EJUSDEM GENERIS Ejusdem or Eiusdem Generis: Of the same kind or nature. A rule of interpretation that where a class of things is followed by general wording that is not itself expansive, the general wording is usually restricted things of the same type as the listed items. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v CA G.R. No. 33471 January 31, 1972 A shipment of 438 packages of foodstuffs, declared in the name of private respondent Eusebio Dichoco under Entry No. 109924 (70) arrived on December 16, 1970 at the Port of Manila. The shipment was covered by a "Customs No-Dollar Declaration", dated December 15, 1970. On December 28, 1970, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and detention (S.I. Case No. 12055) for violation of Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to Central Bank Circular Nos. 247, 289, and 295 and section 102 (k) of the said Code. On the same date, private respondent requested the release of the shipment upon the posting of a cash bond, which request, although favorably recommended by the Collector of Customs, was denied by the Commissioner of Customs. However, the proper taxes and duties amounting to P25,998.00 were imposed on the shipment and paid by private respondent. After hearing, the Collector of Customs issued his decision, on January 19, 1971, decreeing the seizure and forfeiture of the shipment "for the simple reason that claimants failed to comply with the regulations, that is, with the Central Bank circulars requiring the production of release certificates for importations similar to the subject articles." On appeal, the Commissioner of Customs affirmed the decision on January 21, 1971. On January 27, 1971 private respondent filed before respondent court a "petition for review, with a motion for release of goods under bond", upon the grounds that the decision appealed from was not supported by substantial evidence and that the goods seized did not constitute prohibited importation as contemplated in Sections 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. In his answer filed before respondent court, the Commissioner of Customs alleged that "the goods having been imported without the release certificate required by the Central Bank", are "subject to forfeiture"
and the goods being of "prohibited importation," may not be released under bond pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The respondent Court, in its resolution of February 3, 1971, granted the motion to release the goods subject to the condition that a cash bond in the sum of P43,854.59 be filed by private respondent with the Bureau of Customs. The bond having been filed, respondent Court issued an order, dated February 9, 1971, directing petitioner to release the shipment. Petitioner filed on March 2, 1971a motion for reconsideration upon the ground that the importation in question, classified as non-essential consumer goods, is banned by Central Bank Circulars No. 289, dated February 21, 1970, No. 294 of March 10, 1970, and No. 295 of March 20, 1970, and "acquired the status of prohibited importation or importation contrary to law" and cannot be released under bond. Private respondent filed his opposition dated March 4, 1971. Respondent court in its resolution dated March 8, 1971, granted the motion for reconsideration, declaring that "Section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that articles the importation of which is prohibited by law cannot be released under bond" and set aside its resolutions of February 3 and February 9, 1971. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent court's resolution of March 8, 1971, and said court, in its resolution of March 24, 1971, reversed its resolution of March 8, 1971 and reinstated the resolution of February 3, 1971, ordering the immediate release of the foodstuffs. Respondent court issued an order, dated April 12, 1971, requiring petitioner to appear on April 16, 1971 and show cause why he should not be declared in contempt of Court for non-compliance with the resolution of March 24, 1971. Petitioner filed on April 16, 1971 his "Motion for Reconsideration and Explanation", explaining why he should not be held in contempt and at the same time praying for the reconsideration of the order of March 24, 1971, which ordered the release of the goods upon the ground that goods imported without release certificates required by the Central Bank are "merchandise of prohibited importation" and cannot therefore be released under any kind of bond. April 19, 1971, respondent court found petitioner's explanation for his failure to comply with the order of March 24, 1971 satisfactory, but denied the motion for reconsideration upon the ground that it was filed 23 days after his receipt of the resolution, and ordering him to comply, within three days, with the order of March 24, 1971.
