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G.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005 AUGUSTO R. SAMALIO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Augusto R. Samalio, former Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation was convicted of the crime of Robbery by the Sandiganbayan for extorting money from Ms. Weng Sai Qin, Chinese, in exchange for her passport. An administrative case was also filed against him for Violation of CSMC No. 46, Rule 2, Section 1, for dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Acting Commissioner, the Secretary of Justice, and the Civil Service Commission, on appeal, found Samalio guilty of the charges and ordered his dismissal. The Court of Appeals also dismissed Samalio's Petition for Review and Motion for Reconsideration. Samalio claims that he was denied due process because no witness or evidence was presented against him and no hearing was conducted on his case. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process HELD: Yes. There was ample evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in administrative proceedings – substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion3 ― to support the decision of the CSC. The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former testimony," in deciding petitioner’s administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasijudicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative agency concerned. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative proceedings before the BID because she left the country on February 6, 1993, or even before the administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679, a case which sprang from the information filed pursuant to Resolution No. 093-0224 dated February 4, 1993 of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City, the very same resolution used by Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was the same issue in the administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied. Thus, the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error when they applied it and took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner was convicted.
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G.R. No. 12724, March 27, 2000 ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner, 66 years old, filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen. He was born in China but has stayed in the Philippines since he was nine years old. Petitioner testified and presented three witnesses. The prosecutor was impressed so he did not present any evidence or witness against the petitioner. Thus, the petition was granted. However, the Office of the Solicitor General appealed claiming that he failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG,"; that he failed to disclose in his petition that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo."; that he failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines because he lived-in with his wife for several years and had four children out of wedlock; and that he failed to file an income tax return because his income is low. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. The petitioner contended that documents not presented and formally offered as evidence are mere scraps of paper devoid of any evidentiary value under Rule 132 §34 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the court should consider evidence which has not been formally offered HELD: Yes. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 §13 of the Rules of Court which provides that — These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents. Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.
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G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003 PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent. FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against Coca-Cola for illegal dismissal. Clarificatory hearings were held for the complaints. The respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaints there being no employer-employee relationship. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, on appeal, ordered the reinstatement of the complainants. However, the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. The CA noted that affidavits of complainants Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo crossexamination. The petitioners contend that the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied in this case because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure. The respondent commented that their affidavits should be stricken off the records for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not an affidavit not testified to in a trial has evidentiary value HELD: Yes. The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. It was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence. Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits. The Court ordered the respondent to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions as regular employees, and to pay them their full back wages, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages are yet to be computed upon proof of his dismissal.
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G.R. No. 123546, July 2, 1998 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant. FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Roxas City convicted Galleno for the crime of statutory rape. The five-year old victim, Evelyn, sustained a laceration in her vagina which resulted in profuse bleeding due to her tender age. Galleno denied the accusation. He claimed that his left ring finger with long fingernail was accidentally inserted into the vagina of the child while they were playing, and that he applied the sap from the leaves of a madre de cacao tree on her vagina to stop the bleeding. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. Galleno claimed that the testimonies of the three expert witnesses, medical doctors who examined Evelyn, failed to conclusively and sufficiently establish the cause of the laceration of Evelyn's vagina. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical doctors HELD: No. As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment. In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference is wrong. The Supreme Court, in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, (held that) evidence, to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact of events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence." This simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and human experience. There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law. However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the teachings of logic and everyday experience. The proverb "the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion" was correctly adopted by the trial court in drawing its conclusions. The loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work against the credibility of accusedappellant's story on which his defense is based. Besides, the trial court's conclusions find support in the testimony of accusedappellant's own witness, Dr. Lourdes Lañada (who was earlier presented during the trial as a prosecution witness), who testified that a laceration is caused by a blunt instrument and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp instrument. The conviction of accused-appellant is affirmed.
