nto a compete explanaton, ut a matte of efeng to just those factos whch actvely contute to the eect. And the elevant tuths aout these wl not amount to a complete expanaton, o so t woud seem. We wl see late, though, that the Stocs conceve of the cause n the naowest sense n such a way that t ecaptues the explanatoy foce causes seem to ose due to the estcton to actve causes. evetheess t s mpotant to eaze that the shft n the noton of a cause theatens the smpe and staghtfowad conceptual lnk etween cause and explanaton But why shoud someody who dd not shae the Stocs' vew that what matteed st of all was the queston of esponslty accept the clam that causes, popely speakng, have to e actve? The Stocs mght ague n the folowng way when the queston What s the aition ? was a queston of egal, moal, o poltca esponsty t may have een dcut to come up wth the answe n patcula cases, ut t woud have een clea that the peson esponse woud e a peson who had done somethng o othe wich he should not have done such that as a esult of hs dong t somethng has gone wong fo whch he s esponse. (The queston of esponsty ognaly s estcted to cases o f ame It s then extended to al notewothy cases, ncudng cases n whch pase s to e estowed. It s only then that the queston of esponsty gets extended eyond the sphee of human o pesona acton, whch s, of couse, facltated y an unwlngness to detemne the mts of pesonal agency n a naow way so as to excude ut human actons Who knows aout the wnds and the sea ? When then the use of ation was extende} such that we coud ask of anythng What s ts aition ?' ths extenson o f the us of aition must have taken place on the assumpton that fo eveythng to e explaned thee s somethng whch pays wth efeence to t a ole analogou to that whch the peson esponsle pays wth efeence to what has gone wong; .e. the extenson of the use of aition acos the oad s ony ntelgle on the assumpton that wth efeence to eveythng thee s somethng whch y dong somethng o othe s esponse fo t 6
The Ognal Noton of Cause This would seem to e a athe questonale assumpton ven n the case of eal esponslty we have to constue the noton of dong somethng qute geneously such that fogettng to do somethng and n geneal falng to do somethng whch one can e expected to do count as dong somethng. But f we extend the noton of esponslty acoss the oad we no longe have a set of expectatons such that any volaton of these expectatons counts as a dong. As a esut thee ae consdeale dcutes n detemning exactly what s to count as dong somethng and as eng actve If columns suppot a oof ths, pesumaly, counts as a case of dong somethng, ut why ? evetheless we do have ntutons n this matte whch go fa eyond, and to some extent coect, the gammatcal actvepassve dstncton. We have a smia dcuty n deteminng what s to count as the anaogue of the thng esponse n a case of eal esponslty. In ths espect thee had een consdeae dcultes even when we ust had to dea wth cases of eal esponslty We had, e.g., to decde that the thng whch s esponsle has to e a peson, athe than an oje ct o an anma But f the noton of espons lty s to e extended acoss the oad t seems that we need a new set of nstuctons as to how one nds what s esponsle n ths extended sense. To the extent, though, that the Stocs w clam that the common noton of a cause does povde us wth such nstucton and that they wll povde us wth futhe nstucton the pont may have some weght afte al We nd anothe agument to the eect that causes should e conceved of as actve n Seneca, . LXV. It seems that wth the excepton of the Epcueans n the case of the sweve all phlo sophes would have ageed that fo any patcula thng a compete expanaton of that patcua thng w nvove efeence to somethng whch did somethng o othe, .e. efeence to a movng cause n the vuga sense of movng cause' But once t s ageed that n evey case a movng cause s nvoved why shoud we extend the noton of cause to aso cove whateve othe tems do ente nto ou expanaton ? Why should we not use Platos dstncton n the Paedo etween causes and necessay condtons (o athe necessay tems, ememeng that ou n the phase aneu ou at Pd 99 does not ange ove popostonal tems and count the othe tems, e.g . matte, among the necessay condtons? That the pesence of somethng s a necessay
Doubt nd Dogmtism condition does not yet men tht it is cuse. This seems to be the ine Senec tkes in Ep. X. He cims tht there is ust one kind of cuse the ctive cuse nd tht if the oponents ssume more kinds of cuses it is becuse they think tht the eect woud not obtin if it were not for the presence of certin other kinds of items in dtion to n ctive cuse. In X 4-6, e.g. when he sts nd expins Aristote's four cuses in e ch of the rst three cses he expins why the presence of ech of them is necessry condition for obtining the resut And hving expined the fourth cuse he dds the rhetoric question or don't you think tht we hve t count mong the cuses of ny work brought bout nything such tht if tht thing hd been removed the work woud not hve been brought bout?' (X 6. And gin in X I he suggests tht the reson why Aristote nd Pto posit whoe bunch of cuses (turb cusrum' is tht they think tht the presence of items of these vrious kinds is required for resut to come bout. But if this is the reson why these things deserve to be ced cuses Senec rgues the four or ve kinds of cuses of the Periptetics nd the Ptonists do not suce in the est Now prt from the thret of proifertion of cuses this rgument w ony hve force if it is redy grnted tht the moving cuse does hve privieged sttus nd is not us t nother necessry condition. Hence it does presuppose some other rgument ike the one from the bsic mening of aton presented bove Another rgument to the gp eft by Senecs rgument coud hve been the foowing We hve to remember tht the vrious cuses supposey invoved in prticur cse re not necessry condtions the conunction of which is sucient. They rther re items the necessry conditions re truths bout. Wht is it then tht hs to be true of the vrious cuses for te resut to come bout ? In some sense they w hve to be present But this wi not be sucient to ccount for the resut. "For in the cse of the moving cuse it wi not ust be its presence which is required It wi so be necessry tht it does or hs done some thing or other And this dos seem to set it o from the other cuses for which we ony require their mere presence. Tht ctve cuses come to be ccorded privieged sttus my so be mtter of chnge of perspective. It my or my not be the cse tht Pto nd Aristote hd commtted themseves to 8
