TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
BY
JACQUES TRAN SLATED
FR OM
ELLUL
TH E FR EN CH
W I T H AN INTRO DUCT ION
BY
JOH N
B Y ROBERT
PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, COLU MB IA
MERTON,
UNIVERSITY
V I N T A G E BOOKS
Division of Random House NEW YORK
WILKIN SON
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there is a technique of friendship and a technique of swimming. Under the circumstances, it is easy to see how far we are from confusing technique and machine. And, if we examine the broader areas where this search fo means is taking place, we find three principal subdivisions subdivisions of m odern technique, in add ition to the mechanical (w hi ch is the most conspi conspicuou cuouss but wh ich I shall ot discuss because it is so well known) and to the forms of in tellectual technique (car d indices, libraries, and so on ). 1) Economic technique is almost entirely subordinated to pro duction, ranges from the organization of labor to economic p l a n n i n g . This technique differs from the others in its object and goal. But its problems are the same as those of all other technical activities. he technique of organization concerns the great masses an 2) applies not only to comme rcial or industrial affa affair irss of m agnitude ( c o m i n g , consequently, under the jurisdiction of the economic) but also to states and to administration and police power. This organi zational technique is also applied to warfare warfare and insures insures the power of an army at least as much as its weapons. E v e r y t h i n g i n t h e legal field also depends on organizational technique. Human technique takes various forms, ranging all the way from medicine and genetics to propaganda (pedagogical tech niques, vocational guidance, publicity, e t c . ) . H e r e m a n h i m s e lf lf b e comes the object of technique. observe, i n t h e case each these subdivisions, that the subordinate techniques may be very different in k i n d a n d n o t necessarily similar one to another as techniques. They have th same goal and preoccupation, however, and are thus related. The three subdivisions subdivisions show th e wide extent of the technical phenomenoik n f ac ac t , n o t h i n g a t a l l escapes technique today. There is no field where technique is not dominant— this is easy to say and is e are so habituated to machines machines that there scarcely surprising. seems to be nothing left to discover. Has the fact of technique no intrinsic importance? Does i t s p r i n g merely from the march of time? Or does it represen representt a problem p e culiar to our times? times? O ur discuss discussion ion of the biology of technique w i l l face w i t h this question. b r i n g us face question. Bu first w e m u s t survey d e t a i l th vast field w h i c h t h e t e c h n i c a l p h e n o m e n o n covers, order to become fully cognizant of w h a t signifies.
he Technological Society
Historical
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D e v e lo lo p m e n t
P r i i t i v e T e c h n i q u e . It is scarcely possible to give here a his tory of technique i n its universal aspect, as we have just defined defined it e a r e o n l y n o w b e g i n n i n g to to k n o w a little of the history of me chanical technique. It is enough to recall the works of Andre Leroi-Gourhan, Richard Lefebvre des Noettes, Marc Bloch, and others. But the full history of technique has yet to be w r i t t e n . book is no t a history. I shall speak n a historical vein only whe n it is necessary to the understanding of the technical problem in soci ety today.
Technical activity is the most p r i m i t i v e activity of man. There is the technique of h u n t i n g , of fishing, of food gathering; and later of weapons, c l o t h i n g , a n d building. A n d h e r e w e face a mystery. W h a t is the origin of this activity? I t is a phenomenon whi ch ad mits of no complete explanation. By patient research, one finds areas of imitation, transitions from one technical form to another, examples of penetration. But at the core there is a closed area— the phenomenon of invention. can be shown that technique is absorbed into man's psychol ogy and depends upon that psychology and upon what has been called technical motivation. B u t w e have no explanation of how an activity w h i c h once did not exist came to be. did man come to domesticate animals, to choose certain plants to cultivate? The mo tivatin g force, we are t o l d , wa religious, and the first plants were cultivated w i t h some m a g i c a l e n d i n m i n d . This is likely, but how was the selection made? h o w d i d i t h a p pe pe n t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f these plants were edible? di d man come to refine refine metals metals and make bronze? W as it chance, as the legend of the discovery of Phoenician glass has it? This is obviously n ot the answer. One is left w i t h an enigma; and there is some poin t in emphasiz emphasiz mysterious q uality as in the appear in that there is here the same mysterious ance of life itself. Each p r i m i t i v e operation of man implies the bridging of such an enormous gulf between instinct and the techni' See, for example, Pierre D e f f o o U i n e s'i C d o g r a p h i e (U
religions.
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cal act that mystic aura hovers about al l subseq subsequent uent develop Our modern worship of technique derives from man ancestral worship of the mysterious and marvelous character of is o w n h a n d i w o r k . has not been sufficiently emphasized that technique has evolved along two distinct paths. There is the concrete technique of homo faber—man the maker—to w h i c h we are accustomed, and w h i c h poses the problems we have normally studied. There is also the technique, of more or less spiritual order, w h i c h we call magic. may seem questionable; nevertheless, magic is a technique the strictest sense of the w o r d , as has has been clea rly demonstrated Marcel Mauss. Magic developed along w i t h other techniques as expression of man's w i l l to obtain certain results of a spiritual order. To attain them, man made use of an aggregate of rites, formulas, and procedures w h i c h , once established, do not vary. Strict adherence to form is one of the characteristics of magic: rituals, masks w h i c h forms same k i n d wheels, the same ingredients for mystical drugs, for formulae for d i v i n a t i o n , and so on. All these became set and were passed on th slightest variation in w o r d or gesture w o u l d alter the magical equilibrium. There is relationship between the ready-made ready-made formula and a precise result. The gods being propitiated obey such an invocation of necessity; al l the more reason reason that they be given no oppor t u n i t y to escape compliance because the invocation is not correctly formulated. This fixity is a manifestation of the technical character of magic: when the best possible means means of obt ainin g the desired result has been found, why change it? Every magical means, in th eyes of the person who uses it , is the most efficient one. the spiritual realm, magic displays all the characteristics of a technique. It is a mediator between man and "the higher powers,** just as other techniques mediate between man and matter. leads to efficacy because it subordinates the power of the gods to men, and it secures a prede termined result. t affirm affirmss human power in that seeks to subordinate the gods to men, just as tech n i q u e serves to cause nature to obey. Magic clearly displays the characteristics of p r i m i t i v e technique, as Leroi-Gourhan indicates when he says t h a t technique is a
he Technological Society cloak for man, a k i n d of cosmic vestment. In his conflict w i t h mat ter, in his struggle to survive, man interposes an intermediary agency between himself and his environment, and this agency has twofold function. It is a means of protection and defense: alone is too weak to defend himself. I t is also means of assimilation: through technique, man is able to utilize to his profit powers that are alien or hostile. He is able to man ipulate his surroundings surroundings so that they are no longer merely his surrounding s but become a factor of equilibr-ium'and of profit to h i m . Thus, as a result of tech nique" man transforms his adversaries into allies. These characteristics characteristics of ma terial technique correspond perfectly to the characteristics of magical technique. There, also, man is in conflict w i t h external forces, w i t h the w o r l d of mystery, spiritual powers, and mystic al currents. But there, too, man erects erects barrier around himself, for he w o u l d not know how to defend h i m self by his own unaided intellect. He uses any means that w i l l serve hi both for defense and for adjustment. He turns to his ow profit the hostile powers, w h i c h are obliged to obey him by virtue of his magical formulas. Masson-Oursel, in a recent study, confirms this. He shows that magic is basically a "scholasticism of efficiency" w h i c h man employs as an instr ument against against his en vironment; that magic is pragmatic, yet has a precision that must be called objective; and that its efficiency efficiency is demonstrated only in certain "consecrations or disqualifi catio ns." Masson-Oursel rightly believes that magic preceded technique—in fact, that magic is the first expression of technique. Plainly, we have had t wo strea streams ms of t echnique from the very be ginning. Ho does it happen that we never take cognizance of the second? There are a number of reasons. We can leave aside the causes that come from modern psychology. Because we are ob sessed w i t h materialism and do not take magic seriously, it has little interest for us, and we are unaware even today, as we study technique—the techniques that relate to men—that we are draw in on the great stream of magical techniques. this neglect is due as w e l l to objective causes: in relation to purely materia l factors, it has has been demonstrated that every milieu resists imitating the techniques of another social or ethnic group. Surely, this resistan resistance ce was mu ch stronger stronger i n the realm of magical techniques. Here were all the taboos and prohibitions, the im-
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mense strength of magical conservatism. Then, too, whereas
a terial techniques are relatively distinc t and independen t of one rigid another, magical techniques are rapidly elaborated into system. Everything is of a piece, everything is dependent upon everything else; consequently, consequently, noth ing can be meddled w i t h , noth in modified w i t h o u t threat to the whole stru cture of belief beliefss and activities. Hence, their weak expansive power and their strong power of defense against alien magical techniques. The realm of magical practice is l i m i t e d , and there is little or no diffusion. Propagation begins w i t h "spiritualist" religions which are no bound to special magical rites. There is, then, no possibility of choice between different rival mag ical techniques; yet expansion expansion and choice are decisive factors in technical progress. There is no real progress in the realm of magic; here lies its fundamental dif ference. There is no progress space, no progress in time; indeed, because magical technique the tendency of magic is to regress. is tied to one ethnic group, to one given form of civilization, it dis group or civilization disappears. appears completely when tha t group W h e n civilization dies, it transmits to its heirs its material but ot its spiritual apparatus. T ools, houses, and methods of manu facture live on and, more or less reincarnated, are to be met w i t h again. There may be a tempora ry mate rial regressi regression on in periods periods of great destruction, but the lost ground is recovered, as if a collective historical memory made possible the recovery of what had been lost several generations before. But magical techniques, rites, for mulas, and sacrificial practices disappear irremediably. The new civilization w i l l fashion its own new stock of magic, which has little in common w i t h th old. nly a set set of generalizations generalizations so broad as to mean n o t h i n g , and overhasty analogies, create the belief that magical forms are perpetuated and renewed. Indeed, they live on only in the minds of the "initiates" and not in any hum an or social social reality. Consequently, a magical technique that is not passed on in t i m e or space does not follow the same evolutionary curve as ma terial technique. There is not a progression of discoveries b u i l t side and do one upon the other; rather, discoveries remain side ot affect one another. Th ere is another factor in the regressio regressionn of magical techniques: th problem of evidence. In material techniques, choice is relatively
