Fm3_27(Global Ballistic Missile Defense)

FM 3-27(FM 3-27.10)

ARMY GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (GBMD) OPERATIONS

January 2011

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to protect information and technical data on current technology in areas of significant or potentially significant military application or that related to specific military deficiencies of potential adversaries. This determination was made on 21 August 2007. Other requests must be referred to HQ USASMDC, ATTN: SMDC-FWD-D, Colorado Springs, CO 80910. Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents for reconstruction of the document. Warning Notice: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) or Executive Order 12470. Violations of these export laws are subject of severe criminal penalties.

Headquarters Department of the Army

For Official Use Only

This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).

*FM 3-27(FM 3-27.10) Field Manual No. 3-27

Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 3 January 2011

Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD) Operations Contents Page SUMMARY OF CHANGES .................................................................................... v PREFACE ............................................................................................................. vi Chapter 1

ARMY GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ........................................... 1-1 GBMD ................................................................................................................. 1-1 Missile Defense Doctrine - Definitions ............................................................... 1-1 The US Army's GBMD Mission .......................................................................... 1-2 Army GBMD Role ............................................................................................... 1-2 Ballistic Missile Defense System ........................................................................ 1-3 Ballistic Missile Defense Phases ........................................................................ 1-4 GMD Mission ...................................................................................................... 1-6 Joint Doctrine for Missile Defense Operations ................................................... 1-6 GBMD Organizations ......................................................................................... 1-7

Chapter 2

COMMAND AND CONTROL............................................................................. 2-1 Command and Control ....................................................................................... 2-1 GBMD C2 Systems ............................................................................................ 2-2 GFC .................................................................................................................... 2-2 C2BMC ............................................................................................................... 2-3 Command Relationships .................................................................................... 2-4 GMD Forces ....................................................................................................... 2-5 AN/TPY-2 (FBM) ................................................................................................ 2-6

_____________________________________________________________________________________ DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to protect information and technical data on current technology in areas of significant or potentially significant military application or that relates to specific military deficiencies of potential adversaries. This determination was made on 21 August 2007. Other requests must be referred to HQ USASMDC, ATTN: SMDC-FWD-D, Colorado Springs, CO 80910. WARNING NOTICE: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) or Executive Order 12470. Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents for reconstruction of the document. *This publication supersedes FM 3-27, 20 May 2010, and FM 3-27.10, 24 April 2008.

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Chapter 3

OPERATIONS .................................................................................................... 3-1 Operations........................................................................................................... 3-1 Global Operations ............................................................................................... 3-2 Army GBMD Operations ..................................................................................... 3-3 Missile Defense Warfighting Principles............................................................... 3-4 Protection ............................................................................................................ 3-9 Security Operations .......................................................................................... 3-10 Operations Security .......................................................................................... 3-14 Information Operations ..................................................................................... 3-14

Chapter 4

ARMY GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE SUSTAINMENT ................................... 4-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 4-1 GBMD Site Characteristics ................................................................................. 4-1 Contractor Logistics Support .............................................................................. 4-4 Army Sustainment for GBMD.............................................................................. 4-7 Missile Defense Agency...................................................................................... 4-9

Chapter 5

COMMUNICATIONS .......................................................................................... 5-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 5-1 Communications Requirements .......................................................................... 5-1 GBMD Networks ................................................................................................. 5-2 C2BMC................................................................................................................ 5-4 Responsibilities ................................................................................................... 5-5

Chapter 6

Army GBMD Components ................................................................................ 6-1 GMD Overview .................................................................................................... 6-1 GMD Program Description .................................................................................. 6-1 Launch Support System...................................................................................... 6-3 GBI System ......................................................................................................... 6-6 GMD Fire Direction Centers................................................................................ 6-7 GMD Organization ............................................................................................ 6-11 AN/TPY-2 (FBM) System Overview .................................................................. 6-14 AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Operations ............................................................................ 6-15

Appendix A

THREAT............................................................................................................. A-1 Potential Rogue Missile Threats ........................................................................ A-1 Global Ballistic Missile Threats .......................................................................... A-1 Global Threat Enviroment .................................................................................. A-2 Summary of Strategic Threats ........................................................................... A-2 Trends ................................................................................................................ A-2 Global Threat Environment ................................................................................ A-3 Missiles .............................................................................................................. A-4 Space ................................................................................................................. A-7 Information Operations ...................................................................................... A-8 Physical Attack (Sabotage, Terrorism) .............................................................. A-8

Appendix B

GBMD Support Elements ................................................................................ B-1 Associated BMDS Elements .............................................................................. B-1 BMDS Sensors................................................................................................... B-2 Land Components .............................................................................................. B-4

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Sea Components ................................................................................................ B-7 Appendix C

GBMD OPERATIONS ........................................................................................ C-1 GMD Planning .................................................................................................... C-1 GMD Operations Planning ................................................................................. C-2 Engagement Operations .................................................................................... C-2 GMD Employment Guidelines ............................................................................ C-3 Security ............................................................................................................... C-5 GMD Site Characteristics ................................................................................... C-5 Security Operations ............................................................................................ C-8 GMD GBI Site Security Operations .................................................................. C-10

GLOSSARY

............................................................................................................... Glossary-1

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... References-1 INDEX

..................................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures Figure 1-1. Ballistic Missile Phases and Ranges ................................................................... 1-4 Figure 1-2. GBMD organizational structure............................................................................ 1-7 Figure 2-1. COCOM AOR ...................................................................................................... 2-2 Figure 2-2. GBMD Command Relationships .......................................................................... 2-5 Figure 3-1. GBMD Systems ................................................................................................... 3-2 Figure 3-2. GMD System Actions After ICBM Launch Detection ........................................... 3-6 Figure 3-3. Missile Tracking ................................................................................................... 3-8 Figure 4-1. PCSS Infrastructure ............................................................................................. 4-5 Figure 4-2. Operational Reporting Summarized .................................................................... 4-7 Figure 5-1. GMD COMNET Architecture ................................................................................ 5-3 Figure 5-2. C2BMC Tri-Node Architecture ............................................................................. 5-5 Figure 6-1 Strongback with Crane at a Silo & Transport of GBI from Airfield. ....................... 6-5 Figure 6-2 Vandenberg AFB & FGA GSD. ............................................................................. 6-5 Figure 6-3. OBV & Payload .................................................................................................... 6-6 Figure 6-4. EKV ...................................................................................................................... 6-7 Figure 6-5. FGA Missile Field ................................................................................................. 6-7 Figure 6-6. 100th MD BDE (GMD) MDE ............................................................................... 6-10 Figure 6-7. 49th MD BN (GMD) FDC .................................................................................... 6-11 Figure 6-8. GMD Organizational Structure ........................................................................... 6-12 Figure 6-9. Organization of Crew Positions ......................................................................... 6-13 Figure 6-10. MDE Operations Modes and Functions ........................................................... 6-13 Figure 6-11. FDC Operations Modes and Function ............................................................. 6-14 Figure 6-12. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Search Profile ...................................................................... 6-16 Figure 6-13. Notional AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Radar Site Security Operations ............................ 6-17

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Figure 6-14. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Radar Detachment .............................................................. 6-19 Figure A-1. ICBMs.................................................................................................................. A-6 Figure A-2. SLBMs ................................................................................................................. A-7 Figure B-1. Operations Center Likely to use C2BMC ............................................................ B-2 Figure B-2. DSP Satellite ....................................................................................................... B-3 Figure B-3. SBIRS Satellite .................................................................................................... B-4 Figure B-4. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Radar ...................................................................................... B-5 Figure B-5. UEWR ................................................................................................................. B-6 Figure B-6. COBRA Dane Radar ........................................................................................... B-7 Figure B-7. SBX Platform and Radar ..................................................................................... B-8 Figure B-8. Aegis Ship with AN/SPY-1 Radar ....................................................................... B-9 Figure C-1. In-flight updates .................................................................................................. C-3 Figure C-2. Operational Reporting – Summarized ................................................................ C-8 Figure C-3. Command Relationships for Security Operations ............................................ C-12

Tables Table 3-1. Aspects of GBMD ................................................................................................. 3-3 Table 3-2. GMD Engagement Sequence ............................................................................... 3-6 Table 5-1. Tier I Nodes .......................................................................................................... 5-7 Table 5-2. Tier II Nodes ......................................................................................................... 5-8

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Summary of Changes 1. Purpose: To summarize the revisions made to this Field Manual, Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense Operations, published 20 May 2010. 2. The purpose of FM 3-27 is to describe the Army’s mission and roles in Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD) of the United States homeland, deployed forces, friends and allies from ballistic missile attack. It also establishes the doctrinal framework for Army GBMD operations in the Joint community. 3. TRADOC Commander directed the information found in FM 3-27.10, Army Ground-based Midcourse Defense Operation to be incorporated into FM 3-27 without duplication of information. All incorporated information was copied verbatim from FM 3-27.10 to this document. When approved, this document will supersede FM 3-27.10. a.

Executive Summary • Current: Document lacks Executive Summary. • Change: Adds Executive Summary with changes from original document.

b.

Preface: Provides overview of Army GBMD operations. • Current: Lacks identification of Army GFC and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems. • Change: Adds paragraphs to identify the Army GFC and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems.

c.

Chapter 1: Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense. Chapter defines GBMD doctrine as it relates to the Army role, mission, responsibilities and relationships. • Current: The chapter highlights to ballistic missile defense systems in general. • Change: Adds text to clarify the Army organizations involved in GBMD and the GMD mission. Adds explanation of BMDS engagement phases for ICBM flight path.

d.

Chapter 2: Command and Control. Chapter discusses C2 for GBMD organizations and Army units involved in countering the global missile threat • Current: Chapter did not contain information about C2BMC or AN/TPY-2 (FBM). • Change: Adds a section for each of C2BMC and AN/TPY-2 (FBM).

e.

Chapter 3: Operations. Chapter discusses operations and considerations Army GBMD units must apply for planning and execution of their mission. • Current: Lacks a discussion of operational procedures for GMD. • Change: Adds GMD warfighting principals, force protection requirements, and day-today ops.

f.

Chapter 5: Communications. Contains GBMD communication requirements for Army systems. • Current: Lacks information on In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS). • Change: Adds information on IFICS.

g.

Chapter 6: GMD Components. Chapter contains Army GBMD systems components. • Current: Lacks system component descriptions. • Change: Adds system component descriptions for GMD ground systems, launch support equipment, ground safing devices, GBI, EKV, MDE, FDC and AN/TPY-2 (FBM).

h.

Appendix C: GMD Operations. Appendix gives an in-depth view of operations and considerations GMD units must apply to the conduct of their mission planning and execution. • Current: Lacks in-depth view of operations and considerations for GMD units. • Change: Adds in-depth view of operations and considerations for GMD units.

i.

Glossary and Index have been updated to reflect changes made to this document.


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Preface Field Manual (FM) 3-27 Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD) Operations is a proponent-level manual. It is the principle publication for describing the Army’s role and mission in GBMD of the United States (US) homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies from ballistic missile attack. Although the focus is Army GBMD, all aspects of this FM are consistent with the Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats and United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Global Ballistic Missile Defense Concept of Operations. This FM also establishes the doctrinal framework for Army GBMD Operations in the Joint community. GBMD is any defensive measure designed to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of an adversary ballistic missile attacks. Threats may or may not cross Combatant Commander’s area of responsibility (AOR) and may require coordination or integration among the affected combatant commands. To achieve the Army’s objective of becoming a “…strategically responsive quality force, dominant across the spectrum of conflict and fully integrated within the unified action environment security framework…,” the US must be able to fully integrate GBMD. US Army Strategic missile defense forces contribute to this effort by employing sensor and shooter capabilities as part of the USSTRATCOM GBMD mission. The Operational Army and strategic planners will use this manual as guiding principles for the successful execution of this missile defense mission. In addition, other Services and Joint organizations can use this manual for doctrinal applications of Army GBMD operations. Army trainers will use this manual for the curriculum in Army institutional training and leader development. This FM provides doctrinal guidance on Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system operations to the Army, the 100th Missile Defense Brigade (100th MD BDE (GMD)) and 49th Missile Defense Battalion (49th MD BN (GMD)) as well as how the AN/TPY-2 Forward Based Mode (FBM) radar that supports the Army's GBMD operations. GMD is the only system for strategic missile defense of the US homeland, which is currently protected against the threat of limited intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) attack, as a result of investments made over the past decade. GMD relies on Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) at two sites: Fort Greely, Alaska (FGA) and Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), California. It is an element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and functions under the Army’s GBMD concept for defending the US homeland from ballistic missile attack. This fundamental framework guides the Army participation in GBMD and GMD system operations. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is a forward-based, phased-array, X-band radar used to support BMDS by providing combatant command (COCOM) early warning of ballistic missile launches. It is designed to transmit boost and early midcourse radar track data for both regional and strategic missile defense systems. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars are forward deployed to providing early warning for homeland defense (HLD) as well as regional defense for COCOMs AOR. This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserves (USAR) unless otherwise stated. This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and General Dennis J. Reimer’s Training and Doctrine Digital Library (http://www.train.army.mil). The proponent of this manual is the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/US Army Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT). Send written comments and recommendations on Department of Army DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, HQ USASMDC/ARSTRAT ATTN: USASMDC-FWT-D, P.O. Box 1500, Huntsville, AL 35807-3801 (e-mail: [email protected]).

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Chapter 1

Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense As the Army’s keystone manual for GBMD, this chapter defines GBMD doctrine definitions as they relate to the Army’s role, mission, responsibilities, and relationships. It highlights the BMDS in general to include missile defense doctrine and the Joint warfighting principles for missile defense operations. The chapter concludes with a description of GBMD organizations. This chapter also addresses BMD concepts, doctrine, and the GMD mission.

GBMD 1-1. USSTRATCOM defines GBMD as defensive measures designed to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of adversary ballistic missile attacks that cross COCOM AOR boundaries. These cross boundary threats require coordination or integration among the affected COCOMs. 1-2. GBMD is a USSTRATCOM mission to coordinate the employment of GBMD and strike forces to defeat limited ballistic missile attacks in all phases of flight or prior to their launch, and defend US, deployed forces, friends, and allies. This document only discusses Army GBMD systems. To accomplish this mission USSTRATCOM integrates and synchronizes a wide range of sensors, shooters, and command and control (C2) elements. This includes, GMD, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis (BMD), and sensors - Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR), COBRA Dane radar, Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars and Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) systems. 1-3. The Unified Command Plan 2008 (UCP 08) tasks each COCOM with "Deterring attacks against the US, its territories, possessions and bases, and employing appropriate force should deterrence fail." All combatant commands (and their subordinate commands as applicable) coordinate their GBMD planning and support with CDRUSSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) (See JP 3-01). 1-4. The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missile technology requires a GBMD capability for defense of the homeland and overseas AOR’s. However, as the range of threat missiles increases, so does the potential for cross AOR impacts. Thus, the links from sensors to decision makers to shooters must occur rapidly and reliably, often across traditional geographic and AOR boundaries.

MISSILE DEFENSE DOCTRINE - DEFINITIONS 1-5. BMDS – An evolving, [Joint] integrated, and interoperable system comprising multiple elements and components that will provide opportunities to intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of flight (i.e. boost, midcourse and terminal) against all ranges of threats” according to Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5134.09 dates September 17, 2009. BMDS consists of a layered system of systems comprised of sensors, weapon systems, planning and battle management software and hardware. 1-6. GBMD – Army GBMD is designed to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of adversary ballistic missile attacks that may or may not cross COCOM AOR and require coordination. The Army GBMD systems are limited to countering limited strategic ballistic missile threats. USASMDC/ARSTRAT provides planning, integration, control and coordination of Army Forces (ARFOR) and capabilities in


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support of assigned USSTRATCOM missions; USASMDC/ARSTRAT serves as the proponent for Space, GMD and High Altitude missions and is the Army’s integrator for global missile defense (Army Regulation (AR) 10-87 & General Order 37). 1-7. GMD – An Army System for strategic missile defense of the US homeland. The Army is the lead Service for GMD systems and the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar. GMD is an element of the BMDS. It functions under the USSTRATCOM GBMD concept for defending the US, its forces, and its allies from ballistic missile attack. 1-8. TBM - Theater BMD encompasses all activities focused on the identification, integration, and employment of forces supported by theater or operations and national capabilities to detect, identify, locate, track, discriminate, minimize the effects of, and destroy enemy theater missiles. Theater ballistic missiles (TBM) constitute the primary threat countered by Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) forces. TBMs are missiles with a range from 80 km to 3,000 km.

THE US ARMY'S GBMD MISSION 1-9. The Army mission is to provide to combatant commanders (CCDR) the forces and capabilities necessary to execute the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies. ARFOR provide the capability—by threat, force, or occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit comprehensive control over land, resources, and people. This land power capability compliments the other Services’ capabilities. Furthermore, the Army is charged to provide logistic and other executive agent functions to enable the other Services to accomplish their missions (FM 1). 1-10. The Army is organized to accomplish GBMD mission and trains, provides for, and equips ground missile defense forces to all COCOM. The Army’s GBMD mission is to defend the US homeland, allies and forward based forces against all range of missiles in all COCOM AORs to include intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) with a range between 3,000-5,500 km and ICBM with a range greater than 5,500 km. Army specific responsibilities are to detect, deter, defend against, and defeat adversary ballistic missile threats (see JP 3-27 and JP 3-01). USASMDC is the Army’s proponent for GBMD and ARSTRAT provides planning, integration, control and coordination of ARFOR and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM missions. 1-11. To accomplish the GBMD mission the Army integrates and synchronizes specific Army sensors and shooters. This includes GMD, THAAD, and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars, and BMD battle management assets.

ARMY GBMD ROLE 1-12. The Army GBMD role is to provide protection for deploying/deployed US forces, allies, and facilities and assure the freedom to execute operational maneuver throughout the global area of operations. Joint doctrine presents fundamental missile defense principles that guide the employment of Army GBMD forces in coordinated and integrated action to fulfill this role. 1-13. The GBMD consists of Army systems integrated and coordinated across multiple COCOM AORs. GBMD fully synchronizes and integrates offensive and defensive actions and supporting systems to achieve unity of effort. Within HLD, GBMD activities support actions and plans as part of protecting the US homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies from ballistic missile attack. 1-14. As the lead Service the Army operates elements of BMDS by planning, coordinating, and executing GBMD operations and integrating GMD with other elements of the BMDS. US Army GBMD forces employ a combination of fixed and mobile sensor and shooter capabilities, as integral elements of GBMD forces providing protection for the homeland, Allies, and power projection capabilities. 1-15. US missile defense warfighting principles form the basis for successful execution of missile defense operations and require an integrated strategy that supports the rapid, flexible application of defensive

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Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense

capabilities synchronized with offensive actions to deter and defeat the increasingly prolific global missile threat. 1-16. The Army’s approach to missile defense includes four operational elements: active defense, passive defense, attack operations, command control and intelligence. The Army component also provides an Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) that integrates the operational elements to synchronize Army contributions to Joint counter air operations.  Active Defense. The role of active defense operations is to protect the homeland and our deployed forces, friends, and allies from missile attacks by destroying ballistic missiles in flight. Active defense must consist of defense in depth against all ranges of ballistic missiles. When destruction of the missile prior to launch is not possible or unsuccessful, missiles will be engaged by all available weapon systems throughout their entire flight profile.  Passive Defense. The principal measures used to accomplish passive missile defense includes early warning, reducing targeting effectiveness, reducing vulnerability, hardening and protecting assets and individuals, and recovery/reconstitution. An example is chemical biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) defense operations with these three objectives: minimize casualties, preserve operating tempo and restore combat power.  Command Control and Intelligence. Commanders perform decision making functions through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, executing, and controlling forces in their AOR.  Attack Operations. Offensive operations intended to destroy and disrupt enemy ballistic missile capabilities before, during and after launch. The objective of these operations is to prevent the launch of BMs by attacking each element of the overall system, including such actions as destroying launch platforms, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) platforms, C2 nodes, missile stocks, and infrastructure. 1-17. Commanders use several integrating processes and continuing activities to BMD operations within the GBMD plan. Besides the military decision-making process (MDMP), Composite Risk Management (CRM) should be used during planning. Overall operations must be synchronized with each other as well as integrated. CRM is the Army’s primary decision-making process for identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of Army missions, functions, operations, and activities. CRM is a decisionmaking process used to mitigate risks associated with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM 1-18. The BMDS is a multi-service, integrated, global system of systems comprised of sensors, weapon systems, and C2 information systems. BMDS provides planning and battle management software and hardware, which employs layered defenses to intercept ballistic missiles during their boost, midcourse, and terminal flight phases. BMD activities do not include defense against cruise or tactical air-to-surface missiles. 1-19. Deployed BMDS capabilities are for potential operational use globally. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing and deploying missile defenses systems, for the Department of Defense (DOD), capable of protecting the US, our deployed forces, and friends and allies. As the lead agency for BMDS development, MDA’s charter is to provide centralized management to develop and integrate programs of sensors, interceptors, C2, and battle management into the BMDS. Specifically, the MDA is directed per Executive-level and DOD-level guidance as follows:  To develop and deploy, as directed, a layered BMDS.  To enable the fielding of elements of the BMDS as soon as practicable.  To provide capability in blocks, improving the effectiveness of fielded capability by inserting new technologies as they become available.


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1-20. The Army's keystone system of BMDS is GMD. The GMD element of BMDS engages long range threats in the midcourse engagement area using data from the suite of BMDS and external sensors. GMD is contributing to the development of advanced BMDS capabilities with increased data sharing across the system to more effectively manage BMDS assets and prepare the BMDS to engage missile threats. The technological capability of the system, the mission, and the area to which forces are committed are guiding Army GBMD employment plans and operations as BMDS capabilities evolve in an incremental development process. 1-21. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar detachments are usually forward deployed in relatively static locations outside the continental US (OCONUS). Particular locations are dependent upon mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) resulting in the integral sensor management section to be integrated into the C2BMC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PHASES 1-22. A ballistic missile does not rely on aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. Ballistic missiles have a prescribed course that generally cannot be altered after the missile has burned its fuel. However, a re-entry vehicle (RV) may maneuver independently of the missile or have some form of terminal guidance/control. BMD capabilities are to detect, deter, defend against, and defeat adversary ballistic missile threats. The goal of BMDS is to build an integrated layered missile defense to defeat threat ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. The intent is to be able to engage a ballistic target with multiple weapons systems throughout its entire trajectory. 1-23. BMDS forces incrementally deploy layered defenses that use complementary interceptors, sensors, and C2 tools to engage all classes of ballistic missile threats. These systems provide multiple engagement opportunities against ballistic missiles threat targets in all phases of flight. Figure 1-1 depicts the ballistic missile flight phases and ranges. Ballistic missile flight is commonly divided into three phases: boost, midcourse and terminal. Each phase plays an important role in the design of a robust system intended to defend against a ballistic missiles attack.

Figure 1-1. Ballistic Missile Phases and Ranges


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BOOST PHASE DEFENSE 1-24. The boost phase of a ballistic missiles flight is that segment of flight lasting from launch through the completion of propulsion fuel burn. This is the ideal phase to intercept a missile. Intercepting a missile carrying a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon in the boost phase, will likely cause the debris to fall on or near the launch country. While it is ideal to destroy a ballistic missile as it struggles against the Earth’s gravity, it is also very challenging. The Boost phase defenses can defeat ballistic missiles of all ranges, but it is the most difficult phase in which to engage a ballistic missile. It is not always essential to destroy the RV in the boost phase since an impact with the booster should prevent the RVs from reaching its intended target. 1-25. The infrared (IR) signature created by the combustion of the missile’s fuel provides a highly visible exhaust plume and increases the likelihood of detection by satellite sensors. Satellites provide early warning of missile launches and usually provide the first indication of a missile launch. However, an accelerating missile is difficult to intercept as the boost phase is relatively short, usually lasting less than 300 seconds and at an altitudes of less than 300 kilometers. To engage ballistic missiles in this phase, the BMDS needs real-time launch detection, accurate threat determination (impact prediction), quick reaction times, high confidence decision making, and multiple engagement possibilities. Sensors must quickly detect a launch and relay engagement quality track data about the threat missile. Boost phase defense requires the ballistic missile to be quickly confirmed as a threat and the ability to destroy the threat before booster burn-out. Any BMDS weapons platform positioned to intercept in the boost phase may very likely be exposed and vulnerable to enemy strikes and interdiction. 1-26. Current Boost Phase missile defense elements in BMD include Defense Support Program/SpaceBases Infrared System (DSP/SBIRS) satellites, Aegis BMD and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar depending on their locations.

MIDCOURSE PHASE DEFENSE 1-27. The Midcourse phase begins after the booster shuts down. As the boost phase terminates, the midcourse phase of flight begins as the missile/RVs continues along its ballistic trajectory. This phase can last as long as 30 minutes for ICBMs, allowing opportunity to destroy the incoming ballistic missile outside the Earth’s atmosphere. Any debris remaining after the intercept will likely burn up as it re-enters the atmosphere. The GMD element is designed to defend the US homeland against a limited attack from rogue countries. GMD system can only defend against IRBMs and ICBMs. A network of advanced sensors, radars, command, control, battle management and communication assets provide target detection, tracking and discrimination of countermeasures to guide the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) into the path of the hostile missile, destroying it with hit-to-kill technology. 1-28. The primary elements of BMDS that are operational during the midcourse phase are GMD Fire Control (GFC), Aegis BMD, UEWR, SBX, and COBRA Dane Radar. 1-29. Depending on the threat launch locations, launching multiple interceptors may increase the probability of an intercept. Multiple threat launches may prevent repetitive kill evaluations and reengagement decisions. The more time a threat missile spends in the midcourse phase, the greater the possibility it may deploy countermeasures and penetration aides, if equipped. Conversely, the GMD sensors have more time to discriminate the RV from countermeasures, penetration aides, chaff, and other objects along the same trajectory.

TERMINAL PHASE DEFENSE 1-30. During the terminal phase of IRBM and ICBM flights, the missile RV reenters the Earth’s atmosphere. This phase usually lasts only 60 to 120 seconds. The RV is free-falling at extremely high speeds (14,000+ miles per hour). Defensive systems designed for use in the Terminal phase have a very limited battle space and short timeline to provide adequate defense. It is the last opportunity to make an intercept before the RV reaches its target. Intercepting an RV during this phase is difficult and the least


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desirable of the phases because there is little margin for error and the intercept will occur close to the intended target. Terminal phase interceptor elements include the Army’s Phased-Array Tracking Radar Intercept On Target (PATRIOT) Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) now deployed worldwide and the THAAD system. These mobile systems defend against SRBM to MRBM range ballistic missiles. THAAD provides wide area defense while PATRIOT is most effective in protecting point targets such as troop concentrations, ports, airfields, and staging areas.

GMD MISSION 1-31. The GMD mission is to defend the US and designated areas against IRBM and ICBM attacks in the Midcourse phase of flight as part of the BMDS and to conduct concurrent operational and test activities. Tasks include:  Place the GMD systems on alert.  Execute concurrent testing and defensive operations.  Continue development to incrementally improve capability.  Provide trained and certified crews, installation support, and personnel protection.

JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS 1-32. The rapid evolution of GBMD has outdistanced existing Joint missile defense guidance. Current missile defense doctrine does not adequately capture the integration of BMD elements to include weapon systems, sensors, and battle management. Without doctrinal guidance on this integration, potential adversaries will look to exploit seams in these elements, bringing risk to the homeland and operations in forward AORs. This integration requires close coordination across the Army branches and functional components. 1-33. The Army incorporation of missile defense into doctrine was finalized long ago before JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense was promulgated in the early 1990s. The JP was based on the Army's concept for defeating the Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) threat. The four operational elements of the GBMD concept (active defense; passive defense; attack operations; and battle management command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) are still the basis of all DOD integrated missile defenses. GMD is an active defense component of the global BMDS. NOTE: JP 3-01 incorporated JP 3-01.5 during the last revision. This version of JP 3-01 also established theater missile defense as an important area of concentration under air defense, needing special emphasis and certain different ways of operation from traditional air defense. 1-34. Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats provides the Joint definition for active defense in the air domain, to include BMD. Attack Operations are an element of Offensive Counter Air (OCA) operations. 1-35. Joint Publication 3-27, homeland Defense provides doctrine for the defense of the US homeland across the operational themes from peacetime military engagement to major combat operations. It provides information on C2, interagency and multinational coordination, and operations required to defeat external threats to, and aggression against, the homeland. 1-36. Joint Doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective. In the event that deterrence fails, CDRUSSTRATCOM, in support of the COCOM, is tasked to coordinate the deployment and employment of GBMD and strike forces to defeat limited ballistic missile attacks in all phases of flight or prior to their launch in order to defend the US, our deployed forces, friends, and allies.


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1-37. Although the threat has changed, the defense of the US homeland has always been the primary concern of the nation, DOD, and the Army. Doctrinally, little has changed despite treaty interpretations, funding levels, evolving threat evaluations, and the changing focus of research and political debate. While defense of the US homeland from ballistic missile attacks shifted from “conventional” anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and nuclear-based deterrence technologies to BMDS, Air and Missile Defense (AMD) efforts, and limited-strike shields, the essential task and approach are the same. Currently, the Army is fulfilling its traditional role of defending the US homeland by operating the Army elements of the BMDS.

GBMD ORGANIZATIONS 1-38. Many organizations have a role in GBMD within a COCOM, subordinate COCOM, or JTF. Missile defense is inherently a Joint operation. GBMD operations are multi-command, multi-regional, and conducted according to Joint doctrine. See figure 1-2 GBMD organizational structure.

Figure 1-2. GBMD organizational structure 1-39. USASMDC/ARSTRAT serves as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) to USSTRATCOM who is the integrator for GBMD. USASMDC/ARSTRAT also conducts space operations, provides planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army resources and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM missions. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is responsible for:  ARFOR assigned to ASCC and to USSTRATCOM.  Providing continuous oversight, control, integration, and coordination of ARFOR assigned to USSTRATCOM.  Planning and execution of ASCC responsibilities by exercising specified Administrative Control (ADCON) of organic, assigned, and attached ARFOR.  ARFOR specified for high altitude, GMD, and integrated air and missile defense (IAMD).


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    

Supporting, as directed by CDRUSSTRATCOM, all Army, Joint, multinational, and interagency elements. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the proponent for GMD. Serves as the Joint user representative, centralized manager, and integrator for the GMD system and executes horizontal integration across all IAMD systems. Army integration for GBMD systems and senior mission commander for GMD systems. Integration of technical and operational requirements with material developers.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 1-40. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for GBMD planning and coordinating GBMD operations support. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supporting commander to other COCOMs for GBMD execution and is the COCOM authority for the NG units, 100th MD BDE (GMD), 49th MD BN (GMD) and forward deployed AN/TPY-2 (FBM) detachments. 1-41. USSTRATCOM is organized to accomplish its mission with Joint Functional Component Commands (JFCC) which are assigned specific functional responsibilities. JFCC-IMD is responsible for the day-to-day planning and execution of IMD and JFCC-SPACE is responsible for supporting JFCC-IMD for IMD issues.

JFCC - INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE 1-42. JFCC-IMD coordinates with COCOMs and services for desired Joint effects and capabilities for GBMD operations and support for missile defense. The command also synchronizes GBMD operations and support (sea, land, air and space-based). JFCC-IMD monitors and coordinates activities with associated combatant commands, other USSTRATCOM Joint functional components, and the efforts of the MDA. The JFCC-IMD commander advises the USSTRATCOM commander on all aspects of GBMD and serves as the commander of USASMDC and ARSTRAT. 1-43. The JFCC-IMD mission is to support USSTRATCOM's UCP 08 mission by synchronizing operational-level GBMD planning and GBMD operations support. JFCC-IMD supports development of global effects for DOD and when directed provides alternate missile defense execution support. JFCC-IMD will work with other JFCCs to continuously coordinate, plan, integrate, and synchronize, USSTRATCOM capabilities to provide tailored, responsive effects in support of national objectives and COCOMs. 1-44. Additionally, the JFCC-IMD is responsible for maintaining oversight, situational awareness (SA) and management of the system resources/assets supporting readiness of the GBMD equipment. When one of the GMD or AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems has a readiness change, the JFCC-IMD will conduct an Asset Management Conference (AMC). The AMC is to ensure all command elements concerned are aware of the change to the GBMD capability and status.