The Origin Notion of Cuse position from whch it foowed tht everythng is determned by ntecedent cuses. Even if Aristote ws concerned bout determnsm his reections on the mtter seem to hve been of itte inuence o n his doctrine in gener. Certiny the quesion hd not been preoccuption of theirs But with the Stoics' insistence tht everything tht hppens incuding our ctions is ntecedenty determned this probem strts to occupy centre stge And the whoe technc mchinery of expntion gets pped to cses for which it ws not rey designed nmey to prticur events to nd out whether they dmitted of n expntion which ws comptibe with the ssumpti on tht not everytng is ntecedenty determined The probem of deter minsm mkes one ook t prticur events s the concrete events they re hppening t the prticr time they do rther thn ust s instnces of some gener pttern of behviour As such they coud be ccounted for in terms of the nture or form of the ting invoved But if we hve to sk why this prticur thing behved in this prticur wy t this prticur time it seems cer tht reference to the geer nture of the thing or its end or its mtter or its prdigm w not do In fct it seems tht these with whtever their presence entis ony form the more or ess stbe bckground on which we hve to expin the prticur event by referring to some prticur ntecedent chnge which given stbe bckground mkes the reevnt dierence. And hence the item invoved in tht chnge does seem to be in privieged position nd if nythng it seems to be it which deserves to be ced the cuse. Once it is dmitted tht cuses hve to be ctive hve to do something or other in order to brin g bout the eect it foows esiy for the Stoics tht cuses hve to be bodies. For ony bodies cn do something nd cn be ected ony bodies cn interct. At this point it is importnt to remember though tht for the Stoics not ust physic obects but so stus nd quties nd mxtures thereof re bodies So quity coud qufy s cuse. Cuses propery speking then for the Stoics re bodies which do something or other such tht the fct tht they do wht they do is t est n importnt ingredient in the expntion of whtever it is tht the cuses re cuses of. But wht is it tht the cuses re supposed to be cuses of? We
Doubt and Dogatis so fa have been talkng as if t were geneay ageed that t s popositonal tes, facts, events, and the lke, that are caused or explaned And ths sees to t the coon use of ata and aton It s true that in coon use aton or ato, eg, can be used wth a noun n the genitive as in the ato of the urder', ie those responsible fo the urder' (Hdt IV 200, 1 But t s cear that n such cases the noun is the nonaliation of an underying sentence It is also tue that Aistote oten taks as if causes were causes of entities lke a statue, a an, or heath But again, we ight be inclned to say that this is just a way of speaking; c auses of a statue are cause for there beng a statue or fo soething's beng a statue Nevetheless thee does see to have been soe disagreeent For Cleent trom VIII 9, 26 I = S VII 345) reports that soe phosophes assue that causes ae causes of bodes Fro Sextus (IX 2 1 2) we earn ore speccay that accodng to Epicuus the atos ae the causes of ther copounds, wheeas thei ncorporeal ropetes umbebkota are the causes of the ncor poeal poperties of the coesponding copounds It is not cear, though, whether we should assue that ths eects a serious dsageeent about the notion of a cause, or whether we owe ths bt of doxography to soebody who was looking vey had to nd soebody on who he could pn the view that causes can be causes of copoeal tes as well as of incoporeal ites After a, even f Epicuus had said what s attibuted to h, ths way of speakng adts of so any constuctons that ltte can be ade of these words, uness one assues that Epcurus chose this anner of speaking because he had taken a postion on the issue But ths s hardy plausible, for t woud see that ths is exactly the knd of queston whch Epcurus would regad as sophistical We coud leave the atter at that, f we dd not have additional evdence whch suggests that there actualy was a dspute ove the question what causes are the causes of This s a dsagreeent both Ceent and Sextus report on Sextus (PHill I 4) dstinguishes between what we know to be the Stoc vew, naely the vew that causes ae causes of a pedcte's beng true of soething, and the view that causes are causes of appellatons proora Cleent Strom VIII 9 26, 4) attrbutes the latter view to Aistotle Unfotunately t s far fo cea what the contrast between the two vews is supposed to be, and Sextus' exaple does not ake
0
The Orgna Notion of Cause the atte any cearer On the rst view, accodng to Se xtus, the sun's heat is the cause of the wax's being eted tou ceta, wheeas on the second view t is the cause of the etng of the wax t cue . It s faly clea that the contast is supposed to be indcated by the use of a verb n the st case a nd a coresponding noun in the second Ths would aso t the exaples given by Ceent who says But Aistote thinks that causes ae causes of appelatons, ie of ites of the foowng sort a house, a shp, a bunng kau, a cut tom, whereas exapes of what is caused on the othe view see to be soething's being cut temneta or soethng's coing to be a ship neta naun Also t woud t the fact that nouns n Geek gaar ae called appelatons' o appelatves' the appellatives in Greek graar are a word cass whch copises both ou nouns and our adjectives Fnay t s presuably reevant that the ter we have endered by predcate', naey kateorma, soetes is restrcted to what s signed by vebs or even is used synonyously with verb' rma
