Princeton Princeton University Press
Between Obedience and Revolution Author(s): Clyde Frazier Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1972), pp. 315-334 Published by: Blackwell Publishing Stable URL: http://www http://www.jstor.org/stabl .jstor.org/stable/2265055 e/2265055 . Accessed: 08/05/2011 18:01 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp.. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue o f a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black . . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
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Between Obedience and Revoluton1
Politica! man nds himself in many dilemmas because he is unable to create a government which will insure that only just laws are passed Even with the best of constitutions, a overnment may at times commit morally outrageous acts and al the legal remedies provided by that constitution may prove ineectual in bringing aout a change In such circumstances the concientious citizen nds himself in a par adoxical situation In the interests of preserving a politica! process that s basically just and to which he nay indeed have committed himself, explicitly or otherwise, he has an obligation to perform an act at which his conscience rebels His commitment to the system may prevent him from becoming a revolutionary, but his sense of moral outrage prevents him from being a completely loyal subjet either Because they have been continually faced with such dilemmas and have foud themselves unable to eliminat them completely by framing a procedure to insure that law and justice coincide, men have tried to devise and justify a kind of politica! action that falls somewhere between strict obedience to the state and an attempt to overthrow it What follows is an eort to shed some light on the nature and variety of actions that comprise this category of extraordinary politica! acts It will be my thesis, in particular, that extraordinary politics is a mch broader and more inclusive category than we have generally
This is a revised vesion of a a er a er originally read at the annul meetin o the American Politica! Science Association, Setember am indebted to more eole than can ention for helful crticism f th arlr draf f hi aer
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supposed This essay will be divided into fur main parts In the rst I shall examine the literature on civil disobedience with a vie to mak ing explicit its assumptions about the nature and limits of justiable disobedience Next these assumptions will be traced back to their roots in traditional liberal theory and an attemt made to show that this theory actually allows a much broader range of disobedience than has generally been assumed The third section resents a characterization and examination of the kinds of disoedience encompassed within these broader limits The nal section explores some of the considera tions involved in justifying such acts I ISOBEIENE AS SPEEH
Falling as it does between ordinary politics and revolution, extraordinary politics takes on some of the ·characteristics of each type of politica! action It is always both inside and outside the existing legal system It is always extralegal or illegal enough so that opponents can cry "foul and attept thereby to divert attention from the substantive issues raised It may, on the other hand, be clse enough t existing legality for its proponents to claim that it should be recognized by the legal system and go unpunished2 The predominant tendency in the recent literature on the subject has been to emhasize only one side of this dichotomy, and to admit as morally serious disobedience only tose actions which are so narrowly restricted that their obedient aspects are their main ones Most of is literature has focused on something called "civil disobedience The underlying theme of this work is that disobedience ca be justied only when it is so limited that it can be characterized as an act of politica! speech Disobedience is, from this perspective, an appeal (albeit a desperate appeal) "to the public to alter certain laws or policies that the minority takes to be incompatible with the fundamental principles of morality, principles that it believes the majority to accept3 It is an attempt to address "the sense of justice of the 2 Car Cohen Law Seech ad Disobedience" in Civil Disobedience: Theo and Practic, ed Huo A Bedau (New York 1) 16 3· Marshall Cohen Civil Disobedience in a Constitutional Democracy The Massachusetts Reiew 10 n 2 (Srin 16): 217-218
Between Obedience and Revolutin
ajority i order to urge reconsideratio,4 "a for of persuasio5 Thus conceived, the ctions falling under the heading of extraordiary politics e unusual ones, but they are ot totally foreign to our politica traditions They are departures from e ordinary channels of politics but tey ae appeals to the as well The disobedience ust, there fore, be of a limited chaacter and desind nt to overthw or bypss th syste but erely to get the syste to work The utilization of this exaordinary form of politica! apeal may be justied because of the shortcomings of ordinary speech Mere speech ay fail to produce change in any situations because it does not demand a response Civil disobedience is designed to reinforce the disobedient's appeal Direct disobediene of intrinsically objectionable laws may actualy force the comunity to act on the issue and eiter enforce its laws or chage the 6 Unless the community decides to act and enforce the law i such a situation, that law may i eect be annulled by the xtraleg acon of the disobedient Society becomes the tacit partner i th change through its inaction Where a protest is indirect, involv in disobedience to laws not objetionable in themselves, the rationale o disobedience is similar, soewhat weaker While he cannot force a response, such a disobediet, by capturing public attention or by deonstrating his own seriousness, may strengthen his appeal ad ake a sponse much more likely lthough the recent literature o civil disobedience is divided into wo majors strands, both of the characterize disobedience as speech school of tought, following former Justice Fortas, admits as jusabl only that disobediece which presents itself as a legal appeal dsiged to test the constutionality of a speic law7 The othe school would allow a somewhat broader range of disobedience, admitting t ossibiliy that politica as wll as legal appals may be justied e 4· Joh Rawls he Justcato f l Dsedee Ciil isoeienc, p 240. 5 arrs Woord No-Violece ad the aw: he aw eeds l Ciil Disobedience, p 63 6 arr rosch its t the oral la i Disedece Ehics 75 2 (Jauar 165) 03-05 · ee Fortas' ook Conceing Dissen n Ciil isoedienc (Ne or 68) .
