Ethnic Militancy in Pakistan
January 18
2017
Pakistan is a multi-cultural, multi-linguistic and multi-ethnic country where ethnicity plays vital role in regional and national politics. Ethnic-based political gains and losses severely matter when they lead the country towards social unrest, economic disorder and security risk. Sometimes it generates militancy in neglected areas. Evaluating socio-economic, political, anthropological and emotional viewpoints, this paper deals with the everyday causes, ever-effecting consequences and recommended remedies with respect to ethnic militancy in Pakistan. Apart from religious militancy, economic fissures and social disorder: ethnic militancy is a severe menace to security of Pakistan’s contemporary society. The Pakistan has witnessed its vivisection in 1971; Baloch rebellion (1973 to date); Pashtun separatist movement (Greater Afghania) 1970s; Sindhudesh movement (1980s) and Muhajir militancy in Karachi (1980s). Currently Saraiki and Hazara movements have troubled the Pakistan’s social order. State will have to prioritize the democratic and political solutions of ethnic issues. This paper suggests the implementation of constitution according to its spirit.
Causes, Consequences and Remedies
Aamir Nazir Visiting Lecturer and Student of M.Phil Department of Political Science The Islamia University of Bahawalpur
[email protected]
Article Presented at: Two-Day International Conference "Terrorism, Extremism and Militancy in Pakistan: Domestic & International Factors”
17-18 January 2017 (Tuesday, Wednesday) Bahuddin Zakariya University, Multan
Introduction The political history of the globe has observed upsurge and decay of great movements. Emergence of nationalism, end of colonialism, class struggle of 20th century and disintegration of socialist rule boosted the ethnic nationalism in contemporary world. Surfacing of ethnic nationalism in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Yugoslavia are paramount examples in this regard. Rest of the world has not immunity from the clutches of ethnic issues but observe at varying degrees. USA, Canada, Burundi and Rwanda have also witnessed ethnic crisis. Pakistan has been facing class struggle, religious and ethnic militancy since its inception as an independent state. Emergence of Bengali nationalism turned into militancy and vivisected the Pakistan into two parts. Baloch insurgency is a source of devastation and troubling Pakistan at national and international fronts. Reports of intelligence agencies have revealed various secret plans against integrity and solidarity of Pakistan designed by Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an ethno-political organization. Saraiki and Hazara movements are getting momentum in current arena. Ernest Gellner inks that, unequal distribution of resources are found everywhere in the world. People from deprived regions demand shares equal to those who have monopoly over the resources. Monopolists refuse to go along with the demands of deprived. Resultantly, deprivers have to face the rebellion from deprived segments of the society. Under these circumstances language, culture and traditions turn into identity and nationalism for underprivileged classes (Gellner, 1964, p. 167). Historically, Muslim elite of the North India used religion and language as identity maker while developing two-nation theory when they felt that, Hindus have captured most the economic means (Brass, 1974).
Implementation of instrumental strategy of Ernest Gellner and Brass expresses that, separatists from Muslim minority areas waved the banner of Islam to design the central nature of newly emerged state and ethnic-based separatists opposed the moves of Islamists. Naming Pakistan in 1930: P for Punjab, A for Afghans (NWFP), K for Kashmir and S for Sindh, symbolize the ethnic uniqueness of Pakistan. Muhammad Ali Jinnah stipulated demand for Pakistan drafted in Lahore Resolution 1940, which was purely based on Punjab, Sindh Balochistan and NWFP as
Muslim majority areas. Work of Ernest Gellner and Brass also indicates that Islam could not be established as driving force in Pakistan.
Politically incompetent Lieutenants of Quid-i-Azam chucked the Pakistan into strong clutches of centralized bureaucracy and military. Constitution less initial nine years was the era of predominance of bureaucratic elite and military establishment. Constitutions of 1956 and 1962 were authoritative in nature under which president repeatedly vetoed the allocation of fiscal capital to provinces.
Constitution of 1973 enlarged the provincial representation while
constituting Council of Common Interests (CCI) and National Finance Commission (NFC) but powers of finance-allocation rested with centre. Provinces were not decider of their resources until the enactment of 18th amendment.