Now t is hardy plausibe that accoding to the vew in queston causes are causes of expressons of whatever knd To ake reasonabe sense of the position we have to assue ether that what s eant is that causes are causes of soething's beng propery caed soething or other o that appeaton' hee does not efer to a cetan kind of expession, but to what s signed by an appelatve Thee s a passage n Stobaeus (E , p I 3 7, 5 W) in which appeation is used in the second way, but this ay be due to a confusion on Stobaeus' pat Hence it woud be peferabe f we got by on the assuption that appeation' here has its usual eanng as a gaatica te But what woud be the pont of sayng that a cause is a cause of soethng's being propery caled (a�) X where 'X is a noun or an adective? Gven the lack of evidence the answer has to be quite specuative It ight, e g , be the case that verbs are assocated wth processes or cong-intobengs as opposed to the being of soething; hence, perhaps, the contast n Cleent between a ship or the beng of a ship or soethng's being a ship and the cong-nto-being of a ship o soething's cong to be a shp But if ths s the intended contrast we have to assue that the nouns coresponding to the verbs are taken not to sgnify the pocess sgned by the vebs
Doub and Dogmasm depend on he naure and sae of he hng aeced. I has o be he rgh knd of body. And hrdy, we have o remember ha houg we wan o see how one expans parcular facs we also wan o have genera explanaons whch e us wha n genera causes a ceran predcae o be rue of somehng. The general noon of a cause, properly speakng, accordng o e Socs, hen, seems o be e foowng a cause s a body whch does somehng or oher and by dong so brngs abou ha anoher body s aeced n such a way ha somehng comes o be rue of . may very we be he case ha he Socs hnk ha hs s jus a caracerzaon of he common noon of a cause. 4
KS O CASS A TH CAS H SRC SS
The Socs rejec he swarm of causes (urba causarum, Sen. . LXV I of her opponens and aow only for an acve cause Bu whn he noon of such an acve cause as we have ouned so far hey, oo, alow for deren knds of reaon beween cause and eec and hence for deren causes As Alexander pus , hey ave a whoe swarm of causes (snos atn, Fat I92, 8 SVF II, p. 273, I8). Unforunaey our sources concernng hese varous knds of causes are raher unclear. Hence may be bes o sar wh wha seems o be a quoaon from Chrysppus n Ccero's De jato 4, n whch Crysppus dsngushes wo knds of causes Ccero says abou Chrysppus For of causes, he says, some are perfec and prncpa (perfecae e prncpales'), ohers auxary and proxmae (aduvanes e proxmae'). Hence, when we say ha everyhng happens by fae hrough aneceden causes, we do no wan hs o be undersood as sayng hrough perfec and prncpal causes', bu n he sense of rough auary and proxmae causes'. The pon of he dsncon, f one ooks a he conex, woud seem o be e followng. Chrysppus wans o manan ha everyhng ha happens s faed, s deermned by aneceden causes. On e oer hand he aso wans o manan ha hs does no rue ou uman responsbliy, because, houg human acons are deermined by aneceden causes, s neverheess he human bengs hemselves, raher han e aneceden causes, wo are =
Te Orgna Noon of Cause responsbe for hese acons. Que generaly, hough wha a hng does s deermned by an aneceden cause, s no he aneceden cause bu raher he hng sef or somehng abou ha hng whch s responsbe for wha does, hough, of course, no necessary moraly responsble; for only wh bengs of a ceran sor and under ceran furher condons s responsbly moral responsbly. We are gven wo knds of exampes o llusrae he pon, one from human behavour and one from he beavour of nanmae objecs. Suppose we perceve somehng and ge some mpresson (e.g e mpresson ha here s a pece of cake over ere or he mpresson ha woud be nce o have ha pece of cake now) Now wl depend on us wheher we accep or gve assen o hs mpresson. If we do, we wl hnk ha here s a pece of cake over here or a would be nce o have ha pece of cake now and wll fee and ac accordngy And f we do hnk so and fee and ac accordngly wl have been e m presson whch broug s abou and hence was he aneceden cause of our acon Bu he mpresson by sef does no neces sae a we shoud nk, feel and ac ha way. Oher peope or e ourseves a oher mes woud no accep or gve assen o he same mpressons. And hence wha decdes he maer s no e mpresson; s no e mpresson, bu somehng abou he person whch makes he person accep he mpresson, oug e person woud no accep he mpresson and ac accordngy f he dd no have a mpresson, and hough here s a sen se n whch he mpresson does brng abou or cause whaever acon he person akes as a resul. Chrysppus' pon abou causes, hen, as usraed by s example s s everyhng does have an aneceden cause ; our acons, e.g., have as er aneceden cause an mpresson. Bu ese aneceden causes are no e knd of cause a necessae he resu ey are ony causae aduvanes e proximae' The causa perfeca e prncpals' whc necessaes e resu es n ourselves, s ha abou us wch makes us accep he mpresson and ac accordngy. Te exampes from he behavour of nanmae obecs are moons of a cylnder and a cone or spnop. They coud no sar o move uness hey receved a pus. Bu once ha as appened he hnks a, for he res, s by her own naure a