JFCC - SPACE 1-45. JFCC-SPACE optimizes planning, execution, and force management, as directed by the commander of USSTRATCOM, of the assigned missions of coordinating, planning, and conducting space operations. JFCC-SPACE provides BMDS with ballistic missile early warning and communications capability. 1-46. The mission for JFCC-SPACE is to continuously coordinate, plan, integrate, synchronize, and execute space operations to provide tailored, responsive space effects in support of national objectives and CCDRs. Commander JFCC-SPACE will ensure Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) and Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) systems generate and report precise, timely and engagement quality information on ballistic missiles and nuclear detonations.


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JFCC - INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE 1-47. Commander, JFCC for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) is responsible for providing support to JFCC-IMD for GBMD. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) appoints the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency as the Commander, JFCC-ISR. JFCC-ISR supports oversight and management of the ISR Enterprise by developing and synchronizing operational ISR and associated Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) plans and allocation strategies to integrate national, theater and multinational ISR capabilities to satisfy CCDRs’ requirements.

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND 1-48. US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) deters ballistic missile attacks on the US, its territories, possessions, and bases within its AOR and other areas as directed. Should deterrence fail, and as directed by the SECDEF, Commander USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM) will employ available BMD forces to defeat ballistic missile attacks. 1-49. USNORTHCOM forces are responsible for executing GBMD operations in support of the defense of the US homeland. The 100th MD BDE (GMD) and 49th MD BN (GMD) are OPCON to USSTRATCOM. USNORTHCOM has operational control (OPCON) for execution of the GBMD mission. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) provides ARNG and active component missile defense forces under command of USSTRATCOM to execute BMD operations for the defense of North America. These forces are OPCON to USNORTHCOM during execution of a mission. 1-50. The CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported commander for HLD. If offensive operations are necessary to protect the homeland, CDRUSSTRATCOM will support CDRUSNORTHCOM, Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and the appropriate overseas Combatant CCDRs as directed by SECDEF. JFCC-ISR will support USNORTHCOM’s requirement by developing allocation recommendations of ISR and PED capabilities to satisfy USNORTHCOM’s requirements.

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 1-51. NORAD provides aerospace warning for North America that consists of the detection, validation, and warning of an attack against North America, whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles. NORAD has three missions: aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. Through its aerospace warning mission, NORAD supports USNORTHCOM and its maritime warning missions as well as its aerospace control mission. NORAD provides comprehensive aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for the defense of North America. NORAD's core responsibilities include:  Deter, detect, and defend against aerospace threats to North America.  Provide timely and accurate ITW/AA to North America.

US ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND / ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND 1-52. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is an operational level Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) as the ASCC to USSTRATCOM and exercises ADCON authority and responsibility over ARFOR as delegated by CDR USSTRATCOM. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army proponent for space, high altitude, and GMD; and develops and transitions technology; and provides acquisition support to assigned fields. 1-53. Coordinated Army support to both USSTRATCOM and combatant commands is critical and achieved through the efforts of USASMDC/ARSTRAT and the JFCC-IMD. This coordination is greatly assisted by the fact the Commanding General USASMDC/ARSTRAT is dual hatted as the Commander of the JFCC-IMD. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the integrator of Army GBMD and conducts mission-related research and development in support of Army Title 10 responsibilities.


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1-54. USASMDC Commander also has Army missile defense responsibilities in accordance with (IAW) AR 10-87. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is an operational level Army force, designated by the SECARMY, serving as the assigned ASCC to provide planning, integration, coordination, and control of ARFOR and capabilities in support of the USSTRATCOM requirements. These USASMDC/ARSTRAT functions are:  Conducts research and development for and provides acquisition support to USSTRATCOM or other CCDRs. Serves as the Joint user representative, centralized manager, and integrator for the GMD System and executes horizontal integration across all IAMD systems.  Advocate for AMD funding and requirements; provides input to Army AMD doctrine, policies, and procedures; identifies AMD capabilities, capability gaps, and concepts; coordinates future ground–based air defense requirements issues and programs with CCDR and Joint staff; reviews AMD initial capabilities document and Joint capabilities documentation in support of future requirements.  The Army's integrator for GBMD systems and the senior mission commander for GMD systems.  The Army’s implementing agent for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.  Integrates technical and operational requirements with materiel developers.  The Army’s lead organization for coordination and support to the MDA.  Supports operational and developmental testing of theater/strategic ballistic missiles/ interceptors (Major Range Test Facility Base) and directed energy testing and evaluation in support of laser developmental and operational tests.

ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMANDS 1-55. AAMDCs perform Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) planning, coordination, integration, and execution in support of a CCDR’s priorities. The AAMDC integrates the four operational elements of Army TAMD (passive air defense, active air defense, attack operations, and C2 Information Systems) to protect contingency, forward-deployed, and reinforcing forces as well as designated assets from the CCDR’s critical asset list. 1-56. In a theater an AAMDC will normally not only have a command relationship of OPCON with the ARFOR commander or Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), if designated, but also will be in direct support to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). These command relationships allow the AAMDC to assist in synchronizing Joint TAMD operations. 1-57. If available in the AOR, the commanding general of the AAMDC performs two critical roles as the senior Army ADA commander for AMD operations. The commanding general serves as the Theater Army Air and Missile Defense Coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) to the JFLCC and Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC) to the JFACC or Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) to provide C2 of multi-tiered AMD using air, land, and sea based missile defense assets. 1-58. Currently, there are two AAMDCs that support CCDR priorities in US Central Command (USCENTCOM), US Pacific Command (USPACOM) and USNORTHCOM, with an Air and Missile Defense Detachment (AMDD) supporting US European Command (USEUCOM). The AAMDC that supports USCENTCOM also has a force provider responsibility and serves as the FORSCOM executive agent for TAMD operations and Army AMD force management. Although, the AAMDCs are not in the USSTRATCOM, JFCC-IMD, or USASMDC/ARSTRAT chains of command the AAMDCs do have a coordination relationship (when approved by their higher headquarters) with JFCC-IMD in its role as a GBMD integrator for USSTRATCOM. For example, the AAMDC with the Army AMD force management responsibility supports JFCC-IMD in the global force management process with FORSCOM approval.

100TH MD BDE (GMD) 1-59. The mission of the 100th MD BDE (GMD) is to destroy, on orders, ICBMs in the midcourse phase to defend the US and defended areas (DA). The 100th MD BDE (GMD) is to organize, train, equip, and operate the GFC system. Also, the 100th MD BDE (GMD) provides planning and coordination functions for GMD test activities in support of MDA.


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1-60. The 100th MD BDE (GMD) Commander is dual hatted and serves in both a Title 10 United States Code (USC) and Title 32 USC capacity to effectively C2 multi-component Soldiers. The 100th MD BDE (GMD) provides both ARNG and regular Army Soldiers to operate the Missile Defense Element (MDE) at Schriever AFB, one of the two GFC nodes. The MDE operates continuously, utilizing a five-crew rotation schedule with 5 unique positions per crew. The 100th MD BDE (GMD) also provides C2 for an 49th MD BN (GMD) and is comprised of ARNG active Army Soldiers. 1-61. The mission of the 49th MD BN (GMD) is two-fold. First, the 49th MD BN (GMD) secures the FGA Missile Defense Complex (MDC) and second, they provide Soldiers and operate the Fire Direction Center (FDC), a second GFC node located at FGA to dissuade, deter, and destroy ICBM attacks in the midcourse phase of flight. The 49th MD BN (GMD) is comprised of only ARNG Soldiers. The FDC operates continuously, utilizing the same five-crew rotation schedule with 5 unique positions per crew as does the MDE. 1-62. The mission of the 100th MD BDE (GMD) Detachment 1 is to provide continuous monitoring of the Ground Safing Device (GSD) and Command and Launch Equipment (CLE) located at Vandenberg AFB, California in order to ensure the GBIs at that location are mission ready.


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Chapter 2

Command and Control This chapter describes C2 for GBMD organizations and Army units involved in countering the global missile threat. The C2 of these Army units is complex and includes the Command Authority. Also addressed in this chapter are the GBMD C2 systems with a role in GBMD. This chapter also describes command relationships and interrelated responsibilities between commands.

COMMAND AND CONTROL 2-1. C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform C2 functions through a C2 system (FM 6-0). C2 is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. Each of the warfighting functions relies upon C2 for integration and synchronization. 2-2. Successful execution of GBMD C2 requires an integrated strategy that supports the rapid, flexible application of defensive capabilities synchronized with offensive actions to deter and defeat the sophisticated adversary missile threat. This strategy is based on the principles of unity of effort, unity of command, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. 2-3. GBMD operators will remain under the control of the established Title 10 USC, Title 14 USC, 20 or Title 32 USC chain of command when conducting missile defense operational duties. The SECDEF, as the President’s principal assistant on military matters, has overall authority for DOD and executes the HLD mission (JP 3-27). Colorado, California and Alaska National Guard (NG) Soldiers executing the GMD mission or guarding the GMD facilities do so only while in a Title 10 status and under the command of the Title 10 chain of command. 2-4. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the senior Army headquarters responsible for executing the GBMD mission. USASMDC/ARSTRAT forces will maintain a dedicated C2 structure to plan, integrate, and coordinate Army support to GBMD. These capabilities will be part of a responsive, layered offensive and defensive system capable of deterring, preventing, or defeating missile threats as part of the greater GBMD mission. 2-5. Organizations that have a C2 role in GBMD are the Command Authority, USSTRATCOM, COCOMs, and Service components. Army organizations that have a C2 role in GBMD are USASMDC/ARSTRAT and the AAMDCs in their respective AORs. The UCP 08 identifies regional boundaries. However, since missile threats can across AOR boundaries, COCOMs must establish crossAOR C2 relationships to effectively counter missile threats.

COMBATANT COMMANDS 2-6. Combatant commands are Joint military commands composed of forces from two or more services, has a broad and continuing mission, and is organized either on a geographical basis or on a functional basis. All COCOMs are commanded by either a four-star general or admiral and are considered "Joint" commands with specific badges denoting their affiliation. 2-7. As directed, combatant commands are supporting commanders to CDRUSNORTHCOM for missile defense of the contiguous 48 states, Alaska, and Hawaii. For example, Commander, US Pacific Command


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(CDRUSPACOM) is the supporting commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for execution of the GMD mission with Aegis BMD ships and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) track data for ICBM threats to the homeland (sea, land and space-based). 2-8. CCDRs exercise COCOM authority over forces assigned to them. COCOM authority is the nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 USC section 164, exercised only by commanders of COCOM or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the SECDEF. Figure 2-1 illustrates the COCOM AORs and the possible seams that could add complexity to cross COCOM GBMD C2, and the requirement for the establishment of seamless global C2 relationships.

Figure 2-1. COCOM AOR

GBMD C2 SYSTEMS 2-9. Organizations with a role in GBMD utilize a wide range of BMD battle management systems. These systems enable C2 to mitigate complexities associated with cross COCOM GBMD operations. For GBMD purposes, these C2 systems are C2BMC and GFC. 2-10. Command authority, USNORTHCOM, and COCOMs primarily use the C2BMC system as a BMD battle management decision aide. However, in executing GBMD, the Army utilizes the C2BMC for C2 of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar and GFC for the C2 of GMD. Because of the global threat, execution of this strategy will require close coordination with THAAD units. THAAD will come under the COCOM C2 structure when it is executing the strategic GBMD mission for defense of the homeland.

GFC 2-11. The GFC system is a suite of hardware, software, consoles, communications equipment, and trained personnel integrating the GMD system and other supporting elements to manage all phases of engagement. The GFC controls the GMD which is the first operational hit-to-kill and only operationally deployed missile defense program to defend the homeland against long-range ballistic missile attacks. The system provides early detection and tracking during the boost phase, midcourse target discrimination, precision


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intercept and destruction of inbound ICBMs through the use of hit-to-kill technology. GFC uses multiple sensors, communications systems, and GBIs with EKVs that are capable of detecting, tracking, and destroying IRBMs and ICBMs during the midcourse phase of flight. 2-12. The GFC is the brains of the GMD system. GFC combines a variety of sensors/radars, which include DSP/SBIRS, COBRA Dane radar, UEWR, SBX radar, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and Aegis BMDS. The GFC processes the sensors/radars information on target search, acquisition, track, classification, hit assessment, and in-flight interceptor data communications support to develop an Integrated Task Plan (ITP) for every GBI launched. This information provides the GBI with the ability to locate, discriminate, and destroy the incoming RV. 2-13. GFC nodes receive and pass data from sensors supporting GBMD. They also provide automated C2 information and permit human-in-control (HIC) management of the GMD operations. The GFC Engagement Planner (EP) is the software resource that synthesizes all the sensor data, develops the Weapons Task Plan (WTP) for the GBI and provides information to the operators. The GFC crews then analyze the information provided by the GFC to determine if the Commander’s Intent for engagement has been met. 2-14. The GFC provides instructions and launch direction to GBIs with EKVs that uses kinetic energy from a direct hit on the incoming RV to destroy it. The EKV is a sensor-propulsion package that collides with the target at a closing speed of approximately 15,000 miles per hour.

C2BMC 2-15. C2BMC supports GBMD planning, SA and C2. The C2BMC provides GBMD users with capabilities to plan and maintain SA to commanders, staff and shooters. It provides missile defense forces at both the strategic and tactical levels of command the capability to plan the GBMD fight, while concurrently tracking all potential ballistic missile threats. C2BMC specific capabilities include missile shooter/sensor planning coverage, overall planning assessment, SA, and sensor management. The C2BMC system provides data, decision, and communication linkage between BMDS elements. Actual C2BMC hardware at a given COCOM location will vary by function and data requirements. 2-16. C2BMC serves as the integrator for BMDS elements and components into a global network of integrated sensors, weapons, and fire control systems. Currently there are C2BMC Suites located in USPACOM, USEUCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USNORTHCOM. The USNORTHCOM C2BMC suite supports the USSTRATCOM JFCC-IMD located at the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center (MDIOC) at Schriever AFB, Colorado. 2-17. C2BMC is part of the BMDS Communications Network (BCN), which is integrated with numerous sensor and shooter communications systems and associated message formats, protocols, and computer security information assurance measures. The C2BMC controls the sensor management and track processing for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar via the C2BMC Integrated Battle Management Picture (IBMP) software segment. 2-18. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar interfaces with the C2BMC network through the C2BMC Network Interface Processor (CNIP). C2BMC forwards select track messages to Aegis BMD assets over Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Tactical Automated Data Information Link-Joint (TADIL-J) (STJ) and Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Multicast TADIL-J (MTJ) networks and Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI), C2BMC also forwards track messages to the GMD system. This information is used to cue other systems supporting the missile defense operations and improves the overall SA of commanders at all levels. The Link-16 TADIL-J network also enables the precision cueing of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar by directing messages from Aegis BMD through the C2BMC suite that controls the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar. 2-19. C2BMC program facilitates a layered defense by networking and unifying the individual elements that make up the BMDS. The C2BMC IBMP provides the foundation for detailed IMD data and graphical information available in a variety of tables and reports for operational forces SA. The C2BMC IBMP also allows sensor managers to select radar states, define search parameters, override tracking priorities, control


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track forwarding, define discrimination confidence, and enable wide-band discrimination and coordination with C2 levels and operators and maintainers. 2-20. The Distributed Multi-Echelon Training System (DMETS) Control Center (DCC) is located at Schriever AFB and supports both GMD and non-GMD training, evaluations and exercises. The DMETS servers provide the GFC with medium fidelity emulation of ballistic missile threats and GMD subsystem (e.g. DSP/SBIRS, UEWRs, AEGIS, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), etc.) responses without interference to real world operations. In addition to GFC, DMETS has a wide variety and large number of GMD and non-GMD customers across all echelons of commands. Its use must be scheduled in advance in order to deconflict competing requirements.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 2-21. Command relationships are the interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as COCOM (command authority), OPCON, tactical control, or support. 2-22. Traditionally, command relationships are established through operation plans (OPLANS), concept plans (CONPLAN), crisis planning, or execution orders based on real threats. Increasing range and other technological advances in ballistic missiles may necessitate missile defense forces in one AOR to provide direct support to an adjacent CCDR. The supported commander's requirements establish the overarching framework used by supporting commanders in their respective supporting plans. The supported Commander’s CONPLAN establishes the overarching framework used by AOR CCDRs to develop supporting plans and to support regional missile defense plans. 2-23. Together USSTRATCOM and JFCC-IMD provide recommendations to the Joint Staff/SECDEF to balance HLD requirements with the missile defense needs of other COCOMs. Supported by the Services, USSTRATCOM has the unique position of integrating missile defense requirements and Service capabilities across multiple AORs and linking GBMD planning with decentralized execution. 2-24. At the strategic level, the collaborative missile defense planning process synchronizes each CCDR missile defense plans with the GBMD plans of adjacent CCDRs. At the operational level, the Joint Staff/SECDEF establishes CCDR relationships into supported and supporting roles. Thus, balancing other AOR priorities for defended assets with global missile allocation IAW priorities set forth for HLD. 2-25. The supported CCDR issues “commander’s guidance” for the missile defense mission. The Army component provides forces to CCDRs to execute the missile defense mission. 2-26. The SECDEF will assign or attach forces to respective COCOMs as required for GBMD operations. THAAD, GMD, and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) sensors comprise the Army’s role in GBMD. During GBMD operations, the SECDEF has directed the 100th MD BDE (GMD) and 49th MD BN (GMD) assigned to USSTRATCOM will be OPCON to USNORTHCOM for operational execution. THAAD and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars are under the OPCON of the appropriate COCOM.


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2-27. USNORTHCOM is the supported COCOM for HLD and directs engagement operations when the threat is to the US, its territories and its possessions require an active defense. USNORTHCOM is the supporting COCOM for GBMD threats to other COCOMs. See figure 2-2 for command relationships.

Figure 2-2. GBMD Command Relationships

GMD FORCES 2-28. The GMD Title 10 USC Operational Elements (OE) for the 100th MD BDE (GMD) and 49th MD BN (GMD) are the subordinate MDE and FDC units. METT-TC is the basis for delegation of OPCON to other CCDRs. 2-29. The GMD units are assigned to USSTRATCOM. The 49th MD BN (GMD) is subordinate to the 100th MD BDE (GMD). The 100th MD BDE (GMD) belongs to the Colorado NG, but has a Detachment in the California NG. The 49th MD BN (GMD) belongs to the Alaska NG. The 100th MD BDE (GMD) Commander is dual-hatted Title 10 USC and Title USC 32 who commands the associated State NG units. NG Soldiers transition between Title 10 and 32 statuses IAW the approved SECARMY staffing model.


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The OEs are separate and distinct Title 10 USC Federal units with a clear Title 10 USC chain of command. State Adjutants General retain authority over the NG units and Soldiers only when in a Title 32 status. The State Adjutant Generals have no command authority over the Title 10 USC GMD Soldiers of the 100th MD BDE (GMD) or 49th MD BN (GMD).

AN/TPY-2 (FBM) 2-30. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the responsible organization for deploying and managing the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar detachment as an Army organization. Effective 1 Oct 10, the detachments appears on the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for the 100th MD BDE (GMD), which allows for greater operational flexibility. The detachment has three primary AORs: radar site operations; radar management operations; and radar site security. As a forward deployed element of the global BMDS, all command, control, and support relationships are established IAW Joint and Army doctrine. 2-31. In a regional defense situation, it is likely the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar will be OPCON to the COCOM. As a supporting commander, a COCOM will support the Commander, USNORTHCOM, in the conduct of the homeland defense mission. There are situations where a COCOM may simultaneously be the supported commander. The COCOM may use the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar to concurrently support both strategic and regional missile defense operations. Before deployment of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar into a theater of operations, the reporting chain will be established to deconflict lines of authority for the sensor managers during concurrent strategic and regional crisis operations. 2-32. COCOMs will coordinate/synchronize plans and actions with other COCOMs under the direction of USSTRATCOM who has worldwide synchronizing responsibility. The local COCOM that has OPCON of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar will civil support operations with the radar system as much as possible, based on mission requirements.


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Chapter 3

Operations This chapter presents an overview of operations and considerations that Army GBMD units must apply for the planning and execution of their mission. This chapter describes the global context within which Army GBMD units perform their mission incorporating elements of the BMDS, and it describes the security of Army GBMD sites.

OPERATIONS “The new strategic challenges of the 21st Century require us to think differently, but they also require us to act. The deployment of effective missile defenses is an essential element of the United States’ broader efforts to transform our defense and deterrence policies and capabilities to meet the new threats we face. Defending the American people against these new threats is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and the highest priority of my administration.” President George W. Bush National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 23

3-1. The Operational Environment for the Global BMD consists of simultaneously defeating missile threats to all COCOM AORs, in support of COCOM operations. During GBMD operations, the threat may include SRBMs, Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM), IRBMs, and ICBMs. All of these missiles have the potential to carry either conventional or WMD RVs and can cross multiple AORs. The number of threats can range from potentially hundreds of SRBMs to dozens of ICBMs. Major combat operations adversaries will likely employ these threats in waves, and in combination with other offensive forces against any or all of our defended assets. 3-2. HLD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. DOD is responsible for the HLD mission, and therefore, leads the HLD response, with other departments and agencies in support of DOD efforts. In today’s complex threat environment, our approach to HLD must address all aspects of the operational environment. 3-3. Externally, the US seeks to shape the international environment through the application of diplomatic, economic, military, and informational means. Confronting the homeland is a variety of interrelated threats that demand coordinated procedures and synchronized efforts among US Government departments and agencies charged with law enforcement and national defense. 3-4. These threats include any transnational activity including international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons, to include WMD, and the delivery systems for such weapons that threaten the national security of the US.


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3-5. The friendly forces organization will include layered defenses employed in a manner intended to give prioritized defense capabilities to a given list of assets. This layered defense will include the ability for defense forces to engage and destroy the threat in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phase of flight. The defensive capability will be a distributed system of systems, including sensors, shooters, C2, and communications. In the aggregate, these systems form the elements of the BMDS. GBMD involves multiple sensors, and shooters at every echelon of command, see figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. GBMD Systems

GLOBAL OPERATIONS 3-6. CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning for GBMD. CDRUSSTRATCOM is a supporting commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for BMD execution in defense of the homeland. 3-7. In preparation for global deployment of strategic missile defense forces in the homeland or into an AOR for forward based GBMD forces, the Army will participate in Joint collaborative planning. This is done IAW the COCOM priorities and Defended Asset List (DAL), development of the theater area air defense plan, finalization of Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and engagement criteria, refinement of existing HLD plans, determination of cross COCOM engagement coordination, and force allocation. Distribution of approved plans across the Joint network to all affected missile defense forces is critical so engagement operations can commence as soon as possible. Multinational missile defense forces are included in all phases of the MDMP and training of multinational missile defense forces across multiple security levels must be considered.


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3-8. Missile defense planning, intelligence support, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, and airspace management are four areas critical to successful employment of GBMD. Planning is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. Army FMs and JPs on these subjects provide important guidance toward successfully supporting GBMD planning. However, whether planning for strategic level missile defense or theater missile defense, the tenets for GBMD apply. See table 3-1 for the aspects of GBMD. Table 3-1. Aspects of GBMD 1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

The growing threat defines the mission…the threat from adversaries across all ranges of ballistic missiles is increasing for the US and Allies across the globe. GBMD is greatly enabled by persistent and reliable indications and warnings. GBMD addresses all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight and can best be optimized by using networked C2 and integrated sensors; layered defenses complicates enemy offensive actions. GBMD acquisition provides interoperability on delivery, is an active partnership with the Services and missile defense forces, and can take years to optimize for missile defense fight occurring in minutes/seconds. GBMD forces are low-density/high-demand, expensive, unique and global in nature. GBMD assets are frequently located in the US homeland or in friendly countries environments. GBMD assets are managed remotely and over global distances and are highly interdependent for both homeland and regional defenses. GBMD planning is 90% of the fight. GBMD is a four dimensional fight that cross multiple regions and AORs. Three dimensions are commonly called length, width, and depth (or height), and the fourth dimension is space/time. GBMD is both Joint and Combined warfare; one nation's "region" is another nation's homeland. Interagency coordination is a unique aspect to homeland GBMD.

3-9. Properly employed GBMD forces allow a nation the freedom of action to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the operational themes from peacetime military engagement to major combat operations to successfully conduct those operations. Because of their complexity, the short reaction times presented by the threat, the large number of forces, and size of the geographic areas involved, Joint GBMD must be a centrally planned and decentralized executed, but closely coordinated operation. JFCC-IMD plays a key role in synchronizing GBMD planning support to missile defense operations.

ARMY GBMD OPERATIONS 3-10. USASMDC/ARSTRAT serves as the ASCC to USSTRATCOM and provides continuous planning, oversight, control, integration, and coordination of ARFOR supporting USSTRATCOM. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army proponent for space, GMD and IAMD; develops and transitions technology; and provides acquisition support to assigned fields. As the ASCC, USASMDC/ARSTRAT provides the same planning, oversight, control, integration, and coordination functions for GMD forces.


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3-11. The GBMD only addresses ballistic missile and includes active defense, passive defense, and C2 functions. Army organizations contribute directly to theater and GBMD. These organizations and systems include GMD, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and THAAD at the global level and PATRIOT, Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS), AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and THAAD at the theater level.

MISSILE DEFENSE WARFIGHTING PRINCIPLES 3-12. The regional approach supports interests of allies who have growing missile defense capabilities with weapon systems (such as Arrow, PATRIOT PAC-3, and Aegis BMD) and new C2 systems such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Air Command and Control System (ACCS). US Allies and multinational partners plan and execute missile defense on a regional basis. 3-13. Joint operations are normally conducted within the context of an alliance or multinational forces. However, each operation is unique. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) should evaluate key considerations and differences involved in planning, coordinating, and conducting missile defense operations in a national, bi-national or multinational environment. The US and allies tend to view missile defense from a significantly different perspective. AOR or tactical level missile defense to the US may be national or strategic missile defense to an ally or multinational partner. 3-14. A responsive, flexible, and integrated Joint force is required to effectively counter the growing diversity of missile threats. Within missile defense, unity of effort, unity of command, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key warfighting principles. The global nature and attributes of a ballistic missile threat dictate rigorous application of these principles; integrated, global missile defense and GMD systems operations involve more than one CCDR. COCOM regional missile defense plans and the plans for the defense of North America must be coordinated and integrated across all four operational elements of missile defense. The four warfighting principles support the commander's vision of how the missile defense mission will be accomplished for all phases of the operation.  Unity of effort — Coordination and cooperation between nations and military forces for a commonly recognized objective grow in importance with BMD/GMD forces. Unity of effort over complex operations is possible through decentralized execution of a centralized, deliberately derived CONPLAN/OPLANS. Consider Joint and multinational relationships when addressing the need for near-real time response to the threat. In multinational operations in which unity of command may not always be possible, unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort through cooperation and common interests is an essential component to multinational command.  Unity of command — GBMD places increased demands on CCDRs. To ensure complementary efforts and achieve synergy among all joint force components, missile defense planning for passive defense, active defense, and attack operations is continually coordinated and is best accomplished when all elements concerned with defense of a given area fall under one Combatant Command. Since ballistic missile threats can enter and leave AORs quickly, the AOR and regional command structures and C2 execution must be especially flexible and responsive to accommodate the real-time danger of ballistic missile threats.  Centralized planning — Unity of command and decentralized execution are best accomplished with centralized planning. Centralized planning enforces proper application of fundamental military principles, such as economy of force, ensures synchronization and/or deconfliction among components and enables effective and efficient use of forces and other resources. Planning should establish—  Task organization and apportionment of forces between commanders.  Command relationships (including supported and supporting relationships).  The wide range of operations that may be appropriate.  Integration of the means and measures for different missile defense elements.


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The possible impact of missile defense operations on other missions and tasks. Missile defense targeting priorities.  Prioritized critical asset list (PCAL) and DAL.  ROE.  Detailed missile defense plans with sub-unit tasks.  Missile defense preplanned responses (PPR) and procedures to adjust PPR based on situation. Decentralized execution — A centralized plan is best accomplished by decentralized execution. The speed of attacking missiles and the range at which intercepts occur make BMD operations unique, and therefore, require a real-time response to threats. The near real-time reactive nature of missile defense operations requires COCOMs to provide execution authority to subordinate forces according to planned guidance and ROE prior to a ballistic missile threat. Subordinate commanders must also be flexible and have the authority to adapt to the situation IAW the CCDR’s intent when situations do not develop as the planners envisioned.  

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ARMY GMD 3-15. The automated C2 decision support portion of the GFC capability will provide the CDRUSNORTHCOM with the capability to assess the threat, to characterize the attack, and to provide force direction that best defends against the threat. The automated EP provides essential fire control/system information to the GMD operator enabling battle redirection in support of the commander’s intent. 3-16. ARFOR must acquire and fuse a constant flow of GBMD SA data and information. Missile defense forces use approved tactics, techniques, and procedure (TTP). Although planning and engagement authorization is centralized, effective engagements require decentralized execution. In order to conduct decentralized execution, the GMD crews have to know what the Commander’s Intent for engaging the threat is before they begin the battle; which they receive from the Commander in the form of CONPLANs, Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Operations Orders (OPORD) and Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO). The speed at which attacking ballistic missiles can travel and the range and the speed at which GMD intercepts occur makes rapid responses essential for a successful engagement. GMD execution uses automated processes with a HIC. 3-17. Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR), which includes the DSP/SBIRS, should provide the first indication of a ballistic missile launch. These sensors should also provide the first indication of a ballistic missile launch threatening the DA. The OPIR sensors will continue to track the missile until booster burnout. GMD operators track the launch throughout its trajectory based on data received from OPIR space based data collection platforms, ground-based, and sea based systems, providing greater fidelity on predicted impact. Once a determination is made that engagement criteria have been met, the Weapons Release Authority (WRA) authorizes weapons free, and the USNORTHCOM Missile Defense Officer (MDO) passes weapons free authorization to the MDE crews who initiate the engagement sequence. 3-18. An AAMDC supports GBMD operations with the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars within their AOR using the C2BMC system to provide cueing data regarding threats against the homeland and regional missile defense for designated assets and defenses. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar sensor management section is integrated with the AAMDC to operate the C2BMC system in the employment of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar. This integration normally occurs at the Joint Air Operations Center/Air Operations Center (JOAC/AOC) that supports the COCOM. The AAMDC also conducts Joint and combined strategic AMD to support designated OPLANS/CONPLANs. 3-19. OPIR, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and the Aegis BMD provide launch location, initial track data, early warning, target type-classification, fire control data, sensor cueing data, and target impact-point estimates to the GFC. The GFC uses additional data from COBRA Dane, UEWR radars and SBX (if available) to determine state vectors, determine a predicted impact point, assess the threat to the DA and alert GMD systems. The HIC determines whether engagement criteria are met and enables further actions. Figure 3-2 illustrates system alerts and actions and Table 3-2 details events for the GMD engagement sequence.


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Figure 3-2. GMD System Actions After ICBM Launch Detection Table 3-2. GMD Engagement Sequence 1) 2)

Threat ICBM launches. DSP/SBIRS detects launch and passes IR data to the Mission Control Station (MCS).

3) 4)

MCS passes threat data to MDE and FDC alerting the GFCs and crews.

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Once the GFC determines there is a threat to the DA, the system goes to system state alert and sends a message to all GMD.

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Once the crews determine it is a threat to the DA, they request WRA.

7) 8)

9)

About the same time, forward based radars - AN/TPY-2 (FBM) and Aegis BMD ships acquire and start tracking threat ICBM. Track data is passed to the GFC.

GFC uses radar data to cue additional radars, so they can more rapidly acquire the threat. If the GFC needs to launch GBIs, it has enough data so it can at this time (if system is enabled with Weapons Free and GBIs are available); however, the GFC prefers higher resolution of the threat, so if weapons access is available, the GFC will wait until it identifies the RV before committing/launching the GBI against the threat. This higher resolution data comes from additional radars COBRA Dane, UEWRs, SBX, and AN/TPY2 (FBM) depending on positioning. The crews evaluate the threat and determine the proper GBI allocation to meet the commander’s intent per threat and apply them IAW their firing doctrine.