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can, in this view, use disobedience in appeling to the governmet to change its politics even when it is clear at the policy in question is legally enacted and constitutionally permitted n both cases disobedi ence is employed as a means of appeal, though the appeal is directed to dierent audieces: the legal system in te one case and the po ti cl system in the othe Some dirences in the types of acts disobedients may employ fol low from the dierent characterizations of disobedience advanced by th two schools (te justiability of indirect disobedience is a prime xample); but the concern of the vast majority of writers of both schools has been to stress the limits on disobedience that ow from its characterization as speech and which they terefore hold in common Writers of both persuasions hav bee almost unanimous in demand ig that disobedience be open, pulic, limited, and respectful of the rights of other citizens Only if al these limits are observed, they assert, can the act of disobedience be charaterized as speech Disobedients have ofte been advised, in addition, to accept the penalty for their disobedience willingly in order to prove their seriousness and rinfoc hei apeal While ost authors have grd with John Rawls that violence is not cmpatible with civil disobedience as speech, sinc it does not invit a dialogue but demands submission, 8 Marshall Cohn has defended some forms of violence, claiming that when strictly limitd it ca b a very eective form of expressio9 t is rvaling that although ther is disagreement about the justiability of olenc, there is agreeent as to the grounds on whih any attempt a such justication must be ad This very limited conception of disoedience as speech seems to have gained wid accetance largely because it describes the kind of civil disobedience that was so successful in the civil rights campaigns of the early fties Later attempts to use disobedience to cobat deeply ooted social segregatio and to protest against the war have prove much less eective ad have exosed a weakness i the ratioale for the kind of disobedience tat ca be described as speech The court d the public have both been unwilling to face squarely the issues aised by the disobedients ad have hidde behind the bae of 1aw 8 Rawls, Th Justication of Civil Disobedinc, 24 g Cohn Cil Disobdinc in a Constitutional Democrac 2
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d order istead Unable to resolve his moral dilemma through th use of disobedience in e narrow sense, the citizen may aain fd himself faced with the basic qustions of obigation and bdience If as many contend, disobedience ca only b justied as an act of speech, the only alternatives left to th unsucessful disobedient a obedience and revolution It is my contention at our fate is not so hash as this and that one may, on occasion, be able to justify mor radical varieties of disobedience which still al short of revoluo It is to an examination of the possibility of such alternatives that now turn I RAIAL ISOBEIENE
search for th reasons that it has seemed necessary to restrict dis obedience so narrowly takes us back to the oriins of liberal theory ssumpions rst mad by Hobbes and acceped by ocke connue o inform much of contemporary thinking about disobediene May modern arguments against disobedience apea to be only slightly altered restatements of the original Hobbesia ones Hobbes pointed out that we have reason to obey even a bad law because we have an interest in the preservation of a system of abitration through which dierences between citizens can be settled peacefully Such a system is possible, he reasoned, only if each member of society is willing to forswear the use of force in disputes with his fellows and to submit them to binding arbitration by the sovereign and his laws. Hobbes felt, accordingly, that unless a member of society could be sure that others would submit to the outcome of such abitration even when they dis agreed with it, he himself would b foolish to submit when he dis agreed with the outcome. The sytem could ot be preserved unless me agreed to submit to al las. Hobbes's arguments have bee reeated i almst ideca form by may moder thinkers. Whe David itz state that "For th sake of th greater good ecured by that systm though its ovement and its law, [citizens] accept eactments which they otherise disapprove,0 he is elying on the orce of the Hobbesia argument Hobbes did not stop, however, with the propostion tht the citize 10 Sitz, Democrac ad the Problem o Civil Disobediece," American olitical Science Review 8, 2 (u 15) 7