The Tech no logical Society
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simple. Since every technique is subordinate to its immediate result, is only a question of choosing the one that produces the most satisfactory satisfactory result; and , in the mater ial dom ain, that result can readily be seen. That one form of axe is superior to another is judgment not beyond a normal man (in spite of the extreme diffi c u l t y p r i m i t i v e man experienced when faced w i t h such a choice). w i t h magical techniques the same certainty or force of evi dence does not exist. exist. W ho can judge their relative efficienc efficiency? y? Magical efficiency is not always to be measured by a clear material result such as making rain fall, but ma mayy have to do w i t h some purely spiritual phenomena or even w i t h material phenomena over a long period of time. Here matters are not clear nor the choice easy; th difficulty becomes even more acute when we think about th uncertainty of the reasons for failure. Was the magical tech nique really inefficient? Or was the one who used it incompetent? The common reaction is to blame the magician rather than the technique, and here again we see an element of i m m o b i l i t y magic. The two great streams of technique which we have traced from their beginnings evolved i n com pletely different ways. In manual technique we observe an increase and later a multiplication of dis coveries, each based on the other. I n magic w e see see o nly endless new beginnings, as the fortunes of history and its own inefficiency call its procedures into question. Explanation becomes even more difficult when w e note that in the magical domain too our own era has achieved an overwhelming superiority; our magical techniques have become really effective. These techniques obviously must not be confused w i t h religious life or anything of that k i n d . This is purely a social phenomenon, both in aim and in form. However, the two aspects of technique, although both are social, are sharply separated, aand nd would seem to have interacted very little anywhere. Greece. Technique is essentially O r i e n t a l : it was was principal ly in the Near East that technique first developed, and it had very little in the way of scienti scientific fic foundation. It was was entirely directed toward practical application and was not concerned w i t h general theories, w h i c h alone can give rise to scientific movements. This predomi nance of technique in the East points up an error which is found throughout Western thought: th at the Oriental m i n d is turned
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t o w a r d the mystical and has no interest in concrete concrete action, whereas t h e W e s t e r m i n d i s o r i en en t e d t o w a r d " k n o w - h o w " a n d a c t i o n , a n d hence toward technique. In fact, the East was the cradle of all action, of all past p r i m i t i v e technique in the present sense the wo rd, and later of spiritual and magical technique as w e l l . Greeks, however, were the first have a coherent scientific activity and to liberate scientifi scientificc tho ught. But then a phenomenon o c c u r r e d w h i c h still astonishes historians: the almost t o t a l separa tion of science and technique. Doubtless, this separation was less absolute than the example of Archimedes has led historians to believe. B ut i t is certain that material needs were treated w i t h c o n t e m p t , t h a t t e c h n i c a l research was considered un wor thy of the in tellect, and that the goal of science was not application but con templation. Plato shunned any compromise w i t h a p p l i c a t i o n , even h i m , only the most ab order to forward scientific research. stract possible exercise reason w a s i m p o r t a n t . Ar A r c h im im e d e s w e n t even further. True, he rationalized practice and even m a d e " a p p l i cations" to a certain degree; but his machine was to be destroyed after it had dem onstrated the exactness of his numerical reckon ings. d i d t h e Greeks adopt this Malthusian attitude toward ac t i v i t y ? There are two possible answers: either they were not w i l l i n g or they were not able. And it is likely that b o t h are true. bel Rey has devoted the fifth volume of his Science Technique to the Greeks. A c c o r d i n g t o h i m , Greece in her decline became " i n capable of sustaining the ideal of hard, disinterested labor (the ideal of an essentially contemplative intelligence disdainful of all u t i l i t y ) . She then fell back on the techniques of the East. Sh was involved in them by her own techniques, for she had none the less sought to satisfy men's v i t a l needs, in spite of the contempt in w h i c h she held t h e m . " C o n f r o n t e d w i t h t e c h n i c a l necessity, Greece lost her inventive genius and tur ned to Eastern technique. She d id k n o w , says A b e l R e y , h o w t o find t h e b r i d g e b e t w e e n " k n o w how" and "know-why." This is true for the period of decadence, th second first centuries b u t i t does seem to be the case i n t h e p r e c e d i n g p e r i o d ; i n t h e fifth c e n t u r y experienced r apid technica technica Greece experienced development, although later it came t o a n a b r u p t halt. their golden age of science, th Greeks c o u l d have deduced
he Technological Society the technical consequences of their scientifi scientificc a ctivity . But they w i s h t o . W a l t e r asks: " D i d th t h e Greeks, obsessed w i t h h a r m o n y , check themselves a t t h e v e ry ry p o i n t a t w h i c h i n q u i r y ran the risk of g o i n g t o excess and threatened to introdu ce a monstrosity into t h e i r civilization?" his was th e result result of a variety of factors, factors, most of whic h were o a philosophic nature. For one t h i n g , theirs was conception of life w h i c h scorned material needs a n d t h e i m p r o v e m e n t o f p r a c t i c a l life, discredited manual labor (because of the practice of slavery), h e l d contem plation to be the goal of inte llectual activ ity, refused refused the use of power, respected natural things. The Greeks were suspicious of technical activity because it represented represented an aspect b r u t e f o rc rc e a n d i m p l i e d a w a n t o f m o d e r a t i o n . M a n , h o w e v e r humble his technical equipment, has from the very beginning played the role of sorcerer s apprentice in relation to the machine. This feeling on the part of the Greeks was not a reflection of a p r i m i t i v e m a n s fear i n t h e face of something he does not under stand (the explanation given today when certain persons take fright at our techniq ues). R ather, it was th e result, result, perfectly mastered and perfectly measured, of a certain conception of life. t r e p re re sented an apex civilization and intelligence. H e r e w e find the supreme Greek virtue, t y p k r u m ( s e l f - c o n t r o l ) . The rejection of technique was deliberate, positive activity in v o l v i n g self-maste self-mastery, ry, recognition of destiny, and the a pplication of given conception of life. Only the most modest techniques were p e r m i t t e d — t h o s e w h i c h w o u l d r e sp sp o n d d i r e c t l y t o m a t e r i a l needs such a way that these needs not get the upper hand Greece conscious effort was made to economize on means and to reduce the sphere of influence of technique. No one sought to apply scientific thought technically, because scientific thought corresponded to conception of life, to wisdom . Th e great ^.e* occupation of the Greeks was balance, harmony and mod eration; hence, they fiercely resisted the unrestrained force inherent technique, and rejected it because of its potentialities. For these same reasons, magic had relatively little i m p o r t a n c e i n Greece. Rome. Social technique was still in its infancy. Doubtless, there had been some attempts at social organization—those of certain Pharaohs, and those of the Persian empire, were not neglibible. But such organizations could be maintained only by police power.
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whereas the exact opposite is true of genuine social organization. By the very fact of its existence, coerci on demonstrates th e ab ab sence of political, administrative, and j u r i d i c a l technique; for this reason the great empires of the past are of little importance to our study. Correlatively, an army (even the army of the Chaldeans, who advanced the art of war furthest) was a fairly inorganic crew was pillage and wh ich applied no social social technique. The whose aim was army of Alexander made use of genuine strategy, strategy, but this was was al most exclusively m i l i t a r y and had no sociological foundations or expression sion n ot of a people people bu t of a state—and state—and attributes. t was th e expres therefore lacked the substance necessary to technique. Rome, however, we pass on, at one step, to the perfection of social technique, b o t h c i v i l and m i l i t a r y . Everyth Ever yth ing in Roman so ciet y was was rel ated to Roman law i n its m u l t i p l e forms, b o t h public and private. To characterize characterize the technique of this law i n the period durin w h i c h it flourished ( f r o m the second century to the second century we can say first of all that i t was was not the fruit of ab stract t h o u g h t , but rather of an exact view of the concrete situation, w h i c h the Romans attempted to t u r n to account w i t h the fewest possible means. This realism respected respected justice and acknowledged history and necessity. From this concrete, experimental view, w h i c h the Romans hel d consciously, consciously, thei r administ rative and j u d i cial technique developed. And a k i n d of discip line appeared: the use of a m i n i m u m of means. This discipline, whic h probably probably had it foundations in religion, is one of the secrets of the whole de velopment. To the degree that the Roman had to respond to neces sity, and at the same time not permit himself excessive luxury, it was necessary to refine every means, to b r i n g it to perfection, to exploit it in every possible possible way, and to give i t free r e i n , w i t h o u t shackling it w i t h exceptions and secondary rules. No social situa developed whi ch did not immediately immediately find its response in or t i o n developed ganization. Nor could this response be the creation of a new means, rather the perfection of an old means. Indeed, the proliferation of means is thought even today to denote technological weakness. second element in the Roman development of organiz ation was the search for an e q u i l i b r i u m between the purely technical factor and the human factor. Ju dici al tech nique di d not begin as as a substitute for man. I n Roman Roman j udic ial technique there was was no
he Technological Society question of eliminating initiative and responsibility, but rather of operate and t assert themselves. themselves. I t was not u n t i l a l l o w i n g them to operate the t h i r d century .D that judicial technique attempted to deal regulate ev erything, to foresee everything, w i t h the details of life, to regulate thereby leaving the in div idual in a state state of complete inertia. But the great judicial era of Rome was one of e q u i l i b r i u m : the law laid down the framework and supplied the means that men could use use i n foll owing their own initiative. Of course, this presupposed a civic sense corresponding to the technical conception. The e q u i l i b r i u m between the tw o was evident i n the system of pro cedure we call bureaucracy; bureaucracy; in t is found, w i t h an almost dis concerting s i m p l i c i t y , the perfect type of procedure. And there we find t h a t one of the conditions of technique is respect for the in d i v i d u a l , who is not yet considered apart from society.