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10)

11)

12)

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Shortly before the GFC decides to launch a GBI, it sends out a defend integrated task plan, which consists of sensor task plan – requesting specific information from radars to support the intercept, communication task plans – tasking specific in-flight interceptor communication systems (IFICS) to support communication events between the GFC and the EKV, and a WTP – providing specific targeting information to the GBI that will make the intercept. Shortly after receiving the WTP, the GBI launches; at launch the GBI has the information it needs to make a successful intercept of the threat, however, the GFC has the ability to send in-flight target updates (IFTU) to the EKV, so the EKV has the most current threat picture prior to making the intercept. After the GBI launches, it does a three stage burn, the EKV separates and conduct star shots to verify its location. The EKV then maneuvers to receive the first communications event, this consists of an IFTU and transmission of an in-flight status report (IFSR) (which lets the GFC know if the EKV is working). It makes course corrections directed by the IFTU then maneuvers to receive a second communications event which is an IFTU only. At a predetermined range, the EKV acquires the threat complex with the use of its onboard sensors, determines which object is the RV, and flies itself into the RV, destroying it by force of impact or kinetic energy. Threat intercepted. If tasked, SBX may provide a hit assessment. This process is repeated for all threats until the battle is over or the GMD system is out of inventory.

3-20. When the MDE and FDC operators confirm the GFC automated recommendations, verify engagement criteria are met, they will request a change in weapons control status (WCS) to weapons-free authorization for engagement. The GFC EP builds and sends a Sensor Task Plan (STP) to cue sensors to begin tracking the threat objects providing additional SA to the operator. Surface sensors detect the threat objects once they enter the radars range and field of view. Some forward based sensors may detect missile launches in the boost phase, if appropriately located. Figure 3-3 depicts threat missile tracking.


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Figure 3-3. Missile Tracking 3-21. With initial sensors input from OPIR, Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar, and the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar, the GFC begins building a fire solution. COBRA Dane, SBX and UEWR radars continue to track, classify, and refine data used by the GFC in launching the GBI. The refined data is sent to the EKV to guide it to the target. 3-22. GMD operators will monitor the threatening missile’s trajectory. Once the target array is classified, the GFC establishes a track file and provides an assessment with options to the operators. Operators must visualize the battle to decide:  Predicted impact points.  Is this event a threat?  Number and engagement timeline of incoming RV to engage.  Execute pre-approved firing guidelines.  Pattern and time between launches. 3-23. During tactical operations, operators should strive to select options that preserve their flexibility, and the ability to identify off-nominal situation possibilities and retain their ability to respond to these situations in later phases of the threat’s flight. Some illustrative tasks that retain flexibility (with permission) are:  Adjust the allocation of GBI’s against each threat/target to account for off-nominal situation and ensure the commander’s intent is met.  Monitor targets for validity, change in identification, and splitting and/or emerging new threats.  Battle redirection – reallocation of GBIs to meet Commanders intent. 3-24. Interceptors can be launched singly or in multiples (salvo) per target as determined by the GFC. This method of fire is based on the operator’s configuration of the GFC system to allocate GBIs based on the threats, TTP and and/or the fire control orders input manually to change the GBI allocation. The basis of


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GBI allocation and sequencing of launch are based upon several factors. These factors includes data available in the GFC, the crew and director’s interpretation of the situation, and their determination of how to best meet the commander’s intent to determine how many GBIs are launched and when. 3-25. The Defense Strategy/Execution Plan (DS/XP) (battle plan, GFC system configuration) will determine the parameters the GFC uses to determine the threat and the number of GBIs to automatically allocate to satisfy these parameters. HIC capabilities allow changes to meet the commander’s intent and Presidential guidance or SECDEF-level pre-approved firing guidance. Due to the few and fixed number of GBI locations, a pre-determined DS/XP is used to determine the minimum number of missiles for each engagement, but the GFC operator provides oversight of the GMD battle to ensure that the commander’s intent is met for each threat engagement.

THAAD OPERATIONS 3-26. The THAAD system may integrate, as a component of the BMDS, with the IAMD to support a theater AOR and cross AOR engagements. THAAD provides endo- and exo-atmospheric engagements of SRBM and MRBM in the terminal phase with future growth possible for engagements of IRBMs. 3-27. THAAD employment is included in the theater Area Air Defense Plan (AADP) which may include a BMDS action plan that describes the C2 relationships and procedures to transition THAAD to a GBMD role in support of USSTRATCOM GBMD priorities. Normally, the AAMDC is responsible for THAAD planning and integration into the AADP. All GBMD planning by USSTRATCOM (to include use of THAAD to support HLD must be coordinated and integrated with the COCOM plans and reflect SECDEF priorities. The Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) is responsible to establish communications with the GMD network. 3-28. The AAMDC deploys into a COCOM’s AOR and conducts Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense (JTAMD), which includes THAAD employment options in support of designated OPLANS and contingency operations. The AAMDC also provides sensor management support for GBMD utilizing C2BMC operations when augmented with AN/TPY-2 (FBM) trained sensor managers. The active defense and passive defense cells of the AAMDC consist of two ADSI remote monitor workstations and a tactical situational display, an AMD work station, an Army COCOMs Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) display, Processing Display System–Migration (PDS-M), and laptop computers.

PROTECTION 3-29. The protection of the GBMD warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants), physical Security System Level-A (SSL-A) assets, and information of the US military. The protection warfighting function facilitates the commander’s ability to maintain the force’s integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and counters or mitigates those threats. Emphasis on protection increases during preparation for missile engagements and continues throughout execution. Protection is a continuous activity that integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard GBMD assets and protect forces. The protection warfighting function includes the following tasks:  Air defense.  Personnel recovery.  Information protection.  Operational area security.  Antiterrorism.  Survivability.  Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.


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SECURITY OPERATIONS 3-30. It is the commanders’ responsibility to apply more stringent security standards required by Strategic Command Instruction (SI) 538-2, Army, and BMDS security during increased threat level or high risk determinations, or as the commander/director deems necessary. The objective of security for the Army GBMD sites is to:  Implement general policy for the security of personnel, installations, military operations, and designated assets IAW SI 538-2, DODD 5200-8 and Army applicable security regulations.  Provide security guidance and general procedures that are realistic, harmonized with other security disciplines, and provide the necessary flexibility for commanders to protect personnel, installations, projects, operations, and related resources against capable threats from terrorists, criminal activity, and other subversive or illegal activity.  Reduce the loss, theft, diversion of, or damage to DOD assets with advanced technologies; thereby enhancing overall security, while ensuring that warfighting capability is maintained.  Standardize personal identification and authentication to DOD installations and facilities, including interoperability with other Federal entities.  Utilize the DOD Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials on the Common Access Card (CAC) as the universal authority of individual authenticity. PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

3-31. The physical security program is that part of security concerned with active and passive measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to personnel, equipment, installations, information, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, terrorism, damage, and criminal activity. Physical security is a primary command responsibility. This security is for worldwide GBMD operations. 3-32. Physical security programs are for prevention and provide the means to counter threats when bypassing or ignoring preventive measures. Physical security threats include, but are not limited to:  Foreign intelligence services.  Foreign military and paramilitary forces.  Terrorists and saboteurs.  Criminals.  Protest groups.  Disaffected persons. 3-33. Physical security planning includes using biometric, electronic, and/or mechanical technological security systems to mitigate both vulnerability to the threat and reduce reliance on fixed security forces.

Requirement For Extraordinary Security Measures 3-34. The baseline for operational or operationally capable GBMD assets is SSL-A, as defined by SI 5382. SSL identifies specific GBMD resources that must be secured, and the level of security that will be dedicated to those resources. SSL-A resources assigned to operational units are resources for which the loss, theft, destruction, or misuse would result in great harm to the strategic capability of the US. The SSLA security level must result in the greatest practical deterrence against and response to hostile acts. In-place security measures should provide an effective means to achieve detection, interception, and defeat of a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources. 3-35. GBMD assets are possible targets for sabotage. It is essential that frequent and periodic security assessments are made of the potential threat and the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the GBMD security program. Other considerations are:  The postulated threat to GBMD assets, DA, and USASMDC/ARSTRAT annual threat statements, local threat, and all other relevant factors will be considered.


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  

Security programs and procedures will be revised accordingly to ensure adequate protection at all times. Physical security procedures must constitute a balanced, in-depth system responsive to all credible and potential threats and vulnerabilities. Construction projects require continuous security coordination between engineers and security personnel from planning through completion of the project.

Security Forces And Use Of Force 3-36. There will be sufficient security forces assigned and designated to provide necessary security requirements. Security forces will be organized, trained, armed and equipped to provide normal day-to-day protection for GBMD assets and to react to security incidents. 3-37. Delay must be long enough to allow security forces to respond to and neutralize the threat before they gain access to the protected facilities containing GBMD assets. Assessing the adequacy of the security of GBMD assets will be an essential task for the responsible commander. The postulated threat to GBMD assets, including intelligence on local threats and other relevant factors will be considered. Security programs and procedures will be revised accordingly to ensure adequate protection. Threat analyses or other security considerations may lead to a doubt that adequate protection can be provided from available resources. If so, commanders will request appropriate assistance through command channels. Other security force considerations are:  Security forces appropriately armed and all possible actions taken, including the use of deadly force within the limitations of AR 190–14, to prevent the sabotage of GBMD assets.  Ensure immediate re-occupation and security of a GBMD asset exclusion area wrongfully penetrated.

Resources And Equipment 3-38. Commanders at all levels will apply sufficient human resources and funds to the DA Asset Security Program to ensure a secure environment for GBMD assets. Commanders will identify resource needs in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, and allocate necessary resources to support their GBMD security programs. Commanders will use funds identified for physical security as intended. For physical security equipment, follow guidance in AR 190–13 for the planning, evaluation, approval, and procurement. This includes any item, device, or system used to protect GBMD assets.

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION 3-39. As the Force Protection Condition (FPCON) increases, the commander may increase the number of personnel on duty. The number of personnel on-duty for each FPCON level is the commander’s decision. The commander may deem it necessary to use all available personnel for the highest level of preparedness. Each increase in the number of personnel on duty includes associated risks and resource expenditure. The commander weighs all aspects of the mission to determine the staffing level and how long to sustain each level. The unit site security Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) reflects the details. Specific security measures must be directly linked with FPCON levels. These considerations are—  FPCON Normal — General threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.  FPCON Alpha — Level applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities (the nature and extent of which are unpredictable) and when circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON Bravo measures. It may be necessary to implement measures from higher FPCON resulting from intelligence or as a deterrent. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.  FPCON Bravo — Applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without


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causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities. While in Bravo, the 49th MD BN (GMD) should bring staffing levels and physicalprotection levels to the point at which the 49th MD BN (GMD) can instantly transition to FPCON Charlie or Delta. FPCON Charlie — Transition to FPCON Charlie is on short notice. It is a result of an incident occurring or the receipt of intelligence indicating that some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Charlie measures should primarily focus on staffing adjustments and procedural changes. Security forces will usually enhance their security presence by acquiring additional staffing or by adjusting the work-rest ratio (such as moving from a 3:1 to a 6:1 ratio). At Charlie, off-installation travel should be minimized. FPCON Delta — Transition to FPCON Delta is immediate, Delta measures should focus primarily on staffing adjustments and procedural changes. FPCON Delta applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. The security force staffing level is usually peaked in Charlie; therefore, Delta additional staffing usually comes from an augmentation force. Once in Delta, nonessential operations cease to enhance the security and response posture. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a local condition.

Day-to-Day Operations 3-40. During day-to-day operations (FPCON Normal) for the GMD or AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site, all posts at the site are manned. However, the unit security force must be prepared to react and negate a threat according to pre-established plans and rules for use of force. The importance of training to react in a crisis cannot be overemphasized. Not all scenarios will allow for a smooth progression. Example: A no-notice attack or penetration attempt could cause immediate transition to crisis operations, thus highlighting the significance of intelligence, extensive preplanning, and personnel and asset management.

DESIGNATED INITIAL REACTION FORCE 3-41. A dedicated security force for the GMD or AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site is required for a show of force to repel/control civilian protestors and defeat or delay any attacking force. In the current force design, for normal operations, the MP Security Platoon inside the MDC provides 15 MPs in five teams of three MPs to respond to intrusion alerts. Four teams are deployed in specified sector areas and one team serves as an immediate reaction force (IRF) to support the other four. All teams are mounted and heavily armed IAW MP Doctrine and local SOPs. Reaction and response times must be determined through exercises and drills while taking into consideration the layout of the MDC and missile operational safety requirements recorded in unit SOPs.

RESERVE FORCE 3-42. Army doctrine requires the designation of a reserve force. A reserve force is an uncommitted force available for action at the decisive moment. Its primary purpose is to retain freedom of action throughout a contingency operation. The designated reserve force consists of the members of the platoon (-) on mission cycle inside the wire, who are not staffing a post or otherwise engaging the threat. Once the IRF and the remainder of the platoon (-) is committed, the commander must immediately reconstitute a reserve force from the company (-) to retain freedom of action.

ENTRY CONTROL OPERATIONS 3-43. Day-to-day operation for entry to the site is a multilevel operation. Arranging authorization to the site is through the Joint Program Office (JPO), unit S2, and site security personnel. Authorizing the prime contractor access to the site requires security forces to have a continuously updated list of authorized


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personnel, and coded to reflect precisely which facilities each individual is working. Guard personnel must perform entry control of vehicles, inspection, and/or clearing by proper authorities and controls before reaching the GMD site (see AR 190-13.) Example: Entry control of a prime contractor technician must have access to the power generation facilities, but has no reason to enter either the readiness and control building or the missile field. Therefore, when the individual provides proper identification at the entry control, access will be granted only to the areas the individual is authorized (for example the power generation facilities). This method of control does not allow access to other facilities or areas.

VISITOR PERSONNEL 3-44. Occasionally, it is necessary to escort personnel who do not have the minimum security clearance required to be granted access to a GMD facility. Approved personnel shall escort cleared visitors within all controlled areas. All GMD units shall have established policy and procedures for escorting visitors.

COMMUNICATIONS 3-45. The security force is equipped with two-way radios, which are essential for the efficient operation of the security force and the accomplishment of its assigned mission. The IESS (alarms and sensors) operator maintains the security force net. All on-duty security force personnel have an individual radio, and the security force vehicles have vehicle-mounted radios. The installation/garrison security force must have compatible communications equipment to allow continuous coordination between the two organizations when the mission dictates. Use secure voice capability when possible.

WEAPONS 3-46. Weapons will provide the maximum practical firepower for security forces, carried and/or immediately available. Where employing side arms, personnel responsible for FPCON of SSL resources will have immediate access to weapons providing greater firepower. Security forces shall be equipped and armed for combat operations and terrorist incidents as determined appropriate by the local commander. The local environment must be considered in authorizing the types of weapons employed. 3-47. Because of the high number of civilian personnel onsite, the MP Commander will brief the MP force on the Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) before receiving weapons. Issuing of weapons to MP personnel will be IAW AR 190-11 and the unit SOP. The commander may prescribe other weapons to the security force based on needs and requirements. Normally, weapons are loaded with live ammunition, except when prohibited for safety reasons. Criteria must be established when to authorize lock and load in prohibited areas. The use of privately owned weapons while on duty is not authorized. Weapons and ammunition issued to security-force personnel are not removed from the installation, except for official duty.

AMMUNITION SUPPLIES 3-48. Ammunition supplies maintained for security force use are on the GMD site in secured storage containers, according to AR 190-11. A basic load of ammunition is kept on hand (sufficient to support site defense against a full level II threat for an extended duration), according to the intelligence picture and the reinforcing support available.


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OPERATIONS SECURITY 3-49. IAW AR 530-1, battalion and higher echelons will have written Operations Security (OPSEC) programs with the following common features:  Designation of an OPSEC officer to direct and implement the program.  Specific requirements to plan for and implement OPSEC before, during, and after operations and other activities that affect the combat capability of the US Army. OPSEC is part of the commanders’ initial planning guidance.  Use of OPSEC analytic techniques to identify vulnerabilities and to select appropriate OPSEC measures.  Training programs to ensure that all personnel, commensurate with their positions and security clearances, are aware of adversary intelligence threats and understand the OPSEC process. Training programs will comply with the requirements in AR 530-1, Appendix F.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS 3-50. IAW FM 3-13 Information Operations (IO), information is an element of combat power. Commanders conduct IO to apply it. Focused IO – synchronized with effective information management and ISR – enable commanders to gain and maintain information superiority. IO is a prime means for achieving information superiority. Common features of programs are:  Procedures to enable commanders to gain and maintain information superiority.  Procedures to protect and defend friendly information, C2 systems, and information systems.  Procedures integrating all IO related activities.  Procedures to synchronize IO with effective information management and ISR giving the commander information superiority.  Procedures to protect C2, shooter, and radar computer systems and information systems from Cyber attack (destruction, degradation, disruption, denial, and deception).


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Chapter 4

SUSTAINMENT This chapter describes the Army’s duties and responsibilities for sustainment support of GBMD units. MDA is a Defense Agency, under authority, direction and control of the USD (AT&L) responsible for managing, directing and executing the development of the BMDS. As such, MDA is an acquisition agent whose development activities make them responsible for planning, acquiring, and implementing activities necessary to support Army GBMD elements. However, it is imperative that support must be responsive to the military commander on a noninterference basis. This is critical given the importance of the GBMD mission to defend the homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies from ballistic missile attack. MDA’s sustainment concept for operations is complex and Army personnel must be familiar with its impact on readiness and availability.

OVERVIEW 4-1. The Army responsibility for logistics support extends into COCOM AORs in regards to GBMD and may be modified when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with Host Nation (HN) agencies, Joint services, or by CCDRs. The COCOM may determine that common servicing would be beneficial within the AOR or a designated operational area. If so, the COCOM may delegate the responsibility for providing or coordinating service for all Service components in the AOR or designated area to the Service component that is the dominant user. Service components will identify and validate support requirements in both the deliberate and crisis planning process, and then provide these requirements to the supporting Service component as soon as possible.

GBMD SITE CHARACTERISTICS 4-2. GBMD units have several characteristics that affect their sustainment. These characteristics include:  Fixed sites that include large fixed structures, permanently situated sites, mobile sensors and IAMD sites in several COCOM locations. The GMD system is neither mobile nor deployable. Most sites are in northern latitudes where operation in cold weather is a factor.  Theater systems like THAAD.  Limited numbers of sites create a very low density of equipment items and trained Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) positions.  Continuous (24 hours a day/7 days a week) operations. Military staffing must be consistent and include careful scheduling of maintenance and training activities.  Some GBMD systems may require an extensive contractor support maintenance concept, which requires contractor life-cycle support. This is an outcome of the GBMD systems being low density, highly complex, with a dual role as operational and a test bed in its initial stages.  Planned upgrades are in phased incremental capability deliveries. Successive capability deliveries increase the overall capability of the system to meet the evolving threat. However, these planned upgrades pose operational and sustainment challenges.


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SUPPORT PRINCIPLES 4-3. Even though GBMD is unique in many aspects, some common Army principles of support apply for government furnished equipment (GFE). The application principles are responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, logistic economy, attainability, sustainability, survivability, and integration, as detailed below:  Responsiveness is the right support in the right quantity in the right place at the right time. Among the logistic principles, responsiveness is the keystone; all else becomes irrelevant if the logistic system cannot support the concept of operations of the supported commander.  Simplicity often fosters efficiency in the planning, execution of national, and AOR logistic operations. Mission-type orders and standardized, interoperable procedures contribute to simplicity. Establishment of priorities and pre-allocation of supplies and services by the supported unit may simplify logistic sustainment.  Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation. Logistic plans and operations must be flexible in order to achieve both responsiveness and economy. This principle is a guide for strategic thinking and forms the template for synchronized and coordinated Joint logistic planning.  Logistic economy is achieved when effective support is provided using the fewest resources at the least cost, and within acceptable levels of risk. At some level and to some degree, resources are always limited. When prioritizing and allocating resources, the commander must continuously consider economy and optimize use of resources to ensure effectiveness and mission success while supporting every effort toward achieving efficiency.  Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations. The commander’s logistic staff develops the concept of logistic support, completes the logistic estimate, and initiates resource identification based on the supported commander’s requirements, priorities, and apportionment.  Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the AOR for the duration of the operation. Sustainability focuses the supporting commander’s attention on long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported forces. Long-term support is the greatest challenge for the logistician, who must not only attain the minimum essential materiel levels to initiate combat operations (readiness) but must also sustain those operations.  Survivability is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential destruction. Logistic units and installations are also high-value targets that must be safeguarded by both active and passive measures. Active measures must include a defense plan for supply with provisions for reinforcement and fire support. Passive measures include dispersion, physical protection of personnel and equipment, deception, and limiting the size of an installation to what is essential for the mission.  Integration consists of synchronizing general civil support operations with all aspects of military and civilian, Joint and multinational partners. Integration involves total integration of Army sustainment process. Support of the commander’s plan is the goal of all sustainment efforts. Effective support requires a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent and synchronizing support plans with the concept of operations. ARFOR conduct operations as part of Joint, multinational, and interagency teams in combined actions.  Condition Based Maintenance plus (CBM+) is the application and integration of appropriate process, technologies, and knowledge based capability to improve the reliability and maintenance effectiveness of DOD systems and components. CBM+ is maintenance performed on evidence of need provided by reliability centered maintenance (RCM) analysis & other enabling processes and technologies such as system health monitoring & management using embedded sensors. To the commander, CBM+ is the ability to meet mission requirements with proactively driven maintenance, as well as the ability to optimize the competing demands of warfighting & planned maintenance.


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GBMD SUSTAINMENT CONCEPT 4-4. The GFE support concept maximizes support to the commander by including:  A single life-cycle support contractor who is responsible for all system peculiar maintenance support and is responsive to the commander’s direction. Through its prime contractor support system (PCSS), the prime contractor will manage all logistical areas of maintenance and system upgrades.  Supply support.  Support equipment, training, and training devices.  Technical data.  Computer resources.  Facilities and system facilities maintenance.  Packaging, handling, storing, and transporting. 4-5. In addition, commanders must have a thorough understanding of the contractors’ Statements of Work (SOW) and their benchmarks and provisions for ensuring responsive and appropriate logistics support. The centralized logistics management support structure is under the support contractor’s responsibility:  A Logistics Control Center (LOGCC) is the support contractor’s responsibility. The LOGCC provides a single point of contact for all sustainment actions and readily accessible sustainment information (such as repair parts usage, due-ins, equipment status, and equipment readiness reporting data).  The contractor also operates the on-site control center tailored to the needs of the assets at each location.  The on-site support center (OSSC) is the main element through which the contractor manages the maintenance support of elements and reports to the commander. Within the OSSC, the Maintenance Management Center (MMC) is the single point of contact to facilitate the military oversight of the support contractor, and ensures the contractor’s responsiveness to the commander’s direction.  The maintenance of GFE exists at two levels, on-site and off-site maintenance, on-site (unit) and off-site (depot).  Because of the requirement to operate 24 hours a day/7 days a week, some depot-level maintenance may be performed onsite.  Extensive use of both diagnostic and prognostic maintenance capabilities using build-in test equipment (BITE), built-in test (BIT), and CBM procedures to automatically predict, detect, and fault isolate down to the line replaceable unit (LRU) without interfering with mission performance (while the system is operating.  The contractor replaces the LRU and repairs it onsite or offsite, as required.  For the long term, the Army considers the use of commercial equipment and practices best for the fixed sites.  “Reach-back” – While different from JP 3-30, BMDS transition transfer plan defines this as the use of GMD prime contractor assets outside of the support contract when it becomes necessary to sustain acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.  “Fix or fight criteria” – Operators and maintainers determine System Capability (SYSCAP) failure analysis criteria to evaluate system’s capabilities, to determine if components will fail during crisis or combat operations.  Logistics considers the parameters that effect of the failure on probability of engagement success: time to troubleshoot/time to repair, availability of LRU for repair operations, criticality of defended asset, and time to impact. These criteria determine if operations proceed or if a system is taken offline for repair.


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The MDA will continue to have primary responsibility for execution of current and future development and production contracts, which encompass the hardware/software development efforts, obsolescence risk reduction, testing and site System hardware procurement. MDA also retains responsibility for software configuration management and for post deployment software support regardless of whether an MDA or Army, contract is used.

4-6. The key imperative is that contractor support must be responsive to the military commander and provided on a noninterference basis. This is critical given the importance of the GMD mission and the need to generate forces in crises. Commanders must be familiar with FM 3-100.21, to ensure contractor operations support the mission.

CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT 4-7. The maintenance concept will consist of two levels of maintenance. Normally, this would be organizational and depot levels of maintenance, but since supporting the BMDS component is via Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), these two levels of maintenance have been designated as on-site and off-site maintenance. The Prime contractor is responsible for identifying and accomplishing on-site tasks, and tasks which require equipment to be sent off-site for repair or replacement by the Prime contractor or the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). 4-8. On-site maintenance will consist of tasks performed on both the installed BMDS equipment and removing failed items for repair at maintenance facilities within the compound. All maintenance activities are through contractor life cycle support. The prime contractor is responsible for planning, acquiring, and implementing all activities necessary to support the program. Also, the CLS contract for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) will require the contractor to operate and sustain the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) at the deployed site(s). However, in order to maintain a small foot print, MDA may be able to obtain some support equipment and services from the host command and/or HN. MDA will perform trade studies to identify improvements to maintenance concepts. 4-9. Off-site maintenance will be performed by the prime contractor or the OEM as agreed upon between the Army and MDA. Off-site maintenance includes depot level repairable items, other unit maintenance (environnent, transportation), and initial spare parts as required.

PRIME CONTRACTOR SUPPORT SYSTEM 4-10. The deployment and maintenance system of the prime contractor provides CLS to meet the readiness objective for the fielded GMD and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) elements. To accomplish this, the deployment and sustainment system has put in place a PCSS that uses a two level maintenance concept of on and off-site maintenance. Figure 4-1 shows the PCSS communications and infrastructure. The Office of Emergency Management and the prime contractor develop and implement a single integrated support infrastructure as the method for implementing an executable support system. 4-11. The PCSS is composed of organization, functions, information systems, tools, and a communications infrastructure. The deployment and maintenance system support organization centrally manages the PCSS through the LOGCC that is located at the prime contractor facility in Huntsville, AL.


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4-12. PCSS overview:  PCSS provides the support infrastructure and maintenance management system for support of GMD prime mission equipment (PME), associated support equipment and operational facilities.  LOGCC provides centralized management of the support system.  OSCC execute hands-on maintenance of PME at sites.  Off-site support centers perform factory/depot support located at PME repair facilities.  Integrated data management and communications links PCSS together.

Figure 4-1. PCSS Infrastructure

LOGISTICS CONTROL CENTER 4-13. The LOGCC provides centralized management of all sustainment development program phase II resources and activities. The LOGCC is located in Huntsville, AL, at the prime contractor facilities and manned by subject matter experts from all the key prime and MDA offices. MDA provides key interfaces for the LOGCC and the site managers for the operations center. Listed below are the principal functions and responsibilities of the LOGCC:  Coordinates the repair, replenishment, movement, inventory, distribution, and modification/updating of all GMD PME assets.  Maintains support data on GMD assets including status and location.


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Provides scheduled and unscheduled maintenance information to the GMD operations center as required. Analyzes PCSS sustainment performance data to determine improvement in the system effectiveness. Provides reports as required to government and prime contractor management. Provides centralized management of processes and procedures, acquisition control, transportation coordination, and authority for parts deviation/re-route. Provide training to personnel prior to deployment. Collects maintenance data from sites, compiles reports, and distributes reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) data and other analyses. Provides program administrators for sustainment management information systems, computerized inventory and maintenance management system, and training records databases. Maintains PCSS metrics.

Other Sustainment Operations 4-14. GBMD elements require continuous, reliable electrical power, air handling, and fire protection. Primary considerations are:  Where possible, site utilities operate on commercial power, with an uninterruptible power supply with backup power generation. The extreme dependence of the system operation on both electrical power and cooling equipment requires that the sites have their own backup power generators.  Heating, cooling, and ventilation must be available to support year-round continuous operations. CBRNE protection must be integral to the design of system operations facilities.  Fire protection is an operational concern for GBMD elements that must operate continuously. The unit must coordinate for fire protection and equipment that will not cause collateral damage to the system, and will allow the system to operate through all emergencies.  Limited time operation by personnel within enclosed environments is possible (for example, using breathing apparatus to accomplish emergency functions, as required).

Unit Readiness 4-15. The GBMD Commander ensures elements are operationally ready according to the potential for attack, the threat level, force protection for missile defense, information protection, operational area security, antiterrorism, survivability, CBRNE, safety, and readiness condition (REDCON). Systems must be ready to complete the GBMD mission while managing many factors such as routine maintenance, weather, training, and equipment upgrades. Ultimately, the commander participates in asset management conferences and has a voice in schedules and readiness decisions.

Sustainment Reporting and Activity Processes 4-16. Figure 4-2 is an example depicting GBMD operational reporting by OE personnel of the 100th MD BDE (GMD) and 49th MD BN (GMD) operational reporting and sustainment actions and informational/SA processes. The FDC forwards equipment “OUTSPOT” reports to the MDE. The MDE will call an AMC to evaluate effects to Operations Capability (OPSCAP). Immediately following the asset management conference, report outages affecting OPSCAP IAW SI 538-1, Vol. II, BMDS Logistics Reporting and Assessment Procedures.


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4-17. The BMDS Operational Readiness Reporting System (BORRS) is the system of record for MDA to collect BMDS operational readiness and system configuration data generated by the BMDS elements. BORRS is a portal-based reporting and data collections system developed specifically to provide operational readiness and system configuration information for the BMDS. BORRS accumulates operational readiness and system configuration information for data received within the MDA operations Support Center, or from any BMDS site with access to the Warfighter Support Center Operations Support Division (MDA/DWOO) portal. MDA/DWOO maintains the BORRS asset list on the classified website.

Figure 4-2. Operational Reporting Summarized

ARMY SUSTAINMENT FOR GBMD 4-18. The Army’s sustainment objective is to ensure mission success. GBMD elements must be operationally ready according to the FPCON, and the REDCON to defend against potential attack, Operations and sustainment are interdependent. Sustainment provides the commander the means to initiate and maintain operations at all levels of war.

SUSTAINMENT FUNDAMENTALS 4-19. The science of sustainment fundamentals for the Army also applies to GBMD forces and integrates strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts. The sustainment fundamentals include mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of the GBMD operations worldwide. Properly employed GBMD forces allow a nation the freedom of action to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the operational themes from peacetime military engagement to major combat operations to successfully conduct those operations. A nation’s capability to deliver logistic resources has historically been a major factor in military operations (JP 4-0).

SUSTAINMENT/LOGISTIC CHARACTERISTICS 4-20. Successful sustainment must be both effective and efficient. Sustainment operations are not successful unless they provide effective support. Scarce resources require sustainment operations to be efficient. Scarce resources require sustainment operations to be efficient. Effectiveness, however, cannot be handicapped by efficiency. These two aspects of sustainment and logistics are balanced to provide the foundation of successful operations. Seven characteristics facilitate effective and efficient operations and enable operational success. The seven characteristics are: responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, sustainability, and survivability.


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4-21. During materiel acquisition, the Army requires critical systems are “militarized,” “ruggedized,” or “hardened”, to operate reliably in environments that might be subject to the effects of missile attacks. GBMD tactical support facilities that withstand electromagnetic pulse (EMP) are an example of hardening. Deployed forces must take steps to decrease their vulnerability to, or reduce the effectiveness of, an attack. For example, during deployment they can:  Use site reconnaissance and selection, field fortifications, and dispersal.  Implement post-attack recovery and reconstitution procedures.  Ensure critical functions and capabilities remain intact by using backup or alternate systems (redundant or robust means) to reduce vulnerability to attack.