Doub nd D ogmsm he cynder rolls nd he spnop urns (42 fn) he de here seems o be h he person who gve he cynder or he column push s he neceden cuse. Whou he push he cylnder would no roll bu he fc h he person gve push does no ye ccoun for he fc h s rolng. Wh mkes ro s somehng bou he cynder self. nd s h whch s he perfec nd prncp cuse of s rollng. s mporn h he exmples should no be msnerpreed n he followng wy we mgh hnk h hrysppus only wns o pon ou h f one gves n objec push wll depend very much on he knd of objec s how wl be eced cynder w rol one wy cone noher nd cube wl no roll ll Bu cero does no us sy n 42 h he cylnder rols n vrue of s own peculr nure (supe nur) he lso es us n 43 h boh n he cse of humn behvour nd he cse of he cylnder once he hng hs receved n mpulse wll move for he res supe v e nur by s own force nd nure. hs mpes h here re wo forces wo ves nvoved : no jus he exernl vs of he neceden cuse he person who gves push (cf. null v exrnsecus exc n 42 ) bu lso vs on he nsde nd seems o be h vs on he nsde whch keeps he cylnder rolng once hs goen s n mpuse. s suggess h here so s somehng cve somehng whch exers force on he nsde of he cynder when he cylnder s rolng. nd gven wh we sd bou he generl noon of cuse hs s no surprsng f cuses re cve nd f n he cse of he cylnder wo cuses re supposed o be nvoved here shoud be wo hngs nvved boh of whch do somehng or oher o brng bou he resu h he cynder s rong. he pcure whch we hus ge so fr s he foowng whenever somehng does somehng or oher here re es wo knds of cve cuses nvolved n neceden cuse whch !s clssed s n uxlry nd proxme cuse nd n nern cuse whch s cssed s cus perfec e prncps hough boh of hem cn be sd o brng bou h he hng does whever does rely s he ner cuse which by s cvy s responsbe for wh s done hs s no o sy h whenever somehng hppens o some hng sy here w be wo cuses nvoved one neceden nd one nernl o mere pssve econ of does no 6
he Orgn oon of use requre he cvy of n nern cuse s cer from he wy cero ses ou his exmples h he neceden cuses do hve n eec on he objec wch s no produced by n nern cuse he person who gves he cylnder push does gve he cylnder begnnng of moon nd he exern sgh or objec does produce n mpresson n us (43) whch s no due o n nern cuse seems h he need for second cuse ony comes n when we wn o expn wh he hng does how he ng recs s resu of beng eced hs wy. s n urn suggess h he cus perfec e prncps s no essenlly n nernl cuse s we my hve hough For he cus perfec e prncpls of mere pssve econ of n objec wl le ousde h objec n he obec whch ecs . nd hs lso seems o be requred by wh we know bou cuse perfece from oher sources here seems o be no doub h cus perfec s j us ceros renderng of aton autoteles We d o no hve ex which clms o gve us he Soc denon of s knd of cuse Bu we hve vrous exs whch dsngush beween () n autoteles aton () sunaton, nd () suneon (G D ed XX 393 K lem Sto V 9 3 3 p. 2 25 ) nd snce we re old n vrous pces h autoteles aton nd sunektkon aton re used nerchngebly (lem. Sto V 9 33 2 = p. 2 27 V 9 25 3 = p IZO, 2 f.) we my so drw on exs like G. D ed p. 3923 K SE PH 5 nd G. Hstphl 9 whch dsngush () sunektkon aton () sunaton nd () suneon Snce Sexus els us h mos phosophers gree on hs dsncon we cn be resonby cern h consderon of hese exs wl ge us ner enough o he Soc noons of hese knds of cuses n fc s lmos cern h hs s bscy Soc dsncon of Soc orgn. nd s so obvously he rgh dsncon o ook n our conex snce he cus duvns wh whch he cus perfec s conrsed n cero clerly s sunaton or suneon Wh hen s he dsncon? he nuve de behnd s fry smpe lwys mus hve been cer h ofen he queson Who or wh s responsbe for hs ? does no dm of smpe srghforwrd nswer becuse here s no snge person or hng o be mde responsbe bu sever ngs hve o be referred o nd mong hem one woud ofen wn o
Doub nd Dogmsm dvde e resonsbly nd dsngus mong vrous degrees of . Hence n ordnry lnguge bu lso n more ecnc dscourse we soon ge suc erms s sunatos etatos, suneos f we wen by ordnry usge we woud guess e Soc dsncon mouned o e foowng: wenever ere s excy one ng wc s resonsble for w ens s s e autoteles aton f ere re wo or more ngs wc no ndvduly bu colecvely ve broug bou e eec ey re sunata f someng us n some wy conrbues o n eec wc s broug bou oug by someng else s
8
suneon
e dcules rse wen comes o e ecncl denons of ese nds. For we re od of ree nds of cuses ey brng bou e eec cf G. D ed) We re so old e erfec cuse does brng bou e eec by sef G D ed XX 393 ; cf. sue v e nur n c. Fat 43·) n fc seems o be s feure of e erfec cuse o wc owes s nme : 'autoteles As lemen (Sto V 9, 33, 2 =S . 2 , 2 7 . ells us : ey lso cl autoteles, snce roduces e eec by sef reyng on nong else. Fnly we now from vrous sources (eg. lem Sto V 9, 33 �S F . 2 , 3 5 . sunea cn er n conjuncon w e erfec cuse o el o roduce e eec. Bu n s cse seems e erfec cuse does no brng bou e eec by sef ere s so suneon wc cn be sd o brng bou e eec oo. Afer l s s wy oo s cled cuse of s eec lely e ony wy ou of e dculy cn see s e followng: we dsngus beween src sense of roducng or brngng bou n eec nd weer sense. s rue of ree nds of cuses ey someow brng bou e eec f ere were no sense n wc e mresson could be sd o brng bou our ssen nd our con nd f ere were no sense n wc e erson wo used e cylnder could be s o ve broug bou e cynders rolng ese ems could no be sd o be cuses of er resecve eecs n e rs lce. Bu en our consderon of cylnder cse so s sown ere s srcer nrrower sense of brngng bou n wc s no e erson wo gves e us bu e erfec cuse wc • Th wy h pu though ugg f ymoogy: a Ka9 aT 7OLDVv -fAos
