What is Porphyry's Isagoge

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I S P ORPHYRY ’S I S A G O G E ?

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RI CCARDO CCARDO CHI ARADO ARADONNA NNA What is Porphyry’s I sago ge ?*

1. B ARNES ’ I S A G O G E The T he way J onathan B arnes (hencefor (henceforth th B .) sugges suggests ts to read P orphyry’s orp hyry’s Isagoge rests rests upon two main assumptions. The first assumption is that the Isagoge was never designed as an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories 1 : « Por phyry himself himself i ndicate ndi catess for what wh at study the I n t r o d u c t i o n provides preparatory preparatory materi materi al : not for a study study of the Categories , but for a study study of the theory of predication, and the construction of definitions, and, in general, matters connected with division and with proof (1.3-6). That is to say, Porphyry Por phyry prese presents his hi s ess essay ay as as a preparation preparation for the study study of l ogi ogi c » 2 . B.’s second second assumption i s that the Isagoge — — apart fr om a few few isolated i solated exce excepti ptions ons — conveys no specifically Peripatetic (or Platonic, or Stoic) philosophical i deas deas : «… « … if i f the work i s Peri Peri patetic, patetic, it i t is so only in the blandest blandest of manners. manners. There T here i s l i ttle ttl e i n i t that a Stoi c could coul d not acce accept pt — and and nothing nothi ng that a P latoni laton i st should not accept. It is written in the philosophical lingua franca of the period period »3 . According Accordi ng to B., B ., therefore, Porphyry’ Por phyry’ss short tre tr eatise is an eleme elementary, ntary, philosophicall phi losophicallyy neutral neutral i ntroduction ntroducti on to the study of log l ogic ic ; as as such, such, the work should not be se seen as reflective of P orphyry’s distinctive disti nctive philosophical phil osophical views : « Porphyry’ Por phyry’ss phil osophical noti ons nee need not be rehe rehearse arsed d here. here. F ortunately ortunately o r p h y r y . I n t r o d u c t i o n , Trans The Th e prese present nt articl e is a review review of J . B ARNES , P or Tr anslation lation with an Introduction and Commentary, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003. The volume contains an introducti in troducti on, translation and detailed detailed commentary, commentary, as well well as 15 additional additi onal notes, a series series of textual notes and a complete bibliography. — A first draft of this paper was presented at a seminar held at Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa. I would like to thank Francesco Del Punta, Gabriele Gabri ele Galluzzo Gall uzzo and the other other parti cipants of the seminar seminar for their valuable sugge suggestions. stions. I am also grateful to Sergio Knipe and Ada Bronowski, for their careful linguistic revision. 1 The T he view view according to whi ch Porphyry’s P orphyry’s eleme elementary ntary treatise treatise is an i ntroducti on to Ar istotle’s istotle’s Categories represe represents, nts, in B.’ B .’ss words, « the traditi onal inte in terpr rpret etation ation » of of the Isagoge (B., (B., p. XV). ag ., The T he tradi tional ti onal interpr i nterpreta etati tion on was favoured favour ed by anci ancient ent commentators (cf. A M M ., i n I s ag . , 20, 15a g .1, 21 ; 22, 22, 23-24 23-24 ; 24, 24, 16-1 16-17 7 ; BO E TH ., I n I s ag . 1, 146, 26-147, 3, etc.), as well as by most modern sagoge scholars (cf. A. DE L I B E R A, Porph yre. I sagoge , Tex T exte te grec grec et et latin, lati n, traducti on par A. de Li bera bera et A.-P. Segonds Segonds,, I ntroduction et et notes notes par par A. de Li bera, bera, Vri n, Paris 1998, 1998, pp. pp. XI I -XX VI I ). 2 B., p. XV. 3 B., p. XI X. *

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RICCARDO CHIARADONNA

so ; for, despite despite his vast vast learni learning ng and and his hi s unusual unusual cri cr i tical acuity, acui ty, Porphyry Porphyr y had had a weakness for fudge»4 . Did Di d Porphyry P orphyry truly tr uly r egard gard elementary lementary logic logi c as an an autonomous and neutral neutral subject subject that could coul d (and should ) be dealt wi w i th reg r egardl ardleess of what w hat one’s one’s ‘dee ‘deeper’ philosophical views might be? The plausibility of B.’s overall interpretation largely depends on the answer to such a question. The answer I wish here to provide provi de is a negative negative one, one, for f or P orphyry, orph yry, I beli belieeve, ve, does not conceive of elementary lementary logic as an autonomous and and ontologically ontol ogically ‘empty’ ‘empty’ discipli disci pline ne.. To T o my mind, B .’s .’s influential reading of Porphyry’s Isagoge — its admirable scholarship and philosophical acumen notwithstanding — remains unconvincing. At the very beginning of his treatise, Porphyry presents his celebrated methodological caveat : Porphyry P orphyry sugge suggests that that his hi s expos expositi iti on wi ll be a brie bri ef and intr oductory one, one, « avoi avoiding ding dee deeper per enquir ies and and aiming aimi ng sui suitably tably at the more simple» ( tw' n me; n baqutev r wn aj p ecov m eno~ zhthmav t wn, tw' n d ’ aJ p loustev r wn ., 1, 1, 8-9) 8-9) : summev t rw~ stocazov m eno~ , Isag ., « F or example, about about gener gener a and and species — whethe wh etherr they th ey subsist, subsi st, whether they actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if they actually subsist they are bodies or i ncorpor eal and whether whether they are are separable separable or are i n perceptibl perceptibl e items and subsist about them — these matters I shall decline to discuss, such a subject being very deep and demanding another and a larger investigation. Here I shall attempt to show you how the old masters — and especially the Peri patetics patetics among them them — tr eated, ated, fr om a logical poi nt of view ( logikwv t eron), genera genera and species and and the th e items befor beforee us »5 .