On April 22, 1971 petitioner filed an "Urgent Omnibus Motion and Manifestation", praying the respondent court to reconsider and set aside its order of March 24 and April 19, 1971 and reinstate its order of March 8, 1971; that the case be immediately set for hearing on the merits; and to excuse him from complying with the order of April 19, 1971. Respondent court denied the omnibus motion in its order dated April 27, 1971. Hence the present petition before this Court. Herein petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Section 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code; that the foodstuffs in question being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond; and that respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in ordering the release of the foodstuffs in question. The petitioner prays that pending the determination of this case on its merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte enjoining the implementation of respondent court's resolutions dated March 24, 1971 and April 19, 1971; and that after due proceedings said resolutions be declared null and void and ordered set aside. This Court, by resolution dated May 5, 1971, issued a temporary restraining order, and required respondents to file an answer. On May 6, 1971 a temporary restraining order was issued restraining respondent Court of Tax Appeals, its agents, representatives, etc. from enforcing the resolutions dated March 24, 1971 and April 19, 1971 issued in its C.T.A. Case No. 2206; more specifically from directing petitioner Commissioner of Customs to release under bond to respondent Eusebio Dichoco the shipment of foodstuffs in question pending final judgment of the case and from citing or declaring said petitioner in contempt of court for failure to release said foodstuffs, etc. An answer was filed, by counsel, for both respondent Court of Tax Appeals and Eusebio Dichoco. In their answer, respondent allege special and affirmative defenses, contending that the instant petition is fatally defective, and certiorari does not lie; that there is no legal basis for the injunction; and that the importation was not a "prohibited importation" and can be released under bond pursuant to Section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Respondents pray for the dismissal of the petition and the dissolution of the temporary restraining order.
Private respondent Eusebio Dichoco, in contending that the instant petition is without basis in fact and in law, does not deny that "articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond" as provided in section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code. He, however, vigorously denies that the "foodstuffs in question are articles of prohibited importation." He argues that the Tariff and Customs Code distinguishes articles of "prohibited importation" from those that can be imported "only upon conditions prescribed by law" or "importation effected contrary to law". He further argues that Section 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which enumerates the articles of "prohibited importations", refers to contraband or absolutely prohibited articles and concludes in its sub-paragraph (k) with a general statement, "all other articles the importation of which is prohibited by law". Respondent maintains that under the well known rule of ejusdem generis, this general statement must be restricted only to those articles which are absolutely prohibited or those considered contraband. Respondent then insists that foodstuffs belong to that kind of importation that are, under Section 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code, "subject to importation only upon conditions prescribed by law", as distinguished from articles "of prohibited importation," mentioned in the same section; that said foodstuffs, furthermore, can be classified under "importation effected contrary to law" as distinguished from "prohibited importation" mentioned in section 2530 of the same Code. Respondent likewise argues that section 2307 also distinguishes different kinds of importations when it provides that there can be no redemption "where the importation is absolutely prohibited", but allows redemption of other kinds of importation including forfeited foodstuffs. Respondent claims that section 2601 also makes the same distinction when it provides that "seized property, other than contraband" shall be subject to sale. Respondent points out that both the Central Bank and the Bureau of Customs, through their authorized counsel, admitted that the foodstuffs are "not prohibited importation under section 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code, "which admission bars them from asserting the contrary. 1 It is, therefore, asserted by respondent that the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband, and are not, as stated by respondent court, among the prohibited importations enumerated in Section 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code, 2 and so said foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in Section 2301 of the same Code. Respondent likewise points out that both the Central Bank and the Bureau of Customs have been releasing outright imported foodstuffs to selected importers. Respondent also urges that the purpose of the release of the importation in question is legitimate, for said foodstuffs are intended to be eaten, and eating is always legitimate; and that the release under bond of the foodstuffs which