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G.R. No. 158203, March 31, 2005 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG, appellants. FACTS: Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were convicted of two counts of murder. The victims Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay were killed with the use of bolos. The prosecution presented Magno Gomez as its lone eyewitness who testified that after he and the spouses left the store where they drank, Calumpang and Omatang followed them and killed the spouses. However, the defense presented witnesses who testified that the appellants did not follow the victims after they left the store and that Santiago and Magno were arguing when they left. ISSUE: Whether the appellants’ guilt for double murder has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: No. After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that the trial court overlooked pertinent pieces of evidence favorable to the accused and disregarded several significant facts and circumstances that cast doubt on the veracity of the testimony of the prosecution’s lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez, justifying a departure from the settled rule that factual findings of the trial court bind this Court. While Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings, the records show that serious discrepancies attended Magno’s testimony in court and his sworn statement, executed during the preliminary examination. Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost always incomplete and often inaccurate or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the testimony given in open court. Jurisprudence, however, forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations, with respect to a person’s participation in a serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness’ account. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself—such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. Appellants' defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place of the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands. The appellants were acquitted on reasonable doubt.
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G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003 HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners, vs. ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO, REMEDIOS COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO, BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA, respondents. FACTS: In 1965, Adolfo Saez, out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of his father, Marcos Saez, without any rent. Thus, Francisco's nipa hut was carried to a portion of Marcos' land. Francisco's heirs succeeded in his posession for free and occupied the premises through petitioners' tolerance. In 1998, petitioners made a formal demand to the respondents to vacate the premises. The respondents refused and claimed that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription and that the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. Petitioners filed a petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of petitioners’ witnesses; Whether or not the admissibility of evidence is similar with its probative value HELD: No. Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief. The testimony of petitioners' witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents' continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a considerable length of time.
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G.R. No. 142856-57, August 25, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ROBERTO NEGOSA alias "JOVIN," Appellant. FACTS: The appellant is the live-in partner of the victim's mother, Cenilda. Gretchen, 12 years old, claimed that she was sexually abused by the appellant on two separate occassions. Gretchen did not inform her mother about the incidents because of fear but she told some of her female friends about these events. She also kept a record on her notebook which her Auntie, Josilyn, discovered and read. Josilyn informed her parents and siblings, except Cenilda, about Gretchen’s revelation. They took Gretchen to the doctor for physical examination on September 14, 1998, and filed two criminal complaints for rape. The appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Cenilda testified for the appellant and claimed that he admitted that he only attempted to rape Gretchen. The court found the appellant guilty of rape and of acts of lasciviousness. ISSUE: Whether or not the late entries on Gretchen’s diary affects her credibility and the probative weight of her testimony HELD: No. The fact that Gretchen started making entries in her "diary" only on September 2, 1998, more than a year after the first rape incident occurred (June 28, 1997), does not lessen the probative weight of the said entries. It bears stressing that Gretchen was only in Grade V, barely eleven years old when the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997. At such a tender age, still inexperienced in the vagaries of life, she could not be expected to act and react like an adult. Being subjected to a vicious sexual assault was an emotional and psychological experience on the part of the young victim. In People v. Aquino, this Court held that "the range of emotions shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is thus unrealistic to expect information from rape victims." The trial court disbelieved Gretchen’s testimony that on September 4, 1998, the appellant managed to insert a small portion of his penis through the side of his short pants and the side of the victim’s loose short pants and convicted the appellant only of acts of lasciviousness. This, however, does not impair Gretchen’s credibility and the probative weight of her testimony that she was raped by the appellant on June 28, 1997. In People vs. Lucena, we ruled that the testimony of a witness may be partly believed or disbelieved, depending on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part of the witness to pervert the truth. The principle FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or reject portions of the witness’ testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the corroborative evidence in the case. There is no evidence that Gretchen intended to pervert the truth as to the extent of the sexual abuse done to her on September 4, 1998. Neither can it be claimed that she prevaricated when she testified that the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997. The appellant is found guilty of statutory rape.