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is bound to obey l the laws. He claimed, using exactly the sam logic, that one is obligated to obey any stat whatsoever, irrespective of its origins or policies The mere existence of a state, whatever its form, is sucient reason for obedience. s long as the state provides a means for settling conicts pecefully, one is bound to obey. citizen might prefer that the state operate for his own benet, or in accordance with certain principles, and Hobbes never denied that it might indeed be desirable to have it so. He insisted, however, that guaratees for citi zes against the state, eve though they were desirable, could ever be enforced without destroying the state Men would only forswear the use of violence and submit their disputes to adjudication, h argued, if they could be absolutely sure that their fellows would do likewise ny attempt to set limits on the sovereign or to give the citizens guarantees against the state would open the way to irresolvable coict, for there would be o one to rede an authoritative decision should a dispute arise o these matters betwee the citizes ad th sovereig ny attempt to set up such a arbiter would leave uaswered the question of what guarantees the citizen would hav against that abiter The roble of ulmate sovereignty would not be solved, it would only have been made mo remot. The existene of these areas of potential conict would, according to Hobbes, leave each citizen unsure that others would comly with the commands of th sovereign; being unsure, h would have no reason to do so himself Men would fall bac into the stt of ature, which was a wa of all against all. s it stands so f, Hobbes's argument is icomplete. While he has shown that th logic of abitration is allencomassing, he has not shown that men must agree to arbitraon in the rst place Might not a citizen choose to reject the state altogeter ad tae his chances in te state of nature? Hobbes met this diculty with a premise whih, considering its importance to his arment, he left curiously unexamined He simply asserted that "te eatest [evil] that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible in respect of the miseries and horible calamities that accompany a civil war or tat dissolute condition of masterless men, wit out subjection to laws ad a coercive power to e their hands from
Between Obedience and Revouti
aine and revenge.... 11Men ought to obey even te hshest state, since from Hobbes's perspective even te worse state would be ette han the best war. He himself recognized only a very few exceptions to this rule. hen te sovereign ondemned a an to die or com manded him to do something tat he regarded as worse than death he had no obliaion o obey. 1 2 Since he underlying purpose of the compact is security of life and liberty, the agreemen is broken if te sovereign threatens your life or worse. Locke denied that man had no choice but to obey any government under which he happened to nd himself, and al of liberal teory has followed him in this denialY Locke saw, and others have agreed, at order alone is not a sucient condition to permit the reaization of tose values for which we establish government. 1 4 Locke's ews on this atter dier frm Hobbes's in at least two important respects.On e one hand, he took a more sanguine view of the condition of man in he state of nature than did Hobbes. He accused Hobbes of confusing the stat of nture wih e state war, and poited ut tat he former only ccasionally dgeneraes int the latter ocke was also more keenly aware tan Hobbes that the cncentration f pwe which a stat eails makes ssibl greater evil han the state of naure or even the stae of war 16 In their natural onditon men an at last ght it out as equals, but n man would have a chance against the suerior force f the tate.The bral view, following Locke, as been hat when e preservation of a sate compels wse evils tha anarchy, the costs of tat state are to high. A citizen has n reason to preserve such a state, for there is no greater good which it maes possile. This arment was used by liberal teorists to defend he right o revolution against Hobbesian insistence on the necessity for absolute obediece, but it cmprises only a part of the liberal response to II.
Thoa obb, Liathan (N ork, 958 52 2 obb, h Citizn (N ork, 99, 79· 3 Joh ock h Son atis of Gon (N or 952 90 itz, Docrac a th robl of iil Diobic 393· 5 ock, Son atis, 2 a of cha 3· i. 8
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Hobbes ndeed, if taken alone, it leaves man wit an even ore dismal destiny an Hobbe ad envsioned. hie it olds hat an can do worse than the state of nature, it does not establis tat e can do any betterThis argument alone does not callenge Hobbes's oter contention, tha ay attempt to provide citizens with guantees against the sovereign is bound to return them to te state of nature ( not actually to te state of war) Te wole stucture of iberal eory wih its constiutiona pscriptions an inaienabe rts ust depend, therefore, on the assertion of a second premise, if it is noţ to be ere wishfu tinking iberal theory ust depend on a premise to the eect that te logic of arbitration is not allencompassinghis premise seeed so obvious to Locke and is followers at n one, so fa as 1 can tel, as bohere to me it expici; t remans, neverteless, the implicit basis f liberal theory. iberal teorists assume tat we do not need absolute certainty at r fellow tzens in a circumtaces ain o disobeg th sovereign in order for it to be rational for us to refran ourselves. On th contrary, it seems more ikey tha only a fairly i deee of prbabiity t they do so is necessary. Some laws t least e clearly not essential to the aintenance of social order, for any laws are broke every dy without causing the coapse of te state.ndeed, we may suspect that he nonenforcement of certain ws is in fact a condition of social