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FORCED ETHNIC MIGRATIONS ON THE BALKANS: CONSEQUENCES AND REBUILDING OF SOCIETIES CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
22-23 February, 2005 Sofia, Bulgaria
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© Antonina Zhelyazkova, Atsuko Kawakita, Dobrinka Parusheva, Dragoljub Djordjevic, Daisuke Nagashima, Elton Skendaj, Evgenia Ivanova, Hidajet Repovac, Ibrahim Yalamov, Ilija Milcevski, Ilona Tomova, MarijanaFilipovic, Marko Hajdinjak, Moyuro Matsumae, Omer Turan, Ryoji Momose, Savcho Savchev, Skelzen Maliqi, Tetsuya Sahara, Toni Petkovic, Tsvetana Georgieva, Vassil Penev, 2006 © Tanya Kmetova, Ekaterina Popova, translators, 2006 © International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, 2006 © Meiji University, 2006
ISBN-10: 954-8872-61-7 ISBN-13: 978-954-8872-61-4
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FORCED ETHNIC MIGRATIONS ON THE BALKANS: CONSEQUENCES AN D REBUILDING OF SO CIETIES CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 22-23 February, 2005 Sofia, Bulgaria
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MINORITY STUDIES AND INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS (IMIR), SOFIA
MEIJI UNIVERSITY TOKYO
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Edited by Ekaterina Popova, Marko Hajdinjak FORCED ETHNIC MIGRATIONS IN THE BALKANS: CONSEQUENCES AND REBUILDING OF SOCIETIES Conference Proceedings
Bulgarian, First edition Format 70х100/16 Printer‘s sheets 16,5 International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations Meiji University
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CONTENTS: Tetsuya Sahara –FOREWORD.................................................................................5 Antonina Zhelyazkova – ЕDITORIAL NOTE.........................................................8 FIRST SESSION: GENERAL OVERVIEW OF BALKAN MIGRATIONS ............... 11 Tsvetana Georgieva – MIGRATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF MULTI ETHNICITY AND MULTICULTURALISM IN THE BALKANS (Bulgarian Sources)............................................................................................. 13
Tetsuya Sahara –FORCED ETHNIC MIGRATIONS AND MODERNITY IN THE BALKANS ............................................................................................. 21 Atsuko Kawakita –‘ЕXPULSION’ OF THE GERMAN POPULATION FROM ЕASTERN ЕUROPE: TOWARD OVERCOMING NEGATIVE HISTORICAL HERITAGE................................................................................ 40 Dragoljub B. Djordjevic, Marijana Filipovic –THE ROMA AND ETHNOCULTURAL JUSTICE: TOWARDS A MODEL OF INTEGRATION................................................................................................... 50 Omer Turan –TURKISH MIGRATIONS FROM BULGARIA...................... 75 Discussion ................................................................................................................. 92
..101 SECOND SESSION: THE BULGARIAN CASE: TURKS, POMAKS, AND ROMA Ibrahim Yalamov –THE ‘RENAMING’: CONSEQUENCES AND HOW TO OVERCOME THEM ................................................................................. 103
Evgenia Ivanova – THE ‘RENAMING PROCESS’ AMONG THE POMAKS: THIRTY YEARS LATER ................................................................................ 115 Ilona Tomova –MIGRATION OF ROMA IN BULGARIA............................ 122 Moyuru Matsumae –TRACES OF THE ‘RENAMING PROCESS’ AMONG POMAKS IN BULGARIA (AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR DISCOURSE) .... 136 Savcho Savchev – TEN ESSAYS FROM TODAY’S BULGARIAN JOURNALISM.................................................................................................... 140 Discussion ............................................................................................................... 152
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THIRD SESSION: FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: WAR, STATEBUILDING AND DEMOGRAPHIC FEARS ............................................................................................... 163
Marko Hajdinjak –GETTING AWAY WITH ADMINISTRATIVE MURDER: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN SLOVENIA ................................... 165 Toni Petkovic –THE CASE OF CROATIA........................................................ 176 AND WAR AND IN THE BALKANS: Dobrinka Parusheva – WOMEN UNACCOMMODATED DIFFERENCE (SOME OF) ITS SCAPEGOATS................................................................................................... 183
Ryoji Momose –DEALING WITH SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE YUGOSLAV WAR: LEARNING FROM THE LESSON OF THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN SERBIA.......................................................... 196 Daisuke Nagashima – MUSLIM NATIONALISM IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA: THE ELITELED NATIONAL MOVEMENTS AMONG BOSNIAN MUSLIMS .................................................................... 199 Hidajet Repovac – POST-DAYTON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA....... 205 Discussion................................................................................................................ 209 IV SESSION: FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: WAR, STATEBUILDING AND DEMOGRAPHIC FEARS CONTINUED................................................................ 219
Elton Skendaj ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN KOSOVA AFTER THE NATO YUGOSLAV PEACE AGREEMENT............................................................ 221 Shkelzen Maliqi – THE ISSUE OF KOSOVA AND THE MINORITIES.... 226 Vassil Penev –THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND THE FUTURE OF MULTIETHNIC SOCIETY (26 eses)........................................................................................................... 231 Ilija Milcevski – MACEDONIA BEYOND OHRID: CONFIDENCE,GUNS AND THE REFERENDUM ............................................................................ 236 Discussion................................................................................................................ 242
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FOREWORD Tetsuya Sahara Faculty of Political Sciences and Economics Meiji University, Japan Nationalist violence, which occurred aer the fall of the communist regimes, still has a strong impact on Balkan societies. Not only has violence hindered rapid economic progress, but it has also seriously decreased the chances of reconstruct ing societies through indigenous initiatives. Peoples are obliged to accept ‘guiding hands’ from without in determining their political and economic systems, social values and, even, cultural orientations. e most striking examples are Bosnia and Kosovo. ere, people cannot even decide their own political destiny by themselves, but must obey the advice of the ‘international community’ when making important political decisions. According to some critics, these are examples of contemporary colonialism in theform of paternalistic intervention in the so-called s‘ tates in bankruptcy.’ ey also represent a form of globalisation. Although globalisation is a multiplex phenomenon, a desire to impose a single standard across the world is in its nature. One of the most explicit forms of this standardisation is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It is true that the ICTY is a genuinely humanitarian institution committed to universal uj stice. e ICTY, however, also has the nature of paternalistic intervention because it seeks and follows a single standard of the international criminal code. e contradiction is clearly revealed in the difficulties that the ICTY has recently been confronted with. In the beginning, Serbs regarded it as an anti-Serb institution and did not fully support it. Conversely, Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians widely expressed their belief in the credibility of this institution. At a later stage, and in order to maintain its neutrality and credibility, the ICTY began to bring many non-Serb culprits to justice. e more it indicts non-Serbs, the less support it enjoys among Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians. We know that the basic motive for establishing the ICTY was worldwide anxiety about the practices of the so-called ‘ethnic cleansing.’ e term ‘ethnic cleansing’ became popular during the Balkan ethnic wars in the 1990s. e practice of ethnic cleansing, however, is not a recent invention. at is why there are intense debates among the Balkan peoples about defining the term and criminal nature of the phenomenon. As the ICTY cases clearly show, Bosniaks and Croats tend to understand the term as exclusively applicable to the Serb atrocities, and try to defend the misdeeds
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of their colleagues as heroic deeds of national emancipation. On the other hand, Serbs exaggerate the srcin of the practices as an invention of the Ustasha regime during the Second World War, and seek to justify their atrocities as inevitable acts of self-defence. ere is a common pattern of thinking in the two cases. It we take into consideration the fact that the perpetrators usually equate the practices of ethnic cleansing with the struggles for ‘national emancipation,’ it will not sound strange to say that the phenomena have their roots in the perception of the nation state. In other words, ethnic cleansing has been part and parcel of Balkan nationalism. Indeed, there are many precedents in modern Balkan history. e Serb uprising in 1804–13, the Hellenic revolution in 1821–30, the Russo-Turkish war and the Bulgarian liberation in 1877–78, the Balkan Wars in 1912–13: all of these great historical events were accompanied by mass expulsion of indigenous (mainly Muslim) population. e Macedonian struggle at the turn of the twentieth century or war atrocities during the two world wars, all saw ‘fratricidal’ battles among the Balkan peoples. Population transfer on a mass scale was repeated, usually aer ethnic wars, but also during ‘peacetime,’ as we can see in the Bulgarian ‘Renaming Process.’e systematic destruction of historical monuments of other nationalities and elimination of their traces has been a quite ordinary practice in this region since at least the beginning of the nineteenth century. e fact that Balkan history abounds with examples of ethnic atrocities also suggests that there must have been many endeavours to reconstruct the societies destroyed by ethnic violence. So, we can find some hints for solving contemporary problems in the past experiences. And we believe they will be a good substitute for the universal justice from without in reconstructing a multiethnic society and peaceful coexistence. e main purpose of the studies contained in this volume is to share information concerning society-building efforts aer ethnic violence and to discuss meaningful devices to prevent the repetition of nationalist destruction. With this purpose in mind, scholars from the Balkans, together with Western European and Japanese specialists, assembled in Sofia and spent two days in discussions. In order to avoid any emotional misunderstanding, we dared not use theterm ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a key notion. Instead, we tried to use a more conclusive and less provoking term: forced ethnic migration. Both terms have a common feature as they connect a particular territory with a particular ethnicity. Although not all the participants agreed to understand forced ethnic migration as a synonym of ethnic cleansing, we are sure that there was a consensus that made the workshop functional. us, this volume is the product of many people’s interest and collaboration. And this study has a wider significance than I have tried to point out here. is is a rare collection of the endeavours of Balkan specialists. I do not think it is easy to meet and to discuss deliberately such a delicate theme for the people living in the region, even for specialists. I am grateful to those who participated in the 2005 workshop in Sofia for their splendid contributions and self-restraint efforts to achieve a common goal. It was a real academic collaboration.
Foreword
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I am particularly grateful to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for its generous financial support without which this enterprise would not have been possible. I am also grateful to the staff of the IMIR and the Institute for Human Science at Meiji University for their self-sacrificing efforts. I hope this will be the first step in the attempt to internationalise Balkan studies both from within and without. September 2005
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EDITORIAL NOTE Antonina Zhelyazkova International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR), Bulgaria e present volume is a result of an interesting cooperation – between two groups of scholars specialised in Balkan studies. Japanese experts from the Tokyobased Meiji University met and discussed relevant issues with their colleagues from various Bulgarian institutions, such as the International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR), the St. Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia, the Institute for Balkan Studies,and New Bulgarian University. Prof. Tetsuya Sahara from Meiji University made the initial proposal for a scientific conference to Prof. Antonina Zhelyazkova, Director of IMIR. Aer numerous telephone and e-mail discussions and a few brainstorming sessions attended by Prof. Sahara in Sofia, Prof. Sahara and Prof. Zhelyazkova outlined, with the help of suggestions and input from Prof. Ekaterina Nikova of the Institute for Balkan Studies, the programme of a conference with the title ‘Forced Ethnic Migrations on the Balkans: Consequences and Rebuilding of Societies.’ e conference was held in Sofia in February 2005 and was hosted by IMIR. e event itself, as is the present pub lication, was completely financed by Meiji University as part of their long-term project for research and internationalisation of Balkan studies. IMIR has fieen years of experience in international scholarly cooperation and in organising similar conferences and round tables devoted to topics such as minorities, Islam, and Balkan and Mediterranean studies. For this reason, we were very impressed by the different approach of our Japanese partners. As IMIR’s Director, and on behalf of the Bulgarian and other Balkan participants (from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey), I want to express our deepest gratitude to Meiji University and personally to Prof. Sahara. Our cooperation was absolutely free from formalities and bureaucratic obstacles and was – so untypicalfor our previous experience – based on unquestionable trust in the given word. For a brief, but most pleasant period of time, the IMIR experts and administrative staff entered a world where words meant more than papers and where promises were more binding than signatures. We sincerely hope that this new atmosphere we experienced (our Japanese colleagues, too, had the chance toexperience Balkan ‘curiosities’) – an atmosphere of joint rationalisation of forced ethnic migrations in the history of the Balkan Peninsula – was
Editorial note
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only the beginning of long-term cooperation in researching and popularising various topics related to the Balkan and Mediterranean regions. e issue of forced transfers of populations belonging to different ethnic and religious communities is painful and very much alive, regardless of how far back in time those transfers might have occurred. When our team of experts was conducting interviews in refugee camps during and aer the Kosovo crisis, we were well aware of the fact that some of us, too, are descended from people who had been refugees in the previous century, and that we were preserving a mythologyand family traditions srcinating in those times. Just like a few years earlier in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we were witnessing the formation of new groups of refugees. eir future was uncertain. What was certain was that new feelings of victimisation and new myths were emerging and growing among them – and, quite possibly, also a thirst for revenge. e fate of a single country, Bulgaria, can illustrate the scale of Balkan population transfers. In the period from the 1878 Liberation to World War II, more than 800,000 refugees from Turkish and Greek race, from Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia, from Northern Dobrudzha, from the Western Outlands,1 from Romania and Banat, and from Bessarabia came to Bulgaria. In the same period, 950,000 people le Bulgaria. More than half of them were Turks, the others being Greeks, Bulgarians, etc. An overall picture of forced migrations on the Balkans, illustrated with a number of charts and graphs, was presented at the conference by Prof. Ivan Ilchev. Unfortunately, his busy schedule prevented Prof. Ilchev from preparing his paper for this public ation. e same holds for Prof. Akira Usuki, who attracted much interest with his comparative perspective on forced population transfers in Israel and Palestine. e purpose of the conference was not limited to discussing the history of forced migrations on the Balkans, caused by wars, peace treaties or contemporary policies of assimilation and local forms of apartheid. Driven by the positive approach of our Japanese partners, the main purpose of the conference became to rationalise those processes and above all, to discuss the possibilities for reconstruction of conflict-torn societies. is purpose was partly achieved, mainly thanks to the contribution of our Japanese colleagues and two colleagues from Germany and the UK. e transcripts of the discussions held aer each session of paper presentations are quite telling: scholars from the Balkan countries are still guided by emotions when discussing events from the recent and not-so-recent past. e organisers expected that the discussion about the so-called ‘Renaming Process’2 would be relatively uneventful, considering that almost two decades have Territories lost to Serbia aer World War I (Editor’s note). eprocessofforcedassimilationofBulgarianMuslimminoritiesisknowninBulgarian language as vuzroditelen proces. It is a bit difficult to translate this term adequately into English and various authors have been using various options. Most oenvuzroditelen proces is translated as the regeneration process, the rebirth process or the revival process. e rationale behind the process and its Bulgarian name was that the Bulgarian nation-state had to ‘explain’ to 1 2
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passed since then. However, this discussion turned out to be just as ‘hot’ as the debates on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Clearly, not only scholars but also Balkan societies are in need of accurate analyses of these events – analyses based on srcinal, archived sources. e academic community is continuing to look for answers to the questions ‘why did the violence occur,’ ‘could the ethnic cleansing have been prevented and the casualties avoided,’ and especially to the intrusive question that cannot be answered: Who is to blame – is it us or is it somebody from the outside? e success of the conference and, hopefully, of this publication is largely due to the unique meeting between scholars from Balkan countries and Japan. Despite their different academic background, different experience and different viewpoints, these scholars have common academic interests and speak a common academic language. One of the major achievements of this cooperation was also the opportunity the conference offered to young scholars specialising in Balkan studies to present their own research, but also their political views about the events in question. A number of young scholars from Albania, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Japan distinguished themselves at the conference, demonstrating not only their maturity as researchers but also presenting a detached, objective opinion about the past and the future of the region.
the Bulgarian Muslims who they really were and help them regain their ‘true’ identity of ethnic Bulgarians. e Bulgarian Muslims were seen as living in some sort of group oblivion and they had to be born again. To achieve this, they were forced to change their names and abandon their religious beliefs. For the purposes of clarity and consistency, we have decided to use the term “renaming process” in this publication, and we have thus edited all the papers and discussions, published in this volume, substituting the terms “regeneration process” and “revival process” with “renaming process.” (Editor’s note)
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First Session:
General Overview of Balkan Migrations
Moderators: Prof. Hidajet Repovac Prof. Antonina Zhelyazkova
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MIGRATIONS I N T HE HI STORY OF MULTIE THNICITY AND MULTICULTURALISM IN THE BALKANS BULGARIAN SOURCES Tsvetana Georgieva Sofia University ‘St. Kliment Ohridski,’ Bulgaria e history of multiethnicity and multiculturalism in Bulgaria is too complex and too long to be reconstructed in one paper, be it plenary or not. Moreover, this history is not a specific Bulgarian phenomenon – it is a variant of an all-Balkan model of coexistence and confrontation between Christians and Muslims who have shared a common space for many generations. In the course of the history of their conflictsand contacts, modern history included, considerable experience has been acquired, and this experience must be analysed and rationalised impartially, beyond the immediate conjuncture. In this paper I shall attempt to draw attention to the migrations and migratory movements in the Ottoman Balkans. I shall do so not only to address the general topic of the conference, but also because these migrations are a key element in the formation and manifestations of contemporary multiethnicity and multiculturalism on the peninsula. e sources information on which this paper is based on refer predominantly to territories, which under the Ottoman rule Bulgarians considered to be theirs, despite sharing part of them with other Balkan ethnoses and above all witha large Turkic population. Contemporary historiography explains the ‘Ottomanisation’ of the Balkans as a result of the mass colonisation by Asian Minor newcomers and a long period of islamization of the local Christian population. e outcome of the initial stage of ‘Ottomanisation’ of the peninsula at the end of the fourteenth century is relatively clear. More obscure is the course the process followed later. is is most accurately described by O. L. Barkan, who compares the settlement of theTurkmen nomads to billiard balls rolling across the Balkans. ese balls quickly found their pockets in the depopulated plains and fields. Given the present-day level of information, this metaphorical description will probably be used for a long time as a point of departure in the study of the migratory processes during the Ottoman conquest. e reason for that is not only that source information is scarce. is description is also readily accepted by the majority of Balkan and Turkish historians. For Balkan historians it is an irrefutable proof of the tragedy that the conquered local population had to live through. Turkish historians use it as a no less conclusive proof of the might of the early Ottoman state.
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e picture of the rearrangement of the ethnic map of the Balkans during the fourteenth and the first half of the fieenth centuries is supplemented by the scarce data on the deportation of the Balkan population to Asia Minor and the settlement of war prisoners from the western part of the peninsula and from the Hungarian territories in the gazibey mülks (properties). e conclusion is that in the course of the Ottoman invasion the Balkans were flooded by a huge wave of migration, which scholars believe had the force of a destructive demographic tsunami. Data from the Ottoman tax registers from the middle and the second half of the fieenth century cast doubt on this thesis. ese data suggest a stable network of settlements on Bulgarian territory, which was the first one to be subjected to the Turkic invasion and parallel colonisation. e earliest data from the mid-fieenth century categorically document a relatively mass presence of Muslims predominantly in the eastern part of the Bulgarian lands. ese Muslims were mostly Asian Minor colonists. According to calculations of R. Kovatchev, in the last decades of the fieenth century there were 2,360 Muslim rayah households in the Nikopol sanjak (administrative district), amounting to 14% of its population. ere were only six Muslim villages in the Sofia kaza (district in the Ottoman Empire), but no Muslims were found in the remaining 125 registeredvillages. Muslims in the Vidin sanjak were registered only in the cities and the castles. e registers from the sixteenth century show a smooth rise in the number of Muslims in the western part of the Bulgarian lands. ey had increased to 26% of the population in the Pashasanjak. At the beginning of the century the number of Muslims in the Sofia sanjak remained small, approximately 6% of the population. By the end of the century, however, it had grown to 18%, with Muslims living in twenty-one exclusively Muslim and forty-two mixed villages. In the mid-sixteenth century‘the wide nomad front,’ described by A. Ostrovski in the space between the Gulf of Orfanou (on the Halkidiki peninsula near essaloniki) and the Rhodope Mountains, extended to the north of the Danube River and to the west of the Ogosta River. e influx of Turkic nomads at the beginning of the sixteenth century was intensified by a second wave of colonisation, considerably smaller in terms of both size and scope, known assurgun. is was a coercive colonisation of the Asian Minor Alevi, organised by the state under the rule of the sultans Selim I (1512-20) and Suleyman I (1520-66). It was concentrated mainly in the region of Dobrudzha. e organised and spontaneous settlements in Rumelia of people coming from Anatolia during the fieenth and sixteenth centuries provided a considerable demographic resource for the Muslim population. is large population was maintained during the following centuries mainly by the Islamization of Balkan Christians and war prisoners from regions neighbouring the Ottoman Empire. A new wave of Muslim immigrants came at the end of the seventeenth and the very beginning of the eighteenth century. is time Muslims came from the Hungarian territories that the Ottoman Empire had lost. is migratory wave has remained outside the scope of interest of researchers. However, this does not mean that the wave did not affect the ethno-demographic situation in the Balkans over the next centuries.
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e first migratory waves of Muslim, mostly Turkic and Tatar people, in the Balkans during the fi eenth and sixteenth centuries are the traditional explanation for the Ottomanisation of the peninsula that changed its demographic picture in all aspects – ethnic, religious and cultural. Undoubtedly, this assertion holds for a large part of the Balkan towns in which the Muslim population had grown sharply. e town of Plovdiv is a classical example: in the year 1516, 1,034 households were registered there, of which 879 were Muslim, 88 were Christian, 35 Roma and 32 were recent Jewish settlers. e ratio of one to ten in favour of the Muslims demonstrates categorically the total ‘Ottomanisation’ of Plovdiv. A similar, though less intense, process also took place in the smaller urban centres – such as Samokov, where in 1569 the Muslim households were 215 against 178 Christian households. A reverse process occurred in the demographic situation in villages. More than 75% of all villages were exclusively Christian, and about 15% were mixed. In these villages the number of registered ‘sons of Abdullah’ and freed slaves suggests that a considerable part of them were first-generation Muslims. However, the presence of numerous Turkic and non-Koranic names in the registers shows clearly thatsettled Turkic people constituted a significantpercentage. Undoubtedly, Asian Minor settlers were registered in hundreds of Muslim villages that had from one to five households. e registrars point out explicitly that they were to a large extent yuruks (nomads). In the fieenth century the yuruks were concentrated in the eastern regions, but during the sixteenth century they took over also some western territories, includingthe Vidin and Kyustendilsanjaks. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the number ofyuruks decreased considerably, with some of them disappearing altogether and others settling in villages of twenty or more households. For Bulgarian historiography this change isone of the proofs of an intensive process of Islamization that is documented through the number of registered Muslims who identified themselves as ‘sons of Abdullah’ – that is, Islamic neophytes. I would like to draw attention to the Muslim and mixed villages, which were found in the registers dating back to the end of the fieenth century. In the light of cultural anthropology, these villages were the places of direct contact between two quite different civilisational models – the model of the settled Christians and that of the near-nomad Muslims from Asia Minor. In fact, an extremely important cultural transformation of the descendants of the Muslim colonists had taken place in such villages not only in the Bulgarian lands but also in the Balkans at large. It is a well known fact that by the end of the sixteenth century – that is, in about one century – a large part of the nomads had dispersed, the majority of them settling as farmers. e inhabitants of almost all registered Muslim and mixed villages were granted the status ofrayah or, in other words, of productive and tax-paying population. e nature of the registered rayah’s taxable production was identical to that of the neighbouring Christian villages. To illustrate, I shall give as an example the situation in eighteen Muslim villages, which, according to the 1479 register, had almost completely encircled the old Bulgarian capital of Turnovo. e registrar explicitly mentions that these Muslim villages were new – that is, they were non-existent in the old registers. e total number of their Muslim
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households was 364. e men who were household heads had predominantly Turkic names, such as Aydan, Turalı, Hisar bey and Göçeri. Koran-related are the names mainly of forty-two household heads and unmarried men, whose second name is ‘son of Abdullah,’ and the names of eighteen freed slaves. I am drawing attention to the fact that about 16% of the inhabitants of these new villages were first-generation Muslims because, in my opinion, by sharing their production experience with their fellow-villagers they had facilitated the transformation of the nomads into settled farmers. e change is categorically proven by the taxable products of the localrayah: wheat, barley, rye, millet, and beehives. e only difference in the tax register of the Muslim village of Avcılar and the neighbouring Christi an village of Dimcha are the fieen buckets of must and the tax on swine levied from the Christians in the second village. In the sixteenth century, dozens of Muslim villages had to pay taxes on vineyards and on must. e fact that the descendants of the Asian Minor nomads had mastered the local farming practices proves that they had adapted to the local conditions and to the farming activities in the Balkans, by mastering the centuries-old production practices of the Balkan population. It may be added that this process was bilateral, although not completely equivalent in terms of its parameters. e fact that in a similar register from the Kyustendil sanjak from the sixteenth century two thirds of the rice growers in the Strumitsa region are Christian is significant enough. eir skills in growing rice, unknown till the Ottoman conquest, mean that they had learned from the Muslim colonists. Metodija Sokoloski has found that in the midsixteenth century there was an intensive wave of settlement by theyuruks – a name given to the nomads in the Ottoman registers. is process was directed and implemented by the central authorities, which had made numerous efforts to place the nomads under administrative control, but the real transformation of the nomads into farmers occurred through their contacts with the local population and by learning how to grow the local crops. e result was a type of farming common to Christians and Muslims, which blurred the sharpest edges of their cultural differences. It is the point of intersection on which their compatibility was built, since both on the everyday and social levels Christians and Muslims turned out to have similar interests and to face similar threats in their personal lives. is process was neither short-lived nor void of problems. Dozens of Ottoman documents provide evidence of court cases between Christians and Muslims over land plot disputes and the common land between neighbouring villages. But the number of such cases among Muslims or among Christians only was not lower. Essentially, these conflicts were economic, not civilisational. e transformation of the colonised nomads into settled farmers had created the conditions for the existence of the system ofkomşuluk (the spirit of neighbourhood) between people of different origins and religions. With its strict rules, this system regulated everyday life and transformed the mutually acknowledged otherness into a familiar, recognised difference. ere was a ritual exchange of sacred food during the major religious festivals between neighbours of different religions, and a mandatory
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participation of representatives of the other religion in the key rites of passage (weddings, births, burials). Respect for the different communities was demonstrated in everyday contacts. Respect was a mandatory requirement and its violation could threaten order and the expectations of both communities. In a cultural anthropological aspect the komşuluk system proved to be not only a link connecting the cultural traditions of Christians and Muslims, but also a chain of their mental attitudes and standards of behaviour. Eventually, it also le an imprint on the scale of Christian values where compromise proved to be more valuable than conflict. rough this system the Muslim and Christian notions of good and evil became closer despite the contradictions embedded in their primary cultural models. ere were other types of migratory movements, documented in the Ottoman registers, which furthered this development. ese movements can be defined as local displacements of the population from one village to another and from village to town. ey were recorded in all detailed registers, which listed the names of the household heads, the unmarried men, and widows in every settlement. As a rule, the registrars recorded the changes in the population number using the hackneyed terms ‘runaway’ and ‘newcomer’ as additional qualifiers. Very frequently the two definitions for migrants (‘runaway’ and ‘newcomer’) are found simultaneously in one and the same settlement in different ratios. ere are hundreds of examples of such individual migrations. e 1445–1446 register of the village of Polovyane, Sofia district, offers an example of the village-to-neighbouring-town movement. e registrar wrote that 32 out of 124 complete and 24 widow rayah households had settled in the nearby city of Sofia. is implies that one fih of the inhabitants of Polovyane had le the village and had become urban residents. ere were individual resettlements from one village to another all over the country, though not on such a large scale. A detailed register from the year 1501 for the Nikopolsanjak shows that there were four newcomers, all of them non-Muslim, in the village of Bela. In the village of Vulchetrun there were four newcomers too, but they were all Muslim. In the village of Vishegrad there were six persons, three of them Muslim, who had ur n away. In the village of Trumbezhki Izvor there were five newcomers, unmarried Christians, and one of the old villagers had run away. A similar register from 1515–1516 for the Samokov nahiye (neighbourhood, community) records five runaways and three newcomers in the village of Mehomie (now the town of Razlog). ese constant internal movements all over the country were well known to the authorities, who legalised them by entering the changes inthe registers. eindividual migrations provide solid arguments against the traditional thesis concerning the serf status of the productive rural population in the Ottoman Balkans. e massive migration all over the country shows that the central authorities had transferred the responsibility for agricultural production and tax collection to thespahi (Ottoman landlord). Obviously, they were not particularly concerned with exercising direct control over the population. rough legislation the central authorities guaranteed the right of peasants to legalise their new place of residence fieen years, and in some cases ten years, aer
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leaving the village where they were srcinally registered. In practice, however, the place of residence became legal aer the first registration at the new place. Since such migrations occurred all over the country, individual resettlements became a second type of local migration. Present-day studies define them as ‘flight’ of the inhabitants of whole villages, who le their homes. If we take even a single register from the Skopje region, we will find resettlement of four villages: Barevo was completely deserted; Bobovo was destroyed in a flood and its rayah were registered in other villages; the inhabitants of the village of Dryanovo had ‘taken to flight’; so had the peasants from the village of Yarovo. ese collective resettlements of entire peasant communities were rarer than individual migrations, but their occurrence in many registers supports the assumption that they were a permanent factor. In many cases they were not flights in an unknown direction – the registrar duly records the new settlement. A register for the vilayet (province of the Ottoman Empire) of Nevrokop notes that the village of Ponikovo was le uninhabited because its rayah had resettled in the village of Kochan. A register from 1501 for the Nikopolsanjak reports that the inhabitants of the village of Pavlitsi lived in the village of Devlyani, and that therayah from the village of Kozarevo had moved to the village of Konarevo. e list of similar examples can be extended almost indefinitely. ey were recorded in the Ottoman registers for the purpose of correcting the size of a giventimar (fief) rather than facilitating modern studies; that is why it is very hard to set the record straight as to the intensity, direction or cause of these collective local migrations. In contemporary Bulgarian historiography they are used as an example of ‘the difficult situation of the Bulgarian people under Turkish yoke’ or they are interpreted as a mechanism through whichrayah, be it Christian or Muslim, was able to reduce its tax burden to a bearable level. e second thesis is proved by documents showing threats of massive flights of rayah from villages, which directly served the Sultan’s Court or the central authorities. Such is the caseof the village of Dragobrashte in the Kochannahiye (neighbourhood), which was included in the Sultan’s hassas (properties). Its inhabitants were obligated to keep in their houses wine produced for the Sultan’s Court. Against this additional obligation they demanded to be relieved of regular taxes, threatening to run away if their demand was not met. Aer long negotiations, as we would say today, their additional taxes were abolished and they agreed to pay onlyispenç (species of small poultry), and of the regular taxes – only a fixed sum of money instead of the tithe on wheat and a tax on the sheep. e Dragobrashte peasants did not run away secretly. ey even warned the authorities about their intentions and clearly formulated their economic demands. In the same year, 1573, the inhabitants of thevillages of Karageltsi and Nikushel, who were defending the Kratovo Pass, ‘ran away’ without notice. eyscatteredamong the neighbouring villages, aer which travelling through Skopska Crna Gora1 became 1 A region north of Skopje, located along the present border between Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo (Editor’s note)
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very difficult. ‘Out of necessity’ and following an order issued by the Sultan, the local authorities had to trace them, return them to their villages and – in compensation for their obligations to defend thedervent (the pass) – relieve them of all taxes. By the mid-seventeenth century the flight of entire villages had become the number one problem for the Ottoman fiscal system. Dozens of documents issued by the central authorities demand tracking down and returning the rayah to villages in order to ensure the collection ofçiziye (poll-tax) and avarız (extraordinary tax), i.e. taxes collected by the cen tral government. at the situation was critical is evidenced by a Sultan’s fırman (decree) from 1672, which states the total inability of the authorities to collect çiziye in twenty villages in the kaza of Huzurgrad (Razgrad), since eleven villages had moved out and the inhabitants of the remaining nine villages had refused to appear before the kadi (judge) court – they had set their houses on fire and run away. e documents of the local authorities show that this was a migration process that could not be controlled. e authorities found out that the tax-paying population had decreased due to a plague epidemic and the resettlement of the peasants in farms or vakıf (bequeathed property for charity purposes) settlements. e population demanded tax cuts for separate villages and entire kazas. e central authorities responded by ordering the rayah to be turned back from the ‘small towns, villages and influential people’s farms.’ e information provided by the local administration frequently supports these findings. In a 1660 petition by the non-Muslim rayah of the kasaba (small town) of Turnovo and itskaza for a çiziye tax cut, it is pointed out that forty families from the town and several hundreds of families from the adjacent villages had resettled in the vakıf village of Arnautköy (present-day Arbanasi). In a document from 1659 with the same content, signed by a clerk in the local fiscal administration, it is claimed that the rayah that had le the Turnovo kaza had resettled in Yambol, and in the villages of the samekaza and those around Stara Zagora, Nova Zagora and present-day Alexandroupolis. Christians and Muslims from the Nevrokop kaza had migrated in the same direction, namely towards the racian Plain. Most probably this process was related to the spread of the landowners’ farms, around which large new villages appeared. In the Ruse region alone, eight new villages with more than forty households were founded around private land properties at the beginning of the seventeenth century. At the same time, about one in ten villages in the Marica River valley had in their kadi provide names the word ‘farm.’ A series of sultan’s orders addressed to the Vidin evidence about the intensive resettlements of peasants across the Danube River in both directions. Some of the documents ordered that the peasants who had fled to the north of the Danube be made to come back. Other documents ordered the inclusion of the settlers from Wallachia, who had gone into hiding from the owners of thevakıfs, timars (fiefs) and farms, in the list of the tax-paying rayah. In Bulgarian historiography these spontaneous migrations are usually used as evidence of an intensive process of Islamization, since they were found mainly in the
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çiziye records. e more comprehensive database containing information from the avarız deers (register lists) indicates that the Muslim population was also actively involved in the migrations. e direct consequences of these spontaneous displacements were a denser network of villages in the plains and a growing urban population. ey transcended the local and regional level and intensified the multiethnic relations in the entire Balkan Peninsula. Evliya Çelebi’s travel notes give a relative idea about their parameters. According to him, in the city of Plovdiv the infidels were Bulgarians and Greeks. In the city of
Belgrade people spoke Turkish, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Bosnian. In Elbasan there were Bulgarian and Greek infidels, in essaloniki people spoke Turkish, Greek, Jewish, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Albanian. Documents from the next centuries show that the chaotic migrations did not severely disrupt the settlement network, which means that the depopulation recorded in the seventeenth-century registers was temporary. Many of the villages that existed in the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries have survived to this very day. By seeking compromise solutions and introducing some reforms in the tax collection system, the Empire succeeded in restricting, within possible limits, the chaotic migration but it could not stop it altogether. Conversely, the movement of individuals and groups of the population on a local and regional scale is considered to be a sustainable solid component of Balkan reality and a way out from extreme situations. Undoubtedly, behind the resettlements of individuals and masses there are countless cases of outburst of violence and thousands of human dramas. But over the centuries these migrations from places of birth and from one’s own ethnic environment have markedcountless intersections ofmultiethnic contacts. ey have evolved into a permanent network transmitting everydaylife standards, moral attitudes and spiritual values between thedifferent communities. Ultimately, they have created the common Balkan world. Despite all the efforts of the Balkan people themselves and of many external factors, this Balkan world is perceived by the non-Balkan people, and even more so by ourselves, as a mutually related human community, whose main distinctive features are multiethnicity and multiculture.
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FORCED ETHNIC MIGRATIONS AND MODERNITY IN THE BALKANS Tetsuya Sahara Faculty ofMeiji Political SciencesJapan and Economics University, Migration is one of the central issues of the modern Balkan history.e basic ethnic composition of today’s Balkan states is virtually a product of migration in the one-hundred year long period from the beginning of the nineteenth tothe first quarter of the twentieth century. e essence of this migration can be described as ethnic homogenisation within the borders of the Balkan states. While it was common to find several religious, linguistic, and cultural groups living together in one single region until the eighteenth century, today the ethnic landscape has changed drastically. Although it is true that the Balkan states still have a complicated ethnic structure, they have by far much simpler ethnic entities than they did in the eighteenth century. It was the displacements of division. ethnic groups that brought aboutonthe transition from ethnic mixture to ethnic is paper concentrates thedrastic migration process in the modern Balkans and attempts to elucidate the framework of a comparative study. Migration is a broad notion that comprises all kinds of movement of places of living that humans make. Families and individuals can migrate either by their own will or against their will. Although the demarcation line between free-will migrations and those forced against their will is not well-defined, the extreme circumstance in the latter case can be described as an intentional and systematic forced migration perpetrated by the state. e most typical example is the exchange of population based on the mutual agreement of governments. Next in importance to this extreme case are those types of forced migrations that make people emigrate because of intentional deterioration of living conditions either prescribed or sanctioned by the state or non-government bodies. We can point out cases where people decide to flee because of the destruction of the political order. Some social scientists argue that a human being naturally seeks to live in an ethnically homogenous milieu. Ordinary people, however, will more than likely want to remain in the place where they have established their living base for a long time. It is not a natural consequence that families or individuals who have enjoyed more or less tolerable living conditions will suddenly decide to migrate to another place and start a new life. us, the majority of the migration processes that have resulted in the ethnic transformation of the modern Balkans seem to have occurred against the will of the
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migrants. is author calls these movements of population forced ethnic migration. A forced ethnic migration is a type of compulsory migration in which members of a particular ethnic group, or those other than the members of a particular ethnic group, are forced to emigrate from certain geographic regions by reason of persecution based on their specific ethnicity.
Forced Migrations Before the Modern Period ere have been constant flows of population in the Balkans since ancient times. Even before the nineteenth century, some types of migrations could have been classified as forced migrations organised and directed by the state. e sürgün, or the state oriented population transfer during the Ottoman period, may be the most famous example of a pre-modern compulsory migration. esürgün stemmed from an old Islamic tradition. e most typical sürgün was to bring Anatolian Turkic Muslims into newly conquered Balkan land and settle them on particular sites. People were transferred in groups, and sometimes even entire communities were moved. From the fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries this type of population transfer frequently took place, and resulted in the formation of many settlements in the Balkans. us,migrations changed the ethnic composition of the regions.1 In addition, the sürgün was not limited to the Muslim population. Christians and Jews were massively transferred on state order too. For example, Sultan Mehmed II deported Balkan Jews to repopulate Istanbul aer the conquest of the city.2 e motives for the sürgün policy were primarily economic. Although these communities suffered harsh times both during and aer deportation, the population transfers were not intended to be punitive measures. Contrary to the modern deportations, which were designed to make the region ethnically homogenous, thesürgün practices tended to bring about an ethnic mixture. e settlements of Anatolian Turkic Muslims among the Christian population, together with their effect on the conversion of the local population, created multi-ethnic/religious landscapes. ere is a debate on the historical characteristics of sürgün. While Turkish scholars tend to emphasise the aspect of state initiatives and planning, Antonina Zhelyazkova assumes that the process was largely spontaneous and not state-controlled. In this paper, the author dares to take the Turkish stance because a comparative study needs simplification. In truth,the author is not in 1
a position to judge this debate. It is beyond the goals of our discussion here. Whethersürgün the was state-controlled or spontaneous, it is clear that the state did not have a desire to make the territory ethnically pure. As for classic research on the sürgün, see Lütfi Barkan, Ömer. ‘Osmanli Imparatorlugunda bir iskân ve koloni zasyon metodu olarak sürgünler,’Istanbul Üniversitesi Iktisat Fakültesi mecmuasi,11 (1949–50), pp. 524–559, 13 (1951–52), pp. 56–78, 15 (1953–54), pp. 209– 237. See also Zhelyazkova, Antonina. 2002. ‘Islamization in the Balkans as a Historiographical Problem: e Southeast-European Perspective,’ in Adanir, F., & S. Faroqhi (eds.). e Ottomans and the Balkans, A Discussion of Historiography , Brill: Leiden, pp. 223–266. 2 Rodrigue, Aron. 1995.e Jews in the Balkans, Blackwell: London, p. 5.
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During Ottoman times it was very rare, even exceptional, that a migration would change the ethnic composition of a certain region in favour of a specific ethnic group. Such cases were not organised by the state in peacetime, but they did happen during or aer wars or other political disorder during which the central government temporarily lost control over a particular region. e famous ‘great emigration’ of Serbs that occurred in 1690 is claimed to have drastically changed the ethnic composition of Kosovo.3 However, this emigration was a by-effect of the Austro-Ottoman War, and the initiative for the former came from the local Serb community.
Modern Migration Aer the seventeenth century, the sürgün population transfers almost disappeared, and disorganised deportations or refugee-type migrations increased only gradually. e central government lost control over most of the Balkan provinces. e emergence of local Muslim notables and their struggle for power accelerated the deterioration of the social order. e increase of activities by the bandits ( hayduks, kirdzalis, and klephts) endangered the lives of all peasants regardless of religion. All those factors eventually contributed to the increase of migration. From the nineteenth century onward, however, a new type of mass migration began toappear. e characteristics of this new type were as follows: it was caused by massive popular violence; the violence was ethnically motivated; and the perpetrators attacked all members of other ethnic groups. From the end of the eighteenth century onwards, the Balkans experienced a drastic increase in civil wars: provincial uprisings, revolts of feudal lords, and clashes between local armed groups. ese civil wars were divided into two patterns; one was waged by Muslims against Muslims, and the other was waged by Christians against Muslims.4 During the 1820s and 1830s, the government of Sultan Mahmud II made great effort to control the unruly ayans (Muslim notables). e Sultan organised a series of military campaigns to the unruly provinces such as Bosnia,Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania, and finally succeeded in bringing rebel Muslim landlords under control.5 3 ere is a classical work on the theme. See Popović, Dušan. 1954. Velika seoba Srba 1690: Srbi seljaci i plemici, Belgrade: Srpska Književna Zadruga. 4 ere were also cases in which Muslim warlords attacked the Christian population. ese military activities were usually short-term operations, and should be categorised as pillage. 5 On the nature of Sultan Mahmud’s ayanpolicy, see Karpat, Kemal. 1973. An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Class, from Millet to Nations, Princeton: Centre of International Studies Research Monograph, p. 87; on the Ottoman campaigns to Bosnia and Kosovo, see:Istorija Srpskog naroda. 1981. Vol. 5, part 1, Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, pp. 227–232; on the Campaigns to Albanian lands, see Skendi, Stavro. 1967. e Albanian National Awakening, 1878–1912, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 23.
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e campaigns of the Ottoman government did produce groups of refugees, but they cannot be regarded as massive ethnic migrations. On the contrary, it was the Christian revolts against the Ottoman authority that in many cases directly caused a drastic change in the ethnic composition of the region. Even before the nineteenth century, the Christian population frequently stood up for arming against the Ottomans when war between the Empire and the Christian states broke out. However, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the growing number of Christian revolts were organised on the initiative of the local Christian population. e mass migration caused by the Christian revolts usually victimised the Muslim population. e Ottoman government, although not at all immune to the suppression and retaliation, never took measures regarding the mass transfer of the Christian population to get rid of the unruly provinces. Rather, the Ottomans sought to appease the Christian discontent and gave more autonomy to Christians, as we can see in the case of Morea aer the 1775 uprising and Sumadia aer the Kotin war. 6 However, the Christian rebels did not respond in kind and were very harsh toward the Muslim population. e Christian warriors mercilessly massacred Muslims and Jews both in the first Serbian uprising of 1804–13 and during the Greek Revolution of 1821–30. In both cases, many perpetrators were recruited from the ranks of ordinary Christian peasants; thus, the battle took on the characteristics of ‘neighbours at war.’ It is misguided, however, if one assumes that these events were the outcome of religious hatred. It is true that many of the victims in those two events were linguistically the same people as the perpetrators. Christian Serb peasants attacked Slavic Muslims who spoke the same dialect. Greek revolutionaries killed Hellenic Muslims and destroyed all the Islamic symbols. Yet the basic motive for the violence was not simply religious, but rather srcinated in nationalistic sentiment. e Serbian rebels waged battle only against the Dahijas (the Muslim outlaws who challenged the Sultan’s authority and oppressed the Serbian peasants) and their allies during the first stage of the uprising. 7 e rebels kept a good relationship with other Muslims and even sought an alliance with themfor the battle with theDahijas.8 It was not until 1807 that Serbs began indiscriminate attacks against the non-Serb population. It is interesting to examine what brought about this change in attitude. In 1807, the Serb leaders decided to side with Russia in the war against the Ottomans, and to 6 Panterlić, Dušan. 1949. Beogradski pašaluk pred prvi srpski ustanak, 1794–1804, Belgrade: SANU. 7 Novaković, Stojan. 1904. Ustanak na dahije 1804: ocena izvora, karakter ustanka, vojevanje 1804, Belgrade: Državna štamparija. 8 Mateja Nenadović describes the good relationship between Serb warriors and the ‘Turks’ (in fact, Slavic Muslims) during the first phase of the uprising in his memoirs. See Nenadović, Mateja. 1969. e Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenadovic (edited and translated by Lovett Edwards), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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build up their own independent state. e leaders started to claim that they were the heirs of the medieval Serbian state, and raised the flag of the Nemanjić dynasty. e incident shows that the emergence of Serbian nationalism set the stage for the atrocities against ordinary Muslims. e Greek Revolution was more nationalistic from the very beginning. e acts of the revolutionaries thus were defined by a nationalist strategy. Within two months of the start of the revolution, Greeks had succeeded in forcing the Ottoman army to retreat behind the walls of several port cities. en, Greeks started an attack on almost all the Muslim peasants who still remained in the countryside. ey killed Muslims regardless of age or gender, and confiscated their property. By doing this, Greeks turned 9 the Morea into a literally ‘Greek land.’ Historians like to describe those two events as the beginning of ‘national liberation movements’ in the Modern Balkans. It is necessary, however, to add one point to this political assessment. e two events were also the starting point of massive Muslim deportations in modern times. Massacres inevitably accompanied the mass exodus. Indiscriminate killingprovoked a strong fear among the Muslim population, and many fled from their homelands. e Christian rebels claimed that Muslims/Turks were oppressors coming from the outside, and did not allow the refugees to return. us the effects of migration became permanent. When the ‘national liberation movement’ turned out to be successful, it brought about ethnic migrations and an enormous humanitarian catastrophe. e Bulgarian independence also caused massacres and mass deportations of Muslims. Unlike its Serbian and Greek precedents, the Bulgarian ‘national liberation’ was the by-product of Russian invasion instead of a mass popular movement. Many Bulgarian peasants and urban dwellers, especially their leaders č(orbadjias in Bulgarian), more or less tolerated Ottoman rule, and wanted to improve their status by peaceful means. ere were also militant elements, called ‘revolutionary nationalists.’ e Bulgarian ‘revolutionary nationalists’ adopted a strategy of overthrowing Ottoman rule through popular revolt. e extremists, however, did not gain any mass-scale popular support. Most had to go in exile and instead sought to organise domestic networks from abroad. ey were affected by Italian nationalist ideas and adopted the guerrilla strategy used by Mazzini and Garibaldi. ey twice organised cheta guerrilla units and sent them to Northern Bulgaria in the hope of igniting mass uprisings there. Originally, a cheta meant a unit of the hayduks. e hayduks were Balkan traditional Christian bandits, who escaped to the mountains usually aer getting into trouble with the Ottoman authorities. ey also attacked wealthy Muslim landlords on behalf of the poor peasants. us, in popular belief, the hayduks were the heroes in the struggle against Ottoman oppression. e Bulgarian revolutionary nationalists intentionally played on this tradition and even recruited some realhayduks. Although McCarthy, Justin. 1995.Death and Exile, e Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922, Princeton: Darwin Press, pp. 10–12. 9
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the cheta guerrilla strategy of the Bulgarian revolutionary nationalists failed miserably, their efforts contributed to bringing together the Balkan hayduk tradition and the modern nationalist guerrilla war concept.10 e Bulgarian ‘revolutionary nationalists’ also played an important role as collaborators of the Russian armyduring the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. During the war, Russians engaged in expelling the Muslim and Jewish populations from the area they occupied. Aer routing the regular Ottoman army, the Cossack units committed the major atrocities. ey were employed as shock troops to expel the Muslim population, killing Muslim peasants indiscriminately, pillaging and burning villages. Bulgarian nationalists played a similar role. Not only did they organise paramilitaries to resume subversive activities; they also collaborated with Russians to wipe non-Christians from the territory.11 Aer a city was captured by the Russian army, Bulgarians would attack the Muslim and Jewish sectors, pillage their shops and destroy religious foundations, thus forcing Muslims and Jews to flee. In the countryside, local priests and teachers in12 stigated the Christian villagers to rob their Muslim neighbours of their property. e atrocities against the Muslims during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877– 78 were a unique combination of the Russian experience of anti-Muslim war in the Caucasus and the Balkan tradition of nationalism. In the Caucasian wars, Russians carried out a systematic expulsion of Muslim populations, both from the lowlands and from places of strategic importance. ey used Christian paramilitaries, especially the Cossacks, for de-Islamization of the territory.13 e same joint pattern of operation between the regular army and the paramilitaries was also introduced into the Balkans. Even in the nineteenth century, the old-style forced ethnic migrations have survived. A good example was the immigration of the Crimean Tatars and the Circassians. During the middle of the century, first, the Crimean Tatars, and then, the Circassians massively fled their homelands because of Russian persecution. ey flowed into the Political use of bandit tradition (more accurately ‘invented tradition’) is not a unique innovation of the Bulgarian nationalists. It was a rather widespread practice of the Balkan nationalists. As Cathy Carmichael points out, the idea of the bandit had been an integral part of Balkan tradition at the level of popular culture during Ottoman times, and mobilising bandits as anti-Ottoman forces became important in the struggle for ‘national liberation.’ us, the existence of bandits became a definitive part of national identity in most of the Balkan states. See: Carmichael, Cathy. 2004.Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans, London: Routledge, pp. 39–41. 10
11 Turan, Ömer. 1998.e Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 1878–1908, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, pp. 119–133. 12 Tamir, Vicki. 1979.Bulgaria and Her Jews: e History of a Dubious Symbiosis , New York: Yeshiva University Press, pp. 81–90. 13 On the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, John Baddeley’s classical research is still worth consulting. See Baddeley, John. 1908.e Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, London: Longman, Green and Co.; on the Muslim reaction to the conquest, see Henze, Paul. 1992. ‘Circassian Resistance to Russia,’in Benningsen Broxup, Marie et al (eds.). e Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World, London: Hurst, pp. 62–111.
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Ottoman territories as refugees. e Ottoman government gave shelter to these refugees, and allotted them land in its dominion. In the Balkans, the main destination was the southern bank of the Danube and Southern Serbia. e allotted lands were of strategic importance to the empire, as they constituted the empire’s borders with Russia and other Christian states. It might be possible to see this colonisation policy as a product of the modern concept of demographic warfare, as we can notice in the policy the idea of decreasing the rate of the Christian population in precarious places.14 It is, however, much more correct to say that it was instead a remnant of old sürgün practices, as the colonisation was not accompanied by the systematic deportation of the Christian population in exchange. It is not clear at what time the Ottomans began to consider the adoption of a Russian-style demographic policy. During the Tanzimat era, the Ottoman government, at least officially, propagated an ‘Ottomanism’ policy in which all Ottoman subjects, regardless of their religious or ethnic backgrounds, were to be treated as equal citizens of the empire. However, a drastic change had taken place by the time of the loss of Bulgaria and Bosnia, two major Christian provinces of strategic and economic importance to the empire. As we have found, the traditional Ottoman colonisation policy tended to create an ethnic mixture on the Sultan’s territory. Aer conquering the Christian territories, the government encouraged Muslim emigration. Conversely, aer the victory of the Christian states, the Muslims in the ‘redeemed’ lands were expelled, and then iven g shelter on the neighbouring Ottoman territories. In both cases, the religi ous and ethnic composition of the Ottoman lands became heterogeneous. We can even see this practice in the aermath of Serbian and Greek independence. According to the privileges conferred to Miloš Obrenović, Muslims were restricted and could dwell only inside the cities on the territory of the Serbian prince.15 Muslims were also excluded from the territory of the Greek Kingdom. Although these seemed to be the beginning of the modern practices of building states on an ethnic basis, the policies were rather an extension of old practices. Both cases affected only Muslims, and neither Serbs nor Greeks in the Sultan’s lands were asked to leave to the new states. In 1878, however, the Ottomans presented an utterly new proposal to the Russian side in the negotiations on the peace treaty. According to Bilal Şimşir, in February 1878 the Ottoman delegate, Safvet Paşa,
14 On the colonisation of the Circassians and Crimean Tatars, see Saydam, Abdullah. 1997. Kirim ve Kaas gocleri, 1856–1876, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu; Pinson, Mark. ‘Ottoman Colonisation of the Circassians in Rumeli aer the Crimean War,’ Études Balkaniques,3, 1973; ‘Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854–1862,’ Güney-Dogu Aurupa Arastirmalari Dergisi , 1, 1972. 15 e legal status of the Serbian Principality was finally settled by the Sultan’s Edict (Hattiserif) of 1830. Article 11 ordered that Muslims leave the territory and sell offtheir properDržavnopravna istorija Jugoslavije, Odabrani izties. See Dragoљ, J. & M. Mirković (eds.). 1986. vori sa komentarima, Belgrade: Savremena administracija, p. 43.
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proposed moving the Muslims who had been le north of the Balkan mountain chain to the south, moving the Bulgarians in the south to the north, and liquidating their properties by a mutual exchange.16 Although the proposal was in vain, it was the first proposal for population exchange made by the Ottoman side. us, in the nineteenth century we notice new patterns of forced ethnic migration in the recorded history of the Balkans. ese new patterns were characterised by a tendency to make the affected territories ethnically homogenous. In the first stage, the main motive for the deportation was popular violence. en, the state apparatus, especially the army, began to play an important role, in collaboration with the ‘ordinary people.’ e popular violence at this stage became more organised and systematically operated in a fashion similar to the earlier types of violence. At the vanguard of the popular violence were the paramilitary units, composed of oldhayduk-style bandits and guerrillas who were revolutionary nationalists. e state also showed its will to control the fate of its subject ethnic groups.
e First Half of the Twentieth Century e twentieth century is an era characterised by the establishment of the framework of nation states in the Balkans. A strong tendency for thestate to exercise control over the fate of its nation appeared. Along with this idea, popular violence increasingly conspired with the state. e most notorious case of this collusion was the Macedonian struggle at the turn of the century.17 Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania all participated in this struggle. e main actors in the bloodbath of Macedonia were the so-called chetadzhis or komitadzhis. Chetadzhis or komitadzhis were paramilitaries who were usually organised and financed by nationalist organisations. e purpose of chetadzhi/komitadzhi activities was to change the ethnic map of Macedonia in order to support their nationalistic causes. ose who sympathised with Bulgaria sought to instigate the population to take up arms for the national uprisings. Others sought to counteract this point of view. us, several nationalist paramilitary groups operated in Macedonia, struggling with each other to secure support among the Christian population and contain their rivals’ sphere of influence.
16 Şimşir, Bilal. 1988. e Turks of Bulgaria, 1878–1985, London: K. Rustem & Brother, pp. 158–159. 17 ere are numerous works on the Macedonian question. Most of them cannot avoid taking a partisan viewpoint. e following works seem to this author to be relatively neutral and worthy of mention here: Adanir, Fikret. 1996.Makedonya sorunu, olusumu ve 1908’e kadar gelisimi (trans. by Ihsan Catay), Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt; Lange-Akhund, Nadine. 1998. e Macedonian Question, 1893–1908 (trans. by Gabriel Topor), Boulder: East European Monographs; Karakasidou, Anastasia. 1997. Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870–1990, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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ese groups enjoyed tacit support from the government whose cause they espoused. us, the core of the chetadzhi/komitadzhi units was composed of military veterans, usually army officers who were in reserve or on vacation. Most of the armed bands were organised abroad, and then sent into Ottoman territory. ey smuggled munitions, threatened villagers to secure support for their causes, recruited paramilitary men among the population, and attacked villages that declared support for the foreign nationalist causes. ey pretended to be the followers of the hayduk tradition, and indeed there were many hayduks among their ranks. e essence of the chetadzhi/ komitadzhi movement, however, was not the same as that of the ‘primitive rebels.’ It was a modern movement in which priests and teachers played a major role as champions of Balkan nationalism, whose main components were religion and language. e state also contributed to future proliferation of popular violence by creating the myth of national heroes who had lost their lives during the struggle for the sake of their nation. For example, Paulos Melas, the Greek military agent who was engaged in several subversive activities and killed by the Ottomans, was enshrined as a national hero in 18 Greek Macedonia and became the symbol of the Greek cause there. e Macedonian struggle was a curtain raiser for the nationally motivated popular violence that erupted during theBalkan wars and the First World War. ese wars were the worst culmination of a nationally motivated popular violence in the history of the modern Balkans. Atrocities committed by ‘ordinary people,’ combined with those committed by the regular army, were widespread across theBalkans and Anatolia, producing a most tragic humanitarian catastrophe. is time, not only the Muslims but also the Christians were massacred and massively deported.19 At the first stage, common scenes could be witnessed. All over Macedonia and race, the chetadzhi/komitadzhi units, backed by the regular armies of the Christian states, killed and chased the Muslim population from their cities and the countryside, resulting in an enormous loss of life.20 In many cases, the war operation resulted in thoroughly wiping out the alien population, and producing an ethnic purification of the territory. Alan Ostler, a correspondent of the Daily Express, wrote on the case of the Bulgaro-Turkish front:
Karakasidou, Anastasia. 2004. ‘Affections of a Greek Hero, Pavlos Melas and Heroic Representations in Greece,’ in Todorova, Maria (ed.). Balkan Identities, Nation and Memory, London: Hurst, pp. 197–232. 18
19 e atrocities during the Balkan wars were well-documented by an international commission composed of scholars from six countries: Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Cause and Conduct of the Balkan Wars . 1914. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; see also an excellent work of journalism by Leon Trotsky: Trotsky, Leon. 1980. e War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky: e Balkan Wars, 1912–13, New York: Monad Press. 20 According to McCarthy, of the 2,315,293 Muslims who had lived in the area taken from the Ottoman Empire in Europe, 1,445,179 were gone. Of these, 413,922 were migrants to Turkey during and aer the Balkan Wars, and 398,849 came to Turkey later. He calculates the death toll at 632,408. McCarthy,Death and Exile p. 164.
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From the Bulgarian frontier as far south as a line down roughly across to Visa, the country, with the exception of Adrianople, is actually in the hands of Bulgars. But infinitely more serious to the Turkish people than the mere military occupation of the tract of land by a hostile force, is the fact that the native population has been driven out of it.21 en, this sphere of Hell spread to the other coast of the Aegean. eTurkishgovernmentofthenationalist Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress) took measures to deport part of the Christian population, mostly Greek Orthodox, from Western Anatolia during the spring of 1914. Part of the reason for the deportation was to provide homes to the Muslim refugees from the Balkans, but it was also a kind of preventive detention. During the deportation, local Muslims organised attacks on the Christian urban sectors, and the general ethnic tension drastically increased.22 In 1919, the landing of the Greek army erupted into popular violence in Western Anatolia. is time the local Christian population played a major role. e occupying Greek army intentionally provided arms and munitions to the local Christian population. e purpose was obvious. Greeks sought to change the ethnic composition of the region in their favour and instigated the local Greeks to expel their Muslim neighbours. e Greek paramilitaries attacked Muslim sectors of the cities, killing community leaders, sacking shops and residences, destroying mosques and other religious foundations, in order to disperse the Muslims. Greeks also organisedcheta-style units and dispatched them to Muslim villages to commit the same atrocities as were being committed in the cities. Many Turks fled to the places that the Greek Front had not yet 23 reached. Some took up arms and hid in the mountains as resistance. en came the defeat of Greeks at the hands of the Kemalists. e perpetrators and the victims exchanged their roles. Turkish bandits, especially those who claimed to be heirs of the efe tradition, hoisted the flags of Turkish nationalism and let the Greek population follow the routing Greek army.24 In this fashion, most of the Anatolian Greeks had le for Greece or the Russian Caucasus as refugees by 1923. At the other corner of Anatolia, Armenians experienced the same tragedy as Greeks.25 Armenians, once called ‘the most faithful Christian subjects of the Sultan,’
21 22
e Inner History of the Balkan War London: Constable, p. 303. Rakin, Reginald. Toynbee, Arnold.1914. 1922.e Western Question in Greece ,and Turkey; A Study in the Contact of Civilisations, London: Constable, pp. 140–141. 23 Toynbee,e Western Question, pp. 271–299. 24 e Efe-Zeybekleris are the traditional bandits in Western Anatolia. On their activities and social character, see Yetkin, Sabri. 1996. Ege’de eskiyalar, Istanbul: Turkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfi. 25 e ‘Armenian genocide’ was not a single separate historical event. It is difficult to understand why the Ottomans started the mass deportation of the remaining Christian popu-
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had been affected by the same nationalism as their Balkan compatriots by the turn of the century.26 During the second half of the nineteenth century, revolutionary nationalists emerged among the Ottoman Armenians. Armenians densely populated the wide area stretching from the Caucasus to the Mediterranean coast of Eastern Anatolia by World War I. e Ottoman Armenian nationalists maintained a close relationship with the Russian Armenians. e Armenian population also were sympathetic to the Russian army, led by Armenian generals and accompanied by Russian Armenian volunteers, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. Aer the war, in Western Armenia the relationship between Armenians and the Muslim population, mostly composed of Turks and Kurds, deterioratedas the Ottoman government manipulated the enmityof the Muslims to put down Armenian movements seeking autonomy. e reformspromised by the 1878 Treaty of Berlin remained a dead letter. e disappointedArmenians, most of them intellectuals, began to organise defence groups in a number of locations. ey then followed the Balkan nationalist movements. By 1885, the first Armenian na27 tionalist party, the Armenakans, had been set up in the Van district. Aer the Sassun uprising of 1894 and the Hnchakians’ demonstration in Istanbul, the Ottoman government began to take harsh measures. In October 1895, Turkish and Kurdish forces launched a systematic attack on Armenian villages and on the Armenian quarters of the towns. By the next summer, between 100,000 to 200,000 Armenians had been killed, and over half a million were doomed to poverty by looting and pillages. A number of villages were burned, and Muslims settled in the depopulated places in exchange; even forced conversions were reported. Because of these atrocities known as the ‘first Armenian massacre,’ tens of thousands emigrated. It is noteworthy that during these atrocities, paramilitaries known asHamidiyes played a major role. e attitude of the Ottoman government toward Armenians had changed from one lation, without taking into consideration the successive plight of the Muslims in the Balkans. e long process of the dismantling of the Empire was a chain of massacres and an exodus of the Muslim population. us, Vahakn Dadrian is partly right when he says that ‘the Armenian genocide was a by-product of the conflicts in the Balkans.’ But it is entirely misguided when he claims that Western diplomacy during the Eastern Question was a forerunner of the ‘humanitarian intervention,’seeking to alleviate the plight of the subject nationalities groaning under Turkish misrule: Dadrian, Vahakn N. 1995.e History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus, Providence: Berghahn Books, p.xx. Saying this is no different from saying that the colonialism by the imperialist states of nineteenth-century Europe was a genuine mission to civilise the peoples of Asia andAfrica. e Westerners saw the nationalist movements of the Ottoman Christian subjects as a lead for their imperialist policy towards the Middle East. 26 Sonyel, Salahi. 1993. Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire , Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. 27 Nalbandian, Louise. 1967.e Armenian Revolutionary Movements: e Development of Armenian Political Parties rough the Nineteenth Century, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 67–89.
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of appeasement to that of taking preventive measures. e government intentionally sought to eliminate the nationalist threat rf om Eastern Anatolia before it could emerge as a concrete movement. Apparently, the Ottomans regarded the entire community of 28 Armenians as an unruly element that would cause separatism in the future. e strategy of the Armenian nationalists also changed aer the massacre of 1895–96. Contrary to the former moderate stance to seek reform by peaceful means, the new generation adopted a more radical line to organise terrorist activities in the hope of Western intervention on their behalf. When war broke out between the Ottomans and Russians in the autumn of 1914, and especially aer the abortive expedition of Enver Paşa to Transcaucasia during the winter of 1914–15, the Armenian revolutionary nationalists began to take up arms and organise subversions. ey also attacked Muslim villages, and committed atrocities against the civilians.29 e violence of the Armenian nationalists, however, was limited both in scale and sphere of activities. Initiatives for the second Armenian massacre mainly came from the Ottoman side. Aer the catastrophic defeat of his expedition, Enver blamed Armenians for his failure. In February 1915, Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army were disarmed and transferred to work battalions. Disarmament was also forced on the entire Armenian population. In March, many Armenians of Zeitun and the other Cilician cities were killed; the survivors were deported. By the end of the next month, the final stage of the deportation had been set up. Orders were cabled to governors and military commanders in the six provinces to remove Armenians by force. Armenians, regardless of age and gender, were told to leave for new locations in a few hours or days. e deportees were forced to move to distant places, especially to Syria, usually on foot and without proper supply of food and drink. Hundreds of thousands were killed by fatigue, hunger, epidemics, and at30 tacks by the local Muslim population. ough the estimated number of victims varies between 300,000 and 3,000,000 depending on the political stance of the claimants, the fact remains that almost the entire Armenian population in Eastern Anatolia was wiped out. It is also a matter of serious dispute how much the Ottoman government was really committed to the death of Armenians. Turkish scholars tend to emphasise the role of non-government factors, such as the attacks by Kurdish tribes, and Muslim ‘popular violence.’ Even if so, it is obvious that the Ottoman government, imbued with Turkish nationalism, ordered the transfer of aparticular group of the population because of their ethnicity. In this way, Turkish Muslims, long-time victims of Christian nationalism, now adopted the same chauvinistic opinion regarding their perpetrators. e sameWar. typee of preventive deportation wasand alsonotorious witnessedCroatian in Bosnia during the First World Bosnian military governor national28 Bournoutian, George. 1994. A History of the Armenian People, vol. 2, Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, pp. 88–98. 29 Gürün, Kamuran. 1985.e Armenian File: e Myth of Innocence Exposed, London: K. Rustem & Brother, pp. 186–206. 30 Naimark, Norman. 2002. Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 27–38.
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ist Stefan Sarkotić began to arrest and deport prominent Serbs; almost five thousand were interned in camps. Sarkotić also ordered the deportation of fiy thousand Serb civilians from the Drina Valley. ese are the first examples of forced ethnic transfer in modern Bosnia. Sarkotić also employed paramilitaries to oppress Serbs. A special defence force recruited among Muslim Bosnians and Croats eventually grew to twenty thousand and engaged in ‘anti-bandit operations’ along the Drina border with Serbia. e force committed massacres of Serb villagers and deported them.31 It is most probable that the period from the Balkan Wars to the Anatolian War was the worst culmination of the ethnic deportation caused by popular violence in modern Balkan history. e original form of these atrocities was set during the RussoTurkish War of 1877–78, when paramilitaries organised by the nationalists and supported by the regular army played the major role in massacring and deporting civilians. is format was now revived aer forty years with even worst brutalities. Not only the Balkan Christian states but also the new nationalist state, Turkey, participated in those atrocities. Almost all over the war theatre, we can find traces of collaboration between the army and the paramilitaries resulting in huge casualties among the civilians and deportation of these civilians on a mass scale. In this way, the basic ethnic map of the Balkans and Anatolia was changed and formulated anew. It was obvious that the states concerned bore the major responsibility for the spreading of popular violence. ey gave tacit approval to the organisation and operation of the paramilitaries. e regular army officers distributed arms and munitions to civilians to transform them into paramilitary units, and provided them with training, financial aid, and information. It is, however, also true that ‘ordinary people’ voluntarily launched attacks against their ‘neighbours.’ Many villagers and urban dwellers organised armed bands that went to faraway places in search of war spoils. Such people committed atrocities with apparent personal motives; they plundered money and other precious things, stole harvests, cattle, and/or sheep. us, we can call the violence a ‘grass-roots’ type of deportation. Unfortunately, most of the perpetrators were not condemned as war criminals at that time. Not only did theyescape from trials; many of them were applauded as national heroes. e reason was simple. ey had contributed to the enforcement of the 32 nation states by eliminating aliens from the ‘national territories.’ us, they became role models for the next generations. It was a triumph of the principlehat t the state indeed controlled the fate of its nation. e attitudes of the ‘international community’ at the time also contributed to establishing the basic political principle. e Lenin-Wilson doctrine of national self-determination was ostensibly democratic by claiming a nation possessed the right to determine its own political fate. is principle, however, only escalated the deterioration of 31 Lampe, John. 1996. Yugoslavia as History: Twice ere Was a Country , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 106–107. 32 Toynbee,e Western Question, pp. 277–278.
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human rights by admitting that groups, not individuals, decided destinies. eview was 33 nothing less than a reproduction of the ethnic cleansing tradition. e ‘international community’ approved the war criminality of nation states asfait a accompli, while forcing the victims to content themselves with their moderate status as minorities. If we take into consideration the atmosphere of the time, it might not be impossible to understand why such anti-human treatment as population transfers were welcomed as rational measures for resolving ‘national questions ’ in those days. Greece and Bulgaria, Turkey and Bulgaria, and Greece and Turkey successively signed agreements on population exchange.34 However, it is nonsense to assume that those state-sponsored deportations were more humane than those caused either by popular violence or by war operations. A great many people perished during the transportation, as the directing governments did not or could not provide the appropriate support they had promised. Many people lost their lives owing to the shortage of food, epidemics, and harsh transportation conditions. It was really hard for those who managed to arrive at the final destination to settle in life again. e compensation for their loss of property was not acceptable at all, or if provided, it was far from adequate and late to arrive. It took those individuals a long time to rebuild their lives and adapt to the host countries. It is also misguidedto assume that the population exchange, in the long term, contributed to the stability of the states inv olved. ey did not recover from the economic damage caused by the deportation for a long time, and suffered from under-development.35 In spite of these ramifications, is author likes to use the term as a broad concept that is not limited to describing the same kinds of mass violence as those that raged during the wars of Yugoslav succession. According to the definition of the UN commission of experts in 1994, ‘“ethnic cleansing” is a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terrorinspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.’ e definition does not exclude state-sponsored population transfer, at least in theory. Among the historians studying modern war criminal acts, it is rather common to understand the term as including mass deportation: Hayden, Robert. 1996. ‘Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing and Population Transfer,’ Slavic Review, 55 (Winter 1996), pp. 727–748; BallFialkoff, Andrew. 1996. Ethnic Cleansing, New York: St. Martin’s Griffin;Naimark,Fires of Hatred; Ethnic Cleansing in 20th Century Europe, Boulder: East Várdy Steven & Hunt Tooley (eds.). 2003. European Monographs; Martin, Terry. 1998. ‘e Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,’ Journal of 33
Modern34 History, 70 (December 1998), pp. 813–861. For a general survey of this theme, see Ladas, Stephen. 1932.e Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, New York: Macmillan. 35 As for the n egative effects of the population exchange in Greek state and society, see Pentzopoulos, Dimitri. 1962.e Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact on Greece, Paris: Mouton; see also the papers read at an international conference organised by the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, in 1998: Hirschon, Renée (ed.). 2003.Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey , New York: Berghahn Books.
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the ‘international community’ repeatedly enforced the same kind of solution to several cases that followed in history. e ‘democratic states’ that prepared the Potsdam declaration approved the deportation of six million Germans from Eastern Europe. e concept of ‘divide and solve’ was also clearly a concept followed by the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995. Furthermore, population transfer is no different an option than the ‘grass-roots’ type of transfer. ere was not the slightest humanitarian consideration in the basic motives of such a state-sponsored population transfer. It was not out of concernfor humanitarian care but out of nationalist anxiety that the population exchange was prepared. e population transfers were no more than brushing up on the task of total elimination of the alien elements, a task whichwartime violence had failed tocomplete.