Two chief chief problems problems may may be singled singled out here here:: (a) what what is the mean meaning ing of Porphyry’s set of questions on genera and species? (b) What is the meaning of Porphyry’s claim that he will not explore such deep matters, but confine himself to a prese presentation ntation of the theori theoriees of the old maste masters rs «fr « from om a logical logical point poi nt of view » ? 2. « F R OM

A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

»

L et us begin begin from f rom (b). (b ). The T he general general consensus i s that Porphyry’s Por phyry’s logikwv t eron means ‘in a logical way, from a logical point of view’. Such a reading can B., p. XI I. P ORPH ., I s a g ., . , 1, 9-16 : auj t iv k a peri; tw' n genw' n te kai; eij d w' n to; me; n ei[ t e uJ f ev s thken ei[ t e kai; ej n

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mov n ai~ yilai' ~ ej p inoiv a i~ kei' t ai ei[ t e kai; uJ f esthkov t a swv m atav ej s tin h] aj s wv m ata kai; pov t eron cwrista; h] ej n toi' ~ aij s qhtoi' ~ kai; peri; tau' t a uJ f estw' t a, paraithv s omai lev g ein baqutav t h~ ou[ s h~ th' ~ toiauv t h~ pragmateiv a~ kai; a[ l lh~ meiv z ono~ deomev n h~ ej x etav s ew~ : to to ; d ’ o{ p w~ peri; auj t w' n kai; tw' n prokeimev n wn logikwv t eron oiJ palaioi; diev l abon kai; touv t wn mav l ista oiJ ej k tou' peripav t ou, nu' n soi peirav s omai deiknuv n ai . The Th e Engli sh translation of passag passagees from P orphyry’s Isagoge is is that of B.

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so ; for, despite despite his vast vast learni learning ng and and his hi s unusual unusual cri cr i tical acuity, acui ty, Porphyry Porphyr y had had a weakness for fudge»4 . Did Di d Porphyry P orphyry truly tr uly r egard gard elementary lementary logic logi c as an an autonomous and neutral neutral subject subject that could coul d (and should ) be dealt wi w i th reg r egardl ardleess of what w hat one’s one’s ‘dee ‘deeper’ philosophical views might be? The plausibility of B.’s overall interpretation largely depends on the answer to such a question. The answer I wish here to provide provi de is a negative negative one, one, for f or P orphyry, orph yry, I beli belieeve, ve, does not conceive of elementary lementary logic as an autonomous and and ontologically ontol ogically ‘empty’ ‘empty’ discipli disci pline ne.. To T o my mind, B .’s .’s influential reading of Porphyry’s Isagoge — its admirable scholarship and philosophical acumen notwithstanding — remains unconvincing. At the very beginning of his treatise, Porphyry presents his celebrated methodological caveat : Porphyry P orphyry sugge suggests that that his hi s expos expositi iti on wi ll be a brie bri ef and intr oductory one, one, « avoi avoiding ding dee deeper per enquir ies and and aiming aimi ng sui suitably tably at the more simple» ( tw' n me; n baqutev r wn aj p ecov m eno~ zhthmav t wn, tw' n d ’ aJ p loustev r wn ., 1, 1, 8-9) 8-9) : summev t rw~ stocazov m eno~ , Isag ., « F or example, about about gener gener a and and species — whethe wh etherr they th ey subsist, subsi st, whether they actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if they actually subsist they are bodies or i ncorpor eal and whether whether they are are separable separable or are i n perceptibl perceptibl e items and subsist about them — these matters I shall decline to discuss, such a subject being very deep and demanding another and a larger investigation. Here I shall attempt to show you how the old masters — and especially the Peri patetics patetics among them them — tr eated, ated, fr om a logical poi nt of view ( logikwv t eron), genera genera and species and and the th e items befor beforee us »5 .

Two chief chief problems problems may may be singled singled out here here:: (a) what what is the mean meaning ing of Porphyry’s set of questions on genera and species? (b) What is the meaning of Porphyry’s claim that he will not explore such deep matters, but confine himself to a prese presentation ntation of the theori theoriees of the old maste masters rs «fr « from om a logical logical point poi nt of view » ? 2. « F R OM

A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

»

L et us begin begin from f rom (b). (b ). The T he general general consensus i s that Porphyry’s Por phyry’s logikwv t eron means ‘in a logical way, from a logical point of view’. Such a reading can B., p. XI I. P ORPH ., I s a g ., . , 1, 9-16 : auj t iv k a peri; tw' n genw' n te kai; eij d w' n to; me; n ei[ t e uJ f ev s thken ei[ t e kai; ej n

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mov n ai~ yilai' ~ ej p inoiv a i~ kei' t ai ei[ t e kai; uJ f esthkov t a swv m atav ej s tin h] aj s wv m ata kai; pov t eron cwrista; h] ej n toi' ~ aij s qhtoi' ~ kai; peri; tau' t a uJ f estw' t a, paraithv s omai lev g ein baqutav t h~ ou[ s h~ th' ~ toiauv t h~ pragmateiv a~ kai; a[ l lh~ meiv z ono~ deomev n h~ ej x etav s ew~ : to to ; d ’ o{ p w~ peri; auj t w' n kai; tw' n prokeimev n wn logikwv t eron oiJ palaioi; diev l abon kai; touv t wn mav l ista oiJ ej k tou' peripav t ou, nu' n soi peirav s omai deiknuv n ai . The Th e Engli sh translation of passag passagees from P orphyry’s Isagoge is is that of B.

