G.R. No. 150025
July 23, 2008
SPS. NARCISO BARNACHEA and JULITA BARNACHEA (now heirs of deceased Julita Barnachea), Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OSCAR C. HERRERA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 20, Malolos, Bulacan, HON., HORACIO T. VIOLA, Presiding Judge, MTC Pulilan, Bulacan, and SPS. AVELINO and PRISCILLA IGNACIO, Respondents.
To avert the implementation implementation of the writ of execution, the petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal. The MTC issued a subpoena dated June 5, 2000 2000 sett settin ing g the the hear hearin ing g on the the peti petiti tion oner ers’ s’ Moti Motion on for for Reconsideration and the respondents’ Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution on June 19, 2000. The petitioners subsequently filed a Compliance that prayed, among others, that the pending resolution on the incident and the Notice of Appeal be deemed to have been filed ex abundanti cautela. The respondents, for their part, filed a Manifestation Manifestation and Motion praying, among others, that the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the May 5, 2000 Order be denied for being moot and academic.
DECISION BRION, J.: BRION, J.: Before us is the Petition for Review by Certiorari filed by the spouses Narciso Narciso and Julita Julita Barnache Barnachea a1 (petition (petitioners) ers) against against the spouses spouses Avelino and Priscilla Ignacio (respondents), rooted in the ejectment complaint the respondents filed against the petitioners petitioners before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pulilan, Bulacan. The petition prays that we nullify the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution 3 denying denying the motion motion for reconsid reconsiderati eration, on, and that we suspend the ejectment proceedings in light of a pending action for quieting of title involving the disputed property. BACKGROUND FACTS The responde respondents nts filed filed their their complain complaintt for ejectment ejectment against against the petitioners before the MTC on October 20, 1998. The subject matter of the complaint were lots titled in respondent Avelino Ignacio’s name (Subdivision Lot 16 covered by TCT No. 86821, and Subdivision Lot 17 covered by TCT No. 86822) 86822),, which which lots are adjacent to the property that the petitioners petitioners own and occupy. These properties were originally part of a piece of land owned by a certain Luis Santos and subsequently subsequently inherited b y his daughter Purificacion Purificacion Santos Imperial. The land was subdivided and transferred to tenant-farmers Santiago Isidro (EP No. A-050545 with TCT No. T-188-EP) and Procopio de Guzman (EP No. 445440 with TCT No. T-185-EP). The property that the petitioners own and occupy was derived from the land transferred to Santiago Isidro. Respondent Ignacio’s properties were derived, on the other hand, from the land originally transferred to Procopio de Guzman. The complaint was dismissed on December 8, 1999, but was revived on April 5, 2000. The petitioners received summons on April 13, 2000 and, instead of filing a new Answer, filed on April 18, 2000 a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer which the MTC denied on May 5, 2000. The petitioners responded to this denial by filing a motion for reconsideration reconsideration on May 23, 2000. Meanwhile, the respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution dated May 24, 2000, which the petitioners received on May 26, 2000.
On July 21, 2000, the MTC issued an order declaring the petitioners’ petitioners’ Motion Motion for Reconsidera Reconsideration tion abandoned abandoned because because of the Notice Notice of Appeal they previously filed. Thereafter, the MTC forwarded the entire record of Civil Case No. 818 to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 (RTC Branch 20), Malolos, Bulacan. On August 24, 2000, petitioners submitted their Appeal Memorandum to the RTC Branch 20 which affirmed the MTC decision on September 20, 2000. On October 5, 2000, the petitioner Julita's sister, Leticia, representing herself to be the sole owner of EP No. A-050545 (TCT No. T-188-EP), filed a Petition for Quieting of Title with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19 (RTC Branch 19), Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 694-M-2000. On October 9, 2000, prior to their receipt of the RTC Branch 20’s September 20, 2000 decision, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Suspension Suspension of Proceedings Proceedings (referred to for purposes of this decision as the urgent motion). RTC Branch 20 denied on October 17, 2000 the petitioners’ urgent motion motion and their their subseque subsequent nt Motion Motion for Reconsi Reconsiderat deration ion.. The petitioners brought the denials to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the issue of "whether the pendency of an action involving the issue of ownership is sufficient basis for [the] suspension of an ejectment proceeding between the same parties and relating to the same subject matter".
ejectment proceedings because of strong reasons of equity applicable to the case – the demolition of the petitioner’s house unless the proceedings would be suspended. The CA ruled that the petitioners’ reliance on Amagan was inappropriate because the said case only applies to unlawful detainer actions while the petitioners’ ejectment suit is an action for forcible entry. To the CA, the initial tolerance on the part of the private respondents did not convert the nature of their ejectment suit from forcible entry into unlawful detainer, following the reasoning this Court applied in Munoz v. Court of Appeals. 5 ASSIGMENT OF ERRORS The petitioners impute the following error to the CA: [T]he Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the said ejectment proceeding was not a suit for illegal detainer but one of forcible entry, thus, denied application to the exceptional rule on suspension of ejectment proceedings, proceedings, at any stage thereof, until the action on ownership is finally settled .6 From this general assignment of error, the petitioners submitted in their memorandum the following specific issues for our resolution: 1) wheth whether er or not the the ejectm ejectment ent case filed filed by the respondents against petitioners with the MTC of Pulilan is for unlawful detainer or for forcible entry; 2) whether the MTC of Pulilan Pulilan had validly validly acquired acquired and exercised jurisdiction over the ejectment case considering that the complai complaint nt was filed beyond one year from the demand to vacate the subject premises; and 3) whether or not the ejectmen ejectmentt proceedi proceedings ngs should be suspended at any stage until the action on ownership of the disputed portion of the subject property is finally settled.
THE CA’S DECISION The CA denied the petition and the petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration, essentially on the grounds that (1) the issue in an ejectment suit is limited to the physical possession of real property and is separate separate and distinct distinct from the issue issue of ownership ownership and possessi possession on de jure that either party may set forth forth in his or her pleading; (2) the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of deed of sale does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, and that ejectmen ejectmentt actions actions generally generally cannot cannot be suspended suspended pending pending the resolution resolution of a case for quietin quieting g of title between the same parties over the same subject property; and (3) the case does not fall under the exception provided by the case of Amagan v. Marayag4, where where the Court allowed allowed the suspension suspension of
OUR RULING We find the petition without merit. 1. Nature of the Action before the MTC. The best indicator of what the plaintiff in an ejectment case intends with respect to the nature of his or her complaint can be found in the complaint itself. In this case, the complaint states:7
"That plaintiffs are the registered owners in fee simple of several residential lots identified as lots 16 and 17 covered by Certificate of Title Nos. 86821 and 86822 issued in the name of the spouses by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, with a total aggregate area of 254 square meters situated at Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan. Copy of the said titles are hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" and "A-1" "That in a portion of the lots 16 and 17, a portion of the house of the defendants was erected and built thus usurping the said portion and this was made known to the defendants when the plaintiffs caused the relocation of the subject lots, however, considering considering that the latter were not yet in need of that portion, they allowed the former to stay on the portion by tolerance; "That "That last July 1998, when the plaintiffs plaintiffs were in the process process of fencing the boundary of their lots, to their surprise, they were not allowed by the defendants to extend the fence up to the portions they illegally occupied; "That despite the advice given to them by several Geodetic Engineers Engineers commissioned by both the plaintiffs and the herein defendants, for them to give way and allow the plaintiffs to fence their lot, same proved futile as they stubbornly refused to surrender possession of the subject portion; The actions actions for forcible forcible entry and unlawfu unlawfull detainer detainer are similar similar because they are both summary actions where the issue is purely 8 physical possession. possession. Other than these commonalities, commonalities, however, they possess dissimilarities dissimilarities that are clear, distinct, and well established in 9 law. In forcible entry, (1) the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical physical possession possession of the property property until until he was deprived deprived of possession by the defendant; (2) the defendant secures possession of the disput disputed ed proper property ty from from the the plain plainti tiff ff by means means of force, force, intimidation, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; hence, his possession is unlawful from the beginning; beginning; (3) the law does not require a previous demand by the plaintiff for the defendant to vacate the premises; and (4) the action can be brought only within one-year from the date the defendant actually and illegally entered the property. property .10 In marked contrast, unlawful detainer is attended by the following features: (1) prior possession of the property by the plaintiff is not necessary; (2) possession of the property by the defendant at the start is legal but the possession becomes illegal by reason of the termination termination of his right to possession based on his or her contract or other arrangement with the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff is required by law to make a demand as a jurisdictional requirement; and (4) the one-year period to bring the complaint is counted from the date of the plaintiff’s last demand on the defendant.11
Under these standards, we do not hesitate to declare the Court of Appeals in error when it held that the present case involves forcible entry rather than unlawful detainer. A plain reading of the complaint shows the respondents’ positions that the petitioners were in prior possession of the disputed property; that the respondents allowed them to occupy occupy the disputed property property by toleranc tolerance; e; that the respondents eventually made a demand that the petitioners vacate the property (on August 26, 1998, which demand the petitioners received on August 31, 1998); and that the petitioners refused to vacate vacate the property property in light of the defenses defenses they presente presented. d. Separately from the complaint, the respondents respondents characterized the action they filed against the petitioners in the MTC as an unlawful detainer when they stated in their memorandum that "as alleged in the complaint, what was filed by the respondents [was] an ejectment suit for unlawful detainer."12 A critical point for us in arriving at our conclusion is the complete absence of any allegation of force, intimidation, intimidation, strategy or stealth in the complain complaintt with respect to the petitioners’ petitioners’ possession possession of the respondents’ property. While admittedly no express contract existed between between the parties parties regardin regarding g the petition petitioners’ ers’ possessi possession, on, the absence does not signify an illegality in the entry nor an entry by force, intimidation, strategy or stealth that would characterize the entry as forcible. It has been held that a person who occupies occupies land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, demand, failing which a summary summary action for ejectment ejectment is the proper remedy. remedy. The status status of the defendant defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose terms has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner. owner .13 To be sure, we are aware of the Munoz v. Court of Appeals 14 ruling that the CA relied upon to reach the conclusion that the present case involves forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. What the CA apparently misread in Munoz was the allegation of stealth in the complaint; anchored on this finding, the Court concluded that the defendant’s possession was illegal from the beginning so that there could be no possession by tolerance. The allegation of stealth, of course, is not present in the present case. On the contrary, tolerance was alleged in the ejectment complaint itself. Thus, there is no reason for the Munoz ruling to apply to the present case; there is no basis nor occasion to conclude that the respondents filed a forcible entry case. 2. The Jurisdictional Issue – Was the Ejectment Complaint Seasonably Filed? We point out at the outset that what the petitioners directly appealed to this Court is the appellate court’s affirmation of the RTC’s refusal to suspend the ejectment proceedings based on the quieting of title case the petitioners cited. Hence, we are not reviewing the merits of the main main ejectm ejectmen entt case, case, partic particul ularl arly y the questi question on of the MTC’s MTC’s jurisdiction, jurisdiction, as these aspects of the case were not appealed to us. If