From the Mid-Twentieth Century to the Present Day Taking the scale and the sphere of influence into consideration, we can call World War I the culmination of ethnic deportation based on the tradition of nationalist violence. World War II, however, surpassed its predecessor in depth of brutality. e worst example can be seen in the case of NDH (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, the Independent State of Croatia). e notorious Fascist puppet state was in a way a compilation of the worst antihuman elements of Modern Balkan nationalism at that time. Lagging behind the other Balkan ‘historical’ nations, Croats succeeded in building their ‘nation state’ as late as 1941. It was not the result of the ‘national liberation’ movement (nor war) of Croats, but a present from Hitler and Mussolini, who appointed Ante Pavelić andhis Ustashe, a small group of Croatian nationalists, to govern the country. As frequently happens to latecomers, Croats adopted the preceding models in their most purified forms. e militant Croatian nationalists, knownas Ustashe, stated an ‘ethnically pure’ state to be their goal. e Ustashe inherited the stream of Croatian nationalist thought that regarded Serbs as the most dangerous enemy of the nation. e tradition started in the ‘Party of Right’; then the ‘Party of Pure Right’ succeeded it. It might be true to say that the Ustashe atrocities partly derived from the peculiarity of this idea. However, the atrocities themselves were not the unique products of this line of Croatian nationalism. e famous three-part theory36 that many writers mention when they explain the Ustashe and NDH was the essence of a nationalist policy that many Balkan states had exercised in one way or another, if with muchless intensity. Deportation was a favourite policy of the Balkan governments in the first half of the twentieth century. Forced conversion, even if not so common, was not unknown. 36 On June 22 in Gospić, Mile Budak, the Ustasha chief propagandist and Pavelić’s education minister, openly announced that one third of the Serbs of NDH would be deported to Serbia and another third converted to the Catholic Church (thereby Croatised). eother third, he added, would simply be killed. See Lampe,Yugoslavia, p. 205.
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eBulgarianandGreeknationalistshadbeenconvertingthepopulationofMacedonia by force to their own churches. e Bulgarian government tried to Christianise Pomaks (an ethnic group of Slavic Muslims) in 1912–13.37 Probably the only innovation the Ustashe added to the list of Balkan nationalist atrocities were the concentration camps for extermination. We may be able to say that the most important contribution of the Ustasha regime to the history of Balkan nationalism was that a strong opposition to their extreme view prepared the stage for criticism of nationalist violence as a whole. ere had been, of course, anti-nationalist voices in the Balkan societies even before World War II. However, it was only aer the bloody experience of the Ustasha regime that the majority of people began to turn their attention to the criminal acts of nationalists. e Genocide Treaty of 1948 also contributed to this process. However, in the former Yugoslavia, people tended to look for examples of genocide more in the case of the Ustashe than in the case of the Nazis. A growing number of people started to consider an ‘ethnically pure’ state a crime against humanity, not a heroic deed.It is interesting to examine the etymology of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ when we consider that process. e term ‘ethnic cleansing’ did not first appear in the Bosnian war. As is well known, the term frequently appeared in political discourses in the latter half of the 1980s in Yugoslavia. At that time, the Serb nationalists used the term to describe the alleged plot of the Albanian nationalists to create an ‘ethnically pure Kosovo.’ In this context, they understood the term as a synonym for genocide, and tried to label Albanians as the ‘Ustashe of today.’38 e irony of this episode shows us that embryos of a new type of thought might have made it possible to breakwith past nationalist criteria. However, the tide turned in the opposite direction. e appearance of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ in political discourse in the former Yugoslavia indeed produced catastrophic effects on ‘brotherhood and unity,’ a basic concept of the country’s federalism. Quite contrary to producing an anti-nationalist public sentiment, the manipulation of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ produced a ‘kettlecalling-the-pot-black’ dispute among the Yugoslav peoples and resulted in thetriumph of the old-style nationalist way of thinking. Ultimately, that thinking then triggered off the new ethnic wars. ese paradoxical consequences were much derived from the nature of the political culture of the socialist regimes. Communism always took an ambivalent stance toward nationalism, as Communism espoused bothinternationalism and national liberation. e socialist governments partly contributed to the appeasement of national 37 Georgiev, Veličko & Stajko Trifonov. 1995.Pokrustvaneto na bulgarite mohamedani, 1912– 1913: Dokumenti (Christianisation of the Bulgarian Muslims, 1912-1913: Documents), Sofia: Prof. Marin Drinov Press. 38 Mertus, Julie A. 1999.Kosovo: How Mythsand Truth Starteda War, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 135–140.
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antagonisms, as they used socialism to control the emergence of chauvinistic elements. It was also true that the socialist regimes provided a degree of protection to minority ethnic groups. However, the socialist regimes by no means resolved the ‘national questions.’ ey cherished the primordial nationalist idea that a nation was a basic unit of humanity; thus any individual must belong to a certain nation, or ‘ethnic group.’ In this way, Communism preserved the essence of the old-style Balkan nationalism. ecommunists also mobilised nationalist sentiments to fortify their regimes. Aer the 1960s, National Communism triumphed over internationalism in most of the Balkan states. e most notorious case was the so-called ‘Renaming Process’ in Bulgaria. During this process, the Bulgarian Communists even introduced an ethnic policy that closely resembled the three-part theory of the Ustashe. Although they did not embark on mass killing, the Bulgarian Communists tried to deport a portion of Bulgarian Muslims, and assimilate the others.39 e real breaking point with the exclusivistic thinking of nationalist tradition thus came with the fall of Communism. e bloodbath during the wars of Yugoslav succession made a strong impact both on the ‘international community’ and on Balkan indigenous societies. e wars themselves were no more than a repetition of the calamities that raged inthe region from 1912 to 1921. All the parties concerned justifiedtheir military activities in the name of national liberation and claimed to be the legitimate heirs to the national traditions.40 e styles of the atrocities that occurred were archaic as well. In fact, they were a grand compilation of similar ethnic violence witnessed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. e UN commission of experts describes the atrocities in Bosnia as follows: ‘[E]thnic cleansing’ has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of 41 attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property.
39 On the ‘renaming process,’ see Eminov, Ali. 1997. Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria, London: Hurst; Yalamov, Ibrahim. 2002.Istorija na turskata obshtnost v Bulgarija
(History of Turkish Community in Bulgaria), Sofia: Krugozor. It may be fair to add that the Balkan Communist governments did not commit to the large-scale mass deportation of all members of an ethnic group, while their Soviet comrades were deeply engaged in such policies between 1936 and 1945. e expulsion of Germans from Yugoslavia and Romania was an exceptional case. 40 is author has previously pointed out the characteristic of post-socialist Balkan nationalism as a recurrence to pre-WWII models, and named it an ‘atavistic nationalism.’ See Sahara, Tetsuya. 2000. ‘Balkan Nationalism aer1989,’ Acta Slavica Iaponica. 41 UN Security Council.Final Report of the Commission of Experts, S/1994/647.
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All of these acts were common and ordinary scenes in the past. Paramilitary groups mushroomed all over the contested areas. Although they came from varied backgrounds, whether former JNA soldiers or amnestied convicts, the groups pretended to be voluntary fighters with good will and desire to protect their oppressed brothers.42 Many paramilitaries enjoyed tacit or explicit support from their governments as well. ey were primarily responsible for well-known acts of ethnic cleansing, such as chasing people from their homes, pillaging the countryside, brutalising, raping women, and murder. e most severe damage to life and limb was done by them. e 43 nationalist atrocities resulted in the creation of more or less ‘ethnically pure’ zones. Croatia and Kosovo have become the ethnicallypurest state/region in Europe. BosniaHerzegovina has become a political body composed of three ethnic territories. erepublics of Serbia and Montenegro have also become much simpler in their ethnicomc position than before the wars. So, the wars le nothing new, except for one point. e difference between the Yugoslav wars and the former Balkan ethnic conflicts resides in the fact that the contemporary ‘international community’ did not accept, at least in theory, the nationalist claims to establish ethnically pure states. An internationally sanctioned population exchange did not occur. An international criminal court was set up and started the work of punishing those who committed war crimes. ese subtle changes in the response to ethnic cleansing will contribute to breaking with the notion that the state controls the fate of its nation.
Conclusion Modern forced ethnic migration is a quite different event than those that happened in earlier times. Contrary to the earlier cases, the modern examples create ethnically pure territories, and the result becomes permanent. Forced deportation appeared simultaneously with the rise of nationalism. Most of the deportations were justified until recently as acts of national liberation. Christian peasants attacked and pillaged During the Yugoslav wars the bandit tradition was effectively mobilised for organising paramilitary units. Paramilitaries drew some of their inspiration from fighters in the Balkan Wars and the Second World War. For instance, the Serb paramilitary fighters in Croatia and Bosnia oen referred to themselves and were referred to by others as Chetniks (Royalist Serb 42
paramilitary during WWII). SeeCarmichael,Ethnic Cleansing, p. 42. Many of the notorious paramilitary leaders came from the criminal circles. us, in a sense, they simply engaged in their long accustomed activities. Notwithstanding, people welcomed them as protectors and even accepted them as their heroes. e reason is simple: the paramilitaries pretended to be patriots and justified their atrocities by tapping into the nationalist rhetoric. See Čolović, Ivan. 2004. ‘A Balkan Identities, pp. 253–268. Criminal-National Hero? But Who Else?’ in Todorova (ed.), 43 It is also important to add the following point. Paramilitaries waged atrocities on their own initiative. See Bax, Mart. 2000. ‘Warlords, Priests and the Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: A CaseEthnic and Racial Studies Study from Rural Bosnia Herzegovina,’ , 23/1, January 2000, pp. 16–36.
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their Muslim neighbours when war broke out. Victims and refugees were regarded as oppressors (or collaborators of the oppressors) and denied their rights to dwell in the land. en revolutionary nationalism gave formal justification to the atrocities and contributed to institutionalising ‘grass-roots’ violence and creating paramilitaries. e paramilitaries were essentially a tool of the modern states. Under the guise of traditi onal popular violence, such as thehayduks or efes, the core of those who committed the violence were career soldiers. By using these paramilitaries, the states succeeded in ethnically purifying their territories. At the next stage, the states become directly engaged in the deportation of people. Governments, either by mutual agreements or with the approval of the ‘international community,’ exchanged their ‘unwanted elements.’ It is a serious mistake to consider such state-sponsored deportation as a humanitarian option to the alternative, ‘grass-roots’ violence. e notion of ethnic cleansing served to reveal the continuity between them clearly. While the popular violence directly posed serious threats to members of the minority ethnic groups and frequently resulted in a mass exodus, the state-sponsored deportations served to sanction the consequences of ‘grass-roots’ violence and to complete the deportation work to create ethnically pure spaces. ey both composed a successive process and complemented each other. ey shared the same principle that the state controlled the fate of the nation. e notion of ethnic cleansing will also contribute to the future break with the tragic chain of forced ethnic migrations in the modern Balkans. Ethnic cleansing is none other than a form of traditional nationalist violence. As the understanding that ethnic cleansing is a crime against humanity becomes more widespread, it will become much more difficult to justify nationally motivated violence as an act of national selfdetermination.
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‘EXPULSION’ OF THE GERMAN POPULATION FROM EASTERN EUROPE: TOWARD OVERC OMING NEGATIVE HISTORICAL HERITAGE Atsuko Kawakita Tokyo University, Japan 1. ‘Expulsion’ of the German Population from Eastern Europe Toward the end and shortly aer the Second World War, the German population was forced to emigrate from the German territory to the east of the Oder and the Neisse, and from Central and Eastern European countries including Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, as well as South Eastern European countries (Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia), the Soviet Union and the Balticcountries. In Germany this forced migration is called Vertreibung (expulsion) and Germans who were forced to leave their residence area at that time are calledVertriebene (expellees). Of the fieen million expellees and refugees, approximately twelve million arrived on the territory of postwar Germany, including both the West and the East. ese expellees and refugees constituted approximately 20% and 25% of the population of 1 West and East Germany respectively. During the forced migration the expellees and refugees suffered from plundering, assault and battery, and sexual assault on women.2 Aer 1950 West Germany’s Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims systematically collected extant private documents and records related to the experiences of the victims of the forced migration, complemented them by questionnaire surveys, and published a Documentation of the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern-Central Europe in five volumes with three supplements in the years 1953 to 1961. In addition, the federal government commissioned aDocumentation of the Reichling, Gerhard. 1986.Die Deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen, part 1, Rheinbreitbach: Kulturstiung der Deutschen Vertriebenen; 1989. Die Deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen, part 2, Meckenheim: Kulturstiung der Deutschen Vertriebenen. 2 Bundesministerium für Vertriebene (ed.). 1984. Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa , 5 vols., München: Deutscher Taschenbunch Verlag; Benz, Wolfgang (ed.). 1995.Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen, new ed., Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbunch Verlag, and so on. 1
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Crimes of Expulsionin 1969, which was compiled from the ‘Eastern Documentation’ of the Federal Archive of Germany. Further, there are many other collections in the form of accounts given by persons involved, response sheets to questionnaire surveys, historical analysis and posthumous writings of private individuals in the Federal Archive of Germany. ere are also official documents from zones of occupation and other federal administrative institutions till 1955, whichreport predominantly the fate of expellees and refugees aer their arrival in the western zones of occupation, and materials from the ministries, which were responsible for expellees and refugees at the regional
and local level. In addition, there are plenty of materials in the collections and archives of the Home Province Information Offices, the search operations of the Church and the German Red Cross, and the nation-wide organisations of expellees and refugees or their affiliated societies. e actual details of the forced migration are reported in great detail in these documents and materials. e following are some examples: 1) Suffering of the Germans who did not flee aer the invasion of the Red Army Among my relatives about three quarters died dur ing Russian rule. Two brothers of my father were shot to death ... When Russians came, they tried to rape 3 my cousin ... My uncle and aunt wanted to help her and were shot to death. For us the situation became more and more terrible. All cattle, horses, sheep, pigs, all poultry, fat and meat, milk, eggs; Russians took everything away, 4 plundered everything; dresses, shoes, laundry, all grain crops. 2) Sexual abuse of German women Soon thereaer we became acquainted with the most terrible Russians. ey sprang upon the women like wolves.5 Women and girls had to work hard despite having an insufficientfood supply. We also saw shameless scenes where women and girls were stripped naked and beaten. On one evening in the girls’ school at Turnplatz women and girls had their clothes removed and were lashed in front of the eyes of hundreds of soldiers and officers of the Czech army. Many injuries occurred. 6 At all times of the day we women were raped and our shirts were torn from our bodies. … I cannot speak in public about the kinds of animalistic perversities that the German women had to endure …7 3
An account of a woman from East Prussia, in Kuhn, Ekkehard. 1989.Nicht Rache, nicht
Vergeltung: die deutsche Vertriebenen, Frankfurt am Main; Berlin: Ulllstein, pp. 81–82. 4 Henke, Josef. 1995. ‘Exodus aus Ostpreußen und Schlesien. Vier Erlebnisberichte,’ in Benz (ed.). Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten, p. 122. 5 An account of a woman from the district of Naugard in Pommern, in Kuhn.Nicht Rache, nicht Vergeltung,p. 76. 6 Harasko, Alois. 1995. ‘Die Vertreibung der Sudetendeutschen. Sechs Erlebnisberichte,’ in Benz (ed.). Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten, p. 146. 7 Naimark, Norman M. 2001.Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, Cambridge; Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, p. 119.
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3) Forced migration from East Prussia en Sunday, 11 November came, the day of our evacuation and transportation from our homeland. Aer Poles had conducted house searchesandrobbed us of all useful things on Saturday, we went to the designated place with twenty pounds of hand baggage, were registered and under the control of armed guards walked to Sonnborn where the Polish office resided. ere we spent two days and aer having our baggage searched and suffering further plundering we had to walk to the station of Mahrungen ... Aer Poles had pillaged us all along the way, we got on the transport train (approximately 45 cattle wagons for 4,500 persons). In my wagon there were 116 people. ere was no place in the wagon to stand or to sit. ... Aer Poles had pillaged us thoroughly once again, the train jerked into motion ... e plunder lasted 11 days.8 e first stage of the forced migration in particular required a lot of sacrifice. Under harsh conditions over two million died in the process, many from hunger and disease.9
2. Forced Migrations as aTwentieth-Century European Phenomenon It was the demarcation of the Central and Eastern European borders aer the Second World War that led to the forced migration of the German population from Eastern Europe. At the Tehran Conference of 1943, the Allies agreed upon the Curzon Line as the western border of the Soviet Union, and Poland lost its eastern territory. To compensate Poland for the loss of its eastern territory, part of the eastern territory of Germany was in turn placed under Polish rule. e alteration of borders seemed to require the immediate migration of the ethnic German inhabitants in order to avoid the risk of ethnic problems in the region in question. Trying to solve the problem of minorities through forced migration was not an unprecedented attempt. A naïve reliance on the concept of an ethnically homogeneous nation state and a lack of hesitation about putting the idea into practice by force was widely shared across twentieth-century Europe. Since the birth of the ethnically heterogeneous states in Eastern and South Eastern Europe aer the First World War, the prob10 lem of minorities had become a pressing issue of international policy. Creating homogeneous inhabitant groups by removing heterogeneous elements was believed to lead to the ofthe ethnic problems. In most the twentieth many exchanges tooksolution place and region where they frequentlycentury occurred was population Eastern Europe. A protocol annexed to the peace treaty betweenBulgaria and Turkey in September 1913 was the first international convention, which formulated the idea of the resoluHenke, ‘Exodus aus Ostpreußen undSchlesien,’ pp. 123–124. Reichling, Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen, part 1, p. 36. 10 Henke, Klaus-Dietmar. 1995. ‘Der Weg nach Potsdam – Die Alliierten und die Vertreibung,’ in Benz (ed.).Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten, p. 59. 8 9
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tion of ethnic problems through population exchanges. In November 1913 a TurkishBulgarian Mixed Commission signed the ‘Convention Concerning the Exchange of Populations’ in which the two governments agreed to the voluntary resettlement of 50,000 people from the Bulgarian and Muslim populations respectively within fieen kilometres on either side of the entire common boundary.12 Most of the minorities had already emigrated during the war and what was intended by the convention was to confirm a fait accompli.13 Britain and France drew on this model in the negotiations towards the settlement of the conflict between Greece and Turkey at the conference of Lausanne in 1922/ 23, and a convention concerning forced population exchanges was signed in January 1923 by Greece and Turkey. e evacuation of approximately 400,000 Turks and approximately 1.3 million Greeks was a sorrowful operation, whichdragged on for years. Despite the monitoring of the transfer by a Mixed Commission of the League ofNations and despite consensus about the rights of minorities, countless hardships and unfair treatment resulted for the persons involved.14 For example in Greece the occupation of Muslim houses by Greek refugees forced the Muslims to leave their homes and to migrate to Turkey as quickly as possible. e condition of Greeks remaining in Turkey was also precarious. Confiscated of their movable property and starving in the depth of winter, they were made to travel barefoot for many miles to the ports specified for their departure. In both countries those subjected to population exchange were sometimes victims of attacks.15 On closer examination, in view of not only the actual conditions of the transfers but also considering the social and economic influence upon both countries, it can be stated that the population transfers in the eastern Mediterranean area were barbaric and ruinous actions, particularly in their first stages.16 But the more time advanced the more it seemed to politicians and diplomats that this served as a positive example for the effective settlement of minority problems through radical ethnic separation.17 So the Second World War had barely begun when both the Polish and Czechoslovak governments-in-exile began talking about the expulsion of Germans from their respective countries aer victory in the war. Both governments referred frequently to the ostensibly successful transfer of Greeks and Turks under the Treaty of Lausanne.18 In the political negotiations during the Second World War, the population exchange between Greeks and Turks aer the First World War 11
11
Ladas, Stephen P. 1932.e Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York: Macmillan, pp. 18–20. 12 Henke, ‘Der Weg nach Potsdam,’ p. 59. 13 Ladas, e Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, pp. 18–20. 14 Henke, ‘Der Weg nach Potsdam,’ pp. 59–60. 15 Ladas, e Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, p. 429. 16 Henke, ‘Der Weg nach Potsdam,’ pp. 59–60. 17 Ibid., p. 60. 18 Naimark,Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansingin Twentieth-Century Europe, p. 108.
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served as a model and functioned as a standard argument of prominent statesmen from the anti-Hitler coalition. But Americans and British were increasingly worried about the costs to their domestic budgets of feeding and housing Germans in their respective zones of occupation. In order to avoid the continued influx of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Western Allies insisted that the process of deportation should be slowed down and regularised.19 us Article XIII of the Potsdam Treaty read: e ree Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognise that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. ey agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.20 So far all three governments (the USA, Britain, and the Soviet Union) agreed on the need for moving Germans out of Eastern Europe as an acceptable solution to the ethnic problems in the region, and were not against the population transfer in itself. e resolution of minority problems through ethnic separation was a dominant idea especially in the first half of the twentieth century, and the international community put it into action in order to establish postwar Central and Eastern European order. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the international community ceased to take the initiative in putting forced migration into action as a recipe for solving ethnic problems. But when there were frequent outbreaks of ethnic hostilities and conflicts, especially in the former Yugoslavia as well as in Asia, Africa and Central and Southern America in the latter half of the twentieth century, behind those conflicts stood the idea that the homogenisation of inhabitant groups leads to the solution of ethnicproblems. e principle of self-determination connected with nationalism and racism had in the twentieth century and has even today a destructive power as an ideology, which leads to ethnic conflicts and ethnic cleansing.
3. Reconciliation aer Ethnic Conflicts: e German Case Today in troubled regions all over the world there is an urgent need to stop conflicts, to provide humanitarian relief to refugees, and to redress and eliminate the major factors causing social differences and poverty which in turn make societies vulnerable to conflict. Furthermore, it is necessary for social reconstruction to address issues such as punishment of the perpetrators, and compensation and mental care for the victims. Ibid., p. 111. Historical Office Bureau of Public Affairs. 1960. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. e Conference of Berlin (e Potsdam Conference) 1945, Vols. I and II. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), p. 1511. 19 20
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While addressing these actual topics, it is also necessary to make efforts for total social reconstruction including a prevention of future conflicts. For example, education for prevention of recurrence of violent conflicts, and reconciliation and promotion of dialogue among the parties in conflict are important. In this context it is important to make use of European experiences in overcoming past negative heritage and in working on regional reconciliation in post-conflict regions. For this purpose the relationsbetween Germany and Eastern Europe aer the Second World War and the ‘expulsions’ provide an interesting casefor considering the reconstruction of post-conflict interstate relations. We would like to take the case of the ‘expulsion’ of Germans as an example in order to examine how to handle the concept of collective memory in the context of reconciliation. Germany, which started the Second World War with its invasion of Poland, occupied neighbouring European countries and above all committed mass-killing of European Jews, played the role of perpetrator in the Second World War. On the other hand, in the collective memory of postwar Germany, the ‘expulsion’ of Germans symbolises Germany as a victim in the Second World War. e German right wing in particular has been trying to balance out the crimes of Nazi Germany with the severe damage caused by the ‘expulsion.’ It is obvious that this is hardly acceptable historically. Nazi Germany encouraged the transfer of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into German-occupied Poland, and expelled Jews and Poles from the region.According to current views, this population transfer policy escalated, became radicalised and led to the Holocaust, a systematic mass-killing of human beings.21 Especially in Eastern European countries it is sometimes said that the forced migration of the German population from Eastern Europe aer the Second World War was just a recompense for the violent population transfer policy of Nazi Germany. e difference of standpoints is reflected in the variety of words, which are assigned to name the historical forced migration process in the countries concerned. e German term Vertreibung has strong emotional implications. It has been used mainly because of the fact that it functions critically against those who put the forced migration into practice. is happens because the term Vertreibung refers semantically to the movement of cattle driven by humans in the meadow.22 e term ‘transfer’ in the Potsdam Treaty on the other hand implies a movement of people from one place to another or orderly evacuationsinvolving maintenance of property. e Czech term odsun 21 Aly, Götz. 1995. Endlösung: Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden, Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. 22 Wojciechowski, Marian. 1987.‘Die Evakuierung, dieFlucht und die Zwangsumsiedlung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder und Neiße (1944–1951),’ in Jacobmeyer, Wolfgang (ed.).Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen bis zur Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (Helsinki 1975), Braunschweig: Selbstverlag des Georg-Eckert-Instituts für Internationale Schulbuchforschung, p. 75.
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in contrast has none of the implications that are associated with the termsVertreibung or ‘transfer.’ It only implies the presence of a superior power. Questions about why or where are not raised. Odsun does not have ethical or legal meanings and implies therefore no responsibility and no memory of the administrations or contracting parties to the population transfer conventions. Consequentlyodsun can be justified as a ‘historical necessity.’23 In Poland, another perpetrator of the forced migration, the term wysiedlenie is oen used. is is a Polish term whose counterpart in German is Ausweisung. e term Ausweisung expresses a legally legitimised act and suppresses therefore all the signs of violenceimplied by Vertreibung.24 Comparing various terms, it is obvious that Vertreibungis a word that reflects the victim consciousness of Germans. e term Vertreibung connotes an accusation against the injustice of theVertreibung and an intention to attack those who executedVertreibung. In view of the fact that each country has a different terminology which reflects its own standpoint, the recommendations of the German-Polish Textbook Commission in 1976 adopted the termBevölkerungsverschiebung. e territorial changes at the end of the Second World War led to large-scale population shis (Bevölkerungsverschiebung). ey aimed to match ethnic boundaries with national boundaries as far as possible. e historical experiences of ethnic conflicts as well as the violent population transfer and occupation policy in the preceding period played a substantial role in this context.25 On the other hand there are many cases in the process of forced migration of Germans from Eastern Europe where the termBevölkerungsverschiebungdoes not always seem a fitting description of the situation. In line with this, Recommendation 22 of the German-Polish Textbook Commission said: In the former German territory to the east of the Oder and Neisse, which was ceded to Poland based on the Potsdam Treaty, lived approximately 8.5 million people in 1939. About half of them, in addition to the majority of the German population in Danzig as well as the Germans who lived in Poland, were either evacuated or fled into the German areas to the west of the Oder and Neisse before the end of the war with the loss of many lives. In the years 1945 to 1947 the majority of the German population who remained in the Oder-Neisse areas
23 Schmidt-Hartmann, Eva. 1995. ‘Menschen oder Nationen?,’ in: Benz (ed.).Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten, p. 180. 24 Kera, Sumio. 2000. ‘Dainiji sekaitaisen go no doitsujin “tsuihō” mondai – Poland ni okeru sono genzai’ (‘“Expulsion”’ of German Population aerWorldWarII:From theViewpoint Nowadays in Poland’),Journal of Modern and Contemporary History , vol. 46 (2000), p. 60, footnote 1. 25 Empfehlungen für die Schulbücher der Geschichte und Geographie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der Volksrepublik Polen. 1995. Braunschweig: Selbstverlag des Georg-EckertInstituts für Internationale Schulbuchforschung, p. 29.
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were displaced or forced to emigrate, based on the allied transfer agreements. In succeeding years spontaneous emigrations and departures to rejoin families took place especially in 1956/57.26 e recommendation refined the process generically referred to as Vertreibung into various stages: free-will evacuation and refuge, displacement, forced migration, emigration and spontaneous departure.27 is terminological refinement was an appropriate compromise between Germany and Poland at the time. But these terminological politics also show us the limits of bilateral dialogues on the historical consciousness. e forced migration aer the Second World War cannot be confined to a mere matter of a simple bilateral perpetrator-victim relationship between Germany and Poland or Czechoslovakia, but has to be discussed in the entire context of the forced migrations in twentieth-century Europe. Now in Germany a plan to build a centre for the commemoration of expulsions and forced migrations in twentieth-century Europe is in progress. e Foundation for the Centre against Expulsions (Stiung Zentrum gegen Vetreibungen), one of the pressure groups of expellees and refugees, which was establishedni September 2000 for the purpose of setting up the centre for the commemoration of expulsions, is making efforts to realise the plan. e foundation describes its purpose as follows: e fate of the more than 15 million German victims of deportation and expulsion from the entire region of Eastern and South Eastern Europe, along with their own culture and settlement history in their homeland, must be able to be learned at a glance in Berlin. ... Expulsion and genocide of other nations particularly in Europe definitely fall under the themes dealt with by the CENTRE AGAINST EXPULSIONS (ZENTRUM GEGEN VERTREIBUNGEN). In Europe alone more than 30 national groups suffered and are suffering from such violations of human rights: Albanians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Estonians, Georgians, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, Poles, Chechens, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Greek Cypriots and all the persecution and mass-killings of European Jews by the National Socialists. Up to now pressure groups of expellees and refugees have been working on the issue of the German ‘expulsions’ in liaison with German right-wing groups in postwar West Germany. Until the German unification their largest concern was the border issue. German expellees and refugees established their own interest groups in West Germany Ibid. Kondo, Takahiro. 1989.Kokusai rekishi kyōkasho taiwa – Europe ni okeru “kako” no saihen (International Schoolbook Dialogue: Reconstruction of the Past in Europe ), Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, pp. 101–104. 26 27
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and demanded the recovery of the former German eastern territories where they had lived and desired to return to their home towns. During the Cold War period, West Germany neither formally recognised the new border between postwar Germany and Poland, nor discussed the treatment of the expellees and refugees with Poland an d Czechoslovakia. In this situation the pressure groups of expellees and refugees were one of the strongest active forces demanding the return of the former German eastern territories. In Germany today, aer the unification and formal recognition of the established postwar border, compensation for confiscated property is the most pressing topic for the expellees and refugees. Aer the unification a Reconciliation Declaration was agreed with Poland andGerman Czechoslovakia. Butinno1990 agreement was reached and indeed no negotiations were conducted in relation to compensation for the expellees and refugees. e West German government compensated the expellees and refugees in the 1950s within the framework of domestic war victim aid. But now pressure groups of expellees and refugees are demanding compensation for confiscatedproperty from the Eastern European countries, which were newly included in the EU in May 2004. e pressure groups of expellees and refugees have declared that they are ready to file a complaint to the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European Court of Human Rights. A political solution to the issue has not yet been found. Although all parties can to a certain extent admit the new and fascinating character of the concept of the Foundation for the Centre against Expulsions, whichwould commemorate all the forced migrations and expulsions in twentieth-century Europe, this and political background of Centre, the issueand makes somewhatcounhesitant historical to speak openly about the plans of the otherGermans Eastern European tries suspicious of growing conservatism in German historical consciousness.
4. Commemoration of Negative Historical Heritage in the European Framework: Learning from the Holocaust Remembrance As discussed above, the forced migrations and expulsions in twentieth-century Europe were not a problem of any individual bilateral interstate relationship. erefore problems concomitant to these forced migrations, especially the remembrance of this historical process, cannot always be dealt with effectively and properly through bilateral dialogue. To resolve the conflicting perspectives, efforts have to be made by the European community itself. Finally, I would like to discuss the activities in remembrance of the Holocaust, in which European countries have already begun to take initiatives for creating a cooperative framework. With the developments in European integration, the importance of researching, remembering and handing down information concerning the Holocaust is increasingly recognised as a challenge for Europe. While Holocaust education has not been incorporated into the legitimate education curriculum in each country yet, interests in research and education about the Holocaust have become more and more intense
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in Europe. Efforts for the creation of a future Holocaust education programme in the European framework are being made at various levels. For example, the Swedishgovernment established a‘Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research’ in Stockholm in May 1998. Begun with three countries, Sweden, the USA and Britain, the Task Force was joined by Israel and Germany in September 1998, and by France, Holland and Poland in March 1999. e Task Force currently has twenty member countries, mainly from Europe. e purpose of the Task Force is ‘to place political and social leaders’ support behind the need for Holocaust education, remembrance, and research both nationally and internationally.’ is organisation supports projects such as teacher seminars on the theme of the Holocaust, publication of educational pamphlets, educational materials and research papers, and information services.28 In addition, the Swedish government invited the representatives of forty-six countries to Stockholm in January 2001, held the first ‘Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust’ and provided a forum for discussion concerning education, remembrance and research about the Holocaust. e declaration, which was adopted at the Forum, reads as follows: With humanity still scarred by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, the international community shares a solemn responsibility to fight those evils. … We share a commitment to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and to honour those who stood against it. We will encourage appropriate forms of Holocaust remembrance, including an annual Day of Holocaust Remembrance, in our countries.29 Commemoration of ethnic cleansing and forced migrations in twentieth-century Europe and prevention of further violence in the future also need to be discussed not in a single country but in the pan-European community. In April 2004, shortly before the EU’s eastern enlargement, the ministers of education of Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria met and made a decision to establish a ‘European Network against Forced Migrations and Expulsions.’ ey agreed to promote networking of memorial museums and research institutions in European countries, to accept the participation of organisations of forced migration victims within the network, to hold another meeting in October 2004 and to let experts develop the design of the network in the future.30 Unfortunately, to judge from developments up to the present date, we cannot be optimistic about the future of the network, but even so it should be positively evaluated as the first step toward overcoming the negative heritage of twentieth-century Europe.
http://taskforce.ushmm.org/ http://www.holocaustforum.gov.se/ 30 Ein Zentrum wird vertrieben, intaz, 24.4.2004. 28 29
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THE ROMA AND ETHNOCUL TURAL JU STICE: TOWARDS A MODEL OF INTEGRATION * Dragoljub B. Ðorđević Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, University of Nis, Serbia and Montenegro Marijana Filipović Faculty of Philosophy, University of Nis, Serbia and Montenegro ‘…Without recognising the importance of ethnocultural justice, And without basic arrangements that would assure some balance Among ethnic aspirations, the process of modernisation cannot start to unfold. e society might very well wish economic well-being But will remain unable to make purposeful 1
And concentrated efforts to achieve it.’
Global Multiculturalism as a Fact and the Problem of Solving the ‘Living Together’ Issue e question of different communities’ living together is maybe one of the oldest social issues. Since the beginning of the world, there has always been the same problem – how can two, three or more, more or less similar or different groups of people be organised to live on the same territory, at the same time, without avoiding or hating each other. e very question emerged because of the fact that although there are numerous unpopulated territories on Earth, the majority of places have multiple ‘owners,’ or at least people who are trying to be that. Multiculturalism has long since
is paper was written under the project (1310) on ‘Cultural and Ethnic Relations in the Balkans – Possibilities of Regional and European Integration’ implemented at the Faculty of Philosophy, Niš, and financed by the Ministry for Science and Technology of the Republic of Serbia. 1 Várady, Tibor. 2001. ‘On the Chances of Ethnocultural Justice in East Central Europe,’ in Kymlicka, Will and Magda Opalski (eds.).Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?Western Political eory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press, p. 136 *
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become a global fact, a practice that is only confirmed by exceptions. Naturally, parallel with multi-culturisation, there was a process of scientific verification of the concept and analyses of the co-living phenomena. A number of different theories, which first of all depended on the particular groups in question, were produced. at is why it is not surprising that until recently, thinking about multiculturalism referred mainly to particular needs of people such as immigrants, and it started being connected with structural changes in contemporary society only ten years ago.2 e idea of ethnocultural neutrality represents the answer of the majority of Western, liberal academics – such as Walzer, Ignatieff and Pfaff – to the question of organising ethnocultural variety.3 According to these authors, states should be liberal on this question, which practically means that they should be indifferent towards the ethnic identities of their citizens and their representations. Ethnicity is seen as something that people may pursue, but only in their private lives and as long as the others are not endangered. e state should be neutral regarding the language, history, literature, and other ethnic or cultural characteristics of the people who live in it. e United States of America is usually given as an example of ethnocultural neutrality because the country does not have an official language which is defined as such by its Constitution.4 Ignatieff and Pfaff5 have gone even further, claiming that the existence of ethnocultural neutrality is actually the factor that distinguishes liberal, civic nations from illiberal, ethnic nations. While liberal nations are defined through belonging based on acceptance of democratic values and principles, and are completely uninterested in ethnocultural identities, illiberal nations are founded on the reproduction of a particular ethnocultural identity. e principle of ethnocultural neutrality, according to Kymlicka,6 has oen been used as an excuse for refusing any demands that minorities would have and which would go further than the basic individual civil and political rights. is principle has a lot of shortcomings and it is not feasible in real life. If we take the USA as an example, as a country that is usually cited as a prototype of the liberal state, we will see that despite the official neutrality there is a great number of systematic mechanisms that are far from indifference and practically promote integration into a particular ethnocultural group. Although the English language is not constitutionally defined as the official language, there is a legal act requiring children to learn English at school; in addition, one of the criteria for acquiring American citizenship is the ability to speak English. In this way, a hegemony of the English language has been established, because English has become the first language of public use, pushing other languages Semprini, Andrea. 1999.Multikulturalizam, Beograd: CLIO. Kymlicka, Will and Magda Opalski (eds.). 2001.Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political eory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. p. 16. 2 3
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aside. Kymlicka thinks that the story does not end with the usage of the language issue and that it is far from accidental – that is, far from being the exception that confirms the rule. Namely, the process described above was undertaken in order to promote the integration into something that he calls societal culture. Under this syntax, Kymlicka understands a territorially concentrated culture, which is based on a common language used in a great number of societal institutions that cover the full range of human activities in public and private life. e American government has intentionally promoted integration into such a societal culture so that it could provide citizens with access to institutions that base their existence and work on the English language. Kymlicka believes that the model of ethnocultural neutrality is a myth which cannot be achieved in real life and which needs to be replaced with a more realistic model of ‘nation-building.’ is model is almost entirely based on the promotion of the societal culture that includes the majority of citizens, although it is also possible that a government might support the existence of two or more societal cultures within one state. Positive examples of this can be found in Switzerland, Canada, Spain, and Belgium. e tools of the nation-building model are the use of one language, development of the national media, promotion of national symbols and holidays, naming of streets, rivers, and mountains aer national heroes or events. e model is present in almost all liberal democratic countries and it was applied in their building. e basic mechanisms or means for establishing one dominant societal culture are: introducing an official language, a uniform system of education, acceptance of the policy of migration and naturalisation, altering of administrative regions in order to lessen the share of minorities in them, and centralisation of power. e nation-building model is so widespread and accepted that despite the positive examples of existence of more than one societal culture, one can question whether this model is fair to minorities. Or, to quote Kymlicka himself, ‘the standard for evaluation of minority rights isn’t ethnocultural neutrality any more but ethnocultural justice.’7 Although he does not say explicitly that nation-building affects minorities destructively, Kymlicka nonetheless claims that if there are a language and culture that are being supported by the state and at the same time represent a frame for the functioning of the economy, politics and other social subsystems, this means that the people who recognise this particular language and culture as their own have a big advantage. As far as East European countries are concerned, Kymlicka believes that they do not even pretend to be ethnoculturally neutral and that they are trying to apply the nation-building model. is practically means that these countries are working for the spread of a common societal culture on their entire territory. Considering that this model is taken from liberal countries, where the minority question does not constitute the foundations and reason for conflicts and instabilities, one may say that East European countries are obviously applying and putting the above-mentioned mechanisms in different contexts. Kymlicka talks about nine differences in applying the na7
Ibid. p. 21.
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tion-building model observed between liberal (Western) and illiberal (East European) states. ose differences are: the level of coercion which is used in order to promote common national identity; more restrictive concept of public sphere and more expansive concept of private sphere in which differences are tolerated; banning speech or political parties which are against integration into the unique national identity; definition of the national community; narrowly defined concept of national identity; valuing or non-valuing the nation as the highest value in society; attitude towards cosmopolitanism in national identity; attitude towards dual nationality; and, attitude towards minorities which are territorially grouped and do not accept the official model of national identity. Having in mind the history of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, the following question must be posed: How does applying the liberal model of nation-building as a dominant way of solving co-living affect minorities? It has been shown that this model, combined with more extreme variants of the above-mentioned nine factors, does not give good results and that states are faced with growing demands of minorities for autonomy and greater alienation from the preferred societal culture. Finally, Kymlicka thinks that when minority groups find themselves within the project of nation-building, they have four possible options of reacting to it: 1. they can emigrate; 2. they can accept integration and discuss the fair terms of integration so that they would not lose their identity; 3. they can fight for autonomy and in that way preserve their, parallel to the official, societal culture; and, 4. they can accept permanent marginalisation.8 Emigration is possible only if there is a country, which would be ready to accept the particular minority group. If such a country does not exist, there is a danger that the minority group would only make other countries angry since they would have to deal with it. Integration can be perceived as the best solution, but it implies big responsibility on the part of the minority group, very strong identity, as well as the existence of a self-conscious cultural and political elite that would negotiate the integration terms. Integration also presupposes readiness of the state to negotiate and assure a favourable climate for minorities so that they can then join the societal culture. Forming an independent societal culture has proved to be a good solution in some liberally oriented countries; however, it again relies on the strong identity and the will of the state to ‘share’ the public sphere within its borders. Finally, permanent marginalisation seems to be the easiest, but also the most tragic solution. However, minorities that lack either well-developed self-consciousness or identity are very likely to slowly slip into that direction. 8
Ibid. p.22.
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Multiculturalism in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia: e Roma as a Model of Ethnocultural Justice It seems that multiculturalism, or any other ‘multism,’ is especially true for the Balkans. e territory occupied by the former Yugoslavia (SFRY), as well as Romania, Bulgaria or parts of Greece, has constantly been populated by a mixture of different peoples. Moreover, it has also been a scene of conflicts that flared up precisely because of multiculturalism. is brings us to the general question of the relationship between the status of minorities and ethnocultural justice in these regions and, more specifically, in the area of Southeast Serbia, East and Central Bulgaria, and Northwest Macedonia. e basic characteristic of the three regions is undoubtedly the diversity of their population. ere is hardly a single square metre here, which is not populated by two or more different ethnic, cultural, religious or other groups. Furthermore, there is hardly a single square metre without a presence of majority-minority relationship; this relationship is so complicated that a particular group may simultaneously constitute the majority in one area and a minority just a couple of kilometres away. Bulgarians, Macedonians, Serbs, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs are found in all of the regions, and their status depends on the history, the surrounding population, organisation, existence and support of the kin-state, but also on the attitudes of the states towards the minority question. To compare the situation regarding multicultural reality and application of ethnocultural justice in the countries in question, we decided to focus on Roma as a group that lives in all three regions. East European governments in general, and especially the governments of the countries that are being discussed here, have oen been criticised by Romani leaders and activists for not paying enough attention to the Romani question. On the other hand, having in mind that Roma in the earlier communist systems of these states were not even recognised, and that now all three countries constitutionally and by other legal acts protect Roma’s rights to be educated in their mother tongue, and also to be politically, culturally and religiously organised, it seems that things are moving in a positive direction. Macedonia, for example, was the first of all other ex-Yugoslav states to recognise Roma as a national group, while the Macedonian government was the only one to show a consistent attitude towards this group. According to Barany,9 the governments in Skopje have always viewed Roma as a truly integral part of society; it was maybe in the context of problems with the ‘problematic’ Albanian minority that they realised that it was better to have a positive attitude towards the solution of the minority question. Barany further believes that Bulgaria, on the other hand, showed great passivity towards Roma until 1997. He sarcastically comments that the best thing which 9 Barany, Zoltan. 2002. e East European Gypsies. Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics, Cambridge University Press.
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Bulgarian governments did in this period for Roma was actually the fact that they did not mention them much in a racial or anti-Gypsy context. is changed aer the government of Ivan Kostov won the elections, since the government not only expressed a wish to integrate Roma into Bulgarian society but it also founded offices, which would work on this issue. Finally, this government, helped by Romani and international non-governmental organisations, elaborated a national programme for integration of Roma.10 As regards Serbia, the minority question in general and the Romani question in particular is far from being solved. Alpar Lošonc is one of the authors who claim that the biggest problems in solving the minority question are to be found exactly in the wider social, political and legal context.11 Using Vojvodina as an example, he states that the ethnic map has been changed radically and that the minorities’ share of the total population has decreased, which negatively affects their chances in society. e reason for this Lošonc sees in the fact that there is no coordinated commitment on the part of the power-holders to minorities, as well as in the fact that since the 1990s the institutional structure of minorities has been destroyed – these institutions have oen been used as statistical examples, as a décor, but the real chances for using them are rather small. Finally, Lošonc concludes that Serbia in particular has a problem regarding this question since its institutional capacity concerning ethnic diversity is very weak.12
Integration as a Way Out? Despite the relatively bleak present, but also the gloomy predictions for the foreseeable future, we accept Várady’s statement that without constructive solutions for the minority question no country in the region could completely transform and progress. Co-living of different ethnocultural groups is imperative, whereas the ways in which we will achieve it is a field where we can show our creativity. is is especially true for Roma. Namely, having in mind the strategy of minorities for responding to the nation-building project discussed by Kymlicka, both Roma and the countries in the region are faced with a turning point: integration or permanent marginalisation! 10
See more in Social Integration of the Roma Population in Bulgaria.2000. UNDP; as well
as Framework Programme on Integration of Minorities, in which there is a special section on the Roma. Also in: Mitev, Petar-Emil. 2004. ‘Ethnic Relations in Bulgaria: Legal Norms and Social Practice,’ in Bašić, Goran et al.Prospects of Multiculturality in Western Balkan States, Belgrade: ERC/FES. 11 Lošonc, Alpar. 2003. ‘Multikulturalnost i etnokulturni diverzitet s posebnim osvrtom na Srbiju,’ in: Bašić, Goran (ed.).Demokratija i multikulturalnost u JugoistočnojEvropi, Beograd: Centar za istraživanje etniciteta. 12 Romi: More on the status of the Roma in Serbia in Đorđević, Dragoljub B. (ed.) 2004. od zaboravljene do manjine u usponu, Niš: OGI.
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Emigration is unrealistic for Roma since there isn’t a single state, which would accept them without hesitation. Suffice it to recall that many Romani families were expelled literally overnight from Germany and other countries in Western Europe although these families went there as refugees from Kosovo. Autonomy as a solution for Roma is also unrealistic because they are not territorially concentrated anywhere in this region. Autonomy presupposes the existence of very strong feelings of group belonging, that is, national identity, which, especially knowing the results of the last public census in Serbia (2002), is not true for Roma. Apart from national identity, autonomy also requires the existence of well-organised political, cultural and educational institutions. Roma have started to work in this field, but the Romani elite, on whom many of these depend, is still extremely disunited. Kymlicka himself mentions the problem of integration of Roma. While discussing the theory of ethnocultural justice, he compares African Americans and Roma, and wonders if some integration models could be applied to Roma. Kymlicka puts Roma in the ‘difficult cases’ category because he cannot easily categorise them into any of the groups (national minorities, immigrants, and metics13). e idea that Roma could be compared to African Americans is based on the fact that both groups lack territorial concentration, as well as that they are situated at the bottom of society wherever they might live. Perhaps an even more common characteristic is the fact that both groups are internally divided on the question of preferring integration or demanding recognition as a separate and specific culture. Having these similarities in mind, some authors suggest applying the principle of affirmative action to Roma, a principle that has been applied for years in the USA with respect to the African American minority. However, considering that affirmative action has failed to change the status of African Americans significantly, and considering that there are obviously more differences than similarities between Roma and African Americans (who do not have the problem of a common language and non-understanding, which is one of the key barriers to developing a national identity of Roma; also, the African American struggle for recognition started long before the Romani one, as a result of which they have succeeded in building a large number of institutions that, on one side, serve the interests of African American groups, but on the other, exercise organised pressure on government), Kymlicka thinks that Roma are an East European minority, a specific case for which there is no matching Western model. He, thus, concludes that the Romani groups should negotiate with each separate country about their status, especially since he believes that the attempts to organise Roma as a transnational or European minority have failed primarily because the majority of countries are scared of the idea, but also because many Roma are against it as well.
13 ‘Metics’ is Kymlicka’s term and represents minorities thathave been living in a state for a long time but have for some reasons been excluded (or have excluded themselves) from the ‘polis.’ Groups that form this category are illegal immigrants, Gastarbeiters,and the like.
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Contemplating the same problem, Gheorge and Mirga pose a justified question: Does integration as a strategy for development of the Romani community have any value for Roma? Answering this question, these honourable Romologists problematise, as possible alternatives to integration,separation or complete withdrawal from the majority society, and assimilation or giving up on the identity of a group and joining the dominant societal culture. As noted above, Roma are nowhere concentrated territorially so the very idea of complete territorial separation is alien to them. Moreover, the Romani tendencies are towards the opposite – towards cohesion with the majority community in economic relations. Assimilation is also unacceptable and unrealistic. e reasons could be found both in the almost complete a priori rejection of Roma by other groups, in repressive assimilation acts of the state to which Roma, rightly, react negatively, and in their inability to adjust to the demands of the majority culture. However, even integration requires sacrifices, which we are not sure that states – or even Roma themselves – are ready to make. e positions of both parties are understandable. For states, i.e. for the majority of society, integration of Roma would mean, inter alia, redefining their own identity. e majority society would have to give up widespread stereotypes and prejudices, as well as the policy of the ‘usual suspects’ practised towards Roma for a long time. Roma, on the other side, see a danger in integration because integration can be only one step away from assimilation. Members of the Romani elite, who oppose integration as amodus vivendi of the Romani community, fear that they will lose their own ethnic and cultural identity. If we take into account the fact that the Romani identity is still a stumbling block for the Romani elite and people, and thus has a very shaky basis, such an attitude should not be so easily rejected as irrational. Because, Mirga and Gheorge conclude, identity is not closed and given forever, but it is a changeable construction that depends on and transforms along with internal and external changes and influences. ese authors agree that integration carries a lot of value for Roma and that at present there is no alternative. However, they still leave unanswered the question of what integration should be like and how big a price should be paid for it. On the basis of the majority of reasons discussed above, as well as on our personal beliefs, we consider integration as the only positive solution both for minorities, in this case the Roma, and states. Naturally, as in the case of all notions that have become quite popular in the last decade, many different things have been understood under the label of ‘integration’ – that is why we need to define the term. If we look it up in dictionaries, we will find that integration15 is ‘( l’integratio) restoration, boosting something with whatever is important for it.’ Besides dictionaries, definitions of integration can be found in other theoreticians’ works. us, for example, Heidmets 14
Gheorge, Nicolae and Andrej Mirga. 1997.e Roma in the Twenty-First Century: A Position Paper.Project on Ethnic Relations, Princeton, NJ. 15 Vujaklija, M. 1976. Leksikon stranih reči i izraza, p. 360. 14
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and Lauristin define integration as a process of political and social inclusion of ‘excluded’ groups. making them equally competitive with the majority in the sphere of education and on the market. ey further claim that at the socio-cognitive level, integration means removing the barriers that inhibit minorities from taking part in local social and political life. Veronika Kalmus, the author of the article ‘Is Interethnic Integration Possible in Estonia,’ on the other hand, puts emphasis on tolerance and understanding, and claims that one cannot talk about integration if there is no mutual understanding between the majority population and other minority groups.17 Accepting the basic principles of the above-mentioned definitions of integration, from our point of view, and in respect to Roma, integration is based on: ■ the principle of ethnocultural justice as a way for solving the minority question; ■ the fact that Roma are an ethno-class – that is, that they do not have anything or have very little, live on the brink of poverty, and depend on social welfare; ■ the assumption that Roma agree with living interculturally; ■ the assumption that they agree with the peaceful preservation of their status of an ethno-class; and, ■ the active role of all actors, and especially Roma themselves, who must take responsibility for their place in society. 16
Factors Influencing Integration of Roma Despite the fact that for us, in the situation and under the circumstances described above, integration as a solution to the Romani question does not have an alternative, it is clear that the process will not develop smoothly. us, it is logical to analyse the factors influencing the Romani integration. We categorise them into three groups: state and general social atmosphere; attitudes of the majority and other peoples towards Roma; and factors arising from characteristics and attitudes of Roma themselves. Since we have already discussed the general social atmosphere in one of the previous sections, we will move on to the other two factors. By doing this, we do not claim that the topic is exhausted but we believe that for the purposes of this study there is no need to open further discussions.
Integration of Roma and attitudes of majority peoples towards Roma. In the previous section, we identified the active role of all participants in the integration process as one of the basic principles. Indeed, no matter how much ef16 Kalmus, Veronika. 2003. ‘“Is Interethnic Integration Possible in Estonia?”: Ethno-poDiscourse & Society, Vol. 14(6), pp. 667–697. litical Discourse of Two Ethnic Groups,’ in 17 Ibid.
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forts Roma put into becoming equal with the rest of society, they will not succeed unless other people from the surrounding population perceive them as equal and unless those people see the necessity of structuring living together in a positive and con18 structive way. As is obvious from the results of many research projects conducted in the last couple of years on the territory of the countries under consideration here, ethnic and social distance towards Roma, as one of the most important indicators of the attitudes towards a particular ethnic group, are very pronounced. According to the data obtained during the research project (1310) onCultural ‘ and Ethnic Relations in theBalkans – Possibilities of Regional and European Integration’19 in Northwest Macedonia, the situation regarding this issue is as follows: allhree t dominant groups in the surrounding population (Macedonians, Albanians, Serbs) agree that they wouldn’t marry a Rom (95.6% Albanians, 83.0% Macedonians, and 90.6% Serbs). e results are not so drastic in the case of other elements of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, but despite that a general trend of very strongly expressed social and ethnic distance towards Roma has been noticed in this region. e same study showed that Western Bulgaria is maybe the most open towards Roma. Namely, although 76.9% of Bulgarians, 75.4% of Turks, and only 51.5% of the Vlachs declared that they would not marry a Rom, we can say that generally speaking the percentages are much smaller than the ones in Serbia and Macedonia. is trend of greater openness towards Roma is especially notable in the case of living together (asked if they would live in a neighbourhood with Roma, 48.9% of Bulgarians, 69.3% of Turks, and even 80.0% of the Vlachs replied affirmatively; in the same city would live 59.5% of Bulgarians, 73.7% of Turks, and 82.2% of the Vlachs; an almost identical percentage of them would live in the same country: 59.0% of Bulgarians, 74.6% of Turks, and 82.2% of the Vlachs) and working in the same company (58.4% of Bulgarians, 68.4%of Turks, and 82.2% of the Vlachs would work in the same company with a Rom). Finally, in South-eastern Serbia, ethnic, social and religious distance towards Roma was noticed in all three groups with which Roma live (Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs),and especially in the sphere of marriage – among Albanians it is 98.3%,among Bulgarians 64.4%, and among Serbs 83.5%. Attitudes are almost divided concerning the ethnic orientation of a friend: 50.0% of the Albanians, 74.4% of Bulgarians, and 53.9% of Serbs would have a Rom for a friend, while 44.8% of the Albanians, 20.0% of Bulgarians, and 31.8% of Serbs would not accept a Rom for a friend. As far as the other elements of the Bogardus Scale are concerned, the majority of responses are positive.
For example, studies conducted under different projects by a group of researchers from the Romology schoolof Niš, which included, in addition to one of the authors of thisstudy (Dragoljub B. Ðorđević), sociologistsLela Milošević and Dragan Todorović. 19 e project was financed by the Ministry for Science and Technology of the Republic of Serbia, and was conducted by researchers centred around the Institute for Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy in Niš. 18
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Although the data are not so optimistic, as well as on the basis of research projects conducted before ours,20 the social distance towards Roma can be said to be lessening. Accordingly, one of the authors of this study, Dragoljub B. Ðorđević, in the article ‘e Balkan Non-Roma about the Balkan Roma,’21 comes to the following conclusions: ‘e non-Roma of the Balkans – that is Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria – in respect to the Balkan Roma in most cases agreed with the following: 1. ey rejected the racist idea of expelling Roma, their good neighbours, somewhere else, in another town or country (60.4%); 2. Burying Roma in the local cemetery is accepted (67.4%); 3. Somewhat less than half of them demonstrate religious tolerance and accept joint practice of religious rites with a Rom, co-religionist (45.8%); 4. Direct blood transfusion is accepted while the social distance from Roma is lessened (52.5%); 5. e behaviour of skinheads towards Roma is not supported (94.8%); 6. In a minority percentage the idea of positive discrimination towards Roma is supported (40.1%); and, 7. Roma are an ethno-class (61.4%).’22 Dragoljub B. Ðorđević claims further that in respect to some questions the percentage of undecided is somewhere around one third of the respondents, as established also by our research in the three countries under review. He concludes, and here we agree with him, that the integration of Roma cannot and will not happen as long as there are such high percentages of people who are still far from the practice of multiculturalism and interculturalism.
20 Dragoljub B. Đorđević, for example, showed in the researches that heundertook in the period between 1999 and 2002 that ethnic distance was especially expressed among Albanians, Bosniaks and Serbs, being always higher than 70% and, in some cases as high as 98.4%. Such high percentages were also recorded in the case of accepting the Roma as bosses at work (from 48.5% to 93.5%), while the proposition of accepting the Roma for friends was not rejected by more than 50% of Serbs, Bosniaks and Albanians. ese results are quite different from the re-
sults established by our research project and could indicate that the social distance towards the Roma is lessening. See more about the above mentioned studies in Đorđević, Dragoljub B. 2004. Social, Ethnic and ReligiousDistance Towards Roma of Serbia. And in Dragoljub, B. Đorđević et. al. Romas & Others, Others & Romas. Social Distance, Sofia: Ivan Hadjiyski Institute for Social Values and Structures. 21 Đorđević, Dragoljub. B. 2004. ‘e Balkan Non-Roma about the Balkan Roma,’ in Regionalni razvoj i integracija Balkana u structure EU – Balkanska raskršća i alternative , Niš: Filozofski fakultet – Univerzitet u Nišu. Institut za sociologiju. SVEN. 22 Ibid. p. 598.
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Integration of Roma and characteristics of the Romani communities. When we talk about the connections between integration of Roma and characteristics of the Romani communities, the factors influencing integration are divided into (at least) two groups: the first is general characteristics of Roma, and the second consists of attitudes of Roma towards the questions we consider important for the success of the integration project. As far as the first group of factors is concerned, it comprises all current problems found in all of the countries in which Roma live: the problem of identity, territorial 23 sparseness, and ethnic distance towards the other peoples. According to Hancock, it is very difficult to define and promote a group of characteristics, which can be called Romani identity. e reasons are to be found in: ■ Romani tendency to hide their identity in public situations; ■ Problem of ownership of identity: Roma are usually told who they are, usually by politicians and academics outside the Romani group; ■ Non-existence of consensus about history: even data on where Roma arrived in Europe, when that happened, how it happened, are subject to debate. Revealing the real history is thus for Hancock a condition for solving the identity problem; ■ e questions of dual identity: disagreements between ‘real,’ Indian identity, and ‘European’ identity; ■ e question of ‘Indian’ identity: common Roma either do not worry much about this side of their identity or claim that for them even Indians are Gadjé and that they cannot identify with India; and, ■ Non-existence of the kin-state. Apart from these general identity problems which are common for all Romani communities, there are those which are more common for the region in question here – that is, for the Balkan Roma. ese characteristics result from conflicts between different groups of Roma (for example, Orthodox Roma versus Muslim Roma; indigenous Roma versus Roma refugees), recent ethnic conflicts in the region which created an atmosphere in which Roma were not only expected to take sides but also to state to which side in the conflict they belong to – Serbian or Albanian. Finally, ethnically aggressive surroundings have given rise to more extreme versions of the struggle for identity, to which, according to some sociologists,24 the Romani elite reacted by promoting nationalistic tendencies. Hancock, Ian. 2003. We Are the Romani People, University of Hertfordshire Press; Hancock, Ian. e Struggle for the Control of Identity, retrieved March 2002 from the World Wide Web: geocites.com/Paris/5121/Identity.htm; Hancock, Ian. Origins of the Romani People, retrieved October 2002 from the World Wide Web: geocites.com/Paris/5121/srcins.htm 24 Jovanović, Ðokica. ‘Roma Mimicry – the Last Resort,’in Todorović, Dragan (ed.). 2003.Culture in the Processes of Development, Regionalisation and Eurointegration of the,Balkans Niš: SVEN. 23
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Ethnic distance, as one of the barriers to successful integration,has also been noticed among Roma, although to a much smaller extent than the distance, which other people in the surrounding population show towards them. In the research that we undertook in the regions of Northwest Macedonia, Eastern and Central Bulgaria, and Southeast Serbia, we found the following data, which refer to ethnic distancing of Roma towards the other nations. In Serbia, for all modalities of the Bogardus Scale except for the question of multiethnic marriages, Roma in respect to Serbs give a very high percentage of positive answers – from 89.3% of agreement to have Serbs for bosses, to 98.1% of agreement to have Serbs for friends, to live with them in the same city or country. Ethnic distance towards Bulgarians is characterised by a somewhat smaller number of positive answers, but still very big. us, for example, 87.3% of the Roma in Southeast Serbia would live in the same city and country with Bulgarians, and 84.5% of them would work in the same company. High positive percentages are also found when we talk about potential friendship between Roma and Bulgarians (76.7%) and when Roma talk about Bulgarians as potential neighbours (79.6%). In addition, more than half of the interviewed Roma would have Bulgarians for bosses (62.1%), while 23.3% would not accept this practice. e only case in which slightly more than half of Roma had a negative attitude and expressed higher ethnic distance towards Bulgarians is in the case of marriage, where 51.9% of Roma would not marry a Bulgarian, whereas 32.7% would. It is interesting to see that in this modality we also have 15.4% undecided. Finally, we can say that the Roma in Southeast Serbia express the highest ethnic distance towards the Albanians. e percentage of those Roma who would marry a member of Albanian nationality is relatively small, 16.5%, while the percentage of those who would not is 66.0%. In this case too there are 17.5% undecided. e most positive answers Roma from the sample gave in respect to living in the same country (63.7% for and 29.4% against) and in the same city (66.0% for and 29.1% against), acceptance to work with Albanians in the same company (66.0% for and 29.1% against), and to have an Albanian for a neighbour (60.6% for and 32.7% against). On the other hand, slightly more than half of the respondents would accept an Albanian for a friend (51.0%), while 36.5% would not. It seems that the most difficult was the question of accepting an Albanian for a boss, considering that 45.6% of Roma answered positively and 41.7% negatively. In this case 12.6% were neutral. In Central and Eastern Bulgaria, we came to the following data on the ethnic distance that Roma express towards other surrounding nations. We chose for comparison Bulgarians, Vlachs, and Turks. It can be said that Bulgarian Roma are the most open to Bulgarians, considering that they expressed very positive attitudes concerning almost all modalities of the Bogardus Scale: 79.5% of the Roma in Bulgaria would have a Bulgarian for a friend or for a boss, while 88.0% of them would work in the same company with Bulgarians; 92.8% of the interviewed Roma in Bulgaria would live in a neighbourhood with Bulgarians, while 95.2% of them would live in the same country, and 96.4% would live in the same city. e only modality regarding which
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those who expressed negative attitudes are a statistically significant percentage is marrying a Bulgarian, and it is 19.3% versus 63.9% of those who expressed positive attitudes on this question. It seems that the Roma of Eastern and Central Bulgaria are the most distanced from the Vlachs, considering that 56.6% of them would not marry a Vlach. It is also interesting to note that the highest percentage of undecided answers is related to attitudes towards Vlachs: 25.3% of Roma could not decide about marrying Vlachs, 23.0% of Roma were undecided about whether they would have a Vlach for a friend, 41.0% about whether they would live in a neighbourhood with Vlachs, and 49.4% about whether they would have a Vlach for a boss. Surprisingly high percentages of undecided are also found in the modality of living together in the same city (26.5%) and in the same country (27.7%). On the other hand, if we exclude intermarriage, there are almost no negative answers, while the positive answers range from 38.6% of those who would have a Vlach for a boss to 71.1% of Roma who would live in the same town and country with Vlachs. When we talk about the distancing of Roma in Central and Eastern Bulgaria from Turks, the general impression is that the ethnic distance is small because the respondents gave very positive answers to almost all modalities of the Bogardus Scale, with a very small percentage of negative answers. e exception is marrying a Turk, where 50.6% of the interviewed Roma expressed positive attitudes and 34.9% negative. In almost all other modalities, negative attitudes do not cross the threshold of statistical relevancy. Neutral responses are not an exception in this case either, but they are not as drastic as in the case of attitudes towards Vlachs; they are found on the questions of marrying a Turk (14.5%), having a Turk for a friend (25.3%), living in the same neighbourhood with a Turk (12.0%), working in the same company (15.7%), and having a Turk for a boss (19.3%). As far as Northwest Macedonia and distancing of Roma from other surrounding nations are concerned, the study found that ethnic distance was most pronounced towards the Albanians, but not drastically. Negative answers prevail only to the question about marrying an Albanian (78.6% negative versus 17.3% positive answers). Although negative answers are to be found in other modalities, they do not exceed 24.0%, whereas positive answers range from 70.4% who would have an Albanian for a friend, through 74.5% who would live in the same neighbourhood with Albanians, 78.6% who would have an Albanian for a boss, 84.7% of Roma who would live in the same city with Albanians, 85.7% who would work in the same company with them, to 86.6% who would live in the same country with Albanians. In respect to the Macedonians and Serbs, the Roma from Northwest Macedonia gave statistically significant negative responses only to the first question on the Bogardus Scale. us, 55.1% of Roma would not marry a Macedonian, and 57.1% would not marry a Serb. Other modalities are characterised by an extremely high percentage of positive answers concerning both Serbs and Macedonians: 94.0% and over. We do not intend to analyse the present data in depth here (all the more so considering that a number of our colleagues from the research team are doing this) but simply to use the results to illustrate our own attitudes and come to some conclusions
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that could be helpful when discussing possibilities of integration. us, looking at the given results, we conclude the following: ■ Comparing the aspirations of the surrounding majority/other peoples with the attitudes of Roma, we noticed a tendency for Roma in all three countries to ethnically distance themselves less than the others; ■ Less social distance was also recorded towards the dominant/majority peoples in the country: the Roma in Serbia expressed the least ethnic distance towards Serbs, the Roma in Bulgaria expressed the least ethnic distance towards Bulgarians, and finally, the Roma in Macedonia expressed the least ethnic distance towards the Macedonians; ■ In Serbia and Macedonia, Roma expressed the largest ethnic distance towards the Albanians, which can be read in the light of the events from the last five years in the region; ■ In Bulgaria we recorded the highest percentage of those who could not express an opinion – that is, neutral ones. Such answers appeared in Serbia as well but far less frequently, and they were almost non-existent in Macedonia. e general conclusion is that neutral answers are never expressed towards the majority people in the country. ese generalisations can be interpreted in different ways. Firstly, it can be said that they only express and confirm the noticed a long time ago conformity of Roma. is thesis is supported by the fact that Roma expressed the smallest ethnic distance precisely towards those on whom their future depends the most – towards the majority peoples in the countries under review. Furthermore, ethnic distance was relatively more pronounced towards those peoples with which the majority people were in conflict or still have some unresolved issues. On the other hand, the same generalisations can be interpreted differently – namely, as indicating an openness on the part of Roma and a readiness to live, work, and profoundly share the same space with others; in other words, that Roma are ready to integrate into the societies in question. Whichever path we decide to take, the fact remains: the majority of Roma are neutral on some questions. Even this can be used for different purposes, and we suggest that it should be interpreted and used in a positive way – neutral attitudes are those which can still be influenced by the integration idea. e attitude of Romani leaders towards integration is one of the factors that will strongly influence the future of Romani communities, because the Romani political, cultural and intellectual elites are opinion leaders and a side in the negotiation process with other nations. However, the Romani elites do not have unified attitudes towards integration and this further complicates the issue. Osman Balić, for example, is ‘the loudest opponent ofintegration, especially when it concerns Roma. Who do they want to integrate, he and his supporters are asking – us Roma? Haven’t we been living mixed with Serbs on this territory for the last millennium? We somehow live together
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and I wonder who came up with the idea of this integration; we are not newcomers, like the Chinese, or some intruders that should be taught order.We are an autochthonous minority and we need every kind of support to emancipate ourselves from many things and become closer to the majority.’25 Balić is primarily calling for emancipation, which is perceived as a process that occurs within the Romani ethnos and that essentially consists in defining the Romani identity, education, and lessening of poverty. e term and at the same time the concept that should replace integration is becoming closer, and he justifies its use by the fact that ‘Roma are at the bottom of the social hierarchy of power in most of the countries they live in.’26 Although Osman Balić’s attitudes can be a reference point for a detailed analysis and debate on which process is important for the Romani minority and which concept should be applied, we will not do that here. Instead, we will only note that integration includes becoming closer and does not rely only on the activity of one side, namely, the Romani. Furthermore, integration does not oppose emancipation; moreover, emancipation, in the way Balić defines it, is a basis for positive integration since its result should be a self-conscious Romani community, which is a precondition for equal status in the process of integration.
Integration and the attitudes of Roma towards some integration modalities. Apart from the first two groups of factors that we discussed earlier, the success of the integration model depends on the attitudes of Roma towards certain issues which are manifestly or latently connected with its essence. Wewill here focus only on three issues: the minority question, the national identity question, and the question of changes/reforms. ese factors are analysed through groups of questions, which were posed to Roma during our research project. We started from more general and moved towards more specific factors, hoping that we would ultimately get a clearer picture about which model of integration, i.e. treatment of minorities in general, would be more adequate for Roma. Roma and the minority question. e minority issue is one of the key questions of every state in the contemporary world not only because of the development in the sphere of individual and group human rights, but also because of the fact that finding a solution is crucial for the future of a large number of countries – especially the socalled ‘young democracies,’ such as Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia. Reality shows that so far the minority question has been approached from the majority’s point of view, i.e. from the standpoint of the majority’s opinion about what minorities need and what they can and are allowed to be ‘given.’ Practices presupposing active participation of minorities in defin ing the conditions of their being in a particular situa25 ‘Romi od zaboravljene do manjine u usponu. Razgovor Dragoljuba B. Đorđevića i Osmana Balića,’ inRomi od zaboravljene do manjine uusponu, Niš: OGI 2004. p. 44. 26 Ibid. p. 45.
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tion, irrespective of declarative acceptance of equality and egalitarianism, have so far largely depended on the dominant majority. However, if we want, even in theory, to apply principles of ethnocultural justice, the opinion of minorities about solving the minority question is very important. And who if not Roma could offer a more fruitful insight into that question? eir attitude is very important also because of the fact that they are a minority in all of the three countries in question (Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia). In the group of questions related to the issues noted above, we asked Roma to express their opinion about the general living conditions of minority groups, about the conditions in which they live, about problems influencing their status in society. Looking at the interviewed Roma from Central and Eastern Bulgaria, it is interesting to note the very high percentage of undecided Roma. On the other hand, the ratio between those who agree and those who disagree with the given statements is almost equal. us, for example, 36.2% of Roma totally and largely disagree with the statement that national minorities and ethnic groups are being granted excessive rights in society, while 18.0% of Roma totally and largely agree with the same statement. Rather surprising are the 45.8% of Roma who were undecided here. Opinions are even more divided on the question of the responsibility for the poverty of national minorities: 33.8% of the Roma in Bulgaria totally and largely disagree with the statement that national minorities are poor because their members aren’t enterprising and educated, 34.9% of Roma totally and largely agree with this statement, while 31.3% of them could not choose an answer. We found similar responses to the question whether the majority people should make all important decisions in society: 53.0% of Roma were undecided, 25.3% totally and largely disagreed with this statement, while 21.7% of Roma totally and largely agreed. It is also interesting to note that even 73.2% of the respondents from this group of Roma could not state their opinion on whether nationally and religiously homogenous states are more progressive than multinational and multi-religious states. e percentage of those who disagreed with this statement is almost insignificant, 8.6%, while 18.3% of Roma agreed. e attitudes of the Roma from Southeast Serbia concerning the above-mentioned statements are almost drastically different from those of the Bulgarian Roma. e very fact that the percentage of undecided is much smaller – that is, the fact that the Roma in Serbia were more inclined to have an opinion about these questions – throws a diffe rent light on the views expressed in the two countries. Also, the attitudes of the Roma in Serbia largely met the expectations of the researchers: the vast majority of Roma (82.4%) disagreed with the statement that minorities have too many rights, as well as with the claim that the majority people should make decisions about all important issues in society (77.7%); 78.7% of Roma also agreed that members of national minorities are to blame for the poverty they live in. e Roma in Southeast Serbia were undecided only about the statement that nationally and religiously homogenous countries are more progressive (37.0%), whereas 44.7% of Roma disagreed, and 18.5% agreed with it.