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G.R. No. 14440, February 24, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FERDINAND MATITO y TORRES, a.k.a. "FREDDIE," appellant. FACTS: Filomena Raymundo heard gunshot wounds so she rushed to her husband’s direction. She saw that he was bleeding. Mariano told her that Freddie shot him. Matito interposed defenses of denial and alibi, but the Trial Court found him guilty based on Filomena's testimony and other pieces of circumstantial evidence, such as the presence of nitrate powder on the cast taken from the right hand of appellant; the bitter quarrel that ensued between him and the victim after the latter had cut off the former’s water supply; the denial by appellant of the request of his neighbors (including the victim) to widen the right of way along the premises of his house; and hours before the victim was killed, the threatening remarks of appellant to the former’s daughter. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the witness as a dying declaration should be given credence HELD: Yes. A dying declaration, also known as a statement in articulo mortis, may be received in evidence under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which we quote: "SEC. 37. Dying Declaration. – The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death." To be admissible, the following requisites should be met: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) he or she is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a case in which the declarant’s death is the subject of the inquiry. In addition, the fact that he was still able to enter the house after being shot three times, as well as the significant lapse of time before he died in the hospital, showed that he had ample time to communicate to his wife the assailant’s identity. That there was no way the victim could have told his wife before he died that it was appellant who had shot him cannot be accorded absolute credence and faith, as such testimony was given by Dr. Aves who was not a speech therapist or a neurologist. Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact finder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free." It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence. Cases have recognized that in its effect upon the courts, the former may surpass the latter in weight and probative force. To warrant a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. On the strength of the circumstantial evidence proven in the current case, we hold that the court a quo did not err in convicting appellant of the crime charged. The combination of the circumstances comprising such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime. Alibi and denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, undeserving of any weight in law. Alibi is an inherently weak defense, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. Appellant must prove that he was not only at some other place when the crime was committed, but that it was impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time the crime was perpetrated. This he failed to do. The appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
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G.R. No. 152954, March 10, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PAULINO SEVILLENO y VILLANUEVA, a.k.a. "Tamayo Sevilleno", appellant. FACTS: The appellant was charged with rape with homicide. The victim was Virginia Bakia, nine years old. The appellant pleaded guilty and was found guilty as charged. On automatic review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court and set aside its decision as the appellant was not properly apprised of his fundamental right to be informed of the nature of the accusation leveled against him. The appellant then pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented witness who testified that appellant and Virginia passed by together but only the appellant emerged from the sugarcane fields with scratches on his face and neck. The examining physician also testified and concluded that Virginia must have been raped and strangled to death. Appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi, but no other witness was presented for the defense. ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of the accused is valid and binding HELD: Yes. The rule is that once the prosecution has shown compliance with the constitutional requirements on custodial investigations, a confession is presumed voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of destroying this presumption. The confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. Appellant failed to show that his confession in this case was given under any of the above circumstances. Significantly, appellant’s conviction was not based solely on his extra-judicial confession but on other pieces of evidence established by the prosecution to the satisfaction of the court. To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the appellant. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. These, the prosecution were able to establish. While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove. On the other hand, an alibi, to be believed, must receive credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses. Appellant failed to present his employer or any co-worker to corroborate his alibi or a logbook that would prove his presence at his workplace at the time of the commission of the crime. Neither was there any evidence to show that it was impossible for the appellant to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. In the end, the rule is settled that where the culpability or innocence of the accused hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, the findings of trial courts are given the highest degree of respect. Hence, their findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, unless some fact or circumstance of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. We find no circumstance of weight or substance that was overlooked by the trial court. The appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
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G.R. Nos. 139751-52, January 26, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NOEL DARILAY, appellant. FACTS: Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda were on their way home from a store after buying tinapa when appellant emerged and struck Ailyn twice at the back with a piece of wood. The appellant also struck Marilyn. When Ailyn regained consciousness, she looked for her sister and the appellant. Ailyn told their mother what happened. Their father looked for Marilyn and the appellant while their uncle reported the incident to the police. They found torn pieces of clothing and a slipper bearing the Marilyn's name. The appellant pointed where Marilyn was. Marilyn’s body was in a grassy area near bushes and trees along the river. She was lying face down, her legs spread apart and was completely naked. There was blood on her nose, her mouth, and her vagina. The appellant was arrested. The appellant was charged of attempted murder and with rape with homicide. The appellant denied the charges and claimed that Hercules Bon and Jose Delfino raped and killed Marilyn and he did nothing to prevent them. The Trial Court found him guilty as charged. ISSUE: Whether or not circumstantial evidence may prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt HELD: Yes. The testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons, so that once established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full credence. We agree with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said crime. However, direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. What was once a rule of ancient practicability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur: "x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution. We are convinced that the appellant raped Marilyn about 15 meters from where he had earlier waylaid Ailyn. He then carried Marilyn across the river where he killed her to prevent her from revealing to the authorities that she was raped. The appellant hid her body under the bushes and trees to thus prevent police authorities from discovering that he killed Marilyn. Irrefragably, Marilyn was killed by reason of the rape. The killing of a child, barely 9 years old, is murder. Nonetheless, the appellant is guilty of rape with homicide because the latter crime is used in its generic sense. The appellant is found guilty of rape with homicide and of attempted murder.