t h i r d characteristic of Roman technique was tha t t was rected toward a precise end: the internal coherence of society. This technique was was not self-justifying, self-justifying, i t did not have as its raison detre it own self-development, and i t was not imposed from the out side. I t was not a k i n d of scaffolding scaffolding whi ch held independent independent ele ments together; i t sought sought rather to promote cohesion. cohesion. The founda society was not the police; i t was an organization wh ic tion of society enabled society to make the least possible possible use use of the police. wide variety of techniques—religious, administrative, and finan cial—were obviously needed to execute this design, design, b ut i n no case was there recourse to force. When it appeared tha t the state w o u l d be compelled to use force, the organizational sense of the abandon a given projec t rather than attem pt Romans led them to abandon to maintain it by force Force is never economical, and Rome was economical in things. This social coherence was the first judicial technique the w o r l d had known. I t wa also the basis for the Roman m i l i t a r y system, expression of c i v i l society society i n that it had the same w h i c h was a dir ect expression efficiency and economy. economy. F rom i came the development respect for efficiency of organs of transport, food supply, and so on; and the Roman con ception of mass strategy and thei r refusal to create heroes: combat was thus reduced to its most most utilitarian level. element was was continu ity. The j udic ial technique technique of the fourth element Romans was constantly being readapted in accordance w i t h a his torical plan. I t involved a policy policy of watchful w aiting while circum-
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stances were not propitiou s, at the same time making preparations fo th r i g h t m o m e n t , a n d w h e n t h a t m o m e n t came, c a r r y i n g o u t the plan decisively. regards material techniques, the Romans d i d n o t d e v e l o p them as brilliantly. F r o m t h e fourth t o t h e first c e n t u r y B . C . , after the second c e n t u r y .D ., there was almost t o t a l stagnation— tools and armaments no longer evolved. But from th first c e n t u r y t o t h e first c e n t u r y A . D . , a technical revival took place. place. Practical w i t h regard to necessity (on the economic and m i l i t a r y levels transpo rt) was met by the productio n of animal-powered m a chines (forges, water wheels, pumps, plows, the screw press, cord-operated ballistic engines, engines, et c.) Romans possessed a remarkable understanding of applica system could be applied always b i l i t y . heir judi cial system every w h e r e ( i n t h e E m p i r e ) ; i t w a s a d a p t e d t o a n u n f a i l i n g continuity. these w e r e t o t a l l y n e w p h e n o m e n a w h i c h Rome i n t r o d u c e d . L a t e r , Rome was allowed to drift into a technical vertigo; the end as near. Christianity nd Technique. East: passive, fatalist, contem ptu ous of life and action; the W est: ac tive, conquerin g, t u r n i n g nature to profit. These contrasts, so dear to popular sociology, are said to result from a difference in religion: B u d d h i s m a n d I s l a m o n t h e one hand; on the other, Christianity, wh ich is credited wifli having forged the practic al soul of the W est. These ideas are hardly beyond the level of the rote repetitions f o u n d even i n t h e w o r k s o f serious historians. It is not for me t examine religious doctrines in themselves or as absolute if unreal ized dogma, b ut rather to interpr et them sociologically. sociologically. A fter al l, I a m n o t w r i t i n g theology; I am w r i t i n g h i s t o r y . n d t h e r e i s a w o r l d of differenc differencee between dogma and its sociological sociological applicatio n. ( shall not touch upon the personal interpretation o f r e l i g i o n , w h i c h concerns concerns the relationship between the i n d i v i d u a l a n d G o d . ) T h i s b e i n g t h e case, it is is obvious th at certain statement statementss call for modification. For example, the assertion that as a consequence the teachings of Mohammed, the Islamic conquests of the seventh century are evidence of passivism. This might also be said of the estern encroachments encroachments durin d e t e r m i n e d I s l a m i c resistance to the last two centuries. centuries. W e attri bute to Buddhist indifferentism the remarkable artistic, p o l i t i c a l , military development in India
he from th second to the fifth century. In fact, however, these c i v i l i zations were little advanced t e c h n i c a l l y , t h o u g h t h e y h a d d e v e l o p e d in many other areas. Russia, on the other hand, gave rise to a mystical Christianity civilization which was indifferent to material life and had technical drive and no interest in economic exploitation. " A h , yes!* i s t h e re re p l y . " B u t C h r i s t i a n i t y i n Russia had Eastern overtones overtones . . ere, then, indifference indifference to technique wou ld appear to be a ques tion of temperament and n ot of religion. Ano ther embarrassing embarrassing fact: whe n in her decline Greece a p p l i e d herself to technical i n q u i r y and the development of industry, she looked to the East for methods. And in the first c e n t u r y , w h e n Rome—the perfect example of the technical spirit i n a n t i q u i t y took up industry, she too turned to the East f o r i n d u s t r i a l te te c h niques—the refining of silver silver and go ld, glassmaking, glassmaking, the temperin ship construction, and so on. A ll these t e c h of weapons, potter y, ship niques came to Rome from th East, either early, through the Etruscans, or much later, after the conquests. conquests. e are far far indeed from b e i n g able to support this traditional cleavage between East a n d W e s t . I n f a c t , d u r i n g classical a n t i q u i t y i t w a s t h e East w h i c h possessed the concrete, inventive m i n d t h a t grasps th truth exploits T h e W e s t i s m a k i n g a p r o d i g i o u s advance in technique at the present, and the West is traditionally C h r i s t i a n . N o r c a n i t b e m a i n tained that Chris tianity is is a negligible factor in that advance. H o w ever, there were several distinct historical periods in the West. Th est was officiall officiallyy Christian u n t i l the fourteenth century; there after, Christianity became controversial and was breached by other influences influences.. W ha t do we find, from a technical standpoint, in the so-calle so-calledd Ch ristian era, the perio from th fourth to the fourteenth centuries, the "sociological moment"? First, we observe the break down of Roman technique in every area—on the level of organiza tion as well as in the construction of cities, in industry, and in transport. From the fourth to the t e n t h centuries, in fact, there was a complete o bliteration of technique, a co ndition so so deplored th at focus of anti-C hristian polemic, and rightly so. t was became a focus because the Christians held judicial and other technical activity in such contempt that they were considered the "enemies o f t h e h u m a n r a c e "— "— a n d n o t o n l y because they opposed Caesar. T h e r e -
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proach of Celsus was not w i t h o u t t r u t h . After the Christian t r i u m p h Rome, there was not one great great juris t left who cou ld guarantee guarantee th life and the value of the Roman organization. Decadence? —complete disinterest in such activity. Saint Augustine devoted m u c h of his Civitate ei to justifying the Christians in this respect, and to denying that their influence influence was detrimental. T h e y are good citizens," he proclaimed. That may have been so, but their focus of interest was nevertheless on something other than th state and practical activity. I shall show later on that the technical state of m i n d is one of the principal causes of technical progress.
is not a coincidence that Rome declined as Christianity t r i u m p h e d . Th e Em peror Julian was certainly justified justified in accusing accusing th Christians of ruining the industry of the Emp ire. A f t e r this period of decadence (for w h i c h , of course, course, Ch ristianity was no t solely solely respon sible), what does the historian find? find? Th res toration, under Christian influence, of an active civihzation— m e t h o d i c a l , exploiting the riches riches of the w orl d as as a gift given by God to be put to good use? N o t a all. The society which developed from th t e n t h to the fourteenth century was v i t a l , coherent, and unanimous; but it was characterized by total absence of the tech n i c a l w i l l . t was "a-capitalistic" as wel l as as "a-technical." From the point of view of organization, it was was an anarchy i n the etymological sense of the word—and it was completely nontechni cal. Its law was principally based on custom. It had no social or political organization based on reasoned, elaborated rules. n all other areas—for example, in agriculture and industry—there was th same nearly total absence of technique. This was also true w i t h regard to the m i l i t a r y , the principal activity of the t i m e . C o m b a t was reduced to its most most elementary—to charging i n a straight line and to hand-to-hand engagement. engagement. nly architectural technique developed and asserted itself; but this was prompted not by a technical state of m i n d but by religious religious impulse. L i t t l e effort effort was m ade to imp rove agricultur al or industrial prac tices. There was no effort effort at useful creation—e vidence of the re markable p ractical genius genius of the Christian religion! nd when at th beginnin g of the the twelfth century, at first very feebly a technical movement began to take f o r m , it developed under the influence of th East.