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We found a similar situation among the Roma in Northwest Macedonia: the percentage of undecided is irrelevant in the case of most of the questions, the respondents having very clear views on most of the statements they were asked about. us, 75.0% of Roma disagree with the statements that national minorities and ethnic groups have too many rights, while 19.0% agree; 80.8% of Roma believe that the majority people shouldn’t be in charge of all important decisions in the state, while 12.1% accept this idea. A significant percentage of undecided responses was recorded in the case of more controversial issues: 39.0% of the Roma from Northwest Macedonia could not decide if the statement that members of minority groups are to blame for their poverty is true, 47.0% disagreed, and 14.0% agreed with it. Finally, 60.6% of Roma believe that nationally and religiously homogenous states aren’t more progressive, 18.2% think that they are, and 21.2% are undecided. e question arises: Why was it so difficult for the Roma from Eastern and Central Bulgaria to state their opinion on statements concerning central issues in their life as a minority community? Or, the question could be asked from the other perspective too: What is it that allows the Roma in Macedonia and Serbia to be certain and to clearly articulate their attitudes? e answers are very important because responsibility for integration into the majority society cannot be taken without a readiness to express one’s opinion in an intelligible and clear way, Here, unfortunately or fortunately, we cannot give conclusive answers to these questions; we can only suggest possible explanations. e Roma in Serbia and Macedonia probably are more certain in their attitudes precisely because the circumstances (ethnic disputes and conflicts, aggressive surroundings) have forced them to have strong opinions. Also, maybe the overall work of Romani leaders on building national identity has been more effective in Serbia and Macedonia. e fact that Romani media are the most developed in Macedonia confirms our thesis. Considering that in both cases we are actually dealing with the issue of identity, as well as its protection,it seems that the key, or at least part of the key, to positive and constructive integration of the Roma lies in the actions during which Romani identity will be defined, explained, accepted. Our conclusion matches the opinion of the Romani leaders who advocate the ideology of Romanipe (or Romanipen). Romanipe is, in essence, cultural and national identity of Roma, but with an important dynamic element since it presupposes constant reformation. Romani leaders see the Romanipe ideology as the answer that Roma should give to majority pressures.27 Strong national identity is one of the postulates for positive integration of Roma, but not the only one. Accepting and taking responsibility for integration is one of the important prerequisites. at is why we asked Roma to express their opinion about what needs to be done in order to improve the status of minority communities. 27 For more on Romanipe, see ‘Romi od zaboravljene do manjine u usponu. Razgovor Dragoljuba B. Đorđevića i Osmana Balića,’ inRomi od zaboravljene od manjine u usponu, Niš: OGI 2004.
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e answers of the Roma from Serbia and Macedonia, on one side, and from Bulgaria, on the other, again differ significantly. While the Roma from Serbia and Macedonia believe that the majority people should show solidarity (37.1% of the Roma in Serbia and 71.7% of the Roma in Macedonia), the Roma in Bulgaria think that it is most important to apply laws (34.9%), although they agree with their fellow Roma from the other two countries that solidarity of the majority people is important (18.1%). e idea of engaging minorities as one of the prerequisites for improving their status is supported by 26.5% of the Roma from Bulgaria and 26.7% of the Roma from Serbia, but it is not even mentioned by the Macedonian Roma. It is good to see that Roma are conscious of the fact that without accepting responsibility for their own destiny they would not be able to change their status. Yet, it is interesting to note that such readiness was not recorded among the Macedonian Roma, who still perceive the majority people and the application of laws – which is the second selected postulate and which again mostly depends on the will of the majority people – as being responsible for their status. Without any desire to justify standpoints and deeds of the majority peoples in the three countries and although, as we pointed out earlier, we agree that without an active role of the majority people there cannot be positive integration, we also believe that Roma are not in a position to transfer all of the responsibility onto somebody else. Integration has to be done by Roma themselves: ‘[T]heir shoulders will have to bear the burden of self-strengthening and self-equipping in order to be able to better and more widely approach and use society’s goods, demonstrate power in social space and gain respect from the wider community.’28 Roma and national identity. While discussing the attitudes of Romani leaders towards integration as well as opinions of academics concerning the integration of minorities, we mentioned as its shortcoming the possibility that integration might ruin the identity of a group that is to be integrated and might grow into assimilation. To prevent this from happening, we concluded and subsequently confirmed that consciousness of one’s own identity is critically important. at is why in our research we were interested to know what Roma’s attitudes towards this were. Before talking about and interpreting the results, we must note that some questions from the questionnaire which we chose to illustrate the attitude to identity are many-layered and do not exclusively refer to the segment that interests us: some of them are more related to ethnocentrism. Despite these shortcomings, we nevertheless decided to include them in our analysis hoping that they will be helpful in a discussion about the integration of Roma. When we look at the results we got during the research and data analysis, we first see that the percentage of undecided Roma in the sample is very high for all three countries and for almost all questions. Still, we can say that the Bulgarian Roma were 28
Ibid. p. 48.
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the most undecided. As many as 65.1% of them were not sure if the biggest danger to national identity came from the infl uence of foreign ideas and behaviours, compared with 25.0% of the Serbian Roma. ere were no undecided responses to this question by Roma in Macedonia, where the majority (74.0%) clearly stated that they disagreed with the abo ve statement. e majority of Serbian Roma (45.4%) also disagreed with this statement, while one third of them (29.6%) supported it. In Bulgaria, few disagreed with the statement that the biggest danger to national identity comes from foreign influences, while 25.3% agreed. A high percentage of the Bulgarian Roma were undecided about whether a person could feel completely secure only if they lived in a community where the majority was constituted by members of their own ethnic group – 37.3%, although the majority (56.6%) expressed an opinion and agreed with the statement. It is interesting to note that contrary to the Bulgarian Roma, the majority of Serbian (55.5%) and Macedonian (56.0%) Roma did not agree with this proposition. ere were undecided responses in both countries, but their percentage is much lower than in Bulgaria – 15.7% in Serbia and 20.0% in Macedonia. ere are also Macedonian and Serbian Roma who agreed with this statement – 24.0% in Macedonia and 28.7% in Serbia. In addition, exactly half of the Serbian and the Bulgarian Roma agreed with the statement that their people isn’t perfect, but that their cultural tradition is still better than the others,’ while one third (60.6%) of the Roma from Macedonia disagreed. Undecided responses are found in all three samples: Bulgaria leads again with 42.2%, Macedonia follows with 23.2%, and Serbia comes last with 19.4%. Perhaps the most interesting question in this set got the highest percentage of undecided responses in the Macedonian sample: 36.7% of the Macedonian Roma were not sure if their ethnic community possesses any qualities that makes it superior to others. Still, the majority of them (40.8%) rejected this claim, while 22.2% agreed with it. On the other hand, in Bulgaria the majority of interviewed Roma (67.5%) agreed that Roma are superior to other people, while 26.5% of them could not decide. Finally, in Serbia the majority of Roma (62.1%) agreed with Bulgarian Roma and the given statement, 17.6% of them disagreed, and 20.4% were undecided. e Macedonian Roma showed the greatest openness towards the other communities and the smallest readiness to support extreme ethnocentric claims. By doing that, they indirectly showed greater confidence in their own positions and identity. e Serbian Roma are following the same path but to a lesser extent and with a lot of meandering. e most problematic is Bulgaria, both because of the surprisingly high percentage of undecided responses and the fact that almost all who are not undecided think that national identity is in danger because of foreign influences, that they feel most secure when they are surrounded by their co-nationals, and that they are superior to other ethnic groups. Such attitudes of part of the Roma in Serbia and the majority of Bulgarian Roma are worrying and can negatively influence the integration project. Ethnocentric attitudes could be also understood as a result of their own insecurity, which again confirms that the question of strong identity is at the centre of any model of integration.
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Roma and changes. Since integration includes also a dynamic element, and thus presupposes readiness to accept changes and undertake reforms in old ways of thinking and living, developing any kind of integration requires taking into account the attitudes of the minority community, in this case Roma, towards the issue. e opinion that changes always bring something new and modern is widespread. As regards social and political life, people in the Balkans almost always perceive changes in the light of modernisation that comes from other countries, most frequently defined as more developed and progressive. at is why, as Alpar Lošonc 29 also notes, modernisation values are oen perceived as patterns which are foreign to the country’s tradition and heritage. Oen, because of the same reasons, these values are rejected. If we apply this thesis concerning the relations between countries to relations between majorities and minorities in the Balkan states, we may presume that most of the minority communities would have a negative attitude towards the changes that would come from the majority people, i.e. the state as the latter’s representative. Considering that the Romani community is characterised as being very patriarchal and traditional, we may presume that Romani attitudes towards changes would be negative. Let us see what Roma from our sample said about this. e Roma from Serbia expressed rather negative attitudes towards changes. Almost one third of them (56.6%) agreed with the statement that those people who think that every change brings progress are wrong, 57.0% of them said that rebellious ideas of young people do not contribute to the development of society, while 57.0% believed that new things in life should not be accepted without thinking. e attitudes are also divided concerning the statement that aer every change in society things are worse than before: 29.9% of Roma disagreed with this, while 28.9% agreed. e percentage of undecided Roma in the Serbian sample is quite high: undecided responses are found in the case of every statement, with percentages ranging from 25.9% (‘Rebellious ideas of young people contribute to the development of society’), through 27.8% (‘People who think that every change brings progress are wrong’), 30.8% (‘New things in life should be accepted without thinking’), and ending at 41.1% (‘Aer every change in society things are worse than before’). Still, the percentage of undecided responses is again highest in Bulgaria – from 66.3% (‘Rebellious ideas of young people contribute to the development of society’), 61.4% (‘New things in life should be accepted without thinking’), 59.0% (‘People who think that every change brings progress are wrong’), to 48.2% (‘Aer every change in society things are worse than before’). If we exclude the fact that two thirds of the Bulgarian Roma cannot state their opinion on almost every question, we can say that the attitudes of the rest of the Roma from the Bulgarian sample towards the changes are divided. Namely, while 35.0% of them believe that people who think that every change brings progress are wrong, and 37.4% of the Bulgarian Roma agree with the statement that aer every change in society things are worse than before, the major29
Lošonc, ‘Multikulturalnost i etnokulturni diverzitet s posebnim osvrtom na Srbiju.’
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ity of Roma in Bulgaria agree that rebellious ideas of young people contribute to the development of society (21.7%) and that new things in life should be accepted without thinking (25.3%). e situation in Macedonia is not simple either: while the majority of Roma from Macedonia believe that those who think that every change brings progress aren’t wrong (46.9%) and that rebellious ideas of young people do not contribute to the development of society (67.7%), 45.4% of them do not accept the statement that aer every change in society things are worse than before, and 43.5% agree that new things in life should be accepted without thinking. To make things even more complicated, undecided responses appear in this sample as well and comprise one third of all responses to the statements ‘Aer every change in society things are worse than before’ and ‘New things in life should be accepted without thinking.’ While trying to identify the general trends in Roma’s attitudes towards changes, we cannot avoid saying a few words about the ways in which the questions in the questionnaire were formulated. We think that it is very possible that the fact that the questions were not sufficiently precise may have contributed to the very high percentage of undecided responses. Yet even so, the questions were very helpful and although they might have failed to produce answers they have nevertheless opened new chapters in the debate on the integration of Roma. Actually, we could interpret the relatively negative attitudes of Roma towards changes as a result of the fact that in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Serbia, in the last ten years, many things were started but very few of them have been really brought to an end. is may also explain the differences in the strength of negative attitudes between the Roma in the three countries. Namely, the Serbian Roma were most negative about changes and that can be understood in the light of the fact that in Serbia there are constant changes of laws, rules, regulations, every government introduces their own reforms which are then cancelled by the next governments – there isn’t an end for non-constructive changes! On the other hand, from the three countries Bulgaria is in the relatively best position – economic and political reforms have brought Bulgaria quick inclusion into the European Union, which means that Bulgaria has reached a particular level of social, political and economic development. For citizens in general, and for the Roma in particular, this means that the years of economising and ‘suffering’ the changes have paid off. Finally, Macedonia is in a relatively better position than Serbia, maybe not so much in economic terms but in terms of politicians’ attempts to preserve the rule of law, which is strongly supported by the international community – Macedonia accepted the latter’s advice and changed its attitude, primarily towards minorities, thus avoiding civil war. It, of course, has not completely solved the minority question but the general impression that Macedonia has moved forward prevails. How to explain such divided responses? For the purposes of this study, the conclusion that Roma’s attitude towards changes is not black-and-white only but includes many shades of grey is sufficient. is conclusion is of real importance because there is always more optimism and possibilities for negotiation among those who are not so
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extreme in their attitudes. In the same way, better understanding of this division requires introducing some other factors for analysis. Finally, it would be good to crosstabulate the attitudes of Roma towards changes and some independent variables, such as place of residence, education, and year of birth. We think that those data would give us a better idea of what and who ‘trips’ changes in the Romani community, which would be an excellent basis for considering specific action. Still, that as well as introducing other factors for analysis, we will leave for another occasion.
In Lieu of a Conclusion While writing this paper, our purpose was to discuss one of the most important questions today – the issue of how different national communities can live together. As we have shown, this problem can be approached from different perspectives, and the solutions that are offered can vary. As our leading idea we accepted Kymlicka’s theory of ethnocultural justice which, inter alia, includes existence of separate space for minorities, more equal share of public space in society, and search for countermeasures to neutralise ethnic recessions and prevent the transformation of the ‘one man, one vote’ principle into ethnic monopoly of majority over minority. Ethnocultural justice can be attained if states define their societal cultures broadly enough and offer space for expressing differences from the official culture, or if they accept and facilitate the existence of a larger number of societal cultures. As far as Roma, as a minority community that interests us here, are concerned, the attitude is clear – although integration into the majority societal culture brings a number of dilemmas, uncertainties or dangers to all sides involved in the process, right now it does not have an alternative. Emigration, self-government and permanent marginalisation are not realistic for the Roma in the Balkans. Moreover, emigration and permanent marginalisation are also undesirable because they face Roma with even bigger problems and distance states from the principle of ethnocultural justice. We have also shown that integration would depend on a large number of factors. Some of them are to be found in the very characteristics of the countries in which Roma live, while others result from the openness or closedness of the surrounding majority people. It is clear that as long as states accept minority communities formally only, i.e. declaratively, integration will remain nothing but a dead letter. Efforts must be made to counter deeply rooted, systematic inhibitory mechanisms that influence the majority of members of minority communities, and especially Roma. Alpar Lošonc,30 while reflecting on these problems, comes to the conclusion that ethnocultural diversity cannot be reduced to agreements between the political elites of majority and minority groups, or to being an element of European integration (which is one of the arguments that politicians have started using a lot recently in the context of solving the minority question). As Lošonc says, ‘In the first case, it would just be 30
Ibid.
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mere expression of interest-driven communion, which threatens the dynamics of interests with instability. In the second case, it would be reduced to a technical element of adjusting to European institutional structures.’31 Lošonc is right to conclude that ‘ethnocultural diversity touches the identity of Serbian [and we add Macedonian and Bulgarian too] society, since one can insist on multiculturalism only through self-rec32 ognition of societal identity by means of ethnocultural diversity.’ Considering the more concrete problems discussed here as well as the state of affairs represented by the research results, we can offer the following conclusions, that is, instructions for further action: 1. Any type of integration, and especially integration of Roma, should be based on building and strengthening the identity of the minority community that is being integrated. If group identity is weak or non-existent, integration is very likely to turn into assimilation. Action to build and strengthen the identity of Roma should be undertaken by all relevant subjects – from Romani non-governmental organisations, educational, political, cultural and information institutions, through important individuals and the Romani elite, to local ‘opinion leaders.’ 2. Positive acceptance of integration of Roma requires a strong sense of selfidentity among the majority community too – if Serbs, Macedonians, Bulgarians have a clear picture of who and what they are, their fears that by integration Roma would take something away from them, as the most important barrier to integration, will lessen. us, parallel with projects of identity building of Roma, there should be projects on strengthening the identity of majority population in a positive sense, and not through negation of other surrounding communities. 3. Studies have shown that there is a distance on the part of the majority and other peoples towards Roma, but that this distance has decreased – which is a positive fact. However, there is still a lot to be done for a positive presentation of Roma and for changing the attitudes of the other peoples. is important role can be played by the media – both national and minority, i.e. Romani. 4. Research has shown, among other things, that Roma do not easily accept changes, therefore an appropriate way should be found for implementing integration in a form that will ensure that integration is not perceived as a novelty introduced from ‘above’ (by the majority people), or as drastic change in the previous way of life. Future action should be planed and taken as a series of small steps before applying radical measures.
31 32
Ibid. p. 198. Ibid. loc. cit.
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5. Finally, recognising and understanding the importance of the fact that Roma themselves must take responsibility for integration. In order for that to happen, there must be a critical mass of Romani leaders who would first agree with the idea of integration and then take concrete steps towards its realisation. We understand that for the time being at least, part of these recommendations are unrealistic. We are also aware of the fact that many factors influencing the integration of Roma have not been taken into account. Without wishing to justify ourselves, we must nevertheless stress that the problem is very complex and demands constant monitoring, adding new factors and maybe omitting some of the old ones. It is also true that we have not discussed any of the attempts that Serbia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia as well as Romani leaders and organisations have already made towards integration. We will leave that for another occasion and discussion.
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TURKISH MIGRATIONS FROM BULGARIA Omer Turan History Department, Middle East Technical University, Turkey eOttomanTurksfirstcametotheBalkans,whichtheycalledRumelia,in1356. Over the next century, they conquered almost all ht e lands of the Peninsula. During the reign of Murad II, they conquered today’s Bulgaria and Macedonia; during the reign of Mehmet II, the Adriatic coasts; during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent, lands up to Szigetvar in Hungary were annexed to the Ottoman territory. Among the Ottoman-controlled Balkan lands, today’s Bulgaria, Macedonia and Greece were most densely settled by Turks. e Ottoman Empire annexed today’s Bulgarian lands in the second half of the fourteenth century. Two hundred and fiy years aer the conquest, those lands had a dense network of Turkish settlements. e Turkoman tribes, which were brought from different parts of Anatolia, sometimes as a 1 reward and sometimes as a punishment, were settled in almost all of today’s Bulgaria. As a consequence of this settlement, the Turkish population became a majority in Chirmen, Sofia, Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, Tatar Pazarcık, Silistra, Razgrad and Varna at the end of sixteenth century.2 Stanford Shaw defines the Ottoman Empire/Turkey as a ‘land of refugees.’ NonTurkish and non-Muslim groups, especially Jews, took refuge in the Ottoman lands in different periods of history when they regarded their situation as insecure in their places of srcin. 3 Generally speaking, as the Ottoman Empire started losing territories at the end of the seventeenth century, people living in those lands and feeling affiliated to the Ottoman Empire or regarding the Ottoman administration asheir t protector be-
Naldöken Turkomans, Tanrıdağı Turkomans, Ofçabolu Turkomans, Vize Turkomans, Kocacık Turkomans and Tartars were the Turkoman groups who were settled in today’sBulgaria. Naldöken Turkomans were settled in Eskihisar-Zagora, Plovdiv and Tatarpazarcık; Tanrıdağı 1
Turkomans in Ruse, Tırnovo, Razgrad and Nikopol. For further information about those Turkoman groups and their settlements, see Yücel, Yaşar. 1985. ‘Balkanlarda Türk Yerleşmesi ve Sonuçları,’ inBulgaristan’da Türk Varlığı , Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, pp. 67–84. 2 Şahin, İlhan, Feridun M. Emecen and Yusuf Halaçoğlu. 1990. ‘Turkish Settlements in Rumelia (Bulgaria) in the 15th and 16th Centuries: Town and Village Population,’ in Karpat, Kemal H. (ed.). e Turks of Bulgaria: e History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority , İstanbul, pp. 26–42. 3 Shaw, Stanford J. 1991.e Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, New York: New York University Press.
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gan to migrate from Crimea, Caucasus, and the Balkans to the lands where Ottoman sovereignty continued.4 In order to regulate migrations to the Ottoman lands and to 5 organise settlements, a refugee commission was established in 1860. Turkish migrations from the Balkans to Anatolia began with the OttomanAustrian wars of 1683–1699. During these wars, the Austrian forces invaded presentday Macedonia, burned the city of Skopje in 1689, and destroyed many of the Ottoman monuments there. In those years, the city’s population was sixty thousand. Almost all of the population le Skopje because of the fire, contagious diseases and Austrian oppression. Some of the Muslims came to Istanbul and established the Skopje quarter in the city.6 Between 1806 and 1812, due to the Serbian, Croatian, Greek and Bulgarian oppression, 200,000 Muslims became refugees in the Balkans.7 According to official Ottoman statistics, more than one million refugees came to the Ottoman lands between 1876 and 1895.8 Approximately 100,000 Bosnians took refuge in the Ottoman lands between 1882 and 1900.9 Beginning with the 1821 Greek Revolt until the 1912– 1913 Balkan Wars, the number of refugees that came from Crete alone was one hundred and thirty thousand.10 Hundreds of thousands of Turkish refugees migrated to Turkey during, as well as in the years aer the Balkan Wars. According to Ahmet Halaçoğlu, the author of a book about migrations from the Balkans to Turkey during the Balkan Wars, nearly 200,000 refugees were settled in Istanbul province in this period. From the beginning of the Balkan Wars to 10 April 1913, the number of refugees that came from Rumelia to Turkey was nearly two hundred thousand.11 According to Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, 200,000 from Western race and 240,000 from Macedonia, or nearly 440,000 Turks migratSaydam, Abdullah. 1997. Kırım ve Kaas Göçleri (1856–1876) , Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. 5 About the establishment of the commission and its activities, see Eren, Ahmet Cevat. 1966. Türkiye’de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri, Tanzimat Devri, İlk Kurulan Göçmen Komisyonu, Çıkarılan Tüzükler, İstanbul. Also, Geray, Cevat. 1962. Türkiye’den ve Türkiye’ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskanları, Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi. 6 Hoca, Nazif. 1986. ‘Üsküb,’ inMEB İslam Ansiklopedisi, Istanbul: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, p. 124. 7 Eren, p. 33. 4
8 Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye’nin 1313 Senesine Mahsus İstatistik-i Umumisi . 1316. İstatistik-i Umumi İdaresi, Nezaret-i Umur-ı Ticaret ve Nafia, İstanbul,p. 27. 9 Bosna Hersek İle İlgili Arşiv Belgeleri (1516–1919). 1992. Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, p. 309; Gölen, Zafer. 1996. ‘Bosna Hersek Hakkında Bir Layiha,’ Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Vol. 2, p. 297. 10 Ağanoğlu, Yıldırım. 2001. Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Balkanların Makûs Talihi Göç , İstanbul: Kum Saati, pp. 40–41. 11 Halaçoğlu, Ahmet. 1994.Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri (1912–1913), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, p. 63.
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ed to Turkey during the Balkan Wars. According to the Helsinki Human Rights Committee, 302,907 Turks between 1912 and 1913, and 276,489 Turks between 1918 and 1941 migrated from Kosovo to Turkey. Erhan Türbedar asserts that when these figures are compared with other sources, they should include also some refugees from Macedonia.13 Unfortunately, we are not able to give a certain figure about migration from Bulgaria to Turkey during the Balkan Wars. e number of Turks who migrated from Romania to Turkey was 113,710 between 1923 and 1938.14 According to Yugoslav sources, 80,000 people migrated to Turkey between 1953 and 1966. Some Turkish sources raise this figure to nearly one hundred and fiy thousand. 15 ese figures will grow if we consider unsystematic migrations from different parts of the Balkans to Anatolia. What they all have in common is that they involved people who fe lt affiliated to the Ottoman Empire and who, in order to save their lives and honour, migrated from lands where Ottoman sovereignty had collapsed due to Austrian or Russian attacks to lands where Ottoman sovereignty continued. Turkish migration from Bulgaria is one of the most tragic migrations that Turks have ever suffered in the Balkans. 12
Russia had been attempting to gain control of the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire since the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774. In this frame, establishment of a satellite Bulgarian state under its control was one of the Russia’s objectives.16 Moreover Russia formed the ‘Bulgaria Commission’ composed of historians, diplomats and soldiers to determine peculiarities of the administration of the planned Bulgaria. During the work of this Commission, it was seen that the Turkish-Muslim population would constitute half of the total population of Bulgaria by the last quarter of the nineteenth century.17 is demographic situation is also confirmed by the researches conducted by 18 the British and the French Consulates as well as the Ottoman yearbooks. e Turkish-Muslim population that constituted half of the future Bulgaria’s population disturbed the pan-Slavic Russian administrators. is great population was regarded as a threat to the existence of a Slav-Orthodox Bulgaria. erefore, ‘to clean the Balkans from the Turkish presence was declared as the objective of the 1877–78 Ottoman-Russian War and the war was planned as a ‘war of races and extermination.’ 12 Bıyıklıoğlu, Tevfik. 1987. Trakya’da Millî Mücadele , Vol. I, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, pp. 92– 93. 13 Türbedar, Erhan. 2003.‘Tarihte Değişen Siyasî ve Sosyal Dengeler İçinde KosovaTürkleri,’ in Türbedar Erhan(ed.). Balkan Türkleri, Balkanlarda Türk Varlığı , Ankara: ASAM, p. 74. 14 Ağanoğlu, p. 332. 15 Türbedar, p. 76. 16 Jelavich, Barbara. 1991. Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806–1914, Cambridge University Press. 17 Turan, Ömer. 1998.e Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 1878–1908, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, pp. 55–57. 18 Ibid., pp. 79–98.
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e races mentioned were the Turkish and Slav races, and extermination refers to the Turkish presence in the Balkans.19 e first Turkish migration from today’s Bulgaria began due to those reasons and in that way. It would not be wrong to call the history of the Turks of Bulgaria after 1877 a history of migration. Special Cossack troops were formed ‘to exterminate’ civilian Turks and Muslims from their places. ose troops attacked and forced those civilians to leave. Cossack troops performed their functions before the main Russian army.20 On 8/20 July 1877, fourteen foreign correspondents wrote and signed the following report: ‘We are foreign press representatives gathered in Shumen. We believe that it is our mission to summarise together the news, which we had sent separately to our newspapers before, related to inhuman actions against innocent and defenceless Muslims in Bulgaria. We record what we witnessedand testimonies of children, women and elderly people who were wounded withspears, swords and guns in Razgrad and Shumen. ose wounded people were telling horrible stories about cruel actions of Russian forces and sometimes of Bulgarians against the Muslims. According to their testimonies, the entire populations of many Muslim villages were massacred while escaping or in their looted villages. Every day new wounded people are coming. We who have put our signatures below have observed that most of the wounded people are children and women, and they had been mostly wounded with swords.’21 e British ambassador Layard, in his report dated 24 July 1877, described the situation to his government as follows: ‘e proceedings of Russians and Bulgarians in Bulgaria and Rumelia convinced the Muslim inhabitants of the provinces and theTurkish government that it was the deliberate intention of Russia either to exterminate the Muslim population by the sword, or to drive it out of the country. ere was to be a general confiscation of the property of the Muslims, which had already commenced. Without any doubt, the shocking outrages, which were committed upon them, either by Russians or Bulgarians under their protection, struck terror amongst the Muslim populations. ey were flying, at Russians’ advantage, to escape the fate of their brethren, and were seeking refuge in the Turkish fortresses and in Istanbul.’22 Ibid., p. 120. Turan, pp. 119–134; McCarthy,Death and Exile, pp. 69–70. 21 Kerman, Zeynep (ed.). 1987.Rusların Asya’da ve Rumeli’de YaptıklarıMezalim. İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları, pp. 24–25. 22 Turan, p. 137. 19 20
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Survivors headed to Istanbul in an unplanned and unconscious way to protect their lives and honour. Because of the great panic the Ottoman authorities could not control events. e vice-governor of Plovdiv sent a telegraph to Istanbul on 12 January 1878, demanding the transfer to Edirne of 15,000 refugees who had been waiting in snow for three days at the Plovdiv station. However, at that time all trains operating the Edirne–Tatarpazarı line were confiscated in order to transfer soldiers, but the order could not be applied because refugees stormed the trains. Still, the refugees could not 23 escape from the attacks of the Russian forces approaching Plovdiv on 14 January. Despite all difficulties, many refugees came to Istanbul. Faced with the misery of this great number of refugees, foreign traders, businessmen and diplomats felt obliged to help them. ey joined aid activities, delivered daily food and supplies, and collected 24 aid from Europe by establishing an international society of aid for refugees. A quarantine was applied to prevent epidemics in the city. In the course of the 1878 peace negotiations between the Ottoman and Russian authorities at the end of the 1877–78 War, the Ottoman delegate Safvet Pasha proposed a population exchange. According to the Turkish proposal, the Turks living north of the Balkan Mountains should have been brought to the south, and Bulgarians living in the south should have been transferred to the north; their property and possessions should have been exchanged mutually. However, the Russian delegation did not accept this proposal. ey probably thought that the Turkish population had already been expelled or 25 would be expelled from their lands so there was no need for such an agreement. e policy of expelling the Turks from Bulgaria and creating a homogeneous Bulgaria during the war continued aer the establishment of a Bulgarian state. As Cengiz Hakov points out, ‘despite their different ideological and political orientation, forcing the Bulgarian Turks to migrate to Turkey has been an unchanged state policy 26 of the Bulgarian governments.’ e Berlin Treaty signed at the end of the war permitted the return of all refugees except the Circassians. ose who trusted the abovementioned provisions of the Treaty and wanted to return were met with obstructions on the part of the Russian authorities. Despite all obstructions, some refugees returned but they were robbed, beaten and even killed. e houses of some had been destroyed or were occupied by Bulgarians, who had been brought in from different places.27 us those who returned to Bulgaria again migrated to the Ottoman lands, losing their hope to live in Bulgaria because of this terrible treatment. İpek, Nedim. 1994. Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Türk Göçleri (1877–1890) , Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, p. 27. 24 Turan, p. 143. 25 Şimşir, Bilâl N. 1985. ‘Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Göç Sorunu,’ inBulgaristan’da Türk Varlığı Bildiriler Kitabı, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, p. 49. 26 Hakov, Cengiz. 2002. ‘Bulgaristan Türklerinin Göçmenlik Serüveni,’ in Celâl Güzel, Hasan, Kemal Çiçek and Salim Koca (eds.).Türkler, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, p. 371. 27 Turan, p. 148. 23
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In the Bulgarian Principality, Turks suffered from oppression of the new authorities on di fferent pretexts, and migrated to Turkey to protect their lives and honour. e Bulgarian gendarmerie or bandits sponsored by the Bulgarian gendarmerie forced the Muslims to migrate by using violence.28 In order to prevent transfer of money to Turkey, buying the property and possessions of Muslims, who wanted tosell their possessions and leave, was forbidden.29 e 1880 law on conscription of the Muslims and 30 the 1882 land tax law were among the reasons that caused migrations of Muslims. As Table 1 shows, according to the reports of the British and the French Consulates nearly 100,000 people came to Turkey from Bulgaria via Port Varna alone between 1879 and 1883. It should be kept in mind that this figure applies only to the number of people who used Port Varna to leave Bulgaria. In addition to them, others le by steamboat from the Danube ports, but we do not know their number. We know that some of them went to Romania but we do not know exactly how many. Table 1 Migration to Turkey from Port Varna Between 1879 and 1880 Period 1879 January–September1880 October–December1880
N umb e r 14,000 18,033 20,798
1881–1882 January–June1883
13,000or14,000 35,000
Source: Balkanlardan Türk Göçleri, Bilâl N. Şimşir (ed.), Vol. III, pp. 104–106, 337–340, 486–488, 527–532. As the British Consul Brophy wrote, ‘the greater bulk, however, of the Muslim population quitting this country did not go by sea from Varna, but preferred to go overland, crossing the Balkans in their own oxen-carts carrying their families and their household utensils.’31 Laffon, the French Consul in Edirne, stated in his report dated 31 October 1883 that 50,000 refugee families from Eastern Rumelia and the Bulgarian Principality had passed through Edirne in the last three months.32 According to the official Ottoman documents, the number of refugees from Bulgaria who came to Istanbul between March 1886 and February 1887 was 11,715; a total of 17,646 came between
Ibid., p. 150. Ibid., p. 149. 30 Turan, pp. 150–152; İpek, pp. 130–149. 31 Şimşir, Bilâl N. (ed.). 1989. Balkanlardan Türk Göçleri, Vol. III, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, p. 486. 32 Ibid., pp. 565–566. 28 29
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March 1891 and January 1892. As Table 2 shows, according to Bulgarian official statistics nearly 70,000 Turks migrated from Bulgaria to Turkey between 1893 and 1902. 33
Table 2 Migration from Bulgaria to Turkey Between 1893 and 1902 Year 1893
N umb e r 11,460
1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 Total
8,837 5,095 1,946 2,801 6,640 7,354 7,417 9,339 9,717 70,603
Source: Principauté de Bulgarie, Direction de la Statistique, Statistique de l’Emigration de la Principauté dans Pays Etrangers, de 1893 à 1902 , Sofia, 1905, pp. IV–V. According to the Bulgarian official statistics, 802,597 Muslims lived in the Bulgarian Principality and in the Eastern Rumelia Province in the 1880-1884 period. As is known, Eastern Rumelia was annexed by the Bulgarian Principality in 1885. Aer Bulgaria gained independence, the Muslim population numbered 601,999 in 1910.34 In other words, the Muslim population in Bulgaria had decreased by 200,000 in a period of thirty years. If we consider the above-mentioned consulate reports, the growth rate of the Muslim population and some other factors, we may claim that the number of people who migrated from Bulgaria to Turkey must have exceeded 200,000. Stoyanov, Vasileva and Eminov have written that 350,000 Turks migrated from Bulgaria to Turkey between 1878 and 1912 – that is, in the period from the establishment of the Bulgarian state to the Balkan Wars.35 33
İpek, pp. 152–153. Nedim İpek’s book, based on documents from the Ottoman ar-
chives, important information about migration to the Ottoman Empire from the Balkanscontains and subsequent settlement in Anatolia. 34 Turan, p. 113. 35 Stoyanov, Valleri. 1994. ‘e Turks in Bulgaria,’ in Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility Between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria,Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations Foundation, p. 269; Vasileva, Darina. 1992. ‘Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return,’ in International Migration Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Summer 1992, p. 346; Eminov, Ali. 1997.Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, London: Hurst & Company, p. 79.
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In the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria fought against each other. During these wars both the Turks of Bulgaria and the Turks in invaded lands suffered cruelties and torture. ere are some figures about the refugees coming from Kosovo, Macedonia and race but we do not have exact data about the number of the Turks who migrated from Bulgaria to Turkey during the Balkan Wars.36 Turkey and Bulgaria were allies in World War I. As a result of this, it can be said that Turks did not face any oppression. Aer World War I, Alexander Stamboliyski became prime minister of Bulgaria. is period is called the ‘golden age’ of the Turks of Bulgaria. In both periods there was no serious migration movement from Bulgaria to Turkey. In the period from the fall of the Stamboliyski government as a result of a coup on 9 June 1923 to World War II, the Turks in Bulgaria were subjected to oppression and unjust treatment, and they again started migrating en masse. When we consider migrations from Bulgaria to Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, the cruelties of Rodna Zastita in Northern Bulgaria and the race Committee in Southern Bulgaria against Turks can be regarded as the main reason for those migrations. Rodna Zastita forced Turks to migrate by attacking them, including killing them, and announced that ‘other races have no right to live in Bulgaria.’37 e Turkish-Bulgarian population exchange agreement38 dated 18 October 1925 regulated migration from Bulgaria to Turkey. Article 2 of the agreement provided for voluntary migration of the Turks from Bulgaria, allowing migrants to take their movable property and animals with them, and to sell their immovable property and bring their money freely. As a result of this agreement, migrations from Bulgaria occurred relatively regularly in the first years of the Republican period. Since the migrants came in moderate numbers and with their possessions and animals, there was no chaos in Turkey in that period. As Table 3 indicates, until the 1934 fascist coup in Bulgaria 10,000 people migrated to Turkey per year, but aer that the number increased to 15,000 per year.39 A report of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry dated 21 March 1934 claimed that Turks in Bulgaria could exercise all rights and freedoms granted by the 36 As a result of the negotiations of 2–15 November 1913, aer the Balkan Wars an agreement was reached to exchange populations living on either side of the border between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Consequently,48,570 Muslims living in Bulgariaand 46,764 Bulgarians living in the Ottoman Empire were exchanged. However, that event is outside the scope of this paper, which deals with migration. See Önder, Selahattin. 1991. ‘Meclis-i Vükela Mazbatalarında Türk-Bulgar Mübadelesi,’ inAnadolu Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. III, No. 1, 1991, pp. 207–225. 37 Şimşir, ‘Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Göç Sorunu,,’ pp. 53–55. 38 For the full text of the agreement, see, Belgelerle Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri (1913–1938). 2002. Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, pp. 51–65; see also Belleten, Vol. LV, No. 212, pp. 114. Altuğ, Yılmaz. 1991. ‘Balkanlardan Anayurda Yapılan Göçler,’ 39 About the settlements of the Turkish migrants who came from Bulgaria in Turkey, see Öksüz, Hikmet. 2000. ‘İkili İlişkiler Çerçevesinde Balkan Ülkelerinden Türkiye ’ye Göçler ver Göç Sonrası İskân Meselesi(1923–1938),’ in Atatürk Dergisi, Vol. III, No. 1, Mayıs 2000, pp. 177–180.
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Constitution and laws, but they were being instigated by Kemalist propaganda to migrate to Turkey.40 eTurks ofBulgariaconstitutedthemain axis ofTurkish-Bulgarianrelationsduring 41 the post-WWII period. Large-scale migration s occurredin 1950–51, 1969–78, and1989. Table 3 Migration from Bulgaria to Turkey Between 1923 and 1960 Year 1923–33 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
N umb e r 101,507 8,682 24,968 11,730 13,490 20,542 10,769 7,004 3,803 2,672 1,145 489 631 706 1,763 1,514 1,670 52,185 102,208 4 2 9 4 32 -
1958 1959 1960 Total
6 25 11 367,571
Source: Geray, Table 2. 40 41
Belgelerle Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve Türk Bulgar İlişkileri (1913–1938), pp. 287–305. Lütem, Ömer E. 2000.Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri 1983–1989 , Vol. I, Ankara: ASAM, p. 320.
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e communists came to power in Bulgaria on 9 September 1944. ey gave land to landless Turks, made teaching of Turkish language compulsory in Turkish schools, opened teacher schools, and paid salaries to the Turkish teachers. In doing so, the communists aimed to gain support from Turks in the first years of their rule. e communists gained more power aer the 1946 elections. When the regime was consolidated in the second half of the 1940s in Bulgaria, the rights that had been granted to Turks were abolished one by one. e communists nationalised land that had been 42 allocated to Turks, limited Turkish teaching, and abolished Koran teaching. Turkish pious foundations, which kept alive thethe Turkish schools nationalised. In 1946 Turkish schools, which hadhad until then had status of privatewere schools, were made state 43 schools. New legislation was passed, enabling the government to take control of the religious administration of the Muslims in 1946.44 Because of these developments, Bulgarian Turks began to look for ways of migrating to Turkey and sent a petition to the Turkish President.45 Turkish migration from Bulgaria remained at its almost lowest level during World War II and in the following years. As Table 3 shows, the number of refugees sometimes decreased to hundreds in these years. It averaged 2,100 per year. e reason was not any reluctance of Turks to migrate to Turkey from Bulgaria but the prohibition of migration. Aer World War II, Bulgaria entered the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Turkish-Bulgarian relations followed aparallel way of development as did the TurkishSoviet relations.46 In those years, the Soviet Union began to claim a right over the Turkish objectedNations to this and claimsent anda took action to join NATO. spondedStraits. to a callTurkey of the United brigade to the Korean War Turkey that hadrebegun with attacks of the communists. All these developments strained Turkish-Soviet relations. e Soviet Union objected to Turkey’s attempts to join NATO as well as to the establishment of close relations between Turkey and the USA, and therefore attempted to exert pressure on Turkey by using its satellite Bulgaria.47 In this context, Bulgaria delivered a diplomatic note to Turkey on 10 August 1950, declaring that nearly 250,000 Turks from Bulgaria wanted to migrate to Turkey, that Bulgaria would send them in three months, and that Turkey should accept them.48 Hakov, p. 372. On the education of Bulgarian Turks in that period, see Memişoğlu, Hüseyin. 2002. Geçmişten Günümüze Bulgaristan’da Türk Eğitim Tarihi, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, pp. 228–233. 44 Eminov, pp. 82–83. 42 43
45 46
Şimşir, ‘Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Göç Sorunu,,’ p. 58. Lütem, p. 42. 47 Sander, Oral. 1969. Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945–1965), Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, pp. 70-76. 48 On the Soviet Union’s demands concerning the Soviet-Turkish border and the Turkish Straits aer the Second World War, and Turkey’s subsequent desire to establish good relations with the USA and to become a member of NATO, see Sönmezoğlu, Faruk. 1994. ‘II. Dünya Savaşı Döneminde Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası: “Tarafsızlıktan NATO’ya”,’ in Sönmezoğlu, Faruk (ed.). Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi , İstanbul: Der Yayınları, pp. 79–87.
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e Turkish government responded to Bulgaria’s note with another note on 28 August 1950. e Turkish note stated that migration of such a large group within three months was not normal, and that Turkey could always accept a moderate number of refugees every year. Turkey demanded that Bulgaria permits the refugees to bring their moveable property, and that ways of transferring money received for sales of immovable property be determined.49 According to Şimşir; between June and September 1950 a total 57,886 people received Turkish entry visas from the Turkish Consulates.50 According to Hakov; the Turkish Consulates issued visas to 212,150 people between 1 January and 30 September 1950.51 Turkey accepted nearly 30,000 refugees between 1 January and 7 October 1950. e Turkish government closed the Turkish-Bulgarian border, arguing that Bulgaria was sending people without visas or with fake visas to Turkey. Aer almost two months of negotiations, Bulgaria accepted the return of such people and undertook not to send them back. e border was reopened on 2 December 1950. Nearly 22,000 refugees entered Turkey by the end of December.52 Consequently, some 52,000 refugees migrated from Bulgaria to Turkey in 1950.53 Migration continued in 1951. Approximately 800 refugees were being accepted per day. e Turkish government closed the border once again, arguing that Bulgaria was inserting Gypsies among the Turkish immigrants. Bulgaria forbade migration on 30 November. e total number of immigrants, who came from Bulgaria in 1951 was 102,208. is time the border stayed closed for about fieen months. Bulgaria accepted the return of the Gypsies whom it had sent with fake visas, and the border was reopened on 20 February 1953. Turkey was willing to accept immigrants in moderate numbers. However this time Bulgaria did not permit migration of Turks. ere was almost no migration from Bulgaria to Turkey until 1968. 54 According to a survey conducted among more than 154,000 immigrants who migrated from Bulgaria in 1950–1951, eleven percent of the immigrants had come willingly, 85% had come because it was impossible to live in Bulgaria, and 3% had come because they had been forced to leave by Bulgarians. Twenty-four percent of the respondents said that they had not been exposed to ill-treatment, and 74% argued that they had been exposed to ill-treatment in different ways. Just 2.6% of the immigrants had been able to sell their property at its real value, 63.4% had sold it far below its real value, and 27.3% had been unable to sell their property.55 49
For the full text of the Turkish note, seeAyın Tarihi, No. 201, Ağustos 1950, pp. 41–46.
Even ment though yet. the Treaty of 1925 proposed a new agreement on that matter, there was no agree50 Şimşir, ‘Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Göç Sorunu,,’ p. 59. 51 Hakov, p. 372. 52 Sander, pp. 78–79. 53 Ibid., pp. 78–79. 54 Şimşir, ‘Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Göç Sorunu,,’ p. 61. 55 Şimşir, ‘Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Göç Sorunu,,’ pp. 61–62. Kostanick, Huey. 1957. Turkish Settlement of Bulgarian Turks, 1950–1953, Berkeley: University of California.
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e sudden interruption of the 1950–51 migration flow divided many families, some of whose members were in Bulgaria, while others were in Turkey. Reuniting divided families was a permanent issue on the agenda at least of the Turkish side in the 1950s and 1960s. Bulgaria put aside the migration subject and in 1951 began to apply some programmes to win over Turks. In this context schools teaching in Turkish, Turkish teacher schools, a Turkish press, theatres and folklore groups were formed and supported. All this aimed to create a Turkish mass that would embracethe socialist regime and abandon religious values and traditions. By the mid-1950s, it was obvious that the programmes applied could not succeed in transforming the Turkish identity into a socialist international identity. us it was assumed in April 1956 that Turks and other minorities should be assimilated into the Bulgarian identity.56 In this framework, in 1958 the communist regime resolved to unify with the respective Bulgarian schools the Turkish high schools, the teacher schools and institutes in the 1958/59 academic year, and the Turkish primary and secondary schools in the 1959/60 academic year.57 Education in Turkish was completely abolished. is situation spurred the desire of Turks to migrate to Turkey in order to escape assimilation. Many visa applications were submitted to the Turkish Consulates in Bulgaria.58 In September 1961 Turkey delivered a note demandingthat Bulgaria respect minority rights and permit people who wanted to migrate to Turkey to do so. Bulgaria did not respond to this note for a long time. Eventually, a decision was made to negotiate on the migration problem during Foreign Minister Ivan Basev’s visit to T urkey from 16 to 21 August 1966. Aer long negotiations, a limited migration agreement was signed on 22 February 1968. A month later the Bulgarian Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivan Basev visited Turkey and a new treaty on migration was signed on 22 March 1968. e treaty permitted migration of people whose close relatives had migrated to Turkey before 1952. is permission applied to spouses, parents, grandparents, children, and grandchildren. Aer the signing of the treaty, nearly 130,000 immigrants came to Turkey. ese people had a status of people who emigrated on their own free will and they did not receive aid from the Turkish government. Bulgaria could manage to keep the Turkish population at a certain level relative to the total population by its policy of sending Turks to Turkey, a policy that Bulgaria had been following since 1878. However Bulgaria had the lowest birth rate and population among the neighbour socialist states. us Bulgaria decided to assimilate Turks instead of expelling them, and began the so-called ‘Renaming Process.’ere are different interpretations relatedto Bulgaria’s assimilation policy. Eminov, pp. 82–84. Memişoğlu, pp. 260–261. 58 According to Şimşir, who was a diplomat as well, applicat ions began to be submittedespecially in 1963, their number reaching 400,00 0 in March 1964. See Şimşir,Bilâl N. 2003. ‘Türkiye ve Balkanlar,’ in Türbedar, Erhan(ed.). Balkan Türkleri,Balkanlarda Türk Varlığı, p. 335. 56 57
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It is argued that Zhivkov followed an assimilation policy on the orders from Moscow. According to the proponents of this argument, theSoviet administration used Bulgaria as a pilot region in the assimilation of Turks. If this had succeeded in Bulgaria, the same way would have been followed in other countries bound tothe Soviet Union. However, while Bulgaria was following an assimilation policy, the Soviet Union was trying to apply perestroika and glasnost. In addition to this, Bulgaria could not rely on Soviet support when it was criticised on the international scene because of its assimilation policy.59 Vasileva notes that excitation of ethnic conflicts to prevent more dangerous social conflicts was a typical characteristic of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states in the 1980s.60 Another, more frequently offered explanation for Bulgaria’s assimilation policy is that the Bulgarian population was decreasing while the Turkish and the Muslim populations were increasing. e population growth rate in Bulgaria was at its lowest level during the 1980s. General population growth decreased to 3.6% in 1980. is rate decreased to 2.8% in 1981, 2.7% in 1982, and 2.4% in 1984.61 Additionally, as Table 4 shows, while the Bulgarian population was decreasing the population of minorities was increasing. Lovech, Mihailovgrad and Vidin had a dense Bulgarian population. When we consider the regions where the minority population is dense, we will see the Macedonians in Blagoevrad, the Pomaks in Smolyan, and the Turks in Kurdzhali. As we can see from Table 4, while the populations of the Bulgarian regions were decreasing, the populations in non-Bulgarian regions were increasing. e Communist Party leaders were afraid that Turks and Muslims would be a majority in Bulgaria by 2000. And they applied an assimilation policy to prevent this possibility. Table 4 Population Growth Rate in Some Regions of Bulgaria (%) Year 1979 1981 1984
Lovech –2.8 –3.3 –4.6
Mihailovgrad –1.6 –3.3 –4.9
Vidin –4.8 –6.3 –7.2
Blagoevrad +9.6 +9.3 +8.3
Smolyan +9.9 +7.8 +7.7
Kurdzhali +17.9 +15.9 +14.0
Source: Poulton, p. 122.
59 Lütem, p. 489. Actually, Russians influenced Bulgaria’s policy not only towards Turks but also towards Jews. See Mutafchieva, Vera. 1994. ‘e Turks, the Jews and the Gypsies,’ in Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility Between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria , Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations Foundation, p. 46. 60 International Vasileva, Darina. 1992. ‘Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return,’ Migration Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Summer 1992, p. 346. 61 Poulton, Hugh. 1991. e Balkans, Minorities and States in Conflict, London: Minority Rights Publications, p. 122.
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Eminov claims that the secret documents in the Archives of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party demonstrate the plan of the Party. According to this plan, both forced migration and assimilation would be used to reduce the Turkish population in Bulgaria by 10% to 15%.62 Eminov emphasises that the communists manipulated and exaggerated statistical data and, on the basis of Table 5, points out that while the Bulgarian population growth rate had decreased by 1.8% between 1956 and 1974, the decrease in the population growth rates for Turks was 7.5% and for Gypsies it was 12.8%.63 Table 5 Population Growth Rate of Some Ethnic Groups in Bulgaria (%) Year 1956 1965 1974
Bulgars 8.3 5.5 6.5
Turks 25.2 21.7 17.7
Gypsies 25.8 14.3 13.0
Source: Eminov, p. 93. In the framework of assimilation, a name change campaign waslaunched. In the first half of the 1980s, the Gypsies and the Pomaks living in the Rhodope Mountains were given Bulgarian names. e names of the Turks living in Southern Bulgaria, especially in Kurdzhali, wereinchang ed in November andwas December 1984. eTurkish-toBulgarian name change North-eastern Bulgaria completed in March 1985. e forcing of people to take Bulgarian names triggered a strong reaction both in Bulgaria 64 and abroad. Some of the resisting Turks were imprisoned, wounded and killed. e Turkish President Kenan Evren wrote a letter to the Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov demanding an immediate end of the forced name changing. In the following months diplomatic negotiations, notes and protests between Turkey and Bulgaria continued, sharpening in tone. Turkey was eager to find a solution to the problem, including a comprehensive migration agreement on the basisof international agreements and mutual negotiations. e Bulgarian administration regarded these developments as Turkish propaganda and intervention in its internal affairs.65 e attitude of the Bulgarian government changed aer some events, which began in the village of Todor Ikonomovo (Mahmuzlu) and spread to neighbouring villagEminov, p. 82. Ibid., p. 93. 64 Poulton, pp. 130–151. 65 e memoirs of Ömer E. Lütem, who was the Turkish ambassador in Sofia at the time, contain valuable information about theattitude of the Turkish embassy and government, their attempts, the answers/reactions of the Bulgarian government and authorities, negotiations between the representatives of the two countries, mutual notes, reactions of international organisations, etc. See Lütem, pp. 173–572. 62 63
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es, and seven people were killed on 20 May 1989. When Zhivkov demanded the opening of the border for immigrants, the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal replied positively. us an unplanned and unorganised migration to Turkey began in June 1989.66 In the summer of 1989, a total of 369,839 people came to Turkey in less than three months. e 1989 migration is the greatest migration wave from Bulgaria to Turkey. ose 369,839 people, who constitute 43% of the Turks of Bulgaria, le their lands where they had lived for centuries, their houses, jobs and social rights, and came to Turkey. ey formed a line more than twenty kilometres long at the Kapıkule border checkpoint, with their TV sets, refrigerators, pots, and domestic animals loaded on cars, handcarts, and horse carts.67 Turkey was not ready and prepared to accept and settle such a great number of people in such a short period. It therefore blocked free migration and permitted only migration of the Turks who had visas. When Turkey took this action, a great number of people that is close to the number mentioned above were preparing to migrate to Turkey. However the migration of 369,839 Turks from Bulgaria terminated Bulgaria’s assimilation policy and it terminated even the Zhivkov regime. As a result of demonstrations that began in the autumn of 1989, Zhivkov had to resign sa General Secretary of the Party on 10 November 1989. e new administration declared that the assimilation of Turks was contrary to the Bulgarian Constitution and the international agreements, and harmed national unity. e new Bulgarian administration revoked restrictions on choosing native names, religious freedoms, use of a language other than Bulgarian, and free practice of customs.68 In summer 1989, a survey was conducted among the Turkish immigrants in Kapıkule and Çadırkent. e respondents were randomly chosen; all were from villages, mostly from Northern Bulgaria, and half of them had a university diploma. ey were asked, ‘What do you think about the attitudes of Bulgarians related to this vent?’ e Sixty percent of the respondents indicated that Bulgarians whom they knew did not approve of the assimilation andforced migration policiesof the Bulgarian government. Forty percent said that some Bulgarians approved the policies, which were applied. People from rural areas said that Bulgarians did not generally support the policies of the government. However the city dwellers claimed that Bulgarians generally supported the policies of the Bulgarian government. When the respondents were asked, ‘What does your Bulgarian neighbour think?’ they replied that their neighbours had told them not to leave their property unprotected, and that the Bulgarian government had done an evil thing by starting all this. e neighbours had also said that the immigrants
Lütem, Ömer E. ‘Tarihsel Süreç İçerisinde Bulgaristan Türklerinin Hakları,’ in Balkan Türkleri, Balkanlarda Türk Varlığı , p. 56. 67 According to Vasileva, the communist government promoted migration of Turks of Bulgaria in order to solve internal problems. See Vasileva, pp. 347–348. 68 Lütem, ‘Tarihsel Süreç İçerisinde Bulgaristan Türklerinin Hakları,’p. 57. 66
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would live in poverty and be miserable in Turkey, and some of them had not wanted to part with the them and had cried.69 Table 6 Turkish Migrations from Bulgaria, 1878–1992 Years 1878–1912
N umb e r 350,000
1923–33 1934–39 1940–49 1950–51 1952–68 1969–78 1979–88 1989–92 Total
101,507 97,181 21,353 154,198 24 114,356 0 321,800 1,160,614
Source: Eminov, p. 79. e Zhivkov regime fell in the autumn of 1989 and Bulgaria stepped on the path to democracy. Great changes in policies towards Turks occurred. eTurkish identity was recognised and Turkish names, language, newspapers and journals were permitted. Turkish was also permitted in schools within certain limits. Religious freedom was granted. Turks got the right to found social, cultural and even political associations and parties.70 With the end of pressure against Turks and thanks to the granted freedoms, 154,937 Turks returned to Bulgaria. However almost the same number of people came to Turkey due to economic, political and family reasons in the early 1990s. At the beginning of the 21st century, migration from Bulgaria to Turkey is about to cease. is is mainly due to Bulgaria’s new policies towards minorities, transition to pluralist democracy, NATO membership, and coming accession to the European Union. Some authors have started proposing a ‘Bulgarian model’ to bring an end to ethnic conflicts in the Balkans. Yet, Turks and the Muslims constitute the bottom seg-
69 Toğrol, Beğlân. 1989. 112 Yıllık Göç (1878–1989), 1989 Yazındaki Üç Aylık Göç’ün Tarihî Perspektif İçinde Psikolojik İncelemesi , İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, p. 35. 70 About the situation of the Turks in Bulgaria in the 1990s, see Turan, Ömer. ‘Bulgaristan Türklerinin Bugünkü Durumu,’ inYeni Türkiye, 1995/3; Turan, Ömer. 2003. ‘Geçmişten Balkan Türkleri, Balkanlarda Türk Günümüze Bulgaristan Türkleri,’ in Türbedar, Erhan (ed.). Varlığı, Ankara: ASAM, pp. 27–43; Demirtaş-Coşkun, Birgül. 2001.Bulgaristan’la Yeni Dönem, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Ankara-Sofya İlişkileri, Ankara: ASAM, pp. 62–67, 90–94; Özgür, Nurcan. 1999. Etnik Sorunların Çözümünde Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi, İstanbul: Der Yayınları; Eminov, pp. 167–175.
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ment of society. And they severely suffer from the present economic and social problems in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, because they are not subjected to pressure against their national and religious identities, they are not thinking of migrating. And they are working with their Bulgarian neighbours for the future of Bulgaria. As Stanford Shaw puts it, the Ottoman Empire and her legatee Turkey is a ‘land of refugees.’ In the course of history, Jews, Christians, and Muslims who sufferedfrom oppression in different regions took refuge in these lands. Aer the Ottoman Empire, both in the process of establishing independent states and in following periods, Turks and Muslims, who were the remnants of theOttoman Empire, were regarded as a danger for the existence of the above-mentioned states. And inorder to remove Turks and Muslims, some inhuman actions were taken. In this framework, as we can see from Table 6,the number of immigrants coming from Bulgaria, from its establishment to the present day, exceeds one million. History demonstrates that such actions can be seen more oen in war periods and in totalitarian regimes. History again demonstrates that such actions do not bring any benefit to states and regimes as in the Bulgarian case. We wish that the Balkans would be a meeting point of different languages, religions and cultures as they have been in history. With adoption of principles like toleranceand coexistence, the bitter migration stories that have been told for 200 years should be consigned to history and should not be repeated.
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DISCUSSION Wolfgang Hoepken:We’ve just heard several excellent papers and I was getting very anxious to ask some questions. May I start with the last paper by Mr. Turan concerning the Turkish emigration from Bulgaria?I have a little bit of a problem to perceive the Turkish emigration from Bulgaria in terms of a continuous story of suppression and ethnic cleansing. It starts with the 1877–1878 war, which of course was accompanied by a great deal of violence against Turks both from the Russian side and from the Bulgarian side. In the political archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany we have a fund, which consists of eleven volumes and is called ‘Acts of Cruelty Against the Turks in Bulgaria.’ So there were, without any doubt, such deedswithin the context of war. But I have my doubts whether we can describe the war from the Russian side as a war of extermination. I don’t think that this was a diplomatic priority of Russian politics in 1876–1878. And if you look carefully at the documents, and I am referring mainly to the documents I have found in the political archives of Germany, you will find that there are some suspicions of German and British top diplomats that Russians would like to see Turks emigrate, but in general this argument isn’t very prominent. I don’t think that this was an ethnic war. It is a question of sources in this context. You quoted Layard,1 who oen reported to the Foreign Office about violence against Turks to an extent that he was sometimes seen by the Foreign Office as going too far in this argument. But I would question if this was really a war of extermination. And I also would question if we can follow this through the next centuries, or the next decades. A very interesting source, which for some reason I don’t think has been used enough – a Bulgarian source on this question – are the annual reports of the local administrators from the different okrugs [districts] of Bulgaria. Each year they report about demographic changes. And if you go through them for the 1880s and 1890s, then you see that time and again local administrators were complaining about massive emigration because it was disrupting the local economy. So I think it was a very complex process of emigration, which of course had been set in motion by violence, by war; it was supported in some way by state politics, but it also had different motives, very complex motives. And I think we should distinguish that. is was my question to Mr. Turan.
likeus to acontinue with a short comment onthe the various very richforms paperofofmigraProf. Sahara,I would who gave very comprehensive overview of tion. I think that you convincingly argued that we have to see the continuity of this forced migration – the continuity, which is of course vested in the idea of a national 1 Sir Austen Henry Layard, (1817–1894), English archaeologist and diplomat. Layard served in Parliament (1852–1857 and 1860–1869), became under-secretary of foreign affairs (1861–1866), and was appointed ambassador to Istanbul (1877–1880) (Editor’s note).
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state, which tends to become homogeneous. But again here I think as a historian that we should also see the very substantial differences. I would stress more than you did the period aer the turn of the century, particularly starting with the Balkan wars. Starting with the Balkan wars, and then continuing – not only in the Balkans but all over Europe – in the First World War and during the 1920s and the 1930s, forced migration became systematic, it became a matter of warfare. is was something new and it marked a new quality, which you can clearly see in theBalkan wars. Ethnic migration was being argued more in racial terms. In this sense I think what we saw in the Balkan wars was more a part of the European ethnic policy influenced very much by the experience of the colonial wars, and then of course leading to the ethnic wars that Germany conducted in the 1930s. So I would very much stress the differences between the twentieth-century forced migrations and what we observed in the nineteenth century. e second point to your interesting paper, which I have very severe reservations about, is connected to the Armenian question. I was a little bit reserved about your terminology. You spoke about ‘prevention,’ ‘harsh measures,’ or some kind of punishment of Armenian nationalism. I ask, what exactly happened in Armenia? Was it part of an ethnic cleansing in the tradition of the nineteenth century, or was it part of a policy of annihilation of ethnic groups? I don’t want to go into the discussion of whether it was genocide or not. For me it was genocide. For some Turkish colleagues it was also genocide. On the one hand I think this marks the linkage between the policy of ethnic cleansing and the policy of annihilation of ethnic groups. In fact it was neither planned nor institutionalised; the purpose wasn’t primarily to deport people but to kill them. And in this sense I think it was also part of the twentieth-century politics of annihilation. What you said about the Ustasha state also raises the question of continuity. Of course Ustashe were in some sense in line with nineteenth-century nationalism, but they were not the outcome of nineteenth-century Croatian nationalism, as my colleague Vasilije Krestic in Belgrade oen claims. ere are fundamental differences: Ustashe are picking up from nineteenth-century rt aditional nationalism, but they were as much a product of twentieth-century European racist ideology, and this was their new quality. Ilona Tomova: I would like to support Prof. Hoepken’s comments on the explanation of the reasons for Turkish emigration from Bulgaria in the differentperiods, and to point out especially the implications that land collectivisation and urbanisation in Bulgaria had for the huge number of Turks who emigrated in this period. You interpreted emigration in 1950–1951 mainlyas the result of pressure from theSoviet Union against Turkey – a process in which the Bulgarian Turks were used as a means to an end – and emigration in the 1960s and 70s as an attempt to avoid the assimilation of the Turkish population by the Bulgarian authorities. I think, however, that one of the very serious reasons for those mass emigrations lies in the fact that in this period the Communist Party was conducting modernisation and industrialisation in Bulgaria at the expense of the rural population and at the expense of all rural resources. isem-
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igration was much less ethnic than economic. Bulgarians, who couldn’t react in any other way, moved to the towns and cities and formed the poor part of the urban working class. If we look at what was happening withTurks, we will see that in their case the process of urbanisation was actually delayed as a result of their opportunity to leave the country and go to Turkey, where they had other opportunities for economic progress. And I think that this is extremely important. In fact, this process of urbanisation and modernisation, which was conducted entirely at the expense of the rural masses, was very difficult for Bulgaria at large. Eighty percent of the Bulgarian Turks were rural residents, as were Bulgarians. ey bore a huge brunt, but they had an opportunity to emigrate if they wanted to. Bulgarians didn’t have such an opportunity. ank you. Ibrahim Yalamov: I would like to say something in connection with Tomova’s comment. I find it difficult to agree with such an explanation. My impressions are that in the last decades, in the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the economic factor for the emigration of Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey has hardly been so important. All emigrations have a common reason and each emigration in the different periods has specific reasons. I think that the common reason for all emigrations are the restrictions but also the kinship ties of our Turks from Bulgaria with the Turks from Turkey. However, specific reasons gained prominence in the specific periods. For example, the main reason for emigration in the 1930s was the discrimination policy of the authoritarian monarchic regime that was established in Bulgaria aer the coup d’état on 19 May 1934. e main reason for emigration in 1950–51 was the flight from socialism, the flig ht from land collectivisation, and perhaps here we have some economic factor. In the 1960s and especially in the 1980s the main reason was the desire for survival, flight from assimilation. is is how I see things. ank you. Slavka Draganova: I only want to note another factor: the fear of the people who are emigrating. For example, in the Russo-Turkish War in 1828–29 there was mass emigration of Bulgarians across the Danube. ose were very affluent Bulgarians and they le with a huge amount of cattle and property. Nobody was throwing them out. ey were simply afraid. To make them return to their native lands eventually, the Turkish government provided a number of incentives. at is why this factor, fear, must be taken into account too. Omer Turan:ank you for the comments. If you have to summarise more than a hundred years in a short paper sometimes all emphasised things should be tolerated, so I have to explain my points as well. Of course, in each period there were some factors that were more prominent than others. But if we generalise, cleansing the Balkans from the Turkish presence was quoted in the Declaration of Objectives of the 1877–78 Ottoman-Russian War by the Russian government. Before the war they issued a declaration explaining why they had decided to go to war, and these words were taken from that declaration. e war was also defined as a ‘war of races and extermination’
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by Vladimir Cherkaski, who was the head of the pan-Slavic Russian Committee and who was at the same time, I think, head of the Bulgarian commission established before the war. He wrote a letter and the Russian Ministry of Defence, which wasn’t panSlavic, replied that they couldn’t exterminate four million people from the Balkans. But if we look at what happened in practice, this war can be described as a war of races and extermination. Special Cossacktroops were sent before the main army to terrorise Muslim and Turkish civilians and to make them leave the Bulgarian lands. ismakes it quite clear that it was a war of races and extermination. I have got plenty of reports 2
from the journalists who followed the war, from the British consuls, but I simply gave a small example. ese are my explanations to the comments about Turkish migrations. Many of my colleagues made comments on Armenians and the Armenian problems. I would like to make a few points about that. About the population of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: according to official Ottoman sources, before the beginning of the First World War the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire was about 1.2 million. But as we know, Ottoman official figures were always smaller than the actual number of the population, not only in the case of Armenians but also of the Muslims and of all nationalities. Normally we should add 30 percent. So you can say that the Armenian population before the First World War was 1.7 million more or less, and most of the demographers agree on that figure. Some Armenian patriarchs sometimes claimed that there were 2.5 million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. But for instance when the British representative at the Berlin Conference questioned this figure said, ‘Okay, let’s has say one half million.’ they dropped a fewabout hundredthey thousand. Nobody seenand the adocuments of Suddenly the Armenian Patriarchate the census results, about the relevant reports. As Ivan Ilchev said, there were revolutionary Armenian groups in the Ottoman Empire and in their constitutions they stated that they were waiting for a war period to claim independence. During the First World War, as some of my colleagues mentioned, they collaborated with he t Russian armies, which invaded Eastern Anatolia. In Van, in Eastern Anatolia, the Armenian rebels declared an independent Armenian state. erefore the Turkish authorities were obliged to make a decision that the Armenians from the war zones had to be transferred to another part of the empire, mainly to Syria and Iraq. ey weren’t deported from the Ottoman Empire, and only the Armenians from the war zones were deported. According to the reports of American consuls, about 600,000 Armenians reached Syria and Iraq. I also have the reports of American Protestant missionaries who distributed food, soup, and money for those refugees. Another figure is that approximately 500,000 Armenians from Eastern Anatolia and the Turkish Black Sea coast followed the Russian army when it retreated at the end of the First World War. ey weren’t deported but they followed the army because during the war they had collaborated with Russians. And also, dur2 Vladimir Cherkaski was a Russianknyaz and politician. During the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, he was the Red Cross representative in the Russian army. He was named a provisional governor of the liberated Bulgarian lands and as such issued an instruction on the foundation of civil government of Bulgaria.He died on March 3, 1878 (Editor’s note).
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3 ing the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Boghos Nubar Pasha, who was the head of the Armenian Committee at the Peace Conference, declared that there were about 700,000 Armenians in Anatolia, Western Anatolia, Istanbul, etc. So if we count those 600,000 in Mesopotamia, 500,000 in the Caucasus, and 700,000 in Anatolia, we will get roughly the same figure for the size of the Armenian population as before the First World War.
Hidajet Repovac: So, we still have half an hour for discussion. But before somebody else joins the discussion, I would like to say a few words in connection with the definition of migrations as the only paradig m for the Balkans. I wouldn’t say that the problem is the same in all parts of the Balkans. Migrations are caused by different factors in different regions. Of course, the reasons are political, economic, cultural, civilisational, etc., but for example in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, about which I will speak tomorrow, there were also some other reasons. Violent nationalism on one side, and an attempt for preservation of national identity in one of the republics of the former Yugoslavia on the other. I think that thenational identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been preserved, but at a very high price. is price includes 1.5 million people who were forced to emigrate to various European countries, and more than 250,000 people who were killed. In Sarajevo alone, 10,200 people were killed, of which 1,700 were children aged under fourteen. is is our Bosnian paradigm, which is different from various other types of Balkan migrations. It is clear that the Balkans are a place where migrations of various kinds do occur, caused by different factors forcing people to migrate. I think this is a topic we really do need to talk about. And we need to hear many different opinionsabouthow to overcome such a situation and to prevent it from happening again, because it is clear that on the Balkans the same things are happening all over again. So my question is: What is to be done – politically, economically , culturally – in order to prevent a new repetition, because another repetition will be even more terrible. Its consequences will be even more terrible. Repetition is possible because the main reasons for migrations still exist. Wolfgang Hoepken: ere were also two papers, which didn’t deal with the Balkans, and I would like to refer to the interesting paper of Ms. Kawakita concerning Germany. I think you are certainly correct in stressing that currently in Germany there is a discussion about the expulsion of Germans and, as you said, irght-wing groups and interest groups are strongly pushing forward this question which, by the way, has damaged German-Polish relations very much. But I think that in the discussion of expulsion we should make a distinction between the political dimension and what I would 3 Boghos Nubar Pasha (Alexandria 1851– Paris 1930). Son of Nubar Pasha, who was three times prime minister of Egypt. Boghos Nubar Pasha was an engineer and civil servant in Egypt. In 1906 he co-founded the Armenian General Benevolent Union, of which he remained president until 1928. In 1919 he became president of the Armenian delegation representing the Western Armenians at the Paris Peace Conference. He retired from politicsin 1921, concentrating on welfare and construction (Editor’s note).