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actually be traced back to the ancient Neoplatonic commentators on the Isagoge (cf. (cf. Ammonius’ distinction between three methods of inquiry: the ‘logical’, the th e ‘physical ‘physical’’ and the ‘theol ‘theological’) ogical’) 6 ; it i t was also favoured by the two most rece recent trans tr anslators lators of Porphyry’ Por phyry’ss treati treatise se (de Libera, L ibera, « d’une d’une mani manièère plus 7 logique logique » ; B., « from a logica logicall point of view view ») . Boethius rendering of logikwv t eron as p r o b a b i l i t e r (indicati (i ndicating ng a dial dialeectical, as oppose opposed to scientifi c, i nquiry) nqui ry) has h as usually usuall y been been rejected rejected by modern modern scholars scholar s (with (wi th the exce excepti ption on of Steven K. Strange) 8 . I f logikwv t eron , however, really means ‘in a logical way’ v el el si si m i l i a , a further question arises as to the meaning of the word ‘logical’. According to B , the term term ‘logical’ refers refers to « how we talk and think thi nk about gene genera ra etc. etc. » : « you discuss discuss some somethi thing ng logi logi cally or logikw' ~ insofar i nsofar as you discuss how it i t is is 9 spoken about or lev g etai » . Such Su ch a re r eading bears bears important i mportant conseque consequence ncess : for theorie theori es about genera genera and speci speciees in i n the Isagoge do not re r efer to ‘how things thi ngs are’ and should not be interpreted on the basis of Porphyry’s ontology. B. consistently consistently mini mizes the philosophical phi losophical import i mport of Porphyry’s P orphyry’s asse asserti rti ons : these, he argues, reflect ‘familiar doctrines’ and do not refer to specific philosophical tenets and arguments 10 . According to B., most of Porphyry’s arguments in the Isagoge are are actually mere commonplace, expressed in the curre curr ent philosophical phi losophical parlance of the time. Porphyry’ Por phyry’ss theori theoriees in the Isagoge , therefore, therefore, are are unrelated unrelated to his hi s distinctive distincti ve philosop phil osophi hica call alle all egi ance: « Porphyry Por phyry was a Platonist. The I n t r o d u c t i o n is compatible with Platonism. But the I n t r o d u c t i o n is i s not, and was designed designed not to be, be, a Platoni Pl atonist st document document »11 . B . refers refers to Simpli Si mplicius’ cius’ use use of logikwv t eron at I n C at a t . 104, 10-14 ( a d A ARIST ., Cat. 5, 3 b 10) 12 : Aristotle, according to Simplicius, discusses matters logikwv t eron inasmuch as he discusses how they lev g etai : « N ow, of what is i s said said concerni ng substance substance ‘not bei bei ng in a subject’ subject’ is taken taken from its relation to the things that are in a subject, and ‘to signify a thissomething’ from the practice of predication ( aj p o; th' ~ tou' kathgorei' s qai sunhqeiv a ~). What the substance receiving such relations is itself, is not stated ag. , 45, 1 ff. Cf. A M M ., I n I s ag Of the th e two, B.’s rendering renderi ng is the better better : as is often the case, case, the Greek comparative comparati ve adverb adverb is here used in a positive sense (cf. B., p. 35). 8 ag. 2 , 168, Po r p h y r y , a n d t h e N eo eo p l a t o n i c Cf. B O E TH ., I n I s ag 168, 9-16 9-169, 9, 5 ; S. K . S T RA N GE , P l o t i n u s , Po I nt erpr etati on of the ‘Cate ‘Categories gories’ ’ , A N R W I I I 36.2, 36.2, de Gruyte Gru yter, r, B erl in-N ew Y ork 1987, 1987, pp. 954-97 954-974, 4, p. 961. 9 B., p. 36. 10 Cf. B., pp. 119, 275 etc. 11 B., p. 141. 12 B., p. 36 n. 59. 6 7

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at all 13 . However, because the issue at hand is to divide how each thing is predicated and in how many ways, for this reason provides their peculiar characteristics ( ij d iwv m ata ) as the predication occurs ( kaqov s on hJ kathgoriv a giv n etai ), and because he is hunti ng for the peculi ar characteri stics of the categories from a l ogical point of view ( logikwv t eron), i.e. from speech ( oi| o n aj p o; tou' lev g esqai ). After all , the study of signifying words cannot be otherwise than insofar as they are spoken ( h] kaqov s on lev g ontai ) »14 .

In his extant short commentary on Categories , Porphyry points out that Aristotle’s enquiry in that treatise does not focus on things as such, but rather on words that ‘signify’ things 15 . Accordingly, one should not look for deep metaphysical theories in Categories . Porphyry’s line of reasoning agrees with Simplicius’ use of logikwv t eron in the passage quoted above; it may also contribute to explain P orphyry’s method of enquiry in the Isagoge , a method which avoids profound arguments and aims «suitably at the more simple». There is a further crucial, though mostly impli cit, assumption behind B.’s interpretation : Porphyry’s introductory investigation on « things insofar as they are spoken about » and the more profound investigation on « things as they are » represent two radically different and mutually independent fields of enquiry. The former field simply bears no relation to the latter : Porphyry the logician (= Porphyry L) focuses on «things as spoken about », while Porphyry the Platonic philosopher (= Porphyry P) focuses on « things as they are». When dealing with Porphyry L, one can (and should) forget about Porphyry P. Sten Ebbesen, in his seminal works on Porphyry’s logic, had already followed a similar line of reasoning: « Por phyry assigned the li ttle corner of the universe that interests most men as a sphere of operation for Aristotelian logic on the condition that it must not extend its field of operation to ontology proper whi ch can be investigated only in Platonic terms»16 .

Only one (important) difference exists between Ebbesen’s interpretation and that of B. : while according to E bbesen Porphyry’s logic is Peripatetic , Cf. Plotinus’ polemical remarks on this at VI 1 [42], 3, 19-23. S IMPL ., I n C at . , 104, 6-18 ; trans. F. A. J . DE H AAS , Sim pli ciu s. On Ari stotle Categori es 5-6 , Translated by F. A. J . de Haas and B. Fleet, Duckworth, London 2001, pp. 47-48 (translation quoted here with slight alterations). De Haas renders logikwv t eron as « in a more dialectical way ». 15 Cf. P ORPH ., I n C at . , 56, 34-57, 12 ; 58, 15-20 ; 91, 11-12 ; 91, 25-27. On Por phyry’s semantics cf. A. C. L LO YD , T h e A n a t o m y o f N eo p l a t o n i s m , Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990, pp. 36-75. 16 S. E BBESEN , Porphyry’s Legacy to L ogic : A R econstructi on , in R. S ORABJI ed., Ari stotle Transform ed. The Ancient Comm entators and their I nflu ence , Duckworth, London 1990, pp. 141-171, p. 144. 13 14