stabil ity. Nor ave the muc ore irect threats to e legitimy of the state reresente by civil rigts and antiwar disobedients ( and even rioters) destroyed the fabric of law and order, thou it ould be fos o cten at ·that fabric as not been amage to se extent, particularly by the more violent manifestations of deance. Some citizens probably do experience easure of insecurity, because suc occurrences me e fee ta the stae is no onger protecing tem. But if we do not ave total domestic peace, neither ave we returned to the stte of nture as Hobbess eory redicts. Tou Locke never made expcit is denial of Hobbess claims bout the loc of bitration, e clearly relied on t He acknowledged e fct that in tteptg to ve ctizens uarantees gains the state e wa leaving open the possibiity of vioence and revlutin.Tee is, e admitted, no judge on eth th authority to decide the contro ersies at these guarantees wou ignite: "the appea then !ies
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nowhere but to heaven; fore between eiher persons who have no known supeor n earth or which permits no appeal t a judge on ear, being properly a stae of war wherein te appeal lies only to heaven. 7 is a possibility and Locke never denies that it is, but tis mere possibility is not enouh to make men s insecure as to feel tat hey ust retrn to the state of nature here each underakes to protect himsef by his own force.Liberal theory clely assumes tat man is not stu in the state of nature, for that theory is an attempt to expore various aternatives t this undesirable state. It is my contention that liberal theory, throuh its reection f obbes's argment about e ogic of arbitration, opens the possibility of a much wider range of disobedience than liberal theorists have generally recognized.Locke himself was not coneed i he problem o disbedience but wih that of revolution. He id dispute Hobbes's ontention that he iizen as n choice but to obey, but Locke et a evout was e nly aleative open th citizen. Hobbes's assertn that anying less tan total obedience is revolutionary was suported by his argument about e lic of sovereignty.He used that same gument to deny the possibility of a limited, constituional state. Loke had to dispue Hobbes's argument about he logic of sovereignty in order to establish the possbility of limits on the power f he gov ernment, but he ailed to realize that this also undermined his ( and obbes's) assumpton that any disobedience to te state was ipso facto revolutinary. t seems, ironically, that the very arguent by which beral theorists established the possibility of a limited constutional egi as established possibility of a de ran f acts disobedi ent to the laws of that reme but stiU fallin short of revolution. Locke probably failed to recognize this because he never made his own agment eit, and because he failed to se the connecon betwee te two dierent parts of obbes's work. He therefore contnued to support obbes's denial of the possibility of nonrevolutioary disobedience, while his o work contradicted the assuptions on which that deni was based. Most modern theorists have made a similar mistake. They have denied te possibility of all but the most strictly limted dsobedience, bid ·
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and the ogic of their denials has been consisten obbesi Walma's reasonng s typica when he states, "hose who asset ghts under th constuto and the aws made ereunder must abde b a constitution and the aw if that ontitution i to urvive1 8 Notce at Wdman speaks only to ose who do assert rights under the constitution Revolution remains a possbiity for anyone who wiling to forgo the benets of constttional guarantees, bt short of that e only option s to obey.Wdman denes, a obbe and Locke denied, the ver poibili that disobeence s coatibe th the surviva o any sort of state at l. e does nt contend that a dis obedience is unjustied, but holds that the justiation mus be revolutionary one. he ontnng prevalence of i o oe important reason for te insistence ta disobediene be limited to such an extent at it can be cassied as an ac of peech.Ee supporters of disobedence seem to have aepted the obbesi og and to assume that if one oversteps the narrow imit which alo act of disobedience to be characteed as kind of speeh t becoe iplicity revoutiony. 1 9 I most eem a i ost iterature on "ci disobedience is attemptng to show at very arefuy te disobedience is not really otsie the syste te ch eha ha led to an extremel nrow notion of jutible diobeen ere ha been a failure to expore te ange d chaacter of e act i whic nonrevolutionry disobedient igt enge It to u exploraon that 1 trn n the next seton VARETES OF RESSTANCE
Not stdents of disobedience ave been bnd to te esten of aternaves to taditiona cv disobedience an ve inted tat alternaves are viabe, 20 bt tey e not folowed p tese ggestons, and the exact natre d range of sc ats remains a ys tery f the dening featre of traditiona c disobeence was h t could be charactezed as a fo of speec te moe c pos 18 Wldman, "Civil ghtsYes: Cil DisobeiecN, in Civil Disbed n 0 (ts mne) Cohen, Civ soedene n a Consttutonal Demoray, 215 20 Mrshal Cohen, "Cv soediene, h G I oy 1971 Chi ago, ), 246; an Mart Luther Kn, "Lette fom Binh Ci Ja, Cii ioin p. 78.