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call the dimension of memory. In the political dimension we have these right-wing groups and the interest groups of the expellees – the leader of which, by the way, was only one year old when she was expelled from Poland and, moreover, she wasn’t born there but was the daughter of a German officer who had occupied Poland. I wouldn’t overstress the importance of those groups. For example, the claim for property compensation, which they have brought up, has been clearly rejected by all political par ties, by the German government and by the Polish government. ey are acting jointly to make this impossible. Much more important however is the question of memory. In the 1950s the memory of expulsion was very strong and it was part of post-war German society, which was afraid of addressing its own role as perpetrators and was escaping into the role of victims. But then in the 1960s–1970s the discussion of expulsion was totally ignored, it was pushed aside. e expellees weren’t really recognised by society, they were considered to be very right-wing and they were ignored. And what we now have is that those people are in their 60s or 70s, and at the end of their lives they are bringing up this topic of memory once again. I think we have to face it because we haven’t taken seriously these biographic experiences. And the decisive problem for Germany at the moment is in my view whether we will be able to integrate the memory of the German victims into an overall memory, which nevertheless accepts the basic understanding of Germans as perpetrators. ere is currently a tendency in the public sphere to stress very much the role of Germans as victims, ht e victims of bombing, the victims of rape, the victims of expulsion – all topics that have long been neglected. And Ithink the challenge now is to integrate this memory into our historical consciousness, which nevertheless of course has to be centred on our understanding that we were the perpetrators. And I think that this is the more important part: the question of memory and not the political importance of these groups. Zhelyu Zhelev: I would like to say something about the reasons for the ‘Renaming Process.’ e other emigrations are usually attributed to various specific reasons. In my opinion, this was a fiasco of the entire policy of the Communist Party. In Bulgaria there was collectivisation, forced collectivisation, which drove the young from villages to towns and cities, where they were supposed to build factories, industrial plants and so on, without having the material and logistic resources or housing necessary for that. So young families had to live long without residence permits, being denied the right to live and work where they wanted to in their own country. So what choice did they have – living in a rented room or bedsit, having one or two children, which they had to send to kindergarten because both parents had to work? Birth rates fell drastically aer collectivisation and the subsequent barbaric urbanisation. Of course, Bulgaria would have been urbanised anyway and the ratio of urban to rural population would have been the same as it became by the late 1990s anyway. But if all that had happened in a democratic country, then this process would have occurred in an entirely natural way, propelled by economic mechanisms and laws – as, for example, in Greece. At the end
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of the Second World War both Sofia and Athens had a population of a quarter of a million. Today the population of Athens is four million and of Sofia 1.3 to 1.4 million. My point is that one cannot blame urbanisation as such, because it is a process that simply cannot be stopped – the question ishow urbanisation occurs. But what we had here in communist Bulgaria was that a large part of the population and, moreover, precisely young people, were simply brutally forced to move to the cities, where they had to build a heavy industry that we had to give up immediately aerwards because it was neither efficient nor competitive enough to survive and function in the conditions of market economy. Todor Zhivkov tried to cover up all those reasons and the demographic catastrophe to which the communist regime brought the country. By then Roma had the highest birth rate because they were in cooperative farms and were free to do what they wanted with the land, which they couldn’t do before. Bulgarians were forced to move to the cities, so naturally the relative weight between Muslims and Christian Bulgari ans changed quite drastically. is seriously scared the Zhivkov regime. at is why it resorted to the ‘Renaming Process,’ which I view as a typical case of cultural genocide – I’m not saying this was a case of killing people but that it was cultural genocide, total extermination of the identity of this ethnos. at was what prompted the Bulgarian Turks to emigrate to neighbouring Turkey, their pan-homeland. Some people believed that the ‘Renaming Process’ had been approved by Russians because they had wanted to test this model in Bulgaria before applying it in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the other Asian republics in the Soviet Union with Muslim populations. However, I personally have asked Gorbachev twice whether ht at was true. Had this question been discussed in and before his time? ere was no way he couldn’t have known anything about it. What he told me was: ‘I categorically declare that there was nothing of the sort, nobody had committed themselves; actually, we were even surprised and a bit worried when we saw the reaction of the West too. And we couldn’t defend Zhivkov’s policy.’ is is what I wanted to say. ank you. Tetsuya Sahara: I would like to respond to Prof. Hoepken’s very informative advice. Basically, the assumption is that the phenomenon called ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a reciprocal one; it isn’t such a one-sided story in which the genuine perpetrator attacks the genuine victims. If the conditions change, the roles change as well. So I see the history of deportation and ethnic cleansing as a chain of events that have been repeated in this 150-year period not only in the Balkans but also in other surrounding places. I don’t think there is any clear watershed between theold-style, nineteenth-centuryethnic cleansing or deportation and modern, twentieth-century atrocities. Prof. Hoepken has advised me to think about the element of racism, which has played an important role during and aer the Balkan wars, especially during the Ustasha regime. I do agree with your advice, but I wonder where this element of racism or the racial implication of the Balkan nationalists came from. I’m not very sure, I only assume that the srcinal source of this racism may have come from the Russian side. e Russian experience in the Caucasus, especially the wars against the Caucasian Muslims or the war against
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the Shamil uprisings, gave them some strategy to expel the Muslim element from the lowlands of the Caucasus, thus Christianising the region. And I think that this way of thinking was applied in the Balkans as well during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78. My assumption is that this Russian stimulus wasn’t a complete model for the atrocities that followed. I think it was only a suggestion. And the Balkan nationalists – the nationalist governments and also the Ottoman government and the ultra-nationalistic wing of Turkish nationalism – imitated and innovated this war manual which was introduced by Russians. In this way a new type of ethnic cleansing gradually appeared. 4
It began to emerge during the Balkan culminated under the Ustasha regime.wars, took clearer shape in the later periods, and Hidajet Repovac: ank you, Prof. Sahara, for this interesting comment, but I also have a comment on your comment. I am interested how this issue of reciprocity of ethnic cleansing can fit into our modern times. Ethnic cleansing is conducted by those who have the power – economic, political, and military. ose who don’t have military and political power cannot conduct ethnic cleansing. And I think that such nations and ethnic communities are in danger of becoming extinct. It wouldn’t be the first time in European and world history that a nation has disappeared. You all know how many nations have disappeared from the historical scene. is can happen again if those who possess the political and military power to conduct ethnic cleansing don’t stop. I again insist on mentioning that our Balkan paradigm of ethnic cleansing is being
repeated despite the warnings. And the whypower it is being repeated is that certain military and all political establishments stillreason have the to cond uct ethnic cleansing. is is what happened in the former Yugoslavia, and there are similarities, but also one important difference, between the Ustasha movement in World War II Croatia and what happened in Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia, etc. ere is a clear demarcation line. e Ustashe were part of a Fascist and Nazi movement, while in Kosovo ethnic cleansing is the result of the pain of various ethnic groups, which are trying to live there and to remain there as ethnic and cultural communities. ey are trying to save themselves from the danger of disappearing. is is a question that philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists have to ask themselves today. And finding the answer to this question is extremely difficult. If we find this answer we will solve the problem of ethnic cleansing and migrations in our region. Ilona Tomova: I would like to add something to what Prof. Zhelev said about a more general set of social and political explanations for the last expulsion campaign, which was unquestionably a violent act of political cleansing by way of emigration. I think that Prof. Zhelev focused on one of the socio-political aspects of why this process of ethnic revival was launched but he didn’t draw our attention to other processes. Between 1834 and 1859, the warlord Shamil led a rebellious Sufi brotherhood of Chechens and Dagestanis in a fierce holy war of resistance against Russian rule, forestalling the czar’s hold over the region for twenty-five years (Editor’s note). 4
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In fact, by the end of the 1970s it had become clear that the Bulgarian Communist Party couldn’t ensure further economic progress of theountry c on the basis of extensive development of the economy; nor could it cope with the task of intensifying economic development by using the achievements of the scientificand technologicalrevolution or maintain the standards of living to which the population had become accustomed by then. At the same time, the Bulgarian Communist Party was most distrustful of the intelligentsia. is was due to the Communist Party’s fear of the intelligentsia, which became especially obvious aer 1968. ere was no other country in Central and Eastern Europe the intelligentsia was as underpaid as restrictions in Bulgaria. in ere no otherof country where with such serious class-based and political the was recruitment the intelligentsia; nowhere else was educational and administrative mobility as strongly influenced by political considerations as in Bulgaria. I fully agree with Prof. Zhelev’s opinion that the Communist Party had very strong fears about the country’s demographic development and especially about the higher birth rates among Turks. ose fears were reinforced by the nationalistic aspiration towards homogenisation of the country, which obviously clashed with the Muslim population’s unwillingness to be assimilated in this way. In the late 70s and early 80s the Bulgarian Communist Party felt threatened by something else too, and that was the growing discontent among young people. At the beginning of the 80s our sociological surveys started showing very strong discontent with and very strong alienation from the communist ideals, and generally with the way in which the country was developing and was governed. is discontent and alienation among young people almost as strong group as among the intelligentsia. So Zhivkov decided to experiment by was finding a vulnerable to serve as a scapegoat and to ensure cohesion around the Communist Party and support for the party’s decisions, by pointing out the culprit for all wrongs – be they economic, demographic, national or political. is was in fact an attempt to draw away attention, to solve the problems in a way that had already been tried out in the Balkans and not in the Balkans only. And an attempt to solve social and political problems by using a single scapegoat. at is what made possible this process, which led to the emigration of 350,000 Turks. But it also had another terrible consequence that is rarely discussed: the demoralisation of the Bulgarian public and society. e Bulgarian public didn’t support and rally behind Turks because it was scared both by their demographic number and as a result of a terrifying campaign concerning the stability of the State. Bulgarians, or at least some of them, became forcibly or not so forcibly involved in the harassment of the Bulgarian Turks. Hidajet Repovac: We are at the end of our discussion on the topic of migrations on the Balkans. I don’t think that we need to make a summary now, but I would like to conclude that this discussion has been very fruitful and that it has presented us with a number of new arguments about the situation in the Balkans and in Bulgaria in particular. I think it is very important to raise the correct questions, since raising correct questions is much better than givingwrong answers. I thank all thepresenters for their very good papers. We will continue with the next sessionaer lunch.
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Second Session:
e Bulgarian Case: Turks, Pomaks and Roma
Moderators: Prof. Tetsuya Sahara Prof. Slavka Draganova
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THE ‘RENAMING’: CONSEQUENCES AND HOW TO OVERCOME THEM Ibrahim Yalamov New Bulgarian University, Bulgaria I. Reasons for and Nature of the ‘Renaming’ e so-called ‘regeneration process’ or forced name change embodies the very essence of the totalitarian regime’s policy on minorities in the second half of the twentieth century. e ‘renaming’ was an all-embracing and lengthy process. It was conducted initially only among Pomaks and Roma. It began among the Turkish population at the beginning of the 1960s. Aer an interruption of about five or six years, it continued to be conducted systematically under a decision adopted in 1969 by the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s Central Committee. e ‘renaming’ comprised all activities designed to obliterate the national characteristics of the ethnic mi norities and more specifically their culture, language, names, religion, way of life, customs and traditions. e term ‘renaming’ was coined and gained wide currency in the mid-1980s. It encoded a unique assimilation policy, which caused a deep ethnic crisis. e doctrine and practices of the ‘renaming’ reflect a deep crisis of state socialism that began in the late 60s. By the beginning of the 80s this crisis was all-embracing. One of the important problems facing the totalitarian authorities was the demographic problem. It became a major factor shaping the policy on minorities in the 70s and 80s. Several negative trends in the demographic structure of the Bulgarian population appeared around 1965. e birth rate of Bulgarians began to decline. In 1965 it was 5.5 per thousand, dropping to 4.83 per thousand in 1975. e same trend was also observed in the Turkish minority. e birth rate decreased from 21.9 in 1965 to 11.7 per thousand in 1985. Among the Roma population, the birth rate continued to be high. According to unofficial data presented to the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s Central Committee, Turks, Pomaks, and Roma constituted 18– 19% of Bulgaria’s population. Another factor that led to the ‘renaming’ was the policy of ‘blocs’ or constant confrontation between the two military and political systems. e fact that the two neighbouring countries – Bulgaria and Turkey – belonged to opposite military blocs generated mutual mistrust and suspicion. e leadership of the totalitarian regime was suspicious not only of Turkey but also of the Turkish population in Bulgaria.e latter was regarded as Turkey’s ‘fih column’ in the country. e ideological factor played an important role for the so-called ‘renaming.’ e symbiosis between Marxism and nationalism, which developed in almost all commu-
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nist parties of the former socialist countries aer the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), had developed in the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) as early as the late 1960s. It was generated by the dominant nationalistic wing in the BCP leadership. Under its influence an effort was made to create a unified mono-ethnic nation. In the first years the legitimacy for the appearance of such a nation was substantiated by the Leninist-Stalinist thesis, which stipulated that during the communist phase nations would merge and a unified community would be formed. An attempt was made to create a homogeneous ethnic, political, and cultural identity. is was expected to happen by integrating the ethnic minorities into the Bulgarian ethnos, using mainly coercive and forcible means. However, the social and ideological basis for such a unified ethnicity turned out to be unstable and conflicting. e idea that the different ethnic groups should become one nation was perceived unfavourably not only by the Turkish minority, but also by the Bulgarian ethnos. at is the reason why the theory of ‘the Bulgarian srcin’ started to dominate the campaign’s climax. e authors of this theory set out to prove that not only Pomaks but also the Turkish population in Bulgaria – that is, all Turks – were of Bulgarian stock. Consequently, the objective of the ‘renaming’ was to remove the ethnic boundaries and to assimilate particular communities. is process was centred around the idea of supplanting ethnic consciousness by socialist consciousness and of ‘forcefully moulding and developing a Bulgarian consciousness.’ Moreover, Bulgarian ethnic consciousness was supposed to become the self-consciousness of all citizens with no exceptions. is utopian objective was motivated by the rather dubious thesis that the ethnic consciousness of the Turkish population did not coincide with its ethnic srcin. us, the rewriting of history attained its ultimate goal – to manipulate ethnic memory and to transform the ethnic self-consciousness of the ethnic Turks and of the other communities. e ‘renaming’ began in the period of state socialism aer the April 1956 Plenum of the BCP’s Central Committee. e newly elected party leadership headed by Todor Zhivkov began to work on ‘revising the old notions on the national question’ and to formulate a new policy towards minorities. e nature of this new policy consisted in shortening, even skipping the phase of the blossoming forth of national identity and culture, and imposing total ethnic homogeneity. At the beginning of the 60s attempts were made to rename Roma and Pomaks. e campaign started with the practical implementation of the political measures, approved by the Politburo of the BCP’s Central Committee on 5 May 1962, ‘against the false claims of Gypsies, Tatars and Pomaks about being Turks.’ During this campaign one of the main ideological and political tasks was to dispute those false claims. is was supposed to happen by eliminating the main factors – the influence of Islam, the study of the Turkish language, and some other factors. It was emphasised that ‘citizens of non-Bulgarian srcin … of their own free will can register hemselves t and their children as Bulgarians, can change their first, middle and family names without going to court...’
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e question of the ethnic genesis of the Turkish population in Bulgaria was probably raised for the first time in an official document in a report to the Politburo of the BCP’s Central Committee. e report claimed that part of the population of nonBulgarian origin, more specifically the population of the Ludogorie, Gerlovo, Aitos and some other regions, was of Bulgarian ethnic origin. us, the foundations of the ‘renaming’ were laid. e renaming of Roma and Pomaks began in the spirit of these instructions. A large part of Roma and Pomaks were subjected to administrative pressure and coercion. ese measures caused widespread discontent, and in some places also set off a chain of violent reactions. ere were clashes between the peasants and the repressive state authorities in some villages around the town of Goce Delchev in the Rhodope Mountains. is generated serious social tensions and the campaign was temporarily halted. At the beginning of the 60s the totalitarian regime started conducting a systematic assimilation policy towards all ethnic minorities. e campaign was portrayed to the public as ‘total inclusion’ of the ethnic minorities in the Bulgarian nationality. In fact, however, the inclusion was reduced to assimilating the Turkish, Roma and other minority communities into the Bulgarian ethnos. For Todor Zhivkov this was assimilation from a Marxist-Leninist point of view. By Resolution No. 549 of the Secretariat of the BCP’s Central Committee dated 17 July 1970, the district communist party committees in Blagoevgrad, Smolyan, Kurdzhali, Pazardzhik, and elsewhere were instructed ‘to organise systematic, consistent, and aggressive campaigns ... to cleanse totally the national consciousness of Pomaks.’ In this connection, a purposeful ideological political campaign was initiated to change their Turkish-Arabic names with Bulgarian ones, as well as the way they dressed. e Council of Ministers in its turn created, by Resolution No. 116 dated 4 May 1971, the preconditions stimulating this process. e persons who changed their names were exempted from paying charges and fees, and all expenses were covered by the state administration. ese resolutions gave an impetus to the campaign. e local authorities realised that the task could not be performed by ideological and political means only. at is why they resorted to administrative pressure and coercion, even to violence. As a result of the massive pressure and threats, the campaign was completed within several years. In 1970–1972 the Turkish-Arabic names of about 200,000 persons in the Rhodope and Pirin regions were changed. e culmination of the so-called ‘renaming’ was the forced change of the names of the Turkish population. Since a person’s name is one of the crucial markers of their ethnic identity, the ideologists of the ‘renaming’ considered Turkish-Arabic names to be one of the major obstacles on the road to the ‘unified socialist Bulgarian nation’ that they intended to create. e campaign started at the beginning of December 1984 in Southern Bulgaria and more specifically in the Kurdzhali region. By mid-January 1985, the campaign had also been extended to Northern Bulgaria and it was terminated at the beginning of
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March the same year. In a relatively short period of time about 850,000 persons were officially registered under new Bulgarian names. As to its objectives and nature, the ‘renaming’ was preposterous, inhumane and reactionary. e main goal pursued by this campaign was the formation of an ‘ethnically monolithic nation.’ In the first official document approved by the Politburo of the BCP’s Central Committee the campaign’s main goal was formulated as follows: ‘to consolidate the unity of the Bulgarian socialist nation and its ethnic homogeneity.’ is is closely related to the attempts to change forcibly the centuries-long ethnic self-consciousness of the minority communities and to impose another consciousness, namely a Bulgarian ethnic consciousness, as the self-consciousness of each and every citizen.
II. Social, Political, Ethnic, and Cultural Consequences Due to its wide scale, duration and forcible nature, the ‘renaming’ caused serious ethnic, psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural problems. One of the most dramatic consequences of the ‘renaming’ was a compulsory and unprecedented massive exodus. Growing discontent, especially during the forced name change campaign, and the emergence of a democratic movement in Bulgaria and other countries in Eastern Europe, activated the minorities’ resistance. In May 1989, on the eve of the OSCE Paris conference on human dimensions, hunger strikes and peaceful demonstrations were organised by the Turkish population in many regions. e demonstrators’ demands were the restoration of their names, the right to use their mother tongue, and freedom in observing their customs and traditions. e May events demonstrated unambiguously the failure of the assimilation policy. e authorities reacted to the demonstrations by using force and coercion against the demonstrators, extraditing the most active protestors and, ultimately, provoking an emigration wave that was unprecedented in scale. On 29 May 1989, Todor Zhivkov declared on Bulgarian television that the totalitarian regime would allow the Turkish population to leave thecountry. is statement was followed by a massive propaganda campaign designed to persuade the public that the emigrants were an anti-Bulgarian and destructive community that wanted to leave their homeland of their own free will, and that they were certainly not being driven away by the regime. Meanwhile, however, the Interior Ministry and other governmental bodies were using different means and mechanisms to enlarge and accelerate the emigration wave.People felt cheated, humiliated and deeply offendedby the totalitarian state. e emigration wave, called ‘the big excursion,’ assumed menacing proportions. As a result and mainly due to moral, psychological and administrative coercion, by 21 August 1989 when Turkey was compelled by the massive immigration flow to close its border with Bulgaria, 362,000 persons had le the country, including about 10,000 intellectuals. Another 400,000 persons were preparing to leave. e exodus was unprecedented in scale. Almost the entire Turkish population le. Entire villages were deserted and, especially in the Kurdzhali region, entire districts were depopulated.
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is was the third mass exodus in the period of state socialism. From the beginning of 1950 till November 1951 about 154,393 persons le for Turkey. During the socalled ‘emigration to relatives’ (from March 1969 till 30 November 1978) 115,240 emigrants le Bulgaria. Hence, as a result of the ethnic cleansing, more than 521,600 Turks emigrated from Bulgaria. On several occasions during this period, massive programmes of resettlement by force in the interior of the country were carried out, affecting mainly Pomaks. In 1948 the Council of Ministers adopted several ordinances ordering theresettlement of more than 685 families or about 3,799 persons from a band one kilometre wide along Bulgaria’s southern border. By mid-1950, pursuant to Ordinance No. II-1-1260, another 1,550 families had been moved inland, away from the southern and western borders. eir houses, land, and gardens were transferred to the state land fund. Compensation with land in their new place of residence was slow, so those people had to live and work in severe conditions for years. e massive emigration in 1989 was not based on a special agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey. us, there was no legal framework to regulate the property claims of the exiled persons. is gave rise to profiteering, corruption, and marauding. As to scale, intensity and way of implementation, the ‘big excursion’ differs drastically from the emigration waves aer Bulgaria’s liberation in 1878. e previous emigration waves were motivated by the existence of ethnic and kinship ties, by the specific economic problems facing the Turkish population, by the cooling off of inter-ethnic relations, by inequality and unequal rights, etc. e ‘big excursion’ had the characteristics of ethnic cleansing. Another distinctive feature was its spontaneity, chaotic nature, and intensity. e lack of a special international agreement did not allow the emigration flow to be regulated and to be distributed evenly in time. e fact that aer the closure of the border a so-called ‘back wave’ was generated also supports the claim that the exodus was coercive. By the end of 1989 more than 110,000 persons had returned to Bulgaria. e main reason was the impossibility to find quick solutions to their life problems and, in general, the difficulties in adapting to the new conditions. e ‘renaming’ and more specifically the mass exodus, deepened the social and economic crisis in the country that had begun in the mid-1980s. In practice, it disrupted the production processes in important sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, construction, and transport. Almost allindustrial plants and most of the industrial enterprises in the depopulated regions were closed down. Severe work force shortages necessitated restructuring of the economy and relocation of workers from other regions. ere was a shortage of goods and this intensified inflation processes. e ‘back wave’ created new social problems. Many emigrants who came back remained unemployed, and more than 1,300 families filed applications requiring that their homes be returned. On 4 March 1990 the National Reconciliation Committee for solving the social problems generated by the ‘renaming’ staged a strike in front of
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Georgi Dimitrov’s Mausoleum in downtown Sofia. It was this protest that prompted the adoption of Council of Ministers Ordinance No. 29 of 5 April 1990 which, however, failed to solve the problem. e ‘renaming’ and the coercive mass exodus further complicated inter-ethnic relations and precipitated a serious crisis. Instead of the expected unification the result was deep disunion between the Bulgarian ethnos and the ethnic minorities. During the forced name change campaign and the ‘big excursion’ conditions were created for a rise of chauvinism and nationalism. e ‘renaming’ undermined not only the patriotic feelings of the Turkish population but it also distorted the patriotic perceptions of Bulgarians. e ‘renaming’ did not result in de-ethnicisation of the Turkish minority; conversely, it consolidated its ethnic self-consciousness. e ethnic element and its perception were boosted and they acquired new vigour at the expense of the civic element. e Turkish population started taking a close interest in its ethnic culture, language, religion, and customs. e consequences of this development under the existing conditions were not unequivocal. It is true that the Turkish population consolidated its ethnic self-consciousness. Yet due to the lack of regulatory mechanisms in the firstyears of the transition period this was an obstacle to the integration of the Turkish minority into Bulgarian civil society. e large-scale propaganda campaign describing an apocalyptic situation was, for a certain period of time, successful in deluding part of the Bulgarian ethnos: the communist party apparatus, the civil servants, a number of journalists, researchers, the leaders of some professional organisations of people of the arts, and intellectuals. ese people believed that the survival of the Bulgarian nation depended on the outcome of the ‘renaming.’ Due to the activity of some writers, journalists, and others, some strata of the Bulgarian nation were led astray. It should be borne in mind that the nation had been subjected to ideological pressure and social deformation for years; moreover, among Bulgarians living in mixed regions, a psychosis of fear was created during the campaign. Given the lack of freedom of the press and freedom of speech, Bulgarians had been unscrupulously lied to for five years. at is why the majority of the inhabitants of mixed regions remained passive witnesses to theinhumane campaign and some of them even took part in it. e tragic campaign, especially the ‘big excursion’ had, however, a sobering effect on a particular part of Bulgarians and more specifically on the Bulgarian intellectuals. ey started looking at the situation of the Turkish population from the perspective of humanism and traditional good-neighbourly spirit komşuluk ( in Turkish). Among the members of the Club for the Support ofGlasnost and Perestroika, the Independent Society for Human Rights Protection (ISHRP), and thePodkrepa trade union, a discussion was initiated with the aim of developing a clear position towards the regime with respect to its policy on the Turkish population. Finally, in June 1989, one hundred and twenty-one intellectuals from the Club for the Support ofGlasnost and Perestroika sent a declaration to Parliament in which they condemned the violence against the Turkish
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minority and declared that it contravened the Bulgarian national tradition and human rights principles. On specific occasions some intellectuals stood up for the human rights of the Turkish minority. e renowned Bulgarian poet Blaga Dimitrova stood up for the individual’s right of free choice of name. On the occasion of the internment of her colleague Salih Bakladzhiev, the historian Antonina Zhelyazkova wrote: ‘Stop it! Come to your senses! Give back the names, the language, the culture, and the human rights to the Turkish minority, and I am sure these awful streams of refugees that disgrace our country will dry up.’ Such public acts helped preserve the integrity of the traditional sense of komşuluk. e ‘renaming’ and the massive emigration deepened the internal contradictions of the totalitarian system and accelerated its ultimate collapse. e coercion exerted on Turks caused great discontent among them. From the very ebginning of theforced name change campaign, a resistance movement that took different forms arose among Turks. Protest demonstrations were organised during the name change campaign in several places, where demonstrators clashed with police and Interior Ministry troops. In the mid-1980s a number of underground groups and organisations began to appear. According to Interior Ministry data, from the beginning of 1985 till the end of 1987, forty-two such formations were detected. Most of them were marginal groups without programmes and statutes. ey operated for a few months only. However, individual groups and organisations, such as the Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria, the Long Winter Group, and the Democratic League, had a longer life and achieved some practical results. In the spring of 1989 the resistance of the Turkish population entered a new phase. It had grown into a genuine mass movement, becoming an important constituent of the emerging democratic opposition in Bulgaria. us, the activities of the Turkish organisations were combined objectively with the efforts of the legal and open democratic organisations. As a result, the protest movement of the Turkish minority expanded and became massive, and a number of protest actions were organised. e totalitarian regime’s policy on the ethnic question placed Bulgaria in a very difficult international situation. e coercive actions of the Bulgarian government genuinely perplexed the country’s allies, and many Western states condemned themopenly. e West not only did not support Bulgaria but perceived it as an insufficiently civilised state. Bulgaria found itself in international isolation. In brief, the ‘renaming’ deepened the internal contradictions of the totalitarian system and accelerated its ultimate demise.
III. Gradual Overcoming of the Consequences e transition period marked the beginning of a process of gradual and painful overcoming of the negative ethno-psychological and socio-political consequences of the ‘renaming.’Komşuluk (the sense of neighbourhood), a centuries-old tradition, fa-
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cilitated this process. On the other hand, most of the leaders of the main political parties, such as the Union of Democratic Forces and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, realised in good time that playing with anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim nationalism was something for which Bulgaria might have to pay a heavy price. In the first months of the transition period, when ethnic confrontation was fullscale in the mixed regions, civil society took measures to calm and consolidate citizens. e National Reconciliation Committee, established at the end of 1989, united mainly intellectuals and representatives of different ethnic and religious communities. Its main target was reconciliation and tolerance in inter-ethnic relations. eCommittee brought the demands of Turks and the rest of theMuslim population to the knowledge of international organisations. At the proposal of the Public Council on National Problems, on 15 January 1990 Parliament adopted a special declaration condemning the ‘renaming.’ In November 1990, the Grand National Assembly adopted an Act to Amend the Bulgarian Citizens’ Names Act (adopted in March of the same year), which simplified the procedure of restoring the names of Bulgarian Muslims. People could now restore their names by an administrative procedure, without going to court. ose who wanted to could also restore their patronymic (middle) and family names and, moreover, without the affixes ‘-ov,’ ‘-ev’ or ‘-ova’ and ‘-eva’ (the typical Bulgarian affixes for names). e Republic of Bulgaria has already ratified a number of international treaties. e 1991 Constitution does not use the terms ‘national’ or ‘ethnic minorities’; however, it guarantees the main rights of persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. Equality before the law and banon discrimination are stipulated in Article 6 of the Constitution. Article 29 bans categorically any forcible assimilation. Article 44 safeguards the political rights, and Articles 13 and 37 the religious rights of all Bulgarian citizens. Article 36 grants members of ethnic groups the right to study and use their own language, and Article 54 entitles them to develop their own culture in accordance with their ethnic self-identification, which is recognised and guaranteed by law. All this has created an adequate legal and political framework guaranteeing equal rights of the minorities in Bulgaria. e Turkish population is now participating actively in the legislative and executive branches of government. In the June 1990 elections for a Grand National Assembly, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) won 418,000 votes and twenty-three seats. In the June 2001 general elections, it won twenty-one seats in the regularnational assembly. e MRF had two ministers and five deputy ministers in the coalition government with the Simeon II National Movement (SSNM), as well as two regional governors. As a result of the 2003 localelections, the MRF has 27 municipal and more than 550 village mayors. Although slowly, minority cultural rights have also been recognised. Turks, Roma, and the other minorities are now entitled to mother-tongue tuition. For example, the Turkish language was introduced in school curricula as an elective subject in
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November 1991, and it was made a compulsory elective subject by the Education Act of December 1998. Although on a rather limited scale, the Turkish language has also been introduced in the mass media. Since 1993 the Bulgarian National Radio has had morning and evening half-hour broadcasts for the Turkish population in Bulgaria. News, Turkish and Bulgarian folk songs are included in the broadcasts. In the spring of 2001 the Bulgarian National Television also began broadcasting ten-minute programmes in Turkish. In the transition period attempts were also made to restore the Turkish press. At present there are three weeklies published in Sofia (Sabah, Zaman and Müslümanlar), and a children’s newspaperFiliz and a children’s magazine calledBalon. ere are another two magazines, Kaynak and Ümit, but they do not come out regularly. Religious rights werealso gradually recognised during this period. eMuslims, who according to the 1992 census were about one million and one hundred thousand people, have 1,100 mosques andmescits (small mosques) with approximately 1,160 imams (chief prelates) andhatibs (preachers). In the early 90s three secondary theological schools and a religious Islamic college were established. At the beginning of the 1998/ 99 academic year, the Islamic college was transformed into a Higher Islamic Institute. About five hundred boys and girls attend the four theological schools on a yearly basis. By the middle of the 1999/2000 academic year Islam had been introduced as an elective subject in municipal schools in the regions with a compact Muslim population. Parallel to this, the attitudes of the Bulgarian ethnos have started changing substantially. Prejudices against and stereotypes of ‘the other ethnos,’ ‘the alien’ are weakening, and this is an optimistic trend. e traditional komşuluk (the spirit of neighbourhood) is being restored in everyday life and in the mass consciousness. A study on the problem of ‘Compatibility and Incompatibility among Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria’ conducted in 1994 showed that in about five years a considerable step had been taken towards overcoming the negative consequences of he t ‘renaming.’ e majority of the Christian Bulgarian respondents in an opinion poll, which was a part of the study, defined the ‘renaming’ as ‘a crime.’ ose who thought that it was not a crime were 29%. e political responsibility for the ‘renaming’ has not been transformed into ethnic blame of all Bulgarians. Turks in particular attribute the responsibility for thisprocess to Todor Zhivkov and his circle. e exceptions in the above-mentioned study were only two percent. e ‘renaming’ has not destroyed the spirit of neighbourhood. As studies in mixed regions show, relations between Christians and Muslims are quite intense. Sociological studies confirm the existence of a prevalent trend towards living together. ey show that 97% of Turks and 94.3% of Roma would like to have Bulgarians as neighbours. Conversely, 63.7% of Bulgarians would accept a Turk and more than 25% would accept a Roma as a neighbour. A similar trend is observed as regards friendship: 92.4% of Turks and 92.5% of Roma would like to have a Bulgarian friend. As re-
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gards Bulgarians, 57.6% would accept a Turk as a friend and about 25% would accept a Roma as a friend. Religious tolerance prevails in relations among the religious communities. People of a different religion are perceived normally – as human beings like anyone else. is is categorically expressed by the Muslims. Intolerance is manifested as an exception among them (3– 5%) and among a small group of Bulgarians (10%). Consequently, positive trends have emerged and are dominant in the public sphere. e relations between Bulgarians and Turks, especially in North-eastern Bulgaria, are improving; the spirit of neighbourhood is being restored. Religious tolerance is becoming part of people’s way of thinking. e thesis that there is a specific Bulgarian ethnic model has been advanced in the public sphere, and its nature and role are being discussed. e MRF leader Ahmed Dogan says that there is a Bulgarian ethnic model for solving minority problems. Many Bulgarian politicians and experts regard this model as a tool for regulating inter-ethnic relations and for avoiding confrontation. is last interpretation corresponds more closely to the development of the natural processes in Bulgaria in the past few years. e ethnic conflict, which occurred as a result of the ‘renaming,’ was overcome before it could deteriorate into an armed clash. at was mainly due to the deep-rooted tradition of good neighbourhood spirit, i.e. good-neighbourly relations between the Bulgarian and the Turkish population. In this sense one may speak about a model that essentially consists in avoiding problems that divide and focusing on interests that unite people. However, aer overcoming the conflict the problem of the future of the ethnic minorities has acquired crucial proportions. According to the Human Rights Committee, the aim of minority rights protection is not only the survival of minorities but also the further development of their cultural, religious, and social identity. e preservation and development of identity require not only short-term political solutions but also a long-term strategy for social, economic, and cultural development. e Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which Bulgaria has ratified, recommends the adoption of specific measures in the field of culture and education – the study of the minorities’ native languages, their history, and related research work. However, very little has been done in this field over the last decade, when the MRF has been participating in government. Most of all, in regions with compact Turkish and Roma populations, the educational system is not in keeping with the contemporary needs of society. e schools do not have the necessary facilities and equipment, there are few teachers who are university graduates, etc. In these schools children cannot become computer literate, nor do they learn foreign languages adequately. Not even mother-tongue tuition is compulsory; itis only a compulsory elective foreign-language course coming aer languages such as English, German, French, or Russian. at is why few Turkish boys and girls are studying their mother tongue. eir number is decreasing every year. Many Roma and Turkish children drop out before completing even primary school. Only 3.1% of the young Turks graduate from higher
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educational institutions, and the percentage of the young Roma who do so tends towards zero. e percentage of children of school age, abandoned by their parents, is gradually growing. Illiteracy is thus being reproduced. e newspapers and magazines in Turkish are published mainly with the support of foreign foundations. e respective state institutions have distanced themselves from the publishing houses and provide no financial aid. e publications cannot meet the demands of the Turkish minority either in terms of circulation rate or of quality. e Turkish-language broadcasts of the Bulgarian National Television are rather limited. Research on Turkish literature, culture, and history is virtually non-existent. ere are no more than two or three Turks who are senior researchers. e state administration is not taking the necessary steps to prepare researchers and experts in the field of science and culture. e number of doctoral students in the country and abroad is less than five or six and they are postgraduate students only in Turkish language and literature and Islamic theology. For this reason thecourses in Turkish language and literature at the Sofia, Plovdiv and Shumen universities, as well as at the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia, and the newly established Turkish theatres in Kurdzhali and Razgrad are in great need of highly qualified experts. In this situation one could hardly expect that the srcinal ethnic culture would survive and thrive. Not only the respective state institutions but also the MRF leadership are continuing to underestimate theethnic culture. In the latter’s opinion cultural activities have no place in ‘high politics’ in which ‘they are called upon’ to be involved. It should be specially emphasised that the ethnic model does not have the necessary socio-economic basis. is threatens the model’s future. e attempts of the SSNM and MRF coalition government to develop a programme for the economic revival of some regions populated by ethnic Turks have not brought about any tangible changes so far. ese regions continue to be characterised by an underdeveloped production structure, unemployment and poverty. During the transition period, hundred of thousands of peasants and workers from those regions were isolated from the labour market. According to data of Alpha Research (a sociological agency), only 26.3% of Roma and 54.6% of Turks are employed in the state and private sectors. e income of 60.5% of Roma family members is less than 50 BGN and that of 52.6% of the Turkish families is between 50 and 100 BGN a month. In fact 64.3% of Roma and approximately one quarter of the Turkish families should be classified as poor considering that their monthly income is less than 102 BGN. According to Ahmed Dogan, the essence of the Bulgarian ethnic model is equal participation of the ethnic and religious communities in the country’s public, political, and cultural life. Experts hold similar views. As in most cases, this refers to the participation in national government of representatives mainly of the Turkish ethnic minority. From a formal point of view considerable progress has been made in this field. However, as some researchers maintain, this should be more correctly termed as presence rather than representation. e ultimate objective of political representation is the expression and defence of the specific interests of the respective ethnic minority. e
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politicians emphasise only the common interests: ‘common values,’ ‘European values,’ ‘integration,’ ‘togetherness,’ but the specific interests are neglected. An understanding has emerged in the public sphere that the special programmes targeting minorities represent privileges and that they contravene the principle of equality. e model’s nature as characterised by its defenders is reduced to a balance between the principle of integration and the defence of the ethnic and religious identity. Political practice, however, reveals that the necessity of integration is always pointed out. e way to self-identification is not always clearly delineated. It has repeatedly been stressed that the first priority is the integration of the ethnic minorities into civil society, the formation of a unified Bulgarian and European nation on the basis of common national and European values. Undoubtedly, in the age of globalisation emphasis on thecommon values should be mandatory in a society that has lived through the trauma of the so-called ‘renaming,’ in a region where the fire of ethnic conflicts is still smouldering, in a period when the country is preparing to integrate into the European community. But don’t the ethnic minorities possess their own values, which could enrich the common system of values? Integration does not require that differences should be obliterated; on the contrary they should acquire stable characteristics. Integration should be achieved by preserving people’s identity in order to avoid its transformation into a form of quiet and creeping assimilation. In Bulgaria, due to its more conservative nature, identity is a priori taken for granted, whereas integration is qualified as a goal or as a process. It is a well known fact that the goal can be attained through definite conscientious activities. is, however, does not imply that identity should be le to its own development and oblivion. Undoubtedly, a biased interpretation of the ‘Bulgarian Ethnic Model’ is dictated also by the political conjuncture. Such an approach, however, belittles the creative and regulatory functions of the model and attributes to it manipulative powers. e model should not be rejected. It should be filled with real content and it should be transformed into a working model. It must be consistently implemented as a state policy, which embraces all minorities.
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THE ‘RENAMING PROCESS’ AMONG THE POMAKS: THIRTY YEARS L ATER Evgenia Ivanova New Bulgarian University, Bulgaria I shall start with a case that at first sight has nothing to do with the ‘Renaming Process’: Some time ago (3 April 2004), Svetla Petrova’s otherwise interesting TV talk show Seismograph featured a discussion on the possibility of Islamic terrorism appearing in Bulgaria. Among the common statements by official and unofficial muis motivated by the degree of success in their aspirations to this position, the two ‘arbitrators’ in the discussion – a well-known journalist (a Turk) and a research centre director (a Bulgarian) – took a stance that was, at least for me, rather unexpected. ‘Terrorist acts by Bulgarian Turks are inconceivable,’ the journalist said categorically. ‘Well, such acts can be committed by Pomaks because they have problems with their identity. can be tempted withdirector. 1,000 US‘e dollars...’ ‘is is Besides, preciselythey the are casepoor withand Chechnya, ’ added the Chechens also have problems with their identity and we have seen the result...’ e ‘arbitrators’ looked convincingly competent in their desire to explain terrorism as potentially inherent in an entire community. e link between ‘problematic identity’ and terrorism was presented as self-evident. I am recalling the Seismograph case not only because I still feel guilty about not having reacted immediately as Iintended to. I am mentioning this case because itdemonstrates a distinct tendency (identical to the one during the ‘Renaming Process’) to problematise (and compartmentalise) social, economic, or political categories on an ethnic basis.1 In fact, the success of the ‘Renaming Process,’ taken to mean primarily the events in 1984–1985, was not due to its ‘sudden’ or ‘blitz’ nature resulting from thespontaneous of aalso satanic but precisely compartmentalisation – at that, not only intodecision ethnic but into mind regional and even to family categories. iscompartmentalisation, implemented by the authorities with consistent accuracy, was based on the hitherto existing – but deepened by the process itself – disintegration between the communities. 1 I use the term ‘ethnic’ also about therelations between Christian Bulgarians and Muslim Bulgarians insofar as (despite the incantations that ‘ Pomaks are pure Bulgarians’) these relations are most commonly interpreted mechanically precisely as ethnic.
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e present discourse on the ‘Renaming Process’ and its recurrences focuses (in most cases) on the subsequent relations between Christians and Muslims, and especially on the relations between Bulgarians and Turks. e relations between the Muslims themselves or between Turks and Pomaks are very rarely2 or hardly ever considered as a problem. e Seismograph case is indicative precisely of these relations. Inter-community compartmentalisation was tested and had proved to be arather efficient tool as early as 1964, when the abortive attempt to change the names of the Pomaks in Ribnovo, which led to a revolt in the village, was presented as an ‘isolated, autonomous’ decision of the authorities in the Blagoevgrad region. e end of the revolt, climaxing in slogans like ‘Long live comrade Zhivkov!’ (who had cancelled the ‘isolated’ decision), was the first warning signal of the policy that would be followed in the next twenty years. Aer Ribnovo, every renaming act would be presumed to be ‘isolated’ and every community affected – be it regional or ethnic – would live with the illusion that ‘this could not possibly be done to us...’ e compartmentalisation grew in scale during the first half of the 1970s when the names of all Pomaks were changed. e very few Pomaks who succeeded in ‘hiding’ in regions with a compact Turkish population were tracked down and turned back to ‘their own’ places of residence to be renamed there or ‘to be le in peace’ in the places of ‘the others.’ e fact that not a single Pomak who had ‘hidden’ in a Turkish region had ever been renamed on the spot fostered the illusion among Turks that ‘this would not be done to us...’ e first, once again ‘isolated,’ attempt to rename Turks was made in 1975 in the Smolyan region, populated mostly by already ‘renamed’ Pomaks. is marked the beginning of a sinister process of compartmentalisation into ‘pure Turks,’ ‘purer Turks,’ and ‘purest Turks,’ whose natural end (and not an independent decision) were the events in 1984–1985. Aer the mid-70s, compartmentalisation – which had already assumed an ethnic form – again become regional in character. In the eyes of the power-holders and their subservient scientists who were engaged in digging out ‘the Bulgarian root,’ the classification (from the point of view of Turks themselves) into ‘pure Turks,’ ‘purer Turks’ and ‘purest Turks’ appeared as inverted: so there were ‘purest Bulgarians,’ ‘almost Bulgarians,’ and ‘least Bulgarians.’.. e Smolyan ‘expertise’ was first applied to the mixed regions and mixed marriages, to cover – in early 1985 – also ‘the purest Turks’ or ‘the least Bulgarians’ from the Shumen region. By then compartmentalisation was becoming more and more detailed. It was no longer simply ethnic and even not regional; it also forcibly penetrated the ‘private’ territory of the family. ere were cases when married couples from two neighbouring re-
2 See Ivanova, E. 2002. Отхвърлените “приобщени” или Процеса, наречен “възродителен” (1912-1989) , (e Rejected ‘Integrated’ People or the Process Called ‘Renaming’ [1912– 1989])], Sofia.
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gions (Ruse and Silistra, for example) were renamed at intervals of several weeks only because ‘the time for “her” (or “his”) region had not yet come.’ When the process picked up breakneck speed between 1984 and 1985, there were still people who consoled themselves that ‘this would not be done to us...’ us, the paranoiac proliferation of identities, in which Pomaks were not the only victims, was ‘specified’ – at the end of the 80s – into several ‘calendar’ categories: ‘Bulgarians ’72,’ ‘Bulgarians ’82,’ ‘Bulgarians ’84,’ ‘Bulgarians ’85.’ Whereas the 1989 decision to issue passports en masse, which later came to be known as the ‘Big Excursion,’ excluded ‘the 1972 Bulgarians.’ When collecting field material for my book e Rejected ‘Integrated’ People about the renaming of Pomaks, I was horrified not only by the personal tragedies of the respondents. What probably shocked me most was the behaviour of the communities to each other. Most of Pomaks were even surprised when I said that I would have expected more empathy from Turks with their tragedy in 1972. A not insignificant part of Turks (just as the authors of the renaming, who later wrote copious memoirs) thought that the renaming of Pomaks (and even that of the Smolyan Turks) was ‘in the order of things’ – aer all, they are ‘to some extent’ Bulgarians, aren’t they? In both communities there were people who (like the communist party functionaries from the Smolyan region in the 80s) were sorry that the process had not continued with the renaming of Jews, Armenians and Greeks... In both communities there were people who thought they were and who really were friends. When speaking about ‘the others’ they thought of them as a community, not as friends who had specificnames. I am sure that the Seismograph journalist has friends among Pomaks. I don’t know about the director. In the years aer the ‘Renaming Process’ the majority of both Turks and Pomaks were able to draw the distinction between the ‘renamers’ and Bulgarians at large. Inside the Muslim community itself, however,such a distinction has never been made. Pomaks are still bitter about the indifference of all Turks to the events from the early 70s, whereas Turks regard to this very day all Pomaks as ‘renamers.’ e statement that ‘we get on with Bulgarians better’ is remarkably common in both communities. e notorious ‘self-identification as Turks’ of part of Pomaks, which triggered a heated debate (including in the Bulgarian Parliament) aer the 1992 census, does not disprove this statement in theleast. Pomaks who ‘identify themselves as Turks’ are mostly from the Yakoruda and Goce Delchev districts (Blagoevgrad region). Moreover, 3 their number had visibly decreased between the last two censuses. e ‘Turkish’ selfidentification of Pomaks from the two districts is directly related to the traumas from the ‘Renaming Process.’ It was precisely in the area of Yakoruda and Goce Delchev that the repressions were the most severe and the number of victims was the highest. What
See Results from the 1992 Census. Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics , 1995. Sofia; and http://www.nsi.bg/Census/EthnosMV.htm 3
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prompts many people to opt for this self-identity is the wish to ‘overinsure’ themselves which, naturally, weakens as the trauma recedes into the past. e effect of ‘overinsurance,’ as well as the demonstration of religious zeal that occasionally assumes overblown proportions in ht e Western Rhodope Mountains, has been repeatedly noted by researchers.4 Observations on the dependence of the ‘assumed Turkish self-identity’ on the ethnic composition of one region or another are comparatively less frequent (but nevertheless are being discussed too). Turkish self-identification of Pomaks is definitely more common in the Western Rhodopes where there are few, if any Turks. Conversely, in the regions (the boundary between the Central and Eastern, and the Southeastern Rhodope Mountains) where Pomaks and Turks live in neighbouring or mixed population centres, there is no ‘assumed Turkish self-identity.’ e compartmentalised space is most visible precisely along the boundary between the Smolyan and Kurdzhali regions, which is the ethnic boundary between Turks and Pomaks. e same holds for the Kirkovo municipality (Kurdzhali region), where the two communities are mixed. Precisely these were the regions of the ‘stage-by-stage’ ‘Renaming Process,’ i.e. the regions that shaped ‘the calendar identities’: ‘Bulgarians ’72,’ ‘Bulgarians ’82,’ etc. And precisely in them the disintegration between the two communities most oen took the form of conflict. e Pomaks from the ‘compartmentalised’ spaces rarely refer to their neighbours by the ethnonym ‘Turks.’ ey call them by derisive names, such as Chitatsi, Koynari or Alucha (Yaluchi). e ethnonym Koynari (settled Yuruks5), which is common along the boundary between the Smolyan and Kurdzhali regions, is derived from koyun (‘sheep’ in Turkish) in the mind of Pomaks, whereas Turks themselves associate it with the city of Konya – the capital of the Seljuks and a present-day stronghold of Islam in secular Turkey. e name Yaluchi is found only in the Kirkovo area and is ‘explained’ by local residents in rather interesting ways, which I am tempted to discuss in more detail. According to some of my informants, the word isa combination ofyol üç (‘three roads’ in Turkish) and refers to the three different directions, which the ‘tribes’ of Pomaks, the Turks from the Podkova region, and the Turks from the Benkovski region (who are indeed different from one another) had followed. In other versions it ‘origi-
4 See, for example,Планината Родопи - усилията на прехода. Обобщени резултати от ПСИ “Планината Родопи - модел за толерантност на(e Балканите” Rhodope Mountains: Efforts in the Transition. Summarised Results of a Representative Sociological Survey on ‘e Rhodope Mountains: A Model of Tolerance in the Balkans’). 1998. Sofia: Institute for East European Humanities. 5 See Ivanova, E. 2001. ‘Родопите като път и граница’ (‘e Rhodopes as a Road and Boundary), in Аспекти на етнокултурната ситуация. Осем години ( Aspects по-късно of the Ethno-Cultural Situation. Eight Years Later ). Sofia.
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nates’ from yol uç (‘end of the road’) – because the Turkish settlements in Kirkovo are ‘the last ones,’ those coming aer them being Pomak only.6 Regardless of the variety of interpretations, whose analysis – although quite tempting – will be the subject of another study, all clearly imply a pejoratively marked otherness. Here the road, whose main function is to link spaces, in fact compartmentalises them because it is both a road and a boundary. For the two communities the road ends in ‘nowhere.’7 Beyond it are ‘the others,’ who – if not hated – are usually excluded and forgotten. Unlike the northern regions (the municipalities of Asenovgrad, Banité, Ardino, Nedelino, and Dzhebel) where the ethnic boundary is clear and runs along the mountain ridge, compartmentalising the Pomaks in the west (in the Smolyan region) and the Turks in the east (in the Kurdzhali region), in the Kirkovo area this boundary is blurred, even though it again follows to some extent the changes in altitude. As a rule, Pomaks live on the high southern ‘collar’ of the Eastern Rhodopes (though there are numerous exceptions as a result of inter-regional migrations), whereas Turks live on the lower northern territories. One can find there also several mixed villages, which are almost absent in the other regions. us, from a territorial point of view, the ethnic spaces in Kirkovo could hardlyrival by ‘purity of compartmentalisation’ the clearly divided Pomak and Turkish ‘zones’ to the north. In fact, this ethnic ‘mix’ is largely an artificial product resulting precisely from the ‘Renaming Process’ and the tragic events at the end of 1984 (the death of Tyurkyan, a baby girl aged 17 months, which is commemorated by a fountain, occurred on the territory of Kirkovo near the village of Mogilyané). It was not until 1987 that today’s Kirkovo Municipality, whose centre has far fewer residents (none of them Turkish!) than other villages, was established to unite the three ‘tribes’ from the areas of Kirkovo itself (Pomaks), Podkova (Turks), and Benkovski (mixed). However, the semi-official, internal compartmentalisation into ‘micro-regions’ has continued to this very day. If the main principles in everyday administrative coexistence of the ‘tribes’ are ‘exclusion’ and ‘forgetfulness’ (the owners of the few enterprises in the region, for example, usually ‘forget’ to employ workers from ‘the others’), the periods of parliamentary and especially of local elections transform municipal life into an ‘intertribal’ war. Election results are rarely not contested in court and the two main political forces – the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF, supported by Turks) and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF, supported by Pomaks) – frequently resort to not entirely 6 e interviews were conducted in the villages of Dolno Kapinovo, Druzhentsi, and Domishte. Archives of the Institute for East European Humanities. Another possible interpretation could be uç el (‘the people from the border’). (Cf. Venedikova, K. 2003.Българи, арменци и караманци в средновековна Мала Азия Armenians and Karamantsi [Bulgarians, in Mediaeval Asia Minor], Sofia, p. 73.) 7 e other community’s territory is quite frequently denoted as ‘Beyond there is nothing’ or ‘Beyond is Canada.’
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delicate methods in their campaigns. at is probably the reason why in the remote Kirkovo Municipality, forgotten by God, Allah, and some mobile phone operators, elections as a rule attract media and research interest. And the results justify this interest: in the 2001 parliamentary elections the national favourite, the Simeon II National Movement (SSNM), won in Kirkovo just 5%, whilein the 2003 local elections Kirkovo was the only municipality in the Kurdzhali region in which the MRF failed to win the mayor’s office in the first round. e last local elections brought yet another surprise to the media and researchers. For the first time in the history not only of Kirkovo but also of the MRF, there was an independent candidate whose supporters otherwise voted for councillors from the MRF. In this way each ‘tribe,’ hitherto compartmentalised along strictly ethnic lines – irrespective of the differences between the Podkova and Benkovski districts – had its own candidate: Kirkovo a Pomak from the UDF, Podkova a Turkish woman from the MRF, and Benkovski an independent Turk. e main campaign tool in every rural municipality, rumours, are unmistakably ethnoreligious in character in Kirkovo (and in other mixed regions). e MRF, for example, tried to convince Pomaks that their candidate had converted to Christianity, whilst the UDF intimidated them by declaring that if Turks won, Greece would never open the Makaza border crossing checkpoint. Aer the MRF won in the second round of voting, the economic fears common to every municipality were transformed into ethnic fears: – ‘Now “we” (us Pomaks, not the UDF or BSP or X-supporters) will be dismissed from work.’ – ‘Now “we” (us Pomaks, not the UDF or BSP or X-supporters) will have our pastures taken away.’ – ‘Now “we” (us Pomaks, not the UDF or BSP or X-supporters) won’t be granted building permits.’8 ese quotations are from field interviews, and they are quite similar to those which I recorded during the previous elections (won by the UDF) and which were voiced by the opposite side.9 e ethnicisation of political and economic categories (elections, job dismissals or pastures in the Kirkovo case; terrorist acts in theSeismograph case) will probably be concomitant with life in Bulgarian society for a long time yet. Any hypertrophy – be
8 See Ivanova, E. 2004. ‘Местни избори 2003 - етнически или политически вот? Община Кирково, област Кърджали’ (‘Local Elections 2003: Ethnic or Political Vote? Municipality of Kirkovo, Kurdzhali Region’), inСоциологически проблеми , No. 1/2, 2004. Results from a New Bulgarian University project implemented with the participation of students from the departments of Anthropology and Political Sciences. 9 See Ivanova, E. 1999. ‘Изборът на Родопите - етнически или политически?’ (‘e Choice of the Rhodopes: Ethnic or Political?), inКултура , 10 December 1999.
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it forced ‘homogenisation’ such as the ‘production’ of ‘Bulgarians’ from a specificyear, or forced segregation such as the Roma ghettos – will intensify this process. If any sad logic could be found in the arguments of the ‘arbitrators’ fromSeismograph, it would be motivated by the ethnicisation of poverty. Unfortunately, the horrifying possibility – that starving people may agree to perform terrorist acts in order to earn a thousand dollars – threatens quite a few circles in Bulgarian society. To those people ethnic identity, be it ‘problematic’ or ‘non-problematic,’ hardly matters.
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MIGRATION OF ROMA IN BULGARIA Ilona Tomova Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Science, Bulgaria Number and Relative Share of the Large Ethnic Communities in Bulgaria According to the last census (March 2001), the population of the Republic of Bulgaria amounts to 7,928,901 persons. A total of 6,655,210 or 83.9% of the entire population identified themselves as ethnic Bulgarians, 746,664 (9.4%) as Turks, and 370,908 (4.7%) as Roma. e number of Bulgarian citizens who identified themselves as Roma/Gypsies in 2001 was 57,512 (18.4%) more than in 1992. is ‘increase’ of the Roma community is due both to the high birth rate in the group and to a change in the declared identity among part of these people, whom their neighbours call ‘Roma’ although they prefer to identify themselves as Bulgarians, Turks or Vlachs. Based on expert assessments using the so-called ‘objective criteria’ and the opinion of their neigh1 bours, number the Roma in Bulgaria is estimated to be 600,000 – 800,000 persons, orthe eight to tenofpercent of Bulgaria’s population.
Scope, Intensity and Direction of Roma Internal Migrations Traditionally Roma are perceived by their neighbours as the most mobile community in Bulgaria. At the same time,the data of the National Statistical Institute (NSI) from censuses comprising the entire population as well as data from different sociological studies reveal a very complex picture of Roma’s territorial mobility and migrations. In fact Roma are very mobile. is mobility is however related to finding seasonal jobs, transnational or intercity trade, to their occupations, to collecting scrap metal or odds and ends, or the opportunity to receive social welfare. It does not produce lasting changes in their place of residence, which is conventionally considered as Marushiakova, Elena, and Veselin Popov. 1993.e Gypsies in Bulgaria, Sofia: Club 90 (Марушиакова, Елена, Веселин Попов, Циганите 1993. в България. София: Клуб 90); Liegeois, Jean-Pierre. 1995.Roma, Gypsies, Travellers, Strasbourg: Council of Europe; Ringold, D. 2000. Roma and the Transition in Central and Eastern Europe: Trends and Challenges , Washington D.C.: e World Bank; Tomova, Ilona. 1995. e Gypsies in the Transition Period, Циганите в преходния период. Sofia: IMIR (Томова, Илона, 1995. София: МЦПМКВ). 1
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migration. Moreover, mobility is not characteristic of all Roma alike. It continues to be observed more frequently among the groups and families who had led a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life until the mid-twentieth century and among the Roma from the border regions. It is weaker among the population settled long ago in the interior of the country, particularly among the poorest and marginalised part of the Roma who live in large ghettos, the majority of whom have never le the neighbourhood where they were born. Similarly to the processes among the rest of the population, the Roma with higher education or those with some qualification or skills are more mobile. e illiterate and functionally illiterate unskilled Roma, especially those living in large city ghettos, are not in a position to risk their established survival modes by moving to another population centre, especially if they cannot rely on the support of their relatives in the new place. Sociological studies show that the Roma women, like the women from the other groups, are more mobile. is is related to the tradition of married women moving over to their husbands’ families and to the widely practised serial monogamy in many Roma sub-groups.2 e data from the two last censuses and a sample study of the territorial mobility of the population conducted by the NSI in 2001 enable us to identify the parameters of mobility of the large ethnic groups inside the country. Table 1 Mobility of the Different Ethnic Communities Inside the Country (%) Bulgarians Turks Stationarypopulation 55.9 70.0 Migrationinthecountryto1992 33.9 20.1 Ethnic structure of the migrants up 87.7 7.7 to 1992 (share of the total number of migrants) Intensityofmobilityupto1992 44 30 Migration in the country after 1992 10.2 9.9 Ethnic structure of the migrants after 81.4 11.8 1992 (share of the total number of migrants) Intensity of mobility after 1992 10 10
Ro m a 79.4 13.4 2.5
Others 55.0 33.5 1.7
21 7.2 4.2
45 11.5 1.8
7
11
Source: NSI3 Tomova, e Gypsies in the Transition Period ; Tomova, Ilona. 2000.Poverty and Ethnicity. e Formation of ‘Underclass’ Among the Bulgarian Roma, Sofia: IMIR Archives Бедност и етничност. Формиране на ‘underclass’ сред българските (Томова, Илона, 2000. роми. София: Архив на МЦПМКВ). 3 NSI. 2002. Vol. 6, issue 3, Sample Studies. Territorial Mobility of the Population, Sofia: изследвания. Териториална National Statistical Institute (2002. т. 6, кн. Извадкови 3, мобилност на населението , София: НСИ). 2
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If we try to decipher the data in Table 1, it becomes clear that Roma are the community with the highest share of the stationary population in Bulgaria. Four fihs of Gypsies have never le their birthplace, as compared with two thirds of Turks and slightly more than half of the ethnic Bulgarians. e intensity of mobility is the lowest among Roma both before and aer the transition, but the difference with respect to the remaining ethnic communities is decreasing. Before 1992 Roma, to a greater extent than Turks, had been moving in the village-to-city direction, but the urbanisation process was weaker in their community than among the ethnic Bulgarians. Aer 1992 the main direction of the Roma migrations is village-to-village, whereas among Turks it is village-to-small town, and among Bulgarians – small town-to-large town (the capital).4 For all ethnic communities in Bulgaria, the years of most intense migrations inside the country are the years of intense industrialisation and urbanisation – from the beginning of the 1950s to the end of the 1970s. However, internal migration is much more intensive among the ethnic Bulgarians than among Turks and Roma. As a result of urbanisation and the intensive migration of young people from the villages to the towns, the share of the rural population in Bulgaria had gradually decreased by the end of the 70s. Sociological studies show that in the 1960–1989 period, the processes of integration of the rural Roma population were quite intensive and successful, especially among long-settled Roma with experience in different agricultural jobs or services designed for the traditional subsistence farming, as well as among small Roma communities in villages. In the cities, Roma found jobs in industry and services mainly as unskilled workers. Many of Roma were able to get a better education and acquire some qualification in order to increase their income. is happened in the sphere of trade, or through well-paid, albeit unattractive, difficult and hazardous jobs in large metallurgical plants, chemical works, hazardous productions, in construction or the service sector. e majority of Roma lost their jobs aer the start of the structural economic changes at the beginning of the 90s. e high mobility, particularly among male Roma who tried to make a more decent living, has led only partly to stable resettlement in other locations or outside the country. Aer 1992 the internal migrations of the rural Roma population are also related mainly to the search for better working and living conditions. However, unlike the previous period the most intensive migration was that from village to village. emigration flow from cities to villages was intensified particularly during the critical 1995– 1997 period. A relatively high migration from villages to cities continued predominantly in the regions with a relatively small rural population, located near well-developed economic centres.5 UNDP. 2004. e Rural Regions: Overcoming the Unequal Development (UNDP, 2004. Селските райони: преодоляване на неравнопоставеното ), p. 40. развитие 5 Tomova, Poverty and Ethnicity, UNDP,e Rural Regions. 4
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e different intensity of the migration processes from villages to cities among the large ethnic communities within the country has produced serious changes in the ethnic structure of the urban and rural populations. Table 2 Population by Location and Ethnic Group (%) Location – ethnic group 1900 1920 1946 1965 1975 1992 2001 In cities – total 19.8 19.9 24.7 46.5 58.0 67.2 69.0 –Bulgarians 18.2 19.2 24.8 49.4 61.2 71.6 73.5 –Turks 16.1 13.5 13.7 17.8 21.8 31.6 37.0 – Roma 20.5 25.4 29.2 38.4 44.6 52.3 53.8 In villages – total 80.2 80.1 75.3 53.5 42.0 32.8 31.0 –Bulgarians 81.8 80.8 75.2 50.6 38.8 28.4 26.5 –Turks 83.9 86.5 86.3 82.2 78.2 68.4 63.0 – Roma 79.5 74.6 70.8 61.6 55.4 47.7 46.2
Source: NSI 1994 (recalculated data), NSI 20046
In the 1992–2001 period the most massive resettlements of Turks were from village to city and from city to city. Among Roma more intensive were the regroupings of the rural population in the villages with initially high Roma concentration. e concentration of the urban Roma intensified in the segregated Roma neighbourhoods. No particularly intensive stable resettlements from villages to cities were observed. As a result of these migrations the territorial isolation and spatial segregation of Roma increased sharply.Parallel to the enlargement of the already existing Roma urban ghettos, Roma rural ghettos were established. According to data from the representative study e Consolidation of the Socialist Way of Life Among the Bulgarian Citizens of Gypsy Origin, at the beginning of the 80s a total 49% of the Roma in Bulgaria were living in segregated neighbourhoods.7 Studies have shown that at present three quarters of Roma are living in segregated locations . Spatial segregation is both the result of and a condition for deepening the socialexclusion of this vulnerable minority group.
6
NSI. 1994. Results from the Census, Volume 1, Demographic Characteristics, Sofia:
National Statistical Institute (1994. Резултати от преброяването на населението. Т.1, Демографски характеристики, issue 1, София: НСИ); NSI. 2004. Vol. Population, 1, Demographic and Social Characteristics of the Population,Sofia: National Statistical Institute (2004. т. 1,Население, кн. 1, Демографски и социални характеристики на населението, София: НСИ). 7 Chakalov, Boris, Ivanichka Georgieva et al. 1980.e Consolidation of the Socialist Way of Life Among the Bulgarian Citizens of Gypsy Origin , Sofia (Чакалов, Борис, Георгиева, Утвърждаването на социалистическия начин на живот сред Иваничка и др. 1980. българските граждани от цигански произход . София).
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Social Exclusion and Ethno-Territorial Concentration Aer decades of decreasing social differences and of relative social homogeneity of socialist society, the transition to a market economy was accompanied by many changes: increasing social inequality, complex stratification processes,andimpoverishment ofsignificant parts of the population. ere was also mass social exclusion of the poorly-educated, unskilled inhabitants of the underdeveloped rural/mountainous and semi-mountainous regions, of the vulnerable persons with hea lth, family and age problems, who were forsaken and sent to institutions. e social and exclusion of all these people began with their massive dropout from the labour market it gradually spread to the remaining social spheres. Social exclusion among Roma is particularly disturbing – during the last ten years an ethno-class or sub-class has started to be formed among them, for which social and ethnic exclusion are coincident. e Roma’s territorial segregation and concentration play a very important role in this process. e territorial segregation of Roma in separate neighbourhoods has long-lasting traditions in Bulgaria. For centuries during Ottoman rule, the different ethnic and confessional communities in Bulgaria lived in segregated neighbourhoods in the cities. Aer an independent Bulgarian state was established, there were consistent attempts to overcome this segregation. Today the members of the small ethnic communities, and to a large extent Turks, live in mixed neighbourhoods with Bulgarians. However, in most places ‘the Gypsy neighbourhoods’ have remained. Largely, this is also due to the negative attitude towards this community and to its long social separation from the other groups. However, the preservation of the Gypsy neighbourhoods is also due to factors existing within the group, as well as to social and economic factors. Aer 1989 self-segregation processes among Roma became more noticeable. ese processes were generated by numerous internal and external factors. On the one hand, Roma who lived in urban residential complexes but who had dropped out of the labour market or were rapidly impoverished felt compelled to move, joining their relatives in segregated neighbourhoods. ere they could add a room to a hovel without a building permit, architectural and technical plan, or move in with relatives where the lack of amenities was offset by low utility bills and where they could rely on assistance and support. us, at the beginning of the 90s, a large percentage of the urban Roma sold or moved out of their flats in the mixed residential complexes and settled in urban Roma neighbourhoods. Roma from other population centres joined them there, relying on better opportunities for a livelihood in the city, on the anonymity in Roma neighbourhoods, or on the possibility to receive social welfare. With the increase in the number of Roma who were living permanently or temporarily in large Roma neighbourhoods, there was an increase in the number of Bulgarians andurks T who had been theirneighbours and who started leaving the Roma neighbourhoods or the houses in the immediate vicinity. e mass concentration of poor Roma, however, led to the accumulation of negative processes in the segregated neighbourhoods – unemployment, poverty, deteriorating living conditions, early dropout of children from school, low social control over adolescents, the spread of deviant forms of behaviour, and the formation of cultural models obstructing Roma integration into the macro-society.
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Aer the collective and state farms were closed down and the land was restored to its previous owners, the rural Gypsies remained without subsistence, with no rights to participate in the newly established cooperatives. For this reason and due to the increasing conflicts with their fellow peasants related to frequent thes of agricultural products, Roma started to concentrate in villages with a relatively high percentage of Roma families. e Roma who lived in villages near cities, where they were traditionally employed as low-skilled workers in industry and services, lost their jobs and tried to earn their living in seasonal farming, in felling trees in forest areas or in picking fruit. Relatives from other villages or cities frequently moved over to live with such families. e increased concentration of Roma in the villages-satellites to the cities or in vi llages along the main intercity roads facilitated the tactics of survival on the of ready agricultural produce, burglary of summerhouses in city suburbs, road robbery and illegal tree felling. At the same time this Roma concentration was counter-productive to those families which relied mainly on agricultural jobs (permanent orseasonal) or seasonal work inthe cities. erewere frequent conflicts with the local community. e rest of the population usually blamed all thes on the local Roma. Roma were punished collectively by being refused the services they were offering. us, Roma were compelled to search for work in increasingly remoter settlements. ey encountered serious difficulties when they applied for land from the municipal or national agricultural funds. It was also difficult for them to find a market for the goods and services, which they traditionally offered to the peasants. Along with the Roma concentration in segregated neighbourhoods, there was an increasing isolation of their inhabitants.Most of the adult Roma dropped out of the legal labour market in the 1990–1992 period. More than 90% of the young Roma who should have started work aer this period never found a permanent job. e previous social networks including non-Roma co-workers and friends no longer existed. is made finding even a temporary or seasonal job extremely difficult – in the context of a huge labour market shrinkage, vacant jobs are frequently filled through social networks of friends, colleagues, community and relatives. At present a large part of the Roma depend on finding low-paid jobs in the grey economy where they run the risk of not being paid and not getting any social security benefits. Table 3 shows NSI data from the last census in 2001 on the distribution of employment, unemployment and indirectly of the dropouts from the labour market of large ethnic communities. Table 3 Population by Economic Activity and Ethnic Group as of 1 March 2001 (%) Economicactivity Active–employed Active–unemployed Inactive
Bulgarians 34.9 13.6 51.5
Source: NSI8 8
NSI. 2004. Vol. 1. Population.
Turks 25.9 25.4 48.7
Roma 11.1 37.0 51.9
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As a result of the massive and long-term unemployment of adult Roma, as well as of the underdeveloped system of social assistance and/or shortage of funds for effective aid to needy persons, poverty in the Roma neighbourhoods has become a mass phenomenon. It usually assumes severe forms. Undernourishment of children and 9 adults is a standard for about three quarters of the segregated neighbourhoods. e mortality rate is growing sharply. Even when a medical doctor is available,four fihs of Roma are not in a position to buy medication for the treatment.10 More than half of the children and adolescents have dropped out of school or have never started their formal education.11 All these factors lead toextreme poverty, which is transferred to future generations. e data on the incidence and depth of poverty among the main ethnic communities in the country are given in Table 4, and the comparative data on the poverty in Central and Eastern Europe are given in Table 5. Table 4 Poverty Incidence by Ethnic Group (%) Ethnic group
% of poor
Bulgarians Turks Roma*
% of the population 82.3 7.1 8.8
Depth
5.6 20.9 61.8
Share of the poor 39.6 12.8 46.5
Others Total
1.8 100.0
7.6 11.7
1.2 100
0.2 1.7
0.4 2.2 13.6
Source: World Bank 200212
9 UNICEF. 2003. Situational Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Bulgaria. (УНИЦЕФ, 2003.Ситуационен анализ на положението на децата и жените в България ). 10 FACT – Marketing. 2003.Ensuring Access to Healthcare for the Minorities. (ФАКТОсигуряване на достъп на малцинствата до здравеопазване). Маркетинг, 2003. 11 Tomova,e Gypsies in the Transition Period; Tomova,Poverty and Ethnicity; Tomova, Ilona. 2000. ‘Social Change and Ethno-Religious Relations,’in Fotev, Georgi (ed.).Neighbourhood
of the Religious Communities Bulgaria , Sofia: Instituteпромяна of Sociology,и Bulgarian Academy of отношения’ във Sciences (Томова, Илонаin(2000), ‘Социална етнорелигиозни Георги Фотев, съст., Съседство на религиозните общности, в Институт България по социология при БАН, София). 12 World Bank. 2002.Bulgaria: e Changing Profile of Poverty, Sofia (Световна банка, 2002. България: Променящият се профил на. София). бедността e World Bank study is based on expert assessments of the number of Roma in the country using objective criteria (8– 10%); 8.8 % of the persons from the sample have been identified as Roma, regardless of the way in which they identify themselves.
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Table 5 Poverty Incidence in Central and Eastern Europe (%) Country
YearofStudy
Bulgaria Bulgaria Romania
1995 2001 1998
Latvia Ukraine Hungary Poland
1998 1999 1997 1998
2.15USD per person daily 3.1 7.9 6.8 6.6 3.0 1.3 1.2
4.30 USD per person daily 18.2 31.9 44.5 34.8 29.4 15.4 18.4
Source: World Bank 200213
According to data of the World Bank and a number of representative sociological studies, the average monthly income per person in Roma households in recent years has varied in the range of 31 to 38 BGN. A considerable part of the Roma families buy clothing and shoes from second-hand stores or use old clothes given to them by their neighbours (sometimes against small services). According to studies by UNDP and UNICEF from 2000, the Roma in the country most frequently suffer from severe shortage of staple foods.14 Table 6 Staple Foods in the Daily Diet of Poor Families: Percentage of the Standards for Adequate Nutrition Products Meat Vegetables Fruit Cheese Yoghurt Milk
Christian Bulgarians 41.0 80.9 42.5 43.9 62.0 27.6
Muslim Bulgarians 20.6 61.8 32.4 29.4 82.4 38.2
Turks
Ro m a
Total
15.2 70.9 34.2 39.2 57.0 24.1
13.6 69.8 22.1 25.0 49.0 18.2
27.7 75.0 33.7 35.8 58.1 24.6
15
Source: UNICEF 2003
Ibid. UNDP. 2002.Outsidethe DependencyTrap. eRomainCentralandEasternEurope, Sofia (ПРООН, 2002.Извън капана на зависимостта. Ромите в Централна и Източна Европа. Situational Analysis of the Situation ofChildren and Women in Bulgaria. София); UNICEF, 15 UNICEF, Situational Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Bulgaria. 13 14
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132
e US Census Bureau defines neighbourhoods that are populated mainly by members of vulnerable minority communities, more than 40% of which are poor, as ghettos. In Bulgaria the percentage of the Roma who are below the official poverty line for the country and live in the large Roma neighbourhoods in the towns and .16 It is true that villages with considerable Roma concentration, usually exceeds 80%
in these same ghettos there are also extremely richfamilies. However, a steady tendency has been observed towards permanent impoverishment of the majority of ghetto residents. Ghetto residents suffer not only from the social isolation they live in but also from institutional isolation, which was particularly devastating aer the second half of the 90s. Despite the increased number of people living in such quarters, many of the public institutions (schools, kindergartens and crèches, children’s kitchens, medical centres or polyclinics, social assistance offices, police departments, youth and cultural centres, etc.) providing different services were closed, moved elsewhere in the same town or village, or moved to another town or village. Considering that less than 10% of the Roma households have telephones and that most of the public telephones in the Roma neighbourhoods are out of order, and that Roma oen live in neighbourhoods with undeveloped street networks and no access to local public transport, the chances of the residents of the Roma neighbourhoods to rely on emergency aid, police protection, garbage collection, sanitation, and all other social services, are decreasing drastically. e difference in the social status of the residents of segregated neighbourhoods and the rest of the population is growing.Sociological studies from the mid-
90s show an increasing tendency by members of theother ethnic communities to leave these neighbourhoods. e residents of such neighbourhoods are constantly labelled as ‘Gypsies’ and the negative stereotypes and acts of discrimination against them are reinforced.17 e residents of segregated neighbourhoods frequently complain that they become victims of discrimination simply because of the fact that they live in the so-called ‘Gypsy neighbourhoods.’ ey are discriminated against when they look for a job, when they try to enrol their children in better schools, when they apply for medical services, or when they ask for police protection. As a result, a considerable part of Roma live with the perception that nothing in their lives depends on their own efforts and qualities – they are doomed to misery and discrimination due to their minority srcin and the impossibilityto leave the ghetto. One of the most severe consequences is the gradual formation of behavioural models and psychological attitudes that are typical of ghettos. ey additionally accelerate the processes of social isolation of their inhabitants, increase the social distances from the remaining population and the risk of discrimination, and lessen the chances of personal success and winning recognition by the standards of the macro-society. 16
Tomova, Poverty and Ethnicity.
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133
e social organisation in the Roma neighbourhoods is deteriorating. is means that the extent to which their residents are in a position to achieve common goals, to solve community problems and effectively control the social behaviour of community members, particularly that of adolescents, is decreasing. Since 1997 drug addiction and trafficking, as well as drug-related violence and prostitution have increased in some of the largest Roma ghettos in the capital and in other cities. Crime (most frequently related to thes, still less frequently to violence against the person) has increased. Access to elementary services and utilities has also decreased. e parameters of the living environment in the ghettos are deteriorating.
Most of the ghettos are entirely or partly built outside the town planning schemes and this fact predetermines the lack or insufficiency of infrastructure. ree quarters of the residents of Roma ghettos have no access to sewerage or even to septic pits; half of them have no running water in their homes. A considerable part of their houses are not connected to the electric mains or they are cut off from the mains supply because of unpaid bills. e share of the families with unpaid electricity bills is even larger. Two thirds of the houses in the Roma neighbourhoods are overcrowded and in poor condition. A large part of the houses in the Roma neighbourhoods are made of materials at hand and do not meet elementary sanitary requirements. e average floorage per person in the Roma ghettos is 7.1 square meters. e overpopulation and the poor hygienic conditions in Roma neighbourhoods generate a high risk of epidemics and frequent skin and allergic diseases, as well as parasite-inflicted illnesses. Table 7 Share of Residents of Houses with Amenities by Ethnic Origin (%) Amenities Bulgarians Turks Electricity, water supply, central sewerage 71.7 30.9 Electricity,watersupply,septicpit 20.9 40.4 Electricity,watersupply 3.2 6.9 Electricity 3.3 19.8 None 0.6 2.0
Roma 25.0 20.5 8.9 35.9 9.7
Source: NSI18
Tomova, e Gypsies in the Transition Period; Tomova,Poverty and Ethnicity; World Bank, Bulgaria, Gyurova, Elena, and Ilona Tomova. 1995.Anti-Ghetto. Living Conditions and Roma Preferences in Sliven and Asenovgrad, Sofia: Inter Ethnic Initiative for Human Rights Foundation (IEIHRF) (Гюрова, Елена, Илона. Томова Антигето. Жилищни условия и предпочитания на ромите в Сливен и Асеновград. ). Архив на МИЧП 18 NSI. 2004. Vol. 1. Population. 17
Ilona Tomova
134
Roma are the only community in Bulgaria with a decreasing level of educational attainment during the transition period.More than half of the Roma chil-
dren and young people in ghettos drop out of school in their first years or have never attended school. According to NSI data from the 2001 census, 23% of the Roma aged over twenty are illiterate, and another 28% have completed only elementary school. For the majority of the Roma the Bulgarian language is not native, as a result of which they usually cannot acquire stable reading and writing skills in the elementary educational course or they rapidly lose those skills aer leaving school. us, practically the predominant part of the Roma who have finished elementary school only are functionally illiterate. e quality of education in Roma ghetto schools is much lower than the average in the country. Illiteracy among Roma women is three times higher than that among men and usually has a negative impact on their children’s motivation to study. e low level of educational attainment of adult Roma is an obstacle to finding a job and dooms them to low-paid jobs and poverty. Poverty is the main reason for school dropout. us, the vicious circle low qualification – unemployment – poverty – dropout is closed and passed on to the next generations. Low education is an essential fac tor in the reproduction of poverty and the social isolation of the group. Table 8 Educational Attainment of the Large Ethnic Communities (Persons Aged over 20, in %) EducationalAttainment Higher(incl.specialist)education Secondaryschool Primary school Elementaryschool Illiterate
Bulgarians 19.1 47.7 24.9 7.0 1.3
Turks 2.4 21.9 46.9 18.6 10.1
Roma 0.2 6.5 41.8 28.3 23.2
Source: NSI 2004 (recalculated data)19
In the last fieen years one of the consequences of early dropout from school and of Roma concentration in segregated neighbourhoods has been a declining age of marriage and a destabilised family structure. According to data from representative studies that are also indirectly verified by the NSI, four fihs of Roma marry before coming of age. e result numerous teenage births; more and children being abandoned by young men;areincreased serial monogamy. esewives processes reflect particularly unfavourably on women and children, who live in dire poverty, frequently for life. e early and numerous births account for the high infant and maternal mortality among Roma. A considerable part of the children are subject to poor parenting or are le in state institutions. Many children are forced to work or to beg, to become pros19
Ibid.
Migration of Roma in Bulgaria
135
titutes or to steal in order to survive and provide for their families. is contributes to Roma’s social isolation.
Roma External Migration e ban on free movement of people outside Bulgaria imposed by the communist regime for more than forty years is the reason for the absence of demographic changes in the Roma group caused by external migration until 1989. It is true that small groups of Turkish-speaking Muslim Roma joined the emigration waves of the Turkish population in the 1950s and 60s – as a result of which Turkey cancelled unilaterally both emigration agreements in protest against the inclusion of Roma in the emigration groups – but there are no grounds to presume thatthe number of emigrant Roma was considerable. In the 1989–2000 period, 691,000 persons le Bulgaria. But it 20 is practically impossible to estimate how many of them were Roma. e lack of data on the ethnic composition of emigrants makes it impossible to estimate quantitatively emigration in this ethnic group even on the basis of indirect indicators. e only data at our disposal are those on the strong inclination among Roma to emigrate and information about emigration from different studies, the majority of which are qualitative. It should be noted that Roma are reluctant to discuss the emigration of relatives or their unsuccessful attempts to emigrate. e reasons are different – mistrust in the researchers of social processes, fear that the information may be misused which may result in social welfare cuts for the families of emigrants, fear of ridicule and humiliation because of the nature of their jobs abroad, etc. e rapid and sharp deterioration of living conditions made many Roma eager to leave the country. Even in the first years of the transition period, the share of those wishing to emigrate was on the increase. Comparative data on the dynamics of emigration inclinations among the largeethnic communities are given in Table 9. Table 9 Dynamics of Emigration Inclinations among the Large Ethnic Communities (%)
Would not
Ro m a Bulgarians Turks 1992 1994 1997 2001 1992 1997 2001 1992 1997 2001 70.5 67.2 63.1 68.0 62.6 41.9 34.4 -
emigrate
20 Kalchev, Yordan. 2001. External Migration of the Population in Bulgaria, Russe: Danube Press AD (Калчев, Йордан, Външната 2001. миграция на населението Русе: в България. Дунав прес АД).
Ilona Tomova
136
Long to emigrate Want to make money abroad and come back (labour emigrants) Definitely determined to emigrate (potential emigrants)
26.9
16.1
5.9
-
12.2
2.6
4.5
-
21.6
16.0
-
49.0
32.6 -
18.7 9.5
-
13.8
6.5
-
15.3 7.2
12.3 3.4
3.4
9.6
8.7
9.1
17.7 9.5
Source:21
e factors that mostly motivate potential emigrants from the different ethnic communities to leave the country are different. For Bulgarians and Turks they are the following: the wish to live and work in a country with higher living standards; the wish to earn fast money to solve important family problems; the wish to live with relatives and work (particularly strong among Turks, 77% of which claim that they have relatives the the wishpush for better or professional realisation. abroad, As far asmainly Roma in areTurkey); concerned, factorseducation are very strong: unemployment, poverty, and discrimination. ey were pointed out by one in nine Roma. Roma also attach great importance to the possibility of living and working in a co untry with higher living standards; however, for them this reason is citedtwice less frequently than it is by Bulgarians and Turks. Conversely, they cite relatively more frequently theirwish to travel abroad to earn fast money in order to solve important family problems. e main desired destinations for emigration among the large ethnic communities are different too. Roma cite most frequently Germany, Greece, the USA, Turkey, Poland and, recently, Spain, Italy, and Portugal. eir choice is pragmatic and it is based on information about opportunities for finding a job, about difficulties in overcoming immigration barriers and/or police control, about possibilities to earn income outside the labour market. e Bulgarian Turks most frequently travel to countries where there are already considerable of to Turkish which seriously facilitate their initial adaptation and thecolonies possibility find aimmigrants, job. ese are above all Turkey, Germany, Tomova, e Gypsies in the Transition Period; Георгиев, Ж., И.Томова, М.Грекова, К.Кънев, 1992. Етнокултурната ситуация в България. София: Архив на МЦПМКВ; Zhelyazkova Antonina et al, eds. 1995.Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims. A Collection of Articles.Sofia: IMIR; NSI. 2002. Vol. 6, issue 1, Sample Studies. Demographic Characteristics. Sofia: National Statistical Institute (НСИ, 2002. т. 6, кн. 1, Извадкови изследвания. Демографска характеристика , София: НСИ . 21
Migration of Roma in Bulgaria
137
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the USA. Aer 2001 Spain and Portugal were added to the list with an ever growing number of potential emigrants. e ethnic Bulgarians cite most frequently Germany, USA, Austria, Canada, and Britain. In the last few years the greater possibilities of finding seasonal work in Spain and Portugal have increased the attractiveness of these two countries. Most frequently Roma declare that they have relatives or friends in Germany, Greece, Austria, Turkey, Spain, the Netherlands, andPoland. According to differentsociological studies, a large part of the Roma from the Vlach groups have already emigrated to Greece. Quite a few sedentary Roma from the Sliven district have been working for years in Israel under contracts with various building companies. Many male Roma are working illegally on construction sites in Germany and Austria. Having gained experience in seasonal farm work in Greece, thousands of Roma families have emigrated to that country. A considerable number of young women are working as prostitutes in the countries of Central and Western Europe. In the last few years, the flow of illegal immigrants from all ethnic communities to Spain and Portugal has increased. ese immigrants usually work in agriculture, the construction industry, and hotels. According to NSI data, the Roma are the least frequent travellers abroad as compared to other ethnic communities. is needs to be explained. A large part of the Roma travel frequently to neighbouring countries to trade and/or seek temporary employment. Such travel was particularly intensive during the embargo on the former Yugoslavia. But it is comparatively short-term and cannot be defined as temporary emigration. At the same time the large majority of the Roma are too poor to afford to travel abroad. is explains why 79.3% of the Roma belong to the non-travelling abroad groups, versus 71.8% of the Bulgarian Turks, and 68.3% of the ethnic Bulgarians. Another unfavourable factor is the policy of West European countries, which have tightened immigration regulations and are extraditing illegal immigrants, especially those without education and qualifications who have problems finding a job even in the grey economy. us, many of the Roma who went to the West have been returned to Bulgaria. e low education and qualification of the predominant part of Roma is a major obstacle to successful emigration. At the same time there is a small group of Roma emigrants with high education who are doing well, in some cases even better than Bulgarians in the same position. Early marriage in the group is an additional obstacle to the young male Roma’s desire to emigrate. Divorced or abandoned wives become victims of international women trafficking quite oen. Trafficking of children from poor Roma families is on the rise too.
138
TRACES OF THE ‘RENAMING PROCESS’ AMONG POMAKS IN BULGARIA AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR DISCOURSE Moyuru Matsumae Tokyo University, Japan Last spring I saw on the Bulgarian National TV news the rally commemorating the incident that happened in a village near Goce Delchev, Southern Bulgaria, about thirty years ago. Many people had gathered around the new monument, dedicated to the victims of the resistance to the name-changing campaign in the 1970s, and the guests made speeches praising today’s religious and ethnic tolerance in Bulgaria. However, what impressed me more was that some villagers expressed a wish to sue a person responsible for the incident. is shows that the campaign that marked the beginning of what the authorities would later call the ‘Renaming Process,’ is not mere bygones for the people at whom it was directed. We should reconsider those campaigns from the perspective of these people. How did they experience this process? And how do they see it at present? In this paper I shall analyse discourses of Pomaks or Bulgarian-speaking Muslims mainly in the region of Teteven,1 Northern Bulgaria, and examine their own view on the ‘Renaming Process.’ rough this work, moreover, I wish to look for a clue to social reconstruction aer a conflict. Aer the end of Ottoman rule in Bulgaria, Pomaks were oen pressured to assimilate into mainstream Bulgarian culture. Governments resorted to this policy in an attempt to solve the minority problem and to integrate the nation although their policies towards Pomaks were sometimes inconsistent. Several name-changing campaigns were conducted during the twentieth century, the most massive one being that in the 1960s and 1970s. Pomaks were forced to change their Muslim/Turkish names to Bulgarian ones in order to assimilate, or to ‘revive’ their srcinal Bulgarian identity. Aer that and for the same purpose, they were compelled to give up some traditional/ religious rituals and some styles of dress such as veils,shalvari (baggy pants of women), and fez hats that were considered typical Islamic.
1 I have been carrying out research in this region since 1997. ere are only a few villages in this region where Pomaks live today; the majority of them are in the Rhodope Mountains, Southern Bulgaria.
Traces of the ‘renaming process’ among Pomaks in Bulgaria
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ese campaigns conducted since the 1970s have driven a wedge between Pomaks and Christian Bulgarians. is is the view of both sides in the region of Teteven. One Christian Bulgarian said that since then Pomaks have kept them at a distance, while some Pomaks said that this campaign was a terrible experience. Part of them refused to change their names at first, and they were summoned to the village police office again and again. It is oen noted, however, that the name-changing campaign proceeded more smoothly here than in the Rhodope Mountains, and the restrictions on dress were imposed later. Although there were people who resisted renaming at first, the officials began to replace their names with Bulgarian ones. e name changes proceeded gradually, because Pomaks also changed their second names, which are derived from their fathers’ first names. In addition, new-borns could be registered only with Bulgarian names, and it was impossible to leave a maternity hospital without naming a child. At the same time, people continued to use their old names in daily life, no matter what names they were officially registered under. ey were called sometimes by their new Bulgarian names and at other times by their old ones. A lot of nicknames were used too. is usage of names was one of their responses to the name-changing campaign. As for the whole process, an informant explained that it was uncomfortable for regional communist party officials or civil servants to implement the policy severely, because they knew each other well as neighbours. All the neighbours in the region, including the Christian Bulgarians, were ‘our fellows’ nashi ( hora), so they could negotiate on part of the regulations. For example, calling a cleric to funerals was prohibited according to the socialist ins tructions on rituals, but people oen asked an imam to pray in the latter half of the funeral aer party officials had le. Here we can see a sense of local identity that transcends the boundary between religions (or customs). In a village where Pomaks and Christian Bulgarians cohabit I have sometimes heard that Christians also refer to their neighbour Pomaks as ‘ours’ (nashi). At other times, of course, the word ‘our,’ or rather the ‘us/them’ dichotomy is used to express the contrast between Pomaks and Christian Bulgarians. So people feel senses of belonging on various levels and they are expressed depending on the context. A sense of local identity is one of them, but the examples mentioned above illustrate that this common local identity has provided a ground for negotiation, which enables villagers to compromise on acts in everyday life. On the other hand, we are well aware that national policies are carried out in a way that prevents local identity from functioning and damages it. Regarding the ‘Renaming Process’ too, informants say that police from other regions had been brought in to enforce it. In the case of the region of Teteven, a lot of policemen had been stationed in the villages where women usually wear shalvari, and they inspected peoples’ dress-style in the mid-1980s. Women started dressing in working smocks and long skirts instead, but at times woreshalvari under them; even so, it was a frightening experience for them that the police had stayed for a while and checked their dress strictly. e fact that daily acts were closely monitored made them feel oppressed,
140
Moyuru Matsumae
and many people remember clearly how the police came to their village to inspect the dress-style on holidays. Furthermore, this example suggests the gendered nature of the ‘Renaming Process’ and Bulgarian national policies towards Muslims. As Neuburger points out in her latest study,2 these policies were also an attempt of modern states to control ‘manhood’ and ‘womanhood’ of the nation. erefore men and women, in particular women who had worn shalvari until the prohibition, oen talk about the process differently. We need to draw more attention to the intersection of nation and gender in considering social reconstruction aer these attempts. Aer the reversal of these policies in 1989–1990, Pomaks were given the opportunity to restore their Muslim names and dress-style. In the region of Teteven many Pomaks have not restored their old names, at least not formally, and continue to use two names in daily life. Mainly Bulgarian names are given to new-borns and the younger generation is called by new names, but an informant in his 30s said half in jest, ‘I’m sometimes called A but at other times B, so I myself don’t know who I am.’ Concerning social memory, Connerton argues that we preserve versions of the past by representing it in words and images – commemorative ceremonies are typical instances of this, and also keep the past in our bodies.3 rough practices the past is sedimented in the body as a habit. His study is suggestive, when we consider Pomaks’ practices of naming. eir everyday practices of being called by two (new and old) names are already habitual, but the ‘Renaming Process’ is preserved precisely in them. As for the dress-style, quite a number of women have begun wearingshalvari again. Most of them, however, rarely go to big and distant cities like Sofia or Lovech in shalvari. ey explain the reasons as follows: ‘People in the town keep staring at me if I am wearing shalvari,’ or ‘we must wear dresses as civilised people in the town.’ is indicates that the campaign to eliminate their dress-style as a mark of ‘backwardness’ and ‘otherness’ still affects their choice of dress. As they state, ‘without shalvari we are not different from Bulgarians’; they are aware that shalvari are seen as a marker of ‘Pomaks’ in this region and choose whether to wearshalvari or not depending on the circumstances. We have to note, in addition, that people have other codes of dress in the villages. Certainly shalvari have come to be seen as a symbol of Muslims in the modern period, and so the government and its institutions wanted to prohibit them in order to assimilate Muslims. Whether women wearshalvari is, however, relevant also to their position inside the community -- for example, age, marital status, occupation, the details of work, and so on. Although the difference between religions, or ethnic 2 Neuburger, Mary. 2004.e Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 3 Connerton, Paul. 1989.How Societies Remember, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
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groups, attracts attention especially from the outside, we must not ignore the ambiguity arising from the fact that each person embraces identities derived not only from religious/ethnic belonging, but also from other factors, such as localities, gender, and classes. Several recent studies show the importance of the research on Pomaks’ identities in everyday life.4 Many of them point out multi-level identities of Pomaks. For example, Konstantinov notes that their identity tends to be composed of two main layers. One is a vernacular imitation of official nation-state discourses and another is a real-life enactment of identity. Todorova discusses the problem of an ascriptive identity designated by out-groups and a self-identity. e ‘Renaming Process’ and national policies on identity-affairs made Pomaks (minorities) to create an imitation of official discourses and to try to control their group identity through an ascriptive one. However, there was discrepancy between (quasi-)official identity and their daily one. Of course, they influence each other. Pomaks have reacted to the ascription by outgroups, in particular the nation state, and enacted in everyday life, as our earlier examples suggest. Aer the end of the communist regime it is said that the economy plays a crucial role in the formation of people’s cultural identity.5 e (ex- and quasi-) official discourses on ethnic identity, however, are still influential especially when some people try to form a stable group identity. It seems that some of them feel a sense of insecurity aer a retreat of national regulation concerning group identity. All these things make it clear that the ‘Renaming Process’ is not mere bygones. It may be worth researching daily practices among Pomaks and examining further how they view the traces of the ‘Renaming Process’ under the present circumstances. Finally, it should be added that these arguments concerning identity contain a more general theme. e concept of ‘identity’ has undergone a paradigmatic shi in the recent decade. e view that identity is essentially consistent and unchanging has been reconsidered. So hereaer studying identity formation of Pomaks from this point of view would suggest an interesting and important illustration to us.
4
Konstantinov, 1997. ‘Strategies for Sustaining a Vulnerable Muslim Identity: See, e for Caseexample, of Bulgarian Pomaks,’ inYulian. Poulton, Hugh & Suha Taji-Farouki (eds.). Identity and the Balkan States, London: Hurst & Company, pp. 33–58; Todorova, Maria. 1997. ‘Identity (Trans)formation among Pomaks in Bulgaria,’ in Kürti, László & Juliet Langman (eds.). Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural Identities in the New East and Central Europe , Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 63–82. 5 Todorova reports that under economic, international and geopoliticalpressures Pomaks are being forced to identify along either Bulgarian or Turki sh lines, although this new economic and political situation enables them to enjoy diversity. See Todorova, p. 76.
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TEN ESSAYS FROM TODAY’S BULGARIAN JOURNALISM Savcho Savchev ‘Andral’ Journal, Bulgaria Ladies and Gentlemen, ank you for inviting me to participate in this conference. I could have written the next pages in a style better suited for such a meeting. However, I hope you may agree that for a writer, journalese is more appropriate. e following essays may be known to some of you. But I do not consider their presentation here as either superfluousor ‘outof-place.’ Academic style examines, investigates, and informs. Conversely, journalese tries to soen up, to smooth out, and to overcome trends, which could be subsequently studied by researchers. ese essays are about Bulgaria. I have no doubt that as regards the problems and attitudes discussed, they refer to the Balkans as a whole.
Essay One e attitude towards the Roma in Bulgaria does not differ essentially from that in any other European country. Generally speaking, it varies from sweet, romantic loiness to angry rejection. At the two extreme points of the swinging pendulum, we ‘look at ourselves, and look, and look’ but – we cannot recognise ourselves at all. We create an impression with our way of life, with our typical appearance and language, which is strange to ‘the natives.’ ey have built ‘an image’ of us – the one they were able to build, the easiest way. (And if by chance you cannot be ‘accommodated into’their a priori conceptions, God take pity on you...). In other words, in both cases, these are only mental pictures, or rather s‘ ubstitutes of mental pictures.’ One hundred and twenty-six years aer the establishment of a new Bulgarian state, the level of knowledge about Roma is almost the same as it was at its birth. In the last few years, studies have been published, which try to look at things from more angles. Well, I should say that in those books, reports and articles the authors stay frequently within their empirical findings and display a superficial (to say the least) and manipulative attitude towards the problems. Pseudo-scholars, publicists and researchers pop up everywhere! ey have nothing against dipping into the European purse full of money for modern Roma topics. ere are many questions – so who shall provide the answers, and when? We are unshaven, shall we shave? Shall we pick up a new razor or shall we use the rusty one? Let us ask some of the questions:
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– Is ‘historical’ knowledge in line with the centuries-long ‘residence’ of Roma on these lands? – What is Bulgaria to us? – What are we to Bulgaria? – What is the attitude of the ordinary citizen towards his/her co-nationals? – What has the attitude of the Bulgarian authorities been towards us throughout all these 126 years? – What is our attitude towards the Bulgarian national destiny? – What is our attitude towards ourselves? – What is the attitude of Bulgarian humanities towards us and towards our destiny? – What is our place in Bulgaria’s history and has science given an answer to this question? – What knowledge have the press, the other media,the arts provided about us as a whole? – What do our children learn: mutual respect, tolerance, an attempt to lookinto the nature of the other, or hatred and racism, spiritual dirt and elementary human stupidity? Well, we cannot answer those questions and a lot of other questions... And if we do answer them, what difference will it make...
Essay Two In the centre of Sofia, right behind the Palace of Justice (what irony! showing quite visibly the impotence and carelessness of our judicial system and the government), skinheads threw a homeless and defenceless child from a high building and killed him. A lot of time has passed since this event, which the newspapers used only for a single day, just to increase their circulation! ey never returned to this symbolic event. No one cares whether the perpetrator was identified, and if he was, whether there were any consequences or not… And why has he remained unidentified?Society is in a state of blissful slumber. People have enclosed themselves in a shell, submerged in poverty, in their own physical and spiritual misery. So much have they become used to bad news that the only thing they say to themselves is ‘pray this won’t happen to me’… And the picture which some people saw in the scenarios is already there – to frighten the public, to scare non-stop, if there is something you can use. And if there is nothing – do invent something, whatever it is, but don’t leave in peace the ordinary person, the taxpayer, the one who fills the public coffers. Twenty years ago, Bulgarians were scared with Turks, today they are being scared with Roma, tomorrow… Well, by the time tomorrow comes we may invent something else. Society lives in permanent fear. Manipulate it in any way youcan! If there is no threat simply invent one, but never leave the public in peace. is is a philosophy of cynicism, political cynicism of all rul-
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ers, of the nouveau riches who live on our backs. is is a philosophy of impotence, of total lack of capacity to rule your own country; this is a philosophy of hatred towards Bulgaria and of everything Bulgarian. Yes, it is precisely their lackeys who support the thesis that ‘we are the only ones who are concerned about the country.’ And that is why they raise the ‘big’ question about ‘the Gypsy threat,’ claiming for example that aer ten years Roma will be three million… ese people quote so many results of ‘studies’ that they are more than enough to make ordinary people dizzy… But this, precisely, is their goal! Today they will release a short article, tomorrow a statement on a private TV channel, next day another on mainstream TV,then on Friday a half-hour radio broadcast… Public opinion is manipulated, hooked, minds are framed, brains are washed. Somebody pays for that. With money stolen from the banks – with our money. With money that disappeared before 10 November 1989 – our money! e truth is different: never in their history have Roma raised a hand against another people! In the not so distant past we livedat latitudes where many languages and dialects were spoken, we lived together with many nationalities and national groups, there were many religions and heresies (professed completely freely andni a democratic way that we may dream of even today). Backin those days we lived in tolerance with all our neighbours. When one lives in such a mixed community one has no choice but to assume the principles of respect for the others – respect for their religion, language, culture, for their rights to profess them freely, to live freely, and to think freely. We are not greedy for power; we do not aspire for a state or for a territory of our own. We are wiser than many think we are. For thousands of years, we have been living and working for none other than the country we live in. It wasn’t us who robbed the banks. It wasn’t us who ruined the state – the levers were in other hands. We were mere onlookers, 98% of us being unemployed.
Essay ree For many years I have avoided reading the papers. is has been my reaction to all journalistic and solvent people’s outrages. Well, now and then someone will try to pass me over something idiotic to read. And being a professional reader, somehow I simply cannot ignore it. is was what happened some time ago when a newspaper was pushed under my nose and I was told to ‘take and read this.’ I opened the newspaper and started looking. And I found ‘it.’ A rather renowned cartoonist was hitting out at, surprisingly, Bulgarians – to make them wiser. Strange, I told myself. What is this mania for hitting out at somebody, whoever they might be?! Some twenty years ago a poet, very famous at the time, metaphorically killed Bulgarians. In time, somebody else will hit out at and ‘kill’ Bulgarians, and a few days later another person in another newspaper will hit out at them for nothing. Ouch, so much hitting and killing will befall the damned Bulgarian – so to hell with it, I said to myself! Pushing these fancy thoughts aside, I started reading the great article. I read it and I admit there was so much nonsense that... I must be out of my mind, I said to myself. It must be me and
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not the cartoonist who’s nuts. Aer all, it’s never too late to make a fool of yourself. And to be amazed by your own stupidity. Simply because you are already of an age when it is quite embarrassing to be surprised by somebody in such an inexcusably stupid way. Inexcusably because somebody pretends they are wise and you believe them. But... mind your own business! One cannot pretend every minute to be wiser than one ‘is.’.. From this article I learned that ‘America is not a state but a continent, a mixture of assorted riffraff.’ at Switzerland is not a state either but ‘a laundry.’ What’s laundered there isn’t money but ‘dough.’ I understood also that Bulgaria is not considered as a sovereign state. For the writer, Bulgaria is ‘a misunderstanding in the world ocean, some reef.’ Further on, the big wise man makes a greater discovery: that to become a Nobel Prize winner you need to be no more than a tailor. It is sufficient to know languages; the rest is as easy as a wink. So far, crap aer crap. But let it go, you say to yourself, a man of age, with hair lost and not only hair but brain cells gone too. It is strange that to the question ‘what should be feared most,’the great man goes directly to, well... to Gypsies. How come indeed – Gypsies? And the man makes... a proposal. Czechs were right to isolate Gypsies in ghettos. We should follow suit. And aer a brief historical overview in which he repeats ‘truths’ he sees as appropriate, he considers himself a great expert on the topic... Having read something here and there, he thinks he is so clever that he can give advice to the statesmen who dare not voice that proposal. You read on and on and start getting angry that you speak Bulgarian! And you wonder where to start with this great Balkan wise man! With the fact that it isn’t ‘the Czechs’ but some small municipality somewhere in the backyard of Europe that has voted to raise a wall between people? ose who voted for the wall seem to have forgotten what the Nazis did to them fiy years ago... You might also suggest, for example, that those municipal councillors should have thought about how to create new jobs for these people in order to avoid possible trouble. Because these people are hungry and starving. ‘Gypsies, not Turks, were the scourge of Bulgaria.’ Great, another discovery. Twenty years ago another 700,000 people were deported – back then they were ‘the scourge,’ but now new ones have been chosen to take the blame. And this ‘highly tolerant’ person, as he declares himself, seems incapable of realising that this is not the cause and that he should start looking for the roots of evil in himself. Because it is very easy to put the blame on the other, it is very convenient, it’s never you... Because I don’t know a Gypsy banker, for example, who has been robbing poor people, but I’ve seen Bulgarian bankers on TV. My childhood friend Borko stole wire, but he did it as a man, and he was le hanging on the wire forever. And he did it not because he liked hanging very much but because his three children, already grown-up men and women, were and are still unemployed. And they have families in which no one has found a job to date! Yet, just look around and tell me if you can see a banker hanging somewhere out of shame or a banker dying of hunger – I haven’t. Has the writer ever seen such a banker?! But then, somewhere in the US Bulgarian bankers have built themselves an entire suburbs! Also in
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Johannesburg and in Vienna! And there is no force that can bring them – or the people’s money – back. Because it seems that the reason for the catastrophic situation lies there, not in Gypsies. And elsewhere, of course, but let us stop here and continue with historical data. Long ago Persians invited 10,000 Gypsies to play music and they gave them land and seed, but Gypsies squandered it all... Ladies and gentlemen, when you read Firdausi, you aren’t obliged to believe every fabrication of his – aer all, he is a poet! Just imagine! Could there really be a nation that was so short of peasants and workers and servants and singers and musicians and what have you, that it would have been forced to invite so many people from abroad? Isn’t such a proposition both exaggerated and stupid?! Isn’t it preposterous to presume that such a nation could have given birth to Firdausi, but couldn’t raise musicians?! Good gracious, such a nation must have been very stupid then, and I personally don’t believe a word of that story!!! Firdausi wants to make his king look very silly too! Which shah, king or whatever, would be stupid enough to bring 10,000 people, a whole army into his land! Never mind the instruments, to... supposedly entertain his people! Because, you see, they were supposedly unable to entertain themselves!? Well, when I read Firdausi I draw completely different conclusions! e ‘historical’ story is guided generally by its author’s clearly ‘political’ considerations, considerations that we should try to ‘decipher’ today. But there is also something else. Well, let this piece of information be true: Don’t you think it is rather vulgar to invite somebody for something and then to compel them to do something else?! e Louvre may invite a master cartoonist to draw in Paris for a certain time and then buy part of his paintings at a price worthy of the Louvre and the painter. en, all of a sudden, someone buys ten cows, a piece of land and seed and compels our buddy to breed cows, to plant and reap because, say, at that particular moment there is something wrong with French agriculture. Well, don’t you think our buddy will start swearing like a trooper, using colourful Bulgarian swear words, and promptly pack and return to Bulgaria?! en just imagine that some French newspaper starts to speak foully about that gentleman, accusing him of being very lazy – you see, the entire French nation was giving him a livelihood but he didn’t care and had spurned its generous hospitality… In general, where is the criterion?!? Who gives an intellectual the right to speak in such a way about a whole nation?! And doesn’t the Bulgarian intellectual realise that such a tone is, to say the least, vulgar?!? Who and what are we teaching, educating? Here I will take the liberty to repeat something I told a former ambassador years ago: I am very glad that it was my father, not people like you, who educated me. My father wasn’t the kind of man who would be chased for interviews. But I assure you that he was a highly educated and genuinely tolerant man. If this is supposed to be tolerance, pity our state!!! I doubt very much that if 500,000 Bulgarians had been killed by Hitler – that’s the number of Gypsies Hitler killed without any reason – a Bulgarian intellectual would have had the insolent perversity to claim that Fuehrer is ... shining.
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Essay Four A senior state official is good-mannered (or at least is supposed to be). A senior state official smiles, he is polite to everybody, he listens attentively (or at least is supposed to). e senior university official is with grey hair (exactly as you imagine him). e senior university official gives advice (well, who else should do that?!). And we listen (obey). e senior statein official attentively to thetimes senior university official. Sometimes he smiles a statelylistens manner, and at other semi-condescendingly. ere are no quarrels – we pretend to be well-educated and good-mannered people. I understand that the senior university official is in fact a lecturer – an associate professor, PhD holder, dean; the fellow delivers very wise lectures to an audience eager for knowledge. Students listen (obey) attentively to his wisestories, sit for examinations and possibly fail. e students depend on him. He educates future teachers; they in their turn educate our children. He shapes public opinion. He participates in mapping out the government’s strategies and tactics on certain problems. Here is one of his wisecrack statements (I quote literally): ‘e government should take the necessary steps to make the minorities start loving Bulgaria at least a little.’ e academic feels helpless – he asks the government to help science make those minorities start loving his beloved homeland at least a little. Because the teacher feels that the minorities don’t love his homeland. Andand at this moment I saw professor, the PhD school holder, the dean, the professor whatever . I saw himthe as aassociate teacher in a small monastic one hundred and fiy years ago. I imagined him walking up and down in the middle of the classroom in his homespun full-bottomed breeches, surrounded by children with shaven heads. e teacher, cornel stick in hand, enforcing obedience and pouring knowledge into the pupils’ empty pumpkin heads... e state official nods understandingly. He hasn’t forgotten that he is a diplomat but I know thathis way of thinking is the same. We, the poor ones, we keep mum. We are school kids. We went to school to buy brains. ‘Science is a sun that shines in our souls...’ Ask the teacher whether if this is a homeland for him, it is a pigsty for me! Ask the teacher how come he entered my soul and didn’t find there a drop of love towards his beloved homeland. Ask him what measuring gauge he uses to determine those minorities’ love of his beloved homeland. e teacher must know much, otherwise he wouldn’t have been hired as a teacher, would he? But he definitely doesn’t know that both my great-grandfathers died ‘valiantly’ (as written in an official document that has survived purely by chance) in the Balkan wars. ey died defending the teacher’s beloved homeland, the homeland that he categorically seems to deny me the right to call my own too (I wouldn’t be surprised if he denied my great-grandfathers Nicola and Mincho that right too). Even though for all I know, his great-grandfather might have died from an apoplectic stroke near his wife’s stinking behind. For all I know, his head might be full of 6% millet-ale instead of brain – otherwise how could he possibly think
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that anyone, be it a senior state official or the entire government, could make those ethnoses start loving Bulgaria at least a little... In a word, sheer nonsense...
Essay Five ‘Gypsies are the scourge of Bulgaria’: What have we come to if we can hear that on the Bulgarian National Television... (Aer the gutter daily Trud, the BNT has been quick to follow suit…) A slight revision of this great idea of some genius will show you straight away how stupid this claim is. For instance: ‘Armenians are the scourge of Byzantium.’ Or: ‘Bulgarians are the scourge of Europe.’ All these ‘revelations’ are worm-eaten or moderately stupid. Someone had voiced them somewhere, either in Constantinople a thousand years ago or in Rome while trying to kill the Pope some twenty years ago. True or false, they exist in the speaker’s head. If you are given the opportunity to voice such a piece of idiocy, the television station is to blame. And if you avail yourself of this opportunity, the idiocy is ... personally yours.
Essay Six In the age of the so-called ‘Great Discoveries’ Columbus set out to discover India. He didn’t discover India. He discovered another continent, later named America aer another discoverer who actually didn’t ‘discover’ it. No doubt, this was an injustice. Yet even so, America kept the name of the man who didn’t discover it. e second injustice was that although Columbus realised that he hadn’t discovered India, he named (he or somebody else – it hardly matters considering that the name is used even today!) the local people ‘Indians.’ (In English ‘Indian’ refers both to the American Indians and to India’s people. American Indians are sometimes called ‘Red Indians,’ but this name was obviously coined rather late!) e name has stuck even though the civilised Europeans and civilised Europe could have asked the local people: Hey you, how do you call yourselves? Tell us so that we will call you by your own name! Because you can’t meet Christopher Columbus in the street and without knowing his name start calling him Ivan just because you’ve met and said hello to somebody else whose name is Ivan. But the Europeans didn’t ask. And the native Americans had names, names that differed widely because they came from different tribes, different people with their own traditions, customs, language and culture, achievements and history, worthy of respect. Some called themselves Mayas, others Incas, Cherokees, Apaches, and so on. And they shouldn’t have been called ‘Indians’ because they were not Indians! In fact, Europe did not respect them. During the many years of conquests, massacres or to use a modern word, genocide, Europe behaved as a civilisation of barbarians. Europe was determined to educate the world with blood and fire and to make it learn to live according to European standards. e Europeans are the greatest egoists (possibly) in the entire world. ey think that they are the only ones in the universe and that the tastes
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they indulge are the best. ey are intoxicated only with the smell of their own divine sweat, their lips are the only ones that utter sacred truths, and they alone have the right to determine anything and everything... Strange as it may seem, this reflex is alive even today – look at what the USA has done over the years in Vietnam, Panama, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. And not only the USA; the same has also been done by England, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Russia – all highly civilised states and nations...ey were the right ones. e others were wrong... It was no accident that in the past some ‘right’ conquerors and many ‘great’ persons got themselves eaten alive or boiled on some island or in the impenetrable hinterland. It is no accident that today civilised people are confused when they encounter ‘barbarians’ with bomb belts. ings are clearer than that: evil for evil, blood for blood, inhumane attitude in retaliation for inhumane attitude. But civilised people aren’t losing their reflexes so easily – first they will kill the local population, then build museums in its honour and study its indigenous culture and history... at’s it; long live the dominant culture of the European ‘civilisation.’…
Essay Seven It seems that Bulgarian journalism has been le to its own conscience for fourteen years now. It has had to overcome a number of ‘painful’ notions, ideas, formats, and mentality. Don’t ask me why; just open any newspaper or magazine, turn on the TV or tune in to any radio programme and listen carefully. If you are not prejudiced, you will realise this for yourself. I can give many examples; in fact we are virtually drowned in them. Every new day brings new information so it is hardly appropriate to burden you with my memories or facts... Not that there are no noble people in the journalistic community. ereare noble people and that is good. Some of them obey their own conscience – they take into account also ‘other’ points of view and observe ‘other’ worldly principles and philosophy. But here I am not talking about those journalists. I am talking about the others. ey have adopted a model of public behaviour that is not positive for the Bulgarian nation and that pollutes Bulgaria’s air instead of purifying it. Bulgarian journalism is light years away from Western journalism. Not so much in terms of, say, talent and skills, technical and financial resources, although they count too. But more as regards the journalist’s mission to inform civil society and build the nation’s future. By ‘civil’ here I don’t mean in the sense of ‘civil’ as it was understood ten years ago – that is, a term associated with purely partisan goals, with a specific political party directive. I am talking about the truly creative person’s state of conscience. is conscience compels truly creative persons to seek and comply with other points of view, to have an in-depth understanding of topical problems, to avoid cheap manipulations by ‘ideas,’ political parties, movements or by individual self-sufficientpolitical or financial gurus. Conscience: that’s what contemporary Bulgarian journalism lacks! Regretfully, journalists are concerned much more with ostentation (appearance!), top-of-the-range
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clothes, format, than with the essence of events, their depth... ey aim to amaze. Instead of seeking the roots of a given phenomenon, they are interested only in facts which, needless to say, are no doubt very important too. Instead of looking beyond the facts, they dream of sensations and ‘find’ them even where there are none. Journalists are running around aer the powers that be, aer the gurus, aer money and, regretfully, will not consider any opposite point of view. Journalists are not interested in learning such points of view. ‘Opposite views’ bring no money, no ‘clout,’ no self-esteem or ‘prestige.’ It doesn’t matter that this so-called prestige is self-sufficient, that it is the prestige of scum, of the nouveau riches, and the like. Alas, such prestige turns out to be the coveted one in our times... In this sense, Bulgarian journalists, ‘le to themselves,’ will need a long, long time to change. Hopefully, this time won’t be unbearably long…
Essay Eight What is racism? Here is a specific example. During the Iraq war, the wonderful Bulgarian journalist Elena Yoncheva was attacked and robbed; something even worse could have happened to her. In her live broadcasts from Iraq she talked not only about what had happened to her, but she mentioned also the person who saved her. Next day a high-circulation daily printed on its front page in huge letters that she had been robbed and maltreated by… Arabs. Considering that the piece was published by a newspaper that has contributed heavily to brainwashing in Bulgaria in the last thirteen years, it could be argued that the facts were rendered objectively. Yes, she was indeed robbed and beaten by Arabs. But she was saved also by Arabs. On that point the daily was reticent. e article may have mentioned this detail too. is, however, is in no way sufficient. Aer reading the biased headline I ignored the article and threw the great global newspaper in the garbage bin. is act of mine was a direct consequence of the specific manipulation that literally incites one race against another, one people against another people. I hope other people did the same as me. I shunned this newspaper for a couple of months at least. ere is no other way to oppose today’s public situation. e prosecution authorities, which in such circumstances cannot pretend that nothing has happened, that nothing can be seen, have no right to remain deaf and blind to the obvious bias, racism, and journalistic and human idiocy. at’s it. Some guys are playing on the dark instincts of people in order to sell gutter press information. Other people also join the game by pretending that nothing has happened and that they can see nothing. I shall not continue here to present the many distorted questions and problems. I shall not speak about what Roma have been living through for more than thirteen years as a result of such publications by many other media in bright and beautiful Bulgaria...
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Essay Nine e manipulations can be of all sorts. ey can be deliberate and unintentional, big and small, clever and stupid… And who knows what else. I shall not speak about the deliberate, big and clever manipulations – one can see there other things, much deeper than one could perceive at first sight. But even the ‘small’ manipulations, if one thinks more deeply about it, turn out to be not so small. ey affect the masses by nourishing their false self-esteem. e small manipulations are consonant with the masses’ moods, opinions and principles. And there’s more to it. Bulgarian National Television, Channel 1. e TV camera closes in on a clump of shrubs, we see an open fire on which is a large tin vessel with boiling water. Children hop around. A nylon tent is pitched; the father calls it ‘the palace.’ Elementary questions are asked and the answers are just as elementary. e producer makes ‘a show,’ and Roma father ‘performs’ in the show. To put it in other words, television offersa ‘circus show’ and people love going to the circus. e respondent is answering the questions exactly as you want him to: ‘Do you feel good here?’ ‘Yes, this here is my palace, if I have a place to lay my head on, take a bite and drink a couple of beers, what more would I need? Look, my wife is pregnant again, we are happy.’ In between the TV camera tours around the Gypsy camp, an unshaven man assumes the role of a great lover, well, as a young man he gave pleasure to so many ladies. He raises the beer bottle, probably bought by the TV crew, well, ‘we must make people feel good.’ A small boy pops up, takes the bottle from the beardedman, raises it, the TV camera won’t miss the moment: ‘Well, they’re all like this, this is so typical of them, and TV must catch typical moments…’ e cameraman approaches the woman, asking the same stupid questions. e only difference in the answers is that as a measure of human happiness she needs at least five beers… Meanwhile, we hear typical music in the background. My goodness, could they play Brahms or Paganini? And all this is garnished with the deep thoughts of the interviewer, who not infrequently also shows his good feelings for this different world probably because he himself is different too, hey, ‘there are also wise men.’ e interview is over. But where are those people from? Why are they precisely here and not elsewhere? What made them go to the public square? Do they have a permanent roof over their heads? Have this man and woman ever worked? What kind of job? Are they now employed? Why are they unemployed? ose kids, do they go to school? Why not? How do they see their tomorrow? In fact, do they see it at all? What do they think about their life, about life in general? Is there any alternative for them? Why not? What did their parents do, their grandfathers and grandmothers? What did they do for a living? And why don’t you follow their trade? Do you have to steal? Why do you have to? Where would you like to live? What do you want to work? Why don’t you do something to start working what you want to? What do you think about the state – aerall, you, too, are citizens of this state? And so on and so forth…
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e reporter is not interested at all in asking such questions. Our Roma fellows pretend to have kept their human dignity, they are not complaining. But I know very well that they answer out of spite towards themselves and towards the man with the mike. is is an unconscious psychological reaction – that not everything in your life is lost and squandered. e truth will shine again late at night. When ‘those’ from the apartment buildings behind the shrubs fall asleep, and the music will blare out loud enough to enter your soul. Raise the bottle. And the tears, unwillingly, and in consonance with the true melody that breaks your heart, start rolling down your unshaven cheeks until the booze makes you fall down next to the glowing embers. ere is no escape, deliverance is in heaven. at’s good, it’s the soma. You forget everything at least until dawn…
Essay Ten and Last I like the idea of Atanas Dalchev about the Homeland and how Roma feel about it! In recent years I have found stinking patriotism (even that of some professors, journalists and patriots) deeply repulsive. When my two great-grandfathers died for Bulgaria during the Balkan wars, they must have hardly thought of hoisting the banner of empty fake patriotism. Although they must have certainly cried ‘Five on each bayonet’ when they were called to attack. ey did well because they gave their lives for the Homeland, unlike the professors, journalists and lazy-bone patriots who, an inch beyond the borders of Bulgaria, are absolutely unknown to the world and who have been eating, drinking and profiting all their lives from invoking the Homeland’ name! Not long ago I was deeply impressed by a boy called Svetlin Nakov. He was invited by some big corporations to work across the Atlantic but he refused to go. A highly qualified computer specialist working at the University of Sofia as a lecturer, this young man aged 24 amazed me in a TV interview not only with his achievements but also with his big patriotism that was so different from the small talk of many older and much-titled men. is is genuine patriotism, indeed everything else is from the devil... And this is by no means accidental! A great mind can be seen ‘immediately,’ it is great in everything it touches! I take great satisfaction in knowing that such people exist. I pray (to whom?) that society and the media may give the go-ahead to such people, not to others... In one of his novels omas Mann, half-seriously, half-ironically, speaks of ‘man as friend.’ His hero Tonio Krueger confesses that he would feel proud and happy if he found a friend among men. So far, he says, I have found friends only among the demons, the goblins, the evil spirits and ghosts, who were speechless and still before knowledge, in other words: literary creatures. If I were naïve enough and could have been reincarnated as a literary character just for a moment, then I would not have taken the liberty to draw such a modest analogy with today’s event. I would have repeated that I would feel proud and happy if I could find a friend among men, even if they were demons, goblins, evil spirits and ghosts, who would stand speechless before
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knowledge, in other words: researchers, historians, ethnologists or, in brief, intellectuals. ey are fated to be humanists and to seek and find ‘the friend in man.’ at is the only way they could be elevated to the loy position of men and creators. In conclusion: A fundamental change, which I hope is the true objective of such a meeting, should not be the result of our joint efforts only. I do not doubt the absolute necessity for such a change. I hope that the persons, who develop and cultivate the relations between the different Balkan nations, shall hear their suggestions and conclusions.
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DISCUSSION Slavka Draganova: As a moderator, I would like to point to the fact that the genocide against the Turkish culture had already started at the beginning of the 1960s,
whenrecently I was a that student in Turkish PhilologyPhilology at the University of Sofia. I have learned only the Faculty of Turkish had to follow instructions according to which students weren’t supposed to learn the Turkish language. Our exams were in Bulgarian. We didn’t know this at the time and we simply thought that our professors were incompetent, but they were actually following orders from above that we shouldn’t learn Turkish properly. e more ambitious students educated themselves by using Ottoman Turkish, and I dare say that some of us really made progress. However, at the same time people working at the Ministry of Interior were provided with a very good knowledge of Turkish. at was the policy back in those days. Who would like to take the floor now? Please go ahead. Jorgen Nielsen: May I ask a naïve question regarding Roma? In Northwestern
Europe we occasionally get our own semi-artificial immigration crises, fears of getting flooded by Roma coming out of the Slovakiaout or occasionally So why are we never presented withCzech fears Republic, of Roma coming of Bulgaria?Romania. Ilona Tomova: From the very beginning of the 1990s onwards, the West European country that was the least favoured destination of potential emigrants from Bulgaria was Britain. It was firmly believed that the barriers, which Britain erected to immigration, were so strong that it wasn’t worth even trying to go there.is belief, which was very common among Bulgarians and the Bulgarian Turks, was passed on to Roma too. And indeed it is only in the last few years that there have been more systematic and mass attempts on the part of Bulgarian citizens to enter the UK. We have had a change in migration flows, including in minority emigration flows, in this fifteen-year period. In the case of Turks, at the very beginning the most favoured destination was Turkey, especially for people aged over forty-five. e young and best-edu-
cated people preferred togo totoWestern Europe rather Turkey. e main that they wanted to emigrate at the beginning of thethan 90s was Germany and,country to a lesser extent, Austria. But in the case of Turks, in particular, also Sweden and some other Scandinavian countries plus the Netherlands – in other words, countries that already had large Turkish immigrant communities, which could possibly be mobilised to accept the emigrants. For Roma, the main destination was Germany too. Aer Germany started creating difficulties for potential immigrants, Poland became increasingly attractive for the
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Bulgarian Roma who were now trying to gain illegal entry into Austria and Germany from Poland. e sub-group division of emigration waves among the minority communities is very interesting too. For example, Muslim Bulgarians emigrate to Greece. And almost all Vlach groups among Bulgaria’s Roma/Gypsies have already emigrated to Greece. So much so that we researchers say that we simply cannot find any Vlach Gypsies to include in our studies. Men were the first to emigrate, but they were eventually followed by women, elderly people and children. Among the Kaldarashcommunities, and especially those in which the traditional occupation of women is pickpocketing, the main targets of the emigration wave were Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Spain – and moreover, from the very beginning. But theirs was labour migration; in other words, they would go there in the busy tourist season and come back here when the season was less busy. At present mass labour migration among Bulgarians as well as the Muslim Bulgarians, Turks, and Roma is to Spain and Portugal, where the opportunity to find a job and reside illegally for a longer period of time has grown dramatically. e other country that is undoubtedly very attractive for all ethnic communities is the USA, as well as Canada. But to gain entry there you need a green card. At present it is very interesting that we have a purely regional distribution of labour migration among Roma. For example, the Roma from Sliven and Yambol have been traditionally going to work for more than a year in Israel, where they are employed by construction companies. For years, the most common type of migration was labour and cross-border migration, with Roma going to trade in various goods that were in shortage in the countries from the former Yugoslavia during the embargo or finding seasonal jobs in Greece. But these aren’t long-term migrations. So the strong perception of all Bulgarian citizens, including Roma, that Great Britain is a country to which it is difficult to emigrate, have started to break up only in recent years, and that is the reason why so few people from Bulgaria have emigrated there. Slavka Draganova: I only want to add something about the Roma in the Ottoman Empire. Strict description of the Roma population dates back to the period aer the Tanzimat reforms,1 and in the registers I work with, Muslim Gypsies and nonMuslim Gypsies are identified clearly. ey were employed in both crop husbandry and sheep-breeding, and there were also wandering Roma. It is most interesting that those who were employed in crop husbandry never worked poor-quality land. e assessed value of their land was higher than that of the land of Bulgarians and Turks alike, whereas the wandering Roma were classified in four groups and they were exempted from military tax or from an income tax calledvergi. ey paid Gypsy vergi, divided into four groups – poor, richer, slightly more rich, and richest.So by the second half of 1 Reform program in the Ottoman Empire from 1839 till 1876. Tanzimat is Turkish for ‘reorganisation.’ e program, which started under sultan Abdülmecid I, was initiated by reformists who understood why the empire was in decline. Tanzimat was opposed by numerous conservatives, as it was based upon European ideas and ideals. (Editor’s note).
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the nineteenth century the Bulgarian National Revival press was literally full of regulations concerning Roma, and one can truly say that some efforts to integrate Roma towards Bulgarians and Turks were being made even at the time. Hidajet Repovac: I think one cannot bring enough bitterness into the narrative about certain nations or national minorities in today’s Europe. For me, this bitterness is completely justified. ere has always been a practice of playing music to victims. When Jewish victims were taken away to Mauthausen and Auschwitz, they were accompanied by the music of Beethoven and Bach. e music was played very loudly to hide the screams of the victims as they were taken to the gas chambers. Music was played also to all other victims when they were led to be executed. is was the case also when Jews and Arabs were chased out of Spain in 1493. Aer being driven out of Spain, the Sephardic Jews dispersed all over Europe and a large part of them came also to Bosnia, to Sarajevo. ey have survived in Sarajevo to this very day. ey are a proof that a nation can be protected if there is a will for that. at cultures can be protected and that different cultures can communicate with each other. at multiculturalism can be developed even when this seems impossible. For this reason I’m not a pessimist. If we resignourselves to pessimism, then we will give up on numerous nations. I actively support international and inter-religious communication. Despite the fact that Sarajevo was destroyed during this terrible war and despite the Leningrad-style siege, which lasted four years, one of the first things to be done in Sarajevo, was the construction of a Roma settlement. Italy provided the funds – it was a huge donation – and on a very prominent location in the city beautiful houses were built for Roma. is is one optimistic picture I would like to provide in contrast to the pessimistic one, which I agree is necessary for understanding the situation of some ethnic communities that are degraded and unjustly viewed as inferior. So, despite the fact that I have lived through a four-year siege I am an optimist. I believe that intellectual and moral forces exist on the Balkans, which are capable of building a better world. If we don’t build it, even those who think that they live in a better world will never live to see a brighter future. Tetsuya Sahara: ank you very much. Are there any other comments? We had two reports also on Pomaks, so I am expecting some comments about these reports too. Ekaterina Nikova: Prof. Yalamov, my big question about who designed the ‘Renaming Process’ and why remains, and I would like you to comment on this. e majority of studies, especially foreign studies, represent what happened in 1984–1989 as a natural culmination of the minority policy pursued by the Bulgarian state for half a century. ere are however other scholars (myself included) who think that the true context of the ‘Renaming Process’ isn’t so much the history of interethnic relations but the political history of Bulgarian communism, the political situation in this pe-
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riod. Wasn’t this simply one of the madnesses of communism, such as the systematisation in Romania or the intention to reverse the flow of Siberian rivers? is was, so to speak, ‘worse than a crime, it was simply a blunder,’ a terrible political blunder that was possible because of the structure of government. at is why my question to you is, do you think that the ‘Renaming Process’ was unavoidable? Haven’t you found indications of the contrary in therecently published memoirs of some Communist Party functionaries? at there was a group of people who simply gained the upper hand in the Communist Party leadership, whispered in Todor Zhivkov’s ear, and succeeded in persuading him? Ibrahim Yalamov: To answer your question I must divideit into two parts: first, was this ‘Renaming Process’ unavoidable and second, who imposed it and how. As I point out in my book, in most memoirs, including Todor Zhivkov’s, you won’t find a rational answer about the reason for launching the ‘Renaming Process’ and there is some mystification. Todor Zhivkov declared on several occasions that if he revealed the true reasons for the ‘Renaming Process’ that would spark off civil war in Bulgaria. is was also what his granddaughter Zheni Zhivkova said in an interview. I think that the ‘Renaming Process’ wasn’t unavoidable. On the contrary, in my opinion it wasa deviation from the natural course of historical development. Nothing necessitated it and, most importantly, it didn’t resolve any ethnic or other questions. You heard President Zhelyu Zhelev who shed light on this question. It is obvious, I will repeat too, that the ‘Renaming Process’ was launched because of the regime’s difficulties and helplessness to find solutions to actually existing social and demographic problems. e fall in Bulgarian birth rates was a fact and all Bulgarians were concerned about it. Why did the regime take this particular decision? Outside the realm of strictly scientific methodology, I believe that the following hypothesis is possible. By the 1980s, the leadership of the totalitarian regime had realised that socialism was at a dead end. Todor Zhivkov was absolutely determined to go down in Bulgarian history spanning 1,300 years if not as the first then at least as the second most important figure, and he passed from socialist to nationalist positions. You might have noticed that he declared in the press several times that ‘if they put me on trial they will make me a national hero.’ In other words, he wanted to represent himselfas a saviour of the Bulgarian nation. I am certain that Todor Zhivkov’s so-called ‘hunting band,’ which he also writes about in his memoirs, played an important role in the making of this decision – Zhivkov’s ‘hunting band’ was a close circle of people, of several academicians starting with the President of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; I won’t list the others. It was they who suggested this idea to him. Did it have opponents? Yes, this policy line always had opponents at the top echelons of power. I will note two moments only. e first was when they were discussing the decision in 1969 and the question came up whether to include the term ‘assimilation’ in it. Some were in favour of including the term but Zhivko Zhivkov, who was minister of education at the time, declared: ‘Even if we want to, we cannot assimilate them. at’s why we shouldn’t hurt their national
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feelings.’ e second moment I had only heard rumours about, but I eventually found proof of it in the archives. Alexander Lilov2 wrote a memorandum in 1978 in which he outlines two stances, two tendencies concerning the ethnic question. One tendency is to expel them. ‘But this,’ says he, ‘is impossible, and even if it is possible it won’t be of benefit to Bulgaria because we will lose manpower.’ e other tendency is to assimilate them but that is impossible, he goes on to say, because national self-consciousness is something that takes centuries to develop. So he proposes a third way: to raise the socio-economic level, to equalise the social status of this population, and to naturally intensify its communist reconditioning. So there were forces that disagreed with the general policy line to one extent or another, even though it is well known that those forces disappeared – if not immediately, then at least eventually. e question was raised here of the still existing deep trauma from the ‘Renaming Process,’ and I think this is very true. But in my view the problem isn’t whether this trauma has been overcome, how many individuals have kept their Bulgarian names, dual nationality, and so on. In my view what is important now is to create the necessary preconditions for the preservation and development of the ethnic and cultural identity of the minorities in Bulgaria. Even our people, who claim to be representing us, invariably speak in public of universal human values. at is why I ask: Don’t ethnic minorities have any values that would enrichthe general cultural situation in Europe? Who will speak for them? Who will preserve them? For example, the question of mother-tongue tuition hasn’t been resolved yet. In my opinion, having a tenminute broadcast in Turkish on Bulgarian television is simply incongruous. In Bulgaria there are several Turkish-language newspapers; they are published with the help of foreign foundations but cannot satisfy the needs of this population in either quantitative or qualitative terms. So I don’t see any solid reasons why I shouldn’t be sceptical about the future of ethnic communities in Bulgaria. Back in the past we were quite enthusiastic about internationalism. Now our latest enthusiasm is globalisation and integration. Even the leader of the party,3 which not even the party bosses know if it is ethnic or not, declares that our top-priority task is to build a unified Bulgarian nation and a unified European nation. I am fully aware that what is being referred to here is the socalled ‘etatic’ or ‘political’ nation, but what strikes me strongly is that nobo dy points out the other side of the coin. Namely, that within this etatic nation exist separate ethnic communities with their own culture, language, literature. In my paper I quote articles from the Constitution that provide for development of the culture of minorities.Here I can tell you a lot about how I proposed those articles myself, about what form they had srcinally and what form they acquired. Despite that, however, I am happy that at the time we nevertheless succeeded in including them in Bulgaria’s Constitution. But as my colleague, I too have some concerns about the future of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria. Chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party from 1990 to 1991 (Editor’s note). e Movement for Rights and Freedoms, commonly seen as an ethnic Turkish party in Bulgaria (Editor’s note). 2 3
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Slavka Draganova:Something is bothering me. Why are our fellow Ottomanists and historians, who actively participated in the ‘Renaming Process’ and were even rewarded for it, again the Number One in the country? Some who couldn’t or didn’t want to actively condemn this process in the press and on radio at least stood silently aside, but those who were touring the Rhodope Mountains and helping the government are again the Number One. Well, this is Bulgaria aerall. Boyko Marinkov: I suggest we return to the academic subject that we have been
discussing so far. I would like to go back to a problem raised earlier in Prof. Turan’s paper as well as in the papers we heard this aernoon. is is the problem of Turkish emigration from Bulgaria. e attempt to identify a general tendency in the last 125 years is interesting in itself but, unfortunately, it compels the researcher to cross out specific events in history that we simply cannot ignore. Here I won’t comment on the emigration processes before the Second World War, even though they are more or less understandable and familiar to me. But if we try to connect the three big migrations aer World War II we will come upon facts that we are trying if not to ignore than at least not to mention. Let us take the first emigration wave in 1950–51. is was the year of complete Sovietisation; there was a team of Soviet advisors in every Bulgarian government ministry, and the two big trials connected with purges in the ruling forces were over, including the big trial of Traicho Kostov.4 e two traditional leaders of the Communist Party, Georgi Dimitrov5 and Vasil Kolarov,6 had died, and a new team was taking over. In Turkey meanwhile, the Kemalists fell from power on 14 May 1950. Aer ruling the country for twenty-seven years, the Republican People’s Party lost the parliamentary elections and the Democratic Party came to power for the first time since the establishment of a multiparty regime. But they had little time to enjoy their victory – two months later, they were faced with an avalanche-like immigration wave. Given the capacity of Turkish society in 1950, having to deal with 150,000 immigrants was a huge, awesome problem. And if we must connect events, then it is obvious that this first migration wave in 1950–51 was an open, clear form of pressure from the Soviet 4 Traicho Kostov was a deputy PrimeMinister of Bulgaria. He was arrested and charged with ideological deviation and treason. Together with ten associates, he was found guilty and
executed 5 on 16 December 1948. (Editor’s note) Dimitrov co-founded the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1919. In 1920s he became a member of the executive committee of the Comintern and in 1934, a secretary-general of Comintern. In 1946 he became Prime Minister of Bulgaria and held the post until his death on 2 July, 1949. (Editor’s note) 6 Kolarov became provisional president of Bulgaria in 1946.He remained president until 1947, and then became foreign minister in the Dimitrov government. Aer Dimitrov died in 1949, Kolarov became a Prime Minister, but died only a few months later in January 1950. (Editor’s note)
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Union aimed at continuing the 1945 policy line on changing the status of the Straits, the demand concerning military bases, the demand for territorial concessions in the Caucasian republics, and so on. In other words, the Bulgarian Turks, the emigration wave, was used directly as a tool to exercise pressure on Turkey. Why am I stressing this? Because what we see next is the opposite variant of events. e second emigration wave from 1968–78 started in 1964 as a negotiation process aimed at findinga new scheme for Bulgaria’s Balkan policy. And this is a fact. is is part of the process of normalising Bulgaria’s relations with the two NATO member countries in the Balkans, Greece and Turkey. And the emigration campaign was part of this process of normalisation, of trying to formulate a foreign policy that was adequate to the new times. e context of the events in 1984–85 was entirely different. I have long been telling my colleagues that I think what actually happened is what President Zhelev said this morning from his point of view. In my opinion, there was no Soviet plan and the ‘Renaming Process’ was given a serious initial impetus by the lack of stability and predictability of the situation in Moscow. e great ideologue Mikhail Suslov died in 1981, Leonid Brezhnev passed away in 1982, and then Konstantin Chernenko died in 1983. ere was very serious destabilisation at the top. is is the important factor. And not only wasn’t there a Soviet plan but, conversely, the absence of serious Soviet pressure on foreign political processes aer the Polish crisis in 1980 allowed the specific type of actions that took place in Bulgaria. On this point I more or less agree with Prof. Yalamov that the battle between the different groups in the leadership at the time was not so much over the question of what national policy the Communist Party should pursue from now on, but of who would be the successor of Zhivkov, who was by then 74. e question of succession had already been raised and was on theagenda. And who was it who normally had the strongest cards in this battle? e law enforcement bodies, the secret services, the ‘people behind the screen.’ ose people played an extremely important and crucial rolein provoking the ‘Renaming Process.’ It isn’t difficult to iden7 tify those people if you look at, for example, Dimitar Stoyanov’s memoirs, which are called e reat [Zaplahata]. e process originated as a battle for succession, but the final result was horrifying. I would even say that they themselves watched on in horror because they saw that the process was slipping out of their control. Until then they had been given guarantees that this process was controllable: we hold power, we have sent such and such forces, we have the support of the Turkish intelligentsia. All this turned out to be nothing but hot air. And they remained hesitant what to do untilthe very last moment. en the different groups in power suddenly started looking to the army for Dimitar Stoyanov, who died in 2000, served as interior minister under late communist dictator Todor Zhivkov from 1973 until 1988. One document from the Interior Ministry archives shows that Dimitar Stoyanov ordered a campaign in December 1984 to force ethnic Turks in Bulgaria to adopt Slavic names. e document reveals Stoyanov instructed senior security officers “to start renaming all Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin in all districts where such populations exist.” (Editor’s note) 7
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support. e army was never included in this operation. And this is no accident. e major special units in the Bulgarian Army – I am talking about the Red Berets, the ‘Commandos’ and ‘Granite’ groups – weren’t allowed to go in action. Despite the unrest, despite the sense of weakness, those units remainedni the barracks. Consequently, the thesis connecting all those three emigration waves in a single, consistent line and saying ‘this is Bulgarian nationalism, which started from the Russo-Turkish War and can be traced to this very day’ can be questioned on quite serious grounds. It is obvious that the events were very specific although they undoubtedly had roots in the past. Today we are in a situation, which Prof. Yalamov has defined very delicately (in some Bulgarian texts the definition is much more critical), in which on the whole the political representation of the Bulgarian Turks has been appropriated, monopolised, privatised. Regrettably, all big Bulgarian parties are practically ethnic parties; neither the Bulgarian Socialist Party nor the Union of Democratic Forces have strong representation of ethnic Turks in their leaderships, and this is the first indicator that can tell you immediately who seeks whose votes, who has cleared what ground for other players. Ibrahim Yalamov: At such forums we never have enough time, we are always ni a hurry, but we shouldn’t oversimplify things. Firstand foremost, it is imperative to say that ever since the Liberation, the Bulgarian state has been constantly trying to rid itself especially of the Turkish ethnic community. I have written a book, which is due to come out shortly, where I describe the 30s in greater detail. Even during the very first talks aer the Russo-Turkish War, the Russian delegation openly declared that the presence of Turks in Bulgaria was temporary, that it shouldn’t be discussed at those talks, that they would leave. e influence of Russian and of Soviet policy was different. Let me give you several concrete examples from documents. In 1949, aer the 8 death of Georgi Dimitrov, the new leadership headed by Vulko Chervenkov went to the Soviet Union and met Stalin. ey raised three questions, one of which was, ‘What shall we do with the Turkish population in Bulgaria?’ Stalin said, ‘Let them go, this population is hopeless.’ But he nevertheless asked, ‘Why don’t you Christianise them?’ Chervenkov said, ‘We think that won’t work.’ Stalin said, ‘We’ve tried it out in Georgia, it works!’ So Stalin gave them permission to let them emigrate. Here you are right about one thing. When in the 40s Turkey made attempts to join NATO, the Soviet Union exercised pressure on Turkey, wanting to complicate the situation there, and one of the levers was precisely migration. But only one year later, at their second meeting, Stalin told Chervenkov: ‘You’ve done well to let Turks go. But this won’t solve the question. Divide them. In other words, let those who are hopeless, who we can’t use for the Chervenkov became minister of culture in 1947, deputy Prime Minister in 1949, general secretary of the party in 1949 and Prime Minister of Bulgaria in 1950. Being a Stalinist hardliner, he lost much of his support aer Stalin’s death in 1953. He had to resign as general secretary in March 1954 and as Prime Minister in April 1956. He retired from politics aerloosing also a position of a deputy Prime Minister in 1961. (Editor’s note) 8
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cause of socialism, go, and let’s win over the others for the cause of socialism. I will send you an Azerbaijani delegation.’ e decisions made in 1951 were to the same effect. By then the Bulgarian side had become adamant that emigration was out of the question. Approximately 154,000 had already emigrated as it was. And in 1956 the friend of the Turkish population Pencho Kubadinski9 told Todor Zhivkov in a private conversation, ‘Comrade Zhivkov, what you are doing about Bulgaria’s democratisation is very good! But what about the Turkish question, which is fateful for Bulgaria?’ And they immediately started looking for contacts with Turkey to arrange emigration. ere are perhaps a hundred pages of reports with economic analyses of the potential losses to the Bulgarian economy and how they could be compensated for if Turks were allowed to emigrate. e question of the attitude of the Soviet Union emerged once again during the ‘Renaming Process’ and the struggle for Todor Zhivkov’s succession, a question that you have raised. First let me tell you a quote from the memoirs of General Kasabov, who was deputy chief of police in Shumen, and later became chief of police in Razgrad: ‘I felt that there was some hesitancy, some reservations in the Soviet position, and one day I dropped in at the next-door office of the interior minister and told the Soviet advisor: “In Turgovishte, our people went to change Hassan’s name to Asen. Hassan said he had nothing against being renamed but he wanted his new name to be Sergey. Why, they asked him. Because I don’t want to be renamed a second time.”’ And the Soviet general said, ‘So that’s what he said, is it?’ e documents show that the Soviet Union and Soviet diplomacy supported us for sometime. At the same time, however, off the record they would admit to being ‘very worried about the problems in the humanitarian sphere in Bulgaria.’ And Gorbachev finally said, ‘I’ve told them to tell Todor Zhivkov that, at the end of the day, the attitude to the Turkish population in Bulgaria is unjust.’ is is also what President Zhelyu Zhelev said about his conversations with Gorbachev. In my opinion, the right way to put it is as follows: ‘ere was some Soviet pressure, but it intertwined with the internal desire to homogenise the nation.’ Next, I don’t see why you are underestimating the role of the ideological factor, which I was trying to point out. All of us were almost completely convinced that the future of humanity lies in a communist nation. It was being said that the sooner this happened the better. And the last thing you were saying, which you didn’t say openly and which I won’t say openly either, you associated with the threat of Dimitar Stoyanov, whom I’ve know well since youth. is brings us to the other factor that is too sensitive to be discussed: the role of the special services in preparing and conducting the ‘Renaming Process.’ By simply using carefully selected information, slanted information, they prepared the preconditions for the ‘Renaming Process.’ eir role was big and that is why the papers wrote: Politburo starts it, State Security completesit. ank you. Member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (1966-1989) and Chairman of the Fatherland Front (1974-1989). Died in 1995. (Editor’s note) 9
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Slavka Draganova: I would like to add that the emigration of Turks in 1878 was during a war – it was a consequence of war. But the ‘Renaming Process’ was such a shameful affair. It was really something terrible and it was a huge shame for the Bulgarian nation. Ibrahim Yalamov: I wouldn’t agree with your thesis about collective shame for the Bulgarian nation. In my book I have tried to point out a series of instances of worthy conduct of Bulgarians, of entire creative unions – more particularly, I have in mind the Union of Artists in Bulgaria – which took the right position on the ‘Renaming Process.’ Or we shouldn’t forget that on the everyday level, ordinary people generally behaved well too. Although there were some tensions, there were also sparks of light in that darkness. Here we shouldn’t forget the mass disinformation campaign that was launched and that washed brains, and I sincerely point out that it is a success for us that we aren’t ascribing the blame for the ‘Renaming Process’ to the entire Bulgarian nation. And I always try to point out that what we had was precisely a policy of the power-holders. Slavka Draganova: I didn’t express myself correctly. I wanted to say that the government made the whole nation feel ashamed before the rest of the world. egovernment disgraced us in the eyes of the whole world. In 1985 eight of us from Bulgaria were in Munich for a congress on the socio-economic development of Turkey and of the Ottoman Empire. You cannot imagine how they treated us, they were collecting signatures against us. We were subjected to such isolation and contempt! is is what I meant by saying that it was a shame for the Bulgarian nation. ank you. If there are no other comments, I am closing this session.