e Orgnl oon of use brngs bou e rolng moon of e cylnder sue v e nur. Once we me s dsncon s esy o see ow we ge e reefold clsscon. Of ose ngs wc cn be sd o brng bou n eec n e weer sense some so cn be sd o brng bou n eec n e nrrower sense nmely e erfec cuses nd e sunata, weres n nrrow sense e sunea cn ony be sd o e o brng bou e eec Bu mong ose ngs wc brng bou n eec n e src sense some do brng bou by emselves nmey e erfec cuses weres oers only brng bou n conjunc on nd cooeron w oer cuses ese re e sunata W mes erfec cuse erfec or comee en s does no deend for s cus eccy on e gency of some oer cuse ousde s conro. A oen sunaton needs noer sunaton, oenl suneon needs erfec cuse or sunata wc my or my no be vbe s s wy e neceden cuse nd ence fe by emselves do no necesse e eec. For weer e neceden cuse does brng bou e eec deends on e cvy of e erfec cuse nd weer e erfec cuse does c s ousde of e conrol of e neceden cuse oug s deermned. So muc for e dsncon beween autotel sunata, nd sunea ress on n nuve dsncon wc dvdes reson sby. Wen rysus sys neceden cuses re no autotel, bu ony sunea, e rees on e fc nuvely we wll undersnd s s menng s no e neceden cuse wc bers e full resonsby. A wors s someng e n ccomice. Gven e ecnc undersndng of e dsncon rysus cm mouns o syng srcy seng s no e neceden cuse wc brngs bou e eec s someng wn e ng sef wc roduces e eec ll by self Gven s s esy o undersnd wy e cus erfec woud be ced cus erfec e rncs. We my ssume e Gree underyng ceros For of cuses some re erfec nd rnc . . . s someng le s: . . . of cuses some re autotel nd kua (or kutata) s e erfec cuse wc s e cuse srcy seng or n e srces sense. s lso seems o be broug ou by e Gree nmes of ese ree nds of cuses : autoteles aton, 'sunaton, nd 'suneon We
Doubt and Dogmatsm never get the phrase 'sunergon aition (whch also mght reect the fact that sunerga, as opposed to aitia and sunaitia, do not brng about the eect strctly speakng). ow before we have a closer ook at the nature of ths perfect cause let us brey turn to the second knd of cause dstngushed by Chrysppus accordng to Ccero : the auxary and proximate causes (causae aduvantes et proxmae) So far I have been assumng that these are the sunerga But from what has been sad t s clear that auxilary cause could be a translaton ether of sunergon or of sunaition hs ambguty s apparent n Cceros casscaton of causes n the Topics (58 .) where Ccero refers to the sunaitia as those whch stand n need of hep and to the sunerga as helpng (aduvanta). evertheless t s cear that here we are talkng about sunerga For among the causes of somethng we can ether have sunaitia or a perfect cause but not both oreover we know ndependently that t was a pont of Stoc doctrne that fate the chan of antecedent causes ony provdes a sunergon for what tngs do (cf. Cc Top 5 8 ). nd ths seems to be exacty what Chrysppus s clamng n our passage when he says that the antecedent causes whch somehow consttte fate are not causae prncpales but causae auvantes. But ths rases the queston how an antecedent cause can be conceved of as a sunergon, f a sunergon s the knd of tem whch helps to brng about the eect by makng t easer for the eect to be brought about he exampes Sextus and Clement eg gve of a sunergon are of ttle hep. If somebody fts a heavy weght and somebody ese comes aong and gves a hepng hand then the second person s a sunergon n so far as he ust helps to brng about the eect by makng t easer. But the antecedent cause s precsely not the knd of thng whch comes n when somethng s aready happenng anyway It s not the case that the cynder was rong anyway and that the push just ade the rolng easer. Presumably the dea rather s that the ease wth whch the cylnder rolls depends on the knd of push t got he push has to be of a sucent se for t o be easy enough for the cyinder to roll at all and any ncrement n se of the push w make the rong easer he dcuty about ths s that to a ppy generaly ths presuppos es some general physcal theory accordng to whch the antecedent cause contrbutes somethng to the force wth 240
241 he Orgnal oton of Cause whch the eect s brought about by somehow ntensfyng that force But that so me such theo ry of forces and ther ntenscaton actually s presupposed seems to be clear enough from our testmones Ccero as we have seen talks about the externa and the nterna vis, ps.-Gaen and Sextus charactere sunaitia as each exertng an equa force to brng about the result whereas the sunergon s sad ony to contrbute a minor force. Sextus PH III I ) taks of the ntenscaton and remisson of the perfect cause and a correspondng ntensty of the eect. Clement tels us that the sunergon heps to ntensfy the eect (VIII 9 33 7; 3 3 9) In any case we know ndependenty that fate .e the antecedent cause s supposed to hep n the producton of the eect even f t s not the perfect cause (cf. Josephus II 6 3 ) . ow the second knd of cause to be dstngushed s not ust charactered as a helpng cause but aso as a proxmate cause. Causa proxma could be a renderng of 'aition proseches, aition progoumenon, or aition prokatarktikon I assume that t renders aition prokatarktikon and that the causae antecedentes are the aitia
progoumena
If we take the testmony of Sextus Clement and others serously the cass of sunerga and the cass of aitia prokatarktika w not concde snce not a sunerga are antecedent causes. But there s aso no evdence that the class of aitia prokatarktika was arrved at by further subdvson of the class of sunerga hs strongy suggests that the dstncton of aitiaprokatarktika s part of a dvson of causes qute ndependent of that nto autote/, sunaitia, and sunerga nd ths seems to be conrmed by the fact that the prokatarktika are usualy contrasted wth the socaed unektica, a knd of cause to which Ccero n § 44 of the De jato refers as the causae continentes and of which we know from Galen that t along wth ts name was ntroduced by the Stocs De causis cont p. 6, z ; IX 458 . K.). In fact ps.Galen n Defnitiones medicina/es (XIX 392) says that cause s threefold one s the prokatarktikon, the other the progoumenon, and the thrd the sunektikon nd t s only after dentons of these three knds that he turns to the dstncton nto autote/, sunaitia and sunerga Possby ths threefold dstncton s of Stoc orgn For Galen n De causis continentbus (p 8 8 ) tels us that thenaeus the 5 K�( T? ' p0TT€LV Q lKta Ka f Ka 'Q A£irov 71 TO 8ptS KE8, ohv 1 S
v