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tion that I wisb to exlore defens the rit of a citizen not only to apeal to the state ut to resist it as well. n so doing the iizen is f course asserting bis h t defy the stae's laim make ining deisions in a sei area. Tbe logic of bis at is oerive, and it is this movement from aeal to oerion that baraterizes tbe radial disoedient and dierentiates bim from the more traditional ivil dis oedient. Altbouh the great ody of literature on ivil disoeiene bas assumed that a justiale disoediene ould e baraterized as seeb, this more radial aset bas een resent, to some degree, in almost all acts of disoediene. If we aeal to the onsiene of the sovereign with an at of disodiene we ertainly defy bim to an extent as well, even wben we are areful to do so only to a ver mited egre. No matter bow arfully one irumsie a rotst to make it barmonze with the sit of tbe laws, there always remans an ele ment f deane, bowever small it may e. I is this element of de ane tht onents bave ften reognized in even the mildest forms of disdiene and ued as a asis for their ojetion to it. At times suporters f disoediene bave reognized tbe resene of a oeive elment in disoediene and bave even iluded the idea of oerion as art of their denition of traditional iil disoediene.21 Tbe sbortoming of sub analyses is that they bave generally failed to dierentiate ats tha may vary in many resets, eause they ba ve fousd on the form of an at and not on its sustane or eet. It bas usually n assumed in analyses of this kind that e ritea of iility are etern! fators: wbether tbe at is oen and ulic, wbether the enalty is aeted willingly, and so on. It is my onten tion that sub a fous osures vitally imortant dierenes. A dis oedient can aept the enalty for bis at eause be thinks it is bis due or eause be wants to bel k the jails and ring down tbe sys tem of justi. Even some rvolutionary ampaigns, sub as Gandhis gbt for Indian indeendene, bave een arried on y means of ats that meet a the riteria generally set up as tests of the ivility of disoediene. If an at of disoediene is to e aeptale as a form of seeb it generally must bave sub extea! barateristis, ut tbe 1 Hugo A Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, ]oua o hiosoph 58 no 1 (161) 661; and Anthony De Cresiny, The Natue and Methods of Non Vlen Coecion oltica Stuie no (June 16) 63.
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ossession of these haraterstis alone is not enouh to assure that i e aeale as speeh. By fousing on exrna haraterisis of e at even those ho have roe the oerive eeent in is oeiene have een revente fro seeing he full soe of ossiili ties oen to the isoeient. They have ontinue to ean that is oeiene reain within very nao limits esit the iliitly raial thrust of thir an·a lysis Resistane to the state is or at least an e very raia inee. f as we have seen eane of he state oes not enail revolution there oes reain a sense in hih it is evouona. t ou e neat hough muh too sile to say that e resister asserts his right to efy e state only in ertain areas while the revolutionary reahes olete eane. t oul e too sile eause revolutionaries lways shae me oon groun th their oonents. Rater than atteting to seak f resistane an revolution as two istint oes of ation i sees referale o onsier the as ar of a ontinuu of ations that vary in their egree of oosition to the given orer. Ther is of urse a istinon eween thos ats hat ar esine to ng own the existing egal-onstitutional struture an those that are not ut this istintion is not alays foun at the sae oint on the ontinuu. Thee e numerous exales oth of onservative evluon an of aial rsstane. woul like evote th rest of his setin to an examinatin of a nue of varials whih aet the extn t hi isoeiene is rvoutionary an o a very genera onsieration f the ieent kins of as isoeiene might involve. One iortant aset in whih isoeient ats an vy is the egree to whih they are oerive. A isoeient or gou of isoei ents is selom in a osiion o fore a soiey o hoose a pariular ourse of ation or to revent its hoosing another. More oonly wha e isoeien is ale o o is to raise he osts assoiate wih the hoie or rejetion of a artiuar ateative inreasing the ro ailit hat the alternative hosen e the one that he favors. For a heir talk aout sting the oerations of the Pentagon it is i ult to elieve that the aniar eonstrators in 967 atualy eieve hat hey oul in an alou gh with th tros guaring the uil ing. What they erhas hoe as that the goveent oul either n i o uh troule or (ore likely) oul no n it raly