are fast deteriorating would be beneficial for all parties concerned. Petitioner argues, finally, that Customs Administrative Order No. 1970, dated October 20, 1970, contravenes the Tariff and Customs Code. 3. We cannot sustain the stand of the respondents. The importation in question is a prohibited importation under Section 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code which provides, in part, as follows: . SEC. 102. Prohibited Importations. —The importation into the Philippines of the following articles is prohibited: k. all other articles the importation of which is prohibited by law." . Respondents contend that this last paragraph must, by application of the principles of ejusdem generis, be restricted only to those articles the importation of which is "absolutely prohibited," or to contraband. This contention is not acceptable. In the first place, the specific things enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (j), inclusive, of Section 102 have no distinguishable common characteristics and they differ greatly from one another, and the rule of ejusdem generis "applies only where the specific words preceding the general expression are of the same nature. Where they are of different genera, the meaning of the general word remains unaffected by its connection with them." (Black, On Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 218; 50 Am. Jur., p. 248). Moreover, calling contraband only the things "absolutely prohibited by law" is a misnomer, for contraband means any article the importation or exportation of which is prohibited by law (Black, Law Dictionary). Section 102, when examined, shows that it prohibits the importation of two categories of articles, namely those which are absolutely prohibited, for example, those enumerated in paragraphs b, c, d, f, h, and j, and those articles which are qualifiedly prohibited, that is, those that may be imported subject to certain conditions or limitations, for example, those enumerated in paragraphs a and i. Accordingly the general provision in paragraph k, to wit: "all other articles the importation of which is prohibited by law" cannot be so restricted as to comprise only those articles the importation of which is absolutely prohibited like explosives. Articles of prohibited importation cover not only absolutely prohibited articles but also qualifiedly prohibited articles.
Paragraph (k) is comprehensive in the sense that it prohibits the importation of all articles not mentioned in the preceding provision but prohibited by other existing statutes (Tejam, Commentaries on the Tariff Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 6A). The legal effects of the importation of qualifiedly prohibited articles are the same as those of absolutely prohibited articles. (Geotina v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-33500, August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362, 379, 383.) . The laws which prohibit importation mentioned in Section 102 (k) include the pertinent Central Bank Circulars which have the force and effect of laws. "Customs law" includes not only the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code but also all other laws and any regulation made pursuant thereto that is subject to enforcement by the Bureau of Customs or otherwise subject to its jurisdiction (Sec. 3514 of Tariff and Customs Code) and articles imported in violation of Central Bank Circulars have the status of "merchandise of prohibited importation" (Chan Kian v. Collector of Customs of Manila, Jan. 31, 1966, No. L-20803, 16 SCRA 133, 136; Seree Investment Co. v. Commissioner of Customs, No. L-21217, Nov. 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 431, 434; Bombay Department Store v. Commissioner of Customs, No. L-20460, Sept. 30, 1965, 15 SCRA 104, 107-108). It cannot be gainsaid that the importation in question violated Central Bank Circulars, inasmuch as in the words of petitioner Commissioner of Customs in its decision of January 21, 1971, "it was established thru the admission of claimant (Dichoco) that the necessary release certificate in connection with his importation was not secured from the Central Bank. In view thereof, the collector after instituting the necessary seizure proceedings forfeited the 438 packages of foodstuffs for alleged violation of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 247, 289, 294 and 295 in relation to Section 2530 (f) and Section 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code." 4 If the importation in question was made contrary to Central Bank circulars, then said importation is an importation prohibited by law. That importation, even if it be termed "importation effected contrary to law", as respondents call it, is nonetheless a "prohibited importation." . This Court had held: . "Thus, it is now settled that the goods imported without release certificates required in Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 are "merchandise of prohibited importation" as this expression is used in said section 1363 (f). To this effect have been, among others, Commissioner vs. Eastern Sea Trading, Commissioner vs. Santos, Commissioner vs. Nepomuceno, Pascual vs. Commissioner of Customs, Seree Investment Co. vs. Commissioner of Customs, and Lazaro vs.
Commissioner of Customs." (Sare vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-22988, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 715, 718.) 5 As a matter of law, no release certificate may be issued to such importation, although it is a no-dollar importation, because Circular No. 295 provides that: " "No-dollar" imports not covered by Circular No. 247 shall not be issued any release certificate ... ." . and the foodstuffs imported by private respondent Dichoco are not among the items listed in Circular No. 247 for which no release certificates are needed. The reason for this is to protect the country's international reserve, because every import of goods or merchandise requires an immediate or future demand for foreign exchange (Pascual v. Commissioner of Customs, 105 Phil. 1039, 1045). The law also prohibits the release under bond of the imported foodstuffs in question. This is provided in Section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code which provides: . Sec. 2301. — Warrant for Detention of Property-Bond. — Upon making any seizure, the Collector shall issue a warrant for the detention of the property; and if the owner or importer desires to secure the release of the property for legitimate use, the Collector may surrender it upon the filing of a sufficient bond, in an amount to be fixed by him, conditioned for the payment of the appraised value of the article and/or any fine, expenses and costs which may be adjudged in the case: Provided, That articles the importation of which is prohibited by law shall not be released under bond. (Emphasis supplied.) Customs Administrative Order No. 19-70, dated October 20, 1970, also provides that "all importations seized and forfeited for violation of Central Bank circulars shall not be allowed to be released under bond, either surety or cash, nor allowed to be redeemed ... ." This order cannot be said to contravene section 2301 or the Tariff and Customs Code, as contended by private respondent. Anent this matter, this Court has held that: Respondent importer's petition before the tax court was filed to seek judgment "sustaining [the importer's] right to the discharge of its importation from the carrying vessel and its release under bond to it and declaring Customs Administrative Order No. 19-70 null and void" as an alleged unauthorized and arbitrary modification or
amendment of the provisions of section 2301 of the tariff and customs code. As already shown above, the said administrative reiteration of the express prohibition of the cited section against the release under bond of prohibited articles seized and held for forfeiture by the customs authorities. The tax court of course made no pronouncement of the alleged nullity of the said administrative order, the validity of which cannot be gainsaid ..." (Geotina v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-33500, August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362, 384-385). It may be pertinent to note that Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 1410 "An Act to prohibit the so-called "No-dollar Imports" except under certain conditions" also provides that "any violation of this law or any provision hereof shall subject the articles imported to seizure and confiscation without any right of redemption or release under bond, existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding." . Private respondent also contends that there were some importations of non-essential consumer goods that were released by the Bureau of Customs and the Central Bank. This is true. In the record We find, for example, that an importation of fresh oranges, lemons and grapefruits by Savoy Philippines Hotel was issued Release Certificate No. 20134, dated March 31, 1971 by the Central Bank of the Philippines; that an importation of cheese by Savoy Philippines Hotel was also issued Release Certificate No. 19980 dated January 20, 1971; and that an importation of Danish cheese by Hotel Intercontinental, Manila, was also issued Release Certificate No. 39704, dated March 4, 1971. 6 These importations, however, cannot be said to have been made "contrary to law" and were prohibited importations, because the importations were authorized and were covered by "release certificates," approved pursuant to M. B. Resolution No. 383 dated March 4, 1970. 7 The authority granted may be justified because it was given to hotels that cater to tourists visiting the country and are, therefore, dollar earners. In order that the Central Bank might not be accused of arbitrarily favoring certain importers, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Teehankee, has suggested: . But it might perhaps be desirable that the Central Bank spell out such exceptions and the cases where it will grant "prior specific approvals" as against the standing prohibition for the guidance of all concerned, so that it may not be charged with acting arbitrarily and without any definite set of rules and guidelines that assures equal treatment and equal application of its circulars to all. (Geotina v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-33500, August 31, 1970, 40 SCRA 362, 380-381.) .
The reason advanced by private respondent for the release of the importation in question is that foodstuffs are intended to be eaten, and eating is always legitimate. This argument is beside the point. The issue in the present case is whether or not the foodstuffs were imported contrary to law, and not whether the purpose for which the articles were imported is licit or illicit. Even if the purpose of importing the foodstuffs be legitimate, that purpose alone will not justify the prohibited importation, because this is a case where the end does not justify the means. The final reason advanced by private respondent, that the release under bond of the deteriorating foodstuffs would be beneficial to all parties concerned, does not cleanse the importation of its illegality and will not justify their release under bond. The Tariff and Customs Code expressly prohibits the release under bond of articles of prohibited importation. Because "articles of prohibited importation" are not allowed to be imported, the government expects no revenue from such banned articles. Regarding this point, this Court has held: . It is utterly fallacious, therefore, when such banned goods are nevertheless sought to be imported in violation of law, to assume that it is to the interest of the Government, where the goods are perishable to release them to the importer under bond to secure payment of the appraised value thereof in case they are finally declared forfeited in favor of the Government. For the code expressly prohibits the release under bond of such articles of prohibited importation. The Government expects no revenue from such banned articles, since they are not allowed to be imported. Otherwise, the law's prohibition would be rendered totally nugatory, since such banned articles, which are mostly luxury items, are in great demand and command sky-high prices assuring great profit to the smuggler. The smuggler would have the greatest profit motive to wreak havoc upon the currency by purchasing dollars at the highest black market rates to purchase and bring in these high-profit luxury items. Should he succeed in smuggling them in, his venture is a complete success. If he is caught, then all he has to do is put up a bond for the release of the goods "to secure payment of the appraised value thereof" to the Government, and he can still realize a substantial profit from the sale of the banned goods thus released to him. All the measures designed by the Central Bank to strengthen and stabilize our peso and to check the unregulated flow of foreign exchange from the country with the ultimate end of setting aright the country's economy and financial
position would thereby be set at naught. (Geotina vs. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-33500, August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362, 383-384.) . Another issue raised by private respondent is that the instant petition for certiorari is procedurally defective upon the grounds that the disputed resolution of March 24, 1971 was already final and unappealable because of the failure of petitioner to file a timely motion for reconsideration. Regarding this point, it may be said that if private respondent meant that the order of March 24, 1971 had become unassailable and the lapse of fifteen days had given it conclusiveness, said contention can not be sustained because the order complained of is interlocutory, and an interlocutory order is such that it is always subject to correction and amendment before final judgment is rendered in the case. Private respondent also argues that petitioner has not shown that respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion or error of jurisdiction in issuing the order complained of. Under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari may issue not only when the inferior court has acted with grave abuse of discretion, but also when it has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Although a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties it has been held that if a court has no power to give certain kinds of relief, and it acts otherwise, it is acting without jurisdiction (14 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 786). It has been shown that the trial court could not, under the law and decisions of this Court, order the release of the forfeited imported foodstuffs, under bond, and in ordering its release it had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Private respondent furthermore contends that petitioner had an adequate remedy, that is appeal. Suffice it to state that a petition for certiorari is the proper procedure for obtaining a relief from, or review of, an interlocutory order. (14 Am. Jur. 2d., p. 789.) . Private respondent finally urges that the instant petition is defective in that the copies of the orders subject thereof were not certified. This contention has no merit. The Rules of Court should be liberally construed, for they are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be properly laid before the court. When those issues are already clear before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance. What is important is that the case is decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points. (Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672.)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the questioned resolutions of respondent Court of Tax Appeals, dated March 24, 1971 and April 19, 1971 in its CTA Case No. 2206 entitled "Eusebio Dichoco, petitioner, versus Commissioner of Customs, respondent" are annulled and set aside, and the restraining order issued by this Court on May 5, 1971 is made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. MIGRINIO AND TROADIO TECSON G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990 The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. The Board opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos. Respondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent acted as a “subordinate” under E.O. No.1 and related executive orders. HELD:
NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent. Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is – where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. The term “subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2. The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecution agency.
Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez January FACTS: 28 1961 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines from abroad imported various materials such as sodium benzoate, precipitated saccharinate calcium carbonate and as phosphate, stabilizers for and use flavoring dental cream of the it manufactures. importation these materials, made the of Central paid Bank to of on the foreign exchange payment used for the and other charges incident pursuant thereto, to Republic 601, as Act No. commonly known as Law. Exchange The petitioner Tax filed Central with applications for special of excise 17% tax it had auditor paid. of The the refused to pass in audit refund its fixed claims by the Officer-in-Charge Administration, on toothpaste theory that stabilizers are not section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law. to General, Auditor but the latter ruling affirmed of the auditor the the maintaining term “stabilizer that and the flavors” in section mentioned 2 of the refers only to those preparation in the or manufacture or food of food satisfied, the petitioner case to brought the Supreme the present Court thru petition ISSUE: for review. foreign exchange used for the by importation petitioner of dental cream flavors the is 17% exempt imposed by No. HELD: 601). under review was reversed. special General terms. The ruling of term flavors” “stabilizer as used only to law those refers based, food products is principle statutory “general be restricted terms by may result that will be limited language by language specific statute’s object purpose.” however, is The rule, applicable cases only to one general term, all enumeration items in belong an or fall under one (ejusdem In case generis). at bar, it “stabilizer true that term number that may of be articles classified food products, as food but or is immediately other items following belong to it the do same not classification. construction general and that unlimited restrained terms and are limited by particular them, connection does not with require general terms rejection intended merely as an ascertaining aid in intention legislature and is to with other rules of Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez January FACTS: 28 1961 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines from abroad imported various materials such as sodium benzoate, precipitated saccharinate calcium carbonate phosphate, as stabilizers for and use flavoring dental cream of the it manufactures. importation these materials, made the of Central paid Bank to of on the foreign exchange payment used of for the and other charges incident pursuant thereto, to Republic 601, as Act No. commonly known as Law. Exchange The petitioner Tax filed Central with applications for special of excise the 17% tax it had auditor paid. of The the refused to pass in audit refund its fixed claims by the Officer-in-Charge Administration, on the toothpaste theory that stabilizers flavors are not section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law. to General, Auditor but the latter ruling affirmed of the auditor the of the maintaining term “stabilizer that and the section mentioned 2 of the refers only to those or food satisfied, petitioner case to brought Supreme present Court thru petition ISSUE: for review. foreign exchange for the by importation petitioner dental cream the is 17% exempt imposed by No. HELD: 601). under review was reversed. special General terms. The ruling of term flavors” “stabilizer as used in only to law those refers used in the preparation manufacture or food based, food products is principle construction statutory that “general be restricted terms by may result that general will be limited language by language specific statute’s object purpose.” however, is The rule, applicable cases only to one general term, all enumeration items in belong an or fall under one (ejusdem In case generis). at bar, it is “stabilizer true that and the term flavors” number that may of be articles classified food products, as food but or immediately other items following belong to it the do same not classification. and unlimited restrained terms are limited by particular them, connection does not with require general terms rejection intended merely as an ascertaining aid in intention legislature and is to with other rules of Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez January FACTS: 28 1961 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines from abroad imported various materials such as sodium benzoate, precipitated saccharinate calcium carbonate phosphate, as stabilizers for and use flavoring dental cream of the it manufactures. importation these materials, made the of Central paid Bank to of on the foreign exchange payment used of for the and other charges incident pursuant thereto, to Republic 601, as Act No. commonly known as the Law. Exchange The petitioner Tax filed Central with applications for refund special of excise the 17% tax it had auditor paid. of The the refused to pass in audit its fixed claims by the Officer-in-Charge Administration, on toothpaste theory that stabilizers are not section 2 of Law. to General, Auditor but the latter ruling affirmed of the auditor the maintaining term “stabilizer that and the section mentioned 2 of the refers only to those or food satisfied, petitioner case to brought Supreme present Court thru petition ISSUE: for review. foreign exchange for the by importation petitioner of dental cream flavors the is 17% exempt imposed by the Exchange Tax No. HELD: 601). under review was reversed. special General terms. The ruling of term flavors” “stabilizer as used in only the to law those refers used in the preparation manufacture or food based, food products is principle construction statutory that “general be restricted terms by may result that general will be limited language by language specific statute’s object purpose.” however, is The rule, applicable cases only to one general term, all enumeration items in belong an or fall under one (ejusdem In case generis). at bar, it “stabilizer true that and the term flavors” number that may of be articles classified food products, as food but or is immediately other items following belong to it the do same not classification. and unlimited restrained terms are limited by particular them, connection does not with require general terms rejection intended merely as an ascertaining aid in intention legislature and is to with other rules of Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez January FACTS: 28 1961 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines from abroad imported various materials such as sodium benzoate, precipitated saccharinate calcium carbonate phosphate, as stabilizers for and use flavoring dental cream of the it manufactures. importation these materials, made the of the Central paid Bank to of on the foreign exchange payment used for the and other charges incident pursuant thereto, to Republic 601, as Act No. commonly known as Law. Exchange The petitioner Tax filed Central with applications for of 17% it had auditor paid. of The the refused to pass in audit refund its fixed claims by the Officer-in-Charge Administration, on toothpaste theory that stabilizers are not section 2 of Law. to General, Auditor but the latter ruling affirmed of the auditor the the maintaining term “stabilizer that and the in section mentioned 2 of the refers only to those preparation in the or manufacture or food of food satisfied, the petitioner case to brought Supreme present Court thru petition ISSUE: for review. foreign exchange used for the by importation petitioner of dental cream flavors the is 17% exempt special imposed excise by the tax Exchange Tax No. HELD: 601). under review was reversed. special General terms. The ruling of term flavors” “stabilizer as used only to law those refers based, food products is principle statutory “general restricted terms by may result that will be limited language by language specific statute’s object purpose.” however, is The rule, applicable cases only to one general term, all enumeration items in belong an or fall under one (ejusdem In case generis). at bar, it “stabilizer true that and the term flavors” number that may of be articles classified food products, as food but or is the immediately other items following belong to it the do same not classification. general and that unlimited restrained terms are limited by particular them, connection does not with require general terms rejection intended merely as an ascertaining aid in intention legislature and is to be with construction other rules of Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez January FACTS: 28 1961 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines from abroad imported various materials such as sodium benzoate, precipitated saccharinate calcium carbonate phosphate, as stabilizers for and use flavoring dental cream of the it manufactures. importation these materials, made the of Central paid Bank to of on the foreign exchange payment used for the and other charges incident pursuant thereto, to Republic 601, as Act No. commonly known as Law. Exchange The petitioner Tax filed Central with applications for of the 17% it had auditor paid. of The the refused to pass in audit refund its fixed claims by the Officer-in-Charge Administration, on toothpaste theory that stabilizers flavors are not section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law. to General, Auditor but the latter ruling affirmed of the auditor the of the maintaining term “stabilizer that and the in section mentioned 2 of the refers only to those used preparation in the or manufacture or food of food satisfied, petitioner case to brought Supreme present Court thru petition ISSUE: for review. foreign exchange for the by importation petitioner dental cream the is 17% exempt special imposed excise by tax No. HELD: 601). under review was reversed. special General terms. The ruling of term flavors” “stabilizer as used only to law those refers based, food products is principle statutory that “general restricted terms by may result that general will be limited language by language specific statute’s object purpose.” however, is The rule, applicable cases only to one general term, all enumeration items in belong an or fall under one (ejusdem In case generis). at bar, it “stabilizer true that and the term flavors” number that may of be articles classified food products, as food but or is the immediately other items following belong to it the do same not classification. and unlimited restrained terms are limited by particular them, connection does not with require general terms rejection intended merely as an ascertaining aid in intention legislature and is to be with construction other rules of Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez January FACTS: 28 1961 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines from abroad imported various materials such as sodium benzoate, precipitated saccharinate calcium carbonate phosphate, as stabilizers for and use flavoring dental cream of the it manufactures. importation these materials, made the of Central paid Bank to of on the foreign exchange payment used of for the and other charges incident pursuant thereto, to Republic 601, as Act No. commonly known as Law. Exchange The petitioner Tax filed Central with applications for of the 17% it had auditor paid. of The the refused to pass in audit refund its fixed claims by the Officer-in-Charge Administration, on toothpaste theory that stabilizers are not section 2 of Law. to General, Auditor but the latter ruling affirmed of the auditor the maintaining term “stabilizer that and the section mentioned 2 of the refers only to those or food satisfied, petitioner case to brought Supreme present Court thru petition ISSUE: for review. foreign exchange for the by importation petitioner of dental cream flavors the is 17% exempt special imposed excise by the tax Exchange Tax No. HELD: 601). under review was reversed. special General terms. The ruling of term flavors” “stabilizer as used in only the to law those refers used in the preparation manufacture or food based, food products is principle statutory that “general restricted terms by may result that general will be limited language by the language specific statute’s object