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according to B. it is philosophically neutral and compatible with different (and even alternative) philosophical assumptions 17 . The method of enquiry Porphyry adopts in his elementary writings indeed avoids posing profound metaphysical questions, questions pertaining to beings and their causes. In my view, however, this fact does not necessarily imply that Por phyry’s investigation on « things as they are spoken about » and his investigation on «things as they are» are two separate and mutually independent subjects. The use of the expression ‘logical’ among ancient commentators on Aristotle has recently been the focus of scholarly interest. Myles Burnyeat has drawn attention to Simplicius’ distinction of three meanings for logikw' ~ (S I M P L ., I n P h y s. , 440, 19-441, 2) 18 . Simplicius suggests that Ari stotle, in talking of a ‘logical’ puzzle at Phys. , G , 3, 202a21-22, might mean any of the following: 1) that the puzzle is based on reputable premises (ej x ej n dov x wn proi> o u' s an ) ; 2) that its persuasiveness is a matter of argument alone, without support of empiri cal fact ; 3) that it proceeds from generali ties rather than from principles peculiar and appropri ate to the subject. Simplicius then cites Alexander’s commentary in order to illustrate the contrast descri bed in 3). Burnyeat convincingly argues that the third meaning actually fits many of the examples of the use of the term ‘logical’ in B onitz’s I n d ex A r i st o t el i c u s ; among these, the comparative forms logikwtev r wn (scil . lov g wn ) and logikwtev r a~ (scil . diatribh' ~ ) at Metaph ., M , 5, 1080a10 and E t h . E u d . , A , 8, 1217b17. According to this meaning, logical discussion is abstract, general, and does not make use of principles appropriate to the subject-matter (e.g. physics, ethics, first philosophy). Burnyeat also singles out another meaning for ‘logical’: the meaning favoured by Andronicus (since Andronicus had recommended logic as initi al training for students of Ar istotle’s philosophy). The study of ‘logical’ works such as Categories and An . Post . «prepare and equip the reader to embark upon the sciences […] i n the following works » 19 . I do not wish to discuss A. C. Lloyd’s complex interpretation of Porphyry’s ‘logic’ in any detail here (see esp. L L O Y D, A n a t o m y cit., pp. 53-56). Lloyd detects the presence of two programmes in Porphyry’s work : the fir st a conventional programme (explicating predicates by reference to psychological, metaphysical or at any rate extra-l ogical elements) ; the second a pure logici an’s programme, whi ch does not incl ude extra-logical elements. According to L loyd, Porphyry’s Isagoge follows the second programme. As I aim to show, Lloyd’s conclusion is incorrect : for onl y one ‘programme’ (i.e. the conventional programme) is followed by Prophyry — and the Isagoge provides its most elementary version. 18 Cf. M. B URNYEAT, A M ap of ‘M etaphysics’ Zeta , Mathesis Publications, Pittsbugh 2001, pp. 19-21. 19 B URNYE AT , M ap cit., p. 25. According to B URNYE AT , M ap cit., p. 23 Simplicius’ (and Alexander’s) contrast between ‘logical’ (understood in the third sense of the term) and ‘nonlogical’ is unrelated to the contrast between linguistic and non-linguistic considerations. I do not wi sh to dwell here on Burnyeat’s descripti on of Ari stotle’s use of logikw' ~ (B urnyeat rejects Ross’s interpretation of logikw' ~ at M e t a p h ., Z , 4, 1029b13), but I do wish to suggest that, with 17

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Burnyeat’s remarks are useful to understand Porphyry’s ‘logical’ method. Both in the Isagoge and in I n C at ., Porphyry argues that his research is of an introductory and preliminary nature (cf. Isag ., 1, 7-9; I n C at . , 75, 29) ; as Porphyry remarks in I n C at . , he is not focussing on «things as such » but on « words which signify thi ngs». Porphyry’s li ne of thought, then, appears to be as follows. An inquiry on «things qu a things» (peri; pragmav t wn h/ | prav g mata : P ORPH ., I n C at ., 57, 5) is not suitable for beginners : from a pedagogical point of view, thi s must be preceded by a different introductory enquiry. The adverb logikwv t eron at S I M P L ., I n C at . , 104, 12 denotes this mode of research, which does not focus on the principles appropri ate to things; rather, i t starts from a semantic analysis of language and focuses on « words signifying things ». While one may well i nfer that such enquiry pertains to elementary ‘logic’, this certainly does not entail that «words signifying things» and «things as such » are two independent areas (the former pertaining to ‘logic’, the latter to ‘ontology’). Porphyry clearly argues in favour of the opposite conclusion : « Q : But if the treatise is about significant expression, how is it that the whole of hi s subsequent discussion was about things ? A. Because words are like messengers that report to us about things, and they get their generic differentiae from the things about whi ch they report. H ence it is necessary to begin the consideration of them from what makes their use necessary, so that they may receive their difference in genus from the generic differentiae of the things about which they report. So our inquiry is i ncidentally concerned with the generic differentiae of beings, while primarily it is about significant expressions, as I said »20 . respect to the commentators, Bur neyat’s conclusi on i s perhaps too peremptory. Simplicius, for instance (I n C at ., 104, 6 ff. quoted above) shows that logikwv t eron was connected to lev g esqai. It may well be argued that logikwv t eron at I n C at ., 104 expresses the first of the three meanings of the term at I n P h y s. 440, 19 ff. ( i.e. that of ‘dialectical’ — and thi s would also speak in favour of Boethius’ rendering of logikwv t eron at I s a g . , 1, 15). The issue, nevertheless, deserves further scrutiny. Simplicius’ remarks at I n C at ., 104, 6 ff. do not point to any distinction between a ‘li nguistic’ and a ‘non li nguistic’ sense of logikwv t eron ; rather, logikwv t eron is in i tself connected with the idea of ‘being spoken’ ( aj p o; tou' lev g esqai ). I only wish to point out here (1) that the oppositi on between a ‘logical’ and a ‘scientifi c’ inquiry was current among the ancient Ari stoteli an commentators ; (2) that such a distincti on does not point to any ‘neutrality’ of logic, but only to the preparatory character of ‘logical’ inquiries. 20 P ORPH ., I n C at . , 58, 21-29 : ’E. ’Alla; pw' ~ , eij peri; fwnw' n shmantikw' n ej s tin hJ pragmateiv a , ej n toi' ~ eJ x h' peri; tw' n pragmav t wn oJ pa' ~ auj t w' / gegev n htai lov g o~… ’A. ”Oti aiJ fwnai; aj g gev l w/ ej o ikui' a i ta; prav g mata aj g gev l lousin, aj p o; de; tw' n pragmav t wn, w| n aj g gev l lousi, ta; ~ diafora; ~ lambav n ousin: aj f ’ w| n toiv n un to; th' ~ creiv a ~ aj n agkai' o n e[ c ousin, tau' t a aj n agkai' o n qewrei' t ai, i{ n a kata; ta; ~ genika; ~ diafora; ~ w| n aj g gev l lousi kai; auj t ai; to; diav f oron lav b wsi to; kata; gev n o~. ej m piv p tousa toiv n un gev g onen hJ peri; tw' n kata; gev n o~ diaforw' n zhv t hsi~ tw' n o[ n twn, prohgoumev n h dev ej s tin hJ peri; tw' n fwnw' n tw' n shmantikw' n , wJ ~ ei[ r htai . Trans. S. K. Strange, Porphyr y. On Ar istot le Categories , Translated by S. K. S TR AN GE ,