Centrality of governance mechanism enhanced ethnic nationalism and fueled ethnic extremism in Pakistan. Dearth of regional autonomy compelled the distressed Bengalis to run on the way of separation. Socio-economic backwardness is a major driving force behind the Baloch insurgency, which also prevailing in Hazara and Saraiki regions. People of Hazara and Saraiki communities particularly youth are aggressive and assuming hard lines against state-served injustices. Ethnic movements of Sindh and Muhajir militancy depict same scenarios.
Eruption of crisis and violence from massive disagreements and unresolved conflicts corrode the achievements and harm the assets. Immediate and effective solutions are need of the hour. Time consuming and fruitless efforts exaggerate the situation. Pakistan has been offering space for hard-core elements who distorted Pakistan’s social and political appearance. Policy designers and conflict managers never prioritized the solution of ethnic conflicts and corrosion of ethnic militancy due to which Pakistan has lost precious lives, enormous wealth and its principle image.
Emergence of Bengali Nationalism Yasser Latif Hamdani verbalizes that, emergence and strengthening of Bengali nationalism did not come immediately. Post independence emergence of Bengali nationalism was deep rooted because of a number of reasons. A few Bengali Muslim Leaguers termed Pakistan Movement as class struggle. In addition, Policy designers announced Urdu as national language of Pakistan,
rejected by Bengalis who wanted Bengali instead of Urdu. They voiced against this declaration against which central government cracked down in Eastern part in 1952. Bengalis demonstrated resentment in harsh means. Hamdani further adds that, Eastern wing received 35% development budget during Ayub period despite of 55% share in total population (Hamdani, 2015).
According to Ashok V. Desai, primarily Pakistan was a producer of raw material, cotton from Western and Jute from Eastern wing. Trade and exchange control by bureaucratic elite resisted the promotion of Jute business in East Pakistan. 60% foreign exchanges earned by Eastern wing were to be spent by central government, which originated sense of Bengali nationalism (Desai, 1971). Ashok V. Desai expresses East/West share in civil services and military posts in these figures. Central Civil Cervices Name of Posts
Total Posts
Eastern Pakistan
Western Pakistan
Secretaries
19
0
19
Joint Secretaries
41
3
38
Deputy Secretaries
133
10
123
Under Secretaries
548
38
510
Military Posts Lieutenant Generals
3
0
3
Major Generals
20
0
20
Brigadiers
35
1
34
Colonels
50
1
49
Lieutenant Colonels
200
2
198
Majors
600
10
590
Naval Officers
600
7
593
Air Force Officers
680
40
640
Economic Disparity Profile Features
Eastern Wing
Western Wing
Population in1970
55
45
Share in Civil Services
17
83
Military Posts
11
89
1st Five Year Plan 1955-60
33
67
2nd Five Year Plan 1960-65
33
67
3rd Five Year Plan 1965-70
37
63
Allocation of Foreign Aid
25-30
70-75
Import Expenses
25
75
Export Income
40
60
Average GDP Share
48
52
Average Per Capita Income
285
420
Source: (Bengali & Sadaqat, 2002)
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman launched heavy and emotional election campaign while focusing the injustices of Pakistani establishment. He advocated his six points, which were comprised of a lot of provincial autonomy with separate currencies for each part. Awami League won 160 out of 300 national seats followed by Bhutto led PPP with 81 seats but Awami League was not allowed to form government in centre. All winning members of Awami League announced that they would not accept any plan besides self-rule (Aziz, 2012). Social, political and economic injustices enthused the Bengalis to gauge an armed movement against Pakistan. More than 3000 military personals joined Indian-trained Makti Bahni and raised revolt against Pakistan (Qasmi, 2015).
Sindhi Nationalism G.M. Syed a Sindhi nationalist opened the new perspectives of ethnic conflict, which led the Sindh towards ethnic militancy. He instigated the Sindhis against Punjabi and Muhajirs through his writings published in “Daily Qurbani” and a book “Faryad-e-Sindh”. Majority of Sindhis endorsed his nationalist but not militant views (PILDAT, 2011). G.M. Syed composed at his
official website (http://www.gmsyed.org) that Sindh was a country with unique culture, history and tradition but not Pakistan. He also wished a political framework outside the Pakistan. B. Raman an Indian author reveals in his book “The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane” that, G.M. Syed visited India and met with Indian leaders including Rajiv Gandhi where he ashamed of his participation in Lahore Resolution 1940. G.M. Syed informed Rajiv Gandhi that, advocates of Sindhudesh are voicing for their rights across the globe (Raman, 2013).