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ossile to take the ations neessary to revent an ocuation of the uilding. he dsoedient may emloy minimal oeron when the puli is aathti aout a oliy and rsists in following it not out of strong commitment ut largely through iertia. n suh a situation raising the osts only slightly may ause a hge in uli sentiment toward the oliy. (Of ourse the disoedient also risks rovoking the oosite reation.) n general, the higher the degree of oerion an at of disoediene involves (verything else eing equal), the more radial a hallenge it oses to the estalished authority. A seond ruial varale is the soe and imortane of the area in whih the disoedient hallenges the states authority. Deane of one patiular law n very nrow grounds sems uh less hraten ing to the tate than deane of a roadr ty whih involv disoey ing many dient laws. The imotne f t artiular law ques tion is also a relevant fator here. Dae of r lw or of laws regulating ersonal sexual ehavior seems hardly more than a nui sane to the state, ut deane of draft laws strikes at an area that is mh more entral to the states owr and authority. t is for this reason that many have seen refsal to ay taxes as eing among the most radial ossile ations, for if it ere widesread it would render impossile the estene of any kind of government at One an onsider the question of the so of deane in another sense as well. Ats of disoediene an vy greatly in the extent to whih they attemt to thwart the enforement of any artiular law. The ase of the moral refuser, who does not attemt to thwart the enforement of a law ut refuses for moral reasons to rform artiular duties required of him y that law, is eseially interesting in this reset. The draft refuser ay defy the apliation of the law only to one of its suets, himself. Even though his t may e hihly oerive, sine his refusal is asolute, his hallenge to the state is less radial than many oters, ivolng as it dos suh a small erentage of the citi zens aeted y the law A ird aor variale is the extent to whih ats are urely oer ive, rather than eing mixed orms of oerion and aeal he ast aority of disoedient ats, though they have involvd som oerion, have relied mainly on a moral apeal. Disoedients have attemted to dramatize the inustie of government oliy at the same time they
Phloophy & Pul Ar
tried to frustrate it y their disoediene and their willingness to suf fer. hile in some ases oerion and aeal are imliit in the sae at, in others they may e art of the same amaign ut ertain to dierent ats. Those who artiiated in th underground railrad made a moral aeal against slavery as well as trying to frustrate enforement of the law, ut they did not make this aa y heling the slaves to esae. Any attemt to make their ats uli would have undermined their eetiveness. This simultaneous aea to oth the onsiene and e selfinterest of the uli has een one of the great strengths of traditiona disediene. Oer ossile forms of ation may minimize the element of aeal and e almost urely oerive. Saotage is an at of this sort, and for this reason it omes very lose to the revolutionary end of the ontinuum. One an imagine instanes, however, where a itizen might attemt to saotage a artiular gov ement roam, the nulear weaons develoment rogram for examle, wiout hallenging the government in any other ea. Suh an ation would e a diult one to evaluate, for although it is oth highly and exlusively oerive it hallenges only a very limited aset of government ower A fourth imortant variale, n the demorati ontext at least, is the numer of eole involved in the rotest A demorati soiety ases its legitimay on oular suort, and a rotest movement whih had very wide suort ould hav a ind of legitimay in suh a soiety It might even go so fa as to e suversive of the artiular regime in ower without attemting to underut the fundamental on stutional order. It ight indeed e laimed that the regime itself was suversive of the more fundamental order. It is for this reaso at attemts to render the draft ineeve through mass refusal of indu tion have always seemed less threatening than shemes to do so y the destrution of draft les, even though the otentia degree and soe of oerion is the same oth ases. An eetive rogram of mass refusal requires the kind of road uli suort whih endows it with a good measure of resetaility in a demoray A fth vaale of imortane is the romity of the disoediene to e law or oliy eing rotested. Diret disoediene raises the few est hallenges to the state, ut it is not always ossile. Disoediene to laws not diretly hallenged ut whih suort te ect of e
Bn bdnc nd Rvoluton
otes aise a ew oe qestios Cil hts deostaos co l boe tesass s with hich e had o qe s sc ecase sch las ee sed t efoce seregatio Attets to oce hage b disbeyig law that have dit coecti ith the object o the otest se ve eet ideed Suh isbeiece sets a a e adical challee to sociy a sees to be alost a o social blacal he eed salli o the eeas di to th Nw Yk ds ai is a eaple o such actio s e a (houh b eas l) sitis Ma of the ecet attepts to bob publi buildi e this cass sice the coeo betee the tats f the attacs ad the cotiuati of the w is teuous ideed A sixth a al sieatio i evaluati the deee of thea tat ats o isobediee se to e state is the ete to whih the olate te ights o othe itizes Sie the gaatee o suh ights is a tally ipoat utio ay goveet a isobediet who lates e ghts o his elow izes is uh oe heateig tha e who does t Attets t eve opoets o seaig l htly be see as etreel subvesive i a deocati ode bease e olate oe o the os basi olitia ights Sitis th iede a acess to oes ow et o t bli opet ae st eets o e hts e ctes bt he e a es seos Sipe eusa t op ih the t aw cod aso be sd o e the iht o othe ities o e deeded but the coeco s ve iiet ad the ea tha i poses t e tate is co espodigly wea I ave ted i eales to ive ve gh idea o te e actios ope o the adial disobediet It is ctetio ta i ts the ids vaabes discussed aove ad ot by y eteal haatestis that oe st evalate his t t deteie the deee dage it eesets to the establishd de V. JUSTFYNG RESSTANCE