Doubt and Dogmatism increasing compexity there wi be an increasing number of ranges of such states. Some of these states wi be active states' such that being in those states the pneuma wi act in a certain way. Whether a state i s active and how precisey the pneuma w act in such a state wi depend on the precise nature of the pneuma, the modications it has undergone, the dispositions it has acquired, and the other states it is in We coud, e.g., try to imagine that the pneuma is characterized by a compex set of interdependen tensions in some more or ess comfortabe equibrium such tha t, if certain of these tensio ns are intensied to a certain degree, we have an active state of the pneuma and a certain kind of action resuts. Moreover, we mght imagine that, if an object is aected, one or more o f these tensions are aected and hence, as a resut, the whoe system of tensions is aected. So we might imagine that if an anima receives a certain impression at east one of these tensions gets intensied. If the whoe system of tensions is such that as a resut an action producing tension gets sucienty intensied, this action woud be due to the whoe system of tensions, but it sti mght be thought to be iteray true that the impression, or more generay the antecedent cause. had contributed some of the force with which the action was executed, in so far as the increased force of the intensied action producing tension in part was the force of the tension intensied by the impression But whatever the mechanics of the aition sunektikon may have ben supposed to be it is cear that most peope woud not have subscribed to the physica theory underying it. They mght, eg., deny that the primary active cause for a thing's behaviour was to be found in the thing itsef. Even if they accepted the view that the pneuma payed an important roe in the expaation of the behaviour of things, they mght not, as e.g. Gaen did not, accept the view that such a pneuma was needed to account for the existence of obects as that which hods them togther (cf. De causis cont V and VII). evertheess, they mght want to have some kind of cause which on their physica theory in some way or other pays a roe anaogos to that of the sunektikon aition and which they hence woud ca by the same name. And i this case it woud be cear that the name coud no onger be interpreted as referring to the fact that this kind of cause is that which hods the object aected together. 244
The Origina Noton of Cause 245 And, as a matter of fact, we do nd a sorts of nonStoic uses of 'sunektikon aition. One of them, in Cicero's eJato 44 seems to have puzzed editors and commentators no end Von Arnim, e g, prints a text (S II, p 283 3 4 .) whch makes Chrysippus concede that the antecedent cause is the sunektikon i.e the perfect cause. Cicero refers to a doctrine accordng to which the prox mate and containing cause (proxima ia et continens causa') woud be the impression, if somebody gave assent to it. It is cear that here the causa continens is the aition sunektikon But it is equay cear that this term now is not used in the Stoic sense For the Stoics specicay deny that the antecedent cause is the containing cause. Moreover the positon Cicero describes en visages the po ssibiity that the impression, though it is the con taining cause of the assent, aso might not have brought about the assent (I take it that the subunctive of movat' is not just the subjunctive of indirect speech). This again, as we wi see shorty, seems to be incompatibe with the Stoic notion of a containing cause. Hence it is not surprising that Cicero shoud go on to say Chrysippus wi not admt that the proximate and containng cause of the assent ies in the impression and hence he wi aso not admt that ths cause, i.e the impression, necessitates the assent.' Cicero's remarks in De Jato 44 very much suggest that Chrysippus thought that if something were the containng cause of something it woud necessitate its eect. And this I actuay take to be Chrysippus' view But in what sense coud the con taining cause be thought to necess itate its eect? In ths connection it is presumaby reevant to refer to Stobaeus' characterization of Zeno's notion of a cause E I, p 38, 14 W). According to Zeno a cause is such that its presence necessi tates the eect. And ths principe is iustrated by the foowing exampes it is wisdom which brings about being wise, the sou whch brings about iving. This rends one not just of the unreformed giants of Pato's Sophist (247 b .), with whom the Stoics were very much in sympathy (cf. SVF II, p 2 3 , 6 .= Soph 246 a ), but aso of Socrates' safe causa accounts in the Phaedo and Aristote's forma causes The connection between wisdom and bing wise and sou and being aive mght seem to be triviay necessary in so far as it ust is with reference to somebody's wisdom that we ca him wise
Doubt d Domtism But this cot be wht Zeo hs i mid, for he seems to thk of somebodys bei wise s eect produced by wisdom, s if oes wisdom ivriby d ecessrily brouht it bout tht oe is wise Perhps the ide is the followi. It is true tht our commo otio of wisdom does ot tell us how it is tht wisdom mkes somebo dy wise. But if we hd compete techic uder stdi of wht wisdom rely is, the we woud so uderstd tht wisdom by its very ture bris it bout tht those who possess it ivriby re wise Looked t i this wy the ecessity ivoved still c be rerded s some kid of coceptu ecessity (This is ot to ttribute to the Stoics distictio betwee loic or coceptu d physic or empiricl ecessity) Give the correct complete techicl otio of wisdom which reects its ture i ll deti, oe sees how wisdom cot fi to produce its chrcteristic eect. It my be lo these lies tht the Stoics thik tht the cotii cuse ecessittes its eects. If oe uderstds the ture of soul s chrcteried by wisdom oe sees tht it cot fil to produce the eect tht so mebody is wise. I this cse the ecessity ivolved would just be the ecessity which chrcteries Chrysippe