purpose.” however, is The rule, applicable cases only to one general term, all enumeration items in belong an or fall under one (ejusdem In case generis). at bar, “stabilizer true that and the term flavors” number that may of be articles classified food products, as food but or is immediately other items following belong to it the do same not classification. and unlimited restrained terms are limited by particular them, connection does not with require general terms rejection intended merely as an ascertaining aid in intention legislature and is to be with construction other rules of Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez January FACTS: 28 1961 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines from abroad imported various materials such as sodium benzoate, precipitated saccharinate calcium carbonate phosphate, as stabilizers for and use flavoring dental cream of the it manufactures. importation these materials, made the of Central paid Bank to of on the foreign exchange payment used of for the and other charges incident pursuant thereto, to Republic 601, as Act No. commonly known as Law. Exchange The petitioner Tax filed Central with applications for special of excise 17% tax itit had auditor paid. of The the refused to pass in audit refund its fixed claims by the Officer-in-Charge Administration, on toothpaste theory that stabilizers flavors are not section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law. to General, Auditor but the latter ruling affirmed of the auditor the of the maintaining term “stabilizer that and the in section mentioned 2 of the refers only to those used preparation in the or manufacture or food food satisfied, the petitioner case to brought Supreme the present Court thru petition for review
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILS. INC. VS. HON. Gimenez G.R. No. L-14787 January 28 1961 The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of the Central Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.Petitioner
appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term “stabilizer and flavors” mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present petition for review. ISSUE: importation of dental cream imposed Law (Republic by the Act Exchange No. 601). HELD: terms. The ruling of the law refers only to those and food products isand based, terms may be restricted byTax limited by the specific language however, is applicable only to exchange cases belong to or fall under one thefood term “stabilizer or products, but it isflavors” classification. the same Whether or not the foreign used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601). YES. The decision under review was reversed. General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and flavors” as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that “general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose.” The rule, however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors”is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particularrecitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ECHAVEZ G.R. No. 4775761 January 28, 1980 FACTS: Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled)
on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected “with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands. HELD: NO. Appeal was devoid of merit. Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed. The lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.
VERA VS. CUEVAS G.R. Nos. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979
The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction which restrained the CIR from requiring private respondents to print on the labels of
Private
respondents
manufacture, throughout
sale
the
(the and
companies) distribution
Philippines.
Private
of
are
engaged
filled
milk
respondent,
in
the
their rifled milk products the words.
products
Institute
of
Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for
Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a
prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction.
corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and
Respondent-companied therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade
maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry,
Board desist from further proceeding from the action filed by the
of which all the other private respondents are members.
Philippine Association of Nutrition for misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or misbranding. That petitoners' milk was not
Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte
labeled as an imitation of cow's milk.
petition for preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation to
Both cases was heard jointly.
the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled milk products.
Respondent court held to perpetually restrain the CIR and the Fair Trade Board from requiring respondent-companies to print on the
The controversy arose when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
labels on the filled milk products.
required the companies to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by
ISSUE: Whether respondent court was correct.
Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with a warning of action if they failed.
RULING:
Section of the Tax Code is as follows:
Yes.
Section 169.
Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. — All
Section 169 of the Tax code has been repealed by implication. It
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which
was enacted together with Sections 141 and 177, which were
the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on
already repealed. Through it, Section 169 became a merely
sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
declaratory provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.
immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for
It was also apparent that Section 169 does not apply to filled milk.
nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
Following
equivalent words.
skimmed milk which implies a restriction in scope of the classes of milk.
ejusdem
generis,
the
provision
specifically
stated