FACILITIES 4-22. The Army must maintain support and facilities for GBMD sites both within CONUS and OCONUS. For the Army facilities management and responsibilities, see AR 420-1. 4-23. Installation Management Command (IMCOM) has responsibility for facilities and support. The basis for additional OCONUS considerations are the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or HN Agreement (HNA) that may augment the method of support provided by IMCOM. 4-24. Support and facilities for GBMD OCONUS sites include mobile and fixed sites, MDC, and support facilities.  The Base must be a closed area in the territory of the HN used by US forces pursuant to the provisions of the agreement for the purpose of deployment of ground-based BMD interceptors. The base constitutes an agreed facility and area as defined in the US – HN supplemental SOFA. The base corresponds to a US installation.  The MDC is a restricted area, IAW SI 538-2. Restricted areas will be located within the military base/installation where all US missile defense system components and supporting equipment installation and maintenance under US control.  GBMD Facilities are permanent structure built within the MDC to house, operate, or support US missile defense system operations.

GBMD MISSION TACTICAL FACILITIES 4-25. Mission tactical facilities are those facilities that contain or are essential to the operation of launch essential/mission critical (LE/MCr) equipment/system(s). The design of GBMD facilities will meet specific operating requirements and environments. These requirements include:  Power and heating plant.  Fuel storage facility.  Interceptor field.  Mechanical electrical building.  Interceptor monitoring building.  IFICS Data Terminals (IDT).  Communications Support Complex.  Site infrastructure such as, but not limited to communications, power, and water distribution lines, that directly connects to or operates with LE/MCr equipment/systems.

GBMD MISSION SUPPORT FACILITIES 4-26. Mission support facilities are collocated with the tactical facilities in the launch farm complex and are required to operate and/or sustain those components. The design of facilities will meet the operating requirements and environments of the system being sustained. The baseline tactical sustainment facilities for European sites are:  Administration and maintenance facility.


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Security monitoring and response facility. Entry control station. Logistic warehouse. Tank/De-Tank facility (interceptor receiving facility). EKV fuel tank storage facility. EKV oxidizer tank storage facility. Interceptor storage facility. Water supply building. Waste water treatment facility. General site infrastructure (water, sewer, electrical, fire protection, roads, fences, parking areas).

PERSONNEL 4-27. Army Soldiers and prime contractor personnel man and maintain Army GBMD systems continuously 24/7/365. The current approach for operational and support personnel will be qualified and certified military personnel, and that the maintenance and support personnel will be provided via a CLS concept. Army GBMD forces consist of a mixture of active duty Army and NG personnel and are commanded by dual hatted, Title 10 USC and Title 32 USC officers. Contract personnel fall under a chain of command established by the prime contractor. 4-28. The Army, in conjunction with the prime contractor and individual GBMD Components, specifies the quantities and skills of labor required for the BMDS Element. Military personnel are expected to have completed their respective institutional resident training courses, been awarded their required Army Area of Concentration/MOS Codes, upgraded their proficiency via on-the-job training and experience, and / or attended advanced residence courses. These individuals may occupy operations, maintenance, and support positions that include operator, command, staff, instructor, and test functions. The military services will certify personnel to their positions within the BMDS. Contractor personnel will qualify and certify their respective organizations to their assigned positions and duties. Soldiers who operate the GFC system are trained and certified IAW the GMD Gunnery Program. 4-29. During the accelerated fielding of the first two AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars, the MDA provided contractors to operate and provide initial security at the two AN/TPY-2 (FBM) locations. Security responsibilities for the two initial sites were transferred from MDA to the COCOM ASCCs and these procedures are expected to be followed for future AN/TPY-2 (FBM) deployments. Site commanders have ADCON of the site but do not provide command and tactical control (TACON) of the radar. TACON is normally exercised by the COCOM’s AADC through the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) detachment sensor managers using C2BMC. 4-30. Operating and maintaining the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar sites on a continuous basis has and will likely continue to rely largely on contractor support. The radar requires 24 hour staffing year round. Any changes to the proper balance between military and contractor personnel will evolve by using lessons learned during initial operations, METT-TC factors and other analysis.

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 4-31. The MDA keeps combatant commands informed of the programs, plans, system capabilities, characteristics, limitations, and sustainment plans of GBMD systems. MDA will provide responses to requests for information and analysis in support of Army missile defense planning, operations, and sustainment. The SECARMY signed an overarching Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between MDA and the Army establishing the conditions for the transition and transfer (T2) of BMDS capabilities to the Army. The MOA address GBIs, ground BMD systems, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and other Army missile defense systems. A separate Annex for the Army is in development that will outline Army responsibilities sustainment maintenance throughout the life cycle system.


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4-32. The current plan for sustainment costs for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is for the Army Service Cell to execute the sustainment mission IAW Army regulations and policy. During transition, the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) the Army/MDA Hybrid Product Office will prepare and obtain Army approval of the Supportability Strategy. After the transfer, the Army will be responsible for sustainment costs. A forum will prepare Army senior leaders for decisions in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and budget. The Army funds through the program evaluation groups and the costs are used for internal planning and funding allocation processes. 4-33. Prior to deployment of any new or upgraded capability affecting ARFOR MDA will provide a detailed briefing on the operational capabilities, limitations and in-AOR support requirements. The purpose of these briefings is to identify the actions required to integrate improved capabilities within the existing C2 and support infrastructure and to plan sustainment.

GMD Equipment Upgrades 4-34. Developing the GMD equipment over an extended period of time and will include several planned upgrades. The concept is for the initial deployment to include sufficient space, power, and air handling, making subsequent upgrades without interference. After initial deployment, the local commander will be centrally involved in all systems upgrades to ensure current operations are not degraded and that upgrades are examined that may impact sustainment. 4-35. The local commander is centrally involved in all systems upgrades and maintenance decisions to ensure current operations are not degraded. Because the mission requires continuous operations, there will be closely managed windows of opportunity to shut down the system for routine and preventive maintenance. Performing maintenance in real-time without interference and before malfunctions cause secondary and tertiary faults is critical to the mission. Redundancy and multiple nodes in systems allow sub-elements to be off-line while performing maintenance. Managing maintenance windows for Army GBMD equipment will be accomplished through the asset management process as outlined in SI 538-1. 4-36. The system requires certification testing of new hardware and software for fixes and upgrades. Any equipment or software connected to operations must be rigorously tested and certified before incorporation in the operational configuration. Since the systems cannot be shut down for testing, it is conducted on a non-interference basis.


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Chapter 5

COMMUNICATIONS This chapter describes the global communications systems needed to support the GBMD and it provides a general review of the existing architectures in support of global communications. The Global communications network (COMNET) is the link, which connects GBMD elements with fire control networks for missile intercepts. Additionally, key organizations that support GBMD have duties and responsibilities to ensure specific communications systems and equipment are always available to support GBMD battle management, C2.

OVERVIEW 5-1. GBMD defense uses many secure voice and data communication systems to execute the mission. The GBMD communications capability will be secure, interoperable, collaborative, redundant, and survivable, providing connectivity to the entire GBMD community. The communications infrastructure should consist of interoperable systems spread across theaters, regions, and COCOM AORs including considerations for HN interface and multi-national forces. To support inter and intra-AOR communications, a comprehensive network has been developed. Information assurance must be built into every aspect of the system to ensure a high probability of mission success.

COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS 5-2. Reliable communications are imperative for GBMD systems conducting their mission. Effective battle management requires reliable signal/communications support to enable the commander to conduct operations during stressing situations for extended time durations over extended distances. The commander must retain the flexibility to operate GBMD units across the battlefield and to maintain communication links with the C2 elements, space-based systems, and to maintain access to time-sensitive data to influence the battle. 5-3. Seamless, integrated secure COMNETs provide for the horizontal and vertical integration of voice, data, graphics, imagery, and video information. Integrated networks support combat operations with the purpose of keeping the commander informed. This means connectivity to Joint streamlined communications links, global connectivity of extended-range assets, and integrated communications. These networks must connect to existing military and civilian, Joint and multinational partners, operations, forces, intelligence sources, sustainment centers, and support administrative functions. 5-4. Satellite communications (SATCOM) support all battlefield systems to significantly enhance the speed and accuracy of useful information that commander’s exchange with subordinates. COMNETs provide entry at key points within the force structure to facilitate SA through data exchange and through automated routing capabilities. 5-5. GBMD Communications systems require the capability to collect, process, display, and communicate large amounts of information while denying the enemy access to the information. Communications systems supporting GBMD, including space-based resources, are capable of providing secure near real time exchange of essential information between commanders and subordinate commanders. The systems must be sufficiently flexible and responsive to allow timely redirection of


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GBMD resources. GBMD communications systems must have sufficient capacity, electronic protection, and flexibility to accommodate information exchange among all levels of command, even when an intermediate level has been disabled (degraded operations).

GBMD NETWORKS 5-6. To support GBMD operations, communications are established and maintained using all available means, including strategic, tactical service component, sustaining base, commercially-leased, multinational, and HN communications. The required communications must support high-speed data systems with massive data storage, retrieval, and dissemination capabilities. The following types of information are exchanged:  SA - consisting of common operating picture and alerting and early warning.  C2 - consisting of command, OPCON, and tactical control.  Operations and intelligence - consisting of planning, coordination, orders, reports, static intelligence, dynamic intelligence, and targeting information.  Administrative/sustainment - consisting of sustaining information, personnel and unit information, and status reports. 5-7. There is one main communication network used to support GBMD, the BMD COMNET. There are two communications sub-networks for GBMD that support the BMD COMNET NetOps structure. The first is the BCN. The BCN is the collection of telecommunications switching, routing, and ancillary equipment and interconnecting virtual circuits that distribute BMDS information among BMDS Subsystems, using the DOD telecommunications infrastructure (For example the GIG and the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN)). 5-8. The BCN includes all the data, voice, video, and transport systems independently installed and operated across multiple AORs supporting GMD. Additionally, they assist global and theater NetOps service providers with isolation activities, ensuring network outages affecting the BMDS are resolved in a timely manner. The second is the GMD Communications Network (GCN). The GCN is a dedicated GBMD network providing communications connectivity for GMD components, as well as the prime items of the GFC with the GFC nodes. 5-9. The BCN includes all the data, voice, video, and transport systems independently installed and operated across multiple AORs supporting GMD. The BCN shares the same transport and NetOps systems used to support multiple missions. Infrastructure is available through commercial and DOD Networks and Satellites. The second is the GCN. The GCN is a dedicated GBMD network providing communications connectivity for GMD components, as well as the prime items of the GFC. The GCN also includes radio frequency line-of-site systems. 5-10. The GCN connects the components of GMD with a secure, fire control system for simultaneous missile intercepts. The GCN integrates multiple separate sub-components collectively, capable of secure data, secure voice links, and encrypted long-haul multimedia communications links. It uses both government and leased civilian equipment. A fundamental criterion to select the components of the GCN was the need to configure a data and voice network that was both accurate and rapid. 5-11. The mission of the GCN is to ensure commanders have access to the information and data required to execute the GBMD mission. The network provides the infrastructure that connects/integrates all missile defense assets (sensors, weapons, and C2BMC). The network includes the leased GCN, Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), MILSTAR Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) and UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellites frequency line-of-site systems TADIL-J, and all physical and logical links providing data and voice communications. Figure 5-1 depicts the geographic layout of the GCN and the locations of the various GMD sub-components in the network.


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Figure 5-1. GMD COMNET Architecture 5-12. The primary mission of the GCN is to provide:  Connectivity to the GFCs suite locations.  Connectivity to the GBI missile fields.  Sensor data links to/from the GFC. 5-13. The GCN is composed of long haul communications (LHC), long-haul communications system manager, communications node equipment (CNE), and network system manager. The LHC provides secure, reliable, multi-path, wide area network (WAN) services between all geographically separated GMD locations, using fiber optic cable and SATCOM. The LHC system monitors the health and status and controls the WAN LHC. A single LHC system monitor workstation is collocated with each GFC node. 5-14. The CNE and the network status monitor provide each GMD component access to the secure, survivable GMD WAN. The CNE is that portion of the GCN subcomponent that provides communications interface to each GMD component. Ground Stations (GS) are the components that provide the data communications access to those GSs and GMD components within each local geographical area. 5-15. The network status monitor collection station, collocated with each CNE, provides local communications and GS equipment performance monitoring, fault detection, isolation and resolution, and status reporting. Two network status monitor work stations are collocated with each GFC node. The network status monitor WSs are responsible for fault detection, insertion, recovery, and the issuance and tracking of trouble tickets, as well as GS system status reporting. Also collocated with each GFC node is a maintenance execution center to facilitate coordination between the on-site sustainment centers and the system operators.


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5-16. The GCN is monitored and managed by the GCN Network Operations Center (GNOC). The GNOC provides C2, SA, network security, safety, and network management roles and responsibilities for the GCN. The GCN network includes all terminal site long-haul and LAN equipment to include encryption devices. It employs the commercial standards for Telecommunications Management Network (TMN) which includes the functions of fault configuration, accounting (asset management), performance and security. 5-17. The GNOC provides status reporting to the JFCC-IMD Global IMD NetOps Integration Center (GINIC) for distribution to appropriate COCOMs and the BMDS C2 COI. The GNOC is responsible for network restoration, coordination of scheduled maintenance events, near real-time analysis of circuit performance, issuing of trouble reports, and resolving network status alarms. The GNOC also implements transitions for simultaneous test and operations across the GCN. These transitions are directed and implemented by the GNOC network operators, engineers and trained and certified field engineers located at the various GMD terminal sites. 5-18. USNORTHCOM uses SA data provided by the C2BMC system, GFC remote workstation, and voice communication with the MDE of the 100th MD BDE (GMD) to exercise OPCON of GMD components. USSTRATCOM has OPCON of some GMD-related sensors. GFC has the ability to directly task certain USSTRATCOM sensors in support of missile defense operations. Other sensors’ support is coordinated through the C2BMC. 5-19. DSP/SBIRS satellites send data to the DSP/SBIRS MCS. The MCS connects to the C2BMC and GFC. The Aegis BMD uses STJ and MTJ to send data to the GFC using the external system interfaces (ESI). IDTs are located at Vandenberg AFB, Eareckson Air Station, FGA, and on the SBX platform. These GMD components and sensors connect to the GFCs at FGA and the MDIOC via the GCN and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) provided LHC. The GFCs are connected to the C2BMC system used by USNORTHCOM via the GCN with LHC and the BCN. 5-20. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) provided data to the GFC network through fiber optic communications from Japan to the C2BMC in Hawaii and is retransmitted to the GCN using SATCOM links. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) interfaces with the C2BMC network through the CNIP. Data is passed to the GFC from C2BMC at the GFC location. Execution of the sensor management function is from the C2BMC terminals (generally located remotely from the radar). 5-21. Voice communications required for support and coordination of BMDS operations is through “Red” and “Black” phone switch networks. The radar site operations element and the sensor management element are participants in both switched networks. Communications requirements for collateral mission support will be determined by the COCOM.

IN-FLIGHT INTERCEPTOR COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 5-22. The IFICS is a dedicated communications system for GFC. It consists of a high-powered communication terminal and antenna designed to communicate with the in-flight EKV. IFICS establishes and supports nuclear-survivable data communication links between the IDT and the in-flight EKVs. The IDT provides communication support for the transmission of IFTUs from the GFC to the EKV and the reception of the IFSR from the EKV to the GFC. Since the EKVs travel long distances, the IFICS must be located in diverse sites over a broad area to ensure line-of-sight with the EKVs at all times. Currently, fixed IDTs are located at FGA, and Shemya, Alaska. Relocatable IDTs are located at Vandenberg AFB and on SBX.

C2BMC 5-23. C2BMC through its communication architecture links ground and space-based sensors to display track and ballistic missile threat data which is distributed to each C2BMC suite. The C2BMC system consists of the Command and Control Battle Management (C2BM) interface, the C2BM subcomponents of each supporting weapon system, and the communications infrastructure for linking assets with other DOD and non-DOD networks. Sensor managers use C2BMC to control the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar.


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C2BMC TRI-NODE ARCHITECTURE 5-24. C2BMC’s Tri-Node communication architecture provides three primary mission sets for the COCOM, SA, control of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar, and connectivity between the C2BMC suites at USPACOM, USNORTHCOM, and USSTRATCOM. The C2BMC provides C2 of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar at Shariki, Japan and a common operational picture to senior leadership and connectivity for the GCN/GFCs. Figure 5-2 shows a graphical C2BMC Tri-Node architecture.

Figure 5-2. C2BMC Tri-Node Architecture

RESPONSIBILITIES 5-25. The GBMD communications infrastructure needs interoperable systems that facilitate the conduct of GBMD operations against the threat. The organizations with responsibilities in GBMD communications are uniquely organized to accomplish the GBMD mission. Providing communications rests with the combat developer down to the Army GBMD elements. The MDA is the developer, USSTRATCOM has the responsibility for GBMD communication and JFCC-IMD is the asset manager for the BMD COMNET.

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 5-26. MDA, in coordination with Army signal commands, is responsible for developing and providing all BMDS level communications to support the elements of GBMD. MDA has designed communication packages to support the GBMD elements. These on site communication packages are flexible and can support either fixed facilities or deployable shelters and are transportable or non transportable depending on the mission. The following basic communication capabilities are provided:  DSCS satellites.


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        

Military Strategic and Tactical Automated Relay (MILSTAR) satellites. Commercial satellites. Fiber optic interface. High-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) protected power generation. HEMP protected CNE. SIPRNet/NIPRNet workstations. Defense Switched Network (DSN)/Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN) (up to 250 lines). Non-mission support. UHF and UFO satellites.

USSTRATCOM 5-27. USSTRATCOM, which is the C2 center for US Strategic forces, has the responsibility for strategic communication for GBMD as defined within the SI 538-4. USSTRATCOM will leverage overall DOD communications architectures to support the Army GBMD forces working with the JFC, DISA, COCOMs, and services. 5-28. USSTRATCOM has established the BMD COMNET for communications integration of BMDS assets. These assets consist of three layers:  Tier I network constitutes realms and aspects at the strategic level that are relevant to subordinate and adjacent commands within GBMD.  Tier II network includes intelligence, surveillance, tracking, engagement and reporting in support of BMDS operations at the theater level.  Tier III consists of the user elements and managed be the using command. 5-29. The BMDS leverages networks to provide connectivity for BMDS elements assuring commanders have access to information and data required to execute the BMDS mission. These existing NetOps interoperate to form a virtual community of interest network, referred to as BMD COMNET. The BMD COMNET includes data, voice, video, and transport systems that are independently installed and operated across multiple theaters supporting GBMD. The BMD COMNET is not a dedicated network for GBMD; rather, it shares the same transport and communications systems used to support multiple missions. 5-30. Its current infrastructure consists of both commercial and DOD NetOps and satellites. Information system elements of BMDS, and various fragmented developmental and test networks connect to the BMD COMNET infrastructure. The BMD COMNET includes operational, development, test, and training components of DISN, both hardened and non-hardened commercial and military SATCOM assets, DRSN, and the dedicated GCN. 5-31. JFCC-IMD/J6 manages the Tier I assets and the COCOMs Joint command, control, and communications systems directorates (J6s) manage the Tier II assets. Tier III consists of the GBMD user elements. The BMD COMNET includes the leased GCN, SCS, TADIL-J, and all physical and logical links providing data and voice communications.

JFCC-IMD 5-32. JFCC-IMD is the primary asset manager for the BMD COMNET is the primary responsible agency for the Tier I BMD COMNET. JFCC-IMD manages the BMD COMNET through the GINIC. The GINIC is JFCC-IMD’s 24x7 global operations center responsible for monitoring and reporting the availability, reliability and security of the BMD COMNET and the components that directly support the BMD mission. Additionally, they assist global and theater NetOps service providers with isolation activities, ensuring network outages affecting the BMDS are resolved in a timely manner.


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5-33. The GINIC coordinates scheduled and unscheduled maintenance activities affecting BMD COMNET system integrity to ensure minimal operational impact. To ensure NetOps capability gaps are closed, the GINIC relies on support from JTF – Global Network Operations (GNO) NetOps centers, service/agency communication providers, BMDS Network Operations Support Centers (BNOSC). The GINIC shares the global fused picture with JTF-GNO, COCOM, MDA, other NetOps centers, and BMD communication service providers. 5.34 The BMD COMNET mission is to ensure commanders have access to the information and data required to execute the GBMD mission and provides the infrastructure that connects all assets (sensors, weapons, and C2BMC) into an IMD. Tier I and Tier II node table’s 5-1 and table 5-2 show the organizations and locations involved in the BMD COMNET. Table 5-1. Tier I Nodes

TIER I ORGANIZATION

LOCATION

JTF-GNO

Arlington, VA

USSTRATCOM GNCC

Offutt AFB

DISA CONUS

Scott AFB

USNORTHCOM TNCC

Peterson AFB

TNC Pacific

Wheeler AFB

GECIC

Schriever AFB

BNOSC

Schriever AFB


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Table 5-2. Tier II Nodes

TIER II ORGANIZATION

LOCATION

USNORTHCOM TNCC

Cheyenne Mountain Complex (CMC)

USNORTHCOM TNCC

Peterson AFB

USNORTHCOM TNC

Peterson AFB

TNCC USEUCOM

Stuttgart, GE

FGA NOC

Fort Greely, AK

CNOC, Schriever AFB

Schriever AFB

NCC

Makalapa, HI

JFTOC, NCTAMS PAC

Wahiawa, HI

C6F BWC

Naples, IT

JFTOC

Naples, IT


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Army GBMD Components This chapter covers the GBMD program with a varied description of systems, and equipment. Many components provide battle management, command, control, and communications, and operate in conjunction with other external supporting systems or in direct support. This chapter also covers GMD and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) sensors that provide GMD systems with early threat detection, tracking and GBI control.

GMD OVERVIEW 6-1. The GMD system is the first operational, hit-to-kill and only operationally deployed missile defense program to defend the homeland against long-range ballistic missile attacks. The system provides early detection and tracking during the boost phase, midcourse target discrimination, precision intercept and destruction of inbound IRBMs or ICBMs through the force of hit-to-kill technology. GMD uses multiple sensors, communications systems, fire control capabilities, and GBIs that are capable of detecting, tracking, and destroying IRBM and ICBMs during the midcourse phase of flight. The GMD system is comprised of the ground systems, GBI and sensors. 6-2. The ground system is made up of the GFC, GCN, IFICS, and Launch Support System (LSS). The GFC orchestrates the battle and is staffed by Soldiers who operator the GFC system. The GCN links the components of the system together to provide seamless information exchange via fiber optic cables and satellites. The GMD communicates with the EKV during flight via the IDTs. The LSS communicates with the GBI on the ground and passes information between the GFC and the GBIs. 6-3. The GBI is comprised of the orbital booster vehicle (OBV) in a standardized three-stage booster configuration. The OBV caries the Booster Avionics Module (BAM) and the EKV into its trajectory. The EKV uses the kinetic energy from a direct hit on the incoming RV to destroy it. The EKV is a sensorpropulsion package that collides with the target at a closing speed in the range of 15,000 miles per hour. The hit-to-kill method uses proven technology verified in several flight tests, including three tests using an operationally configured GBI. 6-4. Sensors support the GMD by providing data the system relies upon to calculate a firing solution. The sensors consist of satellites, sea-based and ground-based radars which feed data into the GMD. The sensors that provide data to the GMD are the DSP/SBIRS, Aegis BMDS with the AN/SPY-1 radar, the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar, COBRA Dane radar, and UEWRs located at Beale AFB in California and RAF Fylingdales, UK. The SBX provides support to the GMD test program and GMD operations if it is in positional to detect an actual IRBM or ICBM launch.

GMD PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 6-5. GMD uses a variety of sensors/radars, which include DSP/SBIRS satellites, COBRA Dane radar, UEWR, SBX radar, AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars, and Aegis BMDS. The sensors/radars provide target search, acquisition, track, classification, discrimination, hit assessment, and data to support the IFICS support to the GFC for the EKV via the IDT. This information provides the EKV with the ability to locate, discriminate and destroy the incoming RV. 6-6. GBIs must have a fire solution with an opportunity to engage (calculated by the GFC) within the GMD field of view and includes determining a ballistic missile as a threat and command authority to


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launch an interceptor. The engagement opportunity is defined as the distance or time between the first intercept opportunity and the last intercept opportunity. 6-7. The GBI is comprised of a booster vehicle, the avionics package and the EKV. Launch of a GBI occurs after a ballistic missile has been determined to be a threat, the GFC determines there is an engagement opportunity and permission is granted from the WRA. The booster will fly towards a projected intercept point and release the EKV when the booster has burned out. The EKV will adjust its position if it receives updated track data via IFTU. The EKV uses on-board sensors to ‘see’ the threat cluster and performs final discrimination to acquire the likely RV. Then the EKV maneuvers itself to collide with the RV, destroying it by a lethal kinetic energy impact. 6-8. GFC enables the crew to understand and assess the situation, make informed decisions, feed information to interceptors to find and destroy incoming ballistic missile RVs, and evaluate mission success. The GFC ground system component consists of the hardware, software, and communications systems necessary for planning, tasking, and controlling the GMD components during threat engagements. It collects data from all of the sensors, interconnects the communications among all of the components, connects GMD to the overall BMDS, and allows military and civilian authorities to mount a defense against a limited ballistic missile attack.

GMD GROUND SYSTEMS 6-9. The GMD ground system is the integrating and controlling component of the GMD element. The ground system components include equipment, communications, operations, procedures and personnel essential for planning, directing and controlling operations of assigned assets to accomplish the GMD mission. Ground system hardware includes:  GFC.  GCN.  IFICS.  The Launch Support System (LSS). 6-10. The GFC provides automated engagement operations with predictive planning and automated execution. Based on input from the space-based, sea-based, and ground-based sensors, the C2 computers assess the path of the incoming threat, prepare a predicted impact location, and prepare a defend task plan for the GBI. The functions and capabilities include C2, decision support, communications, training, testing, and intelligence. 6-11. The interactive C2 capability allows control and direction of the battle in near-real-time. This includes turning the engagement execution on and off, modifying the mission execution, and managing exceptions and anomalies. The operators bring external information and intelligence (such as the concern of potential follow-on attacks and the nature of the RV) to the engagement. This intelligence drives the modification of XPs. The interactive C2 capability ensures operators are in full control. 6-12. The automated C2 decision support capability provides:  Decision parameters.  Projected benefits and effects of decision choices.  Associated levels of confidence or risk, enabling the commander to develop SA.  Information on the status of the engagement, radar coverage, and GBI fly-out trajectories allowing operators to follow the engagements. 6-13. Both space-based and land-based communications systems C2 nodes provide communications paths through the GFC to the IDT, and on to the GBIs. The communications capability provides connectivity among supporting sensors, ground-based elements, and GFC capabilities located in various operations and control centers. Reliable, redundant communications is necessary among the MDE, FDC and alternate facilities, to ensure all GMD systems components are operating effectively. Both space-based and landbased communications systems C2 nodes connect to the IFICS, and the GBIs.


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6-14. The multi-echelon training capability of the ground systems allows the Army GMD operators to conduct training to maintain proficiency. It also allows evaluation of new XPs during periods of crisis. An embedded testing capability is a goal of system development. It also allows inserting of periodic system tests into the C2 system, without disrupting operational readiness.

TEST EXERCISER 6-15. The TEX drives the GFC/C during testing and consists of threat scenarios and models all GMD components, and. TEX integrates with GFC hardware and software and forms the heart of the training capability. The GMD System Trainer (GST) can run in a stand-alone mode or in a distributed mode with other nodes at FGA, Schriever AFB, and USNORTHCOM. The GFC node allows testing and exercising of the node without stimulus from the actual test articles. TEX is collocated with MDE and FDC nodes and is resident on all GSTs. The GST is a standard GFC node with the addition of an instructor workstation that includes a learning management system. The GST is a training tool that replicates all aspects of the GFC system and the GMD architecture.

External Systems Interface 6-16. The ESI provides interface management and message transfer between the GFC and external elements with a variety of interface protocols. The ESI enables the GMD element to interface with the ITW/AA system as well as evolving C2 systems and external sensors. The ESI Data Bridge consists of a Sun server, data storage device, associated Sun workstation, is located at the space and Naval warfare system center in San Diego, CA and interfaces with the MDE node and the FDC nodes. The ESI main processor, located at the GFC node sites, consists of an upgrade to the existing GFC EP, a data archive system, and two personal computers used for data monitoring.

LAUNCH SUPPORT SYSTEM 6-17. The LSS provides the C2 function that controls the operations of the GBI during ground operations up through launch. It maintains the GBI in a state of readiness to perform its function, generates flight data from target trajectory data received known as the WTP, and sequences Interceptors into a launch posture. The LSS provides the facilities, services, and transport equipment to support the Interceptor and its payload throughout their operational life. Also, it controls the maintenance activities while a portion of the GBI is in the maintenance mode. The LSS consists of three components: Command and Launch Equipment (CLE), Launch Site Components (LSC), and Peculiar Support Equipment (PSE).

COMMAND LAUNCH EQUIPMENT 6-18. The CLE is the key component in the communications link from the GFC and the Interceptor while it is in the silo, also known as pre launch. The CLE consists of four sub components that allows for data to be passed and monitors the entire system for health and status. In addition the CLE provides the health and status of the interceptor and indicates launch when executed. The launch guidance and control equipment, Readiness Station Equipment (RSE), and Communications Equipment is collocated within the Control Facility which is manned. Launch Station Equipment (LSE) is located at the individual silo within the Silo Interface Vault (SIV), and is unmanned. 6-19. The Launch Ground Communications Equipment (LGCE) communicates with the GFC, receives health and status information from the RSE and provides the necessary C2 of the GBI during ground operations through launch. GBI commands are routed from the LGCE to the LSE for controlling the interceptor via the Communication Equipment (CE). The console is composed of redundant workstations and file-servers that provide a HIC environment for controlling day-to-day operations and ensure mission readiness. It receives weapon tasking, state vector and status information request messages from GFC and supplies responses to these messages. Selects and sequence the interceptor to a launch posture as directed by GFC. The LGCE passes mission data to the LSE where the engagement solution is calculated. The


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LGCE houses the CLE Applications (CLEAPS), Mission Applications (MAPL), and Training (TRAIN) software and provides launch C2 of the Interceptor. 6-20. The LSE consists of the hardware and software, which provides C2, receives health and status from the interceptor, provides ground power to the interceptor, and provides the capability to monitor the health and status of the LSE and LSCs. The LSE is housed in the SIV. The LSE is loaded with and utilizes the CLE Launch Station Operations (LSOPS) and Engagement Calculation (ENGAGE) software. The LSOPS uses computer software configuration items (CSCI) to provide C2 for the LSE. The LSOPS CSCI is contained in each Launch Interface Unit (LIU). All functions necessary to support the control of LSOPSs from LSE power application through Interceptor activation and subsequent Interceptor launch are contained within the LSOPS CSCI. The LSOPS CSCI also controls and monitors status for the silo environmental control system and the Silo Closure Mechanism (SCM). 6-21. The Communications Equipment (CE) consists of the following: The hardware and commercial software necessary to interconnect CLE components. It provides the network connectivity and communication links between the LGCE, RSE and the LSE located in the SIV. It interfaces with the GFC/C equipment to allow transfer of data to and from the CLE Components. It provides a separate secure voice communication system between the RSE and the SIVs. The CE provides weapon system inter-site COMNET for transmission and control of data information within the weapon system in support of the Interceptor launch. It provides the capabilities to exchange flight tactical, C2 data and information within the weapon system.

LAUNCH SITE COMPONENTS 6-22. The LSC consist of the silo, the SIV and SCM. The LSC is responsible for maintaining and monitoring the internal temperature and humidity levels and supporting all site maintenance activities. The LSC consists of the components and equipment necessary to provide a sheltered environment for the Interceptor and the LSE portion of the CLE that interfaces with the Interceptor. The LSC provides control of and monitoring of the health and status of the LSC environmental control system. The SIV contains the LSE component of the CLE to communicate with the interceptor for test, maintenance and pre-launch. The SIV interface panel in the silo will contain feed through holes for the electrical umbilical, re-radiation coax cables, and Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) lines routed to the Interceptor. The LSC provides the Lateral Support Group in the Silo to assist the Boost Vehicle with lateral stability while in the silo. The LSC provides conditioned air through an umbilical to support the payload. The LSC provides retraction mechanism(s) for the Air Supply Umbilical. 6-23. The SCM allows for access through the top of the silo for the insertion of the interceptor, maintenance and or removal of the interceptor from the silo. The capability for rapid opening allows the interceptor to meet is launch timelines that it receives from the GFC based upon information obtained from various sensors. In addition the covered top serves to protect/isolate the interceptor from natural, hostile and induced environments that if left unprotected could affect the operational readiness of the interceptor.

PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 6-24. The PSE consists of machinery or apparatus required to safely handle, transport, store or install the payload into the silo. There may be PSE required to test selected payload components during assembly. The PSE is tasked to attenuate any excessive vibration and shock during handling and transport. Figure 6-1 shows the preparation to transport the GBI from the airfield to the MDC and the Strongback and Crane loading an interceptor into the silo.


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Figure 6-1. Strongback with Crane at a Silo & Transport of GBI from Airfield 6-25. The PSE is a component of the LSS. The function of the PSE is to provide Support and Handling Equipment (S&HE) for the Weapon System. Additionally the PSE provides specialized TMDE to support developmental tests and operational deployment of the Weapon System. The PSE provides the S&HE required for transportation, emplacement and removal of the interceptor. This equipment primarily includes tractors, trailers, erectors and ancillary equipment needed to load, transport, transfer, and erect the interceptor. Also included is any specialized S&HE required for installation of the LGCE, LSE and RSE. This equipment is restricted to specialized equipment not commonly provided by the facilities.

GROUND SAFING DEVICE 6-26. The Ground Safing Device (GSD) is a two position switch panel which has SAFE or ENABLE switches for the GBI Missile Fields and GBI launch facilities. The SAFE position allows the GMD operators the ability to disable the GFC launch commands from going to the GBIs: the ENABLE position allows the GFC launch commands to go to the GBIs. The GSD at FGA is located in the GFC node and controls each missile field. The GSD at Vandenberg, AFB is located in the Watch Officer’s room and controls each Launch Facility (silo) individually. Figurer 6-2 shows the Vandenberg AFB switch box (left) and the FGA GSD box (right).

Figure 6-2. Vandenberg AFB & FGA GSD 6-27. The GSD, though a relatively simple switch when compared to the CLE, also provides a vital connectivity between the GFC, and the CLE, and provides safety mechanisms via human-in-the-loop in controlling the SAFING or ENABLING the launch of the GBIs. The GSD must be staffed continuously, 24 hours a day, by a GMD soldier. This individual could be a soldier trained for the CLE mission, but couldn’t cover down on both the CLE and the GSD positions at the same time, since the CLE and the GSD are in different rooms at each site.


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GBI SYSTEM 6-28. The GBI system is designed to intercept RVs outside the Earth’s atmosphere (exo-atmospheric) and destroy them by force of impact. The GBI system consists of a multi-stage solid propellant booster, an EKV and support equipment. The LSS is comprised of the CLE, the LSC and the PSE and missile complex facilities. 6-29. The GBI consists of a booster and an EKV. The booster is a high-powered rocket that propels the EKV to its intercept basket outside the atmosphere and is housed in an underground launch silo. The range and speed of the booster allows the GBI to defend much of the homeland.

ORBITAL BOOSTER VEHICLE 6-30. The GBI consists of two components, the booster and the payload. The Orbital Boost Vehicle (OBV) or booster consists of a three-stage vehicle designed to propel the payload onto its trajectory of flight. The OBV is an off the shelf model used in the Pegasus program and is currently the booster vehicle employed on all operational interceptors. The payload, which is located on the top of the booster vehicle, consists of the EKV, Booster Avionics Module (BAM) and a protective Shroud covering the payload avionics during initial flight through the atmosphere. The BAM is a device that allows the use of one design type EKV on a variety of booster vehicles as they become available. The BAM assists in flight control during the boost phase, supports the EKV during boost and separation and propels the EKV into its trajectory of flight when released from the 3rd stage booster. The shroud is a protective covering that provides protection to the EKV and BAM during the boost phase of its flight. The Shroud is released and falls away from the boost vehicle in the upper atmosphere shortly after second stage separation in preparation of independent EKV operations. Figure 6-3 illustrates OBV and payload. 6-31. The GBI resides in an underground launch silo which serves as both the housing and alignment for the booster. The silo provides protection to the booster from terrorist as well as protection from the external environment. Additionally, the controlled environment inside the silo helps protect critical components from rapid degradation and facilitates routine maintenance.N a normal state. Figure 6-3. OBV & Payload

EXO-ATMOSPHERIC KILL VEHICLE

6-32. The EKV (see figure 6-4) is the bullet of the GBI. Upon being delivered to a point in space by the booster, the EKVs IR seeker and flight package perform all divert, navigation, guidance and control activities necessary to engage the target. After reaching its acquisition range, the EKV can autonomously track, discriminate among objects, engage the threat object, and destroy it through lethal collision. Although nominally the EKV receives required target characterization from the GFC mission data load prior to launch, or from subsequent in-flight updates, the EKV can autonomously discriminate the threat object through its integrated onboard sensor suite and processing algorithms.


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Figure 6-4. EKV

MISSILE FIELDS 6-33. All GBIs are fielded at two operational MF at FGA and a smaller MF at Vandenberg AFB, CA. The missile complex facilities support the maintenance of the GBIs. The facilities are comprised of the missile assembly building, mechanical electrical building, interceptor storage facilities, EKV fuel storage, and EKV oxidizer storage facilities. Figure 6-5 illustrates the FGA MF.

Figure 6-5. FGA Missile Field

GMD FIRE DIRECTION CENTERS 6-34. The GFC controls the C2 functions over the entire system. These GFC nodes are where computer/human interaction takes place. The two GFC nodes are the MDE located at Schriever AFB, Colorado, and the FDC located at FGA. One GFC terminal will be located in USASMDC/ARSTRAT


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operations center at Peterson AFB, Colorado, and one GFC terminal with the JFCC-IMD operations center at Schriever AFB, Colorado to provide SA.

GMD FIRE CONTROL 6-35. The GFC system is a suite of hardware, software, consoles, communications equipment, and trained personnel integrating the GMD and other supporting elements to manage all phases of engagement. The GFC is the brains of the GMD system. The battle manager function provides a capability that synthesizes all the sensor data, makes automated engagement plans for the GBIs, and makes operational recommendations to the operators. 6-36. Two GFC nodes receive and pass data from resources such as the UEWR, COBRA Dane, SBX, IDT, DSP/SBIRS, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and Aegis BMD to identify objects, determine if it is a threat, discriminate the RV from missile debris, and intercept the RV. They also provide automated C2 information, and permit HIC management of the GMD capability. The GFC capability is located at the MDE node in the MDIOC at Schriever AFB, Colorado, and the FDC node is located in the readiness and control station at FGA. There are also four GFC work stations located inside CMC which are connected remotely from the MDE node to provide SA.

GMD SENSORS 6-37. DSP/SBIRS provides initial ballistic missile launch detection with continuous global coverage. DSP/SBIRS used IR technology to tracks a ballistic missile from launch through booster burnout. Information received from the DSP/SBIRS is relayed to the MCS at Buckley AFB, Colorado where it is passed into the GFC System. DSP/SBIRS is part of the ITW/AA system and provides the GFC with a launch location, launch time and predicted point of impact. The DSP/SBIRS data provided to the GFC is not insufficient to obtain a firing solution and therefore will not affect the launch of GBIs to engage a potential threat. The data used from DSP/SBIRS cues other systems to begin searching specified locations for the ballistic missile. 6-38. Aegis BMDS is the most forward based radar that supports GMD. It is cued directly by DSP/SBIRS and provides target classification information to the GFC during late boost and early mid-course phase of a ballistic missile trajectory. The Aegis BMDS needs to be in proper position to be effective due upon its narrow search beam and radar characteristics. It will likely provide be the first sensor to provide engagement quality data for the GFC to launch interceptors. Aegis BMDS is particularly important for the engagement of ballistic missile threats with short flight time. Deployment and support level provided by Aegis BMDS to the GMD mission is tied to REDCON levels. 6-39. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is a re-locatable radar that provides increased coverage in theaters of operation where needed. It augments Aegis BMDS and provides sensor coverage if an Aegis BMDS is not on station. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) used the same phased-array radar equipment as the THAAD system, but the software to support the GMD/BMDS mission is totally different. Data information flows CNIP into the GFC and C2BMC so it can also provide data into Aegis BMDS for launch information related to the SM-3 missile system. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) can operate in either classification or discrimination mode and can support either strategic or theater threats.


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6-40. COBRA Dane radar is located at Eareckson AFB on the island of Shemya, Alaska in the Aleutian chain. It is the only ground based radar currently capable or detecting IRBM and ICBM launches out of North Korea. Its primary mission is intelligence gathering radar, but has been upgraded to conduct additional mission of providing ballistic missile information to the GMD system when cued. It provides target acquisition and tracking information allowing it to detect RV-like objects giving the system the ability to classify. COBRA Dane is a highly reliable, one-sided, phased-array radar owned by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 6-41. SBX provides support to the GMD test program and GMD operations if it is in positional to detect an actual IRBM or ICBM launch. SBX is a discrimination-class radar that gives the GMD system the capability to both classify an RV and provide shape discrimination of an object to detect an RV. SBX also carries on board an IDT to communicate with the EKV; however this IDT is not currently operational. 6-42. The UEWR at Beale AFB, California has a primary mission to detect Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) as part of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). It was modified so it could provide data to GMD system. Beale radar is a two-faced, phased-array radar system with good range that provides target classification data. This radar has limited use to the GMD System due to its field of view and ground location, even though it provides coverage to the southwest portion of the CONUS and Mexico. The UEWR at RAF Fylingdales, United Kingdom is a three-faced, phased-array BMEWS radar system upgraded to support GMD mission. It is currently the only radar system that provides CONUS notification for ballistic missile defense for a ballistic missile launched from Iran.

100TH MD BDE (GMD) MDE 6-43. The MDE (see figure 6-6) provides direction to the GFC based on coordination with the MDO. The MDE is manned continuously 24 hours per day, 365 days a year. Weapons control directives are passed through the MDO to the MDE Director. The MDE executes WCS Weapons Free/ Weapons Hold control status for the systems and normally has weapons control. The MDO cannot accomplish a weapons control order action; it requires two crewmembers at the same node; one to initiate and one to confirm the order to change WCS from Weapons Hold to Weapons Free. The same procedure applies when going from Weapons Free to Weapons Hold. 6-44. The MDE plans for the future battles in coordination with the MDO and FDC Battle Analyst. The MDE monitors the current battle and provides expertise for system performance and readiness and provides SA through reports to the MDO and NORAD/USNORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2) Command Center Director (CCD). On order, the MDE could assume failover actions and execute the current missile defense battle from the FDC.


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Figure 6-6. 100th MD BDE (GMD) MDE 6-45. The GFC prime items consist of an EP, C2 software, system administration tools, and pre-planner. The EP software provides functionality of track management, planning, and interface management. The C2 software provides the user with graphical user interface displays for decision aids, situation awareness, and system control. The displays support GMD C2 decision-making as appropriate at each of the GFC locations. The pre-planner provides an off-line capability to assess GFC performance given alternative threats and control parameters.

49TH MD BN (GMD) FIRE DIRECTION CENTER 6-46. The FDC (see figure 6-7) is located at FGA, co-located with the CLE and will fight the current battle based on direction from the CMC command director and MDE. Staffing is 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. To ensure successful mission execution the FDC will:  Maintain the directed states of readiness.  Assess viability of the DS/XP.  Recommend changes to the DS/XP. 6-47. The FDC will conduct missile engagements by executing Management By Exception (MBE) redirection criteria IAW commander’s intent and directives. Both GFC nodes are identical and share all information and either node can control the battle. Redundancy is essential to maintain readiness; there are three additional system administration workstations that could be used to replace operator workstations if necessary.


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Figure 6-7. 49th MD BN (GMD) FDC

GMD ORGANIZATION 6-48. USASMDC/ARSTRAT exercises ADCON and responsibility of the GMD units and serves as the combat developer while the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the State Adjutants General of Alaska and Colorado provide general equipment and personnel who transition to a Title 10 status in order to man the MDE and FDC. Figure 6-8 shows the GMD organizational structure. USASMDC/ARSTRAT will oversee the Army’s Title 10 USC mission. Army organizations involved in GMD operations include: th  100 MD BDE (GMD) provides staffing for the MDE executing GMD operations. th  49 MD BN (GMD) provides staffing for the FDC executing GMD operations.  A GMD Detachment at Vandenberg AFB.  OCONUS Theater Missile Defense (TMD) planners and units.


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Figure 6-8. GMD Organizational Structure

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSIBILITIES 6-49. ARNG soldiers who transition from Title 32 to Title 10 status in order to execute the Federal GMD mission, IAW the SECARMY-approved staffing model provides the majority of the staffing for Army GMD elements. A mixture of Regular Army and full-time ARNG forces provide the FDC and MDE with sufficient personnel to execute the continuous GMD mission. Crews at the MDE and FDC will conduct operations under the OPCON of the MDO at USNORTHCOM. 6-50. Staffing is a mix of active duty Army, ARNG, Department of the Army civilians and contractors. Thus, the C2 concept of operations is complex. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the senior Army headquarters responsible for executing the GMD mission and executes the Title 10 Federal mission. The 100th MD BDE (GMD) is aligned with a Colorado NG and the 49th MD BN (GMD) is aligned with the Alaska NG. The commanders are dual-hatted, Title 10/32 commanders. Colorado and Alaska NG Soldiers executing the GMD mission or guarding the GMD facilities do so only while in a Title 10 status and under the command of the Title 10 chain of command.

MISSILE DEFENSE ELEMENTS 6-51. The MDE and FDC crews are organized and operated similarly and conduct the operational level execution of the GMD mission for CCDRs. The MDE provides operational and tactical recommendations to the CCDR, synchronizes operations, and directs the tactical fight through the FDC crews. Figures 6-9 through 6-11 shows the organization of crew positions, the MDE and FDC operations modes and functions. 6-52. As required, MDE will deconflict the common operational pictures for warning and missile defense missions for potential follow-on launches. It manages day-to-day control of FDC, REDCON, and develops


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and reports overall GMD SYSCAP. The MDE provides redundant failover capabilities in support of all GMD operations.

Figure 6-9. Organization of Crew Positions

Figure 6-10. MDE Operations Modes and Functions


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Figure 6-11. FDC Operations Modes and Function

AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SYSTEM OVERVIEW 6-53. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is a forward based multi-role sensor that supports the defense of the US homeland and HNs from ballistic missile attacks. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) supports missile defense of deployed US and multinational forces while providing a basis for research, development, test, and evaluation. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is forward based X-band phased array radar based upon the THAAD radar hardware but with different software designed for its unique mission requirements. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) provides cueing and tracking of boosting ballistic missiles, and provides direct interface with the BMDS global C2BMC system. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is air, sea, or rail transportable. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is trailer-mounted and accompanied by a power supply, cooling system, electronics van, and COMNET interface, CNIP, and support vehicles. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) provides object track information to active GFC control systems and to the C2BMC network and/or the AOR TADIL-J (Link-16) COMNET and provides cueing data to Aegis BMD and SBX. The C2BMC element ties all the BMDS elements into a distributed, worldwide, IMD system. C2BMC is the C2 system used to control the AN/TPY-2 (FBM). 6-54. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is capable of discriminating an RV from other objects. Sensor operations include search, tracking, and wide-band discrimination, target type classification, external sensor cueing, launch location, and target impact point estimates. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) automatically performs object classification such as RV, tank, buss, decoy, chaff or junk, with no operator intervention required under nominal conditions. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) design supports potential future forward based cross-cueing of detection and track sensors and will support future development of collateral surveillance capabilities in support of space surveillance and intelligence operations. 6-55. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) may support other BMDS missions IAW national priorities. Other missions may include support to AOR warning, support to targeting operations for USSTRATCOM and AOR attack operations, cueing, and tracking support to AOR AMD operations. Additionally, potential future capabilities may provide support to collateral missions for intelligence gathering and space surveillance. 6-56. Collateral missions, such as space surveillance and intelligence collection, will not degrade the conduct of the BMD mission. HN and CCDR agreements for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) stationing could include requirements for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) support to HN defense. Communications interfaces for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) will enable delivery of warning and track data (cueing) through current communications links.


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AN/TPY-2 (FBM) OPERATIONS 6-57. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) operations include two distinct functions: radar operations and sensor management operations. Radar operations include oversight of maintenance, sustainment, and operational support activities of the radar itself, and occur at the radar site. Sensor management operations include integration and management of the sensor as part of the GMD, and are usually executed from a remote location such as at the JAOC that supports the COCOM’s AADC/JFACC. A third implied mission is security of the radar site. Security for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar detachment may consist of military security forces, contract security forces, or a combination of both. Security staffing will be METT-TC dependent and determined by the COCOM of the COCOM ASCC. 6-58. The baseline operational profile for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is as a forward deployed acquisition and tracking sensor for BMDS kill chains. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) supports the BMDS mission to defend the homeland, friends, allies, and deployed forces. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) may also support other BMDS missions IAW national priorities. Other missions may include support to AOR warning, support to targeting operations for USSTRATCOM and AOR attack operations, cueing, and tracking support to AOR AMD operations. Additionally, potential future capabilities may provide support to collateral missions for intelligence gathering and space surveillance. 6-59. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) sensor operations include search, tracking, and cueing. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) utilizes three types of automatic search mode to acquire a ballistic missile track:  Autonomous Search Operations. This is the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) standard operations mode. Search sectors are defined by deliberate planning to provide desired probability of detection over the AOI. A single search plan normally includes multiple search sectors. The active search plan can be the designated the default search plan or another predefined plan may be selected by the C2BMC sensor manager. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) autonomously acquires and reports tracks through the C2BMC to GMD, Aegis BMD, and other BMDS elements.  Focused Search Acquisition. This mode is for boosting objects and relies on DSP/SBIRS input. DSP/SBIRS detects a launch event and reports the event to C2BMC through the MCS. C2BMC assesses the threat and checks if the radar already has the object in track. If it does not, C2BMC evaluates AN/TPY-2 (FBM) coverage, and selects a focused search plan for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) to activate. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) executes the search, acquires the track, and reports the track through C2BMC to GMD, Aegis BMD, and other BMDS elements.  Precision Cue Acquisition. This mode is for non-boosting objects acquired by another forward sensor (e.g., Aegis BMD). The sensor detects the object and initiates a track across Link-16 to the C2BMC network. C2BMC assesses the threat and checks if AN/TPY-2 (FBM) already has the track. If not, C2BMC assesses cue feasibility, schedules the cue, and activates the cue when the object enters the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) field of view. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) implements cueing, acquires the track, and reports the track through C2BMC to GMD and other BMDS elements. 6-60. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) can execute manual wide-band discrimination on selected targets. This wideband discrimination function is used with TBMs. When the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) transmits object tracks to the C2BMC, the C2BMC forwards the associated cueing data for the two largest objects to the Aegis BMD, the GFC, and to the C2BMC network. 6-61. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) operations require pre-developed mission profiles, which include a set of search plans developed to support the particular radar mission. Developing mission profiles are part of the premission planning process and are long lead time items. When completed, they are loaded into both the radar and the C2BMC controlling sensor operations. 6-62. Radar coverage is a series of layered 3-dimensional pie shaped search wedges of different thicknesses arrayed horizontally and vertically to optimize detection of missile launches emanating from the identified named areas of interest (NAI) (figure 6-12). The search pattern is enlarged or reduced based


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on the geometric relationship of the DA and the trajectories originating from the NAIs. The larger the TBM NAI, the larger the search volume of the radar.

Figure 6-12. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Search Profile

AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SUSTAINMENT 6-63. The operational concept for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) entails staffing of the radar site by contractors with military oversight. Contracted engineers will operate and maintain the radar, and military or contracted security personnel may provide security for the site. The contractor will provide all maintenance support for the radar. Military personnel at the C2BMC will remotely execute the radar management tasks. 6-64. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar will usually forward deploy to a prepared site on foreign soil, but may deploy on US soil. Site preparation and support will require Joint US and HN effort coordinated through established US-to-HN military and diplomatic channels. The radar management section will normally operate from a separate location. Both locations require connectivity into the C2BMC network, as well as supporting voice and data communications to forward deployed AMD units, HN, AAMDC, COCOM USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and USSTRATCOM operations centers. Site preparation will include provisions for:  Radar antenna to include radiation clear zone.  Environmental control, communications, and power support elements.  Fuel storage.  Security facilities, systems, and fences; operations and operations support facilities.  Commercial power from local power grid (if available and nearby). 6-65. HN support requirements will vary with each site and HN. Negotiated agreements will be within the context of existing SOFA and METT-TC requirements. Initially, personnel contracted by the MDA will provide all technical support of equipment. These personnel include the radar maintainers located at the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site, communications technicians, power generation support, and environmental control


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technicians. The support contract will include provision for spares, replacement parts, and their transport to and from the radar site. 6-66. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar and associated equipment are classified as SSL-A assets. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site security provisions will be consistent with SSL-A protection of the warfighting function. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) detachment commander will have oversight responsibility for all AN/TPY-2 (FBM) security operations. Security detachment personnel will be subject to HN SOFA coordination and requirements (see figure 6-13).

Figure 6-13. Notional AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Radar Site Security Operations

AN/TPY-2 (FBM) STAFFING 6-67. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) detachment has four functions: Site C2, Site Operations, Sensor Management, and Security Operations. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) TOE is organized to perform the C2, Site Operations, Sensor Management and Security Operations functions. 6-68. The C2 function is performed by the Headquarters Section (5 personnel), which provides command, planning, direction, coordination, and control for personnel and operations to support the mission.  Commander (O3) – Commands the Site.  C2 Systems Integrator (W2) - Provides maintenance oversight for operations.  First Sergeant (E8) – Senior NCO for the DET.  Supply Sergeant/Armorer (E5) – Provides supply and armorer support.  CBRNE Specialist (E4) – Provides CBRNE support.


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6-69. The Site Operations function is performed by the Site Operations Section (10 personnel), which provides personnel (five 2-person crews/shifts) for Site oversight (one per shift) in the Mission Support Facility and radar operations (one per shift) in the Electronic Equipment Unit. 6-70. The sensor management function is geographically separated from the physical site of the radar and is performed by Sensor Managers. This section is comprised of five 2-person teams who operate on a continuous basis though two consoles that interface providing the linkage between sensor and C2BMC. Sensor Mangers thoroughly understand the management of AN/TPY-2 (FBM) sensor resources and how to manipulate the radar to best utilize the available resources. Sensor Managers initialize and configure the sensor for surveillance operations, enable mission profiles, and monitor operational status. This Section is normally located at a BMDS C2 node to integrate sensor management in support of an integrated BMDS, normally at, or in the vicinity of the COCOMs AOC or AAMDC. 6-71. The Security Operations function is performed by the Security Operations Section (18 personnel), which provides C2 of personnel to perform security operations for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site. The Section provides entry control, oversight, training, and C2 for each shift of security personnel for 24-hour (SSL-A) security for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site. The site contains five, three-person shifts to provide entry control, oversee and conduct all security-related operations, one NCO to supervise the section and two NCOs to provide training oversight and coordination for the security forces. 6-72. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Detachment TOE was approved by HQDA in 2008, and is depicted in Figure 6-14. Although the Security Platoon personnel are required by the TOE, these positions are not resourced by the Army. Staffing the radar site relies almost exclusively on contracted support. This approach makes minimal demands for military staffing slots, but does not provide for unity of command for the elements directly responsible for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) operations. If contractor security personnel are not used at a AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site, and military personnel are desired/required, the COCOM or ASCC must request these forces through the Request For Forces (RFF) process, or resource the military positions from within assets available to the COCOM/ASCC. 6-73. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Detachment requires a Security Platoon, but it is not authorized / resourced. The actual security forces to secure the radar site will be by RFF from the COCOM, contractors, or HN. Security force composition will be site specific, based upon threat, HN agreements, and other factors.


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Figure 6-14. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Radar Detachment


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Appendix A

THREAT This chapter describes the transition of the global missile threat environment. The proliferation of ballistic missiles worldwide threatens our national security. The potential proliferation of CBRNE weapons to rogue nations and terrorists and the threat of limited ballistic missile attack on the US homeland presents new challenges. Also addressed in this chapter is the threat from physical attack to the missile site by protesters, terrorists, and subversives, along with the potential of irregular threats posed by opponents employing unconventional means to counter traditional U.S. advantages. In this changing geopolitical environment, a number of countries overtly hostile to the US have acquired ballistic missile system capabilities. The proliferation of missile technology has made the fielding of GBMD a critical aspect to US national security. The BMDS must be capable of engaging all classes of ballistic missile threats and is a key component in the Army’s defense of the nation.

POTENTIAL ROGUE MISSILE THREATS A-1. Potential rogue missile threats continue to grow in numbers and capabilities. Expanded technology and proliferation of strategic ballistic missile capabilities expand the complexity of protecting the homeland and friendly forces. The proliferation of WMD, coupled with a conventional means of delivery greatly increases potential lethality of any adversary and elevates the importance of employing a robust BMDS capability to protect US homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies. A-2. Other trends also complicate the GBMD mission. The detection capabilities, engagement ranges, mobility, and lethality of launch sites have significantly increased. Missiles are instruments of political coercion. Political targets include civilian population centers and government, cultural, and religious structures and locations. In addition, propaganda value exists in attacking US and multinational forces to show their vulnerability, particularly in European countries. A-3. Adversaries may employ area denial strategies designed to prevent the protected buildup of US forces. Targets may be population centers, infrastructure supporting US power projection capability, or relevant military and political targets. In this environment, the use of WMD cannot be ruled out since nations can acquire nuclear and modern missile technology and a number of countries will continue to increase their offensive missile capability. GBMD must also address the cross AOR ballistic missile threat from a state or non-state actors who may align with rogue states. A-4. For a given operation, proper assessment for counter air planning should take into account the possibility that initial enemy attacks may employ ballistic missiles in conjunction with other systems against a variety of targets: GBMD sites, sensor elements, communications nodes, key civilian facilities such as population centers (modified from JP 3-01).

GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS A-5. One method superpowers previously used to influence client states was to provide relatively modern weapon systems at bargain prices. As a result, regional powers such as India or Iran could build an


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effective military capability. With the end of the superpower rivalry, there is no longer any incentive to provide inexpensive military equipment. Although a lot of modern equipment remains available for sale to any paying customer, most countries will be unable to finance the purchase of a first-rate military capability. In addition, the US demonstrated repeatedly, in Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom that the US can rapidly project sufficient forces to defeat major regional adversaries, and to conduct more than one major operation simultaneously. Force projection operations require:  Ports, airfields, and other critical transportation facilities.  Multi-national support, if only to the extent of providing landing, over-flight, and transit rights.  HN support.  Substantial domestic political and public support. A-6. Without superpower sponsorship in the form of subsidized weapons, there is little likelihood that a regional foe will have the resources to develop traditional armed forces capable of meeting and defeating a US-led multinational task force. However, theater missiles present a grave and rapidly growing threat to the CCDRs’ ability to conduct force projection operations.

GLOBAL THREAT ENVIROMENT A-7. The 21st Century operational environment confronting the US today is radically different from the past. As the events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated, the operational environment is more complex and the US faces growing threats from WMD in the hands of state or non-state actors. These threats range from terrorism to ballistic missiles intended to intimidate and coerce the US, our friends, and allies. Globalization has brought rapid and significant change to threats we face and will be the defining feature. A-8. WMD can cause large scale, wide-spread damage killing large numbers of human beings, animals, and plants. The term covers several weapon types including CBRNE weapons. Due to the universal fear of WMD, the threat of WMD shapes political policies and operations, and fosters social movements. GMD is to counter strategic ballistic missile threats armed with any WMD.

SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC THREATS “The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile states is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense. The strategic logic of the past may not apply to these new threats, and we cannot be wholly dependent on our capability to deter them. Compared to the former Soviet Union, their leaderships often are more risk prone. These leaders also see WMD as weapons of choice and not of last resort. Weapons of mass destruction are their most lethal means to compensate for our conventional strength and to allow them to pursue their objectives through force, coercion, and intimidation. The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used against US forces or interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it will continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries mature.” NSPD 23

TRENDS A-9. By 2020, the US will have to consider several trends when assessing the global threat to its national security. First, China and India will likely emerge as major global players, which will transform the geopolitical landscape with potentially dramatic impacts. This environment may play a potential role in state decision-making. Political Islam will continue to have a significant global impact, rallying disparate ethnic and national groups and perhaps even creating an authority that transcends national boundaries. The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs of abating and thus remain a significant threat.

For Official Use Only A-2

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Threat

A-10. With the fall of Iraq and the voluntary termination of Libya’s ballistic missile program, North Korean and Iranian WMD and missile development programs are viewed as the primary “rogue nation” long-range ballistic missile threat to US national security. Russia and China continue to be capable of attacking the US with ICBMs armed with nuclear weapons. India’s and Pakistan’s ongoing missile development programs are highly aggressive and even provocative, but are generally viewed in a regional context as opposed to a direct threat to the US.

THREAT EVOLUTION A-11. The pre-Cold War inclination for developing nations to imitate Western force structures and approaches is rapidly disappearing. Evolving military forces, once modeled on the US and Russian forces, now take identities more distinctive to their own traditions and societies. Emerging nations and radical groups seek WMD to gain prestige, achieve deterrence, and exercise coercive diplomacy in the international community. Unconcerned with safety or reliability, some nation-states, terrorists, and extremist groups rapidly advance their weapon programs. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD.

GLOBAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT A-12. The Global threat environment presents four types of complex, interrelated, persistent, and emerging security challenges – traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. Many of these threats include nonstate actors that will not be deterred by our overwhelming military superiority, and in fact, are motivated by that superiority. A-13. The four persistent and emerging challenges for Army GBMD include many of the issues in the homeland security environment. However, their boundaries are neither precise nor discrete, and thus, in most situations, will overlap many COCOMs, occur simultaneously, or offer no easily discernible transition from one challenge to another challenge:  Traditional challenges. Traditional threats of aggression from regional adversaries or an adversarial multinational force remain the most dangerous, demanding, and intensive missions for military forces. States will continue to resort to strategies based on the use of military power to achieve their goals, in conflicts that range in size from small scale contingencies to war, and occur in unforeseen locations and conditions.  Irregular challenges. The immediate threat the US faces is the irregular challenge. General characteristics of irregular warfare include protracted struggle, reliance on sanctuaries and outside support, gradual escalation in number and size of tactical actions, and the predominance of close combat as the means of engagement.  Catastrophic challenges. At least 25 countries, as well as non-state groups, are working on developing or acquiring WMD either as a possible weapon or for leverage or deterrence against potential US pre-emptive action, which makes the possibility of WMD attack truly catastrophic.  Disruptive challenges. Few nations will shape their forces or acquisition strategy to directly confront the US, because they understand the power of US capabilities and leadership.  Faced with a looming conflict with the US, possible adversaries will seek to buy the latest technology in niche areas to counteract key US capabilities, including, for example ballistic and other missile systems, solid fuel boosters, WMD munitions, sophisticated RVs (ex. Early release sub-munitions), penetration aids, terminal guidance, electronic warfare systems, and to degrade our advanced C2 systems.  Adversaries will seek acquisitions, which could include breakthrough technology that they believe will be most effective against perceived US strengths, particularly US reliance on digital technologies, space, and communications.  Even the most primitive military adversaries will potentially be ‘space capable’ because of the commercial sector’s provision of such products as high-bandwidth SATCOM, imagery, navigation signals, and weather data.


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Appendix A

A-14. Adversaries will make extensive use of IO to include electronic warfare, computer network operations, and the use of radiofrequency weapons in order to disrupt, delay and/or degrade US forces C2 and active defense measures.

MISSILE PRODUCTION A-15. The number of missile production and development facilities is also increasing. Fourteen countries produce ballistic missiles: the US, France, Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Ukraine. North Korea has been exporting missiles and missile production facilities for a number of years, and there is concern that more countries will enter the missile market as suppliers. Availability of nuclear material on the world market increases through clandestine sales, covert transfers, or outright thefts. Arms control agreements are no longer the bulwark against proliferation. A number of nations fail to comply with existing treaties and non-proliferation agreements. Today, countries quickly transfer missile technologies, components, and complete systems. A-16. Some countries play prominent roles as manufacturing and technology sources for foreign missile development programs. Sales and subsequent reverse-engineering enables countries to quickly acquire new technology capability and then proliferate it into their own domestic industrial base. This enables expansion of efforts to develop more capable and longer range missiles. Some platforms, which have enabled this process, are the CSS-2, M-11, and No Dong missiles. Army missile defense forces face a changing threat environment that includes an increasing number of adversaries capable of using ballistic missiles to deliver WMD. A-17. It appears that no country will achieve military parity with the US by 2020. However, the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and WMD increase the likelihood that potential adversaries will threaten their use in any confrontation with the US The possession of chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea and the possible acquisition of such weapons by others by year 2020 also increase the potential cost of any military action by the US against them or their allies.

MISSILES A-18. Foreign ballistic missiles pose a unique threat to the security of the US because they provide an effective vehicle for delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons over long distances. While WMD can be delivered by a variety of means including aircraft, artillery, or automobile, it is missile-delivered WMD that garner the most domestic and international attention. Countries with a WMD missile capability have the potential to influence the actions of other countries in their regions or even countries on another continent and, in some cases, destroy population centers and national infrastructure. A-19. Additionally, ballistic missiles are relatively inexpensive when compared with their ability to penetrate defenses and strike deep into an enemy’s homeland. Missiles have become a delivery system of choice, a symbol of national might for some countries, and will remain a central element in the military arsenals of nations around the globe over the next fifteen years. States willingly devote often scarce resources in efforts to develop or acquire ballistic missiles; build the infrastructures necessary to sustain future development and production; and actively pursue technologies, materials, and personnel on the world market to compensate for domestic shortfalls, gain increased expertise, and potentially shorten development timelines. A-20. Estimates of the missile threat to the US continue to be controversial for a number of reasons. One is that many missile programs have moved underground, and hidden in a country’s civilian space or aerospace industry, making it much harder for intelligence organizations to track development. Today, the US is within range of the ballistic missiles of Russia, China, and perhaps North Korea. Several other countries have missiles within range of US overseas facilities and interests. A-21. A number of countries are attempting to either procure or develop longer-range ballistic missiles to accurately deliver WMD over great distances. There is much fear that one day launching such an attack against the US by a regional power or rogue state is possible even where there are stringent political and military controls over these weapons.


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Threat

A-22. The missile threat to the US, allies, and forward-deployed forces includes all ranges of ballistic missiles and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBMs). Although technologically far more difficult to develop and deploy, SLBMs are a challenge to defend against because once a ballistic missile submarine is at sea and submerged, the ability to predict and/or prevent a SLBM strike becomes inherently difficult. A-23. Ballistic missile attacks are envisioned in three potential “limited attack” scenarios:  Authorized attack — Leadership of a nation-state, multinational forces, or non-state actors (including terrorists) can authorize a premeditated launch against the US.  Unauthorized attack — Insurgent groups or other radical elements can perpetrate a premeditated attack against the US by a nation-state, multinational force, or group, but is not accidental.  Accidental launch — Unintended launches can result from a random event (such as mechanical failure or human error) that threatens the US.

A-24. Most missile development of emerging ballistic missile nations is based on the Soviet-era SCUD missile and its derivatives. The development of the SCUD missile derives from the World War II German V-2 rocket. Any country with a well-developed SCUD infrastructure can achieve a long-range ballistic missile capability, due to the easily accessible help on the world market. This could include ICBMs with ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers.

IRBMS A-25. An IRBM is a ballistic missile with a range of 3,000-5,500 km. IRBMs differ from ICBMs in that they are usually smaller and thus could be submarine launched as well as land launched. For these reasons, some countries use them as their only nuclear deterrent. An IRBM:  Can pose a threat to regional allies.  Are able to deliver WMD payloads with little or no warning.  Travel at incredibly high speeds, fly varied trajectories, employ evasive maneuvers, and use penetration aids such as decoys.  Are capable of carrying chemical or biological weapons on multiple independently targeted RVs.  Are capable of employing early release of multiple RVs. Therefore, intercept must occur before they reenter the atmosphere and requires precision “hit-to-kill” intercept to ensure complete destruction of all RVs.

ICBMS A-26. Several countries have built, or sought to build, missiles with an intercontinental reach, usually under the auspices of a space launch capability. Thus, the threat to the US continues to grow. Countries developing ICBMs (see figure A-1) are also likely to develop various responses to US BMDS. Developing countries would probably rely on available Russian or Chinese countermeasure technologies such as separating RVs, spin stabilizing RVs, radar-absorbing material, low-power jammers, and simple (balloon) decoys. An ICBM:  Can attack targets more than 5,500 kilometers from their launch point and pose a direct threat to the US homeland.  Possesses great range and travels at extremely high speeds.  Is capable of carrying multiple, nuclear RVs.


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Appendix A

 

Capability may include; projected improvements in mobile basing, reliability, accuracy, and penetration aids. Requires a precision “hit-to-kill” interceptor. Also applies to IRBMs.

Figure A-1. ICBMs

SLBMS A-27. Submarine mobility provides launch-location options unavailable to land ballistic missile forces and makes detection difficult, see figure A-2. Launching ballistic missiles via submarines gives the threat the added advantages of better hiding, shorter flight times, and depressed reentry angles. Targets will generally be similar to those of ICBMs. Projected SLBM improvements include sophisticated payloads and guidance systems, improved reliability, increased range, and improved penetration aids. An SLBM is any ballistic missile launched from a submarine, regardless of range. An SLBM:  Can be launched from multiple locations and pose a direct threat to the US homeland.  Is carried aboard a mobile, stealthy launch platform that is able to hide and wait for extended periods.  Can carry multiple nuclear RVs.  Requires a precision “hit-to-kill” interceptor as does intermediate-range missiles.


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Threat

Figure A-2. SLBMs

SPACE A-28. Threat to space capabilities are integral to modern warfighting. Space assets provide critical surveillance and reconnaissance information, support to command, control, and communications, as well as weather observations and precision positioning, navigation, and timing. Foreign access to space services, whether indigenous or obtained commercially, is proliferating. Most nations will gain access to better quality and/or timely services for communications, remote sensing, navigation, and weather. Adversaries can use extensive counter space techniques, ranging from passive means (for example denial & deception) to more active means (for example, ground segment attack and sabotage, electronic attack) to degrade US space capabilities. Additionally, technologies enabling a space segment attack are available and proliferating. A-29. Imaging Earth from space, monitoring of atmospheric conditions, collecting electronic intelligence, and warning against ballistic missile attacks once were unique capabilities owned by the US and Russia. The leveling and spreading of global technology and the multibillion-dollar commercial space industry allow US adversaries to support a variety of military or terrorist operations. The sheer number of foreignowned, commercial, or government-sponsored imaging satellites diminishes the US ability to impose political constraints on the use of satellite imagery products. These commercial imaging capabilities allow an adversary to challenge a US force’s ability to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical surprise and to gain and sustain information superiority. A-30. More importantly, commercial space-launch vehicles pose a unique ballistic missile threat. Spacelaunch boosters represent a dual-use technology capable of delivering WMD when converted to such use. As commercial access to space expands, so does a threat of a ballistic missile attack threat to the homeland expands.


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Appendix A

INFORMATION OPERATIONS A-31. The threats to the GMD information infrastructure are genuine, worldwide in origin, technically multifaceted, and growing. Today’s threats come from individuals and groups motivated by military, political, social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or personal/industrial gain. IO (see FM 3-13) are the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and OPSEC. These capabilities are used in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making. A-32. Globalization of networked communications creates vulnerabilities due to increased access to our information infrastructure from points around the world. Threats against computers, computer systems, and networks vary by the level of hostility (peacetime, conflict, or war), by technical capabilities, and by motivation. The bottom line is that threats to all forces, from strategic to tactical, exist from a variety of new and different sources, and they exist on a continuing basis even during periods of relative peace.

PHYSICAL ATTACK (SABOTAGE, TERRORISM) A-33. Aggressors are people who perform hostile acts against assets such as equipment, personnel, and operations. Four major aggressor objectives describe aggressor behavior. An explanation of how these objectives apply to each aggressor category is presented in subsequent paragraphs. The four aggressor objectives include:  Inflicting injury or death on people.  Destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources.  Stealing equipment, materiel, or information.  Creating adverse publicity. A-34. Aggressors may use the first three objectives to accomplish the fourth. The four general aggressor categories are criminals, protesters, terrorists, and subversives. Hostile acts performed by these aggressors range from crimes such as burglary to irregular warfare. Each of these aggressor categories describes predictable aggressors that pose threats to military assets and who share common objectives and tactics. This manual does not address the commonly referenced aggressor category of disaffected persons, which includes disgruntled employees.

PROTESTERS A-35. Security forces must consider that only violent protesters are a threat. Protesters include the two general groups of vandals/activists and extremist protesters. Both groups are politically motivated and/or issue oriented and acts out of frustration, discontent, or anger against the actions of other social or political groups. The primary objective of both groups commonly includes destruction and publicity. A-36. Extremist protest groups are moderately sophisticated and are usually more destructive than vandals are. Their actions are frequently overt and may involve the additional objective or consequence of injuring people. They attack symbolic targets, including authority figures such as high-ranking officials and police, weapon systems, and things they consider environmentally unsound.

TERRORISTS A-37. Terrorists are ideologically, politically, or issue oriented. They commonly work in small, well organized groups or cells. They are sophisticated, skilled with tools and weapons, and possess an efficient planning capability. Terrorist objectives usually include death, destruction, theft, and publicity. Three types of terrorist groups identified based on their areas of operation and their sophistication. The three types are terrorists indigenous to CONUS, including Puerto Rico; terrorists indigenous to OCONUS areas; and paramilitary OCONUS terrorists.


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Threat







Current CONUS terrorists are typically right or left-wing extremists operating in distinct areas of the country. They primarily consist of ethnic and white supremacy groups, many with ties to groups which originated during the 1960’s and 70’s. Historically, acts of terrorism in CONUS have been less severe than OCONUS areas, and operations have been somewhat limited. OCONUS terrorists typically are better organized and better equipped than their CONUS counter parts. They include right and left-wing extremists and ethnically or religiously oriented groups. Their attacks have also been more severe and more frequent than have those of CONUS terrorists. Paramilitary OCONUS terrorist groups have shown some military capabilities and have used a broad range of military and improvised weapons. Historically, they have staged the most serious terrorist attacks, including suicidal attacks. These groups are frequently state-sponsored and include transnational terrorists. They are predominantly ethnically or religiously oriented. Some of these groups have legitimate political wings in addition to their terrorist wings.

SUBVERSIVES A-38. Subversives include aggressors from foreign governments or from groups trying to overthrow the government by force. They include saboteurs and spies (hostile intelligence agents).  Saboteurs include guerrillas and unconventional warfare forces. They are paramilitary or actual military personnel who are very sophisticated, highly skilled, and employ meticulous planning. They commonly act in small groups, have an unlimited arsenal of weapons, and are well-trained in the use of those weapons. The objectives of saboteurs usually include destruction of property and death and their targets include mission critical personnel, equipment, and operations.  Spies (hostile intelligence agents) are highly skilled and very sophisticated. They are generally foreign agents, but they frequently employ insiders for assistance. Spies commonly operate covertly to avoid detection before, during, or after an event. Their objective is usually theft of military and industrial or technology information. A-39. Because of its unrivalled conventional military superiority in the opening years of the 21st Century, the US is subject to the “Superpower Paradox.” Our adversaries and potential adversaries observe and identify weaknesses in our capabilities and resort to unconventional means to attack these capabilities. A-40. Adversaries will closely observe emerging US capabilities in an effort to identify and exploit weaknesses using unconventional approaches. An asymmetric approach uses simple counters to negate US capabilities and avoid a direct match with US strengths. Fundamental capabilities that 21st Century adversaries may pursue to counter US strengths include WMD. One possible tactic is long-range ballistic missile strikes, with WMD, against major population centers. Moreover, adversaries can simultaneously conduct asymmetric attacks at the strategic (militarily and politically), operational, and tactical levels:  At the strategic level:  Militarily, attacks could include limited ballistic missile strikes with nuclear devices, or biological and chemical agents. These weapons have psychological and geopolitical effects.  Politically, terrorists can attempt to disrupt or intimidate civilian activity, thus preventing the flow of war materials to ports and airfields.  At the operational level:  Cyberspace attack on computer networks can disrupt the transfer of information.  At the tactical level:  Special operations forces or terrorists could attack GMD sites or nodes in the confusion resulting from cyberspace or WMD attacks. A-41. In today’s operational environment, it is possible that limited ballistic missile attacks on ports, airfields, and other staging areas could be part of an enemy’s anti-access strategy. Even limited ballistic missile attacks on US bases and sanctuaries can reduce the synergistic effects of the Joint force. Any threat to the US homeland affects the nation’s way of life and survival.


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Appendix A

A-42. A deliberate or unauthorized ballistic missile attack could precede (or accompany) a conventional attack on GMD systems. Threats to GMD installations include those associated with high priority defense. These threats may be ground, air, sea, and IO attacks on facilities, or forms of terrorism, sabotage, and special operations (such as terrorists, protestors, and agitators).


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Appendix B

GBMD SUPPORT ELEMENTS GBMD uses a variety of Joint and Army sensors/radars, which provide target search, acquisition, track, classification, hit assessment, and in-flight interceptor data communications support for the GBMD via the C2BMC and the GFC. Sensor elements include DSP/SBIRS, COBRA Dane radar, UEWR, SBX radar, AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars, and the Aegis AN/SPY-1 radars. They provide the GBI’s EKV with the ability to locate, select and destroy the incoming RV.

ASSOCIATED BMDS ELEMENTS B-1. GBMD uses a combination of shared and dedicated components from multiple Services to accomplish the Joint objective of destroying an incoming RV before it impacts US soil. The associated BMDS elements are essential to detect a ballistic missile, track the missile, calculate its trajectory, and launch and control an interceptor until it successfully engages the ballistic missile. BMDS utilizes multiple BMDS sensors to provide GMD systems with ballistic missile detection, tracking, and control for the GBI. The sensor network consists of associated BMDS elements such as C2BMC, space, land and sea, and fire control components.

COMMAND AND CONTROL, BATTLE MANAGEMENT, AND COMMUNICATIONS B-2. The C2BMC system is the overall data, decision, and communication linkage between BMDS elements. See C2BMC terminal as part of the operations center in figure B-1. The C2BMC has three principal missions: planning support, SA, and C2. Actual C2BMC hardware at a given location will vary by function and data requirements. The C2BMC provides BMDS users with capabilities to plan and maintain SA to commanders, staff, and shooters. B-3. C2BMC capabilities include:  Deliberate and dynamic planning.  BMD plan coordination using the C2BMC planner.  OPSCAP/Protection Capability (PROCAP).  Situation Awareness.  Track Management.  Sensor Management and Engagement Monitoring (via C2BMC SA). B-4. C2BMC capabilities include communication network functions of data exchange between C2BMC and BMD elements provide data protection and transport. MDA is the material developer for C2BMC. As of this publication, a Lead Service determination has not been released for C2BMC. Figure B-1 shows an operations center that would likely use C2BMC.


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Appendix B

Figure B-1. Operations Center Likely to use C2BMC

GFC B-5. The GFC automated EP builds and sends sensor task plans to cue sensors to begin tracking the threat objects providing additional SA to the operator. Ground sensors detect the threat objects once they are in their ballistic flight profile; others may detect missile launches in the boost phase, if appropriately located. B-6. With initial sensors input from the OPIR, Aegis BMD, and the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar, the GFC begins building a fire control solution. COBRA Dane, SBX, and UEWRs sensors continue to track, discriminate, and refine data used by the GFC to launch GBIs. The refined data is sent to the EKV either prior to launch in the mission data load or while in-flight through the IFTU, which is transmitted from the GFC through the IFICS to the EKV.

BMDS SENSORS B-7. BMD sensors make up a systems-of-systems consisting of multiple early warning sensors in space, on land and at sea that provide C2 data to enhance engagement operations. BMDS sensors also provide synchronization and integration of capabilities to destroy or disrupt adversary missiles. Early warning sensors are a key element to defense of US homeland.

SPACE COMPONENTS B-8. DSP/SBIRS satellites provide the space segment that enables the GBMD mission. Since groundbased sensors cannot “see” through the Earth and characterize a target array on the other side of the globe, a space-based system provides early target characterization and tracking information, permitting launch of a correctly tailored interceptor package before surface-based sensors detect the targets.

For Official Use Only B-2

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GBMD Support Elements

Defense Support Program B-9. DSP is a constellation of satellites providing IR detection (heat sensing) of missile launches. DSP is part of the ITW/AA mission and provides initial target detection. The DSP provides continuous coverage for IR detection on a target of interest and tracks a threat target until booster burnout. Additionally, the DSP provides a launch location and predicted impact point. The geosynchronous orbit satellites provide space-based surveillance, missile launch detection, and track data to initiate GBMD operations. DSP also supports situation assessments, cueing of other sensors, and engagement planning (see figure B-2).

Figure B-2. DSP Satellite

Space-based Infrared System B-10. After SBIRS detects an IR heat plume from a ballistic missile launch, the satellite will downlink raw IR data to ground stations; the data is distributed to mission processors at the SBIRS MCS to generate mission track reports and messages. To support the GBMD mission, the SBIRS MCS back-up – HEO (MCSB-H) simultaneously receives downlink information and processes it to generate and transmit quick alerts, boost reports, and state vector/covariance information to the GFC. SBIRS and space-tracking and surveillance system, future constellations of IR sensing satellites in a variety of Earth orbits, provides faster detection and more accurate missile tracks than DSP (see figure B-3).


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Appendix B

Figure B-3. SBIRS Satellite

LAND COMPONENTS B-11. The land components are the primary radar sensors that enable the Army GBMD mission are the AN/TPY-2 (FBM), the UEWR, and COBRA Dane radars. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is a forward deployed acquisition and tracking radar; the UEWR and COBRA Dane radars are sensors that support long-range tracking. These sensor systems provide early target characterization and tracking information, permitting launch of a correctly tailored interceptor package during midcourse intercepts.

AN/TPY-2 (FBM) B-12. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is an X-Band radar based on the THAAD system radar (see Figure B-4). It is a high resolution, medium to long-range search and target acquisition radar. This sensor provides early warning, target type-classification, fire control data, external sensor cueing, launch location, and target impact-point estimates. The radar may be able to discriminate the RV from debris and may provide the GMD operators with a hit assessment if the intercept is within its field of view. The Army is the lead Service for AN/TPY-2 (FBM). B-13. Classification is the ability to categorize a target based on observed characteristics such as a RV-like objects or non RV-like objects. Lower frequency radars typically accomplish classification of a threat. Discrimination is the ability to positively determine the type of target based on target features, distinguishing between RVs, fragments, canisters, fuel tanks, or decoys. Typically, higher band C-Band and X-Band radars have the capability to accomplish discrimination of a threat.


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B-14. Other missions may include support to theater warning, support to targeting operations for Global Strike and theater attack operations, and cueing and tracking support to theater missile defense operations. Additionally, potential future capabilities may provide support to collateral missions for ISR collection requirements and space surveillance.

Figure B-4. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Radar B-15. Additionally, AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars have the capability to send messages over existing theater Link-16 connectivity to multinational and US expeditionary forces. Voice communications required for support and coordination of BMDS operations are supported by “Red” and “Black” phone switched networks. The radar site operations element and the sensor management element are participants in both switched networks.

UPGRADED EARLY WARNING RADAR B-16. UEWRs are selectively upgraded sites in the network of ground-based radars that provide missile warning (MW) of attack against North America/Europe and missile tracking data to the BMDS. UEWRs are multi-mission sensors that have the technical capability to perform missile defense, MW and space SA missions simultaneously. UEWRs report and receive data via the GFC. UEWRs support three missions: space SA, ITW/AA and BMD. In addition, they provide ITW/AA data and track data to the BMDS. JFCC-SPACE performs sensor management of UEWRs, see figure B-5.


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Appendix B

Figure B-5. UEWR

COBRA DANE B-17. The COBRA Dane radar is a national, ground-based, technical intelligence sensor that incorporates software upgrades and modest hardware changes required to support the GBMD mission. COBRA Dane provides early detection, acquisition, tracking, and threat-object classification in support of GBMD. Its data can be used for interceptor commit and ground-based radar cueing. COBRA Dane (see figure B-6) is similar in appearance to the UEWR, but has a radar face on only one side. The COBRA Dane radar is multi-mission radar and is capable of supporting multiple missions to the missile defense mode when directed by USSTRATCOM.


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Figure B-6. COBRA Dane Radar

SEA COMPONENTS B-18. The sea based sensors to provide data to GBMD elements for cueing and engagement. This sensor data allows the GFC system the ability to track, discriminate, and assess incoming missiles. Basing the SBX and Aegis BMD with an AN/SPY-1 radar in forward locations will provide high resolution for medium to long-range threat missiles and enhance target acquisition. These sensors also send data to GBMD systems for early warning, target type-classification, fire control data, external sensor cueing, and target impact-point estimates.

SEA-BASED X-BAND RADAR B-19. The SBX radar is a combination advanced X-Band radar with a state-of-the-art ocean-going platform (see figure B-7). The SBX is able to track, discriminate, and assess incoming missiles. It greatly increases the ability of GBMD to conduct strenuous operations and realistic testing. Its mobility allows it to reposition to provide operational forward-based coverage as needed, or relocate for optimum support of the BMDS test program. SBX provides midcourse cued target search, acquisition, track, classification, discrimination, hit assessment, and in-flight interceptor data communications support for the BMDS.


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Appendix B

Figure B-7. SBX Platform and Radar B-20. The SBX uses a semi-submersible, twin-hulled, self-propelled vessel designed for exceptional stability in high winds and sea states. With the mounted radar, the SBX towers more than 280 feet from its keel to the top of the Radome, and displaces nearly 30,000 tons of water. The main deck houses living quarters, workspaces, storage, power generation, bridge and control rooms, and the floor space and infrastructure necessary to support the 2,000-ton X-band radar antenna array; command, control, and communications suites; and an IDT. (Note: SBX IDT is currently in a warm standby mode). B-21. The SBX mobility allows it to reposition to provide operational forward-based coverage, as needed, or relocated for optimum support of the BMD test program. SBX provides midcourse cued target search, acquisition, track, classification, discrimination, hit assessment, and in-flight interceptor data communications support for the BMDS. SBX will carry out its BMDS mission and will act as a test bed for future MDA test and exercise events. B-22. The SBX vessel is a government-owned and contractor-operated vessel with full sovereign immunity. As a sensor and communications platform, SBX is not a weapon system. The SBX is a sea mobile system that includes the SBX, the X-band radar, IDT, a satellite connection into the GCN and an embedded test node.

AEGIS AN/SPY-1 RADAR B-23. The Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar is an S-Band phased-array radar system on the Navy Aegis Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Aegis ships concurrently provide longrange surveillance and tracking capability to support GBMD and the BMDS engagements. The Aegis


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weapon system with the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) on BMD configured ships provides intercept against short and MRBM. The Aegis ship shown in figure B-8 has the AN/SPY-1 radar. B-24. The AN/SPY-1 radar provides target classification information during the boost and early mid course phases of threat missile fly out. The antenna array consists of four independent antennas each providing 110 degrees of coverage. AN/SPY-1 data provides the GFC sufficient target information to launch GBIs, but during a nominal engagement the data is used to cue other GMD radars.

Figure B-8. Aegis Ship with AN/SPY-1 Radar B-25. The AN/SPY-1 can achieve acquisition of the threat through autonomous search using pre-planned search sectors, cueing from National sensors, or cueing from other BMDS elements such as AN/TPY-2 (FBM) or other Aegis ships. Once acquiring a threat, the Aegis Combat System (ACS) will continue to track the target to the maximum extent of the AN/SPY-1 radar (or until manual operator action). Once the threat is beyond the radar tracking capability, the ACS will continue to report the track with degraded accuracy using predicted track position errors (or until manual operator action). B-26. Planning for use of Aegis BMD to support homeland missile defense requires additional considerations compared to other BMDS elements. As a mobile multifunction maritime asset, there must be consideration for ship location, logistical support, AMD protection, task/mission priorities, and C2.

JOINT TACTICAL GROUND STATION B-27. The Army’s JTAGS units disseminate missile early warning, alerting, and cueing information on Strategic and TBM launches and other tactical events of interest throughout COCOM AORs. JTAGS supports the USSTRATCOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, JFCC-SPACE forces.


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Appendix B

B-28. JTAGS provides accurate and timely Theater Missile Warning (TMW)/TMD information to the BMD units. Units are currently forward stationed in three theaters (USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and USPACOM) to detect missile threats.


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Appendix C

GMD Operations This appendix gives a more in-depth view of operations and considerations GMD units must apply to the conduct of their mission planning and execution. It outlines the basic functions and sequences of GMD engagement operations. The appendix includes GMD system training and certification, system trainers, and operational readiness evaluations. This appendix introduces employment guidelines; CLS. Also, it illustrates criteria for contractor maintenance concept; routine maintenance, and site operations considerations and support with GMD implications, with the readiness posture needed to balance GMD sites’ test-bed functions with actual operations.

GMD PLANNING C-1. USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, conducts centralized planning for BMDS and GMD. USNORTHCOM defines all engagement criteria according to threat capability parameters, commander’s intent, and national security objectives within their AOR. Service components conduct the detailed planning that maximizes Service capabilities. C-2. GMD operational planning is linked with the planning of other BMDS capabilities that can engage ballistic missiles capable of striking targets within the US. A critical element of operational planning is the establishment of the combatant PCAL and creation of the DAL. To create the DAL, evaluate the PCAL assets from the standpoint of criticality-vulnerability-threat (CVT). Assign a score to each asset based on the evaluation of the four criteria, and then allocate available defensive efforts to assets according to the supported CCDR priorities. Locations and priority of assets on the DAL affect the configuration of the GMD system’s defensive task plans.

SUCCESSION OF COMMAND C-3. Maintenance of the command authority for operations is critical, given the short flight time of ICBMs. Succession of command does not occur as long as commander, USNORTHCOM or designated successor has voice communications with a functioning command center capable of HIC operations, providing situational understanding and decision-making information. If minimum communications are lost, the designated successor performs USNORTHCOM’s GMD functions.

FORCE OPERATIONS PLANNING C-4. Force operations planning tailors the defenses to incorporate the contributions of other BMDS intercept capabilities into a layered defense. Force operations integrate capabilities of missile defense forces deployed in support of other COCOMs who support GMD operations. Regional contributions include intelligence, target update information, and early engagements. OCONUS forces may be attached or assigned to support a COCOM; however, their dispositions and missions may be affected by BMDS requirements. C-5. Future force operations will include capabilities not currently available. These operations may include adjunct sensors, space-based assets, or new interceptor technology located within CONUS or OCONUS in conjunction with supported CCDRs. Deployment decisions will be determined through the USSTRATCOM BMD management structure to meet the needs of supported COCOMs and global


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Appendix C

strategic, operational or AOR missile defense mission priorities. Additionally, the deployment of terminal assets such as THAAD, and PATRIOT contributes to the layered defense design and allows for added assurance and defense in depth.

GMD OPERATIONS PLANNING C-6. Like all military operations planning, GMD commanders/planners use the standard MDMP. The key part is the commander’s intent. GMD planners must always keep their commander’s intent foremost as they develop GMD DS/XP for the various engagement scenarios. The DS/XP requires delineation of a geographic DA and input of DS/XP data and control parameters that establish or limit the system’s operations. Operators and planners must determine DS/XP factors and decide how to implement other military or civil controls or restraints without a built in HW/SW mode of execution. C-7. GMD has a capability for multiple XPs. Operators must have the tactical and mental flexibility to select the best DS/XP for a given operational scenario. XPs are developed IAW the commander’s intent to address several probable event sequences. Once selecting a DS/XP, operators should fully understand the response to the commander’s intent.

ENGAGEMENT CRITERIA C-8. Engagement criteria are critical elements of planning. A competent military authority issues engagement criteria directives to delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces. The standing ROE/standing RUF for US Forces, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI) 3221.01B provides fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions of commanders and soldiers during all military operations. For GMD there are four Engagement Criteria that must be answered “yes” before a determination can be made that the GMD ROE is met. Procedurally, the four engagement criteria must be met before the GFC Crew Director requests permission from the WRA to place the GFC into “Weapons Free” state. The WRA will then grant permission to move to “Weapons Free” only for the current threat. The procedure for “Weapons Free” must be reaccomplished for each additional threat. C-9. Supplemental rules may augment the standing ROE/RUF. Approval of supplemental ROE/RUF IAW CJCSI 3221.01B is necessary before issue. RUF directives are a guide for US forces for the use of force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execution orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. Supplemental engagement criteria are always applicable unless superseded by properly approved and directed supplemental ROE and RUF. Other directives issued by the President, SECDEF, or other competent authority, such as those delineating WRA, may modify or supersede provisions in the standing ROE.

ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS C-10. Although planning and engagement authorization is centralized for GMD, effective engagements require decentralized execution. The speed at which attacking ballistic missiles can travel and the range and the speed at which GMD intercepts occur makes rapid responses essential. GMD execution uses automated processes with a HIC. C-11. The DSP/SBIRS provide the first indication of a ballistic missile launch. These sensors also provide the first indication of a ballistic missile launch threatening the DA. DSP/SBIRS sensors will continue to track the missile until booster burnout. GMD operators track the launch throughout its trajectory based on data received from sea based, ground-based and DSP/SBIRS data collection platforms, providing greater fidelity on predicted impact. Once a determination is made that ROE criteria have been met, the WRA authorizes “Weapons Free” and the MDO passes authorization to the MDE Crew Director who enters the “Weapons Free” state into the GFC. The FDC crew then initiates the engagement sequence to ensure commander intent is met.

For Official Use Only C-2

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C-12. The GFC/C generates and sends the WTP to the GBI. While the interceptor is in-flight, the EKV receives/sends communication events from the IFICS. During communication event 1, the GFC/C generates an update to track data sent to the EKV and then the EKV sends an IFSR message to the GFC/C, updating its status. During communication event 2, the GFC/C generates another IFTU to relay final track data to the EKV. The interceptor uses communications data provided by the IFTU and IFSR to acquire the threat object, discriminate the RV target from decoys, distinguish the RV from decoys, and guide itself to the target (see figure C-1). For additional GBI firings, the GFC/C provides engagement and hit information and passes recommendations.

Figure C-1. In-flight updates

GMD EMPLOYMENT GUIDELINES C-13. The GMD employment guidelines are to assist GMD operators in meeting Commander’s intent. The GMD employment guidelines represent the best case application of combat power, and they represent the optimal way of fighting GMD systems. The GMD employment guidelines are:  Understand the commander’s intent.  Visualize the operational environment.  Select the best GFC DS/XP.  Retain flexibility.  Maintain SA.

UNDERSTAND THE COMMANDER’S INTENT C-14. This guideline focuses on developing a thorough understanding of how the commander is responsible for the GMD fight, and wants the GMD operators to fight the GMD battle. Every member of the GMD crew must understand the commander’s intent prior to assuming shift on an operational system, because the operational crews must be prepared to react immediately to an ICBM launch against the designated DA.


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Appendix C

C-15. Key tasks associated with this employment guideline are:  The GMD operators must conduct a thorough mission analysis to understand the commander’s intent and guidance for the GMD fight.  Translate the commander’s intent and guidance into requirements on how to configure the GMD system, which tells the system how to allocate interceptors against threats.  Understanding the commander’s intent for the system DS/XP against ICBM threats to the DA. All changes to the system configuration that are authorized for implementation during the course of the battle are necessary to meet the commander’s intent for missile allocation.  Understand all the situations that the GMD operator will have to face in order to achieve the commander’s intent.

VISUALIZE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT C-16. Critical to GMD employment is visualization of the OE as it relates to the threat and its current capacity to target the DA. GMD operators visualize the battle through analysis of information provided by the GFC/C and through intelligence information provided by the Joint community. By understanding the threat, GMD operators can best decide the appropriate allocation of interceptors to react to the incoming threat. Understanding the ability of the system to deal with that threat, they can identify key decision points during each engagement.

SELECT THE BEST GFC DS/XP C-17. Battle plan analysis takes place throughout the battle providing the GMD operator with the flexibility to conduct battle redirection if necessary. The GFC battle plan is the mission directives the operators input into the system that allows the GFC to fight the threat according to the commander’s intent. The DS/XP consists of four mission directives: DA, DS/XP, mission constraints, and reserve.  GFC DA — A geographical area, which defines for the GFC what to defend.  GFC DS/XP — Values that define interceptor allocation (cut-offs & thresholds) and defended asset prioritization (by category) in the DA.  Mission Constraints — Control parameters that further refine interceptor allocation and engagement execution against a threat.  Reserve — Control parameters that restrict/dictate interceptor availability against a threat. C-18. Once the GMD operator understand the threat they must decide if the current system configuration is going to be effective in fighting the threat they face. In other words, is the automated allocation by the system going to allow the GMD operators to effectively meet the commander’s intent for allocation against the current threat? This requires continual analysis throughout the entire GMD battle plan and the GMD systems operators can change the automated interceptor allocation, reconfigured at anytime throughout the battle.

RETAIN FLEXIBILITY C-19. Various DS/XP settings enable the GMD operator to retain flexibility throughout the engagement sequence. This guideline includes all actions associated with battle redirection actions applied to inbound threats on a case-by-case basis. The GMD operator will adhere to this GMD employment guideline. Operators recommend all MBE actions based on shot doctrine associated with manipulating the automated missile allocation based upon a track-by-track analysis and accounting for any near term future threat. C-20. GMD operators will evaluate each threat and determine if they are correctly implementing the commander’s intent. If not, they will manipulate the allocation so that the commander’s intent is met. When accounting for the near term, future, or follow-on threats, the GFC system can only fight threats it can see. It is up to the GMD operator, with guidance from higher headquarters, to determine if retaining a portion of the available interceptors is necessary for future allocation against near term future threats.


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MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS C-21. The purpose of GMD employment guidelines is to maximize SA for the GMD operator throughout the fight. Through careful consideration of all the guidelines combined, the operator not only gains SA of immediate actions at the tactical level, but also maintains greater awareness of guidance derived from operational and strategic leaders. The same is true for the GMD system; the GMD mission operator must maintain a constant awareness of the GMD system’s capabilities, as it defines how an operator will utilize the system during the battle. Note: To paraphrase Sun Tzu – know your enemy and know yourself – if the GMD operator loses SA of either, they are destined for failure in the execution of the GMD fight.

SECURITY C-22. GMD installations face similar security environments as other high-priority defense installations. Complexity and geographic separation of the GMD components require thorough planning against threats (such as ground and air attacks, sea-based attacks on island or coastline facilities, and electronic and cyber attacks). GMD components must also be vigilant against acts of terrorism, sabotage, and interference from protesters and agitators. C-23. The Army provides security for the GMD components under its control. Since GMD requires a high state of readiness and around-the-clock staffing, there must be sufficient crews for continuous operation. See Appendix B for more details and guidance regarding security force operations.

GMD SITE CHARACTERISTICS C-24. Army GMD operations have several characteristics that make it unique and affect its support. These characteristics include—  Fixed sites — GMD systems include large, fixed structures permanently situated in several locations. The system is neither mobile nor deployable. Most sites are in northern latitudes where operation in cold weather is a factor.  Limited number of sites — There are a limited number of sites, creating a very low density of equipment items and GMD trained MOS positions. In addition, not all sites are equipped with all system end items.  Continuous (24 hours a day/7 days a week) operation — GMD systems must always be ready. Therefore, military staffing must be consistent and include careful scheduling of maintenance and training activities.  Extensive contractor support — The maintenance concept is contractor life-cycle support. This is an outcome of the GMD system being fixed, low density, highly complex, with a dual role as a test bed in its initial stages.  Highly automated — Extensive computer operation of GMD systems allows for highly sophisticated detection, isolation, and reporting of faults. Embedded diagnostics will be a mainstay of this capability.  Planned upgrades — The upgrade plan is to deploy GMD in phased blocks. Successive blocks increase the overall capability of the system to meet the evolving threat. However, planned upgrades pose operational challenges, because the system will maintain engagement capability while installing upgrades.


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Appendix C

SUPPORT PRINCIPLES C-25. Even though GMD is unique in many aspects, some common Army principles of support apply. The principals are responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, logistic economy, attainability, sustainability, survivability, and integration.  Responsiveness is the right support in the right quantity in the right place at the right time. Among the logistic principles, responsiveness is the keystone; all else becomes irrelevant if the logistic system cannot support the concept of operations of the supported commander.  Simplicity often fosters efficiency in the planning, execution of national, and AOR logistic operations. Mission-type orders and standardized, interoperable procedures contribute to simplicity. Establishment of priorities and pre-allocation of supplies and services by the supported unit may simplify logistic sustainment.  Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation. Logistic plans and operations must be flexible in order to achieve both responsiveness and economy. This principle is a guide for strategic thinking and forms the template for synchronized and coordinated Joint logistic planning.  Logistic economy is achieved when effective support is provided using the fewest resources at the least cost, and within acceptable levels of risk. At some level and to some degree, resources are always limited. When prioritizing and allocating resources, the CDR must continuously consider economy and optimize use of resources to ensure effectiveness and mission success while supporting every effort toward achieving efficiency.  Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations. The commander’s logistic staff develops the concept of logistic support, completes the logistic estimate, and initiates resource identification based on the supported commander’s requirements, priorities, and apportionment.  Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the AOR for the duration of the operation. Sustainability focuses the supporting commander’s attention on long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported forces. Long-term support is the greatest challenge for the logistician, who must not only attain the minimum essential materiel levels to initiate combat operations (readiness) but must also sustain those operations.  Survivability is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential destruction. Logistic units and installations are also high-value targets that must be safeguarded by both active and passive measures. Active measures must include a defense plan for supply with provisions for reinforcement and fire support. Passive measures include dispersion, physical protection of personnel and equipment, deception, and limiting the size of an installation to what is essential for the mission.  Integration consists of synchronizing general civil support operations with all aspects of military and civilian, Joint and multinational partners. First, it involves total integration of Army sustainment process. Support of the commander’s plan is the goal of all sustainment efforts. Effective support requires a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent and synchronizing support plans with the concept of operations. ARFOR conduct operations as part of Joint, multinational, and interagency teams in unified actions.

SUPPORT CONCEPT C-26. Originally, GMD was a test bed operation and primarily designed to serve as a test and development environment. Then, in response to Presidential directions, MDA directed that GMD provide an initial, limited defensive operational capability. Yet the requirement remained to use GMD as a test bed to perform non-operational development, test, exercise/training, and maintenance activities. There is a requirement to allow concurrent or simultaneous use of the GMD system to conduct both tactical operations and other necessary activities. Concurrent or simultaneous means that regardless of any non-


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operational activities taking place, at least a partial set of assets is continuously available and on operational alert. C-27. The GMD support concept maximizes support to the GMD commander by including.  A single life-cycle support contractor - One contractor is responsible for all GMD peculiar maintenance support and is responsive to the commander’s direction. Through its PCSS, the prime contractor will manage:  All logistical areas of maintenance and system upgrades.  Supply support.  Support equipment, training, and training devices.  Technical data.  Computer resources.  Facilities and GMD system facilities maintenance.  Packaging, handling, storing, and transporting.  The centralized GMD logistics management support structure is under the support contractor’s responsibility:  A GMD LOGCC is the support contractor’s responsibility. The LOGCC provides a single point of contact for all sustainment actions and readily accessible sustainment information (such as repair parts usage, due-ins, equipment status, and equipment readiness reporting data).  The contractor also operates the OSSC tailored to the needs of the GMD assets at each location. The OSSC is the main element through which the contractor manages the maintenance support of GMD elements and reports to the commander. Within the OSSC, the MMC is the single point of contact to facilitate the military oversight of the support contractor, and ensures the contractor’s responsiveness to the commander’s direction. Staffing for these elements are 24 hours a day/365 days a year.  The maintenance of GMD exists at two levels, on-site (unit) and off-site maintenance (depot):  Because of the requirement for continuous operations (24 hours a day/365 days a year), some depot-level maintenance may be performed onsite.  Extensive use of BITE and BIT procedures automatically detect and isolate faults (down to the LRU level) without interfering with mission performance (while the system is operational).  The contractor replaces the LRU and repairs it onsite or offsite, as required.  For the long term, the Army considers the use of commercial equipment and practices best for the fixed sites.  “Reach-back” – While different from JP 3-30, BMDS transition and transfer (T2) plan defines this as the use of GMD prime contractor assets outside of the support contract when it becomes necessary to sustain acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.  “Fix or fight” criteria - Operators and maintainers determine SYSCAP failure analysis criteria to evaluate system’s capabilities, to determine if components will fail during crisis or combat operations.  Parameters that should be considered in the effects of the failure on probability of engagement success: time to troubleshoot/time to repair, availability of LRU for repair operations, criticality of defended asset, and time to impact.  These criteria determine if operations proceed or if a system is taken offline for repair. C-28. The key imperative is that contractor support must be responsive to the military commander and provided on a noninterference basis. This is critical given the importance of the GMD mission and the need to generate forces in crises. Commanders must be familiar with FM 3-100.21, to ensure contractor operations support the mission.


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Appendix C

Unit Readiness C-29. The 49th MD BN (GMD) ensures GMD elements are operationally ready according to the potential for attack, the threat level, FPCON, and the REDCON. Systems must be ready to complete its mission, while managing many factors such as routine maintenance, weather, training, and equipment upgrades. Ultimately, the GMD commander participates in asset management conferences and has a voice in schedules and readiness decisions.

Sustainment Reporting and Activity Processes C-30. Figure C-2 depicts the 49th MD BN (GMD) and 100th MD BDE (GMD) reporting and sustainment actions and informational/SA processes. The FDC forwards equipment “OUTSPOT” reports to the MDE. The MDE will call an asset management conference to evaluate effects to OPSCAP. Figure C-2 shows a summarized operational reporting flow.

Figure C-2. Operational Reporting – Summarized

SECURITY OPERATIONS C-31. This mission of the Military Police (MP) GBI Security Company is to provide area security for the GMD GBI site. This security is for worldwide GMD operations. The Security Company provides tactical forces to detect, identify, and eliminate hostile threats to the MDC. The MDC site is protected to an SSLA. Unit capabilities are; fixed facility security for a GBI site, reaction force personnel, physical security survey and inspection, defense of the GBI area, planning, direction, and coordination of the physical security activities on site, and defend the site facility. The task organization for security operations for any future site will have to be revised based upon the specific postulated threat, distances security forces must travel, climate/weather, configuration of the site, and the number of SSL-A resources.

SECURITY SYSTEM LEVELS C-32. SSL identifies specific GMD resources that must be secured, and the level of security that will be dedicated to those resources. SSL-A resources assigned to operational BMDS/GMD units are resources for which the loss, theft, destruction, or misuse would result in great harm to the strategic capability of the US. The SSL-A security level must result in the greatest practical deterrence against and response to hostile acts. In-place security measures should provide an effective means to achieve detection, interception, and defeat of a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources.

SECURITY PLANNING FACTORS C-33. The following factors must always be considered:  GMD is designated a SSL-A asset, as defined by SI 538-2.


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ARNG personnel man the GMD MP Security Company. The equipment designated in the TOE and table of distribution and allowance must be available. Designate the GMD GBI site and other selected local GMD assets as restricted areas.

DESIGN TO THREAT C-34. Changes to the threat guidance occurred since the approval of the initial GMD unit structure in July 2001. The security force design may undergo other changes as GMD systems evolve. The security force leaders may need to manage operations aggressively to continue to succeed with the available forces. This appendix provides a framework from which to base future adaptations. C-35. The threat to, or aggressors against GMD systems may be criminals, vandals, activists, extremists, protest groups, terrorists, and/or enemy special forces. They may employ all possible tactics (to include moving vehicle bombs; stationary vehicle bombs; small arms and standoff attacks on the facility; forced or covert entry; insider compromise; visual, acoustic, and electronic-emanations surveillance; mail and supply-bombs; airborne and waterborne contamination; and intrusion or attack) to achieve their intended purpose. Determine the tactics the aggressors use such as vandalism, public attention, disruption, or destruction of GMD systems. C-36. Threat assessment must be continuous. The 49th MD BN (GMD) commander, installation commander, and the security force must continuously review and assess threats to the GMD installation. Normally, threat assessment is a Military Intelligence (MI) responsibility. The MI personnel focus on security threats (such as terrorists and military forces). However, within the US, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has primary responsibility for both foreign and domestic terrorists, and the US Army Criminal Investigations Division Command (USACIDC) has police information operations (PIO) collection capability. C-37. Military police success in effecting law and order relies upon acquisition, processing, and application of certain essential information. Police information aids in crime prevention and criminal investigations. Police information supports the commander in administering to unit or installation. Police information in the US Army is one of the elements of command intelligence. During normal operations, the PIO ensures MP’s and local law-enforcement agencies’ gather information and provide intelligence input which is evaluated for relevant intelligence value, and turned into action or intelligence reports. Routine coordination among these elements is essential to maintaining an effective security program. C-38. The force design of the MP Security Company organization is to defeat a level II threat. MP Security Company forces employ organic platoons, standard procedures and tactics, and external assistance arrangements to resist attacks by small tactical units and special operations forces. The security company accomplishes security coordination IAW unit SOP and MOA with the garrison security forces and local and state law enforcement. Note. A level II threat, as defined in FM 3-39, is a small tactical unit or unconventional-warfare forces. Special operations forces are highly trained in unconventional-warfare techniques.

PHYSICAL SECURITY C-39. Physical security is the responsibility of commanders, directors, supervisors, and officers in charge, whether military or civilian. IAW AR 190-16, physical security programs will provide the means to counter threat entities during peacetime, mobilization, and wartime. These include:  Hostile intelligence services.  Paramilitary forces.  Terrorist or saboteurs.  Criminal elements.


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Appendix C  

Protest groups. Disaffected persons.

C-40. Physical security measures are physical security equipment, procedures, or devices used to protect security interests from possible threats. They include, but are not limited to:  Security guards.  Military working dogs.  Physical barriers.  Badge systems.  Secure containers.  Locking devices.  Intrusion detection systems (IDS).  Security lighting.  Assessment or surveillance systems.  Access control devices.  Facility hardening.

GMD GBI SITE SECURITY OPERATIONS C-41. The organization of the security company has a headquarters section and three MP Security Platoons (see appendix C for TOE details). The MP Security Company commander is the principal security advisor for the 49th MD BN (GMD) commander and Staff. Each platoon must task organize to provide:  Entry control facility/integrated electronic security system (IESS) staffing.  IRF.  Sergeant of the guard.  Four roving patrols for each duty cycle.  Provide personnel security oversight of the contractors and soldiers working within the GBI missile fields.  Provide security of the FDC and missile sites. C-42. MP platoon is organic to the GMD MP Security Company and provides physical security to the GMD GBI site. Each platoon is equipped with the appropriate weapons, night vision devices, and radios in common with MP companies. The platoon is composed of a platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and four squads. C-43. MP Platoon Leader is responsible to the company commander for the platoon combat readiness, training, discipline, and maintenance of platoon equipment. The platoon leader directs the execution of the platoon missions, based on the company commander’s priorities. The platoon leader is responsible for accomplishing the physical security and protection of the warfighting function according to the commander’s intent. The platoon leader functions as the officer of the guard for the GBI site. C-44. Platoon Sergeant leads elements of the platoon, as directed by the platoon leader, and assumes platoon command in the absence of the platoon leader. The platoon sergeant directs the platoon day-to-day activities and ensures all required individual and team training and sustainment needs are met. During physical security and protection of the warfighting functions, the platoon sergeant may assist in the control of the platoon. When on shift, the platoon sergeant functions as the sergeant of the guard for the GBI site. C-45. MP Squad has ten soldiers and consists of a squad leader, five sergeants, and four MP soldiers. This enables three shifts/24 hour operations. The MP squads must task organize to provide staffing for entry control, electronic security system monitoring, SSL-A response forces, and a security control center (SCC).  Entry Control Facility (ECF) is designed to assist security forces in controlling entry and exit from restricted areas. The ECF requires five security personnel on duty at all times in order to


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





perform the required tasks of badge exchange, personnel search and vehicle search. All personnel and vehicles entering and exiting the MDC must pass through the ECF with the personnel searches and issuing of badges in one part of the building, and vehicle searches conducted in a separate part of the building. Electronic security system (ESS) monitoring is the responsibility of the sergeant of the guard (SOG), who is the senior MP on duty. From this location, the SOG directs the monitoring of the integrated electronic security system (IESS) and directs the activities of the security response forces. One individual is required to operate the IESS (cameras) which consists of perimeter zone cameras. The number of cameras depends upon the size, construction, topography, and climate for the MDC site. Security Response Team/Immediate Response Force will have a dedicated three-person security response team posted for each SSL-A resource. Additionally, a dedicated three-person IRF will be posted for the entire MDC as supporting forces for the other four response teams. Security force personnel shall not be tasked to perform functions unrelated to the security mission while on duty. SCC is required at every installation supporting SSL-A, -B, or –C resources to provide command, control, and communications for on-duty security forces. From this location, Soldiers direct the monitoring of the IESS and the activities of the security response forces.

SECURITY FORCE COMMAND C-46. Brigade, battalion, and company commanders exercise full command authority over their respective commands. The Federal and State agencies are involved in the GMD mission and their respective chains of command are separate and distinct and should not be confused. GMD operations and site security are Federal military missions. NG soldiers performing the GMD site security portion of this mission transition from a Title 32 State status to a Title 10 Federal status IAW the SECARMY approved staffing model. When performing the GMD site security mission, NG Soldiers are in a Title 10 Federal status under the C2 of the 49th MD BN (GMD). C-47. CCDR for the GMD mission is USSTRATCOM, with OPCON through USASMDC/ARSTRAT. OPCON of the GMD mission may transition to USNORTHCOM for the defense of North America during crises. 49th MD BN (GMD) is subordinate to the 100th MD BDE (GMD) for Title 10 C2. Both of these units are under the OPCON of either USASMDC/ARSTRAT or USNORTHCOM depending on the current operational posture. C-48. GMD site security soldiers in a Title 32 status are under the C2 of their State NG chain of command to include administrative and disciplinary authority. GMD site security soldiers in a Title 10 status fall under the 2, administrative and disciplinary authority of their Title 10 chain of command, the 49th MD BN (GMD) and 100th MD BDE (GMD). C-49. The authority and procedures for staffing the GMD sites and performing the Federal GMD operational mission, utilizes Active Duty, Dual Status ARNG commanders, and ARNG personnel. This authority is contained in the SECARMY approved GMD staffing model, the standing USASMDC/ARSTRAT general order, and the MOA between the NGB, USASMDC/ARSTRAT, the State of Colorado, and the State of Alaska. ARNG GMD operational and site security soldiers transition to Title 10 status upon entering the GMD operational site or otherwise upon order of the Title 10, chain of command. These soldiers return to Title 32 status when released from federal service. They are released by their Title 10 chain of command and when they have departed the GMD operational facility where they were performing Title 10 duties. C-50. The key players are unit commanders, state Governors/Adjutants General, Commander, USASMDC/ARSTRAT, appropriate ASCCs, the installation commander, and the CCDR. Each of these commands influences the authority by which the MPs execute their mission. Understanding the doctrinal principles that govern command, support roles, and the relationship of the GMD MP GBI Security Company with these commands is essential.


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Appendix C

C-51. The command and support relationships of the ARNG GMD security force are both complex and dynamic command relationships for security operations (see figure C-3).

Figure C-3. Command Relationships for Security Operations

STATE GOVERNOR/STATE ADJUTANT GENERAL TO TDA FORCE RELATIONSHIP C-52. Governors, acting through their Adjutant General, will provide state C2 over their NG forces. As members of the NG, the dual status commanders take orders from the Governors, through the Adjutants General, of their respective states. The Governors and their Adjutants General understand that the GMD operational mission has precedence at all times, and the exercise of state command authority must not conflict with the GMD operational mission. C-53. Federal C2, Title 10. The supported CCDR for the GMD mission and the Commanding General, USASMDC/ARSTRAT, will provide federal C2 over the GMD forces performing the federal mission (Title 10). The dual status commanders, as federal officers performing active duty under Title 10, take orders from the President or those federal officers the President and SECDEF have authorized to act on their behalf.

RESPONSIBILITIES C-54. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the ASCC to USSTRATCOM, which has integration responsibility for missile defense. USASMDC/ARSTRAT and 100th MD BDE OE exercises Title 10 C2 over the GMD forces. USNORTHCOM may assume OPCON of these forces when required to execute their HLD mission in response to ballistic missile threat. USASMDC/ARSTRAT responsibilities include:  Title 10 C2 of Soldiers performing GMD mission.  Organizing, training, equipping, and supplying ARFOR to maintain and operate the site security system.  Designing and directing an evaluation and certification program for Army security crews to achieve specified standards.  Managing ARSTRAT support responsibilities.  Coordinating with JPO, ASCC, CCDR, and the State ARNG to ensure support of the installation commander for the site security mission. C-55. The 49th MD BN (GMD) commander directly supports the 100th MD BDE (GMD), ARSTRAT, and the JPO by providing physical security for the site and other selected GMD assets. The commander’s responsibilities include:  Command of Soldiers performing GMD mission.  Planning and conducting day-to-day GMD operations (training, tests, exercises, and maintenance).


FM 3-27

3 January 2011

GMD Operations   



Supporting security system readiness evaluations and certification program for Army security crews to specified standards. Conducting real-time operational and tactical planning for potential attacks and site penetration attempts. Providing physical security recommendations to JPO, USASMDC/ARSTRAT, and 100th MD BDE (GMD) to improve site physical security preparation in response to espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and damage. Conducting the tactical execution of the security mission and providing performance assessment of Soldiers performing the GMD mission.

C-56. The Adjutant General (TAG) is responsible to provide personnel for NG units. TAG must plan activation, support, and recruitment of the personnel to staff the 100th MD BDE (GMD) and 49th MD BN (GMD). Responsibilities include:  Providing personnel management for State ARNG Soldiers working GMD mission.  Providing training for State ARNG Soldiers working GMD mission to be proficient in their common Soldier, individual MOS tasks, and required tasks unique to the AOR.  Ensure Title 32 Soldiers perform Title 32 Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) duties when not performing the federal mission. AGR soldiers in Title 32 duty status organize, administer, recruit, instruct, or train the reserve components. Duty descriptions of Title 32 AGR soldiers will reflect these duties the soldier performs on a regular basis. C-57. USASMDC/ARSTRAT establishes policies governing GMD site security and the 49th MD BN (GMD) commander has overall responsibility for GMD site security. The GMD site installation commander has overall responsibility for physical security and protection of the installation, and establishes installation policies for personnel protection and physical security measures.

AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION C-58. It is important the 49th MD BN (GMD) commander and the installation commander determine the extent and limitations of the site security force’s authority and jurisdiction. C-59. Jurisdiction on FGA is a complex issue; other GMD site locations may have similar issues to resolve. The servicing legal office and/or Provost Marshal will answer all issues relating to jurisdictional questions. C-60. Areas outside the site are subject to Federal, State and Local authority, depending on the actual location, law enforcement agreements, and specific law enforcement personnel. The local staff Judge Advocate and/or provost marshal will provide information and advice in regard to Federal, State and Local authority.


FM 3-27

C-13


Glossary SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AAMDC

Army Air and Missile Defense Command

AAMDD

Army Air and Missile Defense Detachment

AADC

Area Air Defense Commander

AADP

Area Air Defense Plan

ABM

Anti-ballistic Missile

ACS

Aegis Combat System

ADA

Air Defense Artillery

ADCON ADSI

Administrative Control Air Defense System Integrator

AFB

Air Force Base

AGR

Active Guard and Reserve

AMD

Air and Missile Defense AN – Joint system T – Ground transportable P – Radar Y – Surveillance (target detecting and tracking) and Control (fire control and/or air control) Refer to Joint Electronics Type Designation System (JETDS). MILSTD-196E, 17 Feb 98 “Fire Control and/or Air Control” applies to only the Terminal Mode ™ version of the radar used for the THAAD system. It does not apply to the FBM version. AN – Joint system S – Surface ship P – Radar Y – Surveillance (target detecting and tracking) and Control (fire control and/or air control) Refer to Joint Electronics Type Designation System (JETDS). MILSTD-196E, 17 Feb 98 Area of Responsibility

AN/TPY-2 (FBM)

AN/SPY-1

AOR AR ARFOR ARNG ARSTRAT ASCC

Army Regulation Army Forces Army National Guard US Army Strategic Command Army Service Component Command

BAM

Booster Avionics Module

BCN

BMDS Communications Network


FM 3-27

Glossary-1

Glossary

BIT

Built-In Test

BITE

Built-In Test Equipment

BMD

Ballistic Missile Defense

BMDS BMEWS

Ballistic Missile Defense System Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

BNOSC

BMDS Network Operations Support Center

BORRS

BMDS Operational Readiness Reporting System

C2 C2BMC C2BM CAC CBM+ CBRNE CCD CCDR CDR CFACC CLE CLEAPS

Command and Control Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications Command and Control, Battle Management Common Access Card Condition Based Maintenance Plus Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, high-yield Explosives Command Center Director Combatant Commander Commander Combined Forces Air Component Command Command and Launch Equipment CLE Applications

CLS

Contractor Logistics Support

CMC

Cheyenne Mountain Complex

CNE

Communications Node Equipment

CNIP COCOM COMNET CONOPS CONPLAN CONUS

C2BMC Network Interface Processor Combatant Command Communication Network Concept of Operations Concept Plan Continental United States

CRM

Composite Risk Management

CSCI

Computer Software Configuration Item

DA DAADC

Department of the Army

- or -

Defended Area

Deputy Area Air Defense Commander

DAL

Defended Asset List

DCC

DMETS Control Center

DISA

Defense Information Systems Agency

DISN

Defense Information Systems Network

DOD

Department of Defense

DODD DMETS DRSN

Department of Defense Directive Distributed Multi-Echelon Training System Defense Red Switched Nework

For Official Use Only Glossary-2

FM 3-27

3 January 2011

Glossary

DS DSCS

Defense Strategy Defense Satellite Communications System (satellite)

DSN

Defense Switched Network

DSP

Defense Support Program (satellite)

ECF

Entry Control Facility

EKV

Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle

EHF

Extremely High Frequency

EMP

Electomagnetic Pulse

EP

Engagement Planner

ESI

External Systems Interface

ESS

Electronic Security System

FBM

Forward Based Mode

FDC

Fire Direction Center

FGA

Fort Greely, Alaska

FM FPCON FORSCOM FRAGO GBI

Field Manual Force Protection Condition Army Forces Command Fragmentary Orders Ground-Based Interceptor

GBMD

Global Ballistic Missile Defense

GCN

GMD Communications Network

GFC

GMD Fire Control

GFC/C GFE GINIC GMD

GFC Communications Government Furnished Equipment Global IMD NetOps Integration Center Ground-based Midcourse Defense

GNCC

Global Node Control Center

GNO

Global Network Operations

GNOC GS

GCN Network Operations Center Ground Station

GSD

Ground Safing Device

GST

GMD System Trainer

HIC

Human-In-Control

HLD

Homeland Defense

HEMP HN HNA HQ

High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Host Nation Host Nation Agreement Headquarters

IBMP

Integrated Battle Management Picture

IAMD

Integrated Air and Missile Defense


FM 3-27

Glossary-3

Glossary

IAW ICBM IDT IFICS

In accordance with Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IFICS Data Terminal In-Flight Interceptor Communications System

IFSR

In-Flight Status Report

IFTU

In-Flight Target Update

IMCOM IMD

Installation Management Command Integrated Missile Defense

IO

Information Operations

IR

Infrared

IRBM

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile

IRF

Immediate Reaction Force

ISR

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

ITP

Integrated Task Plan

ITW/AA JFC JFACC JFCC

Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment Joint Force Commander Joint Forces Air Component Commander Joint Functional Component Command

JFLCC

Joint Forces Land Component Commander

JFTOC

Joint Force Tactical Operations Center

JLENS

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System

JP JPO JTAGS

Joint Publication Joint Program Office Joint Tactical Ground Station

JTAMD

Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense

JWARN

Joint Warning And Reporting Network

LE/MCr

Launch Essential/Mission Critical

LGCE LHC LOGCC

Launch Ground Communications Equipment Long Haul Communications Logistics Control Center

LRU

Line Replaceable Unit

LSC

Launch Site Components

LSE

Launch Station Equipment

LSOPS

Launch Station Operations

LSS MAPL

Launch Support System Mission Applications

MBE

Management By Exception

MCS

Mission Control Station

MDA

Missile Defense Agency


FM 3-27

3 January 2011

Glossary

MDC

Missile Defense Complex

MDE

Missile Defense Element

MDIOC MDMP MDO

Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center Military Decision-Making Process Missile Defense Officer

METT-TC

Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, Civil considerations

MILSTAR

Military Strategic and Tactical Automated Relay (satellite)

MMC

Maintenance Management Center

MOA

Memorandum of Agreement

MOS

Military Occupational Specialty

MRBM

Medium Range Ballistic Missile

MTJ N2C2 NAI NCTAMS NG NGB NORAD NSPD OCA OCONUS OE OEM OPCON OPIR

Multicast TADIL-J (via EHF satellites) NORAD/USNORTHCOM Command Center Named Area of Interest Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station National Guard National Guard Bureau North American Aerospace Defense Command National Security Presidential Directive Offensive Counter Air Outside the Continental United States Operational Element Original Equipment Manufacturer Operational Control Overhead Persistent Infrared

OPLAN

Operation Plan

OPORD

Operations Orders

OPSCAP OPSEC

Operations Capability Operations Security

OSSC

On-site Support Center

PAC-3

PATRIOT Advanced Capability, 3rd generation missile

PATRIOT

Phased-Array Tracking Radar Intercept On Target

PCAL

Prioritized Critical Asset List

PCSS

Prime Contractor Support System

PDS-M

Processing Display System–Migration

PED

Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination

PIV

Personal Identity Verification

PME

Prime Mission Equipment

POM

Program Objective Memorandum


FM 3-27

Glossary-5

Glossary

PROCAP PSE

Protection Capability Peculiar Support Equipment

RAM

Reliability, Availability and Maintainability

RCM

Reliability Centered Maintenance

REDCON

Readiness Condition

RFF

Request For Forces

ROE

Rules of Engagement

RSE

Readiness Station Equipment

RSTA RUF

Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition Rules for the Use of Force

RV

Reentery Vehicle

SA

Situational Awareness

SATCOM SBIRS

Satellite Communications Space-Based Infared System (satellite)

SBX

Sea-Based X-band radar

SCC

Security Control Center

SCM

Silo Closure Mechanism

SECARMY SECDEF SI SIV SLBM SM-3 SOFA SOP SOW

Secretary of the Army Secretary of Defense Strategic Command Instruction Silo Interface Vault Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Standard Missile-3 Status of Forces Agreement Standard Operating Procedure Statement of Work

SRBM

Short Range Ballistic Missile

SSL-A

Security System Level-A

STJ

Satellite TADIL-J (via UHF satellites)

STP

Sensor Task Plan

SYSCAP S&HE T2 TADIL-J TAG TAMD TAAMDCOORD TBM THAAD TMD

System Capability Support and Handling Equipment Transition and Transfer Tactical Automated DataInformation Link - Joint The Adjutant General Theater Air and Missile Defense Theater Army Air and Missile Defense Coordinator Theater Ballistic Missile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Theater Missile Defense


FM 3-27

3 January 2011

Glossary

TMDE

Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment

TMN

Telecommunications Management Network

TMW

Theater Missile Warning

TNC TNCC

Trunk Node Control Trunk Node Control Center

TOE

Table of Organization and Equipment

TTP

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UCP

Unified Command Plan

UEWR

Upgraded Early Warning Radar

UFO

UHF Follow-On (satellite)

UHF

Ultra-High Frequency (satellite)

US USASMDC USC USCENTCOM

United States United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command United States Code United States Central Command

USEUCOM

United States European Command

USNORTHCOM

United States Northern Command

USPACOM USSTRATCOM

United States Pacific Command United States Strategic Command

WAN

Wide Area Network

WCS

Weapons Control Status

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

WRA

Weapons Release Authority

WTP

Weapons Task Plan

XP

Execution Plan

SECTION II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS administrative control (Joint) Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit sustainment, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1-02)


FM 3-27

Glossary-7

Glossary

area air defense commander (Joint) Within a combatant command, subordinate command, or Joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the AADC’s headquarters. (JP 3-52) area of interest (Joint) That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 2-03) area of responsibility (Joint) The geographical area associated with a COCOM within which a CCDR has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1) Army Forces Strategic Command Name for USASMDC when its role is an Army component command for USSTRATCOM. (AR 10-87) attack operations Offensive actions intended to destroy and disrupt enemy TBM capabilities before, during, and after launch. The objective of attack operations is to prevent the launch of TBMs by attacking each element of the overall system, including such actions as destroying launch platforms; RSTA platforms; C2 nodes; and missile stocks and infrastructure. (JP 3-01) automated engagement planner Software tool that uses sensor data and operator input to plan and build tasks for the GMD system to use when tracking objects, engaging targets, and providing the GBI/exoatmospheric kill vehicle guidance. ballistic missile (Joint) Any missile which does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated. (JP 1-02) ballistic missile trajectory Path followed after the motor burns out and the missile body is acted on only by gravity, friction with the air, and winds. ballistic missile defense system A layered system of systems comprised of sensors, weapon systems, planning and battle management software and hardware capable of managing and executing the GBMD mission assigned to USSTRATCOM. The ballistic missile defense system is limited to countering the ballistic missile threat.


FM 3-27

3 January 2011

Glossary

centralized planning The process whereby one commander has responsibility and authority for planning and coordinating a military operation or group/category of operations. combatant command (command authority) (Joint) Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), USC, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the SECDEF. COCOM (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a CCDR to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, Joint training, and sustainment necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. COCOM (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CCDR considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON is inherent in COCOM (command authority). (JP 1) deterrence (Joint) The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (JP 1-02) force protection (Joint) Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 3-0) global ballistic missile defense USSTRATCOM defines GBMD as defensive measures designed to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of adversary ballistic missile attacks that cross COCOM AOR boundaries and require coordination or integration among the affected combatant commands. Coordinate the employment of GBMD and strike forces to defeat limited ballistic missile attacks in all phases of flight, or prior to their launch, and defend US deployed forces, friends, and allies. information operations (Army) The employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect and defend information and information systems and to influence decision making. joint forces land component commander (Joint) The commander within a combatant command, subordinate command, or Joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFLCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 3-0)


FM 3-27

Glossary-9

Glossary

joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (Joint) The analytical process used by Joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC’s decision-making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. (JP 3-0) kill evaluation Determination by operators or weapon systems software whether an interceptor has successfully destroyed a target. level II threat Enemy activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster augmented by a response force. (FM 3-90) near real time (Joint) Pertaining to the timeliness of data or information that has been delayed by the time required for electronic communication and automatic data processing. This implies there are no significant delays. (JP 1-02) non-nation-state actor Organized group belonging to no nation or having multiple national or transnational links that operate at the international level and are capable of provoking or requiring action from recognized governments. operating tempo A measure of equipment usage in terms of aircraft flying hours, ship steaming days, or tank (driving) miles, commonly used to describe the pace of an operation or operations. operational control (Joint) Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in COCOM (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the SECDEF. (JP 1) OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over GMD forces mission/functions/C2 of the 100th MD BDE (GMD) and 49th MD BN (GMD) Soldiers performing Title 10 missions. Title 10 Soldiers perform all GMD operations and site security. Although for the most part these forces are ARNG forces who transition between Title 10/32 on an almost daily basis, and commanded by dual hatted commanders, their missions, and roles kept separate and distinct. Admin/UCMJ authorities are dependent upon the status of the Soldier and do not automatically flow through one chain of command or the giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.


FM 3-27

3 January 2011

Glossary

operations security (Joint) A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. [Note: the Army replaces “critical information” with “essential elements of friendly information.” (JP 3-13.3) passive defense (Army) Operations that provide essential individual and collective protection for friendly forces, population centers, and critical assets. The principal measures used to accomplish passive defense are tactical warning, reducing target effectiveness, reducing vulnerability, and recovery and reconstitution. Re-entry vehicle (Joint) That part of a space vehicle designed to reenter the Earth’s atmosphere in the terminal portion of its trajectory. (JP 1-02) rules of engagement (Joint) Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02) scud a mobile, short range theater ballistic missile system. state vector Grouping of six mathematical values that describe the three-dimensional location, direction, and speed of an airborne or spaceborne object in relation to the Earth’s surface. system of systems Capability that is primarily composed of previously existing systems, items, or capabilities, generally more limited or simpler in function. system security level A A level of protection applied when the loss, theft, destruction, or misuse of the resource will result in great harm to US strategic capability. terminal high altitude area defense An Army system that will destroy a ballistic missile as it transitions from the mid-course to the terminal phase of its flight. It is a land-based element that has the capability to intercept both inside and outside of the atmosphere.


FM 3-27

Glossary-11

Glossary

Unified Command Plan (Joint) The document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all CCDRs; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographic AOR for COCOMs; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional CCDRs. (JP 1) unity of command One of the nine principles of war: for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. (FM 3-0) unity of effort (Army) Coordination and cooperation among all military forces and other organizations toward a commonly recognized objective, even if the forces and nonmilitary organizations are not necessarily part of the same command structure. (FM 6-0) weapons free A WCS in which weapons can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly. This is the least restrictive WCS. (FM 3-01)


FM 3-27

3 January 2011

References REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication. Joint and Multi-Service Publications All Joint publications are located at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/Jointpub.htm . JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2 May 2007, change 1, 20 May 2009. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, 16 October 2006. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 16 June 2009. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 22 March 2007. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006, Change 2, 22 March 2010. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 05 February 2007. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, 29 June 2006 . JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 12 July 2007. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, 20 May 2010. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, 18 July 2008. Strategic Command Instruction (SI) 538-1 Vol. I, Ballistic Missile Defense System Description and Asset Management, 22 June 2007, change 1, 7 August 2008. SI 538-1, Vol II, BMDS Logistics Reporting and Assessment Procedures, 22 June 2007. SI 538-2, Global Ballistic Missile Defense System (GBMDS) Physical Security Program, 20 May 2007. SI 538-4, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Communications Network (COMNET) Planning, Integration and Network Operations (NETOPS) Reporting Procedures, 7 August 2007. United States Strategic Command, Global Missile Defense Concept of Operations (S), 28 February 2010. MDA Directive 3110.01, Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Readiness Reporting System, 01 June 2007. MDA Manual 3110.01-M, Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Readiness Reporting System, 04 January 2010. Strategic Command Global Missile Defense Lexicon, 01 June 2009. Department of Defense Policy Strategy for homeland Defense and Civil Support, Gordon England Deputy SECDEF, published by DOD, June 2005 http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf Joint Vision 2020, June 2000, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45289 Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998 http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm Remarks by President George W. Bush to the Students and Faculty of the National Defense University, 1 May 2001, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/presidentnmd.html Title 10, Armed Forces, (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/browse.html)


FM 3-27

References-1

References

Title 14, Coast Guard, based on the 2006 edition (January 3,2007) (http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/usc.cgi?ACTION=BROWSE&title=14usc&PDFS=YES) Title 32—National Guard, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/usc.cgi?ACTION=BROWSE&title=32usc&PDFS=YES DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 April 2007. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, 13 June 2005. DODD 5134.09, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 17 September 2009. NSPD 23, National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense, December 16, 2002, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23.htm Joint Electronics Type Designation System (JETDS), MIL-STD-196E 17 February 1998; https://assist.daps.dla.mil/quicksearch/basic_profile.cfm?ident_number=35607 Army Publications AR 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands and Direct Reporting Units, 4 September 2007. AR 190-13, Physical Security, 30 September 1993. FM 1, The Army, 14 June 2005. FM 3-01, US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations, 25 November 2009. FM 3-01.15, Multi-Service Tactics Techniques and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System, 1 May 2009 . FM 3-27.10, Army Ground-based Midcourse Defense System Operations, 24 April 2008. FM 3-39, Military Police Operations, 16 February 2010. USASMDC Operational Concept for the AN/TPY-2 Forward Based Mode (FBM) Radar, 25 June 2010. Nonmilitary Publications Garamone, Jim, “A Short History of homeland Defense.” American Forces Press Service, 25 October 2001, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44614 “Mapping the Global Future” Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, Dec 2004 http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf RELATED PUBLICATIONS These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives, 15 November 2006 . AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993. AR 420-1, Army Facilities Management, 12 February 2008. AR 530-1, Operations Security (OPSEC), 19 April 2007. FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004. FM 1-02.1, Multi-Service Brevity Codes, 17 April 2010. FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 15 October 2009, change 1, 27 October 2010. FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003.

References-2

FM 3-27

3 January 2011

References

FM 3-16, The Army in Multinational Operations, 20 May 2010. FM 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield, 3 January 2003. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 11 August 2003.

Readings Recommended MDA, HTTP://www.mda.mil National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 20. http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf Office of the SECDEF, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 10 January 2001, www.dod.gov/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf NSPD 23, Ballistic Missile Defense, 16 December 2002, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd23.htm CRS Report for Congress, Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries Updated July 26, 2005 Strategy for homeland Defense and Civil Support: Department of Defense Washington, D.C., June 2000, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30427.pdf PRESCRIBED FORMS REFERENCE FORMS Department of the Army (DA) forms are available at the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) Web site at http://www.apd.army.mil.

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Form.


FM 3-27

References-3


Index 1 100th MD BDE (GMD), 1-9, 1-

10, 1-11, 1-12, 2-4, 2-5, 26, 4-8, 5-4, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, C-8, C-12, C-13, C14 2 21st century, 3-1, A-19, A-28 Global threat environment, A-3

4 th

49 MD BN (GMD), 1-9, 1-10,

1-12, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 3-12, 3-13, 4-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, C-8, C-9, C-10, C-12, C13, C-14 A Active Defense, 1-3, 1-7, 2-5,

3-3, 3-4, 3-9, A-21 Active Guard and Reserve, C-

14 Administrative Control, 1-8, 1-

10, 4-9, 6-10 Aegis Ship, B-9 Air and Missile Defense, 1-7, 111, 3-5, 3-9, 6-13, 6-14, 615, B-9 Air Defense Artillery, 1-1 Air Defense System Integrator, 2-3, 3-9 AN/SPY-1 radar, 2-3, 3-8, 6-1, B-1, B-2, B-7, B-9 AN/TPY-2 (FBM), 1-1, 1-2, 1-4, 1-5, 1-9, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-6, 33, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-9, 3-12, 44, 4-9, 4-10, 5-4, 5-5, 6-1, 68, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 617, B-1, B-2, B-4, B-5, B-9 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1-7 Area Air Defense Commander, 3-9, 4-9, 6-14 Area of Responsibility, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-7, 1-10, 1-11, 2-1, 2-4, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-9, 41, 4-2, 4-10, 5-1, 5-2, 6-13,

6-14, A-18, B-10, C-1, C-2, C-6, C-14 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, B-9 Army Air and Missile Defense Command, 1-3, 1-11, 2-1, 35, 3-9, 6-15, 6-17 Army GBMD role, 1-1, 1-2, 111, 3-9 Army National Guard, 1-9, 110, 1-11, 1-12, 2-1, 2-5, 2-6, 4-9, 6-10, 6-11, C-8, C-11, C-12, C-13 Army Forces, 1-2 Army Service Component Command, 1-8, 1-10, 1-11, 3-3, 4-9, 6-14, 6-17, C-12, C13 Army Strategic Command, 1-2, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-1, 2-6, 3-3, 3-11, 6-8, 6-10, 6-11, C12, C-13, C-14 Automated battle manager, B-2 Decision support, 3-5, 6-2

B Ballistic missile threats, 1-1, 12, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-9, 1-10, 1-12, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 3-1, 3-4, 3-5, 3-7, 3-8, 4-1, 48, 5-5, 6-1, 6-2, 6-8, 6-13, A1, A-18, A-19, A-20, A-21, A22, A-23, A-24, A-26, A-27, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-7, B-9, B-10, C-1, C-2, C-4, C5, C-13 global, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 2-1, 2-2, 3-4, A-1, A-18, A19, A-20, A-24 trends, A-19 missiles, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-9, 1-10, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 3-1, 3-3, 34, 3-5, 3-7, 3-8, 4-1, 4-8, 5-5, 6-1, 6-2, 6-8, 6-13, 6-14, A-1, A-18, A-6, A7, A-19, A-20, A-21, A22, A-23, A-24, A-26, A27, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-7, B-9, B-10, C-1, C-2, C-5, C-13

ICBMs, 1-2, 1-6, 1-12, 2-2, 2-3, 3-1, 3-6, 6-1, A-20, A-22, A-23, C-1, C-4 IRBMs, 1-2, 1-6, 3-1, 3-9, A-22 MRBM, 3-1, 3-9 SLBMs, A-22, A-23 Ballistic Missile Defense System, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 15, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 2-3, 2-4, 2-6, 3-1, 3-2, 3-9, 3-10, 4-1, 4-3, 4-4, 4-6, 4-7, 4-9, 4-10, 5-2, 5-4, 5-6, 5-7, 6-1, 6-2, 613, 6-14, 6-17, A-1, B-1, B-2, B-5, B-7, B-8, B-9, C-1, C-8, C-9 BORRS, 4-6, 4-7 contractor support, 4-3, 44, 4-9 communications, 1-9, 2-3, 3-2, 3-9, 5-2, 5-4, 5-6, 57, 6-1, 6-8, 6-13, B-1, B7, B-8 BMDS Communications Network, 2-3, 5-2, 5-4 BMDS elements, 1-1, 1-2, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-9, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 26, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-9, 3-12, 4-4, 4-6, 4-9, 4-10, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 6-1, 6-8, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 6-17, B-1, B-2, B4, B-5, B-7, B-9 Aegis AN/SPY-1, 1-1, 1-5, 1-6, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 3-4, 35, 3-6, 3-8, 5-4, 6-1, 6-8, 6-13, 6-14, B-1, B-2, B7, B-9 AN/TPY-2 (FBM), 1-1, 1-2, 1-4, 1-5, 1-9, 2-2, 2-3, 24, 2-6, 3-3, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-9, 3-12, 4-4, 4-9, 4-10, 5-4, 5-5, 6-1, 6-8, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 6-17, B-1, B-2, B-4, B-5, B-9 C2BMC, 1-1, 1-4, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 3-5, 3-9, 4-9, 5-2, 54, 5-5, 5-7, 6-1, 6-13, 614, 6-15, 6-17, B-1, B-2 COBRA Dane, 1-1, 1-6, 23, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 6-1, 6-8, B-1, B-2, B-4, B-6, B-7 Comm. Network, 2-3, 5-2, 5-4


FM 3-27

Index-1

Index DSP, 1-5, 2-3, 3-5, 3-6, 54, 6-1, 6-8, 6-14, B-1, B3, B-4, C-2 JTAGS, 1-9, B-10 MDE, 1-12, 2-5, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 4-6, 5-4, 6-2, 6-3, 67, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, C-8 Space components, B-3 SBX, 1-1, 1-6, 3-5, 3-6, 38, 5-4, 6-8, 6-13, B-1, B2, B-7, B-8 SBIRS, 1-5, 2-3, 3-5, 3-6, 5-4, 6-1, 6-8, 6-14, B-1, B-3, B-4, C-2 BMDS Network Operations Support Center, 5-7 Booster Avionics Module, 6-6

C C2BMC Network Interface Processor, 2-3, 5-4, 6-13 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives, 1-3, 46, 6-16, A-1, A-19 Cheyenne Mountain Complex, 5-8, 6-8 CLE Applications, 6-3 COBRA Dane, 1-1, 1-6, 2-3, 35, 3-6, 3-8, 6-1, 6-8, B-1, B2, B-4, B-6, B-7 Combatant Command, 1-1, 17, 1-9, 2-1, 2-2, 4-10 Combatant Commander, 1-1, 1-2, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-4, 2-5, 3-4, 3-5, 4-1, 6-11, A-19, C1, C-12, C-13 Combined Forces Air Component Command, 1-11 Command & Control, 2-1, 2-22, 3-4 GBMD, 2-1, 2-2 Systems, 2-1, 2-2, 3-4 Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications, 1-1, 1-4, 22, 2-3, 2-4, 3-5, 3-9, 4-9, 52, 5-4, 5-5, 5-7, 6-1, 6-13, 614, 6-15, 6-17, B-1, B-2 Command and Launch Equipment, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-9 Command relationships, 1-11, 21, 2-4, 2-5, 3-4, C-12 Commander’s Intent, 2-3, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-9, 4-2, 6-9, C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5, C-7, C-11

Common Access Card, 3-10 Composite Risk Management, 1-3 Concept Plan, 2-4, 3-4, 3-5 Contractor Logistic Support, 43, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, C-7 LOGCC, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, C-7 PCSS, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, C-7 Continental US, 1-4, 4-8, 5-7, A-25, A-26, C-1 D Defended Asset List, 3-2, 3-4, C-1 Defense Information Systems Agnecy, 5-4, 5-6, 5-7 Defense Information Systems Network, 5-2, 5-6 Defense Red Switch Nettwork, 5-6 Defense Satellite Communication System, 5-2, 5-6 Defense Strategy, C-2, C-4 Defense Support Program, 1-5, 2-3, 3-5, 3-6, 5-4, 6-1, 6-8, 614, B-1, B-3, C-2 Defense Switched Nettwork, 56 Department of Defense, 1-2, 14, 1-7, 1-9, 2-1, 3-1, 3-10, 42, 5-2, 5-5, 5-6 Department of Defense Directive, 1-2, 3-10 Deputy Area Air Defense Commander, 1-11

E Early warning sensors, 1-1, 13, 1-5, 1-6, 1-9, 2-2, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 5-2, 6-1, 6-8, B-1, B-2, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-10, land components, 1-1, 1-6, 2-2, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 6-1, 68, B-1, B-2, B-4, B-5, B6, B-10 sea components, 1-1, 1-6, 2-2, 3-5, 6-8, B-1, B-2, B-7 space components, 1-1, 15, 1-9, 3-5, 6-1, B-2, B3, Electromagnetic Pulse, 4-8 Electronic Security System, C10

Elements of GBMD, 1-3, 4-1, 46, 4-7, 5-1, 5-6, B-7 Engagement Planner, 2-3, 3-5, 3-7, 6-3, 6-9, B-2 Entry Control Facility, C-11 Execution Plan, 3-9, 6-2, 6-9, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5 Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, 1-6, 2-3, 3-6, 3-8, 4-9, 5-4, 61, 6-2, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, B-1, B2, C-3 External System Interface, 5-4, 6-3 F Fire Direction Center, 1-12, 25, 3-6, 3-7, 4-6, 6-2, 6-3, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 613, C-3, C-8, C-11 Force Protection Condition, 311, 3-12, 3-13, 4-7, C-8 Forces Command, 1-10, 1-11 Fort Greely, Alaska, 1-12, 5-4, 5-8, 6-3, 6-5, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 610, C-14 Forward Based Mode, See AN/TPY-2 (FBM)

G Geographical Combatant Command, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-7, 1-9, 1-10, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 3-1, 3-2, 3-4, 3-5, 39, 4-1, 4-9, 5-1, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 6-14, 6-15, 6-17, A-20, B-20, C-1, C-2 Global Ballistic Missile Defense, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-5, 39, 3-10, 4-1, 4-3, 4-6, 4-7, 48, 4-9, 4-10, 5-1, 5-2, 5-4, 55, 5-6, 5-7, A-18, B-1, B-3, B-4, B-6 Preface, 1-1, 3-3 mission, 1-2, 1-3, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-1, 2-2, 3-3, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-10, 5-1, A-18, B-3, B-4, B-6 networks, 3-2, 3-3, 5-1, 52, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, B-1 organizations, 1-1, 1-6, 17, 1-8, 2-1 operations, 1-7, 1-9, 1-10, 2-2, 2-4, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 35, 3-10, 4-6, 4-7, 5-2, 55, B-3 structure, 1-9, 2-1, 4-1

For Official Use Only Index-2

FM 3-27

3 January 2011

Index sustainment, 4-1, 4-3, 4-9, 4-10 Army role, 1-1, 1-2, 1-11, 3-9 C2 relationships, 2-1, 2-2, 3-9, 6-1 C2 systems, 2-1, 2-2, 5-1, 5-7 Global IMD Netops Integration Center, 5-4, 5-7 Global Operations, 3-2, 5-7 GMD Communications Network, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 6-2, B-8 GMD Fire Control, 1-6, 1-12, 21, 2-2, 2-3, 2-5, 3-5, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 4-6, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 61, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 613, 6-14, B-1, B-2, B-4, B-5, B-7, B-9, C-3, C-4, C-5, C-8, C-11 FDC, 1-12, 2-5, 3-6, 3-7, 4-6, 6-2, 6-3, 6-8, 6-9, 610, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, C3, C-8, C-11 GFC, 1-12, 2-2, 2-3, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 5-2, 53, 5-4, 5-5, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 69, 6-13, 6-14, B-1, B-2, B-4, B-5, B-7, B-9, C-3, C-4, C-5 MDE, 1-12, 2-5, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 4-6, 5-4, 6-2, 6-3, 67, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, C-8 NG, 2-1, 2-5, 6-10, 6-11 GMD System Trainer, 6-3, C-1 GFC/Communications, 6-1, 62, 6-3, 6-4, C-3, C-4 Ground-Based Interceptor, 2-3, 3-6, 3-8, 3-9, 3-11, 4-10, 5-3, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 67, 6-8, B-1, B-2, B-9, C-2, C3, C-8, C-9, C-10, C-11, C12 Ground Safing Device, 6-5

H High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse, 5-6 Homeland Defense, 1-2, 1-10, 2-1, 2-4, 2-5, 3-1, 3-2, 3-9, C-13

Host Nation, 4-1, 4-4, 4-8, 5-1, 5-2, 6-1, 6-13, 6-15, 6-16, 617, A-2 Host Nation Agreement, 4-8 Human-In-Control, 2-3, 3-5, 39, 6-3, 6-8, C-1, C-2

I IFICS Data Terminal, 4-8, 5-4, 6-2, 6-8, B-8 Immediate Response Force, C11 In-Flight Interceptor Communications System, 36, 5-4, 6-2, B-2, C-3 In-Flight Status Report, 3-7, 54, C-3 In-Flight Target Update, 3-6, 54, 6-1, B-2, C-3 Information Operations, 3-14, A-4, A-8, A-10 Integrated Air & Missile Defense, 1-8, 1-10, 3-3, 3-9, 4-1 Integrated Battle Management Picture, 2-3, 2-4 Integrated Missile Defense, 11, 1-7, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-3, 2-4, 3-3, 5-4, 5-6, 5-7, 6-1, 68, C-1 Integrated Tactical Warning & Attack Assessment, 1-9, 110, 6-3, B-3, B-5 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, 1-9, 1-10, 3-14, B-5 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, 1-2, 1-6, 1-11, 1-12, 2-2, 2-3, 3-1, 3-5, 3-6, 6-1, A-3, A-5, A-6, C-1, C-4 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, 1-2, 1-6, 3-1, 3-9, A-5

J JLENS, 3-3 Joint commands/organizations with a role in GBMD, 3-3 USCENTCOM, 1-11, B-10 USEUCOM, 1-11, 2-3, 5-8, B-10 USNORTHCOM, 1-10, 111, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 26, 3-2, 3-5, 5-4, 5-5, 5-7, 5-8, 6-3, 6-8, 6-11, 6-15, C-1, C-12, C-13

USPACOM, 1-11, 2-2, 2-3, 5-5, 6-15, B-10 USSTRATCOM, 1-1, 1-2, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 32, 3-3, 3-9, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15, B6, B-10, C-1, C-2, C-12, C-13 Joint Forces Air Component Command, 1-11, 6-14 Joint Forces Component Commands, 1-9 JFCC-IMD, 1-1, 1-9, 1-11, 2-3, 2-4, 3-3, 5-4, 5-6, 57, C-1 JFCC-ISR, 1-9, 1-10 JFCC-Space, 1-9, B-5, B10 Joint Force Tactical Operations Center, 5-8 Joint Forces Land Component Command, 1-11 Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational, 4-2, 5-1, C-6 Joint Program Office, 3-13, C13 Joint Tactical Ground Stations, 1-9, B-10 Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense, 3-9 Joint Warning and Reporting Network, 3-9

L Launch Essential, Mission Critical, 4-8 Launch farm complex, 4-8 Launch Ground Comm. Equipment, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5 Launch Site Components, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5 Launch Station Equipment, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5 Launch Station Operations, 6-4 Launch Support System, 6-2, 6-3, 6-5 Logistics Control Center, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, C-7 Long-Haul Communications, 53, 5-4

M Maintenance Management Center, 4-3, C-7


FM 3-27

Index-3

Index Medium Range Ballistic Missile, 3-1, 3-9, B-9 Memorandum of Agreement, 49, 4-10, C-10, C-12 METT-TC, 1-4, 2-5, 4-9, 6-14, 6-15 Military Decision-Making Process, 1-3, 3-2, C-2 Military Occupational Specialty, 4-1, 4-9, C-5, C-13 MILSTAR, 5-2, 5-6 Missile Defence Agency, 1-3, 1-4, 1-9, 1-11, 4-1, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-10, 4-9, 5-6, 5-7, 6-15, B-1, B-8, C-7 Missile defense complex, 1-12, 3-12, 4-8, 6-4, C-8, C-11 Missile Defense Integration & Operations Center, 2-3, 5-4, 6-8 Mission Applications, 6-3 Mission Control Station, 3-6, 54, 6-14, B-3 Management By Exception, 69, C-4 Missile defense doctrine definations, 1-1 BMDS, 1-1 GBMD, 1-1, 1-2 GMD, 1-2 TBM, 1-1 Missile Defense Element, 1-12, 2-5, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 4-6, 5-4, 62, 6-3, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 611, 6-12, C-8 Missile Defense Officer, 3-5, 68, 6-11, C-2 Missle defense warfighting principles, 1-1, 1-3, 3-4

N N2C2, 6-8 National Security Presidential Directive 23, 3-1, A-2 National Guard, See Army National Guard National Guard Bureau, 6-10, C-12 NCTAMS, 5-8 NORAD, 1-10, 6-8

O OCONUS, 4-8, 6-10, A-26, C-1 Operations Capability, 4-6, B-1, C-8

Operational Control, 1-10, 111, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 5-2, 5-4, 611, C-12, C-13 Operation Plan (OPLAN), 2-4, 3-4, 3-5, 3-9, C-1, C-2, Operations Security, 3-14, A-8 Overhead Persistent Infrared, 3-5, 3-8, B-2

P PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3, 1-6, 3-4 PATRIOT, 1-6, 3-3, 3-4, C-2 Peculiar Support Equipment, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5 Personal Identity Verification, 3-10 Physical attack (Sabotage, Terrorism), 3-1, 3-10, 3-11, 4-6, A-1, A-2, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, C-5, C-13, Physical security, 3-9, 3-10, 311, C-8, C-10, C-11, C-13, C-14 Prime Contractor Support System, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, C7 Prime Mission Equipment, 4-5 Prioritized Critical Asset List, 34, C-1 Processing Display System – Migration, 3-9 Processing, Exploitation & Disseminatino, 1-9, 1-10 Protection, 1-2, 1-3, 1-6, 3-1, 39, 3-11, 3-12, 4-2, 4-6, 4-9, 5-2, 6-6, 6-16, B-1, B-9, C-6, C-11, C-14 Protection capability, B-1

R Readiness Condition, 4-6, 4-7, 6-12, C-8 Readiness Station Equipment, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5 Re-entry Vehicle, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 2-3, 3-1, 3-6, 3-8, 6-1, 6-2, 65, 6-13, A-3, A-5, A-6, B-1, B-4, B-5, C-3 Reliability, Availability & Maintainability, 4-6 Reliability Centered Maintenance, 4-2 Request For Forces, 6-17 Rules of Engagement, 3-2, 3-4, 3-5, C-2

Rules for Use of Force, 3-12, 313, C-2

S Satellite Communications, 5-1, 5-3, 5-4, 5-6, A-3 Sea-Based X-band radar, 1-1, 1-6, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 5-4, 6-8, 613, B-1, B-2, B-7, B-8 Secretary of the Army, 1-10, 26, 6-11, C-11, C-12 Secretary of Defense, 1-9, 110, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 3-9, C-2, C13 Security force considerations, 3-11 Security System Level-A, 3-9, 3-10, 6-16, 6-17, C-8, C-9, C-11 Sensor Task Plan, 3-7 Short Range Ballistic Missile, 1-7, 3-1, 3-9 Silo Closure Mechanism, 6-4 Silo Interface Vault, 6-3, 6-4 Situational Awareness, 1-9, 23, 2-4, 3-5, 3-7, 4-6, 5-1, 5-2, 5-4, 5-5, 6-2, 6-8, B-1, B-2, B-5, C-3, C-5, C-8 Space, 1-2, 1-5, 1-6, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 2-2, 2-6, 3-3, 3-5, 4-10, 5-1, 5-5, 6-2, 6-3, 6-6, 6-13, 6-14, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-5, B-8, B-10, C-1 Space-Based Infrared System, 1-5, 2-3, 3-5, 3-6, 5-4, 6-1, 68, 6-14, B-1, B-3, B-4, C-2 Space Control Center, C-11 Standard Missile-3, B-9 State Governor/State Adjutant General, 2-6, 6-10, C-12 Status of Forces Agreement, 48, 6-15, 6-16 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile, A-5, A-6 Support & Handling Equipment, 6-5 Support concept, 4-3, C-7 Support Principles, 4-2, C-6 Sustainment reporting, 4-6, C-8 System Capability (SYSCAP), 4-3, 4-9, 6-12, A-1, C-8

T Table of Org. & Equipment, 26, 6-16, 6-17, C-9, C-10

For Official Use Only Index-4

FM 3-27

3 January 2011

Index TADIL-J, 2-3, 2-4, 5-2, 5-7, 613 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, 1-1, 1-2, 1-6, 2-2, 2-4, 3-3, 3-9, 4-1, 6-13, B-4, C-2 The Adjutant General, C-1 Theater air and missile defense 1-11 Planning, 1-11 Theater Ballistic Missile, 1-1, 614, B-10 Theater Missile Defense, 1-7, 3-3, 6-10, B-5, B-10 Theater Missile Warning, B-10 Threat Evolution, A-3 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, B9 TMDE, 6-4, 6-5

Transition & Transfer, 4-10, C7

U UHF/UFO, 5-2, 5-6 Unified Command Plan, 1-1, 19, 2-1, 2-2, 2-5, 2-6, 4-9, 610 United States Code, 1-11 Upgraded Early Warning Radar, 1-1, 1-6, 2-2, 3-5, 36, 3-8, 6-1, 6-8, B-1, B-2, B4, B-5, B-6 USASMDC 1-2, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-1, 2-6, 3-3, 3-11, 6-8, 6-10, 6-11, C-12, C-13 USCENTCOM, 1-11, B-10 USEUCOM, 1-11, 2-3, 5-8, B10 USNORTHCOM, 1-10, 1-11, 22, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 3-2, 3-5,

5-4, 5-5, 5-7, 5-8, 6-3, 6-8, 611, 6-15, C-1, C-12, C-13 USPACOM, 1-11, 2-2, 2-3, 5-5, 6-15, B-10 USSTRATCOM, 1-1, 1-2, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 3-2, 3-3, 3-9, 54, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 6-13, 6-14, C-15, B-6, B-10, C-1, C-2, C12, C-13

W Weapons Control Status, 3-7, 6-8 Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1-1, 3-1, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-9 Weapons Release Authority, 35, 3-6, 6-1, C-2 Weapons Task Plan, 2-3, 3-6, 6-3, C-3


FM 3-27

Index-5

FM 3-27(FM 3-27.10) 3 January 2011

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 1034701

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic media only.

For Official Use Only

PIN: 086285-000

Fm3_27(Global Ballistic Missile Defense)

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