oe so a has bee oly to spot te that thee eists ide age of extaoiay polia! ats ad o exploe se f e wys i whih hese ats va I hve eaied o eaig te eated estio of hei ustaio ti w ease I fe ta
330
Phloophy & Pblc Ar
uch of the debate about the various ors of disobediee has bee arred y a ofuson of these o issues Too ofte studets of disoeiece have olude that ats f disobediene ould ot b justi ed erely because they assued that disoediece was revol tioary this al sectio I wat t tae up the questio of the usticatio of resistace I oe sese a east e otio of justifyi acts of resistance to the state presets rave probles t is lear tha oe aot hope to justify suh resistae i the sse of reahi ooly aree upon criteria to disinuish justied fo unjustied instanes. The very recourse to disobedience in the rs place sees to indicate tha such coon standads have broen down. There is no rule or prin ciple one can loo to as a justication for disobedience tha iht not itself be subject to conroversy.22 f any such standard could be areed on it could be incorporad no th law and disobedience would no be necesary. There can therefore be no leal rih o disobediene although exceptions to articular laws ay be ade in cerain cases. (The provision for conscientious objection to ilitary service is an exaple of this.) This does no ean of course tha acts of resisance are never jutied. Many are (alhouh any are not) and as acors in the politica! syste we are consantly called on to ae decisions about the justicaion of such cts and to ehave accordinly. I does ean however ha we canno hope to nd publicly areed upon standads on which to base our judents. Allowin individuals o interpret hir w politc oblatios aes i entirely possible that irreconcilable conicts ay develop which can be setled only by force. To a certain exten then we erely pic our oral cteria and act on the but his does no ean that we are lef enirely outside the bounds of oral discourse. There is a dierence beween justify in an ac and justifyin the ator who perfors i.23 An actor can perfor he wron acts for the riht inds of reasons. Because of tis we ay at ties face opponents who act because of deeply held beliefs hich we respect but canno share. In such cases we accep our oppo ·
22 ea, "O Cl oeee p 3 23 R tma te emaxk Cv Dsobedence e Hop Feeman (Sata axaxa, Cal, 9), p
331
Btn Obdnc nd Rvoluton
et as a oally seious acto ut this oes ot olige us to agee with hi o to acquiesce to his wishes. ay situatios we ay e covice that ou oppoet shoul act as he oes (give his eliefs etc.) eve whe we feel that ou ow uty lies i opposig his ais.2< The ealizatio that we ae faci a oally seious acto oes how eve equie us to teat hi as such a to show hi the i of pesoal espect that peclues the use of iicule o egaig o ihuae teatet. Fo ost citizes face ith the pole of what they cosie to e a ioal law the pope couse of actio is fa fo clea. Typically a citize s hiself face ot with a sigle oal oliga tio ut with coictig oligatios each of which has pia facie foce ut eithe of which is oclusive. The way he esolves such coicts pes of couse o the atue f his pesoal oal sys te. f the citize's oal syste is teleological (which oes ot ec essaily iply utilitaia) he ill attept to eteie his oal uty y weighig the cosequeces of the vaious couses of actio ope to hi ice feel that such teleological oality is eoiat i ou society wul lie to tu ally to a xaiati of soe of the poles ivolve a attet to alace hse coictig oal clais fo the stapoit of a eleological oal syste. f isoeiece oes ot iply that oe is atteptig to ovetu the syste it oes pose soe age to it a the isoeiet will have to alace this age agaist the goo he poposes t achieve y his act. He ill have to estiate the elative weights of these ac tos i tes of his ow syste of values ut whateve syste he uses it sees safe to say that the geate the goo he ais at o the geate the evil he sees to eliiate te easie t will e to justify a act of esistac. A iseiet ust weigh t oly the agitue of the goo he esies ut also the chace he has f achievig it. Nueous pactica! cosieatios aecti the poaility of success o failue will thus e elevat to the cisio to isoey. Agaist the goo he poposes to achieve the potetial iseiet ust attept to alace the uesiale eects of his act. Oe set of actos he ust weigh petais to the iect eects of the act he 24 H Ato, Poltal Jtato, Civil Disobedience e eau, 228-229
2
Phosophy & Pubc Ars