Another episode of Sindhi nationalism emerged which caused hundreds of deaths. Zia dismissed Bhutto government and hanged him, which deepened Sindhi nationalism among the Sindhis. Zia bolstered the Punjabis who captured 56% of jobs. Sindhis, Balochis, Pashtuns and Urduspeaking acquired 3%, 2.5%, 11% and 25% respectively. Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led protests of opposition parties against Zia regime. Apparently, charter of demands was the establishment of confederation with maximum provincial autonomy. Government deployed 45000 soldiers for six months to tackle protests in Sindh, which lasted with more than 1000 causalities (Jaffrelot & Rais, 1999). According to a report of PILDAT, many successful and unsuccessful militant efforts regarding ethnicity have been made in Sindh during Zia regime (PILDAT, 2011)
Urdu speaking migrants were to be resided in urban areas of Sindh after migration from India. Agricultural land was awarded to Punjabi and Muhajir military officers. Resultantly, marginalization of Sindhis was taken place. Moreover, Sindhi-Muhajir cultural and lingual conflict led the Sindh towards ethnic violence. Historically, Punjabi, Baloch and Pashtun migrants assimilated with Sindhi language and culture but Urdu speaking never recognized or adopted local traditions of Sindh (Khatwani & Abbasi, 2014).
Muhajir Militancy in Karachi A Karachi based student leader Altaf Hussain streamed the identity case of Urdu speaking Muhajirs in 1980. He founded a political party All Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO) renamed as Muhajir Qaumi Movement in 1984 and Mutahidda Qaumi Movement (MQM) in 1997. MQM waved the banner of Muhajir’s social, economic and political rights. Ethnic unrest emerged in Sindh following the creation of MQM (Khalid, Munib, Kulsoom, &
Qasim, 2015). According to Nichola Khan MQM became a militant organization, which is reported to involve in street crimes, blind murders, kidnapping and ransom (Khan, 2012). Emergence of MQM is an opening of crime series and ethnic militancy resulted after socioeconomic and political injustices against Muhajirs (Bengali & Sadaqat, 2002).
Security agencies have arrested many terrorists, robbers and kidnappers who confessed their crimes and affiliations with MQM. Some of them also confessed the criminal relationship including training and financial support from Indian secret agency RAW. Altaf Hussain in his telephonic speeches has also expressed the same associating sentiments. Animosity of RAW with Pakistan is not a hidden element. Criminal confessions of MQM-connected criminals; statements of Altaf Hussain and Supreme Court’s judgment are symptoms of MQM’s involvement in Ethnic militancy.
Historically, case of Muhajirs more or less revolves around identity but not socio-economic grievances. One Unit plan was designed to oblige Punjabi-Muhajir domination and disobliged other ethnic communities. Urdu was given status of national language, a language of migrants, which led the Bengalis towards confrontation. Muhajir’s concerns rose up in 1972. Bhutto administration announced Sindhi as official language of Sindh and reformed quota system while separating rural and urban Sindh against which Muhajirs demonstrated their strong reservations (Khatwani & Abbasi, 2014). Another fact of Sindhi-Muhajir conflict is that, 5% Sindhis enjoy 95% landowning. Major portion of other ethnicities particularly Muhajirs are landless. Political influence of landowners and landlessness of Muhajirs commenced the power struggle between two communities (Ansari, 2005).