he Technological Society The technical impetus of our civilization came from th East, at first through the intermediacy of the Judaei and the Venetians, even so, it limited itself to and later through the Crusades. i m i t a t i n g w h a t i t h a seen—except in art. Certain autonomous dis coveries did take place, especially as a result of commercial neces sity; but this development was no more intense than it had been under the Roman Empire. fact, the Middle Ages created only one new, complete tech n i q u e , an intellec tual techn ique, a mode of reasoning: scholasti cism. The very name evokes its mediocrity. W i t h its gigantic ap paratus, it was in the end nothin g but an extremely cumbersome cumbersome formalism; it wandered for centuries centuries i n intellectual b l i n d alleys, notwithstanding the prodigious intellects of the men who used and were deformed by i t. Th balance sheet shows n o t r i u m p h s , even on the historical plane. Th e technical movement of the est developed developed in a wor ld whic h a d a l r e a d y w i t h d r a w n from the dominant influence of Christian ity. p o i n t can doubtless be made of the effects of the Reformation, the economic consequences of this movement have been singu larly exaggerated. I n a n y case, this is not the place to take up this question. A l t h o u g h , practically speaking, it seems clear that Christianity wa scarcely an important cause of technical progress ( n o t t o m e n tion regression), it is nevertheless customary to hold that Chris tianity, from the theological theological poin t of view, paved the way for technical development. Let us consider the two arguments advanced for this point of view. First, and most impo rtant, it is held tha t Christianity sup pressed slavery, the great obstacle to technical development. The m o m e n t men are free, they supposedly t u r n toward technique to be delivered from the misery of labor. Slavery was thus a hindrance to technique because no attempt was made either to relieve the miserable miserable condition of the slave or to replace h i m b y some other motive force. The second argument is more intelligent: that an tiquity wa possessed of a holy fear of nature, and dared not lay hand on the secrets which to the ancients were gods. T h e y d a r e d make use of natural forces, forces, wh ich for them were supernatural. p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of trader. ( T r a n s . )
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C h r i s t i a n i t y secularized nature: w i t h C h r i s t i a n i t y n a t u r e once again became simply nature and no one scrupled to exploit i U n f o r t u n a t e l y , however, neither of these arguments is quite ac curate. There was in fact fact greater technical progress in civilizations where slavery was prevalent (fo r example, example, Egy pt) than in others others w here t h a t institution was practically unknown (for example, Israel). There was greater technical progress in the slaveholding period of R o m a n h i s t o r y t h a n i n t h e p e r i o d w h e n slaves were freed whole th e liberation of the slaves during the era of the barbarian sale. A n d th invasions produced no technical improvement, even at long t e r m ; almost seven centuries elapsed between the suppression of slavery and the beginning of even feeble technical advance. T h e r e l a tion between technique and the absence of slavery is in no sense absolute; as Bertrand Gille has r i g h t l y pointed out, human trans port means slaves w a s n o t k n o w n i n R o m a n a n t i q u i t y ; y e t the harnessing o f animals had not been develop ed. have here one of those facile, impressive, and altogether antihistoricai explanations which theorists are so fond of. The represented c apital wh ich it was was not in the owner's slave, in fact, represented interest to lose or to use haphazardly. And, as the elder Cato indi cates, had i t been possible to make the slave's labor more efficient master had every interest in doing so. More less fatiguin g, his master o v e r , i t d i d n o t cost any thing to make use of the free free m en who liv ed th vast domains of the public treasury or the limes or the Marches,* and later, on the ecclesiastical and seignorial lands. C e r t a i n l y , i t w a s n o t respect f o r h u m a n l i f e w h i c h p r o m p t e d t h e Romans to spare these people. And the people themselves scarcely possibilities to im possessed the freedom of m i n d or the m aterial possibilities prove their techniques. Gille has shown admirably that in Athens th Greek slaves ay have had greater value than the free work men. second argument is no more applicable. t is is true that Chris secularized n ature. But d id this benefit technique? technique? t i a n i t y secularized have n o t e d , i n passing, the religious origin of many forms of tech as the theater of spiritua l forces, forces, gives rise n i q u e ; indeed, n ature, as to one particular technique already mentioned: magic. One of the • T h e lime* d e s i g n a t e d t h e E m p i r e ' s b o u n d a r y r e g i o n s t o t h e n o r t h ; t h e M a r c h e s , the Scottish Welsh border areas. ( T r a n s . )
he Technological Society goals of magic is to render the gods propitious to practical action and to put the "powers'* at the service o f m a t e r i a l te te c h n i q u e . T h e representation of nature as as inh abite d by th gods was itself a potent act, and favorable, if not to all applications, certainly to technique itself. Taboos applied only to certain concrete applica right and wrong. Man tions which were determined by ideas thus felt that his actions were justified by the help given him by th gods of nature. Christian ity, however, deprive d hi m of this justification. W h a t was the doc trinal position of early C hristian ity regarding p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y , from the very beginning? On the moral plane, Christianity c o n d e m n e d l u x u r y a n d m o n e y — i n s h o r t , e v e r y t h i n g that represented represented the earthly city, wh ich was consecrated consecrated to Satan and opposed to the City of God. This was the era of the anchorite, presented as an ideal. of the renunciation of city life, of cenobitism presented Th e tendency was to war d the the restriction of economic life. O n t h e theological plane, there there was the con viction that the wor ld was ap proach ing its end, that it was useless to strive strive to develop or cu ltivate for the Lord was soon to return. t was wiser to be concerned w i t h eschatology than w i t h w o r l d l y affairs. the beginning of the medieval period, these doctrines lost some of their hold (although they persisted under other guises— the feeling about death, for instance). But another element of Christianity remained wh ich was was opposed to technical develop ment: the moral judgment which Christians passed o n a l l h u m a n activities. T e c h n i c a l a c t i v i t y d i d n o t escape C h r i s t i a n m o r a l j u d g m e n t . T h e question "Is it righteous?" was asked of every a t t e m p t t o change modes of production or of organization. That something might be useful or profitable to men d id not make it right and just. It had to fit a precise conception of justice justice before before God. W hen an element of technique appeared to be righteous from every p o i n t o f v i e w , it was adopted, but even t h e n w i t h excessive c a u t i o n . O n l y i n v e n tions (representing a choice among techniques made by individ uals versed Greek o r L a t i n ) j u d g e d w o r t h y w e r e a p p l i e d o r even allowed to become k n o w n . I t w a s w i t h i n this narrow compass that certain monks propagated and improved technical instru ments. The spread of the hydraulic m i l l by the Cistercians is well k n o w n ; likewise the many specialized mills to be found at the
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Abbey of Royaumont (the smith's m i l l , t h e f u l l e r s m i l l , e t c . ) . B u t these exceptions were few. search for justice before God, the measuring of technique by othe r criteria than those those of technique itself—these itself—these were the great obstacles that Christianity opposed to technical progress. T h e y o p e r a te te d i n th th e M i d d l e Ages i n a l l areas life, and made history coincide w i t h theology. The age of the Reformation, in its effort to return to the most primitive conception of Christian ity, broke down many barriers. B u t , even then, it was not so much from the influence of the new theology as from the shock of the Renaissance, from humanism and the auth oritarian state, state, that technique received decisive petus. he Sixteenth Century. I n t h e p e r i o d from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century the absence of technique in all areas b u t t h e mechanical is striking. There was an absence of human reasoning concerning action, of efforts directed toward simplification and systematization, and of concern for effici efficiency. ency. Cer tain impo rtant technical achievement achievementss were made—for example, guns and gun factories—and there was some a g r i c u l t u r a l research. But it is sig nificant that histories of technique (Pierre Ducasses, for ex a m p l e ) leap from t h e M i d d l e Ages to the end of the eighteenth c e n t u r y . I n d e e d , t h e p e r i o d w h i c h f o l l o w e d t h e Renaissance th Reformation was much less fertile in invention than the period w h i c h had preceded them. Printing, t h e n a u t i c a l compass, g u n p o w d e r (also copied from the East), all date from the fifteenth century. It would not do to m i n i m i z e the importance of these i n v e n t io io n s . F o r N o r b e r t W i e n e r , they "con stitute the locus locus of an in dustria l revolu tion wh ich pre i e n e r , i n a r e m a r k ab ab l e ceded t h e p r i n c i p a l i n d u s t r i a l revolution." w a y , relates the principal inventions of this period to navigation, w h i c h , he proposes, was the propulsive force behind research. Alongside these major inventions, this period also s aw aw a m u l t i t u d e of discoveries and new applications in banking, armaments, ma chinery, architecture (for example, the discovery of a new system for constructing the dome, as as app lied to Sainte-Marie-des-Fleurs), Sainte-Marie-des-Fleurs), agriculture and the making of furniture. Th e fifte fifteenth enth cen tury, in additio n, is notable for a number of technical manuals from s o u th th e r n G e r m a n y a n d n o r t h e r n I t a l y
he Technological Society ( w r i t t e n at the beginning of the century and printed and circulated at the end of i t ) . These show a general interest in these problems, a technical preoccupation on the part of the men of the times. The great voyages were probably a consequence rather than a cause this technical progress. But this technical drive slackened during the sixteenth century, w h i c h became poorer and poorer in technique, and technical weak persisted thr ough the sevente seventeenth enth century an into the be ness persisted g i n n i n g of the eighteenth. This poverty of technical achievement, w h i c h lasted two centuries, leads us once more to question the influence influence of the Reformation. W hat caused this slowdown of tech n i c a l progress after the fifteenth century, which had been so rich discoveries of all kinds? An uninitiated reader opens a scientific treatise on law, econ omy, medicine, or history published between the sixteenth sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries is struck most forcibly by the complete ab sence of logical order. The materials are treated successively w i t h ou any con nection, progression progression of th ough t, development, or show of p r o o f . T h e reader is apparently to be guided only by the au thor s fancy. Every chapter in a scientific work, say, of the sixteenth century, is a self-contained unit which justifies and proves itself. mere affirmation by the author generally serves as proof. And he lets himself go in a free association of ideas w h i c h a r e i n n o w a y pertinent to the subject; his thoughts often wend off to matters completely unconnected w i t h the subject of the book. Purely personal reflection and private experience form the foun dations of these books; in no sense do they represent an effort at common inquiry, reciprocal control, or search for the best m e t h o d , al of which are indispensable for technique. The plan of a book was not laid out w i t h th reader m i n d ; it was not based on subject matter, but rather on the personal fancy of the author, or on more obscure reasonings. Even men of powerful intellect such as Jean B o d i n d i d n o t escape these failings. second characteristic of this scientific literature is that it at tempts to set set do wn in one book the whole realm of know ledge. I is not rare to find, in works on law in the sixteenth sixteenth or seventeenth seventeenth centuries, extended treatments of archaeology, theology, psy chology, and linguistics, not to mention history and literature. En tire chapters concerned w i t h magical practices or Peruvian soci-