coditio whose cosequet is the sttemet tht the perso is wise d whose tecedet is the reevt truth bout his soul. This bris us bck to expltio To simplify mtters let us cocetrte o cses i which somethi does somethi or other, exhibits certi piece of behviour The Stoics ssume d rue tht othi hppes without cuse More specicly, they ssume tht othi hppes without tecedet cuse d rue, e ., tht if this hppeed without tecedet cuses the cotiuity of the uiverse woud be iterrupted. Bu they so ssume tht referece to the tecedet cuse is ot oi to expi why somethi does somethi or other. To expi this we hve to refer to the sunektikn, d we do ot hve_to refer to ythi ese. For truth bout the sunektikn wi etil the truth bout the object to be explied, wheres o truth bout the tecedet cuse by itsef wi be the tecedet of true Chrysippe coditiol wih the fct to be expied s the cosequet. These coditios wil be isttitios of uiversl co ditios of the form if the sunektikn of is su chd-such the is or does) so-d-so. We my ssume tht it is sets of such 46
4 The Oriil otio of Cuse coditios which specify the ture of ech kid of sunektikn, d hece it would be tur to rre these coditios ccordi to the kids of sunektika Sice these coditios re uivers d sice they c be of y deree of eerity we c so drw o them for eerl expltios. ow these coditios wil cover wht hppes withi the thi, so to spek They tel us how thi, ive its kid of ture, the modictio of its ture d the sttes it is i, wil behve. But, thouh this i some sese ives us compete expltio of wht the thi doesfor otherwise the corres podi coditio woud ot be truewe will thik tht we re missi somethi if we do ot et the tecedet cuse ito the picture. ter , the thi would ot hve doe wht we re tryi to expi if there hd ot bee tecedet cuse which i some sese hd brouht it bout tht the thi would behve i certi wy. I fct, we re very much tempted to thik tht the re expltio of wht the thi did would be i terms of wht the tecedet cuse did d some eer w which coects wht the tecedet cuse does with wht the object does. Ad it seems cer tht our coditiols do ot provide us with such ws. Accordi to Ciceros e Jat it seems tht Chrysippus cims tht there c be o true coditios which coect truths bout tecedet cuses with fcts they re the tecedet cuses of evertheess, it seems tht for the purpose of expltio we wil ot eed eer lws i dditio to the coditiols which we lredy hve. It is true tht for other purposes, e divitio d predictio, we miht wt to formulte such eer ws Give his views o cosmc sympthy Chrysippus is ot oi to dey tht evets do ot occur i i sotio of ech other, i fct he is oi to stress tht there is coectio betwee y two this tht hppe He lso is ot oi to dey tht by observtio we could detect reulrities, costt couctios, d tht it woud be worth while to formulte d colect correspodi rules or ws for predictio But he does dey tht such rues s if somebody is bor t the rise of the Do-str he wl die t se oer y exptio for somebodys deth t se eve if the perso ws bor t the rise of the Do-str d there i fct is costt cojuctio For i spite of the fct tht he believes i divitio i eerl d does ot obect to stroloic rues s such he
0
Selec Blogrhy
Do nd D ogmism
The argest collection of texts bearing on Stoicism is Arnim, H. von Soioum Veeum agmena 4 vols Leipzig, 190324) ndices in Vol iv. See also 1 2 delstein, ., and Kidd, . osidonius Vol. i: The agmens ambridge, 1972). For picreanism there are three s efl collections : [13 Usener, H Epiuea eipzig, 1 88 7 Rome, 196 3) ncldes materia on the picrean Schoo generally 14 Baiey, . Epiuus} h e Exan Remains Oxford, 1 926) . ncdes ngish transation and notes. 1 5 Arrighetti, G. Epiuo} Opee 2nd edn., Trin, 1973). ncdes papyrs fragments of picrs, On Naue, and taian translation. An invalabe aid to stdy is 6 Usener, H. Glossaium Epiueum Rome, 1977) The papyrs text of Philodems' On Signs is edited, with transation and commentary, by 17 acy, P H. de, and Lacy, A de hilodemus: On Mehods of nfeene Philadelphia, 1 941 ; 2nd edn. Naples, 19 78)
2
·
STAAR WOR KS O SCOO S A OPCS
(A) ceptcsm 25 Brochard, V Les Sepiques ges 2nd edn, Paris, 19 23 ; repr 1969)· 26 Goedeckemeyer, A. Die Geshihe des giehishen Skepizismus eipzig, 1905) 27 Pra, M. da Lo seiismo geo 2nd edn, RomeBari, 1975) 28 Robin, L. yhon e le sepiisme ge Paris, 944) 29 Stogh, . Geek Skepiism Berkeley and Los Angees, 1 969) .
B Stocsm
.
3 Brhier, Chspe e I' anien soisme nd edn., Paris, 19 5 1 ) . 31 hristensen, An Ess o n he Uni of Soi hilosop open hagen, 1962) 32 Pohenz, M Die Soa nd edn, Gttingen, 1959). 33 Rist, ]. M Soi hilosop ambridge, 1969). 34 Sandbach, F. H. e Sois ondon, 1975).
() Epcureansm
GEERA
Genera acconts of Helenistic philosophy may be fond in 1 8 Zeler, . Die hilosophi de Giehen in ihe geshihlihe Enwiklung iii, Abt. 1 and 2 Die nahaisoelishe hilosophi 4th edn, Leipzig, 1 903 9) ; ngish translation of the st section of iii Abt. : Reichel, 0. ]. Zeller, The Sois Epiueans and Sepis London, 18 7); ng tr of the 2nd secton of iii Abt. 1 Alleyne, S F. Zeler, A Hiso of Eleiism in Geek hilosop London, 1883). 19 Hicks, R. D Soi and Epiuean New York, 1910; repr 1962) 2 ong, A. A. Hellenisi hilosop London, 1974) A special stdy of the notion of a criterion of trth is [ 21 Striker, G. pr�p rf S dOL Gttingen, 1974) Nahihen de Akadeie de Wissenshafen in Gingen Philhist. kase, 1974, Nr. 2, 47 There is mch t o be earned abot physical and intelectal aspects of ancient schoos of phiosophy frm 22 larke, M. . The Garden ofpicrs', hoenix 27 19 73), 3 867 23 Lynch, P. Aisole's Shool Berkeey, 1972) [24 Sedey, D Diodors rons an d Helenistic Philosophy', oeedings of he Camb idge hilologial Soie 203 .s 23) 1977), 74120.
[3 5 Bailey, The Geek Aomiss and piuus Oxford, 1928). 36 Farrington, B. e aih Epiuus ondon, 1967). 37 Rist, Epiuus An noduion ambridge, 1972) 38 Witt, N. W. de Epiuus and his hilosop Minneapois, 1954).
