CASE Burbe v Magulta
FACTS
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a creditor. Petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case. A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow- ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the
DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows: ―It is
evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for t he Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client.
lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day. his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for client, which caused complainant additional damage and himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his such case has been filed. part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the said funds.‖ funds.‖ complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he
Uy v Gonzales
offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, r espondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a certain amount
other than what was previously agreed upon. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed. Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant; complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way
we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
CASE
FACTS
DOCTRINE
The Court held that the evidence on record fails to Mercado v Vitriolo
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. died. On February 7, 1994, respondent respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant. On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution substitution of Atty. de Leon. On April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City for violation of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent alleged alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children by indicating in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching br eaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred. On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Alcala v de Vera
substantiate complainant’s allegations. The Supreme Court explained that in engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of of trust and confidence. confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client‟s secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship, and continues even after the client‟s death. The factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege are: 1. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication. 2. The client made the communication in confidence. The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. 3. The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. For gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure to inform his clients of the decision in the civil case.
In a civil case for annulment of a sale of 2 lots filed by one Semenchuk against Sps. Alcala on the ground that Petitioners do not appear to have suffered any one of the lots cannot be located or did not exist, herein material or pecuniary damage by the failure of respondent respondent represented sps. Alcala. Trial Court rendered Atty. De Vera to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. judgement against against the sps. 2478 since the decision rendered was fair and justified. It is On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de Vera no less true, however, that in failing to inform his clients, received a copy of the decision but he failed to inform his the petitioners, of the decision in said civil case, clients of the judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, a respondent failed to exercise "such skill, care, and sheriff came to complainants' house to serve a writ of diligence as men of the legal profession commonly execution issued in said case. Totally caught by surprise, possess and exercise in such matters of professional Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired employment" The correctness of the decision in the civil case for the status of case 2478. The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated July 22, 1963, informed Alcala that the case was is no ground for exonerating respondent of the charge decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy of the decision was but at most will serve only to mitigate his liability. While received by respondent attorney on April 19, 1963, and that there is no finding of malice, deceit, or deliberate intent to since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued by cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless, proof of the trial court on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk. negligence, inattention, and carelessness on the part of Spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for respondent in his failure to give timely notice of the decision damages against Atty. Honesto de Vera for having failed to in question. Fortunately for respondent, his negligence did inform them of the decision in case 2478 as a result of which not result in any material or pecuniary damage to the herein they lost their right to appeal from said decision. The court complainants and for this reason We are not disposed to denied it for failure to show that they indeed suffered impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's damages. career as the extreme penalty of disbarment. Complainants instituted this complaint for Act of respondent manifests manifests a lack of total dedication dedication disbarment against their former counsel. or devotion to their interest expected of him under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent's inaction merits a severe censure from the Court.
CASE
FACTS
Lim v Villarosa
Atty. Villarosa was hired by Lumot Jalandoni (Chairman of ORC). Without due notice prior to the hearing, Villarosa filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, resulting in Jalandoni’s defeat.
Villarosa claims he wothdre as counsel because he is a retained counsel of Dennis Jalbuena (son-in-law). Nortwhithsatnding the fact that Jalandoni was still hisclient, villarosa opted to represent opposing clients at the same time. Villarosa also deliberately withheld the entire case file despite demands. He capitalized on said documents. His defense was that the documents were public documents. Pormento v Pontevedra
DOCTRINE There is a violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03. It is only upon full disclosure that a lawyer may appear against his client. There is a conflict when a lawyer accepts a new retainer requiring him to do anything injurios to the first client; and when the new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty. A lawyer owes
undivided allegiance to his client. The attorney-client relationship may be terminated by the client, lawyer, or court, by reason of circumstances beyond their control. A lawyer is allowed to withdraw representation only with the written consent of his client or permission of the court.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: “A lawyer shall not represent Complaint against Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct with prayer for disbarment.
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.”
Respondent was the Pormento family’s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The family’s relationship with the
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
respondent extends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations. The rift between complainant and respondent began when the complainant’s countercla im in a civil case filed with the RTC of Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform complainant Pormento of the dismissal of his counterclaim which Another test to determine if there is a representation of resulted to the latter being deprived of his right to appeal. In conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new order to recover his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of was forced to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or institute an action to recover the subject property. invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of performance thereof. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent land located at Negros Occidental. The Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by client against a former client when the subject matter of the respondent. Since there was another person who claims present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded subject matter of the previous litigation in which he respondent’s advice to build a small house on the property and appeared for the former client. Conversely, he may properly to allow his (complainant’s) nephew and his family to occupy the act as counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the latter, house in order for complainant to establish his possession of the against a former client in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the said property. Subsequently, complainant’s nephew refused to previous employment, there being in that instance no conflict of vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment interests. Where, however, the subject matter of the present case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros suit between the l awyer‟s new client and his former client is Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant’s in some way connected with that of the former client‟s action, the lawyer may have to contend for his new client nephew
Garcia v Manuel
Yu v Tajanlangit
that which he previously opposed as counsel for the former client or to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel. There is a violation of Rule 18.04. The lawyer-client relationship is one of confidence; there is present need of the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case.
Garcia, divorced from her husband, approached Manuel for legal advice concerning child support and her condo unit, which her husband refused to vacate. Garcia paid PhP10,000 as advance fee. It was paid for the filing fee in the Manuel also violated Rule 16.01 and Canon 16. For ejectment case. Garcia made several follow-ups and later receiving PhP10,000, Manuel was under the obligation to founded the ejectment case had not yet been filed. Manuel render an accounting of the same. A lawyer who obtains asserted that it was because he had not yet received the registry possession of funds & properties of his client shall deliver return card evedincing receipt by husband of the demand letter. the same to the client; a) when they become due and b) Investigating commissioner concluded that Manuel displayed upon demand. Manuel failed to return the PhP10,000 despite lack of candor and fidelity to her cause. Garcia’s repeated demands. An attorney‟s lien is not an Yu alleged that he engaged the services of Tajanlangit. As defense counsel in a criminal case which esulted in a judgment of conviction. I nstead of filing an appeal, Tajanlangit filed a petition for certiorari. Due to his error in the choice of remedy, the period to appeal lapsed. Yu claims Tajanlangit violated Rule 16.01 for failing to return the bail bond.
excuse for a lawyer‟s non -rendition of accounting. For Rule 18.01, considering Tajanlangit was only hired after the denial for motion for reconsideration. Yu was silent whether an appeal was still available to him. Yu failed to state the material facts and dates. He cannot have acted in negligence in handling the legal matter entrusted to him. For 16.01, it was not all improper for respondent to have withdrawn the cash bond as there was evidence showing that Yu and Tajanlangit entered into a special fee agreement. But however justified Tajanlangit was in applying the cash bond, he is not excused from rendering an accounting of the same.
CASE Solidon v Macalalad
FACTS Atty Macalalad is the Chief of Legal Division of DENR. Secretary of DENR gave him permission to practice privately. While on official visit to Eastern Samar, Macalalad was introduced to Atty. Solidon. The latter asked the former to handle the judicial titling o f a parcel of land owned by Solidon’s relatives. Consideration of PhP80,000 with PhP50,000 as initial payment. Macalald has not filed any petition for registration over the property. Solidon claimed he tried to contact macalalad as testified also by Mrs. Cabo-barata. Macalalad, however, claimed that the delay in the filing of the petition was because of Solidan’s failure to communicate and to furnish needed
DOCTRINE Atty. Macalalad was negligent of his duties. There is a violation of Rule 18.03. The mere failure to perform the obligations due to the client is per se a violation. A lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to protect the client‟s interests.
Receiving money and failing to render services is a violation of Canon 18. The lawyer has the duty to inform the client of the case‟s status and cannot shift the blame on his client for failing to follow-up. If the client is equally at fault for lack of communication, responsibility remains with the lawyer. A lawyer must exercise utmost diligence. Monetary considerations should have made it more impreaticve.
documents. Aranda v Elayda
Spouses Aranda were defendants in a civil case with Elayda as their counsel. They alleged that Elayda failed to appear in a hearing; that they were not informed of the setting of the hearing; that the court naturally rendered an adverse judgment; and that Elayda failed to inform them therof. Elayda claims that the spouses did not bother to contact them to prepare for the case; that he cannot contact the spouse for they failed to give their contact number.
Atty Elayda is guilty of negligence. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality. As counsel for Aranda, he is expected to monitor progress of the case and is obliged to exert all efforts to present every remedy or defense authorized by law. While communication is a shared responsibility, it is the counsel‟s primary duty to inform the clients of the status of the case. He cannot simply wait for them to inquire. Close coordination is necessary. His defense that he was not able to go hearing was that he was in another hearing is untenable. I n the first place, he should not be in another’s hearing at the same time. He has abandoned his client’s cause. Whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserved his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence. By doing so, he maintains the respect due the legal profession.
Briones v Jimenez
Atty Briones was to conduct an audit of the administration of the estate of the late Luz Henson. Atty. Jimenez is the counsel for Henson’s heirs. Atty. Jimenez filed a
notice of appeal from the order of the court questioning the payment of commission to Briones. Then Jimenez filed with rthe CA a petition for mandamus alleging that respondent judge unlawfully refused to comply with his duty to perform/approve the appeal. Briones claimed Jimenez is guilty of forum shopping. Another complaint of forum shopping is when Jimenez filed a criminal complaint against Briones for disobeying the RTC order directing the latter to deliver the residue estate to the heirs. Jimenez claims he was only protecting the interest of his clients. Rural Bank of Calape Inc. v Florido
RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against Florido, who through force and intimidation, with armed men, forcibly took over the management of RBCI, along with his clients. They forcibly evicted bank Manager garay and destroyed the bank’s
vault and installed their own staff to run it. Florido claims he validly acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos Group, the elected board of directors of RBCI.
Miranda v Carpio
Miranda filed for the registration of a property seeking the services of Atty. Carpio. They agreed that Miranda would pay PhP20,000 as acceptance fee and PhP2,000 as appearance fee. During the last hearing, Carpio demanded an additional PhP10,000 for the preparation of a memorandum plus 20% of the total area of the property, as additional fees. Miranda did not accede. When the petition for registration was granted, Carpio took the duplicate copy without consent from Miranda, demanding that the latter pay the additional fees. Carpio claims he had a lien over the property and that the agreement was not in writing because it was founded on trust.
Briones did not reply to the demand letters, so Jimenez filed a criminal complaint for refusal to obey a lawful order of the court. But, he should have first filed the proper motion with RTC instead of immediately resorting to the criminal complaint. There was a premature criminal prosecution. Rule 19.01 states of fair play. A lawyer‟s act must be within the bounds of law. In rlation to Rule 19.01, while lawyers owe devotion to their interest and zeal in defense of their rights, lawyers must not forget that they are officers of the court bound to assist in the efficient administration of justice.
According to IBP, Florido ought to have known clients could not have taken over the management without court order. The foremost duty of a lawyer is to obey the laws of the land. Canon 19 and Rule 15.00 is applicable in the case at bar. A lawyer must employ only fair play and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. Lawyers are indispensible instruments of justice and peace, and guardians of the rule of the law. His duty is to the administration of justice, not to his client. Client‟s success is wholly subordinate.
The additional fees are not valid. There is a violation of Canon 20. The elements of lien are the following: (1) lawyer-client relationship, (2) lawful possession of the client‟s property, (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney fees. No proof of the agreement was presented. The agreement covered acceptance and appearance fee only.
Carpio committed an alarming abuse of atty. Retaining lien, which is not an absolute right. Carpio unlawfully withheld the delivery of the title of Miranda. It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional fees never mentioned nor agreed upon. “Quantum meuit” or as much as he deserves has no application.
CASE Santeco v Avance
Bunsiong Yao v Aurelio
FACTS Santeco filed a complaint against avance for mishandling a civil case. The court found her guilty of gross
DOCTRINE
misconduct for abandoning the client’s cause in bad faith, and
Avance is guilty of contempt. It is a lawyer‟s duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer‟s obedience to court orders. Her acts constitute insubordination and disrespect. Atty Avance is disbarred.
refusing to comply with lawful orders directed at her without explanation. While her five-year suspension was in effect, Judge Amog-Bocar wrote to court administrator Lock, informing of Avance’s active participation in 3 cases and misrepresenting herself as Atty Liezl tanglao. In a resolution, Avance was required to comment but failed to do so. She was fopund guilty of indirect contempt with fine, but still failed to pay. Yao purchased several parcel of land using his personal funds, but were registered in the name of the corporation. Solar Farms and Livelihood and Solar Fishing under the advice of Atty. Aurelio, who was the brother-in- law of Yao’s wife. A dispute between Aurelio and Yao’s wife happened.
He demanded for the return of his investment but Yao refused. He filed charges of estafa and falsification against Yao and also for non-compliance with reportorial requirements of SEC. Yao alleges the acts were harassment and constitutes an abuse of confidential information, which Aurelio obtained by reason of his employment, as counsel. Francisco v Portugal
SPO1 Francisco was charged for murder and frustrated murder but was only found guilty of 2 homicide. Francisco engaged the services of Portugal who filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Then, he filed an urgent Motion for Leave to file 2 nd Motion for Reconsideration. Thereafter, Farncisco never heard of Portugal again despite frequent calls to his office. Portugal states that he was not the original counsel, there was no formal engagement undertaken, no adequate remuneration.
Yao’s refusal to disclose certai n financial records
prompted Aurelio to file several charges, constituting forumshopping. Lawyers must conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.
Portugal committed gross misconduct. At some point, Portugal’s office would have received the Resolution dismissing the petition. He could have at least informed Francisco. Even when he knew that Francisco called, he opted not to return their calls. For his withdrawal, he should have filed it himself instead of the accused. A client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship with or without cause. The right of an attorney to terminate such is restricted. He is not at a liberty to abandon it without just cause. Right to withdraw is vested only after client‟s consent. As supported by Canon 17, there is the presence of attorney-client relationship even without fees being paid or even when under-compensated.
Macaburro may be reinstated. Teves v Macaburo
Macaburo was disbarred for contracting a bigamous marriage with Teves and a 3 rd marriage with one Josephine Constantino. 8 years after, Macaburro seeks judicial clemency and reinstatement.
The following are guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency: 1. Prrof of remorse and reformation (certification/testimonials) 2. Sufficient time lapse from imposition of the penalty to a period of reform 3. He has productive years ahead of him, he can be put to good use. 4. Promise/potential for public service 5. Other relevant factors.
Macaburro has asked for forgiveness from his children from Teves; returned to the province, to take care of his ailing mother; assumed a position of Local Assessment Operations Officer; took part in socio-civic activities; NBI attested that he has no record on file; regular church goer. While the court is mindful of the duty to discipline and remove officer, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways.
CASE In Re: Argosino
FACTS
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte, Raul Camaligan, during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation. On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order recommending petitioner's discharge from probation On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation. On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case. The Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer.
DOCTRINE The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of ju stice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. “ A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose
Olbes v Deciembre
Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the for which he [or she] has sworn to respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him quest for truth and justice, be a fearless crusader.” [18] as security for a loan by writing on those checks amounts By taking the lawyer‟s oath, an attorney becomes a that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had instrument in the fair and impartial administration of already been paid. justice.[19] Lawyers should act and comport themselves with In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to government employees working at the Central Post Office, promote the public‟s faith in the legal profession.[20] The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier and Lourdes, a mandates the following: ―Canon 1. Canon 7. Rule 7.03.‖ mail sorter. A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 required of members of the bar .[21] Such conduct of nobility and her application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and their private lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) public’s faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social blank checks which served as collateral for the approved responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the manner consistent with truth and honor .[22] The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon future.[6] them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks for is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity . times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas court .[23] Pambansa (BP) 22. Several months after, or on January 20, Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit- unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and [32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of dishonorable; Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. The former date the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables took place in Rizal, the latter in Quezon City. one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.[33]
CASE De Guzman v De Dios
Melegrito v Barba
FACTS
In 1995, complainant engaged the services of respondent as counsel in order to form a corporation, which would engage in hotel and restaurant business in Olongapo City. On January 10, 1996, with the assistance of Atty. De Dios, complainant registered Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) with the Securities and Exchange Commission.[2] Complainant paid on respondent a monthly retainer fee of P5,000.00. On December 15, 1997, the corporation required complainant to pay her unpaid subscribed shares of stock amounting to two million two hundred and thirty five thousand pesos (P2,235,000.00) or 22,350 shares, on or before December 30, 1997. On January 29, 1998,[3] complainant received notice of the public auction sale of her delinquent shares and a copy of a board resolution dated January 6, 1998 authorizing such sale.[4] Complainant soon learned that her shares had been acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the incorporators of SBHI. The sale ousted complainant from the corporation completely. While respondent rose to be president of the corporation, complainan t lost all her life’s savings invested therein. Complainant alleged that she relied on the advice of Atty. De Dios and believed that as the majority stockholder, Atty. de Dios would help her with the management of the corporation.
DOCTRINE
Respondent claims that there was no attorney-client relationship between her and complainant. The claim has no merit. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation. She appeared as counsel in behalf of complainant. There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent. Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[8]
We said:
“To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, „of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law,‟ it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.” [9] Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests and engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct .[10] As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyer‟s oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment ,[11] or other disciplinary action.[12] The acts of respondent Atty. De Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate . Although the decision of this court appears to have been final and unappealable when the It appears from an examination of the record that complainants consulted the respondent, we are satisfied Francisco Gonzales, the owner of the greater part of the that he never so informed them, but on the contrary led "Hacienda Esperanza", transferred certain portions of it to his them to believe that the cases could be taken to the daughters Ramona, Guadalupe, Cristina, and Aurea Supreme Court of the United States, and that to Gonzales, and that in 1914 his daughters filed separate prosecute the appeal to the best advantage it was applications in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for necessary for him to go to Washington . the registration of their respective portions of the hacienda . The respondent attorney is guilty of The registration was opposed by Felix Melegrito and more malpractice. He collected several thousand pesos from than 230 other persons. the complainants for the purpose of taking their cases to In February, 1930, the complainants engaged the the Supreme Court of The United States, but he never respondent attorney to appeal their cases to the Supreme removed said cases to that court or attempted to do so, Court of the United States, and agreed to pay him P6,500. because the decision of this court had already become The respondent sailed for the United States in October, final and unappealable, and he was guilty of deceit in 1930, and returned in March, 1931. While in the United concealing that fact from the complainants while States he went to Washington and secured a letter of collecting fees from them for the purpose of prosecuting introduction from the Vice-President of the United States to the appeal.
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands in the hope of being appointed a member of the Governor-General's staff. It does not appear that the respondent made any attempt, either in Manila or in Washington, to take the cases of the complainants to the Supreme Court of the United States, because, as the respondent states, the decision of this court had become final and unappealable, and the records had been returned to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice of other gross misconduct in such office. It appears from the testimony of Felix Melegrito that in April, 1931, he made a demand on the respondent for the return of the money which the complainants had paid him, and the respondent promised to repay the sum of P1,500 at once and the remainder at the rate of P50 a month, but that the respondent has never repaid any sum to the complainants.
CASE
FACTS
Chua v Mesina
now deceased husband Chua Yap An’s legal counsel and
Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building situated at Burgos Street, Cabanatuan City (Burgos property) owned by respondent’s
family, and another property containing an area of 854 sq. m., situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan City (Melencio property), also owned by respondent’s famil y whereon they (spouses Chua) constructed their house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, respondent’s mother Felicisima Melencio vda. de Mesina
(Mrs. Mesina), in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, respondent convinced complainant Ana Chua and her husband to help Mrs. Mesina by way of settling her obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq. m. Accommodating respondent’s request, the spouses
Chua and their business partner, herein co-complainant Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesina’s bank obligation in the
DOCTRINE
This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes,28 and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law;29 That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.30 Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.31 Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owner’s copy of his mother’s title upon the misrepresentation
that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty. That the signature of ―Felicisima M. Melencio‖ in the 1985 document32 and that in the 1979 document33 are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979 or the 1985 document or even both.
amount of P983,125.40. As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another A propos is this Court’s following pronouncement Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to in Nakpil v. Valdez 34 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with of capital gains tax. his client but the business transaction must be Complainants were subsequently issued on January characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to 21, 1986 a title over the Melencio property. Not long after the execution of the February 9, 1979 exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Juanito standard that is required in businessdealings where the Tecson (Tecson) filed an Affidavit[5] dated February 20, 1986 parties trade at “arms length.” Business transactions before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutor’s Office charging respondent’s mother, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and
the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina. A new title was accordingly issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of ―Felicisima M. Melencio,‖ the owner’s copy of
which was entrusted to complainants. Some years later or on May 2, 1990, respondent approached complainants and told them that he would borrow the owner’s copy of Mrs. Mesina’s title with the
undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants’ favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a written undertaking[8] dated May 2, 1990. Despite respondent’s repeated promises ―to effect‖ th e transfer of title in complainants’ name, he failed to do
so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to the public.
between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney‟s favor.35 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the reconveyance of the Melencio property to complainants, consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such promise should be taken up in the civil case filed for the purpose, the issue there being one of ownership while that in the case at bar is moral fitness.37 In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 1. Rule 1.01. Rule 1.02. CANON 7. Rule 7.03. CANON 15. Rule 15.07. CANON 17. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED.
CASE Toledo v Abalos
Cojuangco v Palma
FACTS DOCTRINE This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back. We agree with the Commission that respondent may On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of not be disciplined either by the IBP or by this Court for P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months from failing to pay her obligation to complainant. Complainant‟s date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee the payment remedy is to file a collection case before a regular court of of said obligation, respondent executed a Promissory Note justice against respondent. The general rule is that a lawyer may not be (Exhibit ―B‖). After the lapse of six months, and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily obligation. Afraid that she will not recover her money, assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the non-professional or private capacity . Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the Commission We, however, find the recommendation to suspend on Bar Discipline. respondent from the practice of law for six months to be grossly Despite due notice, respondent failed to disproportionate to the act complained of , i.e., her failure to appear. Accordingly, complainant was allowed to present her appear before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the evidence ex-parte after which, the case was considered IBP. With her legal knowledge and expertise, respondent may submitted for resolution. Respondent received this order as have known all along that the Commission has no jurisdiction shown by the registry return. However, she again did not do over a complaint for collection of a sum of money which she anything about it. borrowed in her private capacity. Hence, her adamant refusal to On June 19, 1999, the Commission passed a resolution appear before said body. recommending the suspension from the practice of law of It was, however, still necessary for respondent to respondent for a period of six months ―for her flouting resistance acknowledge the orders of the Commission in deference to its to lawful orders of the Court and illustrating her despiciency of authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton her oath of office as a lawyer.‖ The Commission, however, disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary declined to discipline her for failing to meet her financial sanction. Thus, her suspension from the practice of law for one obligation, the same having been incurred in her private month is warranted. capacity.
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds ―deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.‖
Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70’s. Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala &
Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal counsel. Consequently, respondent’s relationship with complainant’s family became intimate. He traveled and dined
with them abroad.[2]
He frequented their house and even tutored complainant’s 22 -year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption Convent. On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is c ommitted in the lawyer‟s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[17] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[18 ] While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer,[19] however, professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement.
It
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondent’s
was only the next day that respondent informed complainant
closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s
and assured him that ―everything is legal.‖
Complainant was
complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship
shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded. Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his (complainant’s) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented
with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s back and courted his
complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong.
himself as ―bachelor‖ before the Hong Kong authorities to
facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they ―shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.‖
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law. Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorney‟s Oath which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is allowed to practice.
CASE Lachica v Tormis
Bravo v Morales
FACTS
DOCTRINE
On July 2, 2003, Domugho was apprehended by PO3 Epifanio G. Sanjorjo at around 8:45 p.m. and was brought to It is also undisputed that respondent judge [5] the police station for booking and custody at 9:30 p.m . personally received the cash bail bond for the accused. For However, on July 3, 2003, at around 8:30 a.m., this act alone, respondent is already administratively liable. complainant was surprised to receive a call from the accused Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal informing her that she was released from confinement on Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond July 2, 2003 at 10:00 p.m. Complainant inquired from the may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue police station if an Order of Release was issued by the court, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not but she was informed that the accused was released authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should because the respondent judge called the police station and such cash be kept in his office. The respondent judge is guilty of gross told the desk officer that the accused had posted a cash bail misconduct for having abused her judicial authority bond and may already be r eleased. Complainant checked the case records but the when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the expediente contained no copy of the release order. The accused and for deliberately making untruthful police blotter showed no entry that an order of release was statements in her comment and during the investigation received by the police. Only a notation that the accused had of the instant administrative case with intent to mislead this Court. put up a cash bail bond was entered therein. Complainant also averred that it was improper for the The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine respondent judge to receive the cash bail bond as the and adversely reflect on the honesty and integrity of function belongs exclusively to the Office of the Clerk of respondent judge as an officer of the court; they also betray a Court. She claimed that respondent judge committed an act character flaw which speaks ill of her person. Making false of impropriety when she called the police station to verbally representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As order the release of the accused. She claimed that it was the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more irregular that no copy of the release order was found in the importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by expediente in the morning of July 3, 2003 considering that it the law and weave an example for the others to follow .[13] was supposedly issued on July 2, 2003. These consolidated administrative cases which are At bottom is the sad spectacle of two officials of in the nature of a charge and countercharge sprang from the the judiciary wasting the precious hours of the Court, same incident. Judge Crispin B. Bravo, charges his former including theirs, that could have otherwise been devoted to a branch clerk of court, Atty. Miguel C. Morales with grave more salutary productive judicial pursuit rather than on petty misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer. On the wrangling that has no place in the judicial system. They other hand, Atty. Morales charges Judge Bravo with grave ought to be reminded that the nature and responsibilities of abuse of authority, slander, harassment, grave ignorance of the men and women in the judiciary, as defined in different the law, inefficiency and grave/serious misconduct. canons of conduct, are neither mere rhetorical words nor In his complaint in A.M. No. P-05-1950, Judge idealistic sentiments but working standards and attainable Bravo alleged, in gist, the following: goals to be matched with actual deeds . 3 That while serving as the Acting Presiding Judge of The Court has repeatedly stressed that court MeTC, Manila, Branch 17, he requested the detail of his employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest branch clerk of court, Atty. Morales. Later, he recommended clerk, being public servants charged with dispensing to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the immediate justice, should always act with a high degree of dismissal of Atty. Morales from the service for corrupt professionalism and responsibility, if not maturity. Their practices; that since he made the recommendation, he conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and observed Atty. Morales to have acted discourteously and decorum, but must also be in accordance with law and disrespectful toward him. He relates that whenever he greets court regulations. They should avoid any act or conduct court employees with a "good morning ladies and gentlemen" that would or tend to diminish public trust and after every flag raising ceremony, as was his usual practice, confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with he noticed Atty. Morales mimicking him in a squeaky comical the dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of voice, obviously to make fun of him; among others. responsibility. 4 At his end, Atty. Morales avers in his counterWe take this opportunity to remind both Judge complaint that Judge Bravo failed to behave with due Bravo and Atty. Morales that government service is restraint when the judge ordered his arrest. As Atty. Morales people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of argued, unjust vexation is covered by the Rules on Summary dispensing justice; civility is never a sign of weakness Procedure, adding that unjust vexation is not a continuing and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. offense and, ergo, a warrantless arrest could not be effected Impatience and rudeness have no place in the therefor, let alone by the responding police officers who have government service in which personnel are enjoined to no personal knowledge, as it were, of the alleged crime. act with self-restraint and civility at all times . 7
CASE
FACTS
In Re: MTCC Koronadal
This administrative case stems from the Judicial and Financial Audit conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Koronadal City from August 5 to August 9, 2002, by an audit team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge Agustin T. Sardido, who presided over the MTCC of Koronadal City, assumed office sometime in May 1988; and Clerk of Court Maxima Borja, on February 18, 2002. The latter, however, had been employed therein since 1987, serving as clerk II and stenographer until she was appointed clerk of court. Prior to Borja’s assumption, the clerk of court was Normandie A. Ines, who compulsorily retired on October 9, 2001. The audit team found that Judge Sardido usually arrived late for work. On Mondays, he would report only in the afternoons. Due to his habitual tardiness, court sessions were usually scheduled only in the afternoons. The audit team also found that Judge Sardido had allowed Rufino Vargas, a non-employee of the court, to discharge the duties and functions of a court interpreter without the prior approval of the OCA.. The audit team’s physical inventory of pending cases revealed several anomalous findings. The financial audit also revealed numerous anomalies and lapses. In point: the court failed to collect filing fees in estafa and BP 22 cases; cash bonds were posted with the court without being offcially receipted and were unaccounted; the practice of not issuing official receipts allowed the appropriation of funds for unauthorized purposes
In Re; Judge Herrera
Judge Damaso A. Herrera, the former Presiding Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court in Biñan, Laguna, filed an application for optional retirement effective April 5, 2004. The Court approved his application through the resolution issued on July 5, 2004. Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now a Member of the Court, initiated an administrative matter for agenda dated October 1, 2004 to report on the cases submitted for decision before newly-retired Judge Herrera, citing 55 of such cases mentioned in the March 2004 monthly report of Judge Herrera’s branch, some of which were already beyond the reglementary period to decide. The report further indicated that the cases submitted for decision as reported in the December 2003 monthly report totaling 26 increased to 55 in the March 2004 monthly report due to the addition of 29 cases; that Judge Herrera failed to request the extension of his time to decide the cases; that Branch 24 did not submit the monthly reports of cases within the period required; and that most of the cases submitted for decision had not been reflected in the submitted reports.
DOCTRINE Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue; it is a necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, to all officials and employees, all of whom are deemed standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon courts of justice.[9] In legal contemplation, the judge presiding over a branch of a court is the head of that branch.[10] As such, Judge Sardido should have served as an example to the court employees working under him. This Court has reiterated the need for judges to decide cases promptly and expeditiously. It cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. The failure of judges to decide cases with dispatch constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.[12] By his practice of dismissing criminal cases under preliminary investigation without transmitting the pertinent resolution and records to the prosecutor, Judge Sardido showed either gross ignorance of remedial law or, worse, willful disobedience thereof. For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged with grave misconduct. Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that ―the judge is the visible represe ntation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow.‖[14] Section 15(1), Article VIII, of the Constitution requires a trial judge to dispose of all cases or matters within three months from the time of their submission for decision. Conformably with the constitutional prescription, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of thei r courts‟ business promptly and to decide cases within the required period.Unless every trial judge earnestly, painstakingly, and faithfully complies with this mandate of efficiency, the present clogged dockets in our judicial system cannot be cleared .[12] In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 22, Kabacan, North Cotabato,[13] the Court has impressed upon trial judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously to accord with the time honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied, viz: Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Indeed, a judge must display that ―interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the day’s labor fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods. Only thus can he do his part in the great work of speeding up the administration of justice and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the estimation of the people. Judge Herrera should have sought additional time by simply filing a request for extension if, to him, rendering a decision or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary period became unavoidable. That he did not so seek additional time reflected his indifference to the prescription to decide within the time limits of the law. Thus, we choose not to consider seriously his excuses as exempting him from the due observance of the time limits of the law or as exonerating him from administrative liability. The excuses, assuming they were true, could only be treated as mitigating circumstances vis-à- vis the properly imposable penalty .[17]
CASE
FACTS
In Re: Judge Dizon
The sole charge brought against the respondent by the former Commissioner of Customs, Hon. Alexander A. Padilla, of which we found him guilty is that he rendered a manifestly erroneous decision in People of the Philippines v. Lo Chi Fa through gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. It was alleged that Judge Dizon not only acquitted Lo Chi Fai of the crime of violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960 in spite of the accused having been apprehended with US$355,349.57 worth of foreign currencies while boarding a plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove the criminal intent to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act. This court pointed out that in offenses punished by special laws, proof of malice or deliberate intent is not necessary. The offenses are mala prohibita. The respondent now comes to us appealing for a compassionate review of the Court's judgment. He admits that his decision was erroneous but pleads that his mistaken judgment proceeded from good faith and not from a deliberate desire to pervert his position. He pleads also "(E)ven for the sake of his family alone, ... for a review of (such a) pronouncement which not only imposes the stigma of removal from his position, but adds the trauma of the loss of all benefits derived from his long years of service and the forfeiture of further gainful employment in the Government."
Gandeza v Tabin
Before us is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainant Atty. Gandeza, Jr. against Judge Maria Clarita C. Tabin for Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge. Complainant alleged that on November 20, 2007, around 9 o'clock in the evening, a Mitsubishi Galant with collided head on with a Ssangyong Musso Pick-Up driven by Marion Derez. The Mitsubishi Galant is owned by complainant and his wife, Atty. April B. Gandeza, while the Ssangyong Musso Pick-Up is owned by respondent Judge's nephew, Paul N. Casuga. Complainant recalled that when he arrived at the accident site, he saw respondent Judge conferring with the police investigator. He claimed that respondent Judge approached him and in a harsh tone accused his driver to be the one at fault and was under the influence of liquor. Respondent also kept on reminding the police investigator to put in his report the alleged drunken condition of his driver despite complainant's request to respondent judge not to prejudge the situation. Complainant claimed that at the hospital, while both drivers were being subjected to physical examination, respondent Judge, instead of accompanying her nephew's driver, opted to stand closely beside complainant's driver and kept on suggesting to the examining doctor that his driver was under the influence of liquor. He added that when respondent Judge came to know the "negative" result of the alcoholic breath examination of his driver, she protested and demanded another examination on his driver. Despite his protests and his driver's refusal to undergo a re-examination, respondent Judge's request prevailed. Later on, complainant alleged that a new medical certificate showing his driver was under the influence of liquor was issued upon respondent's insistence. Subsequent interferance also took place in a number of instances.
DOCTRINE This notwithstanding, there is no clear indication from the records that the respondent's assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose to set the plainly guilty free. There is gross misjudgment — yes, but not a deliberate twisting of facts to justify his decision. It was his egregiously erroneous interpretation of the law which led us to discipline the respondent. In our February 23,1988 resolution, we stated that "(A) judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith." (Emphasis supplied) The forego ing doctrine remains the law . We do not, by any means, exonerate the respondent from all blame nor do we completely overlook the erroneous judgment. His act remains unjustified. It does not speak well of an officer who must "read, study and ponder" and "personify learning and equanimity." It is a truism that the learning process in law does not stop upon graduation from college and admission to the Bar. There should be, on the contrary, more sustained intellectual effort on the part of the members of the legal profession. Certainly, judges are not exempt from this obligation. It is even more incumbent on them as they are thought of as the oracles of law. There is likely then to be a disillusionment in the judicial process if, as did happen here, an occupant of the bench was found to be woefully lacking in legal knowledge ... The efforts for improvement in the mode of administering the government in all its manifold complexity would come to naught if our people can harbor the suspicion that judges do not even know what the law is. While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who are selected to fill the positions of administrators of justice. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we feel he has been sufficiently punished for the administrative infraction. We, therefore, order his reinstatement. While we agree with the findings that respondent Judge cannot be held liable for gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judge due to lack of evidence of malice on the part of respondent Judge, we, however, agree with the findings of the OCA that Judge Tabin is guilty of impropriety. As found by the OCA, it was inappropriate for respondent judge to direct that a second test be conducted on complainant's driver when the first test resulted in a "negative." Respondent judge cannot interfere in the conduct of the investigation. Inevitably, as a result of her interference, complainant suspected that she was influencing the outcome of the investigation. Even assuming that respondent Judge did not make public her position as a judge to the examining doctor or the investigating policeman, the fact that she knew that said police officer and the complainant had knowledge of her being a judge should have refrained her from further interfering in the investigation. She cannot act oblivious as to how and what the public will view her actions. She should have kept herself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance herself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum. To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate‟s activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesar‟s wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent‟s act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant observation.
CASE
FACTS
Maceda v Vasquez
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court. Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1991 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences. In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
DOCTRINE
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. However, we agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court t hat can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.
CASE Gutierrez v Santos
FACTS On August 15, 1958 Benigno Musni and others filed a complaint with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications against Ricardo M. Gutierrez alleging therein, inter alia, that the latter had illegally constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds located in Barrio San Esteban, Macabebe, Pampanga. They prayed that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056, the said obstructions be ordered removed or destroyed. On December 13, 1958 Gutierrez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the proceedings to be held before Julian C. Cargullo, the investigator appointed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, would be void because Republic Act 2056 was unconstitutional as it conferred judicial powers to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. This motion was denied and the investigator set the case for hearing on December 19 and 20, 1958. On February 25, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the Hon. Arsenio Santos from trying and deciding the case, upon the ground that sometime in 1948 he had acted as counsel for fishpond owners, like the petitioner Gutierrez, in an administrative investigation in involving the same or at least similar issues and properties, and had expressed views in the course of said investigation prejudicial or adverse to the contention of the respondents in the pending case. Petitioner Gutierrez objected to the motion aforesaid upon the ground that there was no legal ground upon which Judge Santos could be disqualified under the provisions of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. After the hearing on the matter, the respondent Judge issued an order dated April 16, 1959 disqualifying himself and endorsing the case to the Second Branch of the court.
In Re: Flordeliza
The charges laid against the respondent Judge are, in general: (1) That on different occasions the respondent certified falsely as to the status of the cases pending decision before him, in violation of section 129 of the Administrative Code; (2) that the respondent is guilty of delay and lack of diligence in the disposition of the cases pending before him, in violation of section 165 of the Administrative Code, and generally accepted principles which determine judicial standards; and (3) that the respondents is guilty of partiality in the performance of his official duties. One charge is that the respondent Judge has proceeded in many cases with manifest and evident partiality. Under the subject of negligent performance of the duties of his office to the grave prejudice of the public interest, complainants allege that there are to many cases placed on the calendar for one day. Under the same subject, it is further alleged that court sessions are held only for three hours and a half each day, while section 165 of the Administrative Code calls for not less than five-hour sessions of courts of first instance except on Saturdays. The last and most serious charge presented, having a close relationship with the congestion of cases on the docket of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the delay in the disposition of these cases, especially criminal cases, and the lack of diligence in catching up with the court work, concerns the alleged false certification of the respondent under section 129 of the Administrative Code, in order to secure the payment of his salary. Attention is invited to a number of cases which were decided beyond the ninety-day period mentioned in the law, and, with certain qualifications, these facts are admitted by the respondent.
DOCTRINE Petitioner invokes the provision of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it as the true intention of the law — stated in general terms — that no judge shall preside
in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent because — However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it knows, but which it should forget in that process. . . . The fear he has thus expressed — of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment — does not appear to be capricious and whimsical,
having in mind particularly that in his order of August 11, 1959 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. In view of these circumstances, we are constrained to agree with His Honor that the opinion thus expressed by him years ago "might, some way or another, influence his decision" in the case before him. Judges and auxiliary judges of first instance, judges of municipal courts, and justices of the peace shall certify on their applications for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the pay rolls upon which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, demurrers, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate, and no leave shall be granted and no salary shall be paid without such certificate. The law requires that before leave shall be granted or salary shall be paid to any judge or auxiliary judge of first instance, he shall make a certificate that all cases and proceedings which have been under submission for determination or decision for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate. The key words, needing construction, are "determined and decided."
The word "determined" is hardly the equivalent of "decided" and does not have quite as far-reaching a meaning. "Determine," it has been said, does not mean more than tried. "Decided" or "decide," according to the lexicographers, is defined as "to form a definite opinion," "to render judgment." In this jurisdiction, upon the trial of a question of fact, the decision of the court must be given in writing and filed with the clerk. At common law there was an offense known as extortion in office, which was the taking by color of office, of money or other thing of value that is not due, before it is due, or more than is due. It has been held that a judge is removable from office for demanding and receiving compensation to which he is not entitled, and this is so notwithstanding he acts in good faith and in an honest belief that he is entitled to such compensation.
In conclusion, therefore, we have decided to pay no particular attention to the general charges of partiality and negligence which have been filed against Judge Flordeliza. We do find, however, that he has not displayed that interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the day's labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods. Only thus can he do his part in the great work of speeding up the administration of justice and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the estimation of the people. The mountain of six or seven hundred pending cases in Sorsogon could be removed by a judge of first instance of alert mind and quick decision, not afraid of work, with the aid of a helpful bar and a sympathetic government.
CASE Kilat v Judge Macia
FACTS
DOCTRINE
This is an administrative complaint charging respondent Judge Mariano S. Macias, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, with immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape, and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law.[1] According to complainant, Juvelyn Kilat, she was a sixteen (16) year-old working high school student in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur when she met respondent in November 1999. Subsequent events had happened. For his part, respondent claims that complainant was just being used by his ex-wife, Margie Corpus Macias, and several other personalities who he believed had ―selfish and personal axes to grind‖ [4] against him. He denies the accusation of raping and having illicit relations with complainant whom he knew only as a passing acquaintance. He claims that he had been in contact with complainant only once, when he bought her cellular phone, and only because he pitied her. Respondent asserts that complainant informed him that she was kidnapped and merely forced to sign the documents used in the instant administrative complaint. On 1 December 2003, the Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding information and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. L-00727, raffled to RTC Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte presided by respondent judge. On 2 December 2003, respondent issued an order for the arrest of the persons named in the information .[13] The next day, accused moved for the inhibition of respondent from the criminal case on the ground that respondent is directly involved in the said case. Respondent thus issued an order inhibiting himself from the criminal proceedings and recommended to the Court that another judge be designated in his place .[14] The accused in Criminal Case No. L-00727 filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80984) with the Court of Appeals, questioning: (i) the DOJ resolution ordering the filing of informations against them; (ii) the information filed; and (iii) the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, nullifying the information and quashing the warrant of arrest earlier issued.
Administrative charges against members of the judiciary must be supported at least by substantial evidence ,[24] or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the present case, no other document or evidence was submitted to substantiate the charges of immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape, and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law against respondent judge. More importantly, complainant herself executed sworn statements recanting her charges against respondent.
Salcedo v Bollozos
The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo. The complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land ( disputed property ). On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant was supervising an on-going construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police promptly responded and arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition[1] on his behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for employing ―self -help in preventing squatters from putting up improvements in their titled property.‖
In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims h ad been unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleges that the respondent judge ―accommodated‖ the issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalack’s counsel) are
members of the Masonic fraternity.
Now on the issue of abuse of authority. Rule 137 of the Rules of Court mandatorily disqualifies a judge or judicial officer to sit in any case in which: (a) he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; (b) he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law; (c) he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel; or (d) he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record .[26]
There is no dispute that Mrs. Margie Corpus-Macias, accused in Criminal Case No. L-00727, is the estranged wife of respondent judge. This circumstance makes it mandatory for respondent to inhibit himself from the case, but this he unfortunately did not do. He cannot exercise his discretion whether to inhibit himself or not. It was a clear case of violation of the Rules of Court. As properly observed both by the OCA and the Investigating Justice, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not ministerial in nature, but rather requires the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.[27] However, respondent judge issued the warrant of arrest a mere day after the filing of the information charging accused therein with grave coercion and serious illegal detention. Such undue alacrity casts doubt on the motive of respondent, especially since the accused were known to him to be the same people who instigated the present administrative case against him, and against whom he filed a civil suit for damages. Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal, or administrative – for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies .[7]
We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did, that there is no evidence on record that supports the complainant’s allegation that the issuance was tainted with manifest bias and partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The fact that the respondent judge and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not prove that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. The complainant‟s allegation of partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor. Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively accountable simply because he erred in his judgment has never been the intent of the law; reasonable competence and good faith judgments, not complete infallibility, are what the law requires. The more significant issue in this case is the complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against the respondent judge. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested in him.[12] More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive .[13]
CASE Belen v Judge Belen
FACTS
Complainant filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court. According to complainant, [1] sometime in March 2004, respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against complainant’s father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was
dismissed for lack of probable cause by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman. Respondent judge filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and Disqualif[ication]) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-Lagman was always absent during the hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case. Respondent judge likewise filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the filing of several cases against the latter. Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and employees, requesting information on complainant’s piggery and poultry business; advising them of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain environmental laws; and reminding the local government authorities of their duty to forestall the issuance of municipal clearance and license to complainant’s business establishment. All of the letters bore a letterhead indicating respondent judge’s official
government position
DOCTRINE Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public information regarding complainant’s piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as government officials or employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing these letters, respondent judge‟s use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and stating that the letter was “from [his] chambers,” clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his office to influence said government officials and employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In other words, respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest. This is violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. In a similar case, the Court ruled that members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. No position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness on the individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judge‟s transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title. The use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding circumstances of the use - the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of “impropriety” or “appearance of impropriety”. Investigation of Judge Agayan and his court personnel
Mercado v Salcedo
These are consolidated administrative cases filed against Judge Erasto D. Salcedo ( respondent judge), Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Tagum City, charging him with violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[1] Administrative Matter No. RTJ-03-1781 In the letter dated January
2, 2001, the respondent judge was accused of bias and gross partiality in handling the investigation of the administrative case filed against Judge Napy Agayan ( Judge Agayan) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao del Norte; and on Agrarian Cases.
Administrative Case No. RTJ-03-1782
On December 18, 2001, State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco brought to the attention of then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the indictment of the respondent judge for violation of P.D. No. 1612 and recommended that appropriate administrative charges be initiated by the Supreme Court against him for violations of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[12]
From all these, what appears clear to us is that the respondent judge conducted a very superficial investigation, if what he did can be labelled as an investigation at all These actions tell us that the respondent judge deliberately covered up Judge Agayan’s absences and irregular attendance. The respondent judge apparently forgot that his first and foremost duty was to conduct a thorough and objective investigation and to make a complete report of his findings regardless of his personal sentiments and beliefs . The task assigned to him was an assignment involving trust and the exercise of his functions as a j udge. The Possession and Use of a Stolen Vehicle The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court employee is not per se a violation of judicial norms and standards established for court personnel, as borrowing is a legitimate and neutral act that can happen in everyday life. However, judges and court employees – by the nature of their functions and of the norms and standards peculiar to their positions – live their lives under restrictions not otherwise imposed on others; specifically, they cannot simply borrow in situations when this act may or can affect the performance of their duties because of the nature of the thing borrowed or the identity of the borrower, or in situations when borrowing would involve ethical questions under express rules. In this case, the complaint alleged that what the respondent judge borrowed was in fact a vehicle that was the subject of a previous litigation before his sala; the respondent judge borrowed, too, from a lender who still had cases before his sala. The Execution of a Final Judgment in the Consolidated Agrarian Cases
The respondent judge ought to have known that the joint decision was already final and executory and could no longer be disturbed when he made his adjustments. This legal reality, known as the rule of immutability of judgment, is an elementary principle of law and procedure. Once a judgment becomes final, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the Highest Court of the land.[51] The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.[52] To be sure, the respondent judge’s ground for modifying the joint decision is not among these recognized exceptions.
CASE
FACTS
Macias v Judge Macias
DOCTRINE In several cases,[31] this Court has ruled that if what is imputed to a respondent judge connotes a misconduct that, if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench, then the quantum of proof necessary to support the administrative charges or to establish grounds for the removal of a judicial officer should be more than substantial.
In recent rulings, the Court applied substantial evidence as the normative quantum of proof necessary in resolving administrative complaints against judges.
This involves an administrative complain t[1] filed by Second, members of the judiciary are not a complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality class of their own, sui generis, in the field of public and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. service as to require a higher degree of proof for the The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001, when respondent administrative cases filed against them other than, was still sitting as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of the perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are required to live up to Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, a higher standard of integrity, probity and morality. respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral When we dismiss a public officer or employee from relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), his position or office for the commission of a grave offense in single and in her early 20s. The relationship continued until connection with his office, we merely require that the the time of the filing of the complaint. complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish liability.[39] There appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against judges. Basic is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing the averments of her complaint.[40] If complainant fails to discharge this burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge .[41] Burias v Valencia
On 4 and 25 August 2005, respondent borrowed money from complainant in the amounts of P5,000.00 and P2,500.00, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes.[1] On 25 August 2005, complainant filed a verified [2] complaint for forcible entry and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the MTC of Bulan, Sorsogon, presided by Judge Marie Louise A. Guan-Aragon (Judge Guan-Aragon). On 7 November 2005, Judge Guan-Aragon inhibited herself from the civil case.[3] Respondent took over Civil Case No. 590 and, as the new presiding judge in the case, issued a pre-trial conference order .[4] On 4 and 24 January 2007, respondent again borrowed from complainant the amounts of P15,000.00 and P3,000.00, as evidenced by two (2) handwritten notes.[6] On 23 March 2007, complainant filed an urgent motion for respondent’s inhibition on the ground of delay in the resolution of the civil case and apparent bias against complainant based on the Order of 6 December 2006. Respondent denied the motion on 18 April 2007, citing the demise of her son as cause for the de lay.[7] In her administrative complaint, complainant alleged that on 12 October 2005, respondent endorsed a check and thereafter exchanged the same for cash in the sum of P5,000.00 that complainant provided. Said check however was dishonored when presented for payment by complainant. She also averred that sometime in March 2007, respondent verbally demanded from her the sum of P50,000.00 and that her P30,500.000 indebtedness be written off in exchange for a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 590. According to complainant, she refused to accede to the demands of respondent. In April 2007, respondent reportedly called her up and threatened that she would release any of the two (2) draft decisions she allegedly prepared favoring respondent in the civil case. Complainant claimed that by reason of these threats, she was constrained to file the instant administrative case.[9]
With respect to the charge of borrowing money in exchange for a favorable judgment, Rule 5.02, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court‟s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial a ctivities, or increase involv ement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. Under Rule 5.04 of Canon 5, a judge may obtain a loan if no law prohibits such loan. However, the law prohibits a judge from engaging in financial transactions with a party- litigant. Respondent admitted borrowing money from complainant during the pendency of the case. This act alone is patently inappropriate.[20] The impression that respondent would rule in favor of complainant because the former is indebted to the latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. A judge‟s conduct should always be beyond reproach . This Court has time and again emphasized that no government position is more demanding of moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the judiciary. Judges as models of law and justice are mandated to avoid not only impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety, because their conduct affects the people‟s faith and confidence in the entire judicial system.[21]
CASE Simbulan v Bartolome
In Re; Order of Judge Bonifacio
Santiago III v Enriquez
FACTS The criminal case of the accused was originally raffled to RTC in San Fernando Pampanga where Aquino (complainant) presides. Aquino received an Indorsement stating that accused Mercado voluntarily surrendered before the MTC of Sta. Maria Bulacan and posted bail through Summit Guarantee & Insurance Corporation approved by Bartolome. Lercy was the clerk of court of Bartolome. Lercy misplaced and overlooked the subject surety bond which resulted in the delay of its transmission to RTC. Other fact s complained was Bartolome’s issuance of the order of release, without certificate of Detention and Arrest Warrant attached to the documents presented. Lercy admitted lapses and negligence in processing the bail and was remorseful.
Atty. Escabarte issued an inter-office memo to Genabe, referring to her neglect, in leaving for Baguio to attend a seminar for legal researchers, without finishing her assigned tasks, which is to summarize statement of facts in certain criminal cases. Judge Maceda then called a staff meeting. Genabe denied the claims and stated she was not given sufficient time to finish her work. Maceda then issued an order for Genabe for 30 days , using authority in disciplining personnel of c ourts.
Complainant Santiago filed before RTC a petition for reconstitution of lost/destroyed original certificate. Granted by justice Gonzales-Sison, dissented by Justice Enriquez. Justice Velasco concurred with the dissenting opinion until it became the majority opinion of their special division. The decision of the case was reversed and set aside. Santiago filed a motion for inhibition against Enriquez for ―deliberately twisting the law and jurisprudence to the prejudice of Santiago.‖ Charge was
gross ignorance of law.
DOCTRINE The approval of bail was not proper. In approving the bond, Bartolome violated Sec 17, Rule 114.
Mercado was arrested, Mercado should have applied for bail in RTC Pampanga. Bartolome failed also to require Mercado to produce necessary documents. No certificate of detention was issued, thus no legal justification for the release. The supporting paper were belatedly filed. He failed to live up the standards of a good magistrate, as there was flagrant disregard for procedural laws in granting bail. As stated in Code of Judicial Counduct, “judges should supervise all court personnel to ensure prompt and efficient dispatch of business.” Judge Mace cannot punish his personnel. As an Executive Judge, Maceda only had the right to act upon or investigate administrative complaints including light offenses. The power rests within the Supreme Court.
Genabe is guilty for simple neglect of duty for failure to give attention to the task assigned to him. It signies a disregard of duty resulting from carelessness and indifference. She was permitted to attend a 2-day seminar, provided no work would be left pending. He had 3 days to finish the task, but it remained unfinished. When assigned to another, it only took 2 ½ hours to complete. Maceda failed to observe due process. The guidelines only limit him to conducting inquiry only. He had no authority to impose penalty. The proper remedy was not to file administrative charges against Enriquez but to elevate the assailed decision to the higher court. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, unless the assailed order is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. Act must be clearly indicative of the arbitrariness. Failure to interpret law or appreciate evidence presented does not necessarily render a judge administratively liable. Judicial immunity insulates judges/justices from being criminally civilly, and administratively liable for erroneous decision made in good faith. Such is to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary. The decision was not rendered in Enriquez’s individual capacity.
It was a product of consultations and deliberations by the spe cial dvivision. Herein complainant Smartnet’s representative Gilbert is the son of
3-D Industries v Roxas
the spouses Francisco and Simny Guy. The spouses organized Northern Islands Co., Inc. (NICI). The spouses also organized Lincoln Continental Development Corporation, Inc. (Lincoln Continental) as a holding company of 50% of the shares of stock o f NICI in trust for their three daughters. Lincoln Continental filed a complaint at RTC Manila against NICI and Gilbert’s parents-the spouses Guy and three sisters for annulment of the transfer of the 50% NICI shares of stock to Gilbert’s si sters.
The Presiding Judge of branch 24 of RTC Manila inhibited and the case was re-raffled to Branch 46 of the same court. NICI and the Guy family challenged the inhibition of the Presiding Judge of Branch 24. In the meantime, Branch 46, issued a TRO restoring the management of NICI to Gilbert. Branch 46 subsequently issued writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as prayed for by Lincoln Continental. NICI and the Guy family thereafter filed a new petition which was raffled to CA-Eight Division. It issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued by the Manila RTC Branch 46. Hence, the Guy family entered the NICI premises. Gilbert later filed a complaint for replevin on behalf of 3-D before the RTC of Pasig City. The complaint was given due course by Branch 71 of the RTC Pasig which issued on a writ of replevin in favor of 3-D. This prompted NICI and the Guy family to file before the CA-Eighth Division a S upplemental Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Motion for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to Include Supervening Events alleging that Gilbert, in an attempt to circumvent the TROs and injunctive writ issued by the CA-Eighth Division, allowed himself to be used by 3-D by filing, on its behalf, a complaint for replevin NICI and the Guy family later filed a Second Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Expanded Writ of Preliminary Injunction raising the allegedly continuing forum shopping of Gilbert by continuing to use Smartnet, inter alia, as alter ego and dummy to institute various cases in court to gain control of the properties of NICI. The complainants alleged that the issuance of the two resolutions caused undue injury to them by giving the petitioners (NICI and the Guy Family) in the new petition for Certiorari unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of their judicial functions in violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices A ct.
Manifest partiality has been defined as “a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other.” Bad faith connotes not only bad judgment or negligence, but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounting to fraud. Gross negligence is the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned. That the assailed Resolutions issued by respondents favored NICI and the Guy family does not necessarily render respondents guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, absent proven particular acts of manifest, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity being generally presumed in the performance of official duties by public officers. While respondents may have based the assailed Resolutions on mere allegations, thus disregarding what has been established in jurisprudence that “mere allegation that a corporation is the alter ego of the individual stockholders is insufficient,” this does not render them a dministratively liable because not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice, which is not the case here.
CASE Ocampo v Chua
FACTS
DOCTRINE
These consolidated cases[1] stemmed from the administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua. A
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion .[36]
decision has been rendered in Sylvia Santos v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua from which the respondent sought reconsideration . The
immediately preceding case was consolidated with the subsequent administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge in a Resolution dated April 14, 2009 of the Court en banc .
1)
OCAMPO v CHUA; A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ In the Francisco P. Ocampo Case , Ocampo charged respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. On even d ate, respondent Judge is sued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence, to refrain from committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support of P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for medication and education.
2)
OCA v CHUA; A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 In the Chang Tan/RCBC Case , the OCA, through then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed t he Office of the Chief Justice in a Memorandum of the reports about the rampant selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arca ya-Chua. OCA also pointed out that it was not the only case wherein respondent Judge displayed unusual interest. On April 17, 2007, Judge Zenaida G alapate-Laguilles of RTC, Branch 143, Makati City issued an order in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) v. Moreno , setting the application for a writ of preliminary attachment for h earing . In view of the leave of absence of Judge Galapate-Laguilles, respondent Judge was later designated as the pairing judge. Three days after, respondent judge cancelled the previously scheduled hearing and re-scheduled the hearing, where she ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of RCBC.
3)
OCA v CHUA; A.M. No. 08-2141RTJ A judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17 , 2007 at the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by resp ondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, following reports of alleged irregularities committed by respondent. In a Memorandum by the OCA to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock submitted for the Court’s
consideration the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team, informing the Court of an incident that happened on May 17, 2007 in Branch 144 of the RTC of Makati City. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged in connection with the 1,975 copies of marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized for the period covering January 2004 to April 2007 for the following acts: (1) for allegedly ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose of the said copies of marriage certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization fees of one thousand eight hundred nine (1,809) marriages; and (3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases .[6]
4)
SANTOS v CHUA; A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against Judge Arcaya-Chua for serious misconduct and dishonesty. Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judge’s husband, alleged that in the first week of September 2002, she asked respondent’s help regarding
the cases of her friend, Emerita Muñoz, pending before the Supreme Court. At that time, respondent was the Presiding Judge of the MeTC of Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent, a former employee of the Supreme Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of the said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondentP100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter’s chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return theP100,000.00; however, respondent could no longer be contacted.[49]
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (Judicial Audit Case), there is substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua did not report in her Monthly Reports[37] the actual number of marriages she solemnized during her stint and that the solemnization fees that were paid did not correspond to the number of marriages that were solemnized by her. The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge ArcayaChua reported zero or a lesser number of marriages solemnized by her compared with the marriage certificates that were seized from her office. In the light of the substantial evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame to Noel Umipig absent any proof of weight that he forged her signature in the Monthly Reports. The Court sustains the findings of Justice SalvadorFernando in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty of gross misconduct. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 ( the Chang Tan/RCBC Case ), the Court upholds the finding of Justice Salvador-Fernando that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9292, known as the Anti –Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 . Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge ArcayaChua is expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9292. In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ ( the Ocampo Case), the Court sustains the recommendation of Justice Salvador-Fernando that the case be dismissed in the absence of substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is liable for the charge of ―harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.‖ In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00, and her testimony alone, found credible in this case, is sufficient to prove the administrative liability of respondent. The testimonies on record are e vidence against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. The Investigating Justice observed the demeanor of complainant and found her a credible witness. It is settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.[62] The Court found no reason to depart from such rule since Justice Salvador’s observations and findings are supported by the records. The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 is violative of the provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus: Canon 1, S ec. 4. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. Canon 2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Canon 2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people‟s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. Canon 4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
The Court sustains Justice Salvador- Fernando’s finding that respondent Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141. The Court also sustains Justice Salvador- Fernando’s finding that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively. Respondent Judge’s motion for reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
CASE Descalalr v Ramas
FACTS
Atty. Cerilles claimed to know Judge Ramas very well since the latter is his godfather and wedding sponsor. Atty. Cerilles admitted that he had many pending cases before Judge Ramas’ sala, including Criminal Case No. 04 7003, entitled People v. Dizon, for Slight Illegal Detention, which involved his grandnephews. On May 12, 2005, Atty. Cerilles went to the RTC-Branch 18 to find out if his
DOCTRINE
Judge Ramas is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3 generally mandates that a judge
should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence. Rule 3.01 requires that a judge be faithful to the law and maintain professional grandnephews’ Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation could be competence, while Rule 3.09 commands a judge to heard. However, upon inquiry, he was told that Judge Ramas observe high standards of public service and fidelity at was not around because his estranged wife arrived. When all times. Judge Ramas irrefragably failed to observe Atty. Cerilles returned to the RTC-Branch 18 the following these standards by making untruthful statements in his day, May 13, 2005, he was informed that Judge Ramas was Certificates of Service to cover up his absences. still absent. Atty. Descallar testified that Judge Ramas failed The Court has previously held that a judge‟s to indicate his absences on May 12, 13, 24, and 27 to 30, submission of false certificates of service seriously 2005, and June 1 to 21, 2005 in his Certificates of Service for undermines and reflects on the honesty and integrity the months of May and June 2005. The absence of Judge expected of an officer of the court. This is so because a Ramas can be gleaned from the court calendar of hearings certificate of service is not merely a means to one's and his failure to attend the raffle of cases done every paycheck but is an instrument by which the Court can Thursday of the week. Also, the Omnibus Order dated May fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people ' s right to 23, 2005 issued by Judge Ramas manifested his momentary a speedy disposition of cases.
Tierra Firma Estate v Quintin
desistance from performing judicial functions from May 24, 2005 onwards. This is a complaint filed against Quintin for failure Quintin is liable for gross inefficiency. to decide a civil case within 30 days from submission as Actions for unlwaful detainer are governed by required under Rule 70, Sec 9 of the Revised Rules of Civil the Rules on Summary Procedure, which was designed Procedure. to ensure speedy disposition. Such cases involve On Sept. 14, 2000, a complaint for unlawful perturbation of social order, which must be restored as detainer was filed by Firma against Consummer promptly as possible. Speedy disposition is a matter of Commodities Int’l Inc. The case was set for preliminary
Ricon v Marquez
conference on Dec. 7. Despite due notice, Quintin did not appear. The case was submitted for decision. Despite motions for early resolution, Judgment was not rendered until July 10, 2001. Quintin claims the delay was due to the heavy caseload; that he had to preside over MCTC of Navotas, as acting judge; as a result of fire, which destroyed the courthouse, he had to hold proceedings in a cramped room with the barest facilities. Atty. Ricon’s complaint, against respondent judge, consisting of grave abuse of discretion and grave misconduct are based on the following: (1) Marquez called the employers
public policy. The case was decided after 215 days. His reasons for delay are insufficient, as he was not precluded from asking an extension. Part of the reason of the delay was that he entertained motions, which are prohibited by the rules. Justice delayed is justice denied.Delay undermines people‟s confidence in the judiciary.
Judge Marquez is only liable for uttering of vulgar w ords. (1) ―Unsatisfactory‖ rating – there was no grave abuse of discretion. Marquez is given the
―unsatisfactory‖ rating without warning or confrontation
discretion to rate. There is a proper forum where ratings may be questioned, not through an administrative complaint. (2) On laying down Rules – There was no grave misconduct because such were to improve the filing system in Branch 39, which he found outrageous. In changing the covers of
without valid ground; (6) he used the chambers as living quarters. Judge Marquez in turn accused Atty. Ricon of falsifying a motion to lift warrant of arrest. She further claims to have full control and management of the case records.
the case records, Marquez only wanted to make uniform and orderly record keeping. Any inconvenience is inconsequential. He was commended and not criticized. (3) On uttering insulting words – He violated his
who had worked for more than 5 years ―corrupt, etc.‖; (2) he
commence hearing only in June 2002; ( 3) he laid down many rules and regulations according to his specification and for not following such, Marquez yelled ―tamad‖; (4) described his predecessors as ―walang ginawa‖ calling himself ―basurero‖
for picking up the mess left by the former; (5) gave
duty to be courteous to lawyers and litigants, through the use of foul words. Conduct in and out of the courtroom should be in constant observation. (4) On Using the chambers as living quarter –
This was done to finish work, those left undecided by the former presiding judge.