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ology may interrupt the course of a book devoted to revenues or to th jurisprudence of the Parliament of Bordeaux. This amalgam of reflections and miscellaneous bits of knowledge is found in the works of the best authors; demonstrates the ab sence of intellectual specialization specialization The intellectual ideal was uni versality, and it was a rare t h i n g for judge, say, to be ignorant alchemy, or historian, of medicine. This was, in effect, an extension by humanism of the universalism to which medieval theology aspired. the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries every intellectual ha perforce to be a universalist. He had to have complete knowledge, and when he wrote on a given subject he felt constrained to put i n t o the work everything he knew, pertinent or not. This was by means sign of muddleheadedness b ut rath er of the prevailing search for a synthesized, universal system of knowledge. Every author sought to put his whole self into his work, even in the case of technical book. Not the subject but the author dominated the w o r k : this tendency itself is contrary to technical i n q u i r y . Th search was not for practical knowledg but for a comprehensive explication of phenomena. Thus Descartes, after having established an impeccable method of reasoning, gives himself over to the out pourings of his imagination order to explain—to take single example—the movements of the tides. This explains another characteristic of the books w r i t t e n after th century of humanism: their lack of convenience. find few tables of contents, no references, no division into sections, no ap indices, no chronology, sometimes not even pagination. Th e ap paratus standard for scientific works today is not found even r u d i mentarily in the most perfect works of the period; and its absence is characteristic of the absence of intellectual technique. The books the time were not w r i t t e n to be used, along w i t h hundreds of others, to locate piece of information accurately and quickly, or to validate or invalidate an experiment, or to furnish formula. They were not w r i t t e n to be consulted. They were w r i t t e n to be read patiently their entirety and to be meditated upon. Again, this goes back to the ideal of universali ty. The presentation of a book as an author's entire self, as a per sonal expression of his very being, supposes tha t the reader reader sought it not the solution of a given difficulty or the answer to a given
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p r o b l e m , but rather to make personal contact w i t h the author. was more question of a personal exchange than of taking an ob jective position. This applies to every other field of endeavor u n t i l the eighteenth c e n t u r y . Thus, in the simplest technical f o r m , the mechanical, no decisive progress was made d u r i n g this time (unles Pascal were to be considered the sole exception; but even Pascal merely extended already already known techniques). The same holds true for financial, ad ministrative, and military techniques, i n spite of what Vauban says to the contrary. T h e n an intermediate situation developed. But despite the efforts at co-ordination and systematization made by such great techni cians Richelieu and Colbert, the only result was a greater com plication of the system, w i t h o u t much gain i n efficienc efficiency. y. On the ad ministrative and political level, al the new organs (each valuable itself and w i t h o u t doubt efficient, but representing only an addi tion to what already existed) had to take into consideration every other organ already functioning in the same field. New complicated departments, jurisdictions, and hierarchies unceasingly weighed d o w n the machinery. On the financial plane, the same monstrous g r o w t h occurred—for valid reasons—but resulted enfeeblefinan m e n t beneath seeming efficiency. There was no change cial technique, in spite of all the efforts of Colbert, who saw what should be done. There was no change in the technique of recruit m e n t , supply, and administration of the army, in spite of the efforts of Louvois, who sa just clearly what had to be done. Louis XIV was an impotent monarch, despite his authority, because of the absence of technical means. Society was at a crossroads. More and more the need was felt to create new means; even the structure these must take was clearly perceived. But the framework of society, the ideas in currency, the intellectual positions of the day were not favorable t o their realiza tion. t wa necessary to employ technical means in a framework foreign to them; these techniques were powerless to force deci sion or to eliminate outmoded means. means. T hey ran up against the profound humanism, issue of Renaissance humanism, which still h a u n t e d the seventeenth knowl seventeenth cen tury —it believed not only edge and respect for the human being but in the genuine su premacy of man over means. Tins humanism, bound up w i t h the
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idea of universalism, did not allow techniques to grow. Men re fused to conform to any uniform law, even when it operated for their own good. This refusal was found in all strata of society: in th most complex way when finance directors and parliamentary counselors refused to utilize new and precise techniques of ac c o u n t i n g and legislative supremacy; i n the most summ ary w ay w when hen the peasants rejected rejected new and ration al methods of recruit m e n t proposed for the army. The world had to wait for the eighteenth century to see techni ca progress suddenly explode in every country and in every area of h u m a n endeavor. he Industrial Revolution. The term indu strial revolution is is ap p l i e d exclusively to the development of machinery, but that is to see only one side of n actual fact, the ind ustrial revolution was merely one aspect of the technical revolu tion. t is preposterous preposterous t h a t a specialist such as Lewis M u m f o r d can writ e that he has has found the various modes of explo iting energy the key to the evolut ion technique and the moving force behind its transformations. In his view, a first period, which lasted u n t i l about 1750, knew only h y d r a u l i c energy; second period, from 1750 to 1880, 1880, is the age of coal, and a t h i r d , that of electr icity. (T he use of nuclear energy has only recently appeared; it is perhaps to be reckoned as part of the age age of electricity.) M u m f o r d ' s thesis is incomprehensible unless technique is re stricted to the machine; Mum ford actu actuaally lly makes this identifica tion. is distinction is then valid as a plan for the historical study of machines, but it is totally invalid for the study of technical civilization. hen technical civilization is consider considered ed as a w hole, this classification and explanation are shockingly summary and superficial. Nor bert iener likewise rejects rejects th e classification classification founded on the different sources energy. For h im there has been o n l y one indu strial revo lutio n, and th at consist consisted ed in the replace m e n t of human muscle as a source of energy. A n d , h adds, there is second revolution in the making whose object is the replace m e n t of the human b rain. Of this last last we have as yet only prepara tions and indications. e are not yet there. W hat we are are witnessing witnessing at the moment is a rearrangement of the world in an intermediate stage; th change is not in the use of a natural force but in the application of technique to all spheres life.
The T echnological Society Society
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The technical revolution meant the emergence of a state that was t r u l y conscious of itself and was autonomous i n relation to anyt hing that did not serve its interests—a product of the French Revolu tion. It entailed the creation of a precise military technique (Fred erick th Great and Napoleon) in the field of strategy and in the fields of organization, logistics, and recruitment; the beginning of economic technique w i t h the physiocrats, and later the liberals. In administration and police power, it was the period of rationalized systems, unified hierarchies, card indices, and regular reports. W i t h Napo leon particu larly , there was a tendency tendency to war d mecha
nization wh ich resulte from the application of technique to more or less human spheres of action. The revolution also entailed the exertion and the regrouping of ll the national energies. Th ere were to be no more loafers loafers (un der th French R evolution, they were were im prisoned ), no more privileged persons, no special interests. Everyone must serve accordance w i t h the strictures of techniqu e. F r o m the judicial p oint of view, the technical revolution entailed th great systematization of law in the Napoleonic codes and the definitive suppression of spontaneous sources of law; for example, custom. I t involved the unification of legal institutions under th iron rule of the state and the submission of law to policy. And throughout Europe, except Great B r i t a i n , the nations, amazed by such an effici efficient ent operation , abandoned their traditional jjudicial udicial systems in favor of the state. Th is systematization, unification , and clarification was applie to everything —it resulted resulted not only in the establis establishment hment of budget ary rules and in fiscal organization, but in the systematization of weights and measures and the plann ing of roads. roads. A ll this repre repre sented sented technique technique at wo rk. From this point of view, i t migh t be sai t h a t technique is the translation into action of m an s concern t master things by means of reason, to account for what is subcon scious, make quantitative what is qualitative, make clear and pre cise the outlines of nature, take hold of chaos and put order into intellectual activity the same effort was evident, particularly in th creation of an intel lectu al technique for history and biolo gy. The principles established by Descartes were applied and resulted only a philosophy but in an intellectual technique. being ei ng sources of energy th at it These phenomena are so far from b
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an scarcely be maintained that mechanical transformation b r o u g h t about all the rest. rest. In fact, the widespre ad mecha nical de velopment, spurred by the exploitation of energy, came after most of these other techniques. techniques. I t would almost seem that the order was these other techniques was nec reversed, that the appearance essary to the evolution of the machine—which certainly had no greater influence on society th an , say, the organiz ation of the police. T h e r e v o l u t i o n r e s u lt lt e d n o t from the exploitation of coal but rather from change of attitude on the part of the whole civiliza t i o n . Here we are faced w i t h a most difficult q u e s t io io n : W h y , a f te te r such slow progress for centuries, centuries, di d such such an e ruption of technical progress take place in a century and a half? W hy , at a certain m o m e n t in history, did something become possible which had not seemed possible before? e m us us t confess that the ultimate reason hy d id inventions inventions suddenly suddenly burst forth i n t h e second escapes us. say. H ere we are at the h a l f of the eighteenth century? W e cannot say. center of the mystery of i n v e n t i o n , which strangely came to life for this brief m o m e n t . The inventions of the nineteenth century are much more easily explained. A k i n d of chain reaction was set up: the discoveries made at the beginning of the century generated generated those those tha t followed followed events, once th There was a logical and foreseeable succession first steps had been taken. B u t w h y w e r e t h e first steps taken? taken? W w i l l never k n o w , a n d , i n ny case, that is not the purpose of this investigation. e as have rather why technical inventions proliferated so radically and developed to the poin t where they threaten to engulf society. society. W hy the limitless applicability of the sciences become a reality wh en hithe rto it had been been restrained and equivocal? equivocal? Th Greeks knew that machines machines cou ld be utilized; why did it devolve upon the nineteenth century to utilize them? The question, indeed, is why th nineteenth century not only made applications but did so on such a grand scale. Leonardo da V i n c i invented a prodigious n u m ber of useful devices (the alarm clock, the silk-winder, a machine fo carding textile fabrics, fabrics, and so on ), and proposed proposed many technical improvements (double- hulled ships, the universal joint, conical his inventions inventions and improvements gears, etc .). W hy di d none of his find p r a c t i c a l application?