�
(D Logc 3 9 Bochenski, Anien omal Logi Amsterdam, 1 95 ). 40 orcoran, ]. ed Anien Logi and is Mode Inepeaions Dordrecht, 1974). 41 gi, U Zu soishen Dialekik Basel, 1967). 42 Frede, M ie soishe Logik Gttingen, 1974) 43 Kneae, W and M The Developmen ofLogi Oxford, 1962) 44 Mates, B Soi Logi 2nd edn, Berkeley and os Angees, 1 961 ) 4· SCEPCSM
Books 45 Brkhard, U Die angeblihe Heakli-Nahfoe des skepikes Aenesidem Bonn, 1973) 46 Dmont, J.-P Le Sepiisme e le phnomne Paris, 1972).
Dub d D gmtsm
Slct Bbgrphy
[89] The Orns o Tradona Grammar, n Bus, R., and Hnkka, J., edd., istorical and Philosophical Dimensions of ogic Methodolo and Phi/osop of Science (Dordrech, I977), 5 I-79 [9o Prncpes o Soc Grammar, n Rs 83], 2775 [ 9 I ] Grer, W 'AaBEs avyKTBwt> : Zur soschen Erkennns heore, Wurzbrger Jahrbcher fr die Altertumsissenschaft NF. 3 · (I977), 83-92 [92] Goud J. B . Deducon n Soc Loc, n Corcoran [4o], I 5 I68. [93 Goue, R. La cascaon socenne des proposons smpes, n Brunschw 8I], I7I98. [94 Graeser, A. Les caores socennes, n Brunschw 8I], I9922I [95] mber, C. Thore de a reprsenaon e docrne oque, n Brunschw [8I], 223-49 [96] Kererd, G. B. The Probem o Synkatatheis and Katelpsis n Soc Docrne, n Brunschw 8 I], 2 5 1-72 [97] Kdd, . G. Posdonus and Loc, n Brunschw 8I], 273-83 [98 Lacy, P. de The Soc Caeores as Mehodooca Prncpes, Transactions the American Phi/ological Association 76 (I 945 ), 246-6 3 99] Loyd, A. C . Grammar and Meaphyscs n he Soa, n Lon [82], 58-74 Acvy and Descrpon n Arsoe and he Soa, Pro [ Ioo] ceedings of the British Academ 56 (I97o), 22 7-40 Dene Proposons and he Concep o Reerence, m [IOI] Brunschw [8I, 28595. [Io2] Lon, A. A. Carneades and he Soc Teos, Phronesis I 2 (I967), 5 99° [Io3] The Soc Concep o Ev, PhilosophicaQuarter( I8 (1968), 329-43 Soc Deermnsm and Aexander o Aphrodsas De Fato [Io4] (xv), Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 52 (I97o), 24768 The Loca Bass o Soc Ehcs, Proceedings of the Io5] Aristotean Socie 7I (I97o/7), 85I04. 1o6 Freedom and Deermnsm n he Soc Theory o Human Acon, n Lon 82, I7399 Lanuae and Thouh n Socsm, n Lon [82, 75II3 Io7] The Soc Dsncon beween Truh and he True, n [Io8] Brunschw 8 I], 297-3 15 [Io9] Daecc and he So c Sae, n Rs 83], I OI-24 [I Io] Maes, B. Soc Loc and he Tex o Sexus Emprcus, Ame rican Journal ofPhilolo 70 (I949), 290-8 [I I I Mnucc, M. Sur a oque modae des socens, n Brunschw [8 I], 3 I 746
[I 1 2] Mueer, Ian Soc and Perpaec Loc, A rchiv fr die Geschichte der Philosophie 5 I ( I969), I 7387. [ I I 3 ] Pache, P 'La deixis selon Znon et Chrysippe, Phronesis 20 (I975), 24I6 [I I4] Pembroke, S G. Okess, n Lon 82], I I4-49 [I I 5] Pnbor, . Hsororaphy o LnuscsCassca Anquy Greece, Current Tren in inguistics I3 (I975), 69126 [I I 6 Pohenz, M. Zenon und Chryspp, Nachrichten vonder Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Gtingen, Ph.-hs. Kasse, N , 2 (I938), I732IO I I 7] Reesor , M. Fae and Possby on Eary Soc Phosoph y, Phoenix I9 (I965), 28597. II8 Rs, . M. Caeores and Ther Uses, n Lon [82, 3 857. [1I9 Zeno and he Orns o Soc Loc, n Brunschw 8I], 387400 [I2o] Sandbach, F H. Ennoa and Propss, Cassical Quarter( 24 ( I 9 3 o), 44-5 I ; repr. wh uppemenay noes n Lon 82],2237 [I2I Phanasa Kaapk, n Lon 82, 9-21. [122] Verbeke, G. La phosophe du sne chez es socens, n Brunschw 8I, 40I24.
6.
EPCURENIM
Books I23] Furey, D. . Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Prnceon, I967). [124 Lemke, D. Die Theologie Epikurs (Munch, I973). [ I 2 5 ] Manuwad, A. Die Prolepsislehre Epikurs (Bonn, I972)
ticles [ I 26] Bara, A pcur e e Scepcsme, Association Guiaume Bud Actes due VJe Congrs I969, 28692 [I27] Furey, D. ]. Knowede o Aoms and Vod n Epcureansm n Anon, J., and Kusas, G., edd., Esss in Ancient Greek Philosop (Abany, I97I), 6o7I9 128 Godschmd, V. Remarques sur orne pcurenne de a prnoon, n Brunschw 8I], I5569. I29] Lon, A. A. Ashess, Proepss and Lnusc Theory n Epcurus, Buetin of the Institute assical Studies I 8 (I97 I), I I4-33 qo Sedey, D . Epcurus, On Nature Book XXV, Cronache ercolanesi 3 (I 973 ), 5-8 3 I 3 1] Epcurus and hs Proessona Rvas, Cahiers de philologie I (I976), I I959