Ethnic genesis of civilian bureaucrats in 1973 Ethnic Origin
Number of Bureaucrats
Percentage
Punjabis
1728
48.90
Muhajirs
1075
30.35
Others
340
8.5
Pashtuns
285
8.9
Sindhis
91
2.6
Balochis
11
0.89
Total
3530
100%
Source: Researchgate
Baloch Insurgency Balochistan is biggest and richest province of Pakistan. Its covers 43 percent area of Pakistan and is full of valuable resources like gold, copper, oil, gas etc. Province had not control on its natural resources before enactment of 18th amendment. Balochistan has paramount importance due to Gawadar port and accessing way to Caspian region. Pak china economic corridor enhanced its importance for world powers who cast their eyes on its strategic location and natural resources. International players are reported that, they are working on greater Balochistan including the Baloch areas of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Murtha, 2011). Balochistan has been facing despondent attitude of central governments since the emergence of Pakistan. Baloch are far behind the other ethnic communities in terms of socio-economic and political developments. They are deprived of state-provided social services equal to Punjabis, Sindhis and Pashtuns. Pervasive grievances urged the Baloch Youth to pick up weapon against state-sponsored oppression. Dilemma of military operations and case of missing persons in Balochistan intensified the situation. Youth structured militant organizations including Baloch Liberation Army and Baloch Liberation Front to fight for independence. These organizations are involved in suicide bombing, devastation of strategic installments, kidnapping and ransom (Kupecz, 2012). Central and provincial governments tackled the Baloch grievances with miserliness. Economic deterioration and human rights violation urged the suffered Baloch nationalists to demand for
independence or even greater provincial autonomy. Balochistan’s long term growth performance is lowest with 2.7 times from 1970 to 2005 which is 3.6 times in Sindh, 3.5 times in KPK and 4 times in Punjab. 90% Baloch areas are rural and underdeveloped. Majority of Balochis are deprived of pure water, health facilities and sanitation services. Contracts of new development projects are given to non-Baloch companies. Into the bargain, political isolation and ethnic intellect planted the militancy among the Baloch youth (Iqbal, 2012).
Issue of Pashtunistan British military forces marched into Afghanistan in 1839 after capturing Delhi in 1804. The first Anglo-Afghan war ended in 1842 with defeat of British forces. British toppled Afghan ruler Sher Ali in second Anglo-Afghan war 1878. Sher Ali’s son Amir Yaqoob permitted the British to capture frontier cities (currently under FATA and Balochistan) to open British embassy. It was the beginning of Great Game (Siddique, 2014). Mortimer Durand demarcated the Durand Line in 1893 as boundary line between Pashtun regions controlled by British Rule and Abdur Rahman Khan, an Afghan autocrat introduced by British (Rose, 2011). After establishing Durand Line, the British divided the Frontier Region into five parts. British administrators designed two different governing mechanisms for FATA/Balochistan and Afghan frontier regions. Afghan Lashkars waged a war against British who were bushed after First World War. Resultantly, British recognized Afghanistan as an independent state in 1919 under the Treaty of Rawalpindi (Siddique, 2014). These developments urged the Khudai Khidmatgars, Pashtuns of NWFP, to fight for their political rights under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan. Khudai Khidmatgar made alliance with Congress and won the elections of 1937 and 1946. Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan wanted an independent state comprised of Pashtun regions from both sides and boycotted the referendum under which NWFP opted to join Pakistan in 1947. Khudai Khidmatgars accepted Pakistan as fait accompli but a few Pashtuns particularly Mirza Ali Khan popularly known as Faqir of Ipi raised arms against Pakistan. On the other hand, Afghanistan opposed the UN membership for Pakistan, which intensified the Pashtun issue in Pakistan (Siddique, 2014). Faqir of Ipi revolted against British and continued his militant efforts against Pakistan Army for independence after 1947. Jirga of Razmak voiced against creation of Pakistan and appointed him
as first president of Pashtunistan. Afghanistan has also been supporting Pashtun nationalists from 1947 to 1973 for establishment of Pashtunistan (Munir, 2010). Pashtuns think that, they were unified for a century under the Afghan empire. British captured their socio-economic and political rights and fueled the fire while dividing them on both sides of Durand Line. Zahir Shah, Muhammad Daud and post-socialist leadership challenged the Punjabi dominated authority over Pakistani Pashtun areas. They demanded independence of Pashtun areas from Pakistan (Harrison, 2008). In 1950, Zahir Shah campaigned against Pakistan in the support of Pashtunistan. Afghan planes dropped anti-Pakistan brochures in Pashtun areas. Afghan forces attacked the frontier regions of Pakistan repeatedly to strengthen Pashtun cause. In 1950, Afghan raiders approached Dobandi area and captured Bogra Pass of Pakistan (Global Security Organization, 2011). Another historical aspect of Pashtun militancy is post Soviet invasion. Cultural and linguistic resemblances between the Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns tolerated the augmentation of militant dogma in Afghanistan which infiltrated to Pakistan effortlessly. The Pashtun ethnic grouping structured Afghan Talibans who travel freely to tribal areas of Pakistan. The Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for instance, picked inspiration and stimulation from the Afghan Taliban. In the past, the Pakistani establishment has asserted and encouraged Pashtun militancy in Afghanistan to fight against infiltration of Soviet Union (Syed, Saeed, & Martin, 2015).