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There are a number of general answers. One can relate relate everythin to scientific progress, for example. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw advances in application, not in pure knowledge or in speculation. It is useless to recount the scientific evolution of this period or to enumerate the sensationa series of principles and laws formulated and applied at this time. Parenthetically, it might be noted that the scientific revolution began as early as the first h a l f of the seventeenth century. Experiments were then performed to psy prove the exactness of qua ntita tive hypotheses. Mor eover, chological transformation occurred which led to the consideration of phenomen a as wort hy of study in themselves. T his prepared th way for technical progress, but it cannot explain These scientific discoveries represent necessary conditions—but not imperatives. is evident that applications are impossible w i t h o u t principles, but, once principles have been established, applications do not neces sarily follow. Applications may be made out of simple curiosity, as among the Greeks or among the makers of automatons in the eighteenth century. (These automatons were not w i t h o u t experi mental value. Research in cybernetics today likewise ends i n t h e m a k i n g of automatons.) close link between scientific research and technical inven tion appears to be a new factor in the nineteenth century. Accord in t o M u m f o r d , " t h e p r i n c i p a l i n i t i a t i v e s came, from th inventor-engineer, inventor-engineer, bu from the scientist who established the gen eral law." The scientist took cognizance b o t h of the new raw ma terials wh ic h were^ were^ available and of the new hum an needs w h i c h had to be met. Then he deliberately o riented hi research t o w a r d scientific discovery that could be applied technically. And he did this either out of simple curiosity or because of definite definite comm ercial and industr ial demands Pasteur, for instance, was encouraged in his bacteriological research by wine producers and silkworm grow ers. the twe ntieth century, this relationship relationship between scientifi scientificc re search and technical inven tion resulted resulted i n the enslavement enslavement of science to technique. In the nineteenth century, however, science wa still t h e d e t e r m i n i n g cause of technical progress. The society of th eighteenth century was not yet mature enough to allow the s y s tematic developmen t of inventio ns. As Siegfried Gied ion says, th France of that period was a testing ground. Ideas proliferated but
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c o u l d take no final form u n t i l society had undergone a transforma tion. W h a t distinguishes the eighteenth century is that applications were made for reasons of utility; soon the only justification of science was applica bility. Most historia historians ns of technique content themselves w i t h invoking philosophy to explain this. The philosophy of the eighteenth century did indeed favor tech nical applications. applications. I t was was naturalistic and sought not only to know also to exploit nature. I t was utilitarian and pragmatic. It con cerned itself w i t h easing h u m a n life, w i t h b r i n g i n g m o r e pleasure into it and simplifying its labor. For the eighteenth century, man's fife was narrowly confined to the material; it seemed evident that the problem of life wo uld be resolved resolved when men were able t o w o r k less while consuming more. The goal of science thus appeared to be fixed by philosophy. Th is philosophy was was concrete; it was bou nd up w i t h material re sults. sults. W hat cannot be seen cannot be judged, and this explains this century's judgment of history: that the foundation of civilizations is technique, not philosophy or religion. these admirable philosophers, technique had the enormous superiority of manifesting itself in a concrete way and of leaving its tracks for all to read. Voltaire and Diderot were its principal ex ponents. But I am unable to give this philosophy the highest place the history of the development of techniques. It played a role, bu it was not the prime force behind the technical movement. o say it was w oul d be to exaggerate the force of these philosophic ideas an systems, wh ich affe affecte ctedd only a small minority of French men and a minute elite abroad. The technical movement was a European movement; the ideas of these philosophic minorities could scarcely have penetrated Europe in such a way as to make evident to everyone th excellence of technical progress. have only to recall popular reactions to machinery—for example, to Vaucanson Vaucanson s loom , to the first steamboat, and to the first blast fur naces. These philosophic ideas scarcely suffice to explain the re markable mo bilization of all human forces in the nineteenth cen tury. is even questionable questionable w hether this philosophy was universally accepted. A t other times there have been utilitarian currents in philosophy, but they represented only one branch of philosophy
The Technological Society a m o n g several and di d not lead lead to such a radical transformation of society. Th e op timistic atmosphere atmosphere of the eighteenth century, more than this philosophy, created a climate favorable to the rise of technical applications. The fear of evil diminished. There was an imp rove ment in manners; a softening of the conditions of war; an increasing sense man's responsibility for his fellows; a certain delight in life, wh ich was was greatly increase increasedd by the improvem ent of living conditions in nearly all classes except the artisan; the b u i l d i n g fine houses in great great numbers. ll these helped persuade Europeans that progress could only be achieved achieved by the exploitation of natural scientific discoveries. resources and the applica tion of scientific This state of m i n d created, in the second half of the eighteenth century, a kind of good conscience on the part of scientists who de voted their research to practical objectives. objectives. Th ey believed tha t hap investigations; and it is piness and justice would result from their investigations; its beginning. here that the m y t h of progress is clear that this atmosphere was favorable to technical de velopment. B ut, in itse) itse)f, f, it was n ot enough. H ow , then, are we to explain the sudden sudden blossoming blossoming of technique i n the nineteenth cen tury? (The eighteenth century was only the preliminary phase technical application; the nineteenth century is the really interest in period. ) I feel that this transformation of civiliza tion can be explained by the conjunction in time of five five phenomena: the frui tion of a long technica l experience; pop ulati on expansion; th e suit ability of the economic environment; the plasticity of the social m i l i e u ; and the appearance f a clear technical intention. first of these factors must not be neglected: every m o d e r n technical application had ancestors. A r t h u r Vierendeel and Lewis M u m f o r d have analyzed these preparations. Every invention has it roots in a preceding technical perio d, and every p e r i o d bears itself ' n o t o n l y th th e trivial residue but also the valuable survivals of past technologies, and the nuclei of new ones." W h a t appears to be genuinely new is the formation of a "technical complex," w h i c h , ac c o r d i n g t o M u m f o r d , consists of series of partial inventions that combine into an ensemble. This u n i t begins t o f u n c t i o n w h e n t h e greatest number of its constituents have been assembled, and its trend is toward continuous self-perfection. From 1000 to about 1750, 1750, there had been a slow slow fermentation whi ch had no immediate
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consequences b u t w h i c h h a d amassed materials in every area of
life. Th ey had only to be drawn on for the technical miracle to take place. This cont inuity has been been analyzed by V ierendeel in particu l a r ; a n d W i e n e r emphasizes it whe n he writes: " t is interesting interesting to reflect on the fact that every tool possesses genealogy and is the result of the tools which served to make i t . " This enormous sum of experiments, of apparatus, of inquiries was put to use abruptly at th end of an evolutionary period which had lasted for nearly ten centuries w i t h o u t social catastrophe catastrophe.. Co ntin uity of this k i n d wa important because it made unnecessary the transmission of the t e c h n i c a l legacy from one civiliz ation to another, an operation w h i c h inevitably involves the loss of a part of it , especially a part of the social forces that apply to nontechnical areas. T h i s c o n t i n u i t y is found in all fields of technique, from finance to transport. If t e c h n i c a l progress does appear at a given moment, it is only because the social milieu is not completely favorable. But it is ripening underground; it is self-perpetuating even while it is dor m a n t , as in the seventeenth century. This long preparation was necessary as support and foundation for the structure the nine teenth century was to b u i l d ; it represented represented w hat Charles Moraze hi Essai sur la civilisation ^Occident calls "collective incuba t i o n . " Th is incub ation, consisting consisting of millions of accumulated ex periments, was the preparation for the moment of formulation, of expression. second factor was equally necessary: the popu lation expansion. H e r e a g a i n w e find ourselves face to face w i t h a f a m i l i a r p r o b l e m . F o r t w o decades popu lation studi studies es i n relation to the development of civilization have demonstrated that there is a close link between
technique and population: the growth of population entails a growth needs which cannot be satisfied except by technical de velopment. Fr om another view poin t, a population expansi expansion on offe offers rs favorable grounds for research a n d t e c h n i c a l g r o w t h b y f u r n i s h i n g o n l y t h e necessary m a r k e t b u t also the requisite human ma terial. third conditio n has been analyzed by V incen t. If technical progress is to take place, the economic m i l i e u m u s t c o m b i n e t w o apparently contradictory traits: it must be at once stable and in flux. The foundations of economic life must be stable so that p r i m a r y t e c h n i c a l research can be devoted to well-defined objects
The Technological Society and situations. But at the same time this milieu must be capable of great change, so that technical inventions can be absorbed into th economy, and research stimulated. A r i g i d economy brings w i t h fixed customs which stifle the inventive faculty. Studies of the eco n o m i c situation in the second half of the eighteenth century show that it had precisel these two opposed characteristics. But this is w e l l known. I shall do no more than point it out and shall devote greater space to the last last two conditions, wh ich arc usually neg lected. fourth cond ition is possibly possibly the most decisive. decisive. t is is the plasticity of the social milieu, which involves two factors: the dis appearance of social taboos and the disappearance of natural social groups. first these appears in various forms, depending on the society involved. In the Western civilization of the eighteenth cen t u r y there are two large categories: the taboos resulting from C h r i s t i a n i t y , and sociological taboos. The first category takes i n a l l religious and moral ideas, judgments concerning action , the prevail in conception of man, and the ends proposed for human fife. These were, theoretically and factually, opposed to technical de v e l o p m e n t. t. h e n faith had been translated into prejudice and ideology, and personal religious experience incorporated into a so cial institution, a hardening of moral positions took place w h i c h corresponded to the creation of genuine taboos. The natural order must not be tampered w i t h a n d a n y t h i n g n e w m u s t b e s u b m i t t e d to a m o r a l j u d g m e n t — w h i c h m e an an t a n u n f a v o ra ra b l e p r e j u d g m e n t . This was the popular me ntality created created by C hristian ity, partic u larly duri ng the the seventeenth seventeenth century. Closely related to these w e r e sociological taboos, in particular the conviction that a natural hierarchy exists w h i c h n o t h i n g c a n m o d i f y . T h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e nobility and the clergy, and above all of the k i n g , could not be questioned. W hen in the middle of the eighteenth century these be gan to be questioned, the reaction of the people was that sacrilege was being co mm itted; the stupor stupor that accompanied accompanied the execution of Louis XVI was a religious stupor. In fact, regicide was seen as deicide. This constitution of society, which everyone relied on and recognized as the only one possible, was an obstacle to technique w i t h i n it ; technique was h eld to be fundam entally sacrilegi sacrilegious. ous. The natural hierarchy operated against the practice of the mechani-
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c a l a r t s , w h i c h w o u l d o n l y b r i n g conveniences to the lower since the lower classes too believed in the natural classes. hierarchy, they cou ld only be submissi submissive ve and passive; t h e y d i d n o t tr to better their lot. Th e im portan t poin t here was n ot the the reality of th facts or the existence of the hierarchy; it was belief in its natural an sacred character character wh ich stood stood in the way of technique. The very structure of society—based o n n a t u r a l groups—was also an obstacle. Families were closely organized. The guilds and the groups formed by collective interests (for example, the U n i versity, the Parliament, the Confraternities and Hospitals) were distinct and independent. The i n d i v i d u a l f o u n d livelihood, p a t r o n age, security, and inte llect ual and mo ral satisfactions satisfactions in co llectives that were strong enough to answer all his needs limited enough no to make h im feel submerged or lost. Th ey sufficed sufficed to satisfy satisfy th average m a n w h o does not try to gratify imaginary needs his position is is fairly stable, w ho opposes innov ation if he lives lives in a balanced m i l i e u , even though he is poor. This fact, which is so salient salient in the three millen nia of history we kno w, is misunderstood misunderstood b y m o d e r n m a n , w h o does not know what a balanced social en v i r o n m e n t is and the good he could derive from himself may feel less need to improve his condition. I n a d dition, the very existence of natural groups is an obstacle to the propagation of tech nical invention . For p r i m i t i v e peoples, i n v e n tion spreads in certain geographical areas w i t h i n certain groups according to existing social bonds. Exterior diffusion, however, the crossing of a sociological fro ntie r, is extremely difficult. This phe every society. Division into closely constituted n o m e n o n exists groups is an obstacle to the propagation of inventions. The same holds for guilds. Guilds act not only spontaneously and as socio logical units, but also volun tarily and according to the lawfu l con stitution each. This is also true of religious groups. Consider, for example, the manufacturing secrets jealously guarded by the French Protestant Protestantss in the seventeent seventeenthh century. Th e diffusion diffusion of every technique tends to be checked by these social divisions. disappeared at the time of the French Revolu These obstacles disappeared tion, in 1789. W i t h th disappearance of religious and social taboos came the creation of new religions, the affirmation of philosophic materialism, the suppression of the various hierarchies, regicide, and the struggl against the clergy. These factors acted powerfully
he Technological Society upon the popular consciousness and contributed to the collapse the belief in these taboos. th same time (and this is the second factor factor wh ich made for the plasticity of the social social mil ieu) a systematic systematic cam paign was waged against all natural groups, under the guise f defense the rights of the indivi dua l; for example, the guilds, the com munes, and federalism were attacked, this last by the Girondists. There were movements against the religious orders and against th privileges of Parliament, the Universities, and the Hospitalers. There was to be no liber ty of groups, only that of the indi vidu al. There was likewise a struggle to undermine the family. Revolu tionary legislation legislation promoted its disintegration; it had already been shaken by the philosophy and the fervors of the eighteenth century. Revolutionary laws governing divorce, inheritance, and paternal authority were disastrous for the family unit, to the benefit of the individual. spite of temporary these effects were permanent, in spite setbacks. Society was already atomized and would be atomized more and more. The i n d i v i d u a l remained the sole sociological u n i t , b u t , fa from assuring assuring h im freedom, freedom, this fact provok ed the worst kind slavery.
T h e a t o m i z a ti ti o n w e have been discussing conferred on society th greatest possible plasticity—a decisive condition for technique. The breakup of social groups engendered the enormous displace ment of people at the beginning of the nineteenth century and resulted in the concentration of popula tion demanded by m odern technique. To uproot men from their surroundings, from th r u r a l districts from family and friends, in order to crowd them i n t o cities still too small for them ; to squeeze thousands into unfit l o d g ings and unhealthy places of work; to create a w h o l e n e w e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h i n the framework of a new human con dition (i t is too often overlooked that the proletariat is the creation of the indus trial machine)—all this was possible only when the i n d i v i d u a l wa completely isolated. isolated. It was was conceivable conceivable only when he lite rally had no environment, no family, and was not part of a group able resist resist econom ic pressure; when he had almost no way of life left. no technical Such is the influence of social plasticity. W i t h o u t evolution is possible. For the i n d i v i d u a l in an atomized society, society, on ly the state was left: the state was the highest authority a n d i t became omnipotent as well The society produced was perfectly malleable
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remarkably flexible f r o m b o t h the intellectual the material points of view. T he technical phenomenon phenomenon had its most favorable favorable environment since the beginning of history. th same t i m e , by a historical coincidenc coincidencee (whe ther fortuitous fortuitous clear or not, I shall not undertake to say), w hat I have called technical intention came into being. I n all other civilizations civilizations there had been a technical movement—more or less extensive work of this k i n d — b u t no no t a mass intention, clearly understood and de liberately guid ing the whole society society i n a technical direction. Ciedion says of the period 1750 1750 to 1850: 1850: "I nv en tio n was a p a r t of the norma normall course of life. Everyone invented. Every entre preneur dreamed of more rapid and economical means of fabrica Th e wor k was done unconsciousl unconsciouslyy an d anonymously. N o where else never before was the number of inventions per capita as great as America in the 60s of that century. is possible that a similar phenomenon took place in prehistori times when technique appeared out of sheer necessity. Pressed sides, man reacted b y creating technique. I n historical times the situation changed, however. Homo sapiens had by then established his supremacy over the other mammals w i t h respect to natural forces. Some technical efforts had been pursued, now in one field, now in another; for example, example, i n the military art of the Assyrians or the art of construction of the Egyptians. There were always dividuals who possessed clear vision of techn ical supremacy; say, Archimedes i n mechanics, mechanics, or Loyola in spiritual technique. Bu t w almost never find th distinctive characteristic of our time—a precise view of technical possibilities, the w i l l to attain certain ends, ap plication in all areas, an adherence of the whole of society to a conspicuous technical objective. AH these, taken together, con stitute wha whatt I have termed a clear technical intention. W h e n c e arose this intention? Many causes conspired to produce among them the influence of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, reinforced by the philosophy of Hegel and later that of Marx. But there were other factors which were as important. W h a t really produced the general movement i n favor of technique was special interest. This technical movement has been studied by men as different as Descartes and M are. Bu t it was on ly when industrial selfself-int inter* er*
he Technological Society est, for the sake of efficiency, demanded search for the "one best way to do work " that research was begun by Cilb reth in th field technique, w i t h the amazing results we see see to day. Special interest was and is the great motive force behind the de necessarily any par velopment of technical consciousness—but ticular interest; say, the capitalistic interest or the moneyed inter become conscious France, est. The state interest was the first at the time of the Revolution. The state state developed political a n d i n dustrial technique, and later, w i t h Napoleon, military and judicial ju dicial technique, because it found them to be potent forces against it enemies w i t h i n an w i t h o u t . The state protected "the arts and the spirit sciences" (i n reality, techniques) techniques) not out of greatness concern for civilization, but out of the instinct for power. A fter the state, it was the bourgeoisie who discovered how much profit could be extracted from a consciously consciously dev eloped t echniq ue. In fact, the bourgeoisie has always been more or less involved w i t h technique. Th ey were the initiators of the first financial techniques and, later on of the modern state. state. A t the beginning of the nineteenth century, they saw the possibilities of drawing huge profits from this system, especially as they were favored b y the cru blin g "of morals and religion" and felt themselves free, i n spite of the idealistic smoke screen they raised, to exploit individuals. This class put the interests of technique before before the interes interests ts of individu als, who h ad t o be sacrificed in order that technique might progress. t is solely solely b e cause th bourgeoisie made m oney, thanks to technique, that tech ni nique qu e became one of their objectives. Th is alliance alliance is well known and we need recall but a few facts. facts.
steam engine perfected, was ruin ed and at James W a t t , his steam
dead end. I t was a bourgeois, bourgeois, Matt hew Bou lton, who grasped th industrial and financ financial ial possibili possibilities ties of W at ts inve ntion and de cided to apply app ly it. Tw o further facts are pertinent: commercial capitalism preceded preceded indust rial capitalism; industry owed its rise rise to from the accumulation of capital originating commerce. And where industrialization first occur and become most widespread? E ngland, because capitalism was more highly developed there and th bourgeoisie more at liberty to act than anywhere else. This is w e l l k nown . The union betwee betweenn the bourgeoisie and technique wa expressed not only in the development of factories, but much
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more subtly i n the fact fact th at the majority of technicians technicians came from this class. It was the bourgeoisie w h i c h p r o m o t e d t k e advance science.
Moreover, the bourgeoisie were so well aware of the relation be tween economic success and the scientific foundations of that suc cess that they kept in their own hands, almost as a monopoly, the instruction which was the only means of access to the great schools and faculties that trained the technicians of science and the tech nicians of society. T e c h n i c a l progress is a functio n of bourgeois bourgeois m oney. Yet today th Marxists claim that the bourgoisie either have attempted to restrain technical progress or make it serve th purposes of war. T h e i r c l a i m , h o w e v e r , does not prevent history from c o n t r a d i c t i n g their theories. Marx himself would never have made such state ments; wh at is true true today was n ot true in hi time. However, this self-interest of the bourgeoisie was not enough to carry the whole of society along w i t h it—witness the popular re actions against technical progress. As late as 1848, one of the de mands of the workers was the suppression of machinery. This is easily understood. The standard of living had not risen, men still suffered from th loss of equilibrium in their lives lives brought about by a too rapi d injection of technique, and they h ad not yet felt the in toxication of the results. The peasants and the workers bore a ll the hardships of technical advance w i t h o u t sharing in the triumphs. For this reason, there was a reaction against technique, and so ciety was split The power of the state, the money of the bourgeoisie were for th masses were against. the middle of the nineteenth century the situation changed. K a r l Marx rehabilitated technique in the eyes of the workers. He preached that technique can be liberating. Those w h o e x p l o i te te d i t enslaved the workers, but that was the fault of the masters a n d n o t of technique itself. M a r x w a s perhaps not the first have said this, bu t he was the first to convince the masses o f i t . T h e w o r k i n g class w o u l d n o t b e liberated by a struggle against technique but, on the contrary, by t e c h n i c a l progress itself, which would automatically b r i n g about th collapse of the bourgeoisie and of capitalism. This reconcilia• The author includes here not only faculties such as the Ecole Polytechnique, also administrative t r i b u n a l s s u c h a s t h e C o n s e i l d ' E t a t . ( T r a n s . )
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techniquess was decisive. B ut it would not tion of the masses to technique have been sufficient to result in a clear consciousness of the tech nical objective, the new consensus omnium, had it not appeared simultaneously w i t h second historical fact, namely, the diffusion of the so-called benefits of techniques among the masses. These benefits benefits in clud ed, for example, the conveniences of daily life, th progressive shortening of the work day, facilities for public trans portation and medicine, new possibilities of making one's fortune t h e U n i t e d States and in the colonies), housing improvements, and so forth. A prodigious upheaval took place between 1850 and 1914 1914 wh ich convinced everyone of the excellence of a technical
movement that could produce such marvels and alter human life. this, Marx explained, presaged even better things and pointed to the road to follow. Fact and theory were for once in agreement. c o u l d p u b l i c opinion resist? self-interest (th e ideal of comfort, for for instan ce), the D r a w n by self-interest masses w e n t over to the side of technique; society was converted. c o m m o n w i l l developed to exploit the possibilities of technique to the maximum, and groups of the most conflicting interests ( s t a t e a n d i n d i v i d u a l , bourgeoisie a n d w o r k i n g class) u n i t e d t o h y m n it praises. L i t e r a l l y everyone wa agreed on its excellence. rue , after 1914, 1914, certain criticisms criticisms came from the intellectuals, but these were ineffective because they were usually beside t h e p o i n t —manifestations of vague idealism or of sentimental humanitarianism. the middle of the nineteenth century, when technique had hardly begun to develop, another voice voice was raised raised in prophe tic w a r n i n g against The voice was Kierkegaard's. But his warnings, strongest sense solidly thought out though they were, and in the strongest the wor d prophetic, were no t heeded—for heeded—for very different reasons. They were too close to the truth. T h i s analysis applies chiefly to the countries where the technical movement first developed—England and France. I n E n g l a n d events took a somewhat different course t h a n i n France, but they h a d t h e same scope and profound significance. The historical se quence varied, bu t the orientation in b o t h countries was toward technical development. Social plasticity developed in England by different paths and at a different time than in France. Sociological taboos were broken at an early date. The regicide of Charles I
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C r o m w e l l gave the initial and primary impulse to social plasticity; as all writers agree, after this th is date date a r i g i d social social hi erarchy no longer existed existed i n England. The supreme supreme value was produc tive and efficient efficient labor which permitted the industrious to rise h i g h on the social ladder ( W i l l i a m Pitt is a good example). The k i n g no longer rep resented divine authority, nor was he able to resist the nation. No longer was there sociologi cal rigidity based on the royal person or on the power of money. money. I w o u l d be an error to interpret sociologi cally the England of the eighteenth century in accordance w i t h the stability which is discernible in the nineteenth, and w h i c h was achieved after the technical revolution, when society had entered new paths. I n the eighteenth century, England was essentially essentially m o b i l e and unstable in all its structures. Christianity itself was not th conservative force f orce i t proved prov ed to be on the C o n t i n e n t . Two great currents div ided English society society before the advent advent of Methodism: Meth odism: th Chur ch of England and the Puritans. The Puritans, even after fail ure, were were the predominant influence. In keeping their political failure, w i t h the t r e n d the Reformation set, they exploded all prevailing religious taboos and developed a practical and utilitarian mental it that emphasized the us use e and even even the t he exploitat exploi tation ion of th e good things of this w o r l d given by C od t o men. The relation ship of this t r e n d to the development of capitalism is w e l l k n o w n . The Church of England had favored tolerance since since the th e end of the eighteenth century and had adopted as its leading principle Bishop Wartoo , there was a kind of secular burton's idea of social utility. Here, too, ization of religion. Religion Relig ion is no longer the framework framewor k of society; Rather, it inte it can no longer impose its taboos or forms upon grates itself into society, adjusts to and adopts the notion of social criterion and justification. At the same time the disintegra utility tion and atomization of English social groups occurred—brought so much by the influence of the state (as i n Fran ce) as about not so by the destruction of peasant society w h i c h began i n the early eighteenth century and of w h i c h Defoe and Swift Swif t were such elo q u e n t witnesses. The peasant commune and the peasant family were slowly ruined in the eighteenth century. The historian notes notes the collapse, collapse, relentless and more rapid than in France, of a whole society w h i c h been in equilibrium until t h e n . The struggle between the landed and the moneyed interests ended w i t h the victory of the
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moneyed interests. interests. I t is not important here to detail the ways a new peasant society, based on the moneyed interest, came into being. entrepreneurs bought u p the t he great estates and took the N e w l y rich entrepreneurs place of the old gentry, but that is not our concern. Our concern is merchants whose influence changed the t he organic organi c structure struc ture of th t r a d i t i o n a l w o r l d . The small landowners and the yeomen yeomen were eliminated or reduced to an an agri cult ural prolet ariat, or they w ere forced to migrate to the c i t y . The r u r a l corporations were r u i n e d , th communes passed almost completely into the hands of the new coherent sociological units. The landlords and ceased to consti tute coherent movement was was accelerate accelerated d by the appl icati on of new agricultu agric ultu ral accepted much more rapi dly than in France. methods, w h i c h were accepted The enclosure of the commons, w h i c h in France took place chiefly after 1780, began began in i n England Engl and in 1730. The new agric ultural ult ural tech niques were plainly so superior that t was not possible to preserve th old "open field" system—the system—the commons, c ommons, the pastures, pastures, an d the forests; thus the final blow was dealt t o the old , organic, peasant society. The peasant could not survive as such, and w i t h h i m , the w h o l e of society entered into a state of flux. The plastic ity we refer to came about in Englan d as a result of this evoluti on in the use of l a n d , w h i c h furnished the technical movement w i t h the necessary manpower: apathetic, vacant, and uprooted. Not only was this manpower necessary for the development of industry; the masses thus created were indispensable to faith in techniques and the spread of techniques. To summarize: social plasticity came about earlier in England
France, and the technical movement movement developed along w i t h than n France, Moreover, the state, w h i c h was was dominant in French society, di ot have the same influence in Great B r i t a i n .
This applies too to the development development of a clear tech nical con sciousness. n Grea B r i t a i n this consciousness appeared as a bour geois interest. The spirit behind the introduction of new techniques the r u r a l district s was very dif ferent from that which character movement in France ized France a short time later. The technical movement was launched launc hed by the monarchy monarch y and took a scientific f o r m : the academies and the resear research ch instit utes propagated t he new tech niques throughout the country; and the nobles applied t h e m , very often disinterestedly. n Englan d, profit wa from the very begin n i n g the prime motive. An d empiricism was th e dominant factor
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because technique was more efficient. efficient. Techniques were developed because it paid to develop them; commercial activity found them
advantageous. advantageous. This was tr ue in agricu lture as as we ll as as i n indust ry. The English technical movement was marked by the fact that all th different financial systems (banks, stock exchanges, insurance companies) were perfected. The clear consciousness of the value of technique expressed itself primarily in terms of money, and was located at the center of the systems of distribution. And the accel eration of invention in this area influenced all other techniques. The British state attained this clear technical consciousness at comparatively last date, and then only when it saw that techniques were to it immediate interest. This phenomenon of technical clarity sometimes came about through an association of the interests of the state and the interests private individuals. In steelmaking, for example, the fact that H e n r y Cort was supplier to the A d m i r a l t y was decisive, in 1780, 1780, for th applic ation and development of steel puddli ng. The state f o u n d in this procedure an excellent means of improving its naval vessels. However, it was competition w i t h the Napoleonic empire t h a t started His Majesty's government down the road of tech nique. Thereafter, b o t h governments understood that only technical efficiency efficiency in all governmental relations and enterprises enterprises could com affairs of wa r. The English m a n d the paths of peace as wel l as the affairs state henceforth had the same influence on the development of techniques as the French revolutionary state had exerted through th establishment of a clear technical consciousness. The way had already been paved in England by the emergence of the British bourgeoisie. Whateve r the differe differences nces in its development i n Eng l a n d and France, however, the technical consciousness that ap peared was identical b o t h countries. the United States this took place at the begin ning of the nine t e e n t h century. U n t i l then, the society of this country was inor ganic. But at that time the American social milieu was favorable; moreover, the Americans profited from the technical conscious ness evolved in Europe, and so they arrived immediately at a m o d e l for technique. Giedion has noted that the Americans began by mechanizing complex operations, which produced the assembly l i n e , whereas the Europeans Europeans tende d to mechanize simple opera
he Technological Society tions, such as spinning. This American accomplishment was the result of the exceptional flexibility of the American milieu. These conditions were not found in the other European coun tries: Spain, I t a l y , Germany, Austria, Russia. these nations the social structures remained as they were and the social hierarchy was not attacked. The taboos of religion were fanatically respected, and those of society were not questioned. The Inquisition and the T r i b u n a l of the Empire jealously guarded the spirit ual and socio socio logical divisions of society. This w o r l d was already undermined, r u i n e d , and emptied of content, but its r i g i d forms were univer sally accepted as good. There were few changes in the cities and none at all in the rural areas. The traditional organism remained intact. An d when enlightened despotism began to create some ex c i t e m e n t , this w o r l d was so little prepared that it exhausted itself the struggle against the old social structures. Consider, for ex ample, the fate of Peter the Great, Joseph and the melancholy and celebrated Marquis de Pombal. Great inventions may have been made in Germany and Russia d u r i n g this perio d. Everyone is familiar w i t h the claims of H i t l e r , and later of St alin, that all import ant discoveries discoveries were made i their respective countries. A l l o w i n g for exaggeration, there is per haps some t r u t h in these claims. But the discoveries discoveries we re not a p p l i e d , and only application counts in the rise of technique. A p p l i c a t i o n did not take place because the felicitous felicitous combination of factors we have discussed was lacking. The social milieu of these psychology, sociological countries, their spiritual tendencies, group psychology, structures, and past history were al l unfavorable unfavorable to the rise rise of tech n i q u e . The state in some countries, principally Prussia, was fav orable to but a clear technical consciousness on the part of the state alone was obviously insufficient to open the door to the great mobilization of men and things necessary for this multiform prog ress.
Th joint occurrence of the five factors we have briefly analyzed explains the exceptional growth of technique. Never before had these factors factors coincid ed. They are, to summarize: (1 ) a very long technical maturation or incubation w i t h o u t decisive checks before th final flowering; population growt h; (3) a suitable suitable eco n o m i c m i l i e u ; (4) the almost complete plasticity of a society mal-