oteplates. Ctai acts taly acts o violece aais ss have ieiate coequeces hich ae so pulsive that ost disoeiets ule the out egaless o thi eectiveess. Me ote iiect cosequeces ae paaout. The isoeie ust weigh caeully the egee o age that his acts pose t te state. The gate the age etail y his act the oe iculty a is eiet ill have i justiyig it. The csiatios iscuss i the last sctio ae al elevat i eteiig the egee challege to the sate that ay paticula act poses. o acts ae vey likely to juge egatively o both couts. Acts o violece iecte agaist pesos such a ue a kiappig ae itisically epulsive as ell as psig a vey aical theat to th state's authit. The extet to hich a pospective isoeiet appoves o the sys te y hich he is govee is also a ipotat acto aectig the justiaility o his isoeiece. To the extet that he is a ethusiastic suppote o the existig egie his estiatio o the aage his act ill o ill te to issuae hi o isoeiece. To the extet that he places a vey lo value o the existig syste geeally he ill e less cocee aout the avese cosequeces o his act o the staility o he state. He ay ee that he has ot uch to ose y a act o isoeiece eve i it aces a thus he il ot e so easily issuae y the act that he ay eae social staility. The pecise ae i hich a citize's appoval o the state shoul ete ito his politica! ecisios has ot alays ee clealy ue stoo. Lieal theoy i paticula has ige the ipotace o appoval a ocuse the closely elate acto coset. Oe eithe cosets o oes ot ut appoal is cotiuous. A citize ca appove to vayig egees oth o a syste he oes coset to oey a o those systes he oes o. Without eyig the elevace o coset oul like to cote that appoval is geae t the cosieatios o the potetia isoeiet as ell. The ailue to uesta the elevace o both actos has paaoxically le liea theoists to ea too uch oeiece o ost ocasios ut too little o othes. taitioal lieal theoy i a citize oes ot coset to the state he is justie i opposig o atteptig to ovetu it. Touh appeciatio the vtal ole o coset is a poou coecve to
333
Bn Obdinc an Revou
the oesie theoy o oes it is y opiio that the cae o co set has ote ee baly ovestate. Davi pitz kes a eepla eo i this ea he he ssets that a politica! syste e is spa i a eocacy) has o oal asis o eai oeiece o those ho peei othe systes ey its asi leitiacy.25 Spiz is o hee a uch o lieal theoy is o ith hi ecause oes's aguet still etais soe oce eve i it oes ot have the asolute ii quality that oes aitaie. the etet that a diseiet elieves that the syste hile ipeect is ette tha aachy he has som easo ot to eage its eistece. his easo ill ot it is tue alays lea hi to eject isoeiece the ace o eat evl ut it oes ea that he oes ot hve cate lache i the atte isoeiece. The ette the syste the stoe the oliatio to oey a the eate theee ust the ipoveet ouht aout y isoeiece e it is t justiy the isks t als iplies. Eve eak systes heve ay have soe clai o u oeic a a stog syste ay e ale to clai soe oeiece eve the atiss ath o o goveet. ost cases lieal theoy has eae too uch athe tha too little oeiece. ousig o coset aloe it oce e citize to e alost totally oeiet heeve he coul ot justiy evolutay isoeiece. he case o aical isoeiece is i ay ways attept to ispute just this aspect o lieal theoy a t poit out the ossiility a ie age volutoay iseiece. I oul like to a hee oly that eve i the est state e ca evise the possiilty o jusiale isoeiece caot e cateoically eclue. As lo as e caot evise a poceue hich uaatees that oly goo las il e ase (a e caot) the pssiblit o justiale isoeiec ill eist. t is cooly suppose i ou o couty at least that eoc acy is the est syste that ca e evise a that it has special clais to ou eiece. soe ays the case o oeiece to eocatic oveet sues the sae eaesses as the case o oeiece to ay othe type o syste. t caot e aitaie tat 25 Sptz, emoay a the Polem of Cvl soeee, p 394·
33 4
Phosophy & Pbc Aars
the oeatio o the ajoity cile gives us a e assuac o just decisios tha does the oatio o ay th icile o decisi. Thee ae ay olitica! questios it is tue i which the aliatio the ajoty icie sees to eld a esult that is itisically i. ut by o as al olitica! decisios ae this sot. Majoity decisio is ot hweve the oly basis o deocacy o is it ecessaily the stogest. The sto clai that deocacy does ake is that it ecludes the ossibility o justiable disobediece by ovidig alteative eas o chage. Deocacy is ot couse the oly syste that vdes such aveues. Eve the st ieso sible dictato caot be coletely dea to aeals o his eole d i ost edeocatic goveets taditioally escibed eas o aeal to the soveeig wee eset. Deocacy howeve akes cetai that these eas ae aticulaly ueous though its guatees olitica! ights to citizes ad that the aeals will have a good chace beig eective oce they ae eessed. It sees easoable to coclude theeoe that the osective disobediet i a deocacy has aohe acto to weigh i his cosideatios. Not oly ust he weigh agaist the good he desies to ccolish the evil s act ay big about but he ust als weigh agaist t th likeli hood that he ca achieve the sae ed though oal olitica! cha els. Eve i a deocacy this cosideatio will ot absolutely e clude disobediece o ajoities ca be icedibly isesitive to the clais o iies ad the ocesses o odiay olitics ca wok so slowly at coscietious citizes ae dive t disobediece. This is o couse the dilea o ay citizes i the Uited States today . They ae kely awae o the value o the syste ude which ey live but at the sae tie they see that syste coitti what ey ee e imoal cts bth at hoe ad aboad. Uable to justiy evolutio ay citizes have bee coviced at the oly eai ig alteativs ae obediece ad ieectual otest. May othes have becoe evolutioaies by deault because they ee that the evils e itoleable ad have ailed to ecogize the eistece o a wie age o ossible actio shot o evolutio. It is t e hoed that clacatio o the available alteatives will ake it ssible o e to dene thei elatioshi to thei oliticl syste oe sel csciously ad accuately