Movements for New Ethnic Provinces Pakistan is a formation of four ethnic provinces but sizeable ethnic entities are also found within the provinces. No province is free of ethnic and lingual conflicts. For instance, Pashtun and Hazara in Balochistan, Saraiki and Pothohari in Punjab, Hazarawal in KPK and Muhajir in Sindh are under ethnic disagreements. Ethnic and lingual conflicts are going to become hotlines due to growing demands for new provinces on ethnic and lingual basis. People are violent and aggressive because of prejudices, inequalities and chauvinism. Social, economic and political discriminations enhanced the gaps between larger and smaller ethnic entities. Lingual and ethnic conflicts erupt when state ignores concerns of sub-sized ethnicities, which is prime source of ethnic militancy. Dr Moonis Ahmer says that, Pakistan is facing terrorism, violence and ethnic extremism, which shape the socio-political settings. Under this situation,
growing demands of new provinces can track to violent behaviors (Ahmer, 2013). Extreme economic imbalance is creating militancy in underdeveloped areas and driving the movements of new provinces (Feyyaz, 2011). 1 - Hazara Movement Hazara is the largest divisional territory of KPK stretching from Kohistan to Kaghan and populated by Pashto and Hindko speakers. Hazara community are leading a movement to establish a new province i.e. Hazara province whereas Pashtun dominated Awami National Party opposing the division of KPK into two provinces. Demand for Hazara province is a source of conflict between Hazara and Pashtun communities. Abbotabad incident in which seven Hazarawals murdered by police firing, gave new direction to movement. Different groups hold aggressive approach in this regard. Sardar Muhammad Yousaf threatened outside the parliament house that, they would not pay utility bills (Ahmar, 2013). Economic discrimination in KPK fuels ethnic tensions between Hazarawal and Pashtuns. Hazarawal complain that they are deprived of their due share in development budget. The Express Tribune published a news story on February 4, 2012 about blocked funds for Hazara region. Areas
Allocated budget
Due Share
Blocked Funds
Southern Districts
2.8%
21%
18.2%
Hazara Region
6.1%
19%
12.9%
Source: The Express Tribune February 4, 2012 According to a report of Omar Asghar Foundation published on Budget 2016-17, Noshehra a more privileged area is given more funds than less privileged Southern districts and Hazara region. Southern Districts
Hazara Region
Noshehra
2016
4.47 Billion Rupee
4.5 Billion Rupee
5.1 Billion Rupee
Cut Offs/Increase
3.2% to 2.78%
3.1% to 2.82%
3.08% to 3.22%
From Previous Year
Cut Off
Cut Off
Increase
Source: (Omar Asghar Khan Foundation, 2016).
2 - Saraiki Movement Saraiki movement started in 1960 was not political but a cultural and linguistic. Saraiki population perceives the annulment of provincial status of Bahawalpur as violation of accession treaty. Centralized regime of General Zia crushed the movement, which reemerged after his death. Settling of outsiders, revenue/budget difference, economic exploitation, poor infrastructure, meager social services, institutional deficiency and unemployment are major grievances of Saraiki people (Feyyaz, 2011). Economic deprivation, poverty, illiteracy, development imbalance and discrimination are prominent indicators behind the Saraiki Movement and radicalizing the youth of Southern Punjab (Khalid & Leghari, 2014). Education Sector Student Enrollment
Available Teachers
Budget Allocation
Southern Punjab
1805152
39765
22%
Rest of Punjab
3231652
80735
78%
Industrial Growth and Development Industry in 2004
Industry in 2008
Development Budget
Southern Punjab
1408
1838
28%
Rest of Punjab
5115
6812
72%
2004
2006
2008
Southern Punjab
85
105
140
Rest of Punjab
245
295
335
Health Facilities
Poverty Southern Punjab
Bahawalpur Division
D. G. Khan Division
Multan Division
Poverty
38.85 %
49.5%
37.95%
Source: Punjab Development Statistics 2010
Conclusion Pakistan is facing economic fissures, social unrest, political disorder, ethnic militancy and religious extremism. All these factors are generating terrorism and defaming Pakistan at global
fronts. Evaluating socio-economic, political, anthropological and emotional viewpoints, it is concluded that, economic injustice and political discrimination are primary while emotional exaction collided with anthropological resistance and contradiction are secondary indicators of ethnic militancy erupted in Pakistan. Pakistan never tried to tackle ethnic issues democratically but preferred to find a martial solution. A universally known principal of conflict management “it is better to conduct dialogue over the conflict not to fight over the conflict” should be part of plan to tackle ethnic conflicts and combat ethnic militancy. Military establishment tried to find out vigorous solution of Eastern Pakistan quandary in 1971 which caused devastation. Political and military governments have applied same solution strategy in Balochistan and Karachi but had to offer democratic and amicable solution in the end. Political instability and military intervention decrease the pace of growth which is need of the hour to settle the ethnic conflicts. Political system led by powerful feudal lords and influential capitalists has been failed. Leadership crisis has generated ethnic crisis in Pakistan. It should be merged into Pakistani nationalism, possible only under capable middle class leadership. Pace of institutional and public democratization is dead slow in Pakistan, augmenting ethnic militancy. Enforcement of public participatory governance models helped the war-torn countries in countering multifaceted extremism. Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Rwanda and India are practicing same approach. Pakistan can counter multi-type militancy while strengthening local governments and indiscriminative fiscal allocations.
Recommendations ▪
Conflict Prevention
It is first tactics to comprehend the situation and design a short-term approach to put off the possible outbreaks of violent clashes. Security agencies, civil society and vulnerable Groups like Youth and Women should be taken on board to prevent the critical situations. ▪
Conflict Management
Limiting negative aspects and enhancing positive aspects to find out the possible solution is called conflict management. Conflict management approach is a serving-tool to tackle ethnic militancy. It should be discuss and practice in Pakistan.
▪
Separation of Hard Cores and Moderates
It is an applicable solution strategy as experienced in Karachi. State’s negligence has its own place but anti-state brain-washed have to curb. To cut the brain-washed hard cores will curtail the escalation of militancy. ▪
Multi Stakeholder Approach
It is unavoidable for government to prioritize the consultations with all ethnically clashing parties to learn possible solutions and design a final remedy to put an end to ethnic extremism. ▪
Changing Fundamental Approach
Post Quid-i-Azam political leadership, highly centralized bureaucratic formation and military regimes run the state affairs without public participation, which groomed the sense of nonbelongingness among the masses. Resultantly, ethnic nationalism and extremism emerged among the sub-sized ethnicities. This approach minimized in 18th amendment, which should be prioritize in future plans on war footings. ▪
Institutional Democratization
Highly developed countries enforced public participatory governance models to democratize the people. Unfortunately, political and administrative elite practiced institutional centralization in Pakistan. People are unaware of their social, political and economic rights. Public and institutional democratization can prevent the militant ethnicity. ▪
Preventive Diplomacy including Mediation and Reconciliation
Mediatory and reconciliatory diplomacies have solved a number of regional and global disputes. This practice can also be helpful regarding prevention of ethnic extremism in Pakistan. It is state’s responsibility to bring closer the violent ethnic communities in social, cultural and economic terms. ▪
Improving Social Services
Quality of social services maintains the status of healthy society, which is key element of economic prosperity. Poor quality of social services caused frustration in Pakistan. Ignored
communities mark their ethnicities as identifier while thinking their grievances. Improvement in social services can lessen the sense of deprivation among the ignored ethnicities. ▪
Following the Constitutional Procedure
Article 239 of the constitution lays out the procedure for establishing new provinces. Demarcation of new boundaries within the provinces demands approval by two-third majority in respective provincial assembly. Beyond the constitution, political decisions have harmed social and political structure of Pakistan in the past. Going along the constitutional provisions can prevent the country from social unrest and political disorder.
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