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ird Session:
Former Yugoslavia: Warq State-Building and Demographic fears
Moderators: Prof. Jorgen Nielsen Prof. Ivan Ilchev
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GETTING AWAY WITH ADMINISTRATIVE MURDER: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN SLOVENIA Marko Hajdinjak International Centre for Minority Intercultural Relations (IMIR), Studies Bulgariaand e events of the 1990s have brought a very bad reputation to the former Yugoslavia and its successor states (or, although quite undeservedly, to the whole Balkans). Interethnic and inter-religious hatred and wars, instability, organised crime, corruption, underdevelopment, poverty and the like have become terms that are inseparably associated with the region. Among them, one term has become almost synonymous with ‘the Balkans’1 – ethnic cleansing. Despite the fact that forced population transfers oen involving genocide on an even far greater scale than the one witnessed in Bosnia have happened all over the world throughout history, ethnic cleansing has come to be regarded as a ‘trademark’ of the nations populating the territory of the formerNone Yugoslavia. of the above, however, was in any way associated with Slovenia until very recently – except perhaps by Slobodan Milosevic who, sitting in the dock in the Hague, has been trying persistently to convince the judges and the world that it was ‘Slovenes who started it all.’ Although he is anything but a person whosestatements may be taken for granted, in this case Milosevic is not that far from the truth. Several months before the first gun was fired in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Slovenian authorities had already concluded their own campaign of ethnic cleansing conducted in full secrecy, quietly, without guns and fire. If one is cynical enough, one would be tempted to say that ethnic cleansing in Slovenia was performed in a civilised, ‘European’ manner. e setting for this crime was prepared in May 1991, a month before the secessionof Slovenia and Croatia. When it occurred, it affectedsome 30,000 people, legal residents of Slovenia whose only ‘crime’ was improper ethnic origin. Compared the more thanparts threeofmillion people who couldthis benumber considered as victims of ethnicwith cleansing in other the former Yugoslavia, seems For most of the previous decade, the war-ridden former Yugoslavia was superficially referred to as ‘the Balkans’ even by people claiming to beexperts. An attempt to correct thisinaccuracy, which completely ignored the fact that a large part of the peninsula failed to engage in the ‘Balkanisation’ of the 1990s, was the introduction of the clumsyterm ‘Western Balkans,’ a formula which read: the former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania. 1
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to pale in significance. In Slovenia’s case, however, this number comprises 1.5% of the population, which makes ‘the erased,’ as the victims of ethnic cleansing in Slovenia became known later, one of the largest minoritiesin the country. is paper intends to describe the process that in recent years has finally started to receive international attention and that has become known as ‘administrative ethnic cleansing.’ It will look briefly into recent history to search for the reasons for the development of a rather specific Slovenian type of xenophobia aimed, above all, at the people originating from the other parts of the former Yugoslavia. e political agenda aimed at Slovenian independence and adopted both by the Slovene Communist Party and the emerging opposition was largely built on extreme negative propaganda against federal institutions, other republicsand other nations of the former Yugoslavia. Consequently, the people from other parts of Yugoslavia who lived in Slovenia came to be generally regarded as unwanted and unneeded economic immigrants who were not entitled to the rights reserved for the ethnic Slovenes. e Parliament of Slovenia proclaimed independence of the republic on 25 June 1991. is was the culmination of events that had started roughly in 1986, when Milan Kucan became the leader of the Slovenian communists. Numerous parallels may be drawn between the rise of nationalism in Serbia in Slovenia. First was the ascent of Kucan and Milosevic, relatively young but exceptionally ambitious communist apparatchiks, to the very top of the party ranks in 1986. Both Kucan and Milosevic initially strongly upheld the official ‘brotherhood and unity’ policy but soon realised the potential and the power of nationalism, which promised to be the card that could bring them the richest political dividends, at least in the short term. e next parallel is the role of some of the most prominent Serbian and Slovenian intellectuals in igniting the nationalist fire. e 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, a blueprint of the Serbian national programme later adopted by Milosevic, has received much attention in scholarlyworks on the Yugoslav conflict.2 Much less attention has been paid to its Slovenian ‘version.’ In February 1987 the journal Nova revija published an article called ‘e Contributions to the Slovene National Programme.’Nova revija was a gathering place for most of the prominent figures from the opposition who later formed the first post-communist government in Slovenia. ‘e Contributions’ argued that Slovenes should return to their Catholic traditions and should unite their national ranks behind one crucial goal: leaving Yugoslavia. e article caused a major uproar all over Yugoslavia, but the Slovene communists under Kucan dismissed it as ‘insignificant’ and took no action against the authors.3 For a very good and extensive analysis of the Memorandum and its consequences, see Milosavljevic, Olivera. 2000. ‘e Abuse of the Authority of Science,’ in Popov, Nebojsa (ed.). e Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis , Budapest: Central European University Press. 3 Silber, Laura and Allan Little. 1997.Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation , New York: Penguin Books, pp. 49–53. 2
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e democratisation of Slovenia was in itself of course a positive development. e problem is that just as in other republics (although the consequences were not equally appalling), this democratisation was transformed into ethnically-defined authoritarianism. Soon aer the publication of ‘e Contributions’ the Slovenian communist authorities started to cooperate with the emerging opposition on the ‘protection of the Slovenian national interests’ as defined by ‘e Contributions.’ As Niko Grafenauer, one of their authors, stated, these interests (including democracy, human rights, and independence) could not be realised within ‘a nationally, religiously, culturally, economically and politically diverse state’ such as the former Yugoslavia.4 Just as in Serbia, the fact that the Slovenian Communist Party hijacked the nationalist agenda caused a long-lasting contamination of political discourse. Slovenian communists shared the view of theemerging opposition that Slovenes as a nation were under a double threat – from the outside (the federal government and Yugoslav army) and from the inside (the presence of around 180,000 ‘immigrants’ from other parts of Yugoslavia). e perception of being under threat is crucial in any attempt to rationalise the exceptionally negative attitude of Slovenes towards the other ‘Yugoslavs.’ Slovenes are a very small nation, which has always been dominated by stronger neighbours and its survival, together with its language, and culture, have always been under threat. It was not until 1945 that a majority of Slovenes5 was finally united in an administrative unit and granted afairly wide degree of self-government. Milosevic’s nationalist revolution aiming at re-centralisation of the federation was rightfully perceived by Slovenes as a threat, and the Slovenian communists responded with the famous walkout from the Fourteenth Extraordinary Congress of the Yugoslav Communist League, which was practically the first step towards secession. With the first elections only a few months away, the majority of opposition parties played even more nationalistic cards in order to be able to successfully compete with the reforming Communists at a time when ‘the fate of the nation was at stake.’ is created a social and political atmosphere in which it was perceived as permissible for the majority to deny various minorities their rights. is perception was intensified aer the so-called ‘ten-day war’ following the proclamation of Slovene independence. e myth of the ‘heroic victory’ over the Federal Army transformed the eternal underdogs into lords. e quick international recognition of Slovenia and the praise the republic received as the most economically developed ex-communist country intensified the ‘drunkenness of the victors.’ e hangover caused by this drunkenness is still troubling Slovenia today – today perhaps more than ever. As already mentioned, the independence of Slovenia was proclaimedon 25 June 1991. e precondition for the creation of a new state was redefinition of the citizenship concept, which became, as in other former Yugoslav republics, based on ethnicGrafenauer, Niko. 1991. ‘Foreword,’ in Grafenauer, Niko (ed.). e Case of Slovenia, Ljubljana: Nova Revija, p. 5. 5 A sizeable Slovene population remained in Austria and Italy. 4
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ity. In addition to the pejorative term ‘Southerners’ for other Yugoslav nations, a new term was coined: ‘Non-Slovenes,’ referring exclusively to those ‘Southerners’ who were living in Slovenia. In this redefinition of citizenship and the division on Slovenes and Non-Slovenes the central role was played by the imaginary line that supposedly clearly separated the ‘Western,’ ‘Central European’ and ‘Catholic’ Slovenes from the ‘Eastern,’ ‘Balkan,’ ‘Ottoman’ and ‘Byzantine’ others. e fact that historically and geographically, if we for a moment accept this logic of separation, Croats should be placed on the Slovenian side of the line, was deliberately neglected. A number of stereotypes and prejudices were recruited to justify the placement of Croats on the ‘other’ side. Needless to mention, Croats themselves used exactly the same language, criteria and division lines as Slovenes to separate themselves from the other former Yugoslavs. In the words of one typical Slovene ‘intellectual,’ ‘Central European and Catholic Slovenia could not find a common language with the Orthodox and East European Serbia and Montenegro’ whose people were always ready to ‘draw the knife’ and in which ‘Byzantine servility 6 and Levantine cunning [were] carefully cultivated for a millennium.’ e Slovenian Parliament issued a statement, which claimed that human rights, national rights, and rights of republics and provinces in Yugoslavia were ‘grossly violated,’ thus leaving the Slovenian authorities no other option but to secede.7 Slovenian foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel added that Slovenes were ‘fed up with suffering all of Yugoslavia’s woes’ and that democracy in Yugoslavia’s northwest was incompatible with communism in the country’s southeast.8 On another occasion, Rupel added that Slovenes ‘simply [did] not want to enter Europe via Belgrade’ and had ‘no intention to wait for the rest of 9 Yugoslavia to catch up’ with them. In May 1991, a month before the proclamation of independence, the Parliament adopted a new Law on Foreigners. Metka Mencin of the Liberal Democratic Party (successor to the Union of Socialist Youth) proposed an amendment, which stipulated that ‘the citizens of the SFRY, who are citizens of other republics and do not apply for the acquisition of citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia, and have registered permanent residence or are employed in the Republic of Slovenia on the day of entry into force of this law, shall be issued a permit for permanent residence in the Republic of Slovenia.’10 6 7
Jezernik, Mišo. 1991. ‘e Awkward Coexistence,’ in e Case of Slovenia, pp. 57–58. ‘Republic of Slovenia Assembly Basic Constitutional Charter,’ in Trifunovska, Snezana.
1994. Yugoslavia rough Documents: From its Creation to its Dissolution, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 290–291. 8 Rupel, Dimitrij. 1991. ‘Slovenia – A New Member of the International Community,’ in e Case of Slovenia, pp. 88–90. 9 Cohen, Lenard J. 1993. Broken Bonds: e Disintegration of Yugoslavia , Boulder: Westview Press, p. 120. 10 Unofficial translation. See Mekina, Borut. 2002. ‘Izbrisani: Birokratska samovolja ali politična odločitev?’ (e Erased: Bureaucratic Arbitrariness or Political Decision?), Večer, 26 November 2002, http://www.dostje.org/Izbrisani/vecer1.htm.
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e Parliament rejected this amendment. Mencin believes that there were no legal arguments for the rejection of her amendment. e reasons were strictly political. A significant fear of foreigners was present within the then-ruling Demos coalition, which motivated its parliamentary majority to reject the amendment that would have pre11 vented the most shameful violation of human rights in independent Slovenia. When independence was proclaimed on 25 June 1991, the new Law on Citizenship and the new Law on Foreigners entered into force.12 Article 40 (1) of the Law on Citizenship gave the citizens of other republics, who had permanent residence in the Republic of Slovenia on 23 December 1990 (the day of the Referendum) a possibility to apply for Slovene citizenship within a term of six months. Approximately 100,000 people used this opportunity and acquired citizenship. A large number however did not, either unaware that they were supposed to apply for citizenship, or willingly choosing not to do so because they were content with having permanent residency status. e deadline expired on 26 December 1991. Article 81 (2) of the Law on Foreigners stated that those citizens of other republics living in Slovenia who had not applied for Slovenian citizenship within the deadline or whose application had been rejected, would become subject to the Law on Foreigners two months aer the expiration of the deadline. Exactly two months later, on 26 February 1992, the Ministry of Interior erased an estimated 30,000 legal residents of Slovenia, who had not applied for Slovenian citizenship, from the Register of permanent residents of Slovenia. e victims of this unlawful and shameful act later became known as ‘the erased’izbrisani ( ). e erased, many of whom had legally resided in Slovenia for decades, became illegally residing foreigners overnight. e erasure was conducted in full secrecy and in violation of the existing legislation. e erased were not even notified that their residency status had been annulled, so they were deprived of their right to legally object to the government’s action. Loss of permanent residence status meant that the erased lost their right to employment, social and health protection, housing, and free movement, as well as that their children lost the right to education in state schools. e erasure divided numerous families and destroyed many lives. ere are at least seven document13 ed cases of victims of the erasure committing suicide out of desperation. e erasure has been termed by critics ‘so’ or ‘administrative ethnic cleansing.’ is term is more than appropriate since this policy indeed targeted specific ethnic groups with the obvious intention of removing as many of their members as possible from the territory of Slovenia. e erased were not hunted down one by one by the police and expelled from their homes at gunpoint. As the former interior minister of Slovenia, Ivo Bizjak (who later, in a rather perverse turn of events, became the Ibid. Official Gazette of RS, No. 1/91. 13 Dedić, Jasminka. 2003. ‘e Erasure: Eleven Years Aer,’ Public lecture organised by the Association of the Erased Residents of the Republic of Slovenia and the Faculty for Social Work, 27 February 2003, http://www.mirovni-institut.si/eng_html/publications/Erasure.doc 11 12
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first Slovenian ombudsman!) said, the Slovenian state faced the erased ‘in an unobtrusive manner with the possibility to decide whether they preferred to leave the country and their families, or not.’14 More than one third of the erased (around 12,000 people) eventually le Slovenia, either expelled by the authorities or because of the intolerable conditions in which they were put. Many were intentionally tricked by public officials. When victims of the erasure, absolutely unaware of their condition, wanted to extend their driving license or identity card, or if they sought medical assistance, public officials asked for their documents and instantly invalidated them. e person would then be told that they had to go to their ‘native’ republic to acquire certaindocuments. In almost all such cases, persons following those instructions were not allowed to re-enter Slovenia once they had crossed the border.15 e erasure was performed by the Demos government, dominated by centreright parties. Although it, too, was a coalition of four parties, the government that came to power aer the 1992 parliamentary elections was dominated by two centre-le parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (successor of the Union of Socialist Youth) and the United List of Social Democrats (formed aer the merger of the former Communist Party with three other leist parties). e new Prime Minister was the Liberal Democrat Janez Drnovsek. Drnovsek was aware of the problem of the erased at least since 1994, when he was informed about the situation by Dr. Ljubo Bavcon, head of the Council for Protection of Human Rights.Drnovsek promised Dr. Bavcon that thegovernment would look into the matter and correct any injustices, but none of the governments headed by Drnovsek, who remained prime minister aer the 1996 and 2000 elections too, did anything to resolve the issue of the erased.16 During this period the post of interior minister, the official who was the most directly responsible for taking concrete steps to restore the lawful rights to the erased, was held in succession by a Christian Democrat, a Liberal Democrat and a Social Democrat. None of them paid any attention to the problem. On 4 February 1999, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia ruled that the erasure was unconstitutional and constituted a violation of human rights. In response, the Parliament adopted on 8 July 1999 a Law on Settlement of the Status of Citizens of Other Succession Countries of Former Yugoslavia. e Law gave those nationals of other republics living permanently in Slovenia on 23 December 1990,and who continued to live in Slovenia until the present time, a three-month deadline to apply for a permanent residence permit. Around 14,000 persons filed applications, of which around 14 Mekina, Igor. 2003. ‘Janezfašizem’ (Janez-Fascism),Mladina, 3 June 2003, http://www. mladina.si/tednik/200322/clanek/izbris/ 15 Fussel, Jim. ‘e Izbrisani (Erased Residents) Issue in Slovenia,’ News Monitor for Slovenia, 1998 – 2004, http://www.preventgenocide.org/europe/slovenia 16 Mekina, Igor. 2003. ‘Pihal je ksenofobni veter – Pogovor z Dr. Ljubom Bavconom’ (A Mladina, 3 June 2003. Xenophobic Wind Was Blowing – Interview with Dr. Ljubo Bavcon.), http://www.mladina.si/tednik/200322/clanek/izbris/
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1,000 were denied residence permits, many of them with ht e explanation that they had interrupted their stay in Slovenia. is ‘interruption’ was in most cases the result of deportation on the basis of the illegal erasure. According to official data, around 7,000 people acquired citizenship and around 4,800 obtained permanent residence under the provisions of the Law. However, critics objected to the three-month deadline, which was oen insufficient to obtain the necessary documents from the slow Slovenian bureaucratic apparatus. e Law also failed to address those of the erased who were forced to leave Slovenia.17 On 3 April 2003, the Constitutional Court made another landmark ruling. It declared that the Law on Settlement of the Status of Citizens of Other Succession Countries of Former Yugoslavia was unconstitutional because it did not recognise the permanent residence status of the erased persons from the day of erasure, 26 February 1992, and because it did not resolve the issue of persons who had been deported or otherwise forced to leave Slovenia because of the erasure. e Court ordered the govern18 ment to restore the illegally revoked rights to the erased within six months. e Court’s decision caused an instant reaction from the Slovenian right-wing opposition, which continued to claim that the erasure never happened and that the socalled ‘erased’ had willingly and deliberately opted to become foreigners and refused to apply for Slovenian citizenship or residence offered to them. e erased were accused of being speculators whose only motivation were the allegedly astronomic compensations they wanted to extract from the Slovenian state. e Ministry of Interior, headed by a Social Democrat, Rado Bohinc, started dragging its feet over the fulfilment of the clear directive of the Constitutional Court. On its website, the Ministry acknowledged thatthe erasure was illegal and unconstitutional for a number of reasons.19 In spite of that, the Ministry initially refused to start issuing decrees on restoration of permanent residency on the basis of the Court ruling. Instead, it started to prepare a so-called Technical Law, which would retroactively recognise the status of those erased who had in the meantime managed to acquire either a residence permit or citizenship. Opposition parties categorically opposed thislaw and demanded a referendum to block it. e Ministry started preparing one more law, called the System Law, which was supposed to deal with those people who had not managed to resolve their situation. From a legal point of view, both laws were absolutely unnecessary, and the government was just postponing an unpopular action with them.
17 Reindl, Donald F. 2003. ‘Restoring the Erased in Slovenia,’Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 3 November 2003. 18 Dedić, ‘ e Erasure: Eleven Years Aer.’ Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-246/02 (3 April 2003),Official Gazette of Republic of Slovenia, No. 36/2003. 19 ‘Reševanje problematike izbrisanih’ (Solving the Problem of the Erased),Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve, http://www.mnz.si/si/1202.php
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Public opinion polls showed that the majority of Slovenian citizens shared the view of the opposition regarding the erased, which pushed the two ruling parties, the Liberal and the Social Democrats, on the defensive. Both parties repeatedly expressed their full support for the restoration of all rights to theerased and for the respect of the Constitutional Court ruling. However, few concrete measures were taken.Furthermore, interior minister Bohinc resorted to the populist and legally impermissible language used by the opposition, explaining on the evening news on the National TV channel that the Technical Law, which his ministry was preparing, would take into account whether the erased had been for or against the independence of Slovenia. Bohinc expressed similar views in an interview for one of the leading dailies in the country. He said that the demand of those people who believed that permanent residence could not be given to people who had acted against the interests of Slovenian state and its citizens, was justified, and that legal means should be found to exclude such people from those who would have their rights restored.20 On its website, the Ministry of Interior tried to pacify its opponents with cynical remarks that the erased would not be able to claim any compensations from the Slovenian state due to the fact that their cases were older than five years and as such were no longer eligible. e ministry also stated that the persons who had le Slovenia for more than one year would not receive residence status, except in cases when they had been sent abroad by a legal person from Slovenia for work, education or health treatment. To make matters even worse, the erased themselves were obliged to prove that they had been living in Slovenia without interruption, a task which was rather difficult to accomplish if you had no identity card, no passport, no driving license, no 21 health insurance and had been legally non-existent for twelve years. is is another case of unbelievable cynicism, since for the erased the most common reason for leaving Slovenia was the erasure itself. On 29 October 2003, almost two weeksaer the deadline set by the Constitutional Court for restoring the rights toall of the erased, the Parliament finally passed the socalled Technical Law, which dealt only with those of the erased who had already managed to resolve their situation. e opposition parties in response initiated a procedure for a referendum on the Technical Law. Arguing that such a referendum would be unconstitutional, the parliamentary majority decided to ask the Constitutional Court to assess whether the referendum question, as defined by the opposition, was in accordance with the Constitution. e Constitutional Court ruled that it could not give any opinion on the matter. e reason was that the seven-day deadline by which the Parliament may approach the Court on questions regarding referendums had been
Krivic, Matevž. ‘Mediji o izbrisanih’ (Media about the Erased),Mediawatch Mirovni Inštitut, http://www.mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/bilten/seznam/17/analiza 21 ‘Reševanje problematike izbrisanih’ (Solving the Problem of the Erased),Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve. 20
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missed. e only explanation one can give for this inexcusable bureaucratic blunder is that the official mail from Parliament to the Constitutional Court must have been deliberately delayed by Borut Pahor, the president of the Parliament and the president of the United List of Social Democrats. e reason for Pahor’s action can again be found in the reluctance of the ruling parties to resolutely support an unpopular issue in an election year. In January 2004, Anton Rop, who succeeded Janez Drnovsek as prime minister and as head of the Liberal Democratic Party aer the latter was elected President, declared that the outcome of the referendum would not be legally bindi ng as human rights issues could not be subject to a referendum. e referendum was held on 4 April 2004. e question asked of voters was the following: ‘Do you agree that the Law on implementation of Paragraph 8 of Constitutional Court Ruling No. U-I-246/02-28 should be enforced?’ e voter turnout in the referendum was 31.5%. Of those who cast a ballot, 94.68% voted against the Law.22 In other words, they voted that the illegally revoked rights of the erased should not be restored. e year 2004 was an election year in Slovenia and the erased became one of the hottest pre-election topics. Public opinion polls showed that the majority of Slovenian voters viewed the erased as unwanted foreigners who opposed Slovenian independence and who had come to Slovenia when they realised that life here was much better than in their native republics.23 Internet forums can give an interesting picture ofpublic opinion in a country. Analysing the opinions posted on a site dealing with the issue of the erased, one can come to the following conclusion: e majority of Slovenes believe that the erasure was rightful and justified. It is possible that several injustices might have occurred, and that some illiterate and uneducated ‘Southerners’ might have really not understood that they were supposedto apply for the citizenship, which was offered to them, and they may have their status restored aer proving that they deserve it. As for the rest, they are either former aggressors or opportunists, and instead of helping them, the Slovenian state should take care of ‘our own people’ (= ethnic Slovenes) who are unemployed or live in poverty. A widespread opinion was that the Slovenian state was granting ‘foreigners’ too many rights and that the Slovenian nation was becoming a minority ‘on its own soil.’24
22
2004 – Tehnični zakon’ (Referendum 2004 – Technical Law). 2004. Republiška‘Referendum volilna komisija , http://www.rvk.si/tz/index3.html 23 A typical example is an internet poll conducted on the most popular Slovene search engine, Najdi.si. A total of 16,648 people cast their votes, which is an exceptionally high number for a poll of this kind in Slovenia. Of those voting, 57% said that the erased were ‘supporters of the Yugoslav Army and antagonists of our independence,’23% viewed them as ‘speculators who did not believe in the success of Slovenian secession,’and only 8% believed that they were ‘people who were the victims of injustice.’ http://www.najdi.si/ankete/arhiv_anket.jsp?pollId=432 24 http://users.volja.net/ref04/
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For right-wing and nationalist parties, this was naturally an opportunity that was not to be missed. Janez Jansa, then the leader of the largest opposition party, the Slovene Democratic Party, and since the victory in the October 2004 elections the new Prime Minister, said in a TV debate that the erased were the people who tried to ‘destroy our country.’ Zmago Jelincic of the ultra-right Slovene National Party said in the same debate that rewarding those who were firing at us would be a mockery of all ‘honest Slovenian citizens.’25 On another occasion Jansa added that the erased were in fact xenophobic, for ‘they were intolerant towards independence and towards everything that is Slovene.’26 Both Jansa and Jelincic were rewarded for their staunch support of the ‘Slovene cause’ in the elections. Jansa’s Slovene Democrats scored their best result ever and defeated the Liberal Democrats who, together with various coalition partners, had ruled the country for twelve years. Jelincic’s National Party, which in the previous parliament had four MPs, won six seats. Jansa thus became the new Prime Minister and formed a government together with his pre-election conservative coalition partners, New Slovenia and the Slovene People’s Party. As they held exactly 50% of the parliamentary seats, they needed the support of another party, but instead of inviting the National Party, which is too extreme even by the standards of the new government, the small Democratic Party of Pensioners joined the coalition. Jelincic, however, offered his support to the new government, and in return his party was given the post of vice chairman of the Parliament. Soon aer the elections, the new prime minister Jansa declared that the issue of the erased would be resolved by the Constitutional Law that his government would prepare sometime in the future. e Constitutional Law is the only legal means that Jansa can use to bypass the Constitutional Court ruling.27 However, for such a law to be approved, a two-third majority is required, which means that it can only be passed if it is supported either by the Liberal or by the Social Democrats. As this is less than likely, it is obvious that Jansa’s intention is to prolong the status quo for as long as possible and thus to leave the issue unresolved. e erased have been thus once again brushed under the carpet. Kovačič, Gorazd. I‘ zbrisani prikazani kotproblem, ne kot oškodovanci’ (e Erased Presented as a Problem, Not asVictims),Mediawatch Mirovni Inštitut , http://www.mediawatch. 25
mirovni-institut.si/bilten/seznam/19/analiza 26 ‘Janez Janša o današnjem zborovanju Društva izbrisanih prebivalcev Slovenije in društva Dostje v parku Zvezda’ (Janez Jansa on Today’s Meeting of the Society of the Erased Residents of Slovenia and Society Enough in Zvezda Park). 2004.Slovene Democratic Party Web Site, 26 February 2004, http://www.sds.si/displayarticles_novice_baza.php?mode=view_ entry&entry=040226_173911.txt 27 ‘Janša in Hanžek o Romih in izbrisanih’ (Jansa and Hanzek on Roma and the Erased), 24 ur, 26 January 2005, http://24ur.com/bin/article.php?article_id=2051742&show_ media=6030628
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Hopefully, the issue has received enough international attention in the last few years. e shameful referendum was ironically the best favour the Slovenian right could have done to the erased. e international community, and most importantly, European institutions cannot claim anymore that ‘they did not know’that the ‘champion among the post-communist states’ was hiding skeletons in its closet. eSlovenian authorities have committed a crime. It cannot be compared in scale to the crimes committed in other republics and provinces of the former Yugoslavia, but a crime it was. ose who have committed it must be held accountable, and the victims of this crime must have their rights restored. e erased are not a shame for Slovenia alone anymore. Since May 2004, the erased are a shame for the European Union.
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THE CASE OF CROATIA Toni Petkovic Central European University, Hungary Novi Sad Humanitarian Centre, Serbia and Montenegro In this presentation I will attempt to recapitulate the main events during the 1991-1995 war in Croatia, as well as to provide some input about their reception among the Serbian public and on the Serbian political scene. Since it is oen hard for analysts from different sides to agree about an objective description of events, I will use for this presentation some excerpts from the paper Dr. Mile Bjelajac of the Institute for Recent History of Serbia and Prof. Dr. Ozren Zunec of the Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb University, wrote jointly for the Scholars Initiative Project. Iwill try to highlight some of the still unresolved controversies over the causes and nature of the war, as well as other main points of dispute and disagreement between Croatian and Serbian scholars. I will also present the context of Serbian political and public debates at the time by using the daily newspaper Borba from the period, in order to shed some light on the various influences and apparent motives driving the politicians in Serbia to engage in what turned out to be a perilous war for Croatian Serbs.1
e War in 1991 1. Causes of the War e Croat interpretation of the causes of the war includes an elaborated plan for establishing a Greater Serbia. According to this belief, this plan srcinates in various nineteenth- (Garasanin) and twentieth-century political theories and programmes and was lately accepted by Serbian intellectuals (theMemorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts is underlined as the prime example of this) and Milosevic. e main cause of the war is therefore Serbia’s territorial expansion. e Serbian interpretation holds that the main cause of the war was the treatment of Serbs by the new Croatian government that came to power aer the first multiparty elections in 1990. Serbs claimed that thesituation was similar to the situation in 1 According to John Lampe, the number of Serbs in Croatia was reduced from 580,000 or 12% of the total population in 1991 to an estimated 280,000 or 6% in 1997. See Lampe, John R. 2000. Yugoslavia as History: Twice ere Was a Country, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 368.
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1941–1945 when Serbs were the victims of persecution tantamount to genocide; their fears amplified when the HDZ government changed the status of Serbs in the 1990 Croatian Constitution from ‘people’ (narod) to national minority, introduced national symbols similar to those from the 1941–1945 period, and laid off many Serbs from state services. eir point is that they were trying to defend their existence and territory, and that they had conducted a purely defensive war. e plan for establishment of a Greater Serbia, if it had been engineered prior to the war – and had thus been its primary cause – certainly did not function later during war. e evidence forSrpska that is Krajina, that manyRepublika declarations and plans unification of the ‘Serb lands’ (Republika Srpska, Serbiafor proper, and Montenegro) were never realised; furthermore, other ‘Serb lands’ did not come to the rescue of Republika Srpska Krajina during the final Croat operations in the war. Some foreign scholars proposed the theory that the real cause of the war was in the disintegration of governmental authority and the breakdown of a politic al and civil order, and argued, like Susan Woodward, that ‘the conflict is not a result of historical animosities and it is not a return to the pre-communist past; it is a result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy’; the situation was aggravated by declining social standards and an unfavourable international situation in which the former Yugoslavia was of no importance.
2. Nature of the War Croatia has insisted and insists that the armed conflict in Croatia falls into the category of international war, with Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) as the aggressors. Croatian Serbs and Serbia claimed that the conflict was a classic instance of non-international or civil (internal) war. e main evidence for the former is the report of the so-called Badinter Commission, and for the latter the phenomenology of the war and the fact that the insurgent Serbs were citizens of Croatia who rebelled against the central government. It is obvious that both claims are designed to serve for attaining a more favourable status of the ‘victim’ for the respective claimants (Croatia as the victim of external aggression, Croatian Serbs as the victims of the Croatian government), which could in turn ameliorate their overall status and attract sympathy. e solution to this point might be to distinguish between the situation in 1991 when the JNA actually conduct-
ed military to their ownoperations devices. in Croatia, and in 1992–1995 when the Croatian Serbs were le
3. e Recognition of Croatia as an Expedient of the War e recognition of Croatia in December 1991 – January 1992 by the international community, and especially by the European Community, is frequently pointed out, especially by Serbs and some international scholars and politicians, as a powerful expedient of the war and its spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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4. e Performance of the JNA e performance of the JNA in the opening stages of the war is usually rated as very poor. is is evident in the colossal fiasco in Slovenia (June 1991); in the JNA’s inability to conduct successful mobilisation in, among other places, Serbia proper, which had critical operational consequences due to the lack of personnel; in conducting unfocused operations that were either unsuccessful although opposed by much weaker forces or stopped before attaining objectives that were already at hand; and, in conducting operations to ful allfiland logic (e.g. Vukovar); above all, in the JN A’s contrary inability to its every role ofmilitary protecting the population against violence and of assisting a peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis in 1990–1991. e reorganisation of the JNA aer 1985 and the formation of a new organisational format with three theatres of war instead of five or six Army Districts that were more or less identical with the republican boundaries, is frequently considered as a timely preparation of the JNA for internal armed conflict and amputation of Slovenia and parts of Croatia where Serbs are not a majority (and thus a part of the plans for establishment of a Greater Serbia). It is evident that in 1991 the JNA tried to delineate new boundaries by use of force, and thus the reorganisation of the late 1980s could be part of the plan of territorial expansion of Serbia; on the other hand, the strong Yugoslav sentiment of the JNA prior to the debacle in Slovenia suggests the opposite conclusion.
5. Individual Episodes ere are many individual events and episodes in the war in Croatia in 1990– 1991 that are either undocumented or have no logical explanation of their course. Among these the most important are: a) e Borovo Selo incident (2 May 1991). According to official Croatian reports, the Croatian police convoy that entered Borovo Selo in a law enforcement operation was shot at and twelve police officers were killed. According to the Serb account, Croatianpolice attacked in order toinstigate fightingand eventually provoke an all-out war; according to these sources more than one hundred Croatian police officers were killed. b) e Vukovar (August–November 1991). eand JNAaer andthree paramilitary unitsBattle from of Serbia attacked this eastern Croatian town, months of siege and total devastation they entered the town, giving way to the most horrible atrocities of the entire war. Why was Vukovar put under prolonged siege when military logic would dictate that the town should have been le isolated and attacks should have continued on towns and other targets further west? In this siege the JNA used armour and infantry contrary to all principles of the art of war, suffering thousands of casualties and losing more than
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four hundred pieces of armour. e Serbs offer a somewhat different view on the causes and course of events. e JNA added its view, too. In his memoirs Veljko Kadijević (former Yugoslav Minister of Defence) boasts that the battle of Vukovar was a victory over the main force of the Croatian Army, although the town was being defended by fewer than two thousandCroats. (e question of numbers is a delicate one.) c) e attack on Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik was surrounded and attacked by the JNA in October 1991 apparently with no military justification; in addition to that there was no Serb population to defend. e consequence of this attack was a public relations catastrophe and complete loss of any credibilitythat the JNA might still have had. d) Halted operations. Some Serb sources, mainly from or close to the military, claim that the JNA had been able to take Zadar in 1991 but had halted operations upon reaching the entrances of the town. e same is said about the attack on Šibenik in September 1991. Croats claim that Šibenik had been defended vigorously, but are silent about Zadar. e chronology of events suggests that the response of the Krajina Serbs escalated as regards demands concerning their status in Croatia. ey sought cultural autonomy at first, then proceeded to claim territorial autonomy within Croatia and so on, up to secession.
e Reactions on the Serbian Political Scene to the Events in Croatia in 1991 Milosevic On 10 May 1991 Milosevic declared that what was happening in Croatia represented acts of ‘state terror’ against the Serbs in Croatia aimed at violent and unconstitutional creation of an independent and sovereign Croatia and the destruction of Yugoslavia.2 According to Milosevic, the war that was starting had the character of a civil war provoked by separatist and nationalist forces in separatist republics. He said that he did not oppose this creation of new states according to the right to self-determination, but that he would insist that the Serbs in these republics had the same right to secession. On 8 August he stated that Serbs were not a minority in Croatia and in Yugoslavia in general, and that while Croats had the right to secede this right did not apply to Croatia’s administrative borders and that Croats must be prepared to accept different borders if they wished secession.
2
Borba, 10 May 1995, p. 3.
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e Opposition I could find only one strong public protest against the Croatian war made by the joint opposition, publicly stated at the beginning of the crisis on 8 May.3 Vuk Draskovic’s Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO) was the strongest among the parties supporting the protest, while the Democratic Party Demokratska ( stranka, DS) did not support it. Curiously enough, though, on 30 May it was precisely Draskovic’s SPO that made an appeal before the Serbian Parliament to annex ‘Serbian Krajina’ to Serbia, but Milosevic’s ruling Socialists refusedalso to put thefrom proposal on thewho agenda. e next significant initiative concerning Croatia came Draskovic, on 30 July proposed a plan to rearrange the borders and presented it in the talks with Stjepan Mesic, the then Yugoslav (and incumbent Croatian) President. It is obvious that the two strongest opposition parties (the SPO and the DS) did not take a clear stand for or against the war, but rather oen made conflicting and confusing statements. ey did not wish to portray themselves as ‘traitors,’ as Milosevic so oen accused them of being. Dragoljub Micunovic (DS) for instance said that ‘all the blame (for the war) lies with the secessionist politics of Croatia and Slovenia’4 and Vuk Draskovic said that ‘war is something to be ashamed of, but that it is mostly Croats that should be ashamed, for they started it.’5 Even the DS at the time attributed the causes of the war to ‘the character of the emerging Croatian state, which is planned as a nation state of the Croatian people that cannot legitimately hold on to the Serbian territories.’ e DS at the time 6
also the (but two peoples the solution the crisis.e mostproposed laudable ethnic appealsseparation against theofwar with no as proposals for a to resolution) came from some NGOs, such as the Centre for Anti-War Action and Women in Black, which organised several rallies in Belgrade, most notably aer the attack on Dubrovnik.
3 On 8 May 1991, aer the first fighting in Croatia had already taken place, most of the opposition parties in Serbia (except the DS) made an ‘Appeal to the Serbian and the Croatian Nation.’ “Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman have brought you to civil war,” stated the Appeal. “eir regimes can survive only by feeding on the blood that you are going to spill. Since they have destroyed the national economies, they have both turned to arms and ghosts from the
past. e flames of hatred that they are spreading are terrifying results of the politics of political and national intolerance. ey are blaming everything on the ‘others,’ and pushing us towards collective suicide and mutual destruction. Be wiser than the ones you have elected and declare peace,” stated this Appeal of the opposition of Serbia. “Our common interest is to live in peace and democracy, as free, tolerant and reasonable people,inside a free and united Europe,” it concluded. 4 Borba, 2 October 1991, p. 10. 5 Ibid. 6 Borba, 4 November 1994, p. 8.
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e War in 1995 e main controversy aer the end of the second round of war still remains: Was it liberation of occupied territories (the Croatian view) or occupation of Republika Srpska Krajina and final exodus of the almost entire Serbian population from Croatia (the Serb view)? ere is also a controversy about the character of the exodus. e Croat side (politically dominant circles and media at the time) claimed that Serbs had fled willingly in spite of the invitations made by President Tudjman to remain; further were Serbs had fled theythey ‘knew they had doneon to there us.’ On thespeculations other hand,that Serbs claimed thatbecause aer what hadwhat experienced in Gospic, Medak or Western Slavonia they could not wait for the same fate to befall them. In addition, they noted that from the very beginning of the hostilities in 1991 they had been regarded collectively as ‘chetniks’ and war criminals.
e Reactions on the Serbian Political Scene to the Events in Croatia in 1995 Milosevic Unlike 1991, in 1995 Milosevic was much slower to react to the downfall of Srpska Krajina in Croatia. He placed the blame entirely on the local Croatian Serb leadership militarydefeat andactheir refusal accept ‘politics peace.’ ‘Ifpeace the peace plansfor andtheinitiatives had been cepted a yeartoago, thathis would haveofbrought to the Serbian people and all tensions could have been resolved peacefully,’ Milosevic declared in August 1995.7
e Opposition e opposition parties, however, reacted to the Croat offensive much more rapidly and were almost unanimous in laying the blame on Milosevic and his politics. A statement signed by Vojislav Kostunica, Zoran Djindjic and several others on 5 May 1995 blamed Milosevic for abandoning the Serbs in Croatia to ethnic cleansing. e statement suggested re-establishing cooperation between Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, and Serbs from Serbia and strengthening the military instead of the police forces in Serbia. Aer the fall of Knin in August, some opposition parties issued statements blaming the Milosevic regime as well as the international community for failing to prevent it (Kostunica)8; others blamed the blockade of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs by the 9 Milosevic regime and the lack of cooperation among Serbs (Djindjic). Vuk Draskovic Borba, 10 August 1995, p. 2. Borba, 6 August 1995, pp. 7–8. 9 Borba, 7 August 1995, p. 4. 7 8
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noted that the main problem lay in the ‘politics of nationalistichysteria’ that was being promoted by the Milosevic and the Tudjman regimes,10 and called on the international community to force the end of the Croatian attack. Draskovic warned that ‘judgement day for Krajina came with the attack on Srebrenica and Zepa,’ and pointed out that Karadzic should have defended the Serbs in Croatia instead of attacking Muslim towns in Bosnia.11 Vojislav Seselj from the Radical Party (RS, Radikalna stranka) called Milosevic a traitor because of his failure to interfere, and asked for his removal from power.12 In August,13 aer the fall of Knin he demanded a military retaliation against Croatia by a Luna missile attack on Zagreb, as well as an offensive to take Osijek. One of the few party leaders who actually went to Western Slavonia aer the Croatian attack was Vesna Pesic, head of the Civic Alliance of Serbia G ( radjanski savez Srbije, GSS.14 She blamed the entire event on Milosevic, demanded that the international community stops the exodus and punishes Croatia, and directed most of their attention to the suffering of the refugees.15 Finally, it should be mentioned that the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church issued a statement that the ‘genocide that is happening, which is worse than the one committed by the fascists in the Second World War, is entirely the fault of the leadership of Serbia, which abandoned its people, proved its com16 plete incompetence and should step down from power’.
Borba, 16 August 1995, p. 1. Borba, 7 August 1995, p. 6. 12 Borba, 5 May 1995, p. 4. 13 Borba, 5–6 August 1995, p. 6. 14 Borba, 24 May 1995, p. 1. 15 Borba, 6 August 1995, p. 6, and 17 August 1995, p. 6. 16 Borba, 8 August 1995, p. 5. 10 11
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WOMEN AND WAR IN THE BALKANS : UNACC OMMODATED DIFFER ENCE AND SOME OF ITS SCAPEGOATS* InstituteDobrinka of BalkanParusheva Studies, Bulgaria We live in the borderland between two worlds, on the border between nations, within everyone’s reach, always someone’s scapegoat. Against us the waves of history break, as if against a cliff. Meša Selimović, Dervish and Death e 1990s Yugoslav wars entered our living rooms very oen through the millions of TV screens, which depicted the events in the region and the international efforts to resolve the problems. Some authors claim these wars were to some extent media-wars. Others use the termpostmodern war to describe how postmodernity has affected the interweaving of the waging and writing of war. However, it is not necessarily a substantive difference that distinguishes postmodern wars from previous conflicts but a representational one. e media have been focusing on the ‘age-old hatreds’ in the Balkans: people have always hated each other and whatever tolerance and coexistence there used to be, it was imposed by the communist regime.1 At the other extreme is the myth insisting on Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular, being the ideal example of a harmonious and tolerant multicultural society where people did not classify each other in terms ofSerb, Muslim, or Croat. Abstract formulas frequently mask the absence of adequate knowledge of complex situations. In fact, there were coexistence and conflict, tolerance and prejudice, suspicion and friendship at the same time. * is paper is partly based on the research I carried out during my stay at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna as an Andrew W. Mellon Visiting Fellow (January–March 1999). 1 e myth of ancient hatreds can be seen as one of the fig leaves created in response to the need to justify the passivity of the people who knew – and saw – what was happening. One of the most enthusiastic propagators of this thesis is Robert Kaplan. See Kaplan, Robert. 1994. Balkan Ghosts. A Journey rough History, New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc.
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Some Introductory Remarks e war scenes of today are rooted in the region’s turbulent past. e centurieslong Ottoman domination of the Eastern Balkans, the West European (particularly Venetian and Austrian) political and cultural presence in the Western Balkans, and the historical divisions between the East and West, the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Church, and the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets have all le their impact. I would highlight the difference between Eastern and Western Christian cultures in particular, and not simply thedealing difference the and Orthodox and the very Roman Catholic Church, cause we are withbetween ethnically linguistically similar peoples who behave developed distinct national identities through exposureto differentcivilisations.2 e war(s) began in the summer of 1991. It started in Slovenia, and then moved to Croatia. As of 1992 Bosnia became the battlefield of the heaviest bloodshed on European territory since World War II. is was a war that inflicted terrible casualties on civilians. en there were the problems in Kosovo and the NATO bombings in Serbia in the spring of 1999. Aer that military operations on the territory of Kosovo and Macedonia started once again, and so forth. ese regions are still in turbulence, facing various problems that are yet to be resolved. At first glance, it seems that these wars were an outburst of modernity. Modern history – in particular Balkan history, with its post-Ottoman or post-Habsburg and post-Tito conflict potential – was returning with a vengeance. e conflicts demonstrated that thestate cherished characteristics of the nineteenth-–and tury European – thatideal is, ethnic and religious homogeneity havetwentieth-cennot yet been achieved. Each of the three (main) groups engaged in the wars that marked the disintegration of Yugoslavia (except for the very brief war in Slovenia) has a differentreligion. is fact has led some observers to believe that we are dealing here with religious wars. However, while religion is undoubtedly a very important marker for Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, the persons most responsible for the outbreak of the wars may be described as totally lacking religious convictions rather than as having religious zeal. e socialist regimes claimed they were above national and religious problems, which were alleged to be a relict from the ‘bourgeois’ past. In reality the problems were far from solved. New ones also accumulated. is came as no surprise to those who were familiar with the history of the region.
2 is point is also made by Maria Todorova in her ‘Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans.’ She argues that the unbridgeable division between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs can be explained not only by irreconcilable religious differences but also by the different historical traditions within which the two communities have developed, Croats essentially outside the Ottoman sphere. See Todorova, Maria. 1996. ‘e Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,’ in Brown, L. Carl (ed.). Imperial Legacy. e Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 45–77 (67–68).
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Ottoman society constituted a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional and multi-cultural empire. Its population was classified into institutionalised religious communities (millet) and fractured into multiple professional corporations, territorial communities, privileged family clans and tribal groups, each one of which imposed on its members a particular identity. us, there was no common identity that could command or pretend to command a primary and invisible allegiance from all (as a national identity requires in our time). Nations and nationalisms in the Balkans were constructed in the nineteenth century. All these various antagonistic nationalisms have since been shaping boththemselves and others by excluding and exploiting difference. ere is an ‘end-of-empire’ matrix for this complicated transformation ofmillets into nationalities and nations. Religion was (and still is) one of the core elements cited when speaking of national identities in the Balkans. What we actually have is a long process of subordination and use of the religious by the national. e modern Balkan states strengthened their national identities by using religion and language. Political authorities used organised religious communities as channels for the promotion of cultural and political identity. At the dawn of the twentieth century, nationalism was a rising force through3 out the Balkans. In the 1910s the Balkans were thrown into a war marathon. is turbulent period saw profound changes in Balkan political geography. Between 1913 and 1926 major exchanges of population took place as ethnic groups were accommodated to the new national borders. e established in 1918 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes proved an uneasy union. Rivalry grew between Catholic Zagreb and Orthodox Belgrade, with nonSerbs in the Kingdom resentful of Serb power over the government and army. During World War II a bitter civil war broke out. All sides committed atrocities, with Serb Chetnik irregulars and Josip Broz Tito’s partisans taking revenge for the dreadful carnage wrought by Pavelić’s Ustasha terrorists, etc. e number of victims has never been estimated fully (or accurately). But the burden of the hidden past remains a burden in the present and an obstacle to the future. e crisis became visible in the 1980s. Pandora’s Box opened immediately aer Tito’s death. As communism declined, nationalism re-emerged. e battle for political control of Yugoslavia took place against a background of rising unemployment in the domestic economy and growing instability in Eastern Europe. In this context, blaming ethnic injustices was an easy route to political power. Every ethnic group could find grievances – Serbs were too predominant in the army and government, Slovenes and 3 e first Balkan war broke out in 1912. e states, which had restored their independence in the nineteenth century, fought against Turkey. A few months later Greece and Serbia sided with Turkey against their recent ally, Bulgaria. In 1914the Great European War (as termed by its contemporaries) or World War I broke out. It ended in 1918. Barely out of the world conflagration, Greece and Turkey engaged in a battle against each other (1921/22).
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Croats had a better standard of living, and so on. But Serb nationalists, led by Slobodan Milošević, took such complaints to new levels of hysteria, conducting a vicious propaganda war against the ‘enemies’ of Serbs, namely Muslims, Croats and Albanians. Milošević deliberately poisoned the air, reversing the Titoist policyof Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity.’ When Soviet communism collapsed, the nationalist cries became louder. e secession of Slovenia and of Croatia, in particular, led to the violent unravelling of Yugoslavia in the wars of 1991–95. More than 200,000 people were killed in the former Yugoslavia and millions of other lives have been ruined by the wars started by extreme nationalists – and then waged by all sides in a dreadful cycle of bloodlust and revenge.
National/Ethnoreligous and Gender Identity It is high time we came to the main purpose of this paper, namely to observe the intersection of national or ethnoreligious– which, in my opinion, is the more appropriate term when referring to the main actors in the Yugoslav wars – andgendered identity in all the ir complexity aer the socialist experiments in both the redefinition of national identity and the social organisation of gender failed. I will focus mainly on Bosnia-Herzegovina because Bosnia-Herzegovina is, on the one hand, the most complicated in terms of ethnoreligious identities yet, on the other, the most illustrative of the attempts to accommodate differences and their failure. Moreover, the presence of Islam there hasproduced additional aspects of gendered difference. I take nation and gender to be cultural constructs used both in academic writing and in everyday life. As constructs, they are made up but through their utilisation in social life they have become socially real and seemingly natural. Each designates a particular way of organising social difference, a dimension along which categories indicating difference (male, female; Serbian, Croatian, Muslim, Albanian) are arrayed. Each also implies simultaneously both homogeneity and difference. *** National and ethnic identity depends on ascription and description. People locally define and construct their identity according to their own experiences and perceptions, in interaction with and in relation to members of neighbouring groups, and in relation to the official state definitions. Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of a society where collective cultural (ethnic or national) identity has been and continues to be contested by one or more parties. is lack of consensus in defining nationality is particularly salient in the case of Muslim Bosnians and is reflected in the ambiguity of the official ethnonym Muslim which, in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, refers to an ethnic group, a nationality, and a religious community. In Serbo-Croat official orthography the potential ambiguity of the term Muslim was avoided by writing the noun designating a person’s na-
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tionality with an initial capital (Muslimani) and the term referring to a member of the religious community with a small letter m ( uslimani). Official Yugoslav policy implicitly denied that the categoryMuslim was dependent on religious identity. However, in Bosnia religious identity overlaps with national or ethnic identity for all three groups. us, Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam, Croats to Roman Catholicism, and Serbs to Orthodoxy. Religion is part of a person’s cultural identity, whether or not one is a believer. is is as true for a Muslim as it is for a Catholic or Orthodox Christian.4 In the case of Orthodox and Catholic Bosnians, this ambiguity escapes Western observers because their official ethnonym refers not to their religion but to their ethnic and religious ties with peoples outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Serbiaand Croatia respectively. In peacetime, however, especially in rural areas the terms for religious identity, namely Catholic (katolik) and Orthodox (pravoslav), rather than the official national terms Croat and Serb were used. Considering the above, I find that using the term ethnoreligious to describe the identity of all three nationalities would be a more accurate reflection of local understanding of national identity as determined by religious allegiance. e official term Muslim to denote a cultural identity is thus in accordance withlocal parlance, which reflects the overlap between religion and collective cultural identity. is tendency is very well illustrated in Tone Bringa’s bookBeing Muslim the Bosnian Way.5 She shows how the lack of any clearly defined physical or geographical boundaries between the different communities is counteracted by drawing boundaries between two clearly defined and different moral worlds in the village of ‘Dolina’ (author’s pseudonym for a mixed Muslim-Catholic village in central Bosnia). e separate identities of the Muslim and Catholic communities are ultimately maintained by the disapproval of intermarriage between their members. Bringa’s book as well as other studies carried out in the former Yugoslavia provide enough evidence that in rural Bosnia before the wars villagers saw the household as the only safe sphere for the expression of an exclusive, unaccommodated ethnoreligious identity. ey feared that the presence of a non-member would threaten this exclusivity. By examining attitudes toward mixed marriages, we can learn about the interplay between ethnoreligious identity and gender. e opposition to mixed marriages is typically explained in terms of possible everyday practical conflicts. Women in particular worry about getting a daughter-in-law from a ‘different religion’ and the consequences that might have for the everyday running of her household. For example, the mother of a marriageable girl explained her reluctance to see her daughter marrying a Catholic by saying, ‘We respect their [Catholic] holidays, their churches, their prayers and we see it as a sin to blaspheme against their sacred symbols, but we do not marry 4 is attitude is not unique for Bosnia. Secular Jews in the US, for instance, and Catholics and Protestants in Ireland are other examples of suchethnoreligious identities. 5 Bringa, Tone. 1995.Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
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them.’ e problem of food was cited as one of the obstacles to intermarriage between a Muslim and a Catholic. ‘We get along well and we have a good time together, but this is one thing. It is another to have somebody from a different religion together with you in the kitchen. When two who prepare different foods and keep different holy days share 6 the same house many problems arise.’ at the negative attitude toward mixed marriages is understood in terms of problems in the daily running of the household reinforces the argument that thekuca (house) is seen as the primary environment where ethnoreligious membership and identity are formed. It is not surprising that girls should pay more attention to such issues than boys. Aer all it is the girl, not the boy, who as a rule must adapt to new ways when she goes to join her husband in his parents’ household. Because ethnoreligious identity is believed to be formed by the child’s environment, villagers aver that a mother from adifferent ethnoreligious background will inevitably bring with her the knowledge of her own religious traditions. Furthermore, an ‘outsider’ in religious terms (a non-Muslim or a non-Catholic or a non-Orthodox) cannot teach her children religious and cultural values she never learned herself.7 Since religious rituals and values are the main distinguishing factor between the three Bosnian ‘peoples,’ this is obviously less of an issue for non-practising Muslims or Catholics or Orthodox. As I already said at the beginning, there were at the same time coexistence and conflict, tolerance and prejudice, suspicion and friendship between the nationalities in the former Yugoslavia. In Bosnia there were many different ways in which people from different ethnic, religious, and socio-economic backgrounds would live together and side by side. ese varied between town and country, sometimes from one village to the next, from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, and from family to family. While in villages people of different ethnoreligious backgrounds would live side by side and oen have close friendships, they would rarely intermarry. In some neighbourhoods they would not even live side by side and would know little about each other. And while some families would have a long tradition of friendships across ethnoreligious communities others would not. In towns, especially among the urban-educated class, intermarriage would be quite common, and would sometimes go back several generations in a single family. Here the socio-economic strata to which a person belonged was more important than was his or her nationality. War changes people and it changes their perceptions of who they are. As a reaction to and part of the process of the war and the politics behind it, many Bosnian Muslims are re-defining both the content and function of their collective identities, and identifying with a wider world community of Muslims more than before. e discourse on Bosnian Muslim identity in war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina was a response to the re-definition and polarisation of the categories ‘Catholic Croat’ and ‘Orthodox Serb.’ In Bosnia, therefore, the discourse on Islam should be understood in terms of 6 7
Bringa, Ch. 2: A Bosnian Village, pp. 79-80. Bringa, Ch. 4: Marriage and Marriage Procedures.
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the construction of a Bosnian Muslim identity as opposed to a non-Muslim Bosnian one that is either Catholic or Orthodox Christian (and ultimately either Croat or Serb). e notion that Catholic and Orthodox Bosnians belong to the Croat and Serb nation states was accentuated during the exchange of nationalist rhetoric between Croatia and Serbia before and certainly during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (when categories of cultural identity hardened and became transfixed and monomial). It was within this framework that a plan for canonisation along ethnic lines was understood locally and therefore embraced by Serbia and Croatia while being fiercely opposed by BosniaHerzegovina and the majority of its Muslims. ey, together with some Bosnian Croats and Serbs (mainly from the intelligentsia), were committed to a multi-ethnic and multi-religious unitary Bosnian state built on the principles of democracy and pluralism.
Women and War: Symbolism and Reality ‘War is men’s business, not ladies,’ we are told in Margaret Mitchell’s American Civil War novel Gone With the Wind. Such stereotypical identification of men with war and women with peace is as old as human culture. Despite this stereotype, war can be a time when women develop a ‘national awareness.’ During the outbreak of World War I, for example, most of the organised women’s movements in Europe backed their governments and focused their activities on supporting their countries. Who were all these women primarily:women or members of the nation? War and nationalism were used as arguments to give up feminism, claiming that women had to choose between their identity as women and as members of the nation state. A similar situation occurred aer the fall of socialism. e women’s movement in some of the former socialist countries likewise lost its drive because of more ‘urgent’ political goals. Some East European women were overpowered by a more primary anticommunist orientation, and some became involved, and for much the same reason, with overt nationalist movements. Others remained committed to ‘socialist’ ideals that can be aggressively nationalist. At the same time, it is overwhelmingly women who run pacifist movements in countries at war. However, all women mentioned are the organised ones, and they are a minority. e huge majority of women usually (and in BosniaHerzegovina in particular)did not appear in the public sphere at all, except when journalists made them visible (or rather made their personal tragedies visible). e wars of the 1990s are called bratoubilacki rat, Bruderkrieg, guerre fratricide. As far as it is brothers who are supposed to be waging war, there seems to be no space for women within fratricidal wars. Nevertheless, there are interpretations of the 1990s Balkan wars as wars against women.8 However, I am more inclined to agree with Rada 8 On 26 November 1992 the German weekly magazineStern featured the heading ‘Vergewaltigung als Waffe – Der Krieg gegen die Frauen – Opfer berichten.’ Red colour dominated the page. In the centre of the picture was a weeping young woman, wearing a red blouse and with eyes red from crying. e text read: ‘Ordered mass violence: Aer having had lots
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Iveković on this point: they were not necessarilywars against women, although theyare wars in which atrocities against women are particularly brutal and conspicuous, as was the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Perhaps one can say that these wars were anti-women in symbolic terms. But none of this should lead us to believe that women were the only victims. e whole population was victimised, irrespective of sex and nationality.9 To understand the situation it is necessary to analyse what is symbolically at stake for women and men within the war machine, because gender is one of its main organising principles. At the symbolic level, cultural and social stereotypes used in the militarist ideology, in the dominant propaganda of the war machine, and in the war mythology are all ‘gendered.’10 It is characteristic of the symbolic order and of social relationships that every power complex uses as its model other pre-existing power complexes, projecting itself onto those models where possible. is projection ‘legitimises’ practices and domination. One could argue that the extreme cases of war and nationalism take over and adopt the models of gender difference, using them as justifying references. e appropriation of gender in nationalism does not mean that there is one-toone correspondence between gender roles and roles in war. But the political and symbolic systems, which permit or call for war are ‘male’ because the historicallydominant gender is male. e brotherhood is articulated and group identity constructed by excluding the ‘other’ – the enemy (‘the Outside Other’) and women (the ‘Inside Other’). e image of woman is a split one: ‘our’ women are ‘good’ ones; the enemy’s are the ‘bad’ ones.11 ese brotherhoods, indeed, operate in nationalist conflicts and this ‘masculinisation’ of war impacts of course on the individuals who are identified as female but more generally contributes to the reconstruction of gender identities. How does the symbolic order, however, affect the lives of real women? It is important not to forget that there is no univocal position of women in relation to war. Ethnic, religious, and geographical factors profoundly mark the fate of women in the former Yugoslavia. So it is self-evident that gender cannot be isolated from race, eth-
of conversations with maltreated and raped women and young girls in Croatia and Bosnia, Stern journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer does not doubt anymore: Serbs are systematically using abuse and violence against women in their war against Bosnians.’ ere are many examples of interpreting the Yugoslav wars as wars against women: See e.g. Stiglmayer, Al. (Hg.) 1993. Massenvergewaltigung. Krieg gegen die Frauen,Freiburg i. Br.: Kore; Kappeler, Susanne, Mira Renka, Melanie Beyer (Hg.Innen). 1994.Vergewaltigung - Krieg - Nationalismus. Eine feministische Kritik, München: Frauenoffensive. 9 See her articles ‘Women, Nationalism and War: “Make Love Not War”,’ Hypatia in , Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1993), pp. 113–128, and ‘Nationalism and War as ey Affect Women,’ in Krieg/War. Eine philosophische Ausenandersetzungaus feministischer Sicht, herausgegeben vom Wiener Philosophinnen Club. München: Wilchelm Fink V erlag, 1997, pp. 117–124. 10 Every term, utterance, and concept is given a gender ‘value’ with a distinct preference for the male-identified form. 11 Iveković, Rada. ‘Women, Nationalism and War,’ p. 116.
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nicity, religion, nationality, age, and so forth. Nevertheless, as real and not only symbolic victims (and they are most oen real victims), women were ‘entitled’ to specific types of suffering, atrocities, rape, etc. *** e wars of the 1990s created the most severe refugee crisis in Europe in the last fiy years, with women and children constituting the majority of refugees who had to flee their homes and countries. Of some 380,000 refugees living in Croatia in the autumn of 1994, eighty percent were women and children. is is a contingent whose human rights are oen violated. Refugee women face three potential forms of discrimination in the communities where they have taken refuge: as women, because of their nationality or ethnicity, and as refugees. e refugees from Bosnia, who were not Croats, had no civil rights (for example, the right to work, the right to legal defence). Although an international fund paid the Croatian government DM 5 to 6 a day for every refugee, the health services for these people were extremelypoor. Women refugees oen suffered violence (including by police officers) or were raped. Many of these women were unprepared for their new roles as single heads of households. Even those whose husbands or other male relatives were with them had to adjust to altered role expectations in a new context. Identities based on culturally defined gendered roles, or on work or occupations, oen had to be reconstructed in the changed circumstances. 12 A lot of surveys were carried out among displaced persons and refugees in Croatia in 1992–1994. Some of them addressed ‘the oen ambivalent feelings of refugee groups towards each other in refugee centres, and the by no means uniform process of ethnogenesis, by which communities in the former Yugoslavia are reconstructed along the lines of ethnic and religious affiliation.’13 Some refugees found themselves living among, or accepting refuge from people they defined at the time as ‘the enemy,’ a situation which can only give rise to ambivalence and confusion. Others, however, resolutely denied that the war had anything to do with religion or ethnicity at all. ey had found ways to maintain relationships and friendships across ethnic lines, and to make a distinction between those who caused them harm and members of those same ethnic groups, who may, indeed, be relatives, neighbours or friends, or who may simply be innocent victims.14
12 ‘Displaced persons’ came from other parts ofCroatia; ‘refugees’ came from elsewhere, mostly Bosnia. 13 See Gilliland, Mary. 1995. ‘Reclaiming Lives: Variable Effects of War on Gender and Ethnic Identities in the Narratives of Bosnian and Croatian Refugees,’ inAnthropology of East Europe Review. Special Issue: Refugee Women of the Balkans, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 1995. 14 See on this topic Plejić, Irena. 1992. All ‘ that we had, all that we were, reduced to memories,’ in Feldman, Lada, Ines Prica and Rejana Snjković (eds.).Fear, Death and Resistance: An Ethnography of War. Croatia 1991–1992,Zagreb, Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research: Matrix Croatica, X-Press, pp. 229–240.
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For women in the former Yugoslavia, of whatever nationality, reputation in a community and self-worth were largely tied to hard work and self-sacrifice for the sake of family. Women in cities also shared these values, perhaps to a lesser degree but still significantly. But in the refugee centres, women (as well as men) no longer had work and no longer had traditional family roles to define themselves to others around them or to themselves. ey no longer had reputations to care about (or at least in this new setting their reputations were not firmly established). ey had become uncertain about who they were. Being a woman alone is, for a married woman, bothan emotional loss and a loss of personal identity. For adult women in villages and small towns, the married status is a prime marker of identity. As refugees, they found themselves making decisions for their families and contemplating futures without the economic and emotional assistance of a husband. Some of them were already widows; others faced the possibility of being widowed. At the same time all these women in the refugee camps were considered among the ‘lucky’ ones in the war because they had not been raped, maimed or physically hurt. Rape has been used as a tactic of terror in many wars: when the German army marched through Belgium in World War I, when the Russian army marched to Berlin in World War II, when Japanese raped Chinese women in the city of Nanking, to mention only a few cases. But in these wars, rape didnot receive the widespread publicity it had in the 1990s Yugoslav wars. On the other hand, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia provided a broader socio-cultural context of conflict between different groups of men. Acts of rape in this context attacked not only women; they also humiliated the husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons of the victims because they demonstrated the men’s inability to protect their women. is humiliation is especially intense in the Balkans where the honour/shame complex is so strong and female chastity is central to family and community honour.15 In Bosnia-Herzegovina there have been horrifying stories about the rape and deliberate impregnation of women (mostly Muslims violated by Serbian soldiers). A European Community fact-finding mission states that 20,000 women have been raped by Bosnian Serb soldiers as ‘part of a deliberate pattern of abuse’ where ‘rapes cannot be seen as incidental to the main purposes of the aggression but as serving a strategic purpose in itself.’ War rapes are defined as a form of ethnic cleansing or genocide. 16 However, I do not think ethnic cleansing needs rape – a gun and threats will suffice. 15 One example of interpreting rape as connected to patriarchal culture is the book Women, Violence and Warby Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović, Natasa Mrvić-Petrović, Slobodanka Konstantinović-Vilić and Ivana Stefanović. See its review: Grujić, Jelena. ‘Female Side of War,’ in Vreme, Belgrade, 12/4/1995. 16 European Community Report 1992.
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What one of the victims says makes me think that the speculations on patriarchal culture may be closer to the truth. Her statement reflects both the feelings of women and the mentality of men in the Balkans: ‘To feel the rapist’s child in your womb and be convinced that everyone will know that this is a child of the enemy, and to know at the same time that the child is yours as well is one of the most cruel types of torture… Moreover, they suggest to the husbands of the raped women that these women are worthless since they are giving birth to their enemies’ children. e most horrible thing 17 is that the husbands really feel that way.’ Many mass rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred in what the Bosnian government terms ‘rape camps.’ e names and locations of rape camps reflect pre-existing attitudes toward sexuality and courtship but in a cruel new context. ey were situated in former coffee houses and restaurants. eir names symbolise both the traditional and the modern. At one end of the spectrum were places called ‘Vilina Vlas’ (Nymph’s Hair/ Tresses) and ‘Kafana Sonja’ (Coffee House Sonja). ese names symbolise the traditional place of pleasure and this symbolism contributes to blaming the women for their own victimisation. On the other end of the spectrum,places with names such as ‘Laser’ and ‘Fast Food Restaurant’ suggest the modern, Western lifestyle to the people from the Balkans. Such names were correlated with perceived Western promiscuity and sexual permissiveness. Both types of names suggest sexual license to men whobelieve that they pacan do any kind of violent sexual act with impunity. For women, these places were kao na zemlji(hell on earth). In many camps, the majority of the female victimsdied, either from gunshots, bleeding as a consequence of gang rape, or by suicide motivated by shame.18 Most of the stories of rape have come from women forced by their experience to choose isolation (divorced women, widows, or unmarried women). is is not surprising in a culture where female and male honour depend on woman’s chastity. If the woman was ‘lucky’ and did not get pregnant, she will bury her story to spare her family the dishonour. Anything that forces her to go public will be her further tragedy. e sexual violence perpetrated against women during wartime is one indicator that gender identity is a pivotal factor in women’s fates both during and aerwars.19 Violence was not directed at women refugees or enemy’s women only. For instance, Croatian women oen were victims of Croatian men. According to the stud20 ies of the Women’s Human Rights Group ‘B.a.B.e.,’ violence against women in general had grown considerably. Men were psychologically traumatised by the war and frustrated by the loss of economic power. ey expressed their anger (or helplessness) through violence by verbally or physically abusing their wives, girlfriends or other See Grujić, Jelena. ‘Female Side of War.’ Olujić, Maria. 1995. ‘Women, Rape, and War: e Continued Trauma of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Croatia,’ inAnthropology of East Europe Review.Special Issue: Refugee Women of the Balkans, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 1995. 19 Krieg/War, pp. 51–58 (54). See Schott, R.M. ‘Gender and “Postmodern War”,’ in 20 e acronym stands for ‘Be active, be emancipated.’ 17 18
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women. is expression of male domination found its justification in the institutions of the Church and the government of Croatia, both of which had tried recently to proclaim motherhood as the worthiest occupation for women. In October 1994, a special state institute was established for the protection of the family, motherhood and youth to counteract the republic’s negative demographic growth, falling birth and marriage 21 rates, high abortion rate, family disintegration and low morality.
Conclusion
e data presented corroborate the tenet that the role of war is a conservative one and that the militarisation of masculinity is coupled with domestication of femininity, i.e. with women again becoming invisible. us, gender is a defining condition of how war affects individuals. But analyses of gender are of course inadequate to comprehend the way in which war shatters the private worlds of everyday life. War may mean, as it did in Sarajevo, that children cannot go out for two years for fear of bombardments, that families are separated, that a person might be shot to death while going out to visit relatives, etc. For those of us sitting far away war poses differentchallenges than for those whose lives are in tumult because of it. In the summer of 1992, the Croatian writer and journalist Slavenka Drakulić wrote: ‘As the war goes on you create a parallel reality: on the one hand, you neurotically cling to what used to be your everyday routine, pretending normality, ignoring the war. On the other hand,you are unable to deny the deep changes in your life and yourself, the shi in your values, emotions, reactions and behaviour. (Can I buy shoes, does it make any sense? Am I allowed to fall in love?) In war, the way you think of your life and what is essential to it totally changes. e simplest things no longer have the same weight or meaning. at is when you really know the war is on, that it has got to you too.’22 is quotation makes me think, finally, of the different ways of perceiving the war and the place of the different women within it. Drakulić is an intellectual, i.e. she is one of the women who express their attitude to theevents in the region in written or other (audio-) visual form. ere are a lot of other similar examples: Dubravka Ugrešić, Jasmina Tešanović, Rada Ivecović, Biljana Jovanović, Maruša Krese, Radmila Lazić, to mention but a few. However, these women are a small minority; the huge majority either do not want or are unable, for one or another reason, to share their feelings and to make statements. us, we cannot get ‘the whole picture’; moreover, it is impossible to expect that we would. e reasons: firstly, not every woman could use thepress, media, and so on, to express herself.Secondly, the majority of women who were hurt much more badly (either physically or psychologically) do not want to maintain and, thus, to reinforce the memory of what has happened tothem at all – on the contrary, they want See Status of Women’s Rights in Croatia . See Drakulić, Slavenka. 1993.e Balkan Express. Fragments from the Other Side of War, New York: HarperPerennial, p. 2. 21 22
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to forget and that is why they avoid publicity (or at least try to).irdly, we should not forget the fact that in Bosnia, for instance, many more than half of all women are still either illiterate or of low literacy. All these factors influence the thoroughness of the picture we are trying to reconstruct. When the Yugoslav wars started in 1991 and especially when in 1992 BosniaHerzegovina was torn apart by ethnopolitical conflict and war, I was shocked as was every normal human being. At the same time, I felt there was something wrong: all these women and those from Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular had become too visible, which contrasted completely with their normal life… e question may be asked: How can gender be relevant when life and death are at stake? Of course, one could choose to resist gender dualism, but in this way the violence of rape and sexual abuse certainly would not diminish. In my view, the more we can understand how hostilities and aggression are catalysed along gender lines, the more we can explore strategies for diffusing this aggression. It is in this spirit that inquiries into the intersection of gender and war (as an apotheosis of nationalism) may serve peace.
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DEALING WITH SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE YUGOSLAV WAR: LEARNING FROM THE LESSON OF THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN SERBI A Ryoji MomoseJapan Tokyo University, More than ten years have passed since the outbreak of the Yugoslav civil war, in which various forms of violence were committed. e brutality of the violence has deeply shocked the world and stimulated the appearance of many works about the war. Although these recently appearing works have been offering new approaches and new insight into the war and violence, many difficult questions still remain, especially regarding wartime violence against women. It is necessary to deal with this issue seriously and some scholars have actually started studying it, but the issue is still difficult to research. rough this paper, I will attempt to present a perspective for dealing with wartime sexual violence and other forms of violence in the Yugoslav civil war. To do so, I will start with a study of the feminist movement in Serbia. eir movement has been engaged in fighting violence against women since the pre-war period, so it will give us some keys to understanding sexual violence. e contemporary feminist movement in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was revived at the end of the 1970s. Influenced by the radical feminism that had emerged in Europe and the USA in the 1960s, academic feminists started to criticise Yugoslav socialism’s failure to liberate women. In this period, they formed a theoretical framework for their own activity. In the second half of the 1980s, feminists shied their work from discourse to practice. ey launched ‘SOS Hotlines for Women and Children Victims of Violence,’ which was designed to assist women victims of domestic violence and rape in Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Belgrade. rough SOS Hotlines, feminists provided victims with medical services, legal aid, and shelters. It was important that SOS revealed the reality of violence toward women and children, which had been concealed within private homes. SOS succeeded as a grass-roots movement. Some members, however, started to be dissatisfied because their group refused to enter the political scene. Finally, they decided to form new groups for political activities; one of them was the Belgrade Women’s Lobby. is group aimed to cooperate with other parties and movements in order to form a pressure group for improving women’s status. In September 1990 they submitted a programme that dealt with basic women’s issues. Feminists were to tackle these issues aerwards. In these ways, SOS and the Women’s Lobby provided a base for subsequent feminist movements.
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In 1990, omens of Yugoslavia’s disintegration became more and more visible. Feminists felt that they had to get personally involved in political issues in their country. At that time, there were no organisations, which could gather women’s voices from all spheres of society. When it was decided that the first multiparty elections would be held on 9 December, feminists decided to form a Women’s Party. e aims of the Women’s Party were to establish solidarity among women at all levels, and to organise the struggle not only for women’s rights but also for social reform. In order to achieve the former aim, they called on women’s grass-roots movements to form cooperative networks together. ey made women the representatives of social minorities, and then sought to cooperate with them. In addition, they developed active contacts with other opposition parties, yet there were still gaps in the party. eir intention was to utilise political campaigns to promote consciousness aboutwomen’s issues. As the result of the elections, women representatives made up only 1.6% of the Serbian Parliament. erefore, a Women’s Parliament was formed on 8 March 1991. e purpose of the Women’s Parliament was to monitor and respond to all new laws that discriminated against women. Although it owed its basic ideas to the Women’s Party, the Women’s Parliament succeeded in functioning more efficientlyas an opposition influence. Various alternative movements participated in the Women’s Parliament, and thus had the opportunity to become the nucleus of subsequent social movements. When armed conflict broke out in Slovenia, hundreds of mothers organised a protest against the war. e mothers’ protest movement spread to Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina. Feminists supported the mothers’ protest, and joinedthe antiwar movement. e mothers’ protest, however, faded due to manipulation by the regimes, although it had had a great influence throughout the former Yugoslavia. On 9 October 1991, the ‘Women in Black’ started to protest against the war. ey protested against the war by standing in the street in silence, dressed in black. ey held an international feminist conference in order to create international solidarity among women, and then to resist nationalistic politics in Serbia. Other feminist groups set out to work against the war. SOS in particular showed that violence against women and children became more pronounced and drastic during the war. e Yugoslav feminist movement developed into a movement for social reform as a whole through the practices of SOS and other political activities. Feminists shied their own primary interests toward the antiwar movement aer the outbreak of the conflict in Slovenia, supporting women, children, the elderly, and deserters. It seemed meaningful to protest against the war, to attempt to change the traditional gender order, and, through the work of SOS, to point out the patriarchal tendencies existing in Yugoslav urban society. e feminist movement will be evaluated in the following points. First, it has practically provided various kinds of aid for survivors of sexual violence in the war. For example, SOS telephone activity was started for the victims of domestic violence before the war, and was also able to give important support for survivors during the war. Secondly, they made visible male violence against women, a kind of violence that
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had been excluded from public space. irdly, they made a common place for oppositions that were located outside ethnic-nationalist politics. e practice of the Women’s Parliament indicates this well. On the other hand, it is true that their movement was not able to function as a peace movement that would sufficiently deter people from taking part in ethnic conflict. It was quite difficult to form an interethnic peace movement. It is partly because the feminist movement was essentially an academicone that it was not able to have enough far-reaching influence on every woman, especially in rural populations. Another cause of their inability to function as a deterrent may be located in their own theoretical framework. As early as the 1960s, feminism started trying to discover the gender order that exists behind our way of thinking and behaving, and it has since had some success. In the peace movement against the Yugoslav civil war, they defined ‘peaceful women’ as the main core of their peace movement, which implicitly entailed‘violent men.’ is resulted in admitting the existing ‘patriarchal’ gender order and failed to develop toward reconstruction of the gender order. What can we learn from the lesson of the feminist movement? How should we understand sexual violence in the Yugoslav war today? Admitting the extreme brutality of sexual violence in the Yugoslav war and the importance of taking gender aspects into consideration, I think that it would now be useful to temporarily distance oneself from gender studies on sexual violence; it is necessary to place sexual violence into the whole context of the Yugoslav war. Overemphasising the gender aspects of violence brings the danger of fundamentalism, of reducing exclusively all causes of violence to patriarchal phallocentrism. To avoid this, it would be useful to minutely examine what the Yugoslav war is, what characterised the war, how the war developed, then to study what kind of the meaning sexual violence had in the war. is point of view may be important to deal with another kind of violence. As a point of view, I will temporarilysee the Yugoslav war as a process of making of nation states. Modern nation states were made through war, in which process state systems are masculinised, i.e. require a strict gender order as well as ethnic distinction. As a result, individuals were distinguished from others based on ethnic/gender identity politics. I think that there is a similar tendency of identity politics in the Yugoslav civil war. e war was stimulated by exclusive ethnic nationalism. In the meantime, the process of establishing the patriarchal gender order, or masculinising of the community, became widespread all over the region. I assume that a result of that process was wide-ranging sexual violence. e exposure of brutal masculinity in the Yugoslav war – as a most horrible example, we can mention wide-ranging sexual violence – can be seen through this perspective. By doing so, I believe it is possible to obtain another explanation of violence in the war.
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MUSLIM NATIONALISM IN BOSNIA HERZEG OVINA: T HE EL ITELE D NATIONAL MOVEMENTS AMONG BOSNIAN MUSLIMS Daisuke Nagashima Belgrade University, Serbia and Montenegro In this short paper, I will deal with Muslim national movements in BosniaHerzegovina in communist Yugoslavia: How they strove to acquire national status (as the sixth constituent nation); and who played what role in expressing (oen unsuccessfully) their national claim. e focus of analysis will also be on communist policy toward the Muslim national question during this period.
From 1945 to the Early 1960s With a few exceptions among its cadres, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, KPJ, later Savez komunista Jugoslavije, SKJ) did not 1 recognise Muslims as a nation or as an ethnic group, but instead as a religious group. Aer the end of World War II and until the early 60s, the KPJ’s stand was that Muslims were not yet nationally defined, and that they could only be defined as either Serbs or Croats. Some attempts were made by the political, cultural and religious elites of the 2 Muslims to be recognised as a nation, but they proved futile. e other Muslim leaders did not go so far as demanding the status of nation for two reasons. Firstly, despite the strong calls that Bosnia should be an autonomous province under the direct jurisdiction of the federation, Bosnian party leaders had succeeded in having Bosnia recognised as a single republic on the basis of ‘full equality of Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims,’ and secondly, because they were not considering national status as an option due to an undeveloped sense of national identity. Also, there were not enough influential leaders to insist upon it, either in the communist ranks or beyond. 1 Höpken, Wolfgang. 1994. ‘Yugoslavia’s Communists and the Bosnian Muslims,’ in Allworth, Edward (ed.). Muslim Community Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia , Durham/London: Duke University Press., pp. 222–223,227–228; Redžić, Enver. 2000. Sto godina Muslimanske politike u tezama i kontroverzama istorijske nauke: Geneza ideje bosanske, bošnjačke nacije , Sarajevo, pp. 66–70. For opposite opinions by some Bošnjakhistorians, see, for example, Bojić, Mehmedalija. 2001. Historija Bosne i Bošnjaka (VII-XX vijek), Sarajevo: Sahinpasic, pp. 225–226; Filandra, Šaćir. 1998. Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, Sarajevo: Sejtarija, pp. 199ff.
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As in the case of other nations in Yugoslavia, soon aer the war Muslims lost most of their political leaders as well as those intellectuals who had been active before the end of the war. Most of the leaders of the pre-war Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, the clerics of the Islamic Community, and other intellectuals who were considered to 3 have cooperated with the fascists, were excluded in the postwar years. In addition, institutions like ‘Preporod,’medresas and mektebs (madrasas and maktabs, schools of Muslims for mainly religious but also secular education), and the Sharia court, which were considered to be the last bastion of their Muslim identity, were closed down soon aer the war. During this period, Muslim communists considered themselves to be Serbs, most probably as a result of pressure from Belgrade but also because they expected that this would give them greater political possibilities.4 In addition to this, until the end of the 1960s Bosnian communists had been under the strong influence of the KPJ even aer the foundation of their own Communist Party of Bosnia-HerzegovinaKomunistička ( partija BiH, KPBiH, later Savez komunista BiH, SKBiH) in November 1948. In this way Muslim leaders continued to incline towards Belgrade or Zagreb. Some of them believed that they could ‘overcome backwardness’ by ‘declaring to be Serbs or Croats.’5
e Recognition Process from 1961 to 1968 e 1960s were a decade of confrontation between centralism (etatism) and decentralism (self-management), and also of a gradual political shi from the former to the latter. Political decentralisation, especially aer the economic reforms of 1965, paved the way for recognition of the Muslim nation. e process, however, went forward step by step, first in Bosnia and then in the whole of Yugoslavia. 6 It was not until 1967 that Tito officially declared the Muslims the sixth constituent nation of Yugoslavia; See examples of Husaga Čišić and others in Bojić,Historija Bosne i Bošnjaka,p. 227; Firandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, pp. 199-205. 3 In 1947 the Muslim Committee in the People’s Front was abolished, the Young Muslims (Mladi muslimani) were persecuted, and the disobedient clerics in the Islamic community were expelled. In 1946 an agrarian reform was carried out, etc. 2
4 Redžić, Enver. 1970. Tokovi i otpori, Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti BiH, Institut za istoriju, p. 109;Istorija Saveza komunista Bosne iHercegovine(Tom II). 1990. Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju u Sarajevo, p. 32. Atotal 61.5% of Muslim intellectuals in ‘Who’s who for the year 1956’ were listed as ‘Serbs,’ 16.6 % as Croats, 8.6% as Yugoslavs, and 12.6% ‘No nationality’: see Dyker, David A. 1972. ‘e Ethnic Muslims of Bosnia: Some Basic Socio-Economic Data,’ e Slavonic and East European Review, No. 50, p. 245. 5 Redžić, Sto godina Muslimanske politike u tezamai kontroverzama istorijske nauke , p. 70. 6 For details of this process, see Höpken, ‘Yugoslavia’s Communists and the Bosnian Muslims,’ pp. 228–234.
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just as it was not until 1968 that the Central Committee of SKBiH recognised, at its seventeenth congress, the Muslim nationality. Early in the 60s, the leaders of the party gradually admitted that its policy of Muslim national identification with Serbs or Croats had been a mistake, since they had realised that ‘only those who are more dependent on the political realities of the present had identified themselves (as Serbs or Croats), and frequently only for prag7 matic reasons, while the great majority of people remained undecided.’ Communists from SKBiH comprised only 3.7% of the total population (in 1960). Only party members identified themselves as Serbs or Croats;8 non-members who made up the vast majority of the population simply chose ‘Muslim in the ethnic sense’ or ‘Yugoslav.’ In 1965 and 1966, in the course of the policy change, political leaders of SKBiH were also gradually replaced. Aer Đilas (1954), Pijade (1957) and Ranković (1966) le the Central Committee of Belgrade, Pucar Stari, a leading loyal Bosnian communist since the World War II and throughout the postwar years, was also replaced as secretary of the Central Committee of SKBiH (1965), and young Hamdija Pozderac, Nijaz Dizdarević and Džemal Bijedić wereelected to senior positions in the party. e first two were to remain in office until the last years of the 1980s. e position of SKBiH in the SKJ itself improved too; later on, in the course of decentralisation, the influenceof the SKJ gradually declined.9 It must be noted that since the recognition of the Muslim nation was a prerequisite for fuller independence of the Bosnian party organisations from the centre in Belgrade, it was thus favoured also by Serb communist leaders in Bosnia. Cvijetin Mijatović, former ambassador to the USSR, was elected secretar y aer Pucar Stari. Along with Croatian Branko Mikulić, he held the highest position within the party in the 70s and 80s.
e 1970s and 80s Following recognition, Muslim nationalism developed amongst a limited number of communist leaders. e Muslim national affirmation could not but remain within the realm of the communist elites and communist intellectuals close to the party leadership. Other opportunities were strictly suppressed or kept within the limits of ‘positive nationalism’ in favour of ‘Brotherhood and Unity.’ Let us take some examples. In 1972, Avdo Humo, Osman Karabegović and Hajro Kapetanović were dismissed because of ‘discord withthe party line.’ Humo insisted on ‘more national rights for 7 Stated by Andria Krešić at the ird Congress of SKBiH in 1959: see Höpken, ‘Yugoslavia’s Communists and the Bosnian Muslims,’ p. 231. 8 Dyker, ‘e Ethnic Muslims of Bosnia,’ p. 245. 9 In 1969, the Fih Congress of SKBiH adopted the party’s first Statute. e Statute emphasised the ‘independence and responsibility’ of SKBiH in the ‘monolithic organisation of the SKJ’: see Istorija Saveza komunista Bosne iHercegovine, pp. 198–199.
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10 Muslims’ in the amendment of the Federal Constitution. ree years later, in 1975, six Muslim communists were declared guilty. One of them was Pašaga Mandić, a member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of SKBiH and a representative in the Federal and Republic Parliament. e dispute over the interpretation of the Partisan movement during the war and its collaboration with the Chetniks led to a crucial confrontation with the then party leadership, who were persecuted as ‘centralist, nationalist, and anti-self-management. ’ Just a few years before the collapse of Yugoslavia, in 1988, the so-called ‘Agrokomerc Affair’ brought about the dismissal of Hamdija Pozderac. ese three affairs are oen explained as a ‘political purge’ conducted by Serbian nationalists in their anti-Muslim campaign. e SKBiH undertook a number of initiatives to promote the official perception about the status of the Muslim nation. Under the leadership of SKBiH, a research project called ‘e Attitude of Muslims in BiH with regard to National Identification’ was organised. It began in 1967 and ended in 1970. e project was organised by the Centre for Social Research and the Faculty of Politics in Sarajevo. But it was practically initiated by the Central Committee of SKBiH, and strongly influenced the party’s later policy toward Muslims. e project dealt with the development of Muslim identity in Bosnian history.11 In 1971, the first population census aer the recognition was taken. Purivatra and a young historian, Kasim Suljević, wrote a political pamphlet titled ‘eNationalAspect 12 of the Population Census in 1971.’ ey explained that Muslims were a South-Slavic nation of Islamic faith in Bosnia whose identity stemmed from the fourteenth-century Ban
Tvrtko developed during the period. eyalsoexplainedthat‘Yugoslavism’ was notand a national category but Ottoman a ‘patriotic member of Yugoslavia’s socialist communities of nations and nationhoods.’ ey aimedat encouragingthose ‘Yugoslavs’ and ‘undeclared’ in the 1961 census to declarethemselves ‘Muslims’ in the 1971census. Other Muslim historians also tried to take this opportunity – namely, recognition – to encourage their national identification, but except for a few cases such as Enver Redžić13 and Salim Ćerić,14 they did not dare come out against official opinion. Bojić, Historija Bosne i Bošnjaka,p. 248; Firandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, pp. 306–316. 11 Among the main members of the project were Hamdija Ćemerlić, Atif Purivatra, Muhamed Hadžijahić, and Mustafa Imamović: see Redžić,Sto godina Muslimanske politike u tezama i kontroverzama istorijske nauke, p. 90. 12 Purivatra, Atif and Kasim Suljević. 1971.Nacionalni aspekt popisa stanovništva u1971. godini, Sarajevo, pp. 9ff. 13 Redžić insisted that the name ‘Muslim’ was inadequate because it meant nothing but a religious community, and that despite the significant role of Islam ‘they are not a muslim community in the ethnic sense but Bosnian’: see Redžić, Tokovi i otpori, p. 117. About critics against Redžić’s concept, see Redžić,Sto godina Muslimanske politike u tezama i kontroverzama istorijske nauke, p. 87. 14 In 1971, Ćerić proposed to the party leadership that ‘Muslimanska matica’ should become national institution of Muslims, but his proposal was rejected: see Filandra,Bošnjačka politika u XX. Stoljeću,pp. 316–325. 10
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Alija Isaković was regarded as an example of ‘negative nationalism,’ which was seen as inconsistent with e‘ thnic unity’ by the authorities. Isaković took the leading part in the affirmation of ‘Muslim literature’ (Muslimanska književnost). He compiled several bibliographies of Muslim writers, and as an editor published classics of Muslim literature. His work Biserje – Izbor iz muslimanske književnosti(Pearls: A Selection from Muslim Literature) aroused criticism from party leaders as an obstacle to the development of zajedništvo naroda (people’s unity).15 e Islamic Community of Bosnia totally ignored the recognition of Muslims mainly because, from an official viewpoint, the Muslim national identity was separated from the religious component described by the term ‘muslim.’ e only exception Ilmije was Husein Đozo, the then chairman of the Ulama Association BiH Udruženje ( BiH) and the chief editor of the Islamic biweekly magazinePreporod (Renaissance or Revival). Đozo went so far as to insist that the Muslim national identity should be based on Islam, and that all Muslims should ‘return to the Sharia.’ Đozo strove to spread his Islamic movement among imams and ulamas in the field through education, but was dismissed from his posts in 1979. e authorities accused Đozo of intentionally mixing up ‘muslims’ with ‘Muslims’ and, in short, of abusing Islam for encouraging Muslim nationalism. e most serious affair was the case of the trials of Muslim intellectuals in 1983. Alija Izetbegović, the author of the ‘Islamic Declaration,’ and thirteen others were prosecuted as Muslim nationalists; threeof those on trial were members of ‘Young Muslims,’ a pan-Islamic organisation that was active in Bosnia during World War II. It is worth noting that the ‘Islamic Declaration’was written in 1970, a year before the firstnational census aer recognition. Although its contents are purely Islamic and the party leaders knew that, the authorities in their political campaign accused them of being Muslim nationalists. is seems to be merely because their claim of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and their alleged activity in foreign countries would lead to disruption of the ethnic balance in Bosnia and was, in a word, outside the limits of ‘positive nationalism.’ Some ten years later, this affair was utilised by the Serbian nationalist camp as ‘Muslims’ enthusiasm for an Islamic Bosnia.’ Certainly the Muslim national movements were repeatedly suppressed, but we must not conclude that it wasonly the Muslim national movements that wereunjustly and unfairly suppressed. It may be argued that the authorities strove to suppress them simply in order to maintain the status quo of an increasingly fragile ethnic balance in Bosnia, and that is why the suppression against those most recently jumping onto the national bandwagon stood out so sharply. But, the question still remains: Could Muslims fully enjoy their national status as equal to Serbs and Croats, or was their national status purely nominal?16 Firandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, pp. 271–275. Filipović, Muhamed. 1996. Bošnjačka politika: Politički razvoj u Bosni u 19. i 20. stoljeću, Sarajevo, pp. 83–107. 15 16
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Conclusion I would conclude that: 1) Muslim nationalism, controlled by new party elites since the mid-1960s, had been limited within the framework of ‘positive nationalism’ which favoured ‘brotherhood and unity,’ ‘development of self-management on the basis of full equality of nations and nationhoods in Yugoslavia’ or, at least not contrary to these mottoes.17 It could be argued that aer 1970, Muslim nationalism was, in a sense, a similarstates. version of ‘national communism(s)’ as’ was seendescribed in the other Balkan communist Conversely, ‘negative nationalism as hegemonism, separatism, and anti-Yugoslav-communism (anti-self-management). It oen appeared in the form of Islamic movements, which were considered to be phenomena of ‘Muslim nationalisms.’ Since the 1990s, Muslims’ ‘positive nationalism,’ this time without communist terminology in their political programmes, merged into another stream, Bosnianism Bošnjaštvo ( ). roughout the communist period, before and aer recognition, nationalism was controlled to a great extent by a small number of party leaders. Some attempts were made to develop their national interests, their own culture, history, religious identity, and so on, by some political, academic, cultural and religious intellectuals. But most of those attempts were in vain. 2) Even so, their leaders strove to achieve equal national rights to those of Serbs reconfirmed their own Muslim ethnic literature, history, and Croats. culture, and ey religious ethical norms, choosing from the until then so-called ‘serbian-muslim’ or ‘croatian-muslim’ literature, history, culture, etc., and claiming that Serbian and Croatian hegemonists unjustly discredited their existence. e Muslim national movements were repeatedly suppressed but, I would repeat, we must not conclude that it wasonly the Muslim national movements that were unjustly and unfairly suppressed. e national question in Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia, was a truly sensitive matter and it was eliminated before it became a political issue. e mere tendency of a national affirmation was ‘nipped in the bud’ to maintain the ethnic balance, in the name of ‘brotherhood and unity.’
Zajedništvo i nacionalni odnosi u BiH: Savjetovanje oktobra 1973. godine.1973. Sarajevo: Studijski centar Gradske konferencije SKBiH, pp. 17–25. 17
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POSTDAYTON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Hidajet Repovac Faculty of Criminal Justice Science, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina e war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a consequence of the extreme nationalism. e war has slowed down the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina to an extent that the pre-war level of development will not be achieved again for another 20 years. I believe that the Bosnian situation cannot be properly explained from a single particular viewpoint. I am a Bosnian Muslim, born in the family of intellectuals – for instance my great-grand father was a professor at the medresse, a school at the level of the university. My grandfather, Ibrahim Repovac, studied law and received his Doctor’s degree at the University of Vienna. My father continued his father’s tradition. He studied at the Vienna Faculty of Law and accomplished his doctoral studiesni Zagreb. I just continued this family tradition. I believe that the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina is more complex than it is believed – in cultural-civilizational, economic, as well as in political sense. And that is why my paper presents a critical picture of what was happening after the Dayton Peace Accords. Dayton ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but at the same time it petrified the status quo. is situation was accepted by the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for whom that country is the only homeland, as a necessity and as the only possible outcome because they realised that unjust peace was better than continuation of war. But, ten years later, it is obvious that this unfairness of the Dayton peace, with the numerous additional negative resonances, has acquired the form of an unbearable cacophony. Bosnia-Herzegovina suffers from a number of problems. Even ten years have proved insufficient to constitute the state institutions that would provide inviolable guarantees of human rights and freedoms to people belonging to all ethnic communities on the whole state territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. ese rights include right of refugees to return, right to education and fulfilment of cultural needs, right to protection and preservation of personal integrity and property, right to freedom of religion, right to life, etc. Above all, Bosnia-Herzegovina suffers from the undefined state and the lack of its sovereignty; undefined common projects of development, which would enable the country to come closer to European standards; an undefined joint economic, cultural (educational) and political sphere; slow political decision-making process, which hin-
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ders the work of the state and its institutions; competing economic and political interests of both entities (Republic of Srpska and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina); and the fact that numerous war criminals have not been brought to justice. In addition to that, the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as an exponent of colonial authority from previous historical periods, only sanctions ‘the disobedient ones,’ oen in cases when it is already too late for that, instead of supporting the development of democratic and efficient governance, consisting of young people in whose interest would be the development of the country. Due to all this reasons, in last ten years no considerable progress has been noted in Bosnia-Herzegovina even in a single sector. We can even say that the country has been regressing – a process very dangerous for preservation of unity and sovereignty of the state. One of the most difficult consequences of inconsistent economic and social state policies is a general impoverishment of the population. A second consequence, which is related to the previous one, is the high unemployment rate without prospects of improvement. ere have even been cases of deliberate obstruction of all big projects like public works, re-opening of enterprises, and road ocnstruction, which would all absorb masses of unemployed. For example, there is obstruction of the construction of the highway corridor 5C, which should lead from Sarajevo to Budapest and from Sarajevo to the coast. Several companies from the EU and other places have already prepared their offers for this project, but no permission has been given for the beginning of the works, because this corridor would strengthen the link between Bosnia and Europe. ird consequence is a migration of great number of young people to Western European countries. e forth consequence is the absence of normal conditions for the return of refugees to their homes. e fih, and crucially important, is national and cultural ghettoization of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has and will continue to have drastically negative repercussions for the unity and stability of the state – in other words, a fragile Dayton peace. e Dayton peace is indeed very fragile, as it only ended the war, but resolved nothing. It seems that those who had a project for destruction of former Yugoslavia, only had the strategy how to destroy it, and no strategy what to do aer that. My thesis is that all of the nationalisms in former Yugoslavia were paid from the same source – from the same valet. I believe that the same source financed all nationalisms in ex-Yugoslavia and this source was geographically located much more to the west than it was considered. If a sociological survey of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society would be conducted, important negative changes compared to the period immediately before the war would be noticed in every spher e of life. e situation related to the internal development of the state is not optimistic at all. Bosnia-Herzegovina has a number of problems on its own, which means that its development is far from the requirements that would enable its accession into the European Union, but these problems are additionally aggravated by the negative processes in the neighbouring countries. Processes of ‘re-Nazification’ and affirmation of the Chetnik movement in Serbia, national isolation and creation of the image of self-sufficiency, and the proc-
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ess of the ‘Nazification’ in Slovenia and Croatia are not a path towards stability and to the European Union. In all of the former Yugoslavia, national tolerance has been seriously damaged, creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity. is sense of insecurity is especially present among Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, or using the new term, among Bosniaks. ey have paid dearly for every nationalistic rampage in this region because they had no support in the additional, or spare state. Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims had no spare state and their nationalism was expression of the rage for being pressed against the wall, with their very existence and their national and cultural identity under threat. I believe Bosniaks had to fight for survival, and preservation of their national identity. Bosnian Muslims have always paid a heavy price for any nationalistic rampage, as the following example shows. As a result of the decision of the Berlin Congress in 1878, the present day Bosnia-Herzegovina – then a Turkishvilayet – became a part of Austria-Hungary. As a consequence, several hundred thousand Muslims le BosniaHerzegovina and moved to Anatolia.Today more descendants of the Bosnian Muslims live in Anatolia than in Bosnia. ere are between 4 and 6 million Muslims in Turkey who are of Bosnian srcin. Before the coming of Austria-Hungary, people in Bosnia spoke Turkish, which was the language of administration and government (a political language), Arabic, which was a language of philosophy, Koran and poetry, and Persian, which was a language of poetry and literature. When Austria-Hungary came with German language and new culture, all the natives became automatically illiterate, because German became the official language. So a large number of Muslims le Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was then that Aleksa Santic,1 famous Mostar poet wrote: ‘Stay here, the sun of foreign skies will not warm you as this one here does.’ But such was the faith of Muslim in those times and that was neither the first nor the last exodus, as the exoduses continued. During this war in 1990s, around million and a half people le Bosnia-Herzegovina – people of all nationalities, but most of them were Muslims. However, Bosnia-Herzegovina is not anything exceptionalin the contemporary world. What happened in Bosnia is happening also in other parts of the world. is is a consequence of the global world politics, and even this process of destabilisation of the Balkans was a special and deliberate goal of a special policy for the region. Nobody could have foreseen such a beginning for the 21st century. e expectations were that new heights of spirit and technology will be reached, and for more justice, freedom and dignity in the world. Instead, just when the war in Bosnia stopped and we entered the 21st century, it turned out that it was all just fiction and illusion. We have entered the new era without idea and praxis of humanism, without socialism, because all socialist countries have fallen – ideologically and politically –, without Marx and Marxism. is is not because some new ideology has taken over. ere is no new ide1
Aleksa Santic, poet, born in Mostar in 1868, died 1924.
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ology. Furthermore, there is no new thought, no new philosophical system around which people would gather. at is why this emptiness, this vacuum appeared. Apart from Habermas, Marcuse and the Frankfurt School, Karl Popper and Jacques Derrida in Europe, and Rorty in the USA, there are no more serious thinkers. We have thus entered new era in this way, without critical theory of the society, without consciousness, without morality, solidarity and freedom, but with the destroyed Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre, with Dayton Bosnia, with destroyed Iraq, with the Hague Tribunal, with Guantanamo, with a rich diversity of ways to exploit and torture people, with AIDS and with unstoppable poverty. While one part of the world grabs more and more capital, the other part is starving to death. Millions of casualties and destruction are a price to be paid for this new world, since itrequires oil and rivers of human blood to maintain its selfish transient life.
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DISCUSSION Ivan Ilchev: ank you Prof. Repovac. I think that the papers we heard this morning have raised a number of important and interesting questions. In fact, as Professor of Modern Balkan History at the University of Sofia, I have always had the problem of defining the Balkans, and I think that this morning we have heard a number of papers, which prove that the definition of the Balkans isn’t a geographical one, but is rather tied very closely with imagery, attitudes, mentality, etc. I am very glad that we heard papers on the inventing of the nations in the Balkans, and on the fruitful fieldfor which there is no translation in any of the Balkan languages – Gender Studies. I was particularly interested in the last paper we heard. Many times I have asked myself the question about the future of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in theEuropean community, and whether this state can conform to the already accepted models in Europe, or maybe we are all observers of a new model of state-building in Europe. You have the floor for questions. Wolfgang Hoepken: Again I have many remarks and questions to all papers. Perhaps this is the European colonial attitude Prof. Repovac spoke about. I would like to start with your paper, Prof. Repovac. You provided a depressing picture of BosniaHerzegovina. I agree with the problems you mentioned, but nevertheless I have a problem with their explanation and with ascribing those depressing results exclusively or partly to the Dayton Peace Accords and to the international community. Dayton has its deficits and you spoke about them very clearly. But Dayton I think did leave enough room for manoeuvring to achieve a better integration of Bosnia. But in my opinion this room for manoeuvring was constantly obstructed by the political interests of the local political elites. Of course, the Office of the High Representative might be criticised for their politics. How can you construct a democratic order if you are constantly interfering from above? But on the other hand, I think the little progress that has been made to a great extent has exactly been made due to the international intervention. Take the tax reform that is under way now, which for the first time is trying to overcome the entities’ borders; or the police reform, the military reform. e local elites of all the three ethnic
groups the two entities have oen waited for the decisions of the international communityand because they themselves have been unwilling and unable to undertake measures. And this is I think something that also has to be taken into consideration. My Institute for textbook research was involved for a couple of years in the change of textbooks in Bosnia. In those days we had thirteen Bosnian ministers of education in Bosnia; ironically the number speaks for itself. But they agreed on the guidelines for the textbooks of history and geography, and these guidelines will probably become a law. is is a very small step, a very small progress, which is also due to international intervention.
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As to your final remark on the end of the great philosophies, maybe the postmodernists are right that the time of great narratives is definitely over, but this is a different point. I also have remarks on some of the other papers and particularly to the two papers dealing with gender issues, which I found very interesting and stimulating and which are of course a very difficult topic. But Mr. Momose wrote at the end of his paper that the process of establishing the patriarchal gender order led to sexual violence, or that the result of this process was sexual violence. I wonder if this really isplausible. e patriarchal order isn’t an order that necessarily provokes violence. You can easily argue the other way round. Maybe it is the destruction of the traditional patriarchal order in the Balkans during the twentieth century that has led to increased sexual violence in society. So I think that we should study social change in the pre-war society in gender terms and the actual violence before we come to such a conclusion. Jorgen Nielsen: May I propose that we take questions and comments and then go back to the speakers for a round of responses? Antonina Zhelyazkova: I would like to ask Prof. Repovac a question that I always ask as a researcher: Where does the thin line run, the line that allows things to happen in a particular way rather than in another way? We spent all day yesterday discussing the name change in Bulgaria, the violence against Turks. Indeed, we lived through critical moments at the end of 1989 and at the beginning of 1990. For us and for outside observers alike, the possibility that we would start fighting in Bulgaria was very real. But we didn’t start fighting. I remember that a few months before the outbreak of war in Bosnia, I was visited by a group from Israel. ey were representatives of some commission, there were also people from Intelligence, and they askedme about my opinion: Was it possible that there would be war in Bosnia? I laughed and said, ‘at’s absolutely impossible!’ Moreover, when we were establishing our National Reconciliation Committee and were trying to prevent civil war in Bulgaria, we always cited this multiethnicity in Bosnia – for us Bosnia was a role model. I even remember telling them at the time that it was more likely that badthings would happen in Kosovo, as they did later. But I never thought that there could be civil war in Bosnia. So I am simply asking myself the question, why do things develop badly and lead to civil war in some places, but not in others? What happens to set things in motion? By the way, let me tell you that those people from Israel who spoke to me at the time heard me out and told me I was wrong. So that is why they would take action to evacuate Jews from Bosnia. And they did so before the beginning of the war. In other words, they knew that there would be war in Bosnia. Elton Skendaj:I have two question-points to Toni. e first point concerns the major narratives we always hear in the Albanian and Kosovar press, narratives about the Serbian and Croatian elites living somehow in parallel national realities. Basically they
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claim that the other elite manipulated the facts and did everything to mobilise their own people. But at the same time they are ver y much mirror images of one another . So do you think that this might be true? And secondly, considering the latest elections when the Radicals and Socialists, aka nationalists, won a substantial vote in Serbia, what do you think the perception of a Greater Serbia is among (a) the elites, and (b) the population? Jorgen Nielsen: Some of the things that have been said make me speculate as well. In particular, Antonina’s comment about her Israeli delegation. I see many par-
allels here has withinternational Lebanon and Palestine. First is theover roleaof international peacekeeping. What peacekeeping achieved period of fiy–sixty years? I have sympathy with one of the comments that international peacekeeping at least puts an end to the conflict, but very oen it seems to freeze the conflict into place and then eventually ends up prolonging tensions and possibly leading to further outbreaks and repetitions of the original conflict. We have many cases to prove that: Israel and Palestine, Cyprus, currently possibly Azerbaijan, Armenia, the examples from the Balkans. It is interesting that your Israeli delegation didn’t accept your predictions; after all, in 1991 the Lebanese civil war had just ended and theIsraeli delegation could be making direct comparisonsbetween Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina.e Lebanese side of me would anyway suspect some conspiracy; I suspect they knew that weapons transfers were actually taking place secretly from the Lebanese warring parties to the Balkans at the time. It’s not an optimistic set of reflections, I’m afraid. Antonina Zhelyazkova: I am actually asking myself this question about Bulgaria because at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 I simply felt with my skin that we could truly start fighting at any moment. As founder of the National Reconciliation Committee, I somehow felt this for two or three months. In those months, for example, I personally was in danger and so was my family, and the National Bodyguard Service offered us protection. And I’m constantly trying to understand, did somebody decide that we wouldn’t start fighting, or was it us ourselves who did things in a way that made sure we wouldn’t start fighting? at is why I am asking and trying to understand from the Bosnian bitter experience how things stand. Hidajet Repovac: Before we hear more questions we should answersome. About Prof. Zhelyazkova’s question if somebody was interested to start the conflictsbetween nations and ethnic communities, or were they generated from within:I think there was a bit of both, but some initial spark must have come from the outside. I believe that the conflict in Bosnia started because it was in the interest of somebody from the outside to destabilise this space. At least I have such a feeling, because there were so many people against the war that they were even ready to die in the streets, protesting against the coming nationalism and war. Yet despite that the war began, and that means that somebody organised it. I have said it before: this nationalism which appeared in all parts of the former Yugoslavia was financed from the same purse. And a thick purse it was indeed! Whether this purse came from faraway Canada and the USA, or from Australia,
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or from some other countries, I am not certain, but I think it was from there because you know that the Chetnik movement is exceptionally strong in Canada and the USA. Chicago and Detroit are centres of the Chetnik movement, but also of Muslim nationalists. ey also live there and pay heavily for what is happening around here. So Bosnia-Herzegovina was destabilised by force because it was a model of a multinational, multicultural and multi-religious way of life. It was the only model, because all other countries have a mono-national character. Poland is mono-national, France – despite the immigrants from the Maghreb and the Flemish people – is also mono-national. Just try to go against nationalism ous it is. Or German nationalism, or French the English one. and you will see how dangerBosnia-Herzegovina was a small-scale Yugoslavia. It was also a geographical and cultural centre of Yugoslavia. Sarajevo University had 60,000 students before the war, and 26 faculties and art academies. is was a powerful force and it had to be destroyed, it had to be destroyed because it had a strong construction and was on a serious path towards Europe. is is all broken up now and a semi-protectorate has been set up, in which the High Representative decides what kind of policy should be pursued. I think it is his responsibility, and here I am not talking about a concrete person but about the office as such, that the national and nationalist establishment still runs Bosnia-Herzegovina – Serbian, Muslim, Croatian nationalists. ey have been given the right to rule Bosnia and nobody is replacing them. e international community wants an unstable Bosnia because Bosnia could be a model for a possible resurrection of Yugoslavia in some A dangerous because Yugoslavia wasthese better than what we have now. I amway. certain that it wasmodel also more democratic than current multiparty democracies are, which have cost many people their lives. I think that before the war Yugoslavia was much more democratic and European than we are now. Now the national parties direct us what to do and how and when and what to think. And this is a fatal situation, which is currently the norm not just in Bosnia but also in other ex-Yugoslav states that are barely able to survive economically. And this is the essence of our problem. Why should cultural or national-ethnic problems be the most important? Trust me that it would be easy to overcome them if the wages would rise to let’s say 3,000 or 4,000 USD, instead of being a few hundred dollars. Bosnia-Herzegovina indeed is a cultural-civilisational space. Bosnia became a Roman province in the year 9 AD. A Roman province can never be an uncivilised space. So, all that which existed before has been destroyed and the answer to your question, Antonina, is exactly this: somebody from the outside wanted it to happen. It was in somebody’s interest to destabilise the Balkans and I think this is the same model as the one used in Iraq and which is planned for Iran and Palestine and Syria and perhaps for some other parts of the world. Maybe alsofor North Korea, but this is less likely because they have nuclear weapons. You know, it is unbelievable but sometimes nuclear weapons can serve for humanitarian purposes. And sometimes they are used as weapons of mass destruction. We in Bosnia also seem to possess weapons of mass destruction, only in our case they are called nationalism. Nationalism is the most dangerous weapon, but I will talk more about this later if necessary.
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Jorgen Nielsen: I give the floor to other speakers from this morning. Toni Petkovic: If I may reply to Elton’s questions. You asked me one very easy question, and one very difficult. e easy question is were the Serb and Croat nationalisms basically mirror-images and did they support each other. And the short answer is yes, of course. at is relatively obvious. It is common knowledge that during the wars of succession on many occasions Milosevic and Tudjman actually cooperated and helped each other. To give one example, in today’s Serbia it is pretty widely if not known than at least suspected, that even the Croatian offensive against the Serbs of Croatia, which resulted in the Serbian exodus from Croatia, was a deal between the two of them. Of course, there is no proof and the events are still too recent to give any firm historical evidence, but it is at least safe to say that definitely both of these nationalisms fed and boosted each other. e very difficult question is about Greater Serbia and if Greater Serbia was the motive behind the dissolution and the wars that started. is question is extremely difficult and I can give a long answer but the short answer will, I think, probably surprise you. I think that nobody today, and even before, not even the nationalists in Serbia were actually guided by the ideal of achieving some Greater Serbian project, which would encompass certain territories from many years ago. No, this wasn’t the idea. But to explain this I should be very careful and go back to the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the early 1990s there were some very interesting analyses. People like Zoran Djindjic, Vojin Dimitrijevic and Vesna Pesic analysed the various options that Serbs had. To give you the end result, the option finally adopted by the Serbian political elite and Milosevic himself very much resembled the plan for establishing a Greater Serbia, but its roots were much, much different. It would be a simplification to explain everything by a project to establish some historical homeland. e Yugoslav federation could be dismantled according to two principles: first, along ethnic lines, so basically to divide the nations, and second, along administrative lines – that is, the republican borders. So this was the big debate in the 1990s, a debate that was going on not only in Serbia but also in Croatia, Slovenia and everywhere else: which of those two principles were they going to adopt? Reasonable analysts like the ones I mentioned said that whicheverprinciple you chose it was going to be disastrous for Serbs. If you chose ethnic lines in order to unite ethnically Serbian lands, then you would need to attempt to dissolve Croatia, you would commit a bloody massacre in Bosnia, but then, according to the logic of this principle, you would have to give up Kosovo to Albanians, divide Vojvodina and give Sandjak to the ethnic Muslims. A totally wrong way. But the other way – dividing Yugoslavia along republican borders – meant that millions of Serbs would be le out of Serbia in the independent Slovenia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia. So each way was leading to a disaster – a bloody one, as it turned out to be, or peaceful, but in both cases the results would be catastrophic from the point of view of Serbian national interests. What was in the end accepted, not just in Serbia but also in Croatia, was acombination, and this combination led to an ex-
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plosion. When it suits us, in cases in which our ethnic kinsmen live in other republics, we will argue for an ethnic principle, and in other areas, such as Kosovo, it will suit us to argue for republican borders. ese policies were adopted in all the republics, but especially in Serbia and Croatia. Which meant that they were aiming for the maximum. Reasonable people argued that (a) you are going to create bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia, and (b) you are going to lose it all. And I think now most of the prophecies of Djindjic and other smart guys from that period were basically proved to be true. Nobody achieved their goals and the whole country was dragged into a terrible nightmare with huge human, economic and political consequences. At the very early stages of the conflict the visionaries saw that you cannot apply these principles to try to create an ethnically unified state. e only reasonable approach was to create a state, which would be willingly shared by several nations. Djindjic warned that perhaps such state could exist without Slovenia, and perhaps without Macedonia too. But Serbs couldn’t have a viable state without the willingparticipation of at least Bosnian Muslims. ey argued that a war between Serbs and Muslims would destroy both nations. e outcome was precisely that. In terms of suffering from the war, there is no doubt that the greatest victims were the Bosnian Muslims. But in terms of the ability to live together in a normal state, Serbs are pretty much the worst losers in this war. is combination of the two principles that Serbs adopted created the illusion that there was some plan for creating some kind of Greater Serbia. But it was the completely illogical and self-destructive choice of principles that led to this totally catastrophic result. And I want to agree with many of the points that Prof. Repovac made, and say that I share his hope for some coexistence (if not reintegration, which is probably out of the question now), some form of cooperation among the states of the former Yugoslavia. en the only nation or state that could initiate, or mediate between all the sides could be Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims. And I want to ask him: Does he envisage any such initiative in the near or distant future at all, does he think that this is feasible at all, or our region is condemned to wait for many years before Europe forces the remnants of the fragmented state into some kind of cooperation and normal, civilised relations? Marko Hajdinjak: I have two comments. e first one is addressed to Prof. Repovac. Despite the fact that I agree with most of the things you said, I completely disagree with this idea that Yugoslavia was destroyed according to some devious plan from the outside. is is, I think, basically wishful thinking. It is the normal psychological reaction of all of us from the former Yugoslavia – to put the blame on somebody else in order to make it easier for ourselves. However, the truth is that Yugoslavia was destroyed from within. If I have to point at somebody to accuse directly, it was the Serbian and Slovenian communists who started the avalanche that later engulfed the whole country. Of course, there were some influences from the outside. For example, the Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, and Muslim diasporas, which contributed enormous
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amounts of funds to the nationalist sides engaged in the war, but this was basically add ing fuel to the fire. According to my best belief, the initial spark came from the inside. e second thing I would like to bring up is the character of the conflict. Usually in most of the scholarly discussions about the war, and even here at this forum, we present the war in Yugoslavia as an ethnic war or a war between different ethnic and religious groups. And I think we tend to oversimplify what was really happening. e conflict in the former Yugoslavia was played out on many levels. Ethnicity and religion were only one level of the whole thing. One level I can point at was the conflictbetween tradition and modernity – the patriarchal traditional clan system of the highlands, of the Dinaric Mountains, was at war with the multiethnic, peaceful societies of the lowlands. e second level was the war between villages and cities. Fine examples are the sieges and bombardments of Sarajevo, Dubrovnik, and Vukovar. Well, this wasn’t exactly the case with Vukovar, but Sarajevo and Dubrovnik were bombarded by villagers positioned in the hills and mountains around the city. e third level of the conflict was the war between newcomers and old settlers. Here the perfect case in point is Radovan Karadzic. As some of you may know, he is a Montenegrin, born in some god-forsaken village on the Durmitor Mountain. He came as a student to Sarajevo and settled there. He claimed to be a poet and in one his poems he expressed his contempt for and fear of the city. He wrote that ‘we people from the Durmitor Mountain are free-spirited’ and he compared the city, Sarajevo, to a prison constraining him. And the fourth level I want to note is the symbiosis between political elites and organised crime, which waged war on the ordinary people of the former Yugoslavia. One of the gravest consequences of this war was total criminalisation, which lasted throughout the 1990s and still exists to a great extent in Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and to a lesser extent in Croatia. Dobrinka Parusheva: Marko’s remarks are also relevant to what I wanted to say in response to Wolfgang’s comment and question. e question is how should we interpret sexual violence during the Yugoslav wars, could we explain the spread of violence with the existence or, conversely, with the destruction of patriarchal order. e conflict between villages and cities, between highlands and lowlands is very much to the point. What happened even before the wars can indeed be viewed as a sort of change, as destruction of the patriarchal order and the patriarchal way of thinking. But we still shouldn’t forget that a large part of the population in the regions we are talking about is still rural and the patriarchal order and mentality has not only survived there but is being reproduced and, in my opinion, sometimes even grows stronger for one reason or another – especially in wartime. Moreover, in wartime deeper rooted, stereotypical ways of thinking will always grow stronger at the expense of new, modern, European if you want, ways of thinking. ere will always be a regression in people’s minds that is greater than it appears to be. For example, let us compare the relationship between the war and women in a historical perspective; for me it was very interesting to observe precisely this regression. Until the First World War women remained physically removed from any kind of
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combat operations. During the First World War – or, more precisely, even during some of the last wars in the nineteenth century – women became involved as nurses, and so on. In WWI men were replaced by women in the civilian sphere for the firsttime, with women replacing men when the men had to go to the front, and this was a new way of involving women in war. Next, in WWII, we see for the first time women serving on the front not only as medical workers. en at the end of the twentieth century, in the 1990s, women suddenly disappeared from the battlefield. Please correct me if I am wrong, but I personally cannot remember any photos or footage showing women ‘firing’ in any way. is problem can be interpreted in many different ways, but in my view what we had was retrogression. And this has quite a lot to do with the explanation involving the power of cultural codes, and the power and persistence of the patriarchal order and the differences between villages and cities, and so on. As to the violence against women before the war mentioned by Wolfgang, it is true that there was such violence both before and apart from the war. ere is no doubt that there was violence against women apart from the war – domestic violence, as there was and is in Bulgaria. And that is precisely why I think we need to focus more on the deliberate use of the techniques of violence against women aimed at ethnic cleansing rather than on individual cases of violence. By the way, a survey conducted by a Croatian organisation for women’s rights in 1994 found plenty of evidencethat there was violence not only against the other women but also against their own women. Croatian officers, Croatian servicemen abused Croatian women sexually, morally, psychologically – in otherwords, there are many layers, many levels at which the problem can be discussed. Antonina Zhelyazkova: I have a question to Ryoji and to Dobrinka, who have studied rape. We visited refugee camps to interview victims during the Kosovo crisis, and some Western foundations even proposed that we track down cases of rape during this war. But we didn’t find a single case of rape. It would be interesting to compare why there was rape in Bosnia but not in Kosovo. In Kosovo, just as in Bosnia, there are highlands, villages, cities, patriarchal order – who can you call clan-minded and patriarchal if not the Albanians in Kosovo – but Albanians didn’t rape Serbian women nor did Serbs rape Albanian women. In others words, there might be something else. Maybe rape is a conventional weapon, and since everybody chooses their own weapon, men in Bosnia chose this particular weapon while the Albanians in Kosovo opted for another type of weapon. I don’t know, I am asking you what you think. Wolfgang Hoepken: In line with what Antonina said, I think that the question of the cultural background of warfare for historians and anthropologists is a very fascinating one. Yet I think it is terribly difficult and I have the impression that we know very little about it and we tend to replace it sometimes with some vague hypothesis, like for example the hypothesis of the war of the villages against the cities. I mean that in the end the majority of victims came from the villages. In my understanding of the patriarchal order, it is characterised by regulated violence; by extremely regulated violence. e patriarchal order demands violence as
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a duty under certain circumstances but it prevents violence in others. What we had in the Yugoslav war was a totally unregulated violence; there were no borders between civilians and soldiers, no difference between soldiers and civilians who bear arms, no sanctions applied, a totally sanction-free space where you could virtually do anything without being punished. So this is a circumstance which could hardly be described in terms of an existing patriarchal order. Dobrinka Parusheva: Just a few words about Antonina’s question: I don’t have
an answer why there was no rape in Kosovo. But your comments reinforce the point I was trying to make: that because there was violence both before and apart from the war, we should concentrate on the deliberate attempts to pursue a policy of violence, on the attempts to turn violence into a technique and tool of achieving a particular political goal. Probably there wasn’t such a political goal in Kosovo. Antonina Zhelyazkova: Could there be demographic reasons for the rapes? Serbs were terrified by the demographic growth of the Albanians in Kosovo. Maybe they didn’t want to rape Albanian women because that would mean more Albanian births. Hidajet Repovac: I will answer Antonina’s question. I think Prof. Zhelyazkova is partly right when she says that rape was used as a weapon in Bosnia, because among several thousand female refugees from Srebrenica, the majority of them had been raped. So rape was a weapon that was supposed to contribute to the destruction of one ethnic group. Other issues I wanted to briefly talk about are the Dayton Agreement and the Hague Tribunal, and this is in connection with Marko’s remark that all the reasons were internal. e setting in which the Dayton Agreement was signed was the following: behind the table sat Franjo Tudjman, Slobodan Milosevic, who is now on trial in e Hague, and Alija Izetbegovic; behind them stood President Clinton, Holbrooke, and other architects of Dayton. In addition to Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic should probably also have been in the dock in e Hague, but most likely their death saved them from it. Nevertheless, they are the living proof that the concept [for destroying Yugoslavia] was designed outside. e Nuremberg trial of the Nazis was very quick, and all the accused received their verdict in a short period of time. But today in Bosnia we say that it is better to be a Hague indictee than to live in Bosnia. e Nuremberg trial was quick, but the trial in e Hague will go on for ten more years and the question remains whether Karadzic and Mladic, the main executors of the Bosnian war, will ever be t aken to e Hague. Why is this so when the world has at its disposal all possible means of bringing the criminals to justice? Why is this so? Precisely because they don’t want to stabilise Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav territories. If a genuine wish for stabilisation of this region existed, they would have been captured and punished a long time ago. And that is why I think that not everything started from within, but it was also directed from the outside by certain strategic goals.
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Ilona Tomova: It seems to me that we are still too close to the event, that it still hurts too much, that we are still confused and want to find simple and quick explanations for things very complicated. And that in this way we are mythologizing reality. We are inventing a unified international community that has evil designs for the Balkans and we are reproducing all myths of our homegrown nationalisms in whichwe all saw ourselves as victims of the Great Powers – ofall Great Powers at the same time. But this is also a question of our impotence; indeed, it seems very difficult for us to say, ‘we’re decent folks and we were very strongly against this war and tried to prevent it, but it happened despite our will and we must somehow explain this.’ Prof. Repovac is trying to give us not simply an answer. He isn’t saying that only the international community is to blame – there is no such very mythical and very united community. I remember how we explained things in Bulgaria in the 80s and 90s; we, too, used the international community as one of the main explanations for what had happened to us. We were trying to persuade ourselves that we weren’t really so bad, that we had a good heritage from our history which showed that we could be tolerant at times in which others weren’t. So how did this happen to us, why didn’t we react? And then we again saw this mythical outside community as a possible explanation. ey wanted to destroy communism, the reasoning went, and this justified all means. Nationalism as an ideology proved to be a very effective means and it was used full force everywhere in the Soviet bloc. And it succeeded, including in Bulgaria. Because I have been brought up on the ideology of Marxism, I would like us to see many other reasons too: our failure to cope with modernisation, with the very difficult problem of the industrialisation and modernisation of agriculture, our total failure in the field of humanism and of lending value and meaning to human life – the value of the ni dividual was problematic and priority was given to the collective. at is why we cannot look for the main reason outside. is is an easy solution but it doesn’t help us in any way. And it seems to me that the explanations must be so complex and multi-faceted that today we will invariably fail to find one ‘main’ explanation. But the idea that welfare and prosperity automatically solve cultural, language and national problems is an illusion too. Or some mythologized democratic order which we, unlike the West, don’t have and which, if we somehow manage to copy quickly, will immediately help us get rid of nationalism, ethnocentrism, chauvinism and so on – this is a myth too, it too is an attempt to find a quick fix in a very difficult situation, to shirk responsibility and to shi responsibility onto others. To claim that somebody else must make our decisions, that those decisions cannot be wrong, that they must be right, as if somebody from the outside could do it instead of us. It seems to me that what our discussion today shows is our impotence. Jorgen Nielsen: ank you very much. As it wasn’t a specific question and the time is running out, we got to stop at somewhere and I suggest we stop on that. ank you very much.
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Fourth Session:
Former Yugoslavia: War, State-Building and Demographic Fears – continued
Moderators: Prof. Wolfgang Hoepken Prof. Ekaterina Nikova
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ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN KOSOVA 1 AFTER THE NATOYUGOSLAV PEACE AGREEMENT Elton Skendaj Centre for Peace and Disarmament Education (CPDE), Albania In June 1999, Yugoslavia and NATO signed a peace agreement that ended the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, barred the Yugoslav and Serbian forces from Kosova, and practically made Kosova an international protectorate under UN administration and NATO protection. e UN Security Council declared that the international community would help build a multiethnic Kosova. Eighteen months aer the peace agreement, Kosova still remains a violence-torn place. e multiethnic idea is far from becoming a reality. Interethnic and intraethnic violence continues to undermine the security of Kosova. Interestingly, the context – that is, perpetuating violence aerthe war has formally ended – is similar to the one in the Rwandan case portrayed by Philip Gourevitch in his insightful bookWe Wish to Inform You at Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families is paper analyses. the violence in Kosova aer the war, its causes and possible solutions. Hundreds of people have been killed in Kosova since June 1999 for various reasons. e main reasons are: 1) the deep-seated animosity between Albanians, and Serbs and Roma, (Gypsies); 2) Political violence between Albanians; 3) rise of minality cri in the context of lack of law and order; and 4) inability of international structures to deal with the daily violence in Kosova. e future security of Kosova remains precarious.
Radicalised Interethnic Violence Most of the violence has been caused by retaliation between different ethnic groups. Because of the wartime insecurity many civilians and former combatants are well armed and refuse to be demilitarised. As the International Crisis Group points out in the Kosovo Report Card, ‘neitherwith the NATO-led Force (KFOR) nor the UN were prepared to deal effectively the violenceKosovo that unfolded in Kosovo aer the war as returning Albanian refugees sought revenge against Serbs.’2 e ap1 e terms ‘Kosova’ and ‘Kosovo’ are used interchangeably. ‘Kosova’ is the Albanian spelling, while ‘Kosovo’ is the Slavic and also international spelling. 2 International Crisis Group. Kosovo Report Card, 28 August 2000. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1587&l=1 (14 November 2005),1.
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proximately 800,000 Albanian refugees that returned to Kosova had been driven away with impunity by the Yugoslav army and Serb paramilitary forces. e general perception of Albanians was that the Kosova Serbs participated in the killing and helped the Milosevic regime implement its chauvinistic policy. Albanians also claimed that Roma were looting their homes and lands, allying therefore with Serbs. Albanian retaliation against Serbs and Roma has been severe. Serbs and Roma have been forced either to flee Kosova or to live in separate enclaves guarded by NATO forces. Serb violence after the war toward Albanians has been documented as well, but at a ratio of about one to ten cases of Albanian violence against Serbs. A report by Amnesty International insightfully claims that: A ‘ lthough the frequency of violent incidents, particularly against minorities, was reduced between January and June, part of the reason for this may simply have been the increased separation of the communities.’3 Systematic attacks upon the Serb population, and to a lesser extent upon the other non-Albanian minorities, show that there are elements in the Kosova Albanian population that want Kosova to be purely Albanian. ese elements could be put in two broad categories which are not necessarily exclusive: a) Albanian individuals who want to pursue their personal vendettas following the decimation of their own families, and b) the Kosova Liberation Army which, even though it claims to have been demilitarised, has been targeting minorities while using their wartime mentality. e situation of the Roma people is very insecure as well. Attacks on Roma often consisted of hand grenades thrown into their yards or houses. An example cited by the AI report is that of the 72-year-old Axhije Agush from Gjilan. She lived with her husband in one of the former Roma quarters of the town, which most of Roma had already fled. A NATO soldier stood guard a few metres from her house, since one of the tasks of the international mission is to protect the minorities in Kosova. A hand grenade was thrown into her yard on 28 April 2000. Axhije died by the time she reached the hospital. e murderer remains unidentified. Stories like this galvanise the minorities and force them either to flee or to segregate themselves even more. e price of both options is very high. If one flees, one becomes a refugee living at the lowest possible level of human standards. On the other hand, there is a limit to segregation, since Kosova is a small land with little or no open spaces for frontiers. e international forces did not predict this kind of violence well and therefore did not have a coherent strategy for coping with it. ‘International officials, nevertheless, knew that Serbs who had taken an active part in the war would flee and that some Albanians would seek revenge for the murderous campaign Serbs had waged against them during the war.’4 e massive Serb exodus was a surprise to all but Albanians who claimed that the criminals were the ones to leave. ‘Humanitarian officials who entered Amnesty International, Concern Europe January – June 2000 . Report-EUR, 21 August 2000. http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engEUR010032000 (14 November 2005), 1. 4 International Crisis Group. Kosovo Report Card, 28 August 2000. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1587&l=1 (14 November 2005),15. 3
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Kosova on the first day reported that some roads were already clogged with fleeing Serbs, a phenomenon they called – comparing the Serb flight to that of Albanians going in a different direction only a few weeks previously – ‘tractors in reverse.’’ 5 Twenty thousand Serbs le in the first fieen days aer the war, followed by another 130,000 in the next fieen months.
e Collective Guilt Concept Balkan intellectuals attribute the radicalisation of ethnic groups during conflict at least partly to theCollective Guilt idea. If a few Albanians did something wrong, then all Albanians are presumed to have done the same wrong. An issue under dispute becomes personal first and collectivised later. Language reflects this kind of transformation. ‘All Albanians are terrorists,’ Serbian propaganda said during the 1990s. ‘All Serbs are paramilitary and therefore murderers,’ Albanians claim aer the Kosova war. ‘All Gypsies looted and helped the occupiers, those bastards!’ is another common claim I hear during my travels in Kosova. e individual therefore is just part of an ethnic spectrum, not a ray of light of its own. e other side of the coin is the inability of most Kosovars of all ethnicities to take personal responsibility for what is happening around them. Hundreds of years of domination by foreign powers have created a mentality that avoids personal guilt and puts the blame for all victimisation and problems on outside impersonal systems. A popular joke goes like this: Aman is walking in the street and he stumbles upon a stone and falls flat on his nose. ‘Damn government,’ says he, ‘when will we finally have roads without stones?’ Scapegoating relieves everyone from guilt and produces self-righteousness to justify resisting and fighting the others.
Political Violence e end of the war also lied the lid of internal political polarisation in Kosova. Albanian parties rely on the personality cult of their leader in order to assert themselves and gain legitimacy in a cultural context that fosters authoritarian masculine values. Most of these leaders take criticism personally and a culture of in-party loyalty fosters groupthink. Strong schismsoccur when two potential leaders quarrel.e main visible result is the lack of political dialogue between the main parties. Another visible manifestation is the killing of senior politicians. e Kosovar leaders play the power game in zero-sum terms. e quest for independence united all fronts before and during the war. Aer the war, the differences have become visible. According to the Kosovo Report Card, the international community was afraid that there would be a civil war between the radical followers of the Kosova Liberation Army and the moderate members of the majority party of the Democratic 5
Ibid. 15.
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League of Kosova (LDK). e leaders of these two parties, aci and Rugova, harbour personal grudges toward each other. eir followers harbour collective grudges as well. A number of local politicians have been murdered in the past year, mainly because of their political status. An example is the killing of Xhemal Mustafa on 20 November 2000. Mr. Mustafa, according to UN reports, was a spokesman for Rugova and head of the Kosova Information Centre. He was shot and killed outside his apartment. ekillers remain unidentified.6 e political message is clear: ‘Rivals need to be silenced, and even eliminated if they speak too much.’ Virtually all political parties have condemned this murder, but the implicit violent message is well understood by the Kosovars.
Policing Kosova e slowness of the process of policing Kosova has badly affected security in the region. Serbian police fled Kosova aer the war and a combination of international and Kosovar police was supposed to fill the gaps. As a BBC news report claims, ‘Kosova was supposed to get 4,700 international police to establish law and order, but there were less than 2,400 as of February [2000]. is means that KFOR [Kosovo Force of NATO] which numbers about 40,000 troops, has had to assume a police role which was never intended.’7 e quality of the international force varies greatly, and many international policemen can speak neither English nor Balkan languages. Many local Kosovars therefore do not regard this international force as capable of enforcing security inside the region. Currently, international experts are training local police. A 4,000-strong Kosovo Police Service (KPS) is under formation. Of the 350 recruits that graduated in March 2000, fieen percent come from the non-Albanian minorities. As most of the crimes are related to ethnic violence, the police are reluctant to arrest ethnic Albanians. e judges, who are also mainly Albanian, have not shown particular interest in putting them in prison. e prisons are overcrowded as it is. Mere criminality is fostered as well in this climate of lawlessness. If society continues to be polarised, such double standards will go on. Recommendations for Change
1) To counter the Albanian impatience with slow change, the international and Kosovar community need to be convinced that change will be slow, and therefore short-term goals need to be differentiated from the long-term ones. 2) e short-term goal of achieving law and order has to be prioritised in Kosova. UNMIK Bringing Peace to Kosovo News Reports.UN deputy head in Kosovo condemns murder of local politician. 24 November 2000. http://www.unmikonline.org/archives/news11_ 00.htm#2411 (10 November 2004). 7 Kosovo: An Uneasy Peace. BBC news. 12 March, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/kosovo_fact_files/default.stm (25 October 2002), 1. 6
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3) e idea of multiethnic communities needs to be replaced in the short term with a separative peace where both communities will have minimal contact with each other. 4) Projects that focus on the long-term goals of building civil society mechanisms and enhancing multiethnic future solutions need to be built on an orderly, economically better off society. 5) Workshops that include the elderly and youth leaders of the main political parties need to be organised in order to emphasise the value of partnership and cooperation. 6) Internally displaced minorities need to receive some remunerative help from the government. 7) Media and civil society need to promote the doctrine of individual responsibility and downplay the doctrine of collective guilt. 8) Collect more weapons from the civilian population, even if they need to be bought. 9) Create monetary and social incentives for local policemen and judges to enforce the law. 10) Other.
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THE ISSUE OF KOSOVA AND THE MINORITIES Shkelzen Maliqi Centre for Humanitarian Studies ‘Gani Bobi,’ Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) e NATO intervention in Kosova (1999) was indeed inevitable and necessary, as was the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina a few years earlier. If the international community had chosen to stay on the sidelines on both of these occasions, Bosnia and Kosova would have experienced even greater destruction and the consequences for the international community would have been shameful and unacceptable. Kosova was quite lucky in the sense that the decision to intervene was made faster and the international community was more decisive than in the case of Bosnia, where it hesitated far too long for four years. e experience of Bosnia and the quickness and decisiveness of the intervention helped keep the number of victims and the levels of destruction in Kosova on a scale ten times lower than in Bosnia. It can also be said that the Kosova intervention was somewhat motivated by the international community’s guilty conscience about the ethnic cleansing and violent partitions in Bosnia. Aer the Dayton agreement (1995) effectively legalised the Serb aggression and the massive ethnic cleansing and the genocide against the Bosnian Muslims, in 1998 and 1999 Serbs were not allowed to repeat the same scenario in Kosova. NATO intervened in Kosova to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, but it also intervened to fix the mistakes that had been made in Bosnia. e interventions in Bosnia and Kosova ended with the establishment of two types of ad hoc protectorates that at the time were considered unprecedented in international relations. ese protectorates helped stop the conflicts, stabilise the situation, and reconstruct social and economic life. Yet even so, in some crucial aspects both the protectorates can be described as improvisations and experiments. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, what was created aer Dayton was a fragile union where the ethnic entities were powerful, while the central government became rather formal and powerless. It still remains questionable whether the international community can impose, and how long will it need to impose, a more stable, efficient and organic functioning of this composite state. In Kosova, the protectorate has been built on thebasis of an unprincipled compromise between the NATO forces and theBelgrade regime. By June 1999, theNATO bombardments and international political pressure forced the Milosevic regime to submit to NATO’s demands. Milosevic withdrew his armed forces and his administration from
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Kosova and they were replaced with the international Protectorate missions (UNMIK, KFOR…). UN Resolution 1224 made a concession to Milosevic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was still granted sovereignty over Kosova. is concession has had, and continues to have, stagnating consequences for Kosova and the region. *** Kosova remains hostage to its past. ere are still blockades, and some problems seem irresolvable. Probably the greatest factor in this stagnation is the ethnic perspective one the Albanian future of Kosova. majority believes that the only solution should be Kosova’s independence. e Serb minority, supported by the Serb government, sees Kosova only as part of Serbia. Serbs say that they cannot live in an independent Kosova that will be dominated by Albanians; Albanians say that they do not want and cannot live in a Serbia dominated by a Serb majority. On the other hand, the international protectors insist on a model of multiethnic democracy, but the instruments and tactics that they have been using have not helped their cause. By leaving the issue of the final status of Kosova open, the international community has le open and alive the two irresolvable aspirations. is has resulted in the creation of walls of separation by dividingthe Serb enclaves from the Albanian-populated territories. For many years, UNMIK has tolerated the parallel Serb institutions in Northern Kosova and in the enclaves, adding further confusion to the situation. Butgloomy I thinkdescription that the current situation Kosova slightly more advanced than the I have just given. in I think thatisthe dilemma is no longer Independent Kosova or Kosova part of Serbia, simply because the second option is not wanted nor is it possible any longer. I cannot see any return to the days of Serb control over Kosova. And this is not only because Albanians say so, but also because this solution is not preferred either by the international community or by Serbs. In the Serb discourse on Kosova the following alternatives exist: Kosova’s independence or its division. In the international discourse the following alternatives exist: self-governance (independence) or continuation of the international protectorate. In the Albanian discourse there is no alternative to independence. epolitical parties and the citizens are not considering other options or compromises. *** Kosova, although it is not a state yet, is a strong candidate for gaining the status of a state, and thus its independence. With the help of international factors (UNMIK, the OSCE), Kosova has already built, or is in the process of building, the structures of a local governance and system that has most of the elements and instruments of statehood. e international community has a mandate to build a system that is officially called ‘substantial autonomy.’ is phrase means a mixed status: more than large-scale autonomy and less than an independent state. It is a temporarysystem that is open but that objectively leads towards independence, because the protectorate cannot contin-
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ue endlessly. And of course – Kosova’s return into Serbia’s hands cannot be imagined without the risk of a new war. According to the international community, whatever the status of Kosova should be, the system should be based on ‘substantial’ institutions: parliament, president, government, supreme court, police, etc. eseinstitutions are surely the representatives of an independent political and economic system. By gaining more competence, they will logically aim toward full independence from the international protectors and from Serbia. In the past, Kosova had a similar dual status. In Tito’s Federal Yugoslavia it was an equal federal unit, while simultaneously being autonomous within Serbia. According to the 1974 Constitution, Kosova had all the functions and rights of a republic, but not the name: it was called an autonomous region. is was the compromise of Tito’s regime. In contrast to Tito, who did not want to name Kosova a Republic because of opposition from Serbia, today’s international protectors have no reason to oppose the Republic of Kosova. e Republic would be a logical finalisation of the aspirations of Kosova’s majority population. In fact, there are already precedents of created republics. In Bosnia, Serbs themselves have created Republika Srpska, and it is recognised internationally even though it wasestablished violently, through horrendous crimessuch as the Srebrenica massacre. Some international factors have consistently favoured the option of expanding the Union of Serbia and Montenegro by adding Kosova to it. According to this idea, the Republic of Kosova would be partof the Union based on the Bosnian model. ree years ago, the European Union had insisted on the creation of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro by giving it a three-year test-term. Now that the deadline is expiring, it seems obvious that the experiment is not working. eideathatKosovashouldbecomepartoftheUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro is a utopia. Not only is it unacceptable inKosova, but it is also strongly opposed even by Serbia and by Montenegro. ese two countries are in fact closer to a divorce between themselves. In Serbia there are more and more serious voices that want to get ridof the ‘untrustworthy’ Montenegro and to get rid of the burden of Kosova. Dobrica Cosic, the main ideologue of modern Serb nationalism, published a book about Kosova last year that has sold alot of copies in Serbia. In the book, he warns the Serbian state and public opinion that Kosova as a whole is lost for Serbia and that the best option for Serbs is to achieve a compromise that would divide Kosova. e latest boycott of the elections by Serbs, which was initiated by the Serbian government and the Orthodox Church, was motivated by the belief that the international protectorate in Kosova is leading Kosova towards independence. Serbia is now attempting to build a consensual policy that would condition Kosova’s independence with a decentralisation process that would lead to Kosova’s partition. e minimum that the more realist forces in Serbia would agree upon would be to ensure an autonomous Serb unit in an independent Kosova. e maximum demand is that the northern part of Kosova and the monasteries become part of Serbia, while the rest of Kosova can choose its fate whether by becoming an independent state or by joining Albania.
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ere are other rather misty ideas that suggest that the direction of processes might change entirely if all of the places under protectorate – meaning those with border issues and aspirations, or with problems of internal divisions, such as Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosova, and Macedonia – become part of the EU undera special favouring procedure, not within the current procedures of membership. As far as I know, there have been no attempts to build and clarify the models and procedures of such a policy. I have heard for example the idea that Kosova should be declared a ‘territory under the protectorate of the EU.’ Knowing what kind of problems Brussels has with the procedures of approving new ideas and projects, this project seems unachievable in the short term. e problems of the Balkans are too urgent for us to start initialising the path to the EU in this problematic way. But the EU can make precedence by overthrowing the current rigid terms for membership. It can decide for example to create an instrument of an ad hoc limited membership with time limits and deadlines. As such, Kosova and the other problematic territories could gain membership in the EU (not as a promise, but as a formal agreement) by starting with low-scale membership that would rise each year according to the scale of fulfilment of standards necessary and applicable to all other EU states. But, this idea has small chances of winning support in Brussels. *** However, the EU seems to have recently decided to move forward on the status question. At the EU summit on 21 February, the EU issued a statement that a return back to the way things were in 1999 cannot be a solution for Kosova. ismeans that aer the end of the international protectorate the possibility for Kosova to return to Serbian control is excluded. Meanwhile, it remains an open question whether it will become a totally separate state, or whether it will have some sort of conditional independence. e concession made to the vast majority of Kosova’s citizens – Albanians and other ethnic groups such as Turks, Bosnians, Gorans and Ashkali who request independence from Serbia – is now being conditioned by a request to improve the position of the minorities who dislike the idea of an independent Kosova. e status of Serbs, Roma and other minorities in Kosova should be guaranteed and defended with legal instruments and effective political measures that would create the possibility for free movement of minorities and the unconditional realisation of their human rights and freedoms. e current condition of the Serb minority in Kosova is a consequence of the NATO intervention in 1999. According to the Kumanovo agreement of 9 June 1999, all Serbian forces, without any exception, were supposed to leave Kosova – the military, the police, and the paramilitary groups. And since virtually the entire Serbian population in Kosova was armed and recruited in various military and paramilitary forces, this caused an initial massive retreat of Serb citizens as those who had been mobilised to fight went away together with their families. e quick and massive departure
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of Serbs and Roma who had served actively in Milosevic’s regime was catalysed even further when the armed Albanian forces took effective control of the situation on the ground, besides the presence of NATO troops. Also, the massive and quick return of the Kosovar Albanians expelled to neighbouring countries – in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro – resulted in increased pressure on the remaining Serbs due to the fact that a large part of the returnees had no homes or shelters of their own. Around 120,000 Albanian homes were burned or damaged by Serbian forces during the war, and upon their return these people entered the departed Serbs’ apartments and houses as well as pressured the remaining ones to leave – in extreme cases they committed crimes. e intervening NATO forces did not have sufficient power to establish some order in the sheltering policy, and this resulted in the emptying of all the cities from Serbs and Roma – the larger cities of Prishtina, Prizren, Gjakova, Peja, Gjilan were all emptied. To prevent the total exodus of Serbs, which was not the aim of the NATO intervention, a decision was made to create protective zones for Serbs in the regions where they were a majority – regions such as Northern Kosova and the northern part of the city of Mitrovica, as well as some other enclaves in Central and Southern Kosova. is measure stopped the Serbian exodus, and later even achieved to raise the number of Serbs residing in the enclaves. us, today it is calculated that around 60% of Serbs who had lived in Kosova before the war, although internally displaced, still reside in Kosova. However, they complain about the lack of freedom of movement and the obstacles they face in achieving their right to property. As far as the number of inhabitants of Kosova is concerned, no exact demographic data exist because the last census was in 1981. However, it is supposed that officials in Belgrade are manipulating with the figure of the number of Serbs who have fled Kosova – their estimate is 200,000. is cannot possibly be true, since in the 1990s the number of Serbs in Kosova in their entirety was less than 200,000. Nevertheless, the main problem that the Serbs in Kosova are faced with today is the issue of adapting to the position of a minority community. During the period when Serbia administered Kosova, from 1912 until 1999, Serbs had largely considered themselves as members of the majority, a constituent majority, while they served as instruments of the central government in Belgrade for control over the Albanians, whom they considered a ‘constituent minority’ – regardless of the fact that the ratio of Albanians in relation to Serbs was always 9 to 1. e ditch that divides Serbs and Albanians continues to exist because of the lack of a historical agreement between the two nations and the two administrations. Once there is mutual recognition between Prishtina and Belgrade– and an agreeable solution is found on establishing the status of the Serbs in Kosova as a minority and no longer as a constituent majority – there will be a good chance for effective improvement in the life conditions of the minorities. Also, this would create a generally more peaceful environment for survival, respect for political and cultural rights, and for the building of bridges in the sense of normal communication between two nations and two states.
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THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONI A AND THE FUTURE OF MULTIETHNIC SOCIET Y 26 eses) Vassil Penev Sofia University ‘St. Kliment Ohridski,’ Bulgaria I. Background 1. Two immigrant waves, in 1903 and 1913–1914, brought between half and one million people from Macedonia and race to the then Bulgaria and made them its citizens (subjects of the Principality and of the Kingdom). 2. e new state, the Republic of Macedonia, is of key importance for the stability of the whole Balkan region, and especially of the Western Balkans. Albeit blunted, ethnic contradictions are still smouldering. Conflicts based on ethbeenyears overcome. ey half are part of everyday life.have emigrated from 3. nicity In thehave last not twelve more than a million citizens the Republic of Macedonia, mainly to Northern and Central Europe as well as to North America. ese emigrants constitute about 20–25% of Macedonia’s population. e majority of them are of Albanian ethnic origin. is is a continuing trend, although many countries are imposing restrictions on immigration.
II.A Historical and Emotional Perspective 1. Present-day Macedonia is one of the few statesnamed directly and exactly after a territory mentioned in the Bible (see 1 ess. 1:7).1 is same Epistle of Apostle Paul reads: ‘And the Lord make you to increase and abound in love one toward another, and toward all men, even aswe do toward you…’ 2
(1 3:12). that Further on:is‘See that none render evil for evil any man; butess. ever follow which good, both among yourselves, andunto to all men’ (1 ess. 5:15).3 And still further: ‘Prove all things, hold fast that which is good. Abstain from all appearance of evil’ (1 ess. 5:21–22).4 e Holy Bible, King James’ Version, www.beliefnet.com Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 1 2
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2. Alexander the Great (356–323 BC) belongs to the symbols of the new Macedonian nationality. It is good to remember that in addition to his victorious campaigns, he has remained in history also as a statesman who wanted to build an empire where one people, uniting both victors and vanquished, would live in peace.5 Today it is obviously tragic that nobody seems to have listened to Apostle Paul, and that nobody seems to have grasped the essence of Alexander’s imperial ideal. 3. On 2 August 1944 the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM – Antifasistickoto sobranie na narodnoto osloboduvane na Makedonija) defined the future state as national within the framework of Yugoslav federalism. e Assembly did not resolve the issues of self-determination, freedoms, and equality of ethnic groups. 4. Aer the Second World War, the Republic of Macedonia was constituted as part of the Yugoslav federation. Its first Constitution of 31 December 1946 introduced socialist centralism in all spheres of public life. e next two constitutions, of 4 April 1963 and of 25 February 1974 respectively, aimed at encouraging a specific economic liberalisation and economic decentralisation, Tito’s ‘workers’ self-management,’ and decrease of communist party dictate over society. 5. In the whole period until 1991, Macedonia remained the poorest and economically most underdeveloped republic in the former Yugoslavia. eethnic groups (all of them) living in it suffered the pressure – ideological, national, religious – of the political centre in Belgrade. e political regime in Yugoslavia was more liberal than that in the Central and East European countries, but nonetheless remained highly repressive in character even aer its fall. 6. For about fiy years nobody perceived seriously the political dimension of the demographic, ethnic and religious realities. During that period the Albanian ethnic group turned out to be theonly one in Europe to increase several-fold.
III. Nowadays 1. Macedonia is governed according to the Constitution of8 September 1991. As a whole, this is a modern European constitution. It proclaims that Macedonia is a republic with a parliamentary form of government. is is the most unstable republican political system, but in 1991 any another system was hardly possible. e Constitution has been amended nineteen times in accordance with the Ohrid Framework Agreement. e constitutionally declared pursuit of civil equality of permanently coexisting Macedonians (Slavs, whom many consider to be simply speakers of 5
Le Petit Larousse. 1993. Paris: Larousse, p. 1118.
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a Bulgarian dialect), Albanians, Roma, Turks, Vlachs, Bosniaks, and others, proved insufficient to guarantee ethnic peace. 2. e lack of guarantees and regulation of political and civil rights and responsibilities of minorities leads to violation of the internal sovereignty of the state. On one third of its territory, taxes and fees are practically not paid. e state monopoly de facto does not function for almost one fourth of the population. 3. National minorities and ethnic groupsare entitled toself-determination. eir languages may be official on the local level. ey enjoy cultural autonomy. 6 e Ohrid Agreement has done even more in this respect, but the result remains unsatisfactory to this very day.7 In practice, disintegration is deepening in a context of guaranteed identity, but insufficient integration of ethnic groups into political and administrative structures. 4. Public opinion in Macedonia is uneasy. Slavs feel threatened and disheartened. ey do not see clear prospects for the state and for themselves. ey fear that they will eventually become a minority in their own country. ey think that Albanians are some sort of anarchists who are unable and unwilling to build and participate in modern state institutions. All this is increasing the pressure to emigrate. In Eastern Macedonia today one will rarely find a family that does not have at least one citizen of the Republic of Bulgaria among its members. 5. Economic and commercial contacts between the two main communities ha ve been minimised. e same applies to social contacts. ere is virtually no intermarriage. ere is a feeling of a sort of ‘Belgiumization’ of social contacts (the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution gives rise to precisely such processes). New divisions and social barriers between communities hinder the functioning of a unitary state. At the same time, attempts at overcoming these barriers trigger nationalistic outbursts. (Let us recall Struga and Kicevo in the autumn of 2004.) Nationalism among ethnic communities is incitedrom f 8 outside as well as by serious and modern authors in Macedonia itself. 6. Macedonia’s geographic surroundings also cause ethnic tensions. From the south, Greece has an interest in investing in Macedonia, but for fourteen years now it has been incapable of overcoming its own nationalism, remaining concerned with its illusionary claims to names and symbols. Greeks are also anxious about their Slavophone and Albanian minorities to the northwest and to the east of essaloniki. From the west, Albania is reluctant to engage in com6 See Articles 4; 8; 16 (1), 48 of the Statute. Statute of Republic of Macedonia. www.izbori. gov.mk/pretsedatelski2004/usavecel.php 7 See Ohrid Framework Agreement, 13 August 2001. 8 See Mitkov, Vladimir and Savo Klimovski. 1995. Политички и уста вен систем – основи (Political and Constitutional Systems: Basic Elements), Skopje: Prosvetno Delo, pp. 63–64.
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mon economic and infrastructure projects. From the north, Kosovo will remain a security threat, regardless of which of the three possible solutions for its status will be chosen. ese are: full independence; autonomy as a republic within the framework of the federation of Serbia and Montenegro; and longterm maintenance of its present status of an autonomous province andde facto a protectorate.9 Neither of the three is safe for Macedonia. Serbia remains a source of concern with its attempts at reviving the nostalgia for Yugoslavia, with its nationalism, and even as a transmitter of the Russian Orthodox idea. From the east, many Bulgarians are still experiencing irrational emotions for ‘their’ Macedonia. 7. e result of the referendum held on 7 November 2004 was positive, because it temporarily toned down national and ethnic tensions.10 8. e right-wing political space among Slavs is split among the remnants of VMRO, the People’s Party of former prime minister Ljubcho Georgievski, and the new party DRUM headed by Dosta Dimovska. 9. A local election campaign has already started in Macedonia.
IV. Questions to the Future 1. Will Macedonia succeed in affirming itself as a unitary nation state with guarantees both for individual and collective political rights and responsibilities? Allowing the existence of parallel, ethnic-based institutions, including universities, is counter-productive. Replicating the model of Bosnia-Herzegovina can only prove harmful.11 2. Will Macedonia be able to guarantee its borders (mainly the western and northern ones) in order to stop the negative influences and trafficking? Overcoming the ties with the insufficiently democratised and pro-Russian Serbia stands in the same context. Here we should also mention the need of regulating media influence on public opinion. 3. Is it possible to surmount the ideological, psychological and social intolerance between ethnic groups and religious communities? 4. Will the Macedonian political class succeed inpurging itself of traffickersand former terrorists while observing the requirements for ethnic participation?
See Hinkova, Sonja. ‘Prospects of Development of the West Balkans, ’ Report for the seminar on ‘e Future of the West Balkans’ held at the University of Sofia on 4 December 2004. 10 See Result of the Referendum carried out on 7 November 2004. See www.Dik.mk/ ?id=55 11 See Yankulova, Diyana. ‘e West Balkans Are No Longer the Powder-Keg of Europe, But Are Still Emanating Insecurity and Tension,’ Report for the seminar on ‘e Future of the West Balkans’ held at the University of Sofia on 4 December 2004. 9
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is is a very serious problem for all countries in the Western Balkans, because it discredits the very idea of democracy.12 5. Will the existence of overtly ethnic parties be gradually overcome? Will political representation be realised through the normal for Europe le-wing, right-wing and unsystemic political forces? 6. Will it become clear to everybody that the attempts at federalisation and cantonisation are neither an effective nor a well-intended solution for Macedonia? 7. Will the Euro-Atlantic community (that is how it is called in the Ohrid Agreement) realise that the only positive way to build a multinational society living in peace is by giving Macedonia and its citizens a clear and specific prospect of EU and NATO integration? is is necessary in order to put an end to national pessimism and ethnic mistrust! e fact that the peoples of Macedonia are used to living in multinational states is an additional argument. It is no accident that they are emigrating either to federations, or to traditionally ethnically tolerant societies and welfare states with high standards of living. 8. Will international investors realise that they stand to gain from the implementation of some major infrastructure projects in order to capitalise on the security and geopolitical position of the countries in the Western Balkans? And in order to involve those talented peoples in the globalising exchange of human values? ■ In conclusion, I would like to note that when I approached the Embassyof the Republic of Macedonia in Sofia for assistance in obtaining the new version of the Constitution and the Ohrid Agreement, I was politely informed that a copy of the Constitution was provided only aer an official written request together with an explanation what it would be used for. at is why I thank my colleague and friend from the Focus Agency Dimitur Mitev for giving me the documents and materials used in this paper.
See Dronzina, Tatyana. ‘Global Terrorism in a Globalising World: New reats to Democracy in the Balkans,’ Report for the seminar on ‘e Future of the West Balkans’ held at the University of Sofia on 4 December 2004. 12
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MACEDONIA BEYOND OHRID: CONFIDENCE, GUNS AND THE REFERENDUM Ilija Milcevski Euro-Balkan Institute, Macedonia e Ohrid Framework Agreement ended the violent conflict in Macedonia in 2001. It was signed on 13 August 2001 by the leaders of the four main political parties in Macedonia at the time and the former president, Mr. Boris Trajkovski. emain concept of the Agreement was not only finding an acceptable compromise (which would also mean that every side had to ‘sacrifice’ some of its legitimate demands); in fact, it was much more an idea of conflict transformation, which means that the legitimate interests of both sides were equally respected and that their fundamental rights were equally protected. is is most obvious in Article 1 of the Agreement: Basic Principles. e first two paragraphs of this Article (1.1. and 1.2.) aimed at addressing the fears of the ethnic Macedonian side in the conflict and at providing protection of their vital interests. Paragraph the use of violence in pursuit of political aims (both2 sides rejected the use1ofcondemns violence ‘completely and unconditionally’), while paragraph guaranteed the unitary character of the State and its sovereignty and territorial integrity. is is very important, especially in the eyes of the Macedonians, as a strong reassurance that the Ohrid Framework Agreement would not be a first step towards federalisation and disintegration of the state (through renewed violence ‘when the time is right’), as various pan-Albanian ethno-nationalistic programmes demand, but that it would enhance the long-term stability of the country. On the other hand, paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 1 addressed the long-term demands put forward by the Albanians in Macedonia in the 1990s. Paragraph 3 reaffirms that ‘[t]he multi-ethnic character of Macedonia’s society must be preserved (which, in fact, was never denied by Macedonians during the 1990s – there were no attempts at assimilation or other similar policies that could endanger the multi-ethnic character of Macedonian society)the and1990s). reflected in public4life’ (which was oen denied under different pretexts during Paragraph underlined Macedonia’s need of a ‘Constitution [that] fully meets the needs of all its citizens’ (the Constitution from 1991 was adopted without the votes of ethnic Albanian members of Parliament, which was oen emphasised by the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, and was considered as some sort of ‘srcinal sin’ of the state against them and as the main source of their discontent). ese basic principles defined in Article 1 (including paragraph 5, which calls for development of local self-government) were to be implemented by a series of concrete
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steps and measures, legal and constitutional amendments, which were specified and timetabled in the rest of the Agreement and its annexes. e implementation of the Agreement, however, has not proceeded as smoothly as it was designed to. ere are several reasons for that. e first one is the difference in the perception of the Agreement between the ethnic Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians. If at first the Agreement was praised by both sides as a mature step towards interethnic reconciliation, ‘which stopped the war before it had even started on a full scale, without winners or losers’ (as the vice president of the Democratic Party of Albanians, Mr. Menduh aci, said) and ‘finally fulfilled all demands of Albanians in Macedonia’ (according to Mr. Abdurahman Alliti, the former president of the ethnic Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity), later the attitudes of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians towards the Agreement changed in opposite directions. On the ethnic Macedonian side, the Agreement became an object of widespread criticism aimed not so much at the content of the Agreement, but much more at the procedure of its creation and at the circumstances under which it was signed. e most extreme critics even described the Agreement as ‘an act of capitulation signed under threat of weapons and under foreign pressure.’ is shi in public opinion and in the public perception of the Agreement has had its consequences for the ethnic Macedonian political elites, which have become much more cautious about fully supporting, promoting and implementing the Agreement. Moreover,some of the signatories of the Agreement have changed their previous positions and have begun treating the Agreement as a long-term death sentence for Macedonia. As a result (but also under the influence of other factors), the process of implementation of the Agreement has been delayed, failing to meet the scheduled timetable. On the other hand, the ethnic Albanian political elites have become more radicalised in their demands and rhetoric, both because of the sense of triumph that swept through the ethnic Albanian population (largely provoked by the apathy and nihilism of the ethnic Macedonians) and of the appearance of new, more radical competitors within the ethnic Albanian ‘political camp’ – promotion of the Democratic Union for Integration founded by the former political and military leaders of the National Liberation Army, as well as the rise of the ‘Albanian National Army’ and other illegal paramilitary groups. is ‘new radicalism’ is expressed in two forms. e first one (mainly expressed by some minor political parties and illegal groups, but sometimes even by politicians from the two main political parties of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia) is open rejection of the Agreement and demands for a federalisation of the state, or other ‘territorial solutions to the ethnic problems.’ e second one (oen expressed by the ‘mainstream players’ in the ethnic Albanian ‘political camp’) is formal support of the Agreement and frequent demands for its ‘full implementation,’ while at the same time completely neglecting some of its parts and even some of the Basic Principles (such as the complete and unconditional rejection of violence in the political process, complete disarmament of the illegal armed groups, and return of refugees). On the other hand, other parts of the Agreement are being subjected to ‘creative inter-
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pretation’ resulting in new demands that were never agreed in Ohrid although some of them were put forward on the ‘negotiating table.’ ese processes have made the full implementation of the Agreement as well as consolidation of the state and society (especially reconciliation and confidence building) more difficult than expected. One can never say that it has proved unsuccessful, but it has not yet come to the point where a repeat of the crisis would be totally impossible. e symptoms of a possible repeat of the crisis have been present in the field ever since the Agreement was signed. e ‘former crisis regions’ are not yet under the full control of the government institutions. Ethnically mixed police patrols are present there, but they are not yet fully effective in providing a satisfactory level of security in the areas. is is not due to their ethnically mixed structure but is much more the result of an overall inefficiency of the institutions of the state. Policemen (especially the ethnic Albanian ones) oen live in those regions and thus cannot risk interfering in the ‘business’ of local crime bosses (or former and present c‘ ommanders’ of various armed groups), and confronting them when they are not backed up by a fully effective state apparatus. In such cases, police patrols are more likely to turn a blind eye to the illegal activities in the areas of which they are in charge. e most dangerous consequence of this growing inefficiency of the police is a further spreading of these ‘grey areas’ from the former crisis regions to the regions that remained untouched during the conflict in 2001. e main reason for this increase in criminal activities, violence, murders and general level of insecurity is the very large number of illegal weapons (sometimes estimated at more than 100,000 pieces of different weaponry), which have remained in the hands of civilians aer the conflict. Although required to do so by the Framework Agreement (which they praised and supported), members of the National Liberation Army never surrendered all their weapons. e number and quality of the weapons collected during NATO’s Operation Essential Harvest (for disarmament of the NLA on a voluntary basis, as part of Allied support for the Framework Agreement) were far below the previous estimates of the size and capability of the NLA reported by various NATO officials. e operation was declared successful but the problem of illegal weapons remained and became more and more obvious aer NATO’s mission ended. Hence, another campaign for voluntary disarmament was organisedonly two years after Essential Harvest, this time by the Macedonian government and on the whole territory of the country. e results of this campaign were not much better than the previous ones, although the government declared them successful ‘in comparison with other countries in the region.’ e general level of insecurity, the criminal activities, and the large number of illegal weapons have created an environment conducive to the outbreak of several ‘lowintensity’ crises, which threatened to rekindle the interethnic conflict. e most intensive ones took place in the Lipkovo region in the summer of 2003 and in the village of Kondovo at the end of 2004. ey were caused by former low-level commanders of the NLA (some of them with a criminal background), who declared their lists of political demands at the later stages of the crises. ose situations were painfully reminiscent
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of the beginning of the armed conflict in February and March 2001, especially when some ethnic Albanian politicians declared their understanding for the actions of the former commanders and supported some of their demands. Such actions have sent a clear message that violence is yet to be eliminated from the political process, and have significantly lowered the level of interethnic confidence. e low level of interethnic confidence remains one of the main problems in Macedonia aer the Framework Agreement. Politics is still highly ‘ethnicised,’ and almost every important issue acquires an ethnic dimension and becomes a problem in interethnic relations. e most telling example is the new law on the territorial organisation of municipalities, which once again divided public opinion along ethnic lines. is law was part of the new legislation designed to promote decentralisation and local self-government, which was one of the last legislative obligations under the Framework Agreement. While the other laws in this package were adopted by Parliament without too many problems, the law on the new territorial organisation provoked the biggest interethnic political crisis since the end of the conflict in 2001. e main cause was the highly controversial negotiation procedure by which the new law proposal was draed. e negotiation procedure had two major flaws – its format and its main principles. eotherOhrid-relatedissuesandlawproposalswerenegotiatedthroughprocedures that included all major political parties (signatories of the Agreement), under the auspices of the President and with support by the facilitators (‘special representatives’) from the USA and the EU. is time, the composition of the negotiators was changed to include only representatives of the parties ni the ruling coalition (more precisely, the Social Democratic Union, the main ethnic Macedonian partner, and the Democratic Union for Integration, the ethnic Albanian partner). is new format le out two important and very influential parties, the ethnic Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE and the ethnic Albanian DPA, which did not hesitate to show their strong discontent with the result of the negotiations – the newlaw proposal on the territorial organisation of municipalities. e other major flaw of the procedure was the main principle under which the new municipalities were designed – the ethnic principle. e introduction of the ethnic principle as the main principle in the negotiations turned the process of redesigning municipal borders into a sortof ethnically motivated ‘gerrymandering’ and led to a ‘zero-sum game’ between the negotiators, who were also under strong time-pressure as well as pressure coming from reports in the media that various armed groups from Kosovo were crossing the Macedonian border (as a clear example of demonstration of force). e result of this zero-sum game was what the media described as a ‘0:3 loss’ for the Macedonian side, and this triggered the strongest wave of discontent and radicalism on the ethnic-Macedonian side since the Framework Agreement was signed. is strong dissatisfaction was manifested in the support for the civic initiative for a referendum aimed at overthrowing the new law. e referendum was supported by a strange-looking coalition that united even some formerly bitter rival politicians and parties, intellectuals and civic organisations, fierce opponents and strong supporters of the Framework Agreement. Initially, even
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some ethnic Albanian politicians from the DPA pledged their support for the referendum initiative (because of their own discontent with the new law proposal), but they later withdrew their support, mainly because of the radical rhetoric used by the ethnic Macedonian side (especially at the beginning of the campaign), but also under diplomatic pressure from the international community. at marked the referendum as ‘single-ethnic,’ which was widely used by the government officials and the representatives of the international community in their campaign against the referendum. e campaign ultimately proved successful and the referendum failed because of the low voter turnout. Probably the main factor that decided the fate of the referendum was the direct support for Macedonia inits thirteen-year-long ‘name dispute’ with Greece, which the US demonstrated by its decision to start using ht e constitutional name of the country (Republic of Macedonia) instead of the ‘temporary reference’ (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in American documents and bilateral communication. is decision allayed the deepest fears of ethnic Macedonians about their country’s uncertain future (and even about an ‘international conspiracy’ against them), which were sparked by the new law on territorial organisation (which was seen as a division of the country along ethnic lines) and were therefore one of the main driving forces behind the referendum. e referendum failed but the problems of ‘ethnicised’ politics (including the issue of the territorial organisation of localself-government) remained. In that sense, the beginning of the local election campaign (which is still going on at the moment) does not look promising at all. e first promise given by a senior official from the ethnic Albanian opposition coalition (Mr. Mevlan Tahiri, the main candidate for city council member in Skopje) was that ‘if their coalition wins the election, they will install a system of institutional discrimination against the ethnic Macedonians in Tetovo and Gostivar’ (sic!). Soon aer, this was followed by a demand for revising the territorial organisation of local self-government (only three months aer the referendum demanding exactly the same thing was condemned as ‘single-ethnic’) and for introduction of a two-tier self-government and regionalised territorial organisation, ‘which would respect the particular ethnic interests of the population.’ Mr. Rafiz Halliti, the vice president of the Democratic Union for Integration (the ethnic Albanian partner in the ruling coalition) and the informal leader of the more radical faction (of the ‘commanders’) in the party, immediately supported this proposal even though it is in direct contravention of Article 1.2 of the Framework Agreement (which remains the main declared political goal of his party). is kind of election promises do not look very promising for the rest of the campaign. Under the circumstances, we can only wait to see which issues ethnic Macedonian parties will use to ‘ethnicise’ their campaigns too, and what consequences such treatment (and recycling) of ethnic issues will have for the overall political processes in Macedonia. Or more precisely,will the ideological cleavage be the main line of division and political confrontation between the ethnically mixed ‘political blocs’ (as it was during the local elections in 2000, for example), or will the ethnic cleavage prevail and thus situate the main political conflict on the line between the two
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major ‘ethnic camps’ (as it was during the military conflict in 2001)? However, the future development of the situation depends not only on the political elites in Macedonia, but also on the international support for the process of stabilisation of the country, as well as on the overall situation in the region. It is very important to keep Macedonia out of the various scenarios for settling Kosovo ’s final status, especially regarding its borders and internal political organisation, by providing international guarantees for Macedonia’s northern borders and support for their tighter control, and also by supporting the process of emancipation of the political elites of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia from the influences of their ‘elder brothers’ from Kosovo. ere are two main groups of scenarios for the future development of the political situation in Macedonia. In the positive scenario, Macedonia is an integrated and unitary state that has resolved its major interethnic disputes under the terms of the Framework Agreement, where the main political issues are improvement of the living standards of its citizens and the integration of the country into the European Union. In the negative scenario, Macedonia is a country in permanent interethnic crisis, hostage to at least two or three unresolved ethno-national questions in the region, where ethnic and ethno-territorial issues dominate the political agenda, and its citizens’ security and living standards deteriorate constantly. If the political elites in Macedonia (regardless of their ethnic background) and the international community prefer the positive scenario, the Ohrid Framework Agreement must be implemented fully and in all of its terms, Macedonia’s borders must be internationally guaranteed andcontrolled strictly by the institutions of the state, and the government institutions must be strengthened during the process of the country’s integration into the EU, which must startas soon as possible. All delays and compromises on these strategically important issues can easily throw Macedonia into the negative scenario.
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DISCUSSION Antonina Zhelyazkova: Some of us were talking a few minutes ago and we told each other that the picture is getting ever darker and gloomier. Despite the fact that we
are, aerI am all, very good-mannered so weShkelzen don’t sayMaliqi half the we think. For example: sorry that ourpeople colleague isn’tthings here and we cannot discuss it with him, but his report spared us quite a few truths. For example, not even a word about how a new ideology has been gradually emerging in Kosovo in the last six or seven years, and that this is a Nazi ideology. And you can hear it everywhere: in the University in Prishtina, in the street,among politicians, intellectuals, and so on. A selfsufficiency – I heard this word being used also by Prof. Repovac when he was talking about the problems in Bosnia – a contempt for absolutely everybody else. is is a theory consistently justifying their wish to live alone, their wish to simply get rid of everybody else. All the persecutions, expulsions, fires, and so on, aren’t accidental. What they want is an ethnically clean Kosovo. And all the mantras of the European Union about a multiethnic Kosovo are simply nonsense. Let’s see what else were we spared? at an excellent experiment is being conducted in Kosovo: how to build the perfect variant of a mafia state. drugs, havewe you – all ofcitratic in the hands of the political class. AllTrafficking, of Europe women, applauded the what fact that had demo elections in Kosovo, but the result was that we elected a war criminal and the guy controlling, for example, drug trafficking in some part of Europe. And this person is prime minister at present. Our colleague Penev is right when he says that all this discredits that which we are trying to call ‘democracy’ – democracy is something completely different. Hidajet Repovac: I think the Kosovo question is as complex as all the other questions and it cannot be explained easily. ere is work here for sociologists, cultural anthropologists, culturologists, and also for Freud and psychologists. Before the war, we in Bosnia used to say that Slovenia is to blame for everything because Slovenes le the congress.1 And then another thesis was added: No, Kosovo is to blame because it was there that the first demonstrations and opposition against the political estab-
lishment the formerisYugoslavia began. I because don’t know who is did really to blame, it seems thatofeverybody partly responsible everybody their share tobutdestroy Yugoslavia. 1 Fourteenth Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990. Aer the Serbian-dominated majority rejected all proposals of the Slovenian delegation, Slovenes walked out of the Congress and the Slovenian League of Communists withdrew from the Yugoslav one (Editor’s note).
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However, Mr. Elton Skendaj drew a parallel between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo as an independent state. I think there is a substantial difference. BosniaHerzegovina has been a geographically, politically and economically defined state 2 unit for more than 600 years. For example, Herceg Stjepan Kotromanic and Tvrtko I 3 Kotromanic were the kings of the largest state on the Balkans – larger than the Duchy of Serbia and the Duchy of Susic and Zrinski in Croatia. Bosnia continued to exist and kept its srcinal borders even when it became a Turkish vilayet – it even had an exit to the sea. During the Second World War, the Yugoslav Anti-Fascist Councilalso defined Bosnia as a state, again with the same borders that Bosnia has today. Well, here is the main difference between Bosnia and Kosovo, between the Bosnian statehood and the possible statehood of Kosovo. I don’t oppose, of course, the possibility of Kosovo becoming a state, but it shouldn’t be compared to Republika Srpska because Republika Srpska was established as a result of a nationalistic war and I believe none of the two entities constituting today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina will last. We have an absurd situation where Republika Srpska has 49% of the territory, and the Federation, with all Muslims, Croats and Serbs who live on that side, has 51% of the territory. is is nonsense, because Muslims are a majority population. Before the Berlin Congress, Muslims represented 77% of the Bosnian population. All the others together were 23%. A demographic change occurred aer the Berlin Congress, and the share of Muslims fell to 47%. e number of Muslims further decreased to 27% aer World War II, and the others were Croats, Serbs, Jews, Roma, etc. But Bosnia has always kept its borders, even when it became part of the AustroHungarian Empire, when it became its third element. One element was Austria, the second Hungary, and the third Bosnia ascorpus separatum. Bosnia was called like this in Austro-Hungarian documents, and was defined as a state. at is why even today we fight for it as a state. Do you have such arguments for Kosovo? I would like to hear them, and would support such an idea if they existed. But I don’t think the analogy is possible. ese two cases cannot be compared. Do you know what happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina? ose who have conquered the territory have only destroyed the land. ere are no more houses, nor agriculture, nor economy. ere is nothing. ey have completely destroyed the territories they have conquered, and I believe that fiy years will pass before life returns here. is tribal war for territory has achieved nothing. at is why I am asking if this idea of an independent Kosovo can really have some genuine and positive historical result. I 2 Stjepan II Kotromanic (1322–1353), one of the most important rulers of the medieval Bosnian state. During his reign Bosnia achieved unprecedented territorial growth (Editor’s note). 3 King Tvrtko I Kotromanic (Bosnian ruler from 1353 to 1391, crowned as the firstKing of Bosnia in 1377). During his rule Bosnia reached maximum size, stretching from the Sava River to the islands of Korcula and Hvar, and from Zrmanja and Knin to Sjenica and Lim (Editor’s note).
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have also supported this idea once, probably inspired by the principle that every nation has the right to self-determination, to its own culture and identity. Of course, this is all needed and it is necessary, but how can this be realised on the same territory where the state of Raska was formed, and where the Nemanjic4 dynasty set up a huge state that reached the Aegean to the south, and the rivers Tisa, Drava and Danube to the north. A huge state, a huge kingdom, and Kosovo was its centre. And now we have the question of identification of the main cultural-historical events in Kosovo, and of the way in which the people populating it could reach an agreement on specific state-building elements. Because a state can be created only through agreement between nations. at is the problem of Bosnia. You can write a Constitution and cast it in gold, but if it isn’t supported by the will of the nation no state will be built. If you want to force the Serbs in Bosnia to follow some common will and tell them, ‘this is going to be the Bosnian state,’ you will never build a real state unless they willingly support the idea. When the Anti-Fascist Council of Yugoslavia was setting up Yugoslavia in 1943, all nations – Macedonians, Albanians, Muslims, Serbs, Slovenes, Croats – agreed to build the state together and that is why it was possible to form it. If one or two nations had opposed the idea, I doubt that a state such as Yugoslavia could have been created. And this is the problem of Bosnia and Kosovo. However, they are nevertheless different in several aspects. Elton Skendaj: I want to make a few points related to the previous papers and
comments. e first point is whether there is such a thing as the search for a Greater Albania. I heard Ilija, our Macedonian friend, mention such a thing. Lately two major reports have been published on this issue: one by the International Crisis Group and the other one by the US Institute for Peace. Aer thorough research, they have come to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a Greater Albania or pan-Albanian aspirations. Why? Because Albania which is, as some people like to call it, the ‘mother-state,’ the state which is internationally recognised, doesn’t want to include Kosovo, or the Albanians in Macedonia in any way. e politicians, the population, they all feel like that. e task basically is to become part of the EU rather than to incorporate problematic provinces with minorities, etc. Besides,there is a general consensus in Kosovo also that they don’t want to be attached to Albania, which is much poorer than Kosovo itself and has problems of its own. e Albanians in Albania don’t want to include Kosovo with its nationalism and its problems. Kosovars don’t like Albania very much because they consider it sometimes very unpatriotic. A drive for uniting the land is more likely to be observed among the Kosovo elite and among some Macedonian Albanians, but it has nothing to do with a general pan-Albanian agreement.
4 Nemanjic was a medieval Serbian ruling dynasty. e dynasty was named aer Stefan Nemanja. e House of Nemanjic gave eleven Serbian monarchs between 1166 and 1371 (Editor’s note).
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Two months ago Albania arrested the leader of its nationalist party, which can never get enough votes to enter Parliament. Why? Because he had made some comments in Switzerland, which were interpreted as inciting hatred in Macedonia. And together with Bulgaria Albania was the first country to recognise Macedonia, because we believe in regional stability and we get enough bad press for our other problems. Regarding Kosovo’s independence, what Prof. Repovac said about the list of national identifications and why Bosnia should be called a state and so on, I am not going to go through it for Kosovo. I know the list, but I don’t think it matters basically. Two thousand years ago only Albanians and Greeks were living here, and Slavs came 800 years later. It is a very long litany of nationalistic propaganda. My belief is that before the nineteenth century none of these nationalisms existed. Albanian nationalism was one of the latest ones; it was basically formed during the time of the Ottoman decline when Albanians were afraid that their neighbours, the newly emerging nation states of Greece and Serbia, would spread in Albanian-speaking lands, which included Kosovo at the time. is was a late nationalism, but there were others, such as the Bosniak and Macedonian nationalisms, which emerged even later. I would consider that many of the problems we are facing today are problems of nation-building. Albanians in Albania usually say, ‘We don’t care whether you claim to be Macedonian or Kosovar as long as you are comfortable with your identity and you don’t mess with us.’ Some might call it liberal but I’d call it an indifferent approach, because we are too busy with our own problems. Since we were very isolated during communism, we have nobody to blame for our problems. We understand that nationalism isn’t the road to prosperity and we have downplayed it a little bit. And this is very much in contrast to the former Yugoslavia, where because of the conflicts it is still a paramount feeling. I do wish we had a Kosovo-Albanian or a Macedonian-Albanian representative, who could better present their arguments. I come from the majority of a unitary state, Albania, so in many ways we can a fford to be detached. Maybe if I came from a repressed minority I would speak diffe rently. But that still doesn’t qualify my statements about Macedonia and Kosovo as untrue. Tetsuya Sahara: I remember my personal experience in 1980 in Skopje. I met many Albanian friends and theywere very cold towards the fate of their Kosovar neighbours. Such circumstances should drastically change aer a certain period of time, so I’m not headed for some sure claim that the danger of a so-called Greater Albania has got ground. I would like to also add a small objection to the comment of Prof. Repovac. I agree with what you said about Bosnia during the Ottoman period. But in the same way Kosovo was a relatively stable administrative unit as thesanjak of Prizren. And it existed as such a very long time. I think we exaggerate too much the historical hurricanes of the region in order to justify the future. Anyway, I do agree with one of the proposals that Mr. Skendaj made: criminal acts must be individualised, not ethnicised. I would like to add another proposal towards the future solution: it is important
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to educate people in order to get rid of ethnic discrimination. But this is huge work and it takes a lot of time. e best way is to re-educate the law-enforcing officers and also the public employees in the administrative sections. I think it is a waste of time to re-educate the politicians. What we oen had in Kosovo and Bosnia, and also in Macedonia, was that police officers did harm to people from other ethnic groups. is way of thinking is very dangerous and that is why I think it is very important to educate the police officers so that they won’t apply ethnic discrimination. Re-education of policemen and public employees is therefore among the most important tasks of the international community. Tanya Mangalakova: I am a journalist, my name is Tanya Mangalakova and I am a participant in IMIR’s field studies conducted by the method of urgent anthropology. I want to tell Elton Skendaj something he forgot to mention: there is a platform of the Albanian Academy of Sciences that has been published in several languages. Second, when I go for a walk in the streets of Tirana and Pristina, I can buy a map of Greater Albania in both cities. is Albania is indeed very great – it includes Çamëria 5 and reaches even Nis. In the hot summer of 2001 I was in Albania, shortly aerthe census and during the elections. I asked politicians and ordinary people, ‘Okay, you are insisting at top levels on what the census in the Republic of Macedonia should be like, what rights the Albanian minority there should have, yet at the same time your census forms in Albania didn’t have a column on ethnic identity. Please comment on this curious fact.’ I didn’t get a satisfactory explanation. In my opinion, there isa phenomenon that is common to the Balkans. When you ask politicians, they have several answers to one and the same question, depending if they are in opposition or in power . is is typical of the Albanians. Kim Mehmeti, a prominent intellectual from the Republic of Macedonia and translator of theKanun [Code] of Lek Dukagjini, explains this phenomenon as follows: ‘When our politician is in power he has one answer, he is very moderate, meek, he obtains benefits. But when he is in opposition he becomes radical.’ He said this long before the statements of Ljubco Georgievski and Arben Xhaferi, who signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement and then made interesting comments on ethnic division of the Republic of Macedonia. Let me tell you some things we have seen while travelling around Kosovo. We were at the headquarters of Hashim aqi’s influential party, where we interviewed a leading figure. I cannot mention any names because the interviews were anonymous, but I know the name of course. We talked with him and asked him questions, which he answered, but the answers he gave us were predictable. Somehow he had a ready answer to every question, he is a politician wellschooled in politics. I personally wasn’t satisfied with his answers. My point is that he has learned to speak like all other politicians, but perhaps during the conflict his answers would have been different. What happened with this person? He was arrested Albanian name for the region of north-west Greece, located along the Albanian border. (Editor’s note) 5
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and sent to e Hague. In Pristina there were demonstrations in his support, but then about ten days ago I heard that this person had made a very radical statement. e same person who was telling us, ‘Who? Us Albanians? We’re in favour of democracy of course! Just let us create a state in Kosovo and you’ll see perfect order and rule of law.’ en all of a sudden he makes a shocking statement that is quoted by news agencies – moreover, a statement about the Republic of Macedonia, about some sort of Slav population there that didn’t even have a right to a state. So you see an entirely different line of conduct. Another case: an interview with one of the leading figures among the Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia. He can give all sorts of answers, he is smart enough, well-schooled, but there is one answer he will never give to the International Crisis Group. He would hardly suggest, as he has done to Bulgarian scholars, journalists and analysts he has met, with whom he talks on and on and on, and then at some point he says, ‘At the end of the day, the best solution is to divide Macedonia!’ I am not naming names, the interviews are anonymous, I’m not allowed to. You see, sometimes things sound horrifying when you hear them from Balkan politicians. And I am sure that the person in question has an entirely different answer for his own electorate, for the media in Macedonia, for foreign media. is isn’t duality, what we have are many layers. I also want to say something about Kosovo. I am very sceptical about Kosovo, I have been there many times but Ihave never touched or seen thismultiethnic Kosovo. I went to an OSCE conference where the buzzword was multiethnicity, and I asked them, ‘Fine, but then why are you with bodyguards?’ It’s multiethnic, isn’t it, there are pilot projects, standards before status, and so on. Yet theKanun is fully in force, blood feuds ceased during the conflict only, but then resurged full force. ere are reconcilers, authoritative elderly Albanians who go and reconcile people. We hear about minority rights in Kosovo. But in addition to the Serbs who are living in enclaves, there are other minorities too there – for example Turks, who have demands too. ereare Gorani, who live in almost complete isolation in the mountains, and this saves them from same sort of action against them by radical Albanian elements. ey are afraid to go to Pristina and to speak their language, which is a very interesting dialect. We have had problems in Kosovo, you know, when somebody hears you speaking a language close to Serb they will assume you are Serbian! At some point the difference is lost, and this simply happens at the level of everyday life, among ordinary people. Finally, I will quote a respondent from Prizren, a multiethnic town since the age of the Ottoman Empire. I was taking a walk in the streets and I stopped for a cup of coffee right next to a big Serbian church which was in ruins, fenced off with barbed wire, and there were several coffee shops around. ere are no Serbs in the town, all are in KFOR military camps. So I decided to have a cup of coffee and asked the people in the coffee shop if they knew what this church was called. You cannot imagine how much the people resented being asked. ey looked at me with hatred, and two girls, Albanian, told me directly, ‘You’d better stop asking if you don’t want to be in trouble!’ I walked round the church and there I spoke withan interesting Albanian, who told me,
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‘Life is so hard for the Albanians in Kosovo now that we are aprotectorate, we have no jobs, no prospects, no money. e international community come here, they are paid huge salaries, for example 5,000 euros, while we here live on, say, 150 to 200 euros a month. But in the days of Yugoslavia we at least had jobs and we had money.’ Ilija Milcevski: Let me just make a comment about the pan-Albanian issue. First, I never said that the policy of Albania was Pan-Albanianism because during the conflict in Macedonia and before, the Republic of Albania always had a very responsible position according to the guidelines from the international community, as did the Republic of Bulgaria, and also Greece and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, we cannot deny the existence of pan-Albanian political programmes in various circles. But in Albania they aren’t influential at all, I must agree with you on this issue. But they are influential in Kosovo. Kosovo is becoming the place of vigilant nationalism. Albania would never like to unify with Kosovo, but I’m afraid that at some point Kosovo Albanians might want to annex Macedonia and Albania. Tanya mentioned the platform of the Albanian Academy of Sciences. I think that we must be honest to the end and mention it, because the events of the first half of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia were mostly blamed on the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, which in fact was never finished and was added to the pile of unfinished documents from the second half of the 1980s. On the other hand, we have a printed platform for the integral solution to the Albanian national question, officially published by the Albanian Academy of Sciences in 1998. is Albanian national programme states the following: that Kosovo must be independent, that the three municipalities in Southern Serbia – Preshevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac – are part of historical Kosovo, as well as Skopje, which was its capital. And for that reason Albanians must enjoy autonomy in those municipalities, and the Republic of Macedonia must be re-designed as some sort of Austria-Hungary , which was a federal, dual state. ere are also demands for more rights for the Albanians in Montenegro, Greece and for some Albanian-speaking people in Italy. e document is a defined pan-Albanian programme. e real problem is Kosovo. e nationalistic groups in Albania aren’t influential. I guess you were talking about Idajet Beqiri,6 who was arrested by the Albanian authorities and wasn’t allowed to conduct his political activities in Albania. But in Kosovo the situation is very different. We have a number of semi-legal organisations, which are openly promoting that kind of pan-Albanian programmes and they have their roots
Idajet Beqiri is the leader of Albania’s right-wing Party of National Unity, and one of the leaders of the Front of Albanian National Unity (FBKSH), a group claiming to be the political wing of the AKSH (or ANA, Albanian National Army), active since 2001 in Kosovo and Macedonia. Beqiri was arrested in 2003 on charges of ‘incitement and support for the extremist group.’ (Editor’s note) 6
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in the Popular Movement for Kosovo, which was formed as an illegal organisation in the 1990s. Most of its members used to be orthodox communists, supporters of the Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha, but aerwards they changed their ideology. But the nationalistic component of their programme remained. Later, members of that organisation became leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the National Liberation Army of Macedonia. I will give you one more example. At the beginning of the conflict in Macedonia there were three prominent commanders who were well known to the press. One was commander Hoxha, who is srcinally from Macedonia and who is now a member of the Macedonian Parliament. e other one was commander Sokolli who was born in Kosovo and lives in Kosovo now. And the third commander was the most shadowy one – commander Miekra, who gave several interviews fore New York Times and disappeared during the conflict. Yet in a strange coincidence, at the time when he disappeared Radio B92 reported that commander Miekra of the sector South of the Liberation Army of Preshevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac had been shot in a clash with a Serbian police patrol. Hidajet Repovac: I regret that my friends Veton Surroi and Shkelzen Maliqi aren’t here because they would probably have answered those questions adequately. But I expected a scientificdiscussionatthisconference,andnotadiscussioninwhichsomeone has to defend their position and someone else is attacking it. We should be raising scientific questions and formulating scientific theses about the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans. I do believe that we have managed to do just that to a satisfactory extent. However, a number of problems still have to be brought up in order to explain the current situation in the Balkans. I believe Kosovo is a very complex problem. If the late Stipe Suvar7 was here – and I presume you all know who was Stipe Suvar, a professor from the Zagreb University – he would have told you that all the problems were due to the fact that before the war the gross domestic product in Slovenia was, let’s say, 5,000 USD, and in Kosovo 400, in Montenegro 500, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 700, and so on. ere is a famous joke about the Yugoslav train, where Slovenia is represented as a locomotive followed by carriages – Croatia and others. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the last carriage and we used to joke that if we in Bosnia hadn’t been stepping on the brakes, the train would have gotten out of control. ere is one very important sociological problem.InKosovo, Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia, the quality of education has declined drastically. Fewer and fewer children are attending school. e statistics about children not enrolling at schools in BosniaHerzegovina are terrible. Especially the Muslim children in the Serbian entity, and also 7 Stipe Suvar (1936–2004), former head of the Yugoslav Communist Party,former member of the Yugoslav Presidency and former minister of education of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (Editor’s note).
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the Serbian children in the Federation. e situation is similar in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, which were economically underdeveloped. is is the real problem. As I have mentioned before, Bosnia isn’t allowed to construct Corridor 5C, the modern motorway linking Budapest and Sarajevo and continuing to the Adriatic. Such a motorway would open all economic corridors from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Europe, but despite the fact that we have the will and the power to build it, we aren’t allowed to do so. Because through thiscorridor, Bosnia-Herzegovina would enter Europe in a very short time. Why they aren’t allowing us is another question. Someone needs nations and states that can be pushed to the economic margins, and where all dirty and polluting industries can be dumped – and such places are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo. In such places the quality of education has been deliberately lowered so that they would continue to lag behind in their development. is is the sociological picture of our situation. But despite that, asI said yesterday, we shouldn’t give in to pessimism. We have to present an optimistic picture, and why not try to present the possibility of a new Yugoslav, or Balkan federation? But the current mediocre politicians who now rule our countries are neither capable nor suitable for such a task. is project should be taken up by capable people, who will be able to extract economic benefits for all from the spiritual and traditional wealth of all the nations on the Balkans. I am not speaking necessarily about a state. But such projects are our common necessity. We will simply have to rebuild the economic tiesagain, and to build highways and railways. Ten years aer the end of the war, the railway system in Bosnia-Herzegovina still isn’t operating. Not even a single railway track has opened. And this is another proof that somebody deliberately keeps these regions underdeveloped and backward. I believe this is the problem also of Kosovo and of all other places, which were on the margins of economic development even in the former Yugoslavia. Ekaterina Nikova: Prof. Repovac, don’t be so impatient about the railways. A railway track between Sofia and Skopje has been in the process of construction for 120 years. And Bulgaria and Romania, two countries with very friendly relations, at least by Balkan standards, have been trying for twelve years now to agree on where to build a second bridge across the Danube despite the fact that the funding has already been secured. ere is only one bridge along 400 kilometres of the river banks, and in Budapest alone there are six bridges. So you still have time. Hidajet Repovac: Let me tell you that Austria-Hungary built 2,700 km of railway tracks in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Royal Yugoslavia added 80 km between the two world wars. And socialist Yugoslavia didn’t build a single kilometre in Bosnia. Wolfgang Hoepken:I would like to go back to the questions that have been raised by Tanya and others. I don’t know if it’s really worth discussing this symbolic politics, there is so much symbolic politics in the Balkans. I have always argued against overstressing the role and the importance of thememorandum of the Academy
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of Science. Many people have talked about it. I don’t think that it is so terribly important that you can find a map of Greater Albania in the streets of Tirana. e last time I was in Skopje I bought a postcard with a map of Macedonia, which incorporated most of Greece. Maybe the Albanian Academy has written a memorandum; believe me, I have heard terrible nonsense about Macedonian history, or the Macedonian nation. I don’t think this question is that important. e question of Kosovo definitely won’t be decided by the Albanian Academy of Science, nor by any other academy. It will be decided by the international community in negotiations with others. So I think that is more important in discussing the options. e problem is that we have had several options that have obviously failed. We first opted for what Michael Steiner called ‘the institutions before status,’ ‘standards before status,’ but it didn’t work. So what are the other options that we can choose now? Maliqi has pointed out several options in his paper, but unfortunately most of them probably aren’t very likely because the positions of the various actors are irreconcilable on that. I think probably the only way is to strike a bargain within the proper context of European politics. Whether Serbia will be given the clear prospect for EU integration in exchange for concessions in Kosovo. ese are, I think, the issues which really matter today and not rhetorics, symbolics or some historical justification for a Kosovo state. e historical state of Stefan Nemanja is no legitimate justification. We should skip all these historical arguments. Toni Petkovic: I just want to make a short comment about what you said: whether Serbia could be given the incentive of quickly joining the European Union in exchange for recognising Kosovo in some form or giving up Kosovo. ere has been consensus on this issue among the wide spectrum of political parties in Serbia and I practically don’t see any relevant political force in Serbia that would accept such a bargain. is isn’t an option for Serbia. e point is well made that Serbia won’t be in a position to do anything regarding Kosovo, but although Serbia might not be a factor that can influence the outcome, stern refusal on the Serbian side might have some value. Aer all, the consensus was reached not by the ultranationalists but more importantly by President Boris Tadic, and Zoran Djindjic before him – in other words, forces that can hardly be called ultranationalist. ey all are basically repeating the same thing. Probably the Serbian position isn’t the most important factor when deciding the future of Kosovo, but I think this is a factor that should be taken into consideration. I know that it only complicates further the decision-making process of the international community when trying to find some kind of lasting and at least feasible, if not just, solution for Kosovo. Antonina Zhelyazkova: Prof. Hoepken, not everything is virtual and not everything is symbolic. Of course the fate of Kosovo will be decided by the ‘great powers,’ but there are nevertheless some realities with which they obviously cannot cope. For example, Prof. Sahara suggested that we should educate police officers who will operate
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in a multiethnic environment. Precisely which police officers should we educate? Each political party in democratic, multiparty Kosovo has its own party police. Is it them we should educate? And then, it might be that all of us in the Balkans aren’t particularly fond of Serbs, but the reality is that the refugee camps have been full of Serbs for seven years now. I have visited them and I have seen young people there who have married there and who now have children – in other words, we now have a new generation born in refugee camps. ese are realities. Will anybody do something to return those people back to where they belong, to their native land? Or will anybody undertake to improve their status, because it is obvious that the Serbian state is weak and cannot cope. ey don’t even have status. Not even the international humanitarian organisations want to get involved with them because they are said to be displaced persons and not refugees. is doesn’t stop them however from getting married and having children in abject poverty. ese are realities. Jorgen Nielsen: Wolfgang, I don’t think you can dismiss history as easily as you did. Part of the problem is the asymmetry between the different historical mythologies of the various sides. In one sense history is irrelevant, but in another sense mythologized history is being mobilised by various parties in these kinds of conflicts and is being used as ideological ammunition. On the refugee camps that Antonina mentioned, I know from my own experience with Palestinians that these people need something psychologically, collectively to hold on to, and that is very likely to be a mythologized form of history. e historical memory that appears among these various groups is a code for what is going on in the present. One of the big problems that Britain has always had with Northern Ireland is the almost complete asymmetry between the British views of Northern Ireland’s history and Irish republican views of Northern Ireland’s history. For the republicans 1689 happened yesterday, for the British 1689 is water that has long disappeared under the bridge and has no relevance whatsoever. As an academic historian, I can sit down and argue until I’m blue in the face that William of Orange’s forces in the Battle of the Boyne in 1689 included more than 50% Catholic troops defeating Irish forces. But that doesn’t matter. e thing is to try to figure out the code that current necessities impose on mythologized history. I’m not saying that one would achieve any kind of moving forward that way but it may at least contribute some way toward immunising the present against the misuse of history. Tsvetana Georgieva: I have listened vary carefully to the papers and the discussions that we had today, which perhaps naturally concentrated on Kosovo. But hearing the discussions and other positions on the situation there, it struck me that in Bulgaria we have the same problems as those in Kosovo, even if they might be muted and dormant and not in such an explicit and concentrated form as those in Kosovo. Although things in Bulgaria are simply normal, this thing about the map – we have such nationalist organisations too. From time to time, more or less every year, a group that is likewise connected to the Academy of Sciences will come up with some sort of national
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platform and demand that it be accepted by Parliament. Not to mention the problem of roads, of poverty, which we tend to ignore. But hearing all this, it struck me that in the last 120 years all of us in the Balkans have been driving away everybody we could or they have fled from us. But Turkey, the successor of the Empire, has been accepting this population or at least the majority of this population. If in the 1980s Turkey’s population grew by 15 million, all the rest of us are very well aware of how much our populations have decreased. At the same time, in the course of my research I have come across many complaints in the Ottoman archives from – excuse the term – therayah. We are strongly inclined to see things in verydark, gloomy colours. It seems to me that a positive and pro-active attitude will help us not less than the ‘great powers’ or the European community. Prof. Sahara, for example, has suggested a rational solution and it may be considered in some way. Conferences like this one should propose prospects and look towards the future, because what we’ve been doing is basically going straight to the pub once the session is over. When conducting politological and sociological surveys, I would very much like to see young people produce not only findings but also make an effort to propose prospects. Wolfgang Hoepken:I briefly have to respond. I didn’t say that history is not relevant, and I didn’t by far say, Antonina, that it is virtual. As a historian myself I know about the relevance of history and I know about the role of historical myth in national discourses. at wasn’t my point, my point was simply: Are we really willing in such a group to discuss the question of political solutions for these issues by jumping on the bandwagon of these nationalist arguments or not. is is the problem. And I really don’t think we should do it. We should look for successful examples ofovercoming nationalist or political conflicts in the more recent history. What I find more interesting is going beyond the concrete issues of Bosnia and Kosovo. We should think about the question: Do we have strategies to reconstruct a multiethnic society, which has been destroyed by war? e Bosnian example isn’t very successful. e Kosovo example obviously has failed. So is it possible to reconstruct a multiethnic community, which has been disrupted by violence? Is there any example? I don’t know of any. So these are much more structural questions, I think, which are more worthy to be discussed than Albanian or Macedonian maps. Hidajet Repovac: I have to share with you another fact, however difficult you
might find it to accept it. e international forces, despite the genuine help they provided for ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,have also done much harm. e international forces have brought narcotics, prostitution, trafficking of women and various forms of cross-border smuggling. I leave it to you to conclude whether this is positive or negative. ere was no human trafficking in Bosnia before, nor were illegal drugs and prostitution so widespread. I know for certain, because we conducted anumber of studies both before and aer the war, and we at the Institute have very accurate data.
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Ekaterina Nikova: When discussing the different cases of ethnic cleansing and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans we should avoid generalising too much. Aer all, each case is different, and we should bear in mind the different scale and scope. For example, compared with what happened during the Yugoslav wars that stupid euphemism, ‘the big excursion,’ suddenly becomes relevant. Because compared with what happened to Kosovars and Bosnians, what happened to the Bulgarian Turks indeed looks almost like an ‘excursion.’ By comparison, the Bulgarian case seems to have had a happy ending, with recovery from ethnic cleansing. To see this, you only have to look at the hundreds of thousands of Bulgarian Turks who are now travelling freely between the two countries with a Bulgarian and a Turkish passport in each pocket. Yet the trauma remains. At our discussion here we noted how deep and constant the trauma is for Bulgarian society too. And this trauma remains despite the efforts of Bulgarian society, despite the purposeful policy pursued by all governments, whatever their colour, to restore violated rights, property, and so on. So many human fates have changed forever, and so many families remain divided. Numerous studies, including studies conducted by IMIR, show this. When you go there to do fieldwork you are deeply moved and shocked, you only eat and cry all the time. e emigrants welcome you in their nice homes, they have built a new life there, but they have a strong sense of loss, they cry – especially the older ones. Because for them leaving their native land, even if they le with their refrigerators and mattresses as somebody said, remains a trauma. So if I have to end on a more optimistic note, I will say that yes, recovery from ethnic cleansing is possible, but it is a very slow process and the price is very high. Tetsuya Sahara: I think there are two ways to resolve that question: How to heal the traumas of ethnic wars? e first way is a very familiar one in this region, in the Balkans – it is simply to forget. I am familiar with at least two examples of this. One is the creation of socialist Yugoslavia and the other is the Bulgarian case. e creation of Yugoslavia was accompanied by a serious ethnic war, which occurred during World War II, and it is clear that the Yugoslav experiment has failed. Tito’s government covered up all those ethnic traumas by banning the truth about the wartime ethnic crimes. Later it turned out that nothing was forgotten, this option didn’t work. e second option is to reveal everything, to share the truth with the perpetrators and the victims. ere are two recent examples of this option: one is South Africa and the other is Indonesia. ere they set up a public court whose only aim was to establish the truth, not to punish the perpetrators. I don’t know whether this plan is suitable to be applied to the Balkans, but I think it is worth trying. Elton Skendaj: On a higher conceptual level there are several issues connected to the formation of Balkan nation states. I consider myself to be of a Balkan identity. I would be the first one to vote for a Balkan state. e problem is that these nation states have been formed, just like elsewhere else, on the basis of competing narratives and historical myths. I didn’t want to talk about all the historical myths that I have been
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taught in Albanian schools since the age of five. I am fed up with them, but we are all continuing to be told these narratives. is is how our educational system, our historians are. ey keep repeating the same things. Are they true? Partly, but I’m sure there has been lots of polishing and making sure that we look good and that the other, the neighbour, looks bad. e question is whether we continue to stick to the concept of a nation state focused on homogenisation. Before the age of human rights, humanitarian assistance, etc., there was for example, as Mr. Turan noted, Kemalism in Turkey where it was basically said: ‘I don’t care about your srcin, but you are going to be a Turk. If you don’t accept it, we will make you accept that you are a Turk.’ e same approach has been oen applied in other nation states. Interestingly, our greatest national holidays are the days we fought against each other. Greece celebrates the day it was liberated from the Ottomans, Turkey the day it liberated itself from Greeks, Albania and Bulgaria– from Turks, Macedonia celebrates the Ilinden uprising which Albanians, in their own nationalistic narrative, claim that they caused. We are fed all those conflicting stories while we are growing up. Of course when I was a child I saw maps of Greater Albania. Just like you saw maps of Greater Bulgaria during your education. We all have maps: maps of the empires of Alexander the Great or of Simeon. e point is that if we follow that kind of tradition we are doomed to fight all the time. So for me the very concept of a homogenous nation state in the Balkans is flawed.Just like Prof. Repovac, I would like to see some supra-national institution, which will make sure that these narratives slowly become unimportant and other, more high-level narratives start to emerge. Now the bait is the European Union. e efforts for regional cooperation and integration are interesting only because the EU is standing behind them, behind the Stability Pact and other initiatives. Or the US has pushed for better communication systems, etc. It still seems that the push for integration is coming from outsiders, and not from us. I don’t want to go into historical parallels, but only the Romans, the Byzantines or the Ottomans, i.e. bigger empires,have managed to integrate the Balkans. eonly solution is if we all get a ticket to the European Union. Everybody in the Balkans would agree on that. But from the point of view of the EU diplomats, they don’t want to include the Balkans with all their pending problems. e EU requirements are quite clear – they want the problems to be healed and a certain economic level to be achieved. e trick is that as long as Bosnia, Kosovo and all those other places are kept out of the Union, their problems aren’t being solved, they are probably getting worse. So I see here a problem that I don’t know how to solve. I know that we shouldn’t go back to the nation state and start quarrelling again about who came first to these lands or how many kings we had. Antonina Zhelyazkova: Elton has reminded me, actually, that if in the last fifteen years there has been something positive in Bulgaria that has helped heal our wound, it is the fact that society has reached, even if slowly and painfully, consensus on one particular issue. We have given up the idea of ‘one people, one nation, one state.’
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We have given up the idea of the state-nation and have accepted the theory of the political nation or, in other words, of the civic nation. We have accepted Turks, Roma, for the first time since Bulgaria’s liberation, which means that since the end of the nineteenth century it is only now, at the end of the twentiethand the beginning of the twenty-first century that we have accepted all minorities as an inseparable part of our nation. And this has helped us a lot. Ekaterina Nikova: Let me add something to what Antonina’s just said. I too
have doubts about the so-called ‘Bulgarian ethnic model,’ but the obvious absence of interethnic tensions in Bulgaria is a remarkable fact. Let me give you a funny and somewhat silly example to prove it. We recently had our first and hugely successful Big Brother show in Bulgaria. Two of the participants were Turkish. And they were just as impudent, vulgar and ignorant as the ethnic Bulgarians. e rules are that it’s up to the viewers to decide who will get thrown out. What people said about the Bulgarian Turk, who remained in the game almost until the end, was that he was impudent, had filthy personal hygiene habits but, above all, that he was a CSKA8 fan – he wore a CSKA Tshirt for a whole month. During the three months the show lasted, nobody said ‘he is a Turk.’ Which was truly amazing – he was attacked for being a CSKA fan, not for being Turkish. is happened among the youngest generation, and it was a very pleasant surprise for the older generation who thought that those things were forever. Boyko Marinkov: is morning Mrs. Zhelyazkova asked the question why us Bulgarians avoided the Yugoslav scenario, why there wasn’t an ethnic war here. Her question came aer the excellent report of Prof. Repovac, who asked another question: Was the dissolution of Yugoslavia unavoidable? Antonina looks forthe explanation in our national identity or our national mentality. But I think that sometimes things are much more concrete. e ethnic crisis that had started in Bulgaria before November 1989 coincided, in a paradoxical way, with the second crisis in this period – the change of political system. In the big conflict between communism and anticommunism, the ethnic problem suddenly became secondary, supplementary, an undoubtedly important problem but nevertheless one that was on the periphery of the debate. ebig debate was the political debate. And if there is something such as that which is provisionally and wrongly called a ‘[Bulgarian] ethnic model,’ it is that the ethnic debate was guided by the big political debate on which direction should Bulgaria follow, by what means, with which partners. Such a debate didn’t take place in Yugoslavia. ere they suddenly started looking for their symbols and turned to the past. e Bulgarian debate was a debate from the end of the twentieth century, from the modern world. It was sharp and irreconcilable, but it was never radicalised. ere were several attempts at radicalisation, which were curbed very fast – if you remember, there was a Razgrad Republic, there were various local attempts to radicalise the ethnic conflict. But be8
One of the two most popular football clubs in Bulgaria (Editor’s note).
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cause there was such political dialogue and twentieth-century politics, the Bulgarian governments from this period startedmaking progress, even if it was slow and gradual. We cannot rely, as Prof. Sahara suggests, only on bilingual police officersas a solution to ethnic problems. In Bulgaria there was a conflict potential and the external forces which exercised pressure on the political forces knew about this conflict potential, but it was within the realm of the political. It wasn’t so distinctly ethnic, there was no extreme ethnic hatred that we saw in Yugoslavia. So, was the dissolution of Yugoslavia unavoidable? If we reverse the debate by using nineteenth-century arguments – yes, it was inevitable. But if efforts had been made to resort to the kind of political dialogue and compromises found in the political history of the twentieth century, then things would have been different. Ilija Milcevski: I do agree that the former Yugoslavia was a clear case of revival of nineteenth-century nationalism. is happened mainly among the political elites. ere is an anecdote that during the numerous meetings held by the representatives of the European Community with the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics, at one point the former tried hard to preserve the federation and Jacques Delors, then the president of the European Commission, offered the quick integration of Yugoslavia into the European Union and very generous financial support on the sole condition that the presidents of the six republics find some kind of compromise on a unified state, whether federal, confederate, or union of independent states. Slovenia agreed to that, Bosnia and Macedonia also wanted to accept the offer. But Tudjman and Milosevic were against it. Tudjman used a typical nineteenth-century argument: he said that Croats had one chance in a thousand years to create an independent Croatian state, and this was more important than everything else. And Milosevic used the same arguments. Slavka Draganova: I would like to note a fact that is usually ignored, at least in Bulgaria’s case. Turkey’s rapid development has raised the standing not only of our neighbour Turks but also of the Bulgarian Turks. Let’s not kid ourselves, back in the days when I was a Turkish Philology student being Turkish implied being inferior. Today this isn’t so. I myself have seen Turkey’s remarkable economic and cultural progress since 1981, when I went to Turkey for the first time. Over the years, when returning from Turkey and telling my friends what I had seen in Turkey they wouldn’t believe me. Now many Bulgarians are taking trips and holidays and have seen Turkey for themselves. All of them are fascinated. We Bulgarians have always looked down on Turkey in many respects, but now this is changing fast. is is also influencing the attitude in our country towards our Bulgarian Turks. And then, althoughTurks might have financial problems they are allocating funds for thecultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire and have done so much in this respect that I myself, who am an expert in economic history, have realised that I’d underrated Ottoman culture and civilisation.
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Toni Petkovic: I would just like to add to what my colleague Ilija just said about whether the dissolution of Yugoslavia was necessary. I would distinguish two aspects. First, was it inevitable, was it necessary? No, I would say that it was highly unlikely. And the second question: Was the violent nature of the dissolution necessary?I would say it was almost unbelievable. I think there was a special set of very unfortunate circumstances, all combined unfortunately at the same time, which actually led to such an outcome. First, aer the death of Tito the institutions that were supposedly controlling the country suffered from a lack of legitimacy and lack of real political power. is was particularly true on the federal level, which was supplemented by the republican leaders. Second, there was an aggravating economic situation. ird was the sudden loss of international importance of Yugoslavia aer the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yugoslavia had been preserved not only by Tito’s internal manoeuvres, but also by its special role during the Cold War. e republican leaders didn’t realise the fact that Yugoslavia had suddenly lost its importance. Fourth was the negative selection within the Communist Party, where leaders were promoted not according to their intellectual or moral qualities but according to some unconditional obedience to the party. And this brought to the fore completely mediocre leaders. ose circumstances le Yugoslavia in the hands of people such as Tudjman and Milosevic, and that’s why I wanted to say that the convergence of all those elements at the same place at the same time was actually quite unlikely. It doesn’t mean that without all those conditions present at the same time, it is inevitable that all other non-ethnic states or federations would end up in the same way as Yugoslavia; maybe this is an attempt to clear up some of the other factors, but these are, I think, the most important. And maybe in some of these factors we can look for the differences between the Bulgarian or other cases and the former Yugoslavia, and for an explanation why, actually, in Yugoslavia it led to where it did and not in Bulgaria and not in the USSR, and so on. Marko Hajdinjak: I fully agree with what Toni just said. Unlike Prof. Sahara I don’t think that the Yugoslav experiment has failed. In fact the experiment was very successful until it collapsed due to this set of quite unusual and unfavourable circumstances, which accumulated in a very short period of time. Here is one explanation why the scenario in Bulgaria was different: In Yugoslavia we had six competing elites, six competing semi-independent states, while Bulgaria was a uniform state with one structure, so such violent competition between elites as was the case between Serbia and Croatia and Slovenia, etc., wasn’t possible in Bulgaria. For the sake of accuracy I have to disagree slightly with Ilija’s remark about the Slovenian readiness to accept Yugoslavia and remain in the federation in exchange for entering the European Union. By that time Slovenes had no intentions whatsoever of remaining in any kind of Yugoslav union. e Slovenian foreign minister at that time, Dimitrij Rupel, who is also foreign minister now in the government of Janez Jansa, stated sometime in the spring of 1991, a few months before the secession, that Slovenes simply had no intention or desire to enter Europe via Belgrade. Sо when they spoke of
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a confederation or the willingness to participate in some kind of a Yugoslav community, it was basically to score positive points for the eventual international recognition of Slovenian independence. Tetsuya Sahara: I would like to defend myself a little bit. I do agree with what Mr. Petkovic and Mr. Hajdinjak just said that the fall of Yugoslavia was accidental. I said that the Yugoslav experiment failedbecause the attempt of the communist authorities to erase the memory failed. For example, in 1990 the attempts to recover the loss of memory from World War II had very destructive effects on Yugoslav society. I am afraid that Yugoslav society didn’t have the capacity to survive the abrupt revival of the old memory. Daisuke Nagashima: I would like to stress that ethnic tensions were linked to the economic situation and the communist party was well aware of that. In the mid1960s the communist party admitted that the national question wasn’t solved and that the economy was in a really bad and critical situation. A great amount of money went from Slovenia and Croatia to Kosovo to develop the economy, but this wasn’t a systematic way to develop the province. Despite all the funding that had been poured into Kosovo, there was no improvement of the economy. In this relation I would like to point that in Bosnia, as in Kosovo, the economic, political, military or police leaders of the communities, towns, or villages, who played a really great role in the ethnic cleansing or ethnic purges, had a straight continuity with the communist period. ey were actually the same people. Hidajet Repovac: I would like to remind you that our topic were migrations in the Balkans, but we have covered all possible topics to a larger extent than the migrations. We should have provided sociological, economic, political and other explanations about migrations in the Balkans and in the former Yugoslavia. Well, it seems that we will provide such explanations on some other occasion. But since we have brought up all those other topics anyway, we should make some use of them. We should therefore at least define the starting point for our joint path towards the European Union. In the first place, I am speaking about finding a way to put an end to migrations, to migrations towards the EU countries, which are still going on. Especially the young people from Bosnia-Herzegovina are still emigrating to various Western European countries and it seems that this process cannot be stopped. ere are fewer and fewer young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has become a land of the elderly. is is the most important question: How to stop the young from leaving? And how to bring backthose who have le? I have read the White Paper of the European Union, where those questions about migrations are raised. e conditions which countries, including the Balkans countries, have to fulfil to become EU members are also listed. ere are 2,700 such conditions, or criteria. So far, Bosnia-Herzegovina has fulfilled some 250 of them. It
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probably won’t be able to fulfil all of them before 2020. But even Norway or Sweden haven’t fulfilled all of them, and this is our consolation. But the question of migrations remains a crucially important scientific question for all of the former Yugoslavia, but also for Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Albania and other countries. We here are trying to come up with scientific answers and one of them is the creation of political and economic preconditions to convince those people to stay. We cannot stop them by force, but we have to offer them a new way of life. is is what Elton Skendaj also talked about – a better life, a higher level of cultural, economic and political development, which those young people will be able to accept as a satisfactory way of living. If we don’t provide this, then we can only say goodbye to the future generations and let them go. Our famous writer, Miroslav Krleza9 – I say ‘ours,’ but even the Hungarians and some other European nations say that he is theirs too – once said that on the Balkans you always need to have your suitcase packed and ready. is is what we need to change – this situation that on the Balkans your suitcase must always be ready. We have to secure economic and other preconditions, including religious ones. Freedom of religion is extremely important because for example in Bosnia religious tolerance has been destroyed. A tolerance that existed for centuries was destroyed and wehave to restore it. We also have to restore trust among people and trust in people. is will be our first step towards the European Union, the first of those 2,700. Wolfgang Hoepken:I think this was a wonderful closing of our discussion. I would like to give the floor now to the organisers. Ekaterina Nikova: I only want to remind you and to generalise the main tasks, papers and problems that were raised at this conference. With all due modesty, I have to say that I think this has been a successful conference.
9 Miroslav Krleza (1893–1981) is generally considered the most significant figure in Croatian and (former) Yugoslav literature in the twentieth century – a playwright, novelist, essayist, poet and lexicographer. He was born in Zagreb (then still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and was sent to studyat a military academy in Budapest (Editor’s note).
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