Duckworth, London 1992.

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According to Porphyry, words (both individual and general terms) stand for (‘signify’) thi ngs; any discussion on how we speak about things is by no means separate and independent from a discussion on how things are: « Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differentiae, the words that indicate them have also come to be ten in genus, and are themselves also so classifi ed »21 . Porphyry’s semantic theory, then, is based on a rigorous isomorphism between language and reality (more on this later). There is simply no reason to draw an opposition between «things as conceptualised and expressed in language » and «things as such »22 . While the act of dealing with words that signify things comes first pedagogically, it is by no means removed from that of deali ng with the things signifi ed. Evidently, a p r e l i m i n a r y discussion should leave aside fully developed theori es about beings and their principles : this, I beli eve, is the sense of Porphyry’s caveat at I s a g. 1, 7 ff. This, however, does not entail that Porphyry’s logical discussions are philosophically neutral : what comes first in the order of learning is not ‘neutral’, but merely more elementary ; ontology (as I will argue) is not absent, but rather latent in Poprhyry’s Isagoge and I n C at . : both works provide an introductory, general and simplified treatment of questions, the signifi cance of which can fully be appreciated in a wider context involving ontological and psychological doctrines. If we consider such preliminary discussions i n i so l at i o n , we may well gain the impression that logic and ontology are two mutually independent disciplines. Porphyry, however, certainly does not encourage us to do so ; rather, he points out that hi s logical discussions are partial and preliminary: Porphyry never suggests that we should isolate such introductions from what comes later in the order of learning, and regard them as neutral and complete in themselves. Porphyry rather suggests the opposite : that in order to gain a comprehensive picture of what he is focusing on in the ‘logical’ writings, one should look elsewhere:

P ORPH ., I n C at . , 58, 12-14 : eij ~ dev k a toiv n un genika; ~ diafora; ~ perilhfqev n twn tw' n o[ n twn dev k a kai; aiJ dhlou' s ai tau' t a fwnai; gegov n asi kata; gev n h kai; auj t ai; perilhfqei' s ai . Trans. Strange. 22 B . aims to distinguish Porphyry’s account of predication fr om his semantics : « … although the Porphyrean account of predication was conceived and presented in terms of a certain set of semantic ideas, and although these ideas — whether or not they are Aristotelian — are indeed laughably inept, nonetheless the account of predication is in fact independent of the ideas. After all, the account amounts […] to no more than thi s : predicates are a sort of significant expression. To that you may attach whatever theory of signification pleases you — or no theory at all » (B ARNES , T r u t h [completa], Clarendon Press, Oxford 2007, pp. 116-117). I disagree with thi s approach (and with the presentation of Porphyry’s semantics in i b i d . : « The thought or concept ( scil . of animal) fortunately resembles animals or an animal. And so the word ‘animal’ signifies, deri vatively, animals »). 21

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« What does it mean when you say that uni versals are said ( scil . of a subject) and accidents are (scil . in a subject) ? The matter i s deep and too large for your capaciti es ; for someone with the capacities of a beginner cannot know that accidents, like substances, are, whereas uni versals are not i n existence but are merely said and are in thought. So let these things be left aside »23 .

It is extremely important to grasp the difference between (i) «leaving something aside » (temporarily and for pedagogical reasons) and (ii) « being neutral with respect to a thing ». I n Porphyry’s Isagoge and I n C at . there is no trace of (i i) as a characteri sation of the status of logic : there is simply no hi nt in these works that elementary logic might be philosophically neutral. Porphyry’s logical discussion of universals in the Isagoge and in the short I n Ca t . is indeed a simplified discussion : Porphyry avoids engaging with more profound questions concerning the ontological status of general concepts, insofar as such matters are too difficult for beginners. Nevertheless, Porphyry’s enquiry here is by no means neutral with respect to his fully developed theories on universals and abstractions; rather, in his elementary writings, Porphyry provides a simplified and general treatment of questions which he only fully addresses elsewhere. B.’s assessment, therefore, should be reversed : the Isagoge and I n C at . are elementary works, and, as such, are c o m p a t i b l e with a philosophically neutral reading ; but while the Isagoge is an elementary work, it is not — and never was designed to be — a philosophically neutral treatise. Any opposition between Porphyry L and Porphyry P, therefore, is unfounded. Further evidence, in this respect, can be gained from the extant fragments, preserved in Simplicius, of Porphyry’s long commentary on Categories Ad G e d a l i u m . Suppose that Porphyry really did conceive of logic as a philosophically and metaphysically neutral discipline : the difference between an elementary and a complex logical work, then, would simply lie in their degree of logical complexity. I t’s rather different, however : for the surviving fragments of Porphyry’s commentary include detailed discussions on physical beings and their principles 24 . In other words, Porphyry’s great commentary on the Categories did not eschew the ‘profound’ ontological questions that Porphyry choseto avoid in his elementary works. Accordingly, if such detailed discussions do not feature in the Isagoge and in the short I n C at . , this is for merely pedagogical reasons which have nothing to do with the ‘ontological neutrality of logic’. A couple of examples should suffi ce to make this point clearer. P ORPH ., I n C at . , 75, 25-29 : tiv ga; r bouv l etai to; ta; me; n lev g esqai fav n ai se, ta; de; sumbebhkov t a

23

ei\ n ai… baqu; ~ oJ lov g o~ kai; meiv z wn th' ~ sh' ~ e{ x e w~: o{ t i ga; r ta; me; n sumbebhkov t a ej s ti ; n w{ s per kai; aiJ ouj s iv a i, ta; de; kaqov l ou ti lev g esqai ouj k e[ s tin ej n uJ p av r xei, aj l la; mev c ri ej p inoiv a ~ lev g etai, ouj k e[ s ti th' ~ tw' n eij s agomev n wn e{ x ew~ gnw' n ai. tau' t a me; n ou\ n pareiv s qw . Trans. in B., p. 37. 24 Cf. P ORPH . a p u d S I M P L ., I n C at . , 48, 11-33 ; 78, 20-79, 5 ; 158, 27-33 =Frr. 55 ; 58 ; 67 Smith.

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At the beginning of the chapter on quality, Porphyry provides two reasons for the order chosen by Aristotle in his progressive discussion of quantity (ch. 6), relatives (ch. 7) and quality (ch. 8) in the Categories . The first reason is pedagogical : Aristotle’s treatment of quali ty foll ows that of relatives because many questions concerning relatives had previously emerged in his discussion on quantity. The second reason briefly (and somewhat cryptically) has to do with physical concepts: « And i ndeed, after magnitude, which is a quantity, and after the greater, which belongs to the relatives, there arise the affections, such as hot, cold, dry, and wet, which are qualifications »25 .

‘L ogical’ as it may be, Porphyry’s discussion in his short commentary on the Categories includes a fleeting reference to ontological notions. I nterestingly, Simplicius’ I n C at . provides further details on Porphyry’s treatment of this matter in the lost commentary Ad Gedaliu m : « But Por phyry wants to defend Ari stotle’s order. H e says that Quality has its ori gin i n a combination of Quantity and the Relative — just as others thought, especially Empedocles, who showed that qualities originate from the harmoni ous mixture of the elements. Plato too constituted form of such-andsuch a kind, which was determined in accordance with quality of such-andsuch a kind, both of the body and of the soul by means of the rations 3 :2, 2 :1, 4 :3, 9 :8 and other such rations whi ch are observed in the case of the quantiti es and in accordance with the relative» 26 .

Simplicius’ words here should be read alongside those of an important s c h o l i u m , published by Sten Ebbesen in 1987 27 , which describes Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Porphyry’s treatment of the relation between quantity, relatives and quantity. As the s c h o l i u m reveals, an allusion to Empedocles was already present in Alexander’s exegesis. The s c h o l i u m also presents PORPH ., I n C at ., 127, 7-9 : kai; ga; r dh; meta; to; mev g eqo~, o{ ej s ti poso v n , kai; meta; to; mei' z on, o{ ej s ti tw' n prov ~ ti, ej k fuv e tai ta; pav q h oi| o n qermov n , yucrov n , xhrov n , uJ g rov n , a{ ej s ti poiav . Trans. Strange. 26 SI M P L ., I n C at . , 158, 27-33 = P ORPH . Fr . 67 Smith, trans. B. F L E E T , S i m p l i c i u s . O n A r i s t ot l e Categori es 7-8 , Duckworth, London 2002. 27 Ms. Laurentianus Plut . 72, 15 (13th century), f. 22. Cf. S. E BBE SE N , Boethiu s as an A r i s t o t el i a n S c h o l a r , in J. W IE SNE R ed., A r i s t o t el es — W er k u n d W i r k u n g , vol. 2, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1987, pp. 286-311, p. 310 : « The most likely origin of the scholi um is a commentary on the Categories , and it looks very much as if Simplicius and the scholiast are actually reporting each one part of a passage from A d G ed a l i u m in which Porphyry related and discusses Alexander’s use of E mpedocles to support Ar istotle’s order of treating the categories ». 25

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Porphyry’s views on the matter, views which appear to constitute an expanded version of what is found in the short I n C at . : Porphyry here examines the distinctions that exist between prime matter without form, body without quality, three dimensionali ty (which belongs to quantity), the greater and the lesser (which belong to relatives) and qualities. What emerges, then, is the following picture: Alexander’s lost commentary I n C at . included a physical excursus on quantity, relative and quality in which Empedocles’ cosmology was invoked in defence of Aristotle’s order of categories. Porphyry employs Alexander’s exegesis in his lost commentary Ad Gedaliu m , which discusses physical notions such as ‘prime matter’ and ‘body without qualities’. The short I n C at . contains an abridged version of Porphyry’s argument 28 , which leaves out any allusion to E mpedocles and simplifies the treatment of physics (without suppressing it). The whole picture plainly contradicts the view according to which Porphyry’s short commentary on Ari stotle’s Categories is a work of elementary logic with no ontological import. Rather, one should give full weight to Porphyry’s assertion that Categories represents «an introduction to the physical part of philosophy […]. For substance, qualification, and so forth are the product of nature» 29 . The short I n C at . develops the relation between categories and physics in a general and introductory way. Yet the commentary shows no trace of ‘logic’ (as radically opposed to ontology) : as I shall come to discuss, Porphyry’s statement that Aristotle’s Categories does not focus on beings as such, but on words signifying things, is perfectly compatible with his emphasis on the import of the treatise from the point of view of physics. The Isagoge , however, is a more elementary work than the short I n C at . (according to Porphyry, the study of the ‘five items’ actually serves as an introduction to the study of categories — as well as of definitions, division and proof). Porphyry’s Isagoge , therefore, is more open than the short I n C at . to a philosophically neutral reading. However, further problems arise. It might be instructive to focus on Porphyry’s allusion to the priori ty of species at I s a g. , 17, 8-10: «Accidents subsist principally on individuals, whereas genera and species are prior by nature to individual substances» 30 . Three readings of this passage are possible: 1) Porphyry being a Platoni st, he is here On the relation between the two commentaries, cf. R. C HIARADONNA, Revi ew of C. L U N A , Simplicius. Commentaire sur l es ‘Catégories’ d’Aristote. Chapitres 2-4, Les Bell es Lettr es, Pari s 2001 , « E lenchos », 24, 2003, pp. 193-198. 29 P ORPH ., I n C a t ., 56, 29-31 : kai; mav l ista pro; tou' fusikou' a] n ei[ h mev r ou~ th' ~ filosofiv a ~ h] pro; tw' n topikw' n : fuv s ew~ ga; r e[ r gon ouj s iv a , poio; n kai; ta; o{ m oia . Trans. Strange. 30 P ORPH ., I s a g . , 17, 8-10 : kai; ta; me; n sumbebhkov t a ej p i; tw' n aj t ov m wn prohgoumev n w~ uJ f iv s tatai, ta; de; gev n h kai; ta; ei[ d h fuv s ei prov t era tw' n aj t ov m wn ouj s iw' n . 28

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alluding to the distinctively Platonic metaphysical doctrine according to which universal genera and species are intelligible, self subsistent entities ontologically prior to sensible particulars (this is Giuseppe Girgenti’s view) 31 ; 2) as the doctrine of priority of genera and species v s individuals is not exclusively Platonic (it was also embraced, among others, by Alexander of Aphrodisias, who takes it to be uncontroversial, and Aristotelian), Porphyry is here espousing a «commonplace truth » (B.’ reading of the passage runs along these lines) 32 ; 3) the doctrine that genera and species are prior to individuals neither refers to the ontological priority of intelligible Forms, nor to a commonplace truth : rather, Porphyry’s statement alludes (in the general fashion to be expected in an elementary work) to a distinctive ontological doctrine on the status of sensible entities and i n r e universals. This is an originally Peripatetic doctrine that Porphyry adapted to his own Platonic framework. E lsewhere I have argued in favour of this third view 33 : I will here limit myself to a few points. Porphyry’s statement in the Isagoge should be read alongside what he says regarding the priority of genera and species v s individuals in the short I n C at . Here Porphyry maintains that (i) if man is removed, Socrates is co-removed, whereas individuals do not co-remove their species : «For man exists when Socrates does not, but Socrates does not exist when man does not »34 ( i.e. genera and species are prior to individuals, as stated in the Isagoge ) ; (ii) Ari stotle is right in maintaini ng that individuals are prime substances prior to genera and species, since the primacy of individuals resides in them collectively rather than individually (the species m an would not exist if there were no individual man to instantiate it) ; (ii i) individuals are somehow causally responsible for the formation of the universal concepts which are predicated of them : « Y ou ought not to speak about a single man : you must recognise that indi vidual substance does not mean just one of the particulars, but rather all of the particular men, from whom we conceive the man that is predicated in common, and all the particular animals, through which we think the animal that is predicated in common. These are the cause of the being of the common G. G IRGE NTI , Porfi ri o. I sagoge , Testo greco a fronte, Versione latina di Boezio, Rusconi, M il ano 1995, p. 28. 32 Cf. B., p. 273. 33 Cf. R. C HIARADONNA , C o n c et t i gen er a l i , a st r a z i o n i e f o r m e i n P o r f i r i o , in C. E RISMANN éd., D e 31

la logiqu e àl’on tologie. Étu des sur la phi losophi e de Porphyre et son i nfl uence dur ant l ’Ant iqu it é tardi ve et l e hau t M oyen Âge , Vrin, Paris, forthcoming ; R. C HIARADONNA, P o r p h y r y ’ s V i e w s o n t h e I m m a n en t I n c o r p or ea l s , in G. K ARAMANOLIS , A. S HEPPARD eds., S t u d i es o n P o r p h y r y , BI CS Suppl.

98, Institute of Cl assical Studies, London 2007, pp. 35-49. 34 P ORPH ., I n C at . , 90, 19-20, trans. Strange.

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predicates. For it is not possible to think of ox or man or horse or animal in general apart fr om the particulars. But it is from the perception of parti culars that we come to conceive of the common predicate, whi ch we no l onger think as a ‘this’, but as a ‘such’, than i f the parti cular animals are eliminated, what is predicate in common of them wil l no longer exist either »35 .

This difficult passage has been the focus of much scholarly interest. According to Sten E bbesen, i t represents an un-Platonic, conceptualist and ‘logical’ account of the genesis of general concepts (« there cannot be a clash between Aristotelian logic and Platonic metaphysics as long as the logician works within the confines of his art ») 36 . B.’s reading of this passage is based on the «familiar story » according to which it is by perceiving individual cats that we come to form the concept of a cat : «Porphyry suggests that it i s these individual cats who are prior to the species : primacy lies not with Corneli us, not yet with the set of all cats, but with a privileged litter — the litter responsible for the formation of the concept of cat in general » 37 . As I have argued elsewhere, neither interpretation is truly persuasive. At I n C at ., 75, 2631 Porphyry points out that he will not dwell on the ‘profound’ thesis according to which, while accidents exist in the same way as substances, universals merely are ‘in thought’. I will leave Porphyry’s statement about accidents aside for the moment. I t is plainl y evident that the profound thesis about universals hinted to at I n C at . , 75, 26-31 coincides with the doctrine expounded in more detail at I n C at ., 90, 20-91, according to which universal genera and species have a ‘notional’ status ( mevcri ejpinoiva~ levgetai , I n C at ., 75, 28; ejpenohvqh , I n C at ., 90, 33; ejnohvsamen , I n C at ., 90, 34; dianoiva/ , I n C at ., 91, 3). All this is extremely significant : for at I n C at . 75 Porphyry presents his thesis on the conceptual genesis of universal concepts as neither a «familiar story » (pace B.) nor a logical theory opposed to metaphysical speculations about separate forms (pace Ebbesen). R ather, P orphyry argues that a complete treatment of post r em ‘conceptual’ universals exceeds the boundaries of any introductory and ‘logical’ discussion on ‘words signifying things’. As I see it, the reason for this must be sought in what Porphyry asserts elsewhere ( i .e . in PORPH ., I n C at ., 90, 30-91, 5 : dei' de; ouj k ej f ’ e J n o; ~ poiei' s qai to; n lov g on, aj l l ’ e u\ eij d ev n ai, o{ t i ouj k e[ s tin a[ t omo~ ouj s iv a oJ ei| ~ tw' n kata; mev r o~ aj l l ’ oiJ kaq ’ e{ k aston a[ n qrwpoi pav n te~, ej x w| n kai; oJ koinh' / kathgorouv m eno~ a[ n qrwpo~ ej p enohv q h, kai; ta; kaq ∆e{ k aston zw' / a , di ’ a } to; koinh' / kathgorouv m enon ej n ohv s amen zw' / o n. a} dh; kai; ai[ t ia toi' ~ koinh' / kathgoroumev n oi~ ej s ti; tou' ei\ n ai: para; ga; r ta; kaq ’ e{ k aston ou[ t e bou' n ou[ t e a[ n qrwpon ou[ t e i{ p po n ou[ t e o{ l w~ e[ s ti noh' s ai zw' / o n. eij de; aj p o; th' ~ tw' n kaq ’ e{ k aston aij s qhv s ew~ ej p i; 35