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G.R. No. L-3544. March 27, 1907 CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EDWIN CASE, Respondent-Appellant. FACTS: Edwin Case claims a right of way through a passage along the side of Carmen Ayala de Roxas' property. The appellant claims that the right of way exists by prescription, and not founded on any written instrument but on immemorial use alone. The appellant anchors his claim on the law stating that discontinuous servitudes have no fixed periods, but must be proved by usage or a term so long that men cannot remember its commencement (Tanto tiempo de que non se pueden accordar los omes, quanto ha que lo commencaron a usar). However, the supreme court of Spain held that the court should consider the testimony and number of witnesses over 60 years of age who were acquainted with the servitude during their lives and who also had heard it spoken of in the same way by their elders. The appellant failed to comply with the second requirement. Thus, appellant filed an appeal from the Court of Land Registration. ISSUE: Whether or not a right or prescription may be proved by the memory of living witnesses alone HELD: No. There is not vested right in a mere rule of evidence. The law establishes a disputable presumption "that a person is the owner of property from exercising acts of ownership over it or from common reputation of his ownership." The use of the passage proved in this case cannot be held to constitute acts of ownership for the reason that it is quite consistent with a mere license to pass, informal in its origin and revocable in its nature. It seems, however, that under the clause quoted, common reputation of ownership of the right of way was open to proof and on this theory of the case such testimony, if available, should have been offered. In order to establish a right or prescription something more is required than the memory of living witnesses. A right of way claimed to have been established by use prior to the Civil Code, without written evidence, cannot be proved by the memory of living witnesses alone.
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G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005 HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner, vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents. FACTS: Respondent spouses Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. bought a house and lot but the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Marcelino's name. In a Special Power of Attorney(SPA), he authorized Lilibeth Gesmundo to obtain a loan from petitioner secured by the property. The loan was foreclosed, and the petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure. A Certificate of Sale was issued in petitioner's favor and the property was not redeemed so the petitioner consolidated the ownership. Miguela claims that she was not aware of mortgage and that the property is conjugal. She filed complaint for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. Petitioner claimed that the property was the exclusive property of Marcelino. The Trial Court, by preponderance of evidence, found that the property was conjugal in nature and ordered the reconveyance of the property to the spouses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the property was the exclusive property of Marcelino HELD: No. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ." Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
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G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005 AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING, respondents. FACTS: A cadastral decree over Lot No. 4399 in Lapu-Lapu City was issued in favor of the Aying siblings, but the certificate of title was lost during the war. All the heirs of the siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner who filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title which was granted. The Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Aying siblings. Claiming to be the rightful owner, the petitioners notified the occupants to vacate the property. The respondents filed a complaint for cancellation of the ExtraJudicial Partition with Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and damages and alleged that their ascendants are the registered owners of the property. The Trial Court concluded that the document is valid since the respondents failed to provide evidence that it was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and that the action had prescribed. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the action had not yet prescribed. ISSUE: Whether or not the action had prescribed HELD: In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale, it must be determined which party had the burden of proof to establish such fact. The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain. Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, his cause will not succeed. Thus, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiff’s claim or cause of action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden is upon him to establish the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor. In the case at bar, it was petitioner, which set up in its Answer the affirmative defense of prescription. It was, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date from which the prescriptive period began to run. Evidence as to the date when the tenyear prescriptive period began exists only as to the heirs of Roberta Aying, as Wenceslao Sumalinog admitted that they learned of the existence of the document of sale in the year 1967. As to the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, there is no clear evidence of the date when they discovered the document conveying the subject land to petitioner. Petitioner miserably failed to adduce proof of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying were notified of the subject document. Hence, with regard to said heirs, the Court may consider the admission in the amended complaint that they learned of the conveyance of the disputed land only in 1991 when petitioner sent notices to vacate to the occupants of the subject land, as the date from which the ten-year prescriptive period should be reckoned. The amended complaint of the heirs of Roberta Aying is dismissed on the ground of prescription. However, the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, having instituted the action for reconveyance within the prescriptive period, are hereby declared as the lawful owners of a 2/8 portion of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2856.