we touch the jurisdictional aspect of the case at all, it is only for purposes of fully responding to the parties’ arguments. The petition petitioners’ ers’ jurisdic jurisdiction tional al argument argument cannot cannot succeed succeed as the responden respondents’ ts’ ejectmen ejectmentt complain complaintt was filed filed within within the one-yea one-yearr period for bringing an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry that Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires. Section 1 specifically states: Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person depriv deprived ed of the posses possessio sion n of any land land or buildi building ng by force force,, intimidation, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal legal represen representativ tatives es or assigns assigns of any such lessor, lessor, vendor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding withholding of possession, possession, bring an action action in the proper Municipal Municipal Trial Court Court against against the person or persons unlawfully unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. On the basis of this provision provision,, the petitioners petitioners argue that the responden respondents’ ts’ cause of action action – whether whether for forcible forcible entry or for unlawful detainer – had prescribed when the ejectment complaint was filed on April 5, 2000. They point out that the last demand letter (the reckoning reckoning date for unlawful detainer detainer15) was dated Aug. 26, 1998 and was received by the petitioners on August 31, 1998; the complaint was only filed on April 5, 2000 or more than 1 year after August 31, 1998. On the other hand, if the action had been for forcible entry, the prescriptive period commenced on the discovery of the usurpation and the computation period would have commenced either during the relocation survey of the lots or in July 1998 when the respondents were prevented from fencing the disputed property. The one-year one-year period within which which to commenc commence e an ejectment ejectment proceedin proceeding g is a prescript prescriptive ive period as well as a jurisdic jurisdiction tional al requirement. requirement. Hence, Article 1155 of the Civil Code on the manner of reckoning the prescriptive period must necessarily come into play. Under this Article, the filing of a complaint in court interrupts the running of prescription of actions. As an action for unlawful detainer, the one-year prescription period started running after August 31, 1998 – the date of receipt of the respondents’ demand letter. The period ran for almost two months until it was interrupted on October 20, 1998 when the respondents respondents filed their ejectment complaint. This complaint, however, however, was dismissed on December 8, 1999. Upon this dismissal, the prescriptive period again began to run for about four months when another interruption interruption intervened – the revival of the complaint on April 5, 2000. Evidently, under these undisputed facts,
the period when the prescriptive period effectively ran does not add up to the one-year prescriptive period that would jurisdictionally bar the ejectment case. 3. Suspension of the Ejectment Proceedings until Resolution of the Ownership Issue. The issue in an unlawful detainer case is limited to physical possession. When a claim of ownership is used as a basis for de facto possession or to assert a better possessory right, the court hearing the case may provisionally rule on the issue of ownership. As a rule, however, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. Only in rare cases has this Court allowed a suspension of the ejectment proceedings and one of these is in the case of Amagan v. Marayag16 that the petitioners cite. To quote from Amagan – [i]ndisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require suspension of the ejectment proceedings. xxx [L]ike Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry, and most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create "confusion, disturbance, inconvenience and expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.1awphi1 Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.17 However, we do not find these same circumstances present in this case for the reasons we shall discuss in detail below. First. In Amagan, the party refusing to vacate the disputed premises (or the deforciant in the action for unlawful detainer) was the same party seeking to quiet his title. In the present case, the petitioners are not parties to the civil action (for quieting of title) whose result they seek to a wait; the plaintiff in the quieting of title case is Leticia, the petitioner Julita’s sister. No proof whatsoever was offered to show that petitioner Julita is asserting her own title to the property; there is only the allegation that Leticia was appointed as the representative of Julita and the other heirs of Isidro in their various recourses at law to vindicate their landowners’ rights.18 The respondents in fact actively disputed petitioner Julita’s identification with the quieting of
title case in their Comment since Leticia claimed to be the sole owner of TCT No. T-188-EP in her action to quiet title. The respondents also pointed to the document entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana ng Lupa sa Labas ng Hukuman na May Pagtalikod sa Bahagi" executed on May 27, 1995, showing that Julita had relinquished her share over TCT No. T-188-EP in favor of her sister Leticia. A desperation argument the petitioners advanced in their Memorandum is that the Kasulatan was only executed "pursuant to the agrarian reform policy proscribing the parceling of the awarded landholding into smaller units to preserve its viability".19 In other words, the petitioners are disavowing, for purposes of this case, the representation they made in completing their submission before the agrarian reform authorities. We cannot of course recognize this line of argument as justification for the suspension of the ejectment proceedings as the petitioners are bound by their representations before the agrarian reform authorities and cannot simply turn their back on these representations as their convenience requires. No less decisive against the petitioners’ argument for suspension is the decision itself of RTC Branch 19 that the respondents attached to their Comment. This decision shows that Civil Case No. 694-M-2000, instead of being a case for quieting of title, is in fact a mere boundary dispute.20 Second. In Amagan, the MCTC decision involved the demolition of the petitioners’ house – a result that this Court found to be "permanent, unjust and probably irreparable"; in the present case, only a portion of the petitioners’ house is apparently affected as the petitioners occupy the lot adjoining the disputed property. Significantly, the height, width and breadth of the portion of the house that would be affected by the execution of the RTC Branch 20 decision does not appear anywhere in the records, thus, unavoidably inviting suspicion that the potential damage to the petitioners is not substantial. More important than the fact of omission is its implication; the omission constitutes a missing link in the chain of equitable reasons for suspension that the petitioners wish to establish. Thus, the equitable consideration that drove us to rule as we did in Amagan does not obtain in the present case. In the absence of a concrete showing of compelling equitable reasons at least comparable and under circumstances analogous to Amagan, we cannot override the established rule that a pending civil action for ownership shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. Additionally, to allow a suspension on the basis of the reasons the petitioners presented in this case would create the dangerous precedent of allowing an ejectment suit to be suspended by an action filed in another court by parties who are not involved or affected by the ejectment suit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176282 August 22, 2008 VICTORIA FERNANDO, petitioner, vs. SPS. REGINALDO LIM and ASUNCION LIM, respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 31, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the ejectment of Victoria Fernando (petitioner) from the property of Spouses Reginaldo and Asuncion Lim; and the January 15, 2007 CA Resolution 2 which denied the motion for reconsideration. The relevant facts are of record. Lim Kieh Tong and Sons, Inc. (LKTSI) was the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 400 sq. meters, known as Lot 1 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-320, located at Blumentritt Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 125241.3 On the property are improvements registered in the name of LKTSI under Tax Declaration No. 00198.4 Among these improvements is Unit 1682 which, as of March 5, 2004, was being occupied by petitioner for a gross monthly rental of P10,412.00 plus withholding tax of P520.60 or a total ofP10,932.60. 5 When it was about to be dissolved, LKTSI executed on April 1, 2004 a Deed of Assignment of Real Property,6 transferring by way of liquidating dividends all its rights and interests in the property covered by TCT No. 125241 to its stockholder, respondent Reginaldo Lim. Spouses Reginaldo and Asuncion Lim (respondents) subdivided the assigned property and registered their title to the larger portion under TCT No. 263331, and to the smaller portion -- which covers Unit 1682 -- under TCT No. 264835. 7 They also registered in their names the improvements on the assigned property under Tax Declaration No. 00182.8 In a letter dated April 29, 2004, respondents, through counsel, informed petitioner that they were the new owners of Unit 1682 and that they were not renewing her lease, thus: We are writing you in behalf of our client, Mr. Reginaldo Lim, to formally inform you that he is now the new owner of the property you are presently leasing. Please find attached a copy of his title to the said property.
Our client decided not to renew or extend any lease agreement you may have entered with the previous owner. We understand that your lease of the property is on a month-to-month basis. Hence, your lease contract ends on April 30, 2004 and will no longer be renewed. Any stay in the premises beyond the said date should not be construed as a renewal of your monthly lease, but merely by tolerance of our client. At any rate, you are hereby given notice to vacate the premises of 1682 Blumentritt St., Sta. Cruz, Manila within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter. Your failure to do so will compel us to institute an ejectment suit against you to enforce our clients' rights, and charge you with attorney's fees and all attendant damages that will be incurred by our client, including lost business opportunities and income. We trust that you will see yourself clear on this matter and surrender peacefully the possession of the leased premises to our client .9 As their demand went unheeded, respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila (MeTC) a Complaint10 for Ejectment with Prayer for Issuance of Injunction against petitioner, praying that the latter be ordered to vacate Unit 1682 and to pay reasonable monthly rent ofP25,000.00 and attorney's fees. In her Answer,11 petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC in view of an issue of title over Unit 1682 that she raised in a complaint12 she filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to annul the April 1, 2004 deed of assignment for violation of Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517 (P.D. No. 1517), which states:
Petitioner further argued that respondents had no cause of action for ejectment because they did not serve on her a valid demand to pay rent and vacate, or resort to barangay conciliation.14Petitioner was never remiss in her obligations under the monthly lease contract; and under the Rent Control Law, expiration of contract is not a valid ground for ejectment. 15 After the parties submitted their position papers, the MeTC rendered a Decision16 dated June 7, 2005, in favor of respondents, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [respondents] and against the defendant [petitioners]: 1. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the subject premises and peacefully surrender possession of the property located at 1682 Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila; 2. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay a reasonable monthly rental of P25,000.00 to plaintiffs [respondents] computed from the time the instant action was filed up to the time the subject premises is completely vacated and surrendered to plaintiffs [respondents]; 3. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. 4. Without Costs. SO ORDERED.17
Sec. 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas . Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree.
Petitioner appealed to the RTC, Branch 20, Manila emphasizing that she actually owns Unit 1682 because it was she who rebuilt it after it was destroyed by fire,18 petitioner argued that respondents had no interest in or title to Unit 1682; hence, they could not validly compel her to vacate the property. Neither could they claim title to the land on which Unit 1682 stands because the April 1, 2004 deed of assignment was of no effect, for it was in violation of Sec. 6, P.D. No. 1517.19 She reiterated that such issue of title affecting Unit 1682 could only be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria cognizable by the RTC.20
She pointed out that the MeTC could not decide the complaint for ejectment without determining whether the assignment of Unit 1682 to respondents impinged on her preemptive rights under P.D. No. 1517; that the MeTC would also have to determine whether respondents could legally eject her despite the express prohibition against her dispossession under said law; and that, therefore, as the issues of possession and title could not be adjudicated separately, the case should have been brought before the RTC, not the MeTC.13
Moreover, in the event that the complaint for ejectment be found proper, petitioner invoked the protection against ejectment provided under existing rent control laws. She argued that, contrary to the ruling of the MeTC, said laws were applicable to her because she had been using Unit 1682 not just as her business office but also as a dwelling place.21 Moreover, her lease on the property started more than thirty (30) years ago; hence, the P7,500.00 threshold rent set by the Rent Control Law could not prejudice her.22
Finally, petitioner questioned the MeTC's imposition of a P25,000.00 monthly rent for lack of factual and legal basis.23 In a Decision dated December 16, 2005, the RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision with modification, thus: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 7, 2005 of the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 20 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: 1. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the subject premises and peacefully surrender possession of the property located at 1682 Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila to herein plaintiffs [respondents]; 2. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay a reasonable monthly rental of P15,000.00 to plaintiffs [respondents] computed from the time the instant action was filed up to the time the subject premises is completely vacated and surrendered to plaintiffs; 3. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay plaintiffs [respondents the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. 4. Without cost. SO ORDERED.24 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its Order25 dated January 20, 2006. She then filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court in the August 31, 2006 Decision assailed herein. The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the instant petition is perforce denied . Accordingly, we affirm with modification the assailed decision dated 16 December 2005 of the respondent court, in that the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 is hereby deleted . SO ORDERED.26 Her motion for reconsideration27 having been denied by the CA in its Resolution 28 dated January 15, 2007, petitioner filed the present Petition, with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the assailed CA decision and resolution. In a Resolution29 dated February 28, 2007, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the CA, RTC, MeTC and respondents or their agents and assigns from implementing or enforcing the August 31, 2006 Decision and January 15, 2007
Resolution of the CA. Petitioner posted a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.30 Respondents filed a Motion to Lift the TRO or to Require Petitioners to Make the Required Monthly Deposit,31 to which petitioner filed a Consolidated Comment.32 In its Resolution33 of July 9, 2007, the Court denied respondents' motion to lift the TRO, but granted their prayer that petitioner be required to pay P10,932.60 monthly rental from the date of receipt by petitioner of the MeTC decision, in accordance with Section 19,34 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. In separate Certifications35 dated August 22, 2007, the MeTC and RTC reported that petitioner did not make any rental deposit, although she posted a supersedeas bond in the amount ofP100,000.00. Hence, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion 36 dated September 12, 2007 to lift the TRO for failure of petitioner to comply with the Court's Resolution of July 9, 2007. The Court, in a Resolution 37 dated October 15, 2007, required petitioner to comment. In her January 28, 2008 Comment38 to the September 12, 2007 Manifestation and Motion, petitioner explained that she already complied with the July 9, 2007 Resolution of the Court by filing a supersedeas bond for P100,000.00, and that she had filed with the RTC an urgent motion for computation of back rentals but the same had remained unresolved, thus preventing her from making the required monthly deposit. Earlier, on January 23, 2008, respondents filed a Reiterative Motion to Lift the Temporary Restraining Order 39 for failure of petitioner to comply with the July 9, 2007 and October 15, 2007 Resolutions of the Court. On March 12, 2008, the Court issued a Resolution 40 noting both the respondents' Reiterative Motion and petitioner's Comment, and requiring petitioner to deposit to the RTC the unpaid monthly rentals in the amount of P10,932.60 as directed in the Court's July 9, 2007 Resolution and to submit proof of compliance within ten (10) days from notice; otherwise, the temporary restraining order would be lifted. In a Manifestation and Compliance41 dated March 9, 2008, petitioner explained that her January 28, 2008 Comment was in compliance with both the July 9, 2007 and October 15, 2007 Resolutions of the Court. Based on court records, copy of the Resolution was mailed to petitioner on March 18, 2008, 42 and she received the same on April 28. 2008.43 Yet, as per Certification issued on May 12, 2008 by the RTC, petitioner had not made any rental deposit.44 Hence, respondents filed another Manifestation45 for the lifting of the TRO. The Court now resolves the main issues in the Petition, viz.:
1. Whether the pending action for annulment of transfer of title on ground of violation of P.D. 1517 (granting right of first refusal to the lessee and prohibiting dispossession of the property) filed by the petitioner against private respondents and previous lessor LKTSI constitutes litis pendentia or at the very least poses legal questions warranting the suspension of the proceedings of this ejectment suit. 2. Whether the court where the prior pending action involving the issue of whether the lessee can be dispossessed has exclusive and original jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts where the action for dispossession via ejectment suit is filed after.
10. Whether which rights in the instant case must be a priori protected - physical or material right of possession or substantial issue of ownership which subsumes the issue of possession pursuant to the existing and applicable provision of law, 47 in arrant disregard of the July 9, 2007 Resolution of the Court, forbidding new issues from being raised by the parties in their respective memoranda.48 This is a standard prohibition inserted into every Court order for submission of memoranda, the purpose of which is to forestall surprise by one party upon the other, who would have no opportunity to counter whatever new point of law, theory, issue or argument may be belatedly raised.49
3. Whether the trial court a quo has jurisdiction over the complaint.
Consequently, the Court will not resolve such new issues, except when they are related to the issues raised in the Petition, which may actually be condensed, thus:
4. Whether there is a lease relationship between the parties that can entitle the lessor to file an ejectment case.
First, whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC for sustaining the jurisdiction of the MeTC over the ejectment complaint; and
5. Whether there is a proper demand for purposes of ejectment suit.
Second, whether the CA erred in affirming with modification the judgments of the RTC and MeTC ordering the ejectment of petitioner.
6. Whether the appellate court and the trial court a quo could make an award for payment of monthly rental in such amount more than if not other than the last agreed monthly rentals between petitioner and LKTSI.46
Third, whether the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted as prayed for by respondents.
To the foregoing set of issues, however, petitioner, in her Memorandum, added several more, to wit: 1. Whether private respondents committed forum-shopping; xxx 7. Whether on account of the foregoing issues, the application for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction may be granted as prayed for in the petition. 8. Whether ejectment proceedings which are summary in nature can take precedence over an annulment action based upon a violation of specific and express provision of law (PD 1517). 9. Whether the ejectment proceeding can be suspended when it comes to direct conflict with an existing and applicable law; and
On the issue of jurisdiction The allegations in a complaint50 and the character of the relief sought51 determine the nature of the action and the court with jurisdiction over it. The defenses set up in an answer are not determinative. 52 A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites that: a) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; b) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; c) thereafter, defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and d) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.53 The complaint for ejectment which respondents filed petitioner alleges:
against
3. Plaintiffs [respondents] are the absolute and registered owners of the land located at No. 1682 Blumentritt St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, including improvements therein xxx.
xxx 5. xxx The first unit, designated as 1682 Blumentritt St., Sta. Cruz, Manila xxx is presently being occupied by herein defendant [petitioner].
would not be renewed when it expired; and that respondents also served a written demand dated April 29, 2004 on petitioner to vacate Unit 1682, but the latter refused to do so. By these allegations, the complaint clearly drew up a case for unlawful detainer. It was therefore correctly filed with the MeTC which has jurisdiction over ejectment cases.55
6. Defendant's [petitioner's] lease of Unit 1682 xxx with LKT, Petitioner, however, has raised an issue of title, to question the [sic] as with the others, was on a month-to-month basis. The jurisdiction of the MeTC. She claims that respondents have no right to property was transferred to plaintiffs [respondents] on April institute the action for unlawful detainer because they did not validly 2, 2004. Plaintiffs [respondents] have no plans to have the acquire the property in view of the prohibition under P.D. No. 1517 premises leased as they acquired the property for some against her dispossession or the transfer of the property without first other urgent business purpose in mind. Thus, plaintiffs offering it for sale to her. She insists that such issue of title prevents [respondents] talked to and appealed to the occupants of the MeTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case; it should have the building to voluntarily vacate the premises and deferred to the jurisdiction of the RTC where there is a pending case peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs for annulment of the title of respondents. [respondents]. 7. However, defendant [petitioner] did not cooperate and instead stubbornly remained on the subject premises. xxx 9. Thus, plaintiffs [respondents], through their counsel, formally wrote to defendant Victoria Fernando [petitioner], informing the latter that her lease of the aforegmentioned premises, which is on a month-to-month basis, ended on April 30, 2004 and will no longer be renewed. Defendant [petitioner] was also informed that if she ever continued to stay in the premises beyond April 30, 2004, it should not be construed as a renewal of whatever lease agreement defendant [petitioner] previously had with LKT. 10. Defendant, who duly received the letter, was given fifteen (15) days to peacefully surrender possession of the subject premises, particularly 1682 Blumentritt, St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, to herein plaintiffs. A copy of said letter dated April 29, 2004 is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as "Annex C". 11. However, despite oral and written demands to vacate subject premises, defendant failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, without justifiable reason, to vacate the said subject premises and to peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.54 In essence, the complaint recites that when respondents acquired Unit 1682 from LKTSI, petitioner was still in possession of the property by virtue of a month-to-month lease contract with LKTSI; that said lease contract was set to expire on April 30, 2005; that respondents verbally informed petitioner that her lease contract
As a rule, the nature of a complaint for unlawful detainer and the jurisdiction of a court over it are not altered by the mere claim of the defendant of title to the property subject matter of the ejectment case.56 Even a pending action involving title to the property which the defendant may have instituted in another court will not abate or suspend the summary proceedings for unlawful detainer.57 The underlying reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the summary nature of the case by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.58 Respondents cite Solanda Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.59 It involves an action for ejectment filed by the vendee of a parcel of land against the vendor's lessees on the property. In turn, the lessees filed an action for annulment of the sale of the property between the vendor and vendee on the ground that the sale violated their [lessees'] preemptive rights over the property as guaranteed under P.D. No. 1517. The Court held that the action for ejectment may proceed independently of the action for annulment, citing the following reason: xxx the consistent case law is that ejectment suits deal only with the issue of physical possession. The pendency of an action for the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the disputed property may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment. Private respondent's alleged right of possession is conditioned on his right to acquire ownership over the land. His right of the possession is, at best, only inchoate. In any event, the private respondent's expectation of being granted the preemptive right to purchase the property neither establishes his right to possess nor justifies the d is mi ss al of t he e je ct me nt c as e a ga in st him. [Emphasis added.]
It is important to bear in mind that in Solanda, it was conclusively found that the property in dispute was not within the coverage of P.D. No. 1517 as defined under Proclamation No. 1967 60 and certified to by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). But then, there have been two rare cases in which the Court allowed the suspension of an action for unlawful detainer to make way for an action for annulment of title. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño,61 the Court suspended the enforcement of a writ of demolition rendered in an ejectment case until after a case for annulment of title involving the property to be demolished was decided. The Court ratiocinated: x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts. (Emphasis supplied) More in point is Dulay v. Tabago,62 in which the Court sustained the RTC in suspending the eviction of Spouses Tabago from the property of Spouses Dulay in view of the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 2016, which placed the disputed property under the coverage of P.D. No. 1517 and prohibited the eviction of the tenants therein. As there was no dispute over the status of Spouses Tabago as tenants on the property since 1959, or over the status of the property as an urban land reform area, the Court therein held: Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 2016, which was promulgated to forestall violations of P.D. No. 1517, provides that "No tenant or occupant family, residing for ten years or more, reckoned from the date of issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1517 [June 11, 1978] otherwise known as the Urban Land Reform L aw , i n l an d p roc la im ed as A re as o f Pr io ri ty Development . . . shall be evicted from the land or otherwise
dispossessed" (emphasis added). Considering that respondents have been occupants of the lot in question since 1959 and in view of the subsequent classification of the said land as an APD, petitioners' action for ejectment cannot prosper. To be entitled to the beneficence of P.D. No. 1517, a party must provide prima facie evidence of the following facts: a) that the property being leased falls within an Area for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zone; 63 b) that the party is a tenant on said property as defined under Section 3 (f) 64 of P.D. No. 1517;65 c) that the party built a house on said property; 66 and d) that the party has been residing on the property continuously for the last ten (10) years or more, reckoned from 1968. 67 The question is, did petitioner establish the foregoing requisites as to avail herself of the "suspensive" effect of P.D. No. 1517 as in Sps. Dulay and Vda. de Legaspi ? It is noted that the MeTC rejected the claim of petitioner to preferential rights over the property, but petitioner objected on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction to resolve such subject matter. Petitioner's objection was frivolous. Under Section 3368 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the MeTC is conditionally vested with authority to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in the case, the determination of which is necessary for a complete adjudication of the issue of possession.69 In the present case, the MeTC's foray into the issue of whether under P.D. No. 1517, petitioner has preferential rights to the purchase and occupation of Unit 1682 as against respondents' rights was necessary to resolve the issue of material possession. The provisional ruling of the MeTC on said issue is that P.D. No. 1517 does not apply to the case because there was no sale between LKTSI and respondents but a mere distribution of liquidating dividends on account of the dissolution of LKTSI. 70 The share of each stockholder in the remaining assets of the corporation upon liquidation, after the payment of all corporate debts and liabilities, is what is known as liquidating dividend.71 In its interpretation of recent tax laws, the Bureau of Internal Revenue viewed the distribution of liquidating dividends not as a sale of asset by the liquidating corporation to its stockholder but as a sale of shares by the stockholder to the corporation or the surrender of the stockholder's interest in the corporation, in place of which said stockholder receives property or money from the corporation about to be dissolved .72 Thus, on the part of the stockholder, any gain or loss is subject to tax, while on the part of the liquidating corporation, no tax is imposed on its receipt of the shares
surrendered by the stockholder or transfer of assets to said stockholder because said transaction is not treated as a sale.73 Preliminarily, therefore, the Court agrees with the view of the MeTC that the April 1, 2004 assignment of Unit 1682 is not covered by the prohibition under P.D. No. 1517. It should be emphasized that such interim ruling is without prejudice to how the complaint for annulment of the April 1, 2004 deed of assignment is resolved by the RTC. In addition to the foregoing reason, the Court also finds no prima facie evidence that petitioner qualifies as a tenant under P.D. No. 1517. Respondents presented a Land Transaction Certificate issued by the HLURB, stating that Unit 1682 is outside any Area for Priority Development. 74 However, Proclamation No. 1967 identifies in Appendix "J"75 thereof 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila that fall within the coverage of P.D. No. 1517. In the West Sector (Manila), one identified site is "8. Sta. Clara to Blumentritt." Thus, it would appear that Unit 1682, which is located in Blumentritt Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, is within the scope of P.D. No. 1517, 76 the HLURB Certification to the contrary notwithstanding. Moreover, petitioner had a month-to-month lease contract with LKTSI on Unit 1682, which expired on April 30, 2004. Thus, up to that time, petitioner was a rightful occupant of the property as defined under Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 1517. However, other than her bare claim that she owns the structure on Unit 1682 because she allegedly rebuilt it after it was burned down, petitioner offered no concrete evidence of when the original structure was burned down and when she rebuilt it. She presented no detail on how she spent for the construction of the structure, or proof that LKTSI allowed her to claim ownership thereof. On the other hand, it was respondents who presented Tax Declaration No. 00182 which indicates that they are the registered owners of the improvements, including Unit 1682, on the land covered by TCT No. 264835. Furthermore, except for her empty allegation -- which respondents dispute --77 that she has been occupying Unit 1682 for more than thirty (30) years, petitioner presented no concrete evidence of the exact period of her occupation, even when she could have easily produced receipts of past rental payments similar to the receipt78 she easily presented for her March 2004 rental payment. Such unexplained omission prevents an adjudication on whether petitioner's period of occupation qualifies her to exercise the right of first refusal under P.D. No. 1517.79 Therefore, unlike in Sps. Dulay or Guardacasa de Legaspi , there is no prima facie showing in this case that petitioner is protected under P.D. No. 1517 from dispossession of Unit 1682, or that she has the
right of first refusal in the sale of said property. Petitioner, therefore, cannot invoke P.D. No. 1517 in abatement of the complaint for unlawful detainer. Another matter raised by petitioner relating to the jurisdiction of the MeTC is the personality of respondents to give notice to vacate and to file an ejectment case. The Court need not belabor the point for it is well-settled that, as vendees of the property, respondents were placed in the shoes of the original lessor LKTSI and vested with the right to evict petitioner as the lessee from the premises. 80 Whether the transfer of the property to respondents was valid is of no moment, for all that is to be resolved in the ejectment case is whether the latter are entitled to the material possession of the property.81 All told, the Court sustains the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC that the MeTC correctly exercised jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer.
On the issue of the correctness of the judgment of eviction Petitioner poses no serious challenge to the concurrent findings of the MeTC, RTC and CA that her right to possession of Unit 1682 has expired; that her continued possession thereof unlawfully deprives respondents of the enjoyment of the property; and that, therefore, she must now peacefully surrender possession thereof to respondents. Her remaining defense is that, under the rent control laws, respondents cannot eject her because she has been religiously paying her rent. Republic Act No. 9161,82 otherwise known as the "Rental Reform Act of 2002," was the rent control law in force at the time the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed. Sec. 7(e) thereof allows for judicial ejectment of a lessee on the ground of expiration of the period of the lease contract. As already discussed, the month-to-month lease contract of petitioner expired on April 30, 2004 and was not renewed by respondents; hence, the latter acted well within their rights to file a complaint for unlawful detainer. 83 Petitioner has also questioned the award of reasonable rent of P15,000.00. Trial courts are authorized to fix the reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract; and they are not bound by the stipulated rental in the contract of lease, since it is equally settled that upon termination or expiration of said contract, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in values. 84 As to what amount would constitute a reasonable rent of Unit 1682, the same is a question of fact on which the determination of the CA binds the Court, unless the latter finds reason to reverse it.85 In the present case, the CA reduced the award of reasonable rent from P25,000.00 to P15,000.00 based on the
finding that such amount represents the reasonable amount of lost opportunity income respondents would have derived from the conversion of Unit 1682 into a San Miguel Food shop .86 Petitioner has not adduced evidence in refutation of the factual findings of the CA.
On the issue of whether the temporary restraining order should be lifted
the registered owners of a parcel of land and a duplex apartment building constructed thereon located at No. 16 Meriales Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218979. Apparently, said title was issued pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on September 11, 1975 in favor of respondent Arturo Refugia, but the purchase price of P20,000.00 was reportedly advanced by his father, herein petitioner Mamerto Refugia. Thereafter, respondent Arturo Refugia obtained a housing loan from the Social Security System, using the land as collateral to secure payment thereof. In 1976, after the construction of the duplex apartment building, herein petitioners immediately began to occupy one door while respondents stayed in the other unit.
It may also be pointed out that the certification to file action (Exhibit E) issued by the Barangay is for Land Dispute not for ejectment. (Emphasis ours) In the handwritten transcripts of the proceedings in the barangay, it appears that this case is merely an off-shoot of a misunderstanding between plaintiff Aurora Refugia and her in-laws. It was admitted by Aurora that she offered to pay the a mount of P20,000.00 but that the defendants refused to accept the same. Then and there plaintiff Aurora said that she would prefer to sell the unit to another and that out of the proceeds of the sale, she will pay the defendants. These circumstances lead the Court to conclude that it is not true that plaintiffs' daughter is in need of the premises.
The Court finds respondents' September 12, 2007 Manifestation and Motion, January 23, 2008 Reiterative Motion to Lift the Temporary Restraining Order and May 13, 2008 Manifestation to be well-taken. It notes petitioner's January 28, 2008 Comment and March 9, 2008 Manifestation and Compliance, and finds unsatisfactory the explanation put forth therein why she failed to deposit to the RTC unpaid monthly rentals in the amount of P10,932.60 from date of receipt of the MeTC Decision. It should be emphasized that while petitioner may have questioned before the RTC the computation of back rentals, the same cannot muddle the July 9, 2007 and March 12, 2008 Resolution of the Court which are rather explicit in the amount of unpaid monthly rentals she is required to pay. The Court further notes that petitioner utterly failed to show proof of compliance with the foregoing resolutions.
It appears, however, that things did not turn out well between petitioners and private respondents, especially between petitioner Feliza Refugia and her daughter-in-law, Aurora, such that in February of 1993, petitioners were told by private respondents to vacate the unit that they were occupying because, according to private respondents, the family of one of their children who is married needed a place of their own. Petitioners refused to leave, claiming that they own the unit they are occupying by reason of the fact that it was actually Mamerto Refugia who bought the lot on which the duplex apartment stood. Because of this, the matter was brought before the barangay court of conciliation. No amicable settlement having been reached between the parties, private respondents instituted an action for ejectment on October 20, 1993 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in its aforementioned decision, affirmed with modification the judgment of the lower court by declaring herein petitioners and private respondents co-owners of the lot and the two-door apartment. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondents duly filed a petition for review before respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by the court isLIFTED and SET ASIDE.
On March 4, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for ejectment based on its finding that herein petitioners are the lawful occupants of the premises. Thus, it held that:
Considering that no error has been committed by the CA in its August 31, 2006 Decision and January 15, 2007 Resolution, the Court affirms the same.
G.R. No. 118284 July 5, 1996 SPOUSES MAMERTO REFUGIA and FELIZA PAYAD-REFUGIA, RODOLFO REFUGIA, and CANDELARIA REFUGIA,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ARTURO REFUGIA and AURORA TIMBANG-REFUGIA, respondents. REGALADO, J.: p This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34647 promulgated on December 9, 1994 which reversed and set aside the judgment 2 dated April 29, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Case No. 4347-V-94 affirming with some modifications the decision 3 rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81, in Civil Case No. 6089 on March 4, 1994. The records en bloc of the aforesaid cases show that private respondent-spouses Arturo Refugia and Aurora Timbang-Refugia are
Like in any other ejectment suit, the pivotal issue is whether the defendants are unlawfully with(h)olding possession of the premises in question. The question that perturbs the mind of the Court which is not fully explained by plaintiffs is whether the stay of the defendants in the premises was indeed by plaintiffs' tolerance alone. From the evidence on hand the Court is more disposed to believe the position of the defendants that it was Mamerto who bought the lot where the duplex apartment was constructed by plaintiff Arturo Refugia. As stated earlier, the amount of P20,000.00 was withdrawn on September 11, 1975, the date the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits F and F-1) was executed. The consideration of the sale is for P20,000.00. The fact that a two-door apartment was indeed constructed likewise regenerates the claim of defendants that they shall be co-owners of the lot and shall dwell in one of the doors of said apartment. If the averment of plaintiffs that they exclusively own the property is not to be trusted — what have motivated them to construct a two-door apartment instead of a single and a larger house? These facts are small tributaries that lead us to the bigger lake of truth, that is, the stay of the defendants in the premises is not on the basis of mere tolerance.
On December 9, 1994, said respondent court rendered its questioned judgment which reversed and set aside the aforestated decisions of the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, and thereafter ordered petitioners and their privies to vacate the subject premises and to surrender possession thereof to private respondents. In so ruling, respondent court declared that the Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over an ejectment case, had no authority to resolve the issue of ownership and to declare herein petitioners as co-owners because its power is limited only to a determination of the issue of possession, that petitioners' bare allegation of ownership cannot prevail over the transfer certificate of title and deed of sale in favor of private respondents; and that petitioners have been occupying the subject premises by mere tolerance. Hence, this petition wherein petitioners aver that respondent Court of Appeals erred: (a) in giving due course to respondents' appeal despite the fact that it was filed beyond the fifteen (15) day reglementary period to appeal; (b) in disregarding jurisprudence that factual findings of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal; (c) in holding that petitioners' claim of co-ownership of the subject premises is a mere allegation unsupported by any concrete evidence; (d) in ruling that the issue of ownership, as raised by petitioners, is foreign to the issue of possession in an ejectment case; and (e) in reversing the decisions of both lower courts and ordering petitioners' eviction from the disputed premises. Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that private respondents received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court on May 4, 1994 and thus they had until May 19, 1994 within which to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. However, private respondents filed instead a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its Order dated June 21, 1994.
Petitioners argue that since the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure and that the filing thereof did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, the petition for review which was filed by private respondents only on July 21, 1994 was already way beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should not have been given due course by respondent court. In the case of Jakihaca vs . Aquino, et al ., ruled that:
4
this Court categorically
The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Summary procedures have no application to cases before the Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the respondents appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of the latter court. It is thus settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the inferior courts in ejectment cases. Accordingly, this argument of petitioners has to be rejected. There is nonetheless appreciable merit in their contention that the petition for review was belatedly filed in the Court of Appeals. This is because in case of a judgment or final order of the Regional Trial Court rendered in an appeal from the judgment or final order of an inferior court, the former may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review within fifteen days from receipt of said judgment or final order. If a motion for reconsideration is filed, the losing party has only the remaining period within which to file that petition for review. The filing, therefore, of a motion for reconsideration has the effect of only suspending the period to a pp ea l. T hi s rule ha s be en cl arif ied in t he ca se of Lacsamana, et . al . vs.The Honorable Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court , et . al ., 5 as follows: 3) APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in accordance with Section 22 of BP No. 129 and Section 22 (b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The reason for extending the period for the filing of a record on appeal is also applicable to the filing of a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals. The period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days. If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition for review . Hence, it may necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review . (Emphasis supplied). It is not disputed that private respondents received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela on May 4, 1994, and that their motion for reconsideration was filed with said court on the fifteenth day of the reglementary period to appeal, that is, May 19, 1994. In such a case, the rule is that the aggrieved party has only one day from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration within which to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. 6 In the case at bar, private respondents received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 6, 1994, and, without moving for extension of time, were able to file their petition for review only on July 21, 1994; hence their appeal was not seasonably perfected. Strictly speaking, therefore, the appeal should not have been given due course, following the pronouncement in the case of Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al . 7 to the effect that the requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. This rule, however, has been relaxed in the latter case of Tijam, et al . vs. Sibonghanoy , et al . 8 where it was held that a party, after voluntarily submitting a cause, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court simply because it thereafter obtained an adverse decision on the merits. The Court explained therein that the "party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy." It will be noted that the jurisdictional issue involved in the instant case was raised only for the first time in the present petition for review on certiorari . The lack or absence of appellate jurisdiction was never questioned by petitioners either in their Comment 9 submitted with respondent court or in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal 10 which was grounded solely on the fact that the petition for review filed before said court was not verified. Despite several opportunities to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals, petitioners did not challenge its appellate jurisdiction and did so only after an adverse decision was rendered against them. To be more precise, they raised the issue of jurisdiction, for the nullification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, when the case was already on appeal before this Court. They are now barred from doing so under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. 11 Additionally, having participated actively in the proceedings before the appellate court, petitioners can no longer question its authority. 12
The main issue in this case demands the determination of whether the Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer where the issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership. In the affirmative, it becomes necessary to delineate the extent and legal effect of such adjudication. Under Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the jurisdiction of the then municipal and city courts over actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer was defined as follows: Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases . — . . . In forcible entry and detainer proceedings, the municipal judge or judge of the city court shall have original jurisdiction, but the said municipal judge or city judge may receive evidence upon the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the property, solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and damages for detention. In forcible entry proceedings, he may grant preliminary injunctions, in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. (As amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828). The law was subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 5967 13 which vested in the city courts special jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in conjunction with the issue of possession whenever the question of ownership is brought in issue by the pleadings, thus: Sec. 3. Besides the civil cases over which the City Courts have jurisdiction under Section eighty-eight of Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, as amended, it shall likewise have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over the following: xxx xxx xxx (c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. The issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in conjunction with the issue of possession. This special jurisdiction of city courts was differentiated from the power ordinary accorded the inferior courts to receive evidence of title only for the purpose of determining the character or extent of the possession in dispute. This Court had the occasion to apply and interpret the aforequoted statutory provision in Pelaez vs. Reyes, et al . 14 which raised the issue of whether a decision of a city court in an ejectment case involving the question of ownership was appealable to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals, in this wise:
In the light of these provisions, petitioner insists that respondents should have appealed to the Court of First Instance. Specifically, his contention is that the inclusion of the issue of ownership in the pleadings did not change the character of the proceeding as an action of unlawful detainer over which city and municipal courts have original exclusive jurisdiction. He claims that his contention is supported by the very provision of Section 3, just quoted, to the effect that when ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings in an ejection case before the city courts, said courts are to resolve the issue of ownership only "in conjunction with the issue of possession." In other words, he posits that since the action is one of unlawful detainer, the main issue to be settled by the city court remains to be possession, and that to resolve the issue of ownership "in conjunction with the issue of possession" is not the same as resolving it in a judicial litigation where it is the sole issue. We are not impressed. Regardless of the juridical value of the significance petitioner is trying to thus draw from the rather peculiar language of the statute, We are of the considered opinion that the evident import of Section 3 above is to precisely grant to the city courts concurrent original jurisdiction with the courts of first instance over the cases enumerated therein, which include "ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleading." To sustain petitioner's contention about the meaning of the last phrase of paragraph (c) of said section regarding the resolution of the issue of ownership "in conjunction with the issue of possession" is to disregard the very language of the main part of the section which denotes unmistakably a conferment upon the city courts of concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance over ejection cases in which ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. It is to Us quite clear that the fact that the issue of ownership is to be resolved "in conjunction with the issue of possession" simply means that both the issues of possession and ownership are to be resolved by the city courts. And the jurisdiction is concurrent with the Courts of First Instance precisely because usually questions of title are supposed to be resolved by superior courts. In other words, this grant of special jurisdiction to city courts is to be distinguished from the power ordinarily accorded to municipal courts to receive evidence of title only for the purpose of determining the extent of the possession in dispute.
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts. Specifically, the new law modified the power of inferior courts to resolve the issue of ownership in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, subject, however, to the qualification that a resolution thereof shall not be for the purpose of determining the issue of possession, to wit: Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise. xxx xxx xxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Subsequently, this Court promulgated its Interim Rules and Guidelines in the implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 10 of which provides: 10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. — Metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and the question of possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, but the question of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
the inferior courts, which was promulgated pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The old Rule, which took effect on August 1, 1983, stated that: Sec. 1. Scope — This Rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases: A. Civil Cases (1) Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, except where the question of ownership is involved, or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) at the time of the filing of the complaint. This Rule was revised pursuant to a resolution of the Court En Banc which took effect on November 15, 1991, and the aforequoted provision now reads as follows: Sec. 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction: A. Civil Cases (1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Under the original Rule, ejectment cases were covered by the summary rules only where the unpaid rentals do not exceed P20,000.00 and no question of ownership is involved. As presently formulated, however, all ejectment cases are now unqualifiedly covered by the summary procedure, which necessarily implies that even if there is a need to resolve the issued of ownership, such fact will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over these cases.
It being clear, therefore, that in the main ejection case, . . . , the issue of ownership is involved as shown by the pleadings therein filed by the parties, and that under Section 3 of Republic Act 5967, said city court exercised original jurisdiction over the same concurrently with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, the appeal of respondents was rightly made by them to the Court of Appeals (Emphasis ours.)
These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296 which merely allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon the question of title solely for the purpose of determining the extent and character of possession and damages for detention, which thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court to the effect that if it appears during the trial that the principal issue relates to the ownership of the property in dispute and any question of possession which may be involved necessarily depends upon the result of the inquiry into the title, then the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts is lost and the action should be dismissed. With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. In other words, the fact that the issues of ownership and possession de facto are intricately interwoven will not cause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds.
Subsequently, Republic Act No. 7691, entitled "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the 'Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980'", was passed and took effect on April 15, 1994. 15 The jurisdiction of the inferior courts over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases as defined under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was retained. In addition, they now exercise limited original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein depending on the assessed value and location of the property.
However, on August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was approved and it redefined
The intendment of the law was reinforced by the revision of the former Rule on Summary Procedures involving special cases before
Parenthetically, it might be argued that since inferior courts are anyway vested with jurisdiction over real actions, then it can very
well resolve the issue of ownership raised in the ejectment case, under the conditions stated in Section 32(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. It must not be overlooked, however, that proceedings in ejectment cases are summary in nature, whereas actions for recovery of ownership require a full-blown trial on the merits. The difference in the procedure in special civil actions, like ejectment, and in ordinary civil actions, such as accion reinvindicatoria, inveigh against the consolidation of said cases or the joinder of the different causes of action involved. It could also be violative under certain circumstances of the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action since Section 6 of Rule 2 requires inter alia due observance of the rules on jurisdiction and joinder of parties, and that said causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties. As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now stands, even where the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of ownership albeit only to determine the issue of possession. 16 On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence of ownership in order to determine only the nature and extent of possession, by reason of which such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became apparent that the issue of possession was intricately interwoven with that of ownership. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts. At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this particular issue concerns and applies only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the issue of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership. It finds no proper application where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in issue, or where the principal and main issue raised in the allegations of the complaint as well as the relief prayed for make out not a case for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership. In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals , et al ., 17 this Court, in making a distinction between the reception of evidence and the resolution of the issue of ownership, held that the inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de
jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the nature of possession. It cannot, however, resolve the issue of ownership, that is, by declaring who among the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject property, because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer. With this as a premise and taking into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit. Withal, it will be observed, that the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 has spawned seemingly conflicting jurisprudence on the proper interpretation and application thereof. Thus, in several cases decided by the Court after the effectivity of this law, regardless of whether the complaint for ejectment was filed with the inferior court prior thereto or otherwise, it was held that the jurisdiction of the inferior court is lost and the ejectment case should be dismissed where the issue of possession cannot be resolved without determining the issue of ownership. 18 In all of these cases, the Court declared that inferior courts may only admit evidence and proof of ownership but they cannot adjudicate on the question of ownership. Conversely, in also not a few instances, the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to resolve the issue of ownership in order to determine the issue of possession was upheld by this Court. 19 Apparently, it could have been some imprecision in language or a misperception of the statutory text which generated the ostensible doctrinal variance. After due deliberation, we find and so hold that by virtue of the express mandate set forth in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Certain guidelines, however, must be observed in the implementation of this legislative prescription, viz .: 1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership. 2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the p laintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. 20 Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for
ownership, 21 or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, 22 the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property. 3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where the relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the ejectment case, 23 unless it is sufficiently established that there has been a subsequent change in or termination of that relationship between the parties. This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. 4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right through an accion publiciana oraccion reivindicatoria. 24 Corollarily, if prior possession may be ascertained in some other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the issue of ownership. 5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. 25 In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. 26 Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. The interpretative rules we have herein adopted are not without justification. It is our considered opinion that they are more in keeping with the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer which have purposely been made summary in nature so that there may be a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby insuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community, as, otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide, as a measure of self-protection, to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. 27And
since the law discourages continued wrangling over possession of property for they involve perturbation of social disorder which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided. 28 As a matter of judicial experience, there have been cases where persons who have failed to adduce any legal ground for their continued stay on property belonging to another have nonetheless managed to stave off eviction for several years through the improper use of procedural technicalities. 29 Conformably, if we were to allow the dismissal of an ejectment case for the reason that the question of ownership is incidentally involved in determining the question of possession, we are in effect providing the defendants in ejectment cases with the opportunity to prolong their occupancy of premises, over which they have ceased to have any valid possessory right, during the time that an action for recovery of ownership, which involves a more tedious and lengthy court proceeding, is actually pending in court. It is indeed ironic that a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case which is intended to be disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be the most cumbersome and difficult to decide. It is thus about time that this situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of the worsening problem of court congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving them a full-blown treatment in all the courts in the judicial structure, and thereby save the courts the expenditure of precious time and energy which could otherwise be devoted to more significant and vital litigations. 30 With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to the merits of the present case. Petitioners claim to be co-owners of the subject premises on the basis of an alleged verbal agreement between the parties to subdivide the property, as well as the payment made by petitioner Mamerto Refugia for the purchase of the lot in the amount of P20,000.00. On the other hand, private respondents' property rights are supported by sufficient documents and muniments of ownership, namely, the deed of absolute sale, transfer certificate of title, and building permit in their names, the regularity in the issuance of which was never controverted nor put in issue by petitioners. The Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court are not in accord on whether to treat the P20,000.00 as a loan or as payment for petitioners' share in the subject premises, while respondent Court of Appeals believes that the same is actually a loan. It bears significant notice that petitioners never refuted nor denied, in any of their pleadings filed in this case from the court of origin and all the way up to this Court, the allegation that private respondents gave P5,000.00 as partial payment for the loan. No countervailing explanation was advanced by petitioners why such payment was made to and accepted by them as such.
Furthermore, the allegation of petitioners that there was a verbal agreement to subdivide the property between them and private respondents is self-serving and evidentiarily baseless at this stage. In addition, their theory of an "implied trust" was not raised in issue in the trial court and cannot therefore be raised for the first time in the present petition. 31 At most, it was merely alluded to in petitioners' Rejoinder filed with the Court of Appeals, but petitioners never bothered to expound on or substantiate the same. Consequently, it cannot now be raised as an assignment of error in the present petition. In sum, and as held by respondent court, the Regional Trial Court "overstepped its bounds" in ruling that petitioners and private respondents are co-owners of the property, which issue should be finally determined in the separate action for specific performance reportedly pending between the parties. At this juncture, however, the evidence conduces to a finding that private respondents are in possession of the premises in the concept of and consequent to their being owners thereof. Even on such prima facie showing, therefore, private respondents can maintain the ejectment case involved. While it may be argued that petitioners were able to prove prior possession, such, however, is not the issue involved in this action for unlawful detainer. An action for unlawful detainer is different from a forcible entry case in that the former involves an act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the expiration or termination of the detainer's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied, 32 and neither is prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff necessary; 33 whereas in the latter, the main issue is one of priority of possession. 34 In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show that they were legally entitled to continue occupying the unit in question. On the considerations hereinbefore detailed, we agree with the position of respondent Court of Appeals that petitioners would in effect be occupying the premises by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 35 The status of petitioners is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. 36 It has further been held that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer. 37 Here, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance of private respondents from the very beginning. At any rate, it has likewise not been denied by herein petitioners that one of their sons also owns a residential house where they can live.
Notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and the Metropolitan Trial Court for the matter, to qualifiedly resolve the issue of ownership raised in the present ejectment suit, but their findings thereon being devoid of basis in fact and in law, respondent Court of Appeals was fully justified in decreeing a reversal of their judgments. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. G.R. No. 156402 February 13, 2006 SPS. ALFREDO MENDOZA and ROSARIO F. MENDOZA, Petitioners, vs. MARIA CORONEL, represented by JUANITO CORONEL, Respondent. PUNO, J.: On appeal are the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) May 30, 2002 Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67157 and November 12, 2002 Resolution, 2 reversing the September 17, 2001 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 458-M-2001. The RTC of Malolos ruled that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Hagonoy, Bulacan, before which respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners, had no jurisdiction to decide the case for failure of respondent to implead her co-owners of the disputed property, the latter being indispensable parties to the ejectment suit. The facts are as follows: Respondent Maria Coronel is one of the co-owners of Lots 3250 and 3251 located at Sagrada Familia, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioners, spouses Alfredo and Rosario Mendoza, occupied said lots upon tolerance of respondent and her co-owners without paying any rent. When respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, the latter refused. Thus, on December 27, 2000, respondent filed a case before the MTC of Hagonoy, Bulacan for unlawful detainer against petitioners. The MTC ruled in favor of respondent, ordering petitioners to vacate the disputed lots. The dispositive portion of its May 29, 2001 Decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, j udgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all those claiming rights under them: (1) to vacate the subject premises (lots 3250 and 3251) and to surrender possession of the same to plaintiff[;] (2) to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00 and to pay a monthly rental ofP500 from receipt of this decision until they shall have vacated the subject premises; and (3) to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED .4
Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan which ruled in their favor. It annulled and set aside the appealed decision for want of jurisdiction of the MTC. It held that the co-owners of the subject lot should have been impleaded as indispensable parties. On appeal to the CA, respondent was successful as the appellate court reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC and revived the decision of the MTC dated May 29, 2001. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
In the past, a co-owner could not even maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. . . While Article 487 of the Civil Code now provides that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment," former Chief Justice Moran also stressed that all of them are necessary and proper parties . . . We reiterate the Arcelona ruling that the controlling law is Article 487 of the Civil Code which categorically states:
Hence, this appeal.5 Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n) Petitioners assign the following errors: I. The lower court erred in ruling that a co-owner can bring an action in ejectment without impleading his co-owners, relying on an "Errata for pages 38-39 of Volume 280 SCRA," which appears to alter the original tenor of the ruling in Arcelona vs. CA that co-owners are indispensable parties. II. The lower court erred in not taking into account that the complaint was filed by an attorney-in-fact authorized by only one of the co-owners to file the ejectment suit. III. The lower court erred in allowing the petition for review despite the fact that the certification against forum-shopping was executed by an attorney-in-fact, in violation of the requirement that parties must personally sign the same. The main issue in the case at bar is whether any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. The CA is correct in overruling the RTC. The latter court held that in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,6 we held that a co-owner cannot maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other coowners, the latter being indispensable parties. In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA pointed out that the RTC relied on the uncorrected Arcelona decision. The RTC overlooked the fact that the decision has been corrected by an "ERRATA for pages 38-39" appearing on the second leaf of volume 280 of the SCRA. Thus, the CA held: Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." It was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. The foregoing statement was deleted and replaced with the following:
Article 487 is a departure from the rule laid down in the case of Palarca v. Baguisi7 which held that an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. As explained by Tolentino, the law now allows a co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, which covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. 8 We also reject petitioners’ second and third assignment of errors. Petitioners claim that Juanito Coronel, attorney-in-fact of Maria Coronel, one of the co-owners of the lots in dispute is not authorized to file the ejectment suit. They insist that he should have obtained the authority and consent of all the co-owners. But since Article 487 of the Civil Code authorizes any one of the co-owners to bring an action for ejectment and the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all, without the other co-owners actually giving consent to the suit, it follows that an attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff co-owner does not need authority from all the co-owners. He needs authority only from the co-owner instituting the ejectment suit. We likewise hold that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the case at bar is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff co-owner, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, is a party to the ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court 9 includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute the proceedings. IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners’ appeal is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 30, 2002 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 67157 and November 12, 2002 Resolution, reversing the September 17, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 458-M-2001 and reviving the May 29, 2001 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Hagonoy, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 1308, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004 COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J .: The Case Before us is a petition for review 1 of the 21 June 2000 Decision2 and 14 December 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129. The Court of Appeals set aside the 11 November 1996 decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81,4 affirming the 15 December 1995 decision 5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31. 6
The Antecedents In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo ("Pajuyo") paid P 400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985. On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra ("Guevarra") executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s demand. In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused. Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 ("MTC"). In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.
On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. The dispositive portion of the MTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter to: A) vacate the house and lot occupied by the defendant or any other person or persons claiming any right under him; B) pay unto plaintiff the sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) monthly as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises starting from the last demand; C) pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and D) pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED. 7 Aggrieved, Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 ("RTC"). On 11 November 1996, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds no reversible error in the decision appealed from, being in accord with the law and evidence presented, and the same is hereby affirmed en toto. SO ORDERED.8 Guevarra received the RTC decision on 29 November 1996. Guevarra had only until 14 December 1996 to file his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing his appeal with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court a "Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42" ("motion for extension"). Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure questions of law. The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme Court received the motion for extension on 13 December 1996 or one day before the right to appeal expired.
On 27 February 1997, the Court of Appeals ordered Pajuyo to comment on Guevara’s petition for review. On 11 April 1997, Pajuyo filed his Comment. On 21 June 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of t he c ou rt a q uo i n C iv il C as e N o. Q -9 6- 26 94 3 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE; and it is hereby declared that the ejectment case filed against defendant-appellant is without factual and legal basis. SO ORDERED. 11
On 8 January 1997, the First Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution 9 referring the motion for extension to the Court of Appeals which has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The case presented no special and important matter for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of at the first instance. On 28 January 1997, the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution10 granting the motion for extension conditioned on the timeliness of the filing of the motion.
The Court of Appeals declared that Pajuyo and Guevarra are squatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the contested lot which the government owned. Perez, the person from whom Pajuyo acquired his rights, was also a squatter. Perez had no right or title over the lot because it is public land. The assignment of rights between Perez and Pajuyo, and the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra, did not have any legal effect. Pajuyo and Guevarra are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The court will leave them where they are.
Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Pajuyo pointed out that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright Guevarra’s petition for review because it was filed out of time. Moreover, it was Guevarra’s counsel and not Guevarra who signed the certification against forum-shopping.
The Court of Appeals reversed the MTC and RTC rulings, which held that the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra created a legal tie akin to that of a landlord and tenant relationship. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Kasunduan is not a lease contract but a commodatum because the agreement is not for a price certain.
On 14 December 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying Pajuyo’s motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
Since Pajuyo admitted that he resurfaced only in 1994 to claim the property, the appellate court held that Guevarra has a better right over the property under Proclamation No. 137. President Corazon C. Aquino ("President Aquino") issued Proclamation No. 137 on 7 September 1987. At that time, Guevarra was in physical possession of the property. Under Article VI of the Code of Policies Beneficiary Selection and Disposition of Homelots and Structures in the National Housing Project ("the Code"), the actual occupant or caretaker of the lot shall have first priority as beneficiary of the project. The Court of Appeals concluded that Guevarra is first in the hierarchy of priority.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, reconsideration is hereby DENIED. ORDERED.12
the No
motion costs.
for SO
The Ruling of the MTC The MTC ruled that the subject of the agreement between Pajuyo and Guevarra is the house and not the lot. Pajuyo is the owner of the house, and he allowed Guevarra to use the house only by tolerance. Thus, Guevarra’s refusal to vacate the house on Pajuyo’s demand made Guevarra’s continued possession of the house illegal. The Ruling of the RTC
On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed his petition for review with the Supreme Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The RTC upheld the Kasunduan, which established the landlord and tenant relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra. The terms of the Kasunduan bound Guevarra to return possession of the house on demand. The RTC rejected Guevarra’s claim of a better right under Proclamation No. 137, the Revised National Government Center Housing Project Code of Policies and other pertinent laws. In an ejectment suit, the RTC has no power to decide Guevarra’s rights under these laws. The RTC declared that in an ejectment case, the only issue for resolution is material or physical possession, not ownership.
In denying Pajuyo’s motion for reconsideration, the appellate court debunked Pajuyo’s claim that Guevarra filed his motion for extension beyond the period to appeal. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Guevarra’s motion for extension filed before the Supreme Court was stamped "13 December 1996 at 4:09 PM" by the Supreme Court’s Receiving Clerk. The Court of Appeals concluded that the motion for extension bore a date, contrary to Pajuyo’s claim that the motion for extension was undated. Guevarra filed the motion for extension on time on 13 December 1996 since he filed the motion one day before the expiration of the reglementary period on 14 December 1996. Thus, the motion for extension properly complied with the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals in its 28 January 1997 Resolution. The Court of Appeals explained that the thirty-day extension to file the petition for review was deemed granted because of such compliance. The Court of Appeals rejected Pajuyo’s argument that the appellate court should have dismissed the petition for review because it was Guevarra’s counsel and not Guevarra who signed the certification against forum-shopping. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Pajuyo
did not raise this issue in his Comment. The Court of Appeals held that Pajuyo could not now seek the dismissal of the case after he had extensively argued on the merits of the case. This technicality, the appellate court opined, was clearly an afterthought. The Issues Pajuyo raises the following issues for resolution: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION: 1) in GRANTING, instead of denying, Private Respondent’s Motion for an Extension of thirty days to file petition for review at the time when there was no more period to extend as the decision of the Regional Trial Court had already become final and executory. 2) in giving due course, instead of dismissing, private respondent’s Petition for Review even though the certification against forum-shopping was signed only by counsel instead of by petitioner himself. 3) in ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered into by the parties was in fact a commodatum , instead of a Contract of Lease as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court and in holding that "the ejectment case filed against defendantappellant is without legal and factual basis". 4) in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943 and in holding that the parties are in pari delicto being both squatters, therefore, illegal occupants of the contested parcel of land. 5) in deciding the unlawful detainer case based on the socalled Code of Policies of the National Government Center Housing Project instead of deciding the same under the Kasunduan voluntarily executed by the parties, the terms and conditions of which are the laws between themselves.13
The Ruling of the Court The procedural issues Pajuyo is raising are baseless. However, we find merit in the substantive issues Pajuyo is submitting for resolution.
Procedural Issues Pajuyo insists that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright Guevarra’s petition for review because the RTC decision had already become final and executory when the appellate court acted on Guevarra’s motion for extension to file the petition. Pajuyo points out that Guevarra had only one day before the expiry of his period to appeal the RTC decision. Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with this Court an undated motion for extension of 30 days to file a petition for review. This Court merely referred the motion to the Court of Appeals. Pajuyo believes that the filing of the motion for extension with this Court did not toll the running of the period to perfect the appeal. Hence, when the Court of Appeals received the motion, the period to appeal had already expired.
disputed property and the application of Guevarra as beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. The Court of Appeals has the power to grant an extension of time to file a petition for review. In Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court ,18 we declared that the Court of Appeals could grant extension of time in appeals by petition for review. In Liboro v. Court of Appeals,19 we clarified that the prohibition against granting an extension of time applies only in a case where ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere notice of appeal. The prohibition does not apply in a petition for review where the pleading needs verification. A petition for review, unlike an ordinary appeal, requires preparation and research to present a persuasive position.20 The drafting of the petition for review entails more time and effort than filing a notice of appeal. 21 Hence, the Court of Appeals may allow an extension of time to file a petition for review.
We are not persuaded. Decisions of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction are appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review in cases involving questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.14 Decisions of the regional trial courts involving pure questions of law are appealable directly to this Court by petition for review.15 These modes of appeal are now embodied in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Guevarra believed that his appeal of the RTC decision involved only questions of law. Guevarra thus filed his motion for extension to file petition for review before this Court on 14 December 1996. On 3 January 1997, Guevarra then filed his petition for review with this Court. A perusal of Guevarra’s petition for review gives the impression that the issues he raised were pure questions of law. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference is on what the law is on a certain state of facts. 16 There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference is on the truth or falsity of the facts alleged. 17 In his petition for review before this Court, Guevarra no longer disputed the facts. Guevarra’s petition for review raised these questions: (1) Do ejectment cases pertain only to possession of a structure, and not the lot on which the structure stands? (2) Does a suit by a squatter against a fellow squatter constitute a valid case for ejectment? (3) Should a Presidential Proclamation governing the lot on which a squatter’s structure stands be considered in an ejectment suit filed by the owner of the structure? These questions call for the evaluation of the rights of the parties under the law on ejectment and the Presidential Proclamation. At first glance, the questions Guevarra raised appeared purely legal. However, some factual questions still have to be resolved because they have a bearing on the legal questions raised in the petition for review. These factual matters refer to the metes and bounds of the
In the more recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. C ou rt of A pp eal s,22 we held that Liboro’ sclarification of Lacsamana is consistent with the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91. They all allow an extension of time for filing petitions for review with the Court of Appeals. The extension, however, should be limited to only fifteen days save in exceptionally meritorious cases where the Court of Appeals may grant a longer period. A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact on the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected.23 The RTC decision could not have gained finality because the Court of Appeals granted the 30day extension to Guevarra. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it approved Guevarra’s motion for extension. The Court of Appeals gave due course to the motion for extension because it complied with the condition set by the appellate court in its resolution dated 28 January 1997. The resolution stated that the Court of Appeals would only give due course to the motion for extension if filed on time. The motion for extension met this condition. The material dates to consider in determining the timeliness of the filing of the motion for extension are (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition, and (2) the date of filing of the motion for extension. 24 It is the date of the filing of the motion or pleading, and not the date of execution, that determines the timeliness of the filing of that motion or pleading. Thus, even if the motion for extension bears no date, the date of filing stamped on it is the reckoning point for determining the timeliness of its filing. Guevarra had until 14 December 1996 to file an appeal from the RTC decision. Guevarra filed his motion for extension before this Court on
13 December 1996, the date stamped by this Court’s Receiving Clerk on the motion for extension. Clearly, Guevarra filed the motion for extension exactly one day before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. Assuming that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed Guevarra’s appeal on technical grounds, Pajuyo did not ask the appellate court to deny the motion for extension and dismiss the petition for review at the earliest opportunity. Instead, Pajuyo vigorously discussed the merits of the case. It was only when the Court of Appeals ruled in Guevarra’s favor that Pajuyo raised the procedural issues against Guevarra’s petition for review. A party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute for resolution, receives an adverse decision on the merits, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court.25 Estoppel sets in not because the judgment of the court is a valid and conclusive adjudication, but because the practice of attacking the court’s jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting to it is against public policy.26 In his Comment before the Court of Appeals, Pajuyo also failed to discuss Guevarra’s failure to sign the certification against forum shopping. Instead, Pajuyo harped on Guevarra’s counsel signing the verification, claiming that the counsel’s verification is insufficient since it is based only on "mere information." A party’s failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the party’s failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel.27 The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.28 On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite.29 It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. 30 The party need not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.31 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue on the certificate against forum shopping was merely an afterthought. Pajuyo did not call the Court of Appeals’ attention to this defect at the early stage of the proceedings. Pajuyo raised this procedural issue too late in the proceedings. Absence of Title over the Disputed Property will not Divest the Courts of Jurisdiction to Resolve the Issue of Possession
Settled is the rule that the defendant’s claim of ownership of the disputed property will not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case.32 Even if the pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass on such issue to determine only the question of possession, especially if the ownership is inseparably linked with the possession.33The adjudication on the issue of ownership is only provisional and will not bar an action between the same parties involving title to the land.34 This doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of the two summary actions of ejectment, forcible entry and unlawful detainer, where the only issue for adjudication is the physical or material possession over the real property.35 In this case, what Guevarra raised before the courts was that he a nd Pajuyo are not the owners of the contested property and that they are mere squatters. Will the defense that the parties to the ejectment case are not the owners of the disputed lot allow the courts to renounce their jurisdiction over the case? The Court of Appeals believed so and held that it would just leave the parties where they are since they are in pari delicto. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals. Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical possession.36 The same is true when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case. The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.37 It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable,38 or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency.39 Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 40 Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.41 Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.42 To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.
In Pitargue v. Sorilla,43 the government owned the land in dispute. The government did not authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant in the case of forcible entry case to occupy the land. The plaintiff had prior possession and had already introduced improvements on the public land. The plaintiff had a pending application for the land with the Bureau of Lands when the defendant ousted him from possession. The plaintiff filed the action of forcible entry against the defendant. The government was not a party in the case of forcible entry. The defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the courts to settle the issue of possession because while the application of the plaintiff was still pending, title remained with the government, and the Bureau of Public Lands had jurisdiction over the case. We disagreed with the defendant. We ruled that courts have jurisdiction to entertain ejectment suits even before the resolution of the application. The plaintiff, by priority of his application and of his entry, acquired prior physical possession over the public land applied for as against other private claimants. That prior physical possession enjoys legal protection against other private claimants because only a court can take away such physical possession in an ejectment case. While the Court did not brand the plaintiff and the defendant in Pitargue44 as squatters, strictly speaking, their entry into the disputed land was illegal. Both the plaintiff and defendant entered the public land without the owner’s permission. Title to the land remained with the government because it had not awarded to anyone ownership of the contested public land. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were in effect squatting on government property. Yet, we upheld the courts’ jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even if the plaintiff and the defendant in the ejectment case did not have any title over the contested land. Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. 45 The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. 46 Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.47 We further explained in Pitargue the greater interest that is at stake in actions for recovery of possession. We made the following pronouncements in Pitargue: The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving these public lands before final award is made by the Lands Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting
claimants? It is one of utmost importance, as there are public lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially in newly opened regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as it requires the determination of the respective authorities and functions of two coordinate branches of the Government in connection with public land conflicts. Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil Code, either in the old, which was in force in this country before the American occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory action, the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the physical possession of real property, irrespective of the question as to who has the title thereto. Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the accion interdictal, a summary proceeding which could be brought within one year from dispossession (Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we implanted the common law action of forcible entry (section 80 of Act No. 190), the object of which has been stated by this Court to be "to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the court to assert their claims." (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So before the enactment of the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of the country. So the question to be resolved is, Did the Legislature intend, when it vested the power and authority to alienate and dispose of the public lands in the Lands Department, to exclude the courts from entertaining the possessory action of forcible entry between rival claimants or occupants of any land before award thereof to any of the parties? Did Congress intend that the lands applied for, or all public lands for that matter, be removed from the jurisdiction of the judicial Branch of the Government, so that any troubles arising therefrom, or any breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rival claimants, could be inquired into only by the Lands Department to the exclusion of the courts? The answer to this question seems to us evident. The Lands Department does not have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the court herein has another ultimate purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of the peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not
have been intended to include the power to prevent or settle disorders or breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior to the final award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding branches of the Government must continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective functions. The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of the respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition. Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in American courts to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction to determine the rights of claimants to public lands, and that until the disposition of the land has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the courts will not interfere with the administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C. J. 10931094.) We have no quarrel with this principle. The determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands is different from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never be "prejudicial interference" with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts were deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, that threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice, would rule. It must be borne in mind that the action that would be used to solve conflicts of possession between rivals or conflicting applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible entry. This action, both in England and the United States and in our jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedy whereby one in peaceful and quiet possession may recover the possession of which he has been deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or terror; its ultimate object being to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis of the remedy is mere possession as a fact, of physical possession, not a legal possession. (Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752.) The title or right to possession is never in issue in an action of forcible entry; as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is expressly banned, except to prove the nature of the possession. (Second 4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) With this nature
of the action in mind, by no stretch of the imagination can conclusion be arrived at that the use of the remedy in the courts of justice would constitute an interference with the alienation, disposition, and control of public lands. To limit ourselves to the case at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in any way interfere with the manner of the alienation or disposition of the land contested? On the contrary, it would facilitate adjudication, for the question of priority of p ossession having been decided in a final manner by the courts, said question need no longer waste the time of the land officers making the adjudication or award. (Emphasis ours)
The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari delicto to this case. Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code48 embody the principle of pari delicto. We explained the principle of pari delicto in these words: The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ ex dolo malo non eritur actio ’ and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis .’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them.49 The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there are exceptions to its application. One of these exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established public policy.50 In Drilon v. Gaurana,51 we reiterated the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. We held that: It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. 52
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost. Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent.53 Even the owner who has title over the disputed property cannot take the law into his own hands to regain possession of his property. The owner must go to court. Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are squatters. The determination of priority and superiority of possession is a serious and urgent matter that cannot be left to the squatters to decide. To do so would make squatters receive better treatment under the law. The law restrains property owners from taking the law into their own hands. However, the principle of pari delicto as applied by the Court of Appeals would give squatters free rein to dispossess fellow squatters or violently retake possession of properties usurped from them. Courts should not leave squatters to their own devices in cases involving recovery of possession. Possession is the only Issue for Resolution in an Ejectment Case The case for review before the Court of Appeals was a simple case of ejectment. The Court of Appeals refused to rule on the issue of physical possession. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that the pivotal issue in this case is who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has the "priority right as beneficiary of the contested land under Proclamation No. 137."54 According to the Court of Appeals, Guevarra enjoys preferential right under Proclamation No. 137 because Article VI of the Code declares that the actual occupant or caretaker is the one qualified to apply for socialized housing. The ruling of the Court of Appeals has no factual and legal basis. First. Guevarra did not present evidence to show that the contested lot is part of a relocation site under Proclamation No. 137. Proclamation No. 137 laid down the metes and bounds of the land that it declared open for disposition to bona fide residents. The records do not show that the contested lot is within the land specified by Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra had the burden to prove that the disputed lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No. 137. He failed to do so.
Second. The Court of Appeals should not have given credence to Guevarra’s unsubstantiated claim that he is the beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra merely alleged that in the survey the project administrator conducted, he and not Pajuyo appeared as the actual occupant of the lot.
Ako, si COL[I]TO PAJUYO, may-ari ng bahay at lote sa Bo. Payatas, Quezon City, ay nagbibigay pahintulot kay G. Eddie Guevarra, na pansamantalang manirahan sa nasabing bahay at lote ng "walang bayad." Kaugnay nito, kailangang panatilihin nila ang kalinisan at kaayusan ng bahay at lote.
There is no proof that Guevarra actually availed of the benefits of Proclamation No. 137. Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to occupy the disputed property in 1985. President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 137 into law on 11 March 1986. Pajuyo made his earliest demand for Guevarra to vacate the property in September 1994.
Sa sandaling kailangan na namin ang bahay at lote, sila’y kusang aalis ng walang reklamo.
During the time that Guevarra temporarily held the property up to the time that Proclamation No. 137 allegedly segregated the disputed lot, Guevarra never applied as beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Even when Guevarra already knew that Pajuyo was reclaiming possession of the property, Guevarra did not take any step to comply with the requirements of Proclamation No. 137. Third. Even assuming that the disputed lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No. 137 and Guevarra has a pending application over the lot, courts should still assume jurisdiction and resolve the issue of possession. However, the jurisdiction of the courts would be limited to the issue of physical possession only. In Pitargue,55 we ruled that courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public land to determine the issue of physical possession. The determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public land is, however, distinct from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or who has a better right of physical possession.56 The administrative disposition and alienation of public lands should be threshed out in the proper government agency.57 The Court of Appeals’ determination of Pajuyo and Guevarra’s rights under Proclamation No. 137 was premature. Pajuyo and Guevarra were at most merely potential beneficiaries of the law. Courts should not preempt the decision of the administrative agency mandated by law to determine the qualifications of applicants for the acquisition of public lands. Instead, courts should expeditiously resolve the issue of physical possession in ejectment cases to prevent disorder and breaches of peace.58 Pajuyo is Entitled to Physical Possession of the Disputed Property Guevarra does not dispute Pajuyo’s prior possession of the lot and ownership of the house built on it. Guevarra expressly admitted the existence and due execution of the Kasunduan. The Kasunduan reads:
Based on the Kasunduan, Pajuyo permitted Guevarra to reside in the house and lot free of rent, but Guevarra was under obligation to maintain the premises in good condition. Guevarra promised to vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s demand but Guevarra broke his promise and refused to heed Pajuyo’s demand to vacate. These facts make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the withholding by a person from another of the possession of real property to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under a contract, express or implied .59 Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.60 The defendant’s refusal to comply with the demand makes his continued possession of the property unlawful.61 The status of the defendant in such a case is similar to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner.62 This principle should apply with greater force in cases where a contract embodies the permission or tolerance to use the property. The Kasunduan expressly articulated Pajuyo’s forbearance. Pajuyo did not require Guevarra to pay any rent but only to maintain the house and lot in good condition. Guevarra expressly vowed in the Kasunduan that he would vacate the property on demand. Guevarra’s refusal to comply with Pajuyo’s demand to vacate made Guevarra’s continued possession of the property unlawful. We do not subscribe to the Court the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.
of Appeals’ theory
that
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it. 63 An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a certain period. 64 Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted.65 If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary
use.66 If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called a precarium. 67 Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.68 The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While theKasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the lease.69 The tenant’s withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence. Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of commission, administration and commodatum.70 These contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing received. 71 Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the sole ground that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter. Squatters, Guevarra pointed out, cannot enter into a contract involving the land they illegally occupy. Guevarra insists that the contract is void. Guevarra should know that there must be honor even between squatters. Guevarra freely entered into the Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot now impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it. The Kasunduan binds Guevarra.
Pajuyo did not profit from his arrangement with Guevarra because Guevarra stayed in the property without paying any rent. There is also no proof that Pajuyo is a professional squatter who rents out usurped properties to other squatters. Moreover, it is for the proper government agency to decide who between Pajuyo and Guevarra qualifies for socialized housing. The only issue that we are addressing is physical possession. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment.73 This is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer.74 In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Thus, he must allege and prove prior possession.75 But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to possess under any contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is not required.76 Pajuyo’s withdrawal of his permission to Guevarra terminated the Kasunduan. Guevarra’s transient right to possess the property ended as well. Moreover, it was Pajuyo who was in actual possession of the property because Guevarra had to seek Pajuyo’s permission to temporarily hold the property and Guevarra had to follow the conditions set by Pajuyo in theKasunduan . Control over the property still rested with Pajuyo and this is evidence of actual possession. Pajuyo’s absence did not affect his actual possession of the disputed property. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession.77 One may acquire possession not only by physical occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will.78Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary.79
Ruling on Possession Does not Bind Title to the Land in Dispute The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a right to physical possession of the contested property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of Guevarra’s recognition of Pajuyo’s better right of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as there would still be an implied promise to vacate. Guevarra contends that there is "a pernicious evil that is sought to be avoided, and that is allowing an absentee squatter who (sic) makes (sic) a profit out of his illegal act." 72 Guevarra bases his argument on the preferential right given to the actual occupant or caretaker under Proclamation No. 137 on socialized housing. We are not convinced.
We are aware of our pronouncement in cases where we declared that "squatters and intruders who clandestinely enter into titled government property cannot, by such act, acquire any legal right to said property."80 We made this declaration because the person who had title or who had the right to legal possession over the disputed property was a party in the ejectment suit and that party instituted the case against squatters or usurpers. In this case, the owner of the land, which is the government, is not a party to the ejectment case. This case is between squatters. Had the government participated in this case, the courts could have evicted the contending squatters, Pajuyo and Guevarra. Since the party that has title or a better right over the property is not impleaded in this case, we cannot evict on our own the parties. Such
a ruling would discourage squatters from seeking the aid of the courts in settling the issue of physical possession. Stripping both the plaintiff and the defendant of possession just because they are squatters would have the same dangerous implications as the application of the principle of pari delicto. Squatters would then rather settle the issue of physical possession among themselves than seek relief from the courts if the plaintiff and defendant in the ejectment case would both stand to lose possession of the disputed property. This would subvert the policy underlying actions for recovery of possession. Since Pajuyo has in his favor priority in time in holding the property, he is entitled to remain on the property until a person who has title or a better right lawfully ejects him. Guevarra is certainly not that person. The ruling in this case, however, does not preclude Pajuyo and Guevarra from introducing evidence and presenting arguments before the proper administrative agency to establish any right to which they may be entitled under the law.81 In no way should our ruling in this case be interpreted to condone squatting. The ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect title to the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership. 82 The owner can still go to court to recover lawfully the property from the person who holds the property without legal title. Our ruling here does not diminish the power of government agencies, including local governments, to condemn, abate, remove or demolish illegal or unauthorized structures in accordance with existing laws. Attorney’s Fees and Rentals The MTC and RTC failed to justify the award of P3,000 attorney’s fees to Pajuyo. Attorney’s fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 83 Thus, the award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule.84 Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.85 We therefore delete the attorney’s fees awarded to Pajuyo. We sustain the P300 monthly rentals the MTC and RTC assessed against Guevarra. Guevarra did not dispute this factual finding of the two courts. We find the amount reasonable compensation to Pajuyo. The P300 monthly rental is counted from the last demand to vacate, which was on 16 February 1995. WHEREFORE , we GRANT the petition. The Decision dated 21 June 2000 and Resolution dated 14 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 11 November 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943, affirming the Decision dated 15 December 1995 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 12432,
is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The award of attorney’s fees is deleted. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 169793
September 15, 2006
occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with irregularities.7 On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment, which reads:
VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner, vs. NIEVES AMIGO, respondent.
WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence, a JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION and against the defendant NIEVES AMIGOE (sic) as follows:
DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .: 1
This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857, ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the parcels of land described in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 he is now occupying and surrender it to the plaintiff; b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) as attorney's fees, and
The antecedent facts are as follows: Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. 2121-B-1, consisting of 100 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-256650; and Lot No. 2121-B-2 consisting of 607 square meters with TCT No. T-256651, located at District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a single 707 square meter track of land owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on January 18, 1982. On March 21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed an Affidavit of Waiver2 on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision of the land into two lots3 and the issuance of titles in his name on July 18, 1996 .4 Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the then owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Said occupation by respondent continued even after TCT Nos. T-256650 and T256651 were issue to petitioner. Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter5 dated Febuary 1, 2001 demanding that the respondent vacate the subject property. As evidenced by the registry return receipt, the demand letter was delivered by registered mail to the respondent on February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter, respondent still refused to vacate the subject property. Thereafter, on March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint6 for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining order with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as CV-01-030. In his Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and
c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to] P500.00 per month from February, 2001 until the portion of the land occupied by him is surrendered to the plaintiff. COSTS against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.11 Hence the present petition raising the sole issue: [WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT 12 FILED BY PETITIONER. The petition lacks merit. In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property are: 1. Accion interdictal , or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court; 2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and
SO ORDERED.8 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, ruled as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case on the ground that as the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, this Court acquired no appellate jurisdiction thereof. Costs against plaintiff-appellee. SO ORDERED.9 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals which promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion thereof reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for further proceedings. No costs.
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court. 13 Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in this case is the length of time of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. These remedies afford the person deprived of the possession to file at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.14 Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the
dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper Regional Trial Court. After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the proper action in this case is accion publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings. Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.15 On its face, the complaint must show enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. 16
We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are indeed the owners of the subject lot and were unlawfully deprived of their right of possession, they should present their claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment.18 Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that: The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in 1985 but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner filed his ejectment case. The respondent should have filed an accion publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC. However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.
From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the latter vacate the premises remained unheeded. While it is true that the demand letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year from last demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the Regional Trial Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 17 Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that another person was occupying his property way back in 1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for ejectment in 1995, the proper action would be one for accion publicianaand not one under the summary procedure on ejectment. As explained by the Court:
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in
the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. 19 WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