to; koinh' / th' / dianoiv a / aj f iknouv m eqa, o{ p er ouj k ev t i tov d e ti noou' m en aj l la; toiov n de, eij ta; kaq ∆ e{ k aston aj n aireqh' / zw' / a , ouj k ev t i ouj d e; to; koinh' / kathgorouv m enon kat ’ auj t w' n e[ s tai . Trans. Strange. 36 Cf. E BBE SE N , Porph yry’s Legacy cit., p. 146.

B., p. 275.

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n o n - i n t r o d u c t o r y works such as the Sentences and the Comm ent ary on Ptolem y’s H a r m o n i c s ) concerni ng immanent incorporeal entities and their abstractions.

According to Porphyry, ‘concepts’ are abstractions of immanent incorporeal forms ‘torn off’ from matter and stored in the soul : « then it ( scil . imagination) stores the form in the soul. This is the concept »38 . Such incorporeal immanent entities do not exist independently from their sensible instantiations : according to Porphyry, they are only incorporeal insofar as they are notionally separated from bodi es (cf. Sent . 42, p. 53, 6-9 Lamberz). Accordingly, they are sharply distinguished from the status of ‘Platonic’, separate and incorporeal substances such as the soul and transcendent Forms. Porphyry’s statement, then, regarding the different ontological status of accidents and individual substances on the one hand, and of general concepts on the other ( I n C at . , 75, 26-31), becomes clear : accidents, as well as individual substances, exist in the world and are perceived as such (we are directly acquainted with individual substances, with their qualities, etc. etc.), whereas generalities are not the objects of any direct acquaintance. The universal m an as such does not exist in the world ; rather, the immanent nature m an is always instantiated by the individual men by means of whi ch it is perceived : the (universal) essence as such is only grasped v i a the process of abstraction. The ‘conception’ resulti ng from this process of abstraction is the form, that exists in particulars, in so far as this form is separated from matter by the soul. Porphyry’s assertions regarding the status of genera and species in the Isagoge and in I n C at . , therefore, might be viewed as partial, elementary and simplified versions of this doctrine, the complete significance of which emerges elsewhere (i.e. in Porphyry’s non-introductory writings). Furthermore, Porphyry’s doctrine of immanent abstractable natures, as can be traced in his extant writings, runs along the lines of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ theory of abstractable forms39 . This is neither a commonplace truth nor a theory bereft

P ORPH ., I n P t o l . H a r m ., 14, 2-3 Düri ng : tov t e aj p ev q eto ej n th' / yuch' / to; ei\ d o~. kai; tou' t o h\ n hJ e[ n noia (trans. Tarrant). On Porphyry’s theory of knowledge in I n P t ol . H a r m ., cf. I. M U E L L E R , A r i s t o t l e’ s d oc t r i n e o f a b st r a c t i o n i n t h e Co m m en t a t o r s , in S O RABJI , A r i s t o t l e T r a n s f o r m ed cit., pp. 463-480, p. 479 ; H . T ARRANT , T h r a s y l l a n P l a t o n i s m , Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 1993, pp. 120-131, G. K ARAMANOLIS , P l a t o a n d A r i s t o t l e i n A gr eem en t ? P l a t o n i s t s o n A r i s t o t l e f r o m A n t i o c h u s t o P or p h y r y , Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006, pp. 316-317. Further details in C HIARADONNA , Concetti general i cit. ; I D ., P o r p h y r y ’ s v i ew s cit. ; I D ., Platoni smo e teori a della con oscenza stoica t r a I I e I I I s ec o l o d .C . , in M. B ONAZZI , C. H E L M I G eds., P l a t o n i c S t o i c i s m / St o i c P l a t o n i s m , Peeters, L euven 2007, pp. 209-242 (excursus P o r f i r i o e i l c r i t er i o ) . 39 See esp. Alexander’s much debated Quaest . I 3, p. 7, 20-8, 28 ; I 11a, p. 21, 12-22, 20 ; I 11 b, p. 22, 21-24, 22 Bruns. On Al exander’s views on essences and uni versals, cf. (among several contributions) M. T WE E DALE , Alexander of Aphrodi sias’ Vi ew s on Un iv ersals , « Phronesis », 24, 1984, pp. 279-303 ; R. W. S HARPLE S , Alexander of Aphr odisi as. Quaestion es 1.1-2.15 , Translated by ei\d o~ o u d u gev n o~ ent re R. W . Sharples, Duckworth, L ondon 1992 ; M. R ASHED , Pri ori téde l’ 38

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of ontological significance ; rather, i t is a theory which regards the status of physical entities, their immanent principles and their abstractions. I am inclined to believe that Porphyry deri ved such a doctrine from the Peripatetic tradition and fitted it to his Platonic framework. In his elementary writings, Porphyry provides a partial, highly simplified version of the doctrine ; however, he also explicitly points out that more remains to be said on the matter. A further example pertains to the vexata qu aestio of Porphyry’s Stoicism in the Isagoge . Specialists have sometimes detected the presence of distinctively Stoic theori es in the Isagoge 40 . While B. does not deny that Porphyry may have adopted various Stoic notions and doctrines, he strongly opposes any suggestion that there might be traces of Stoicism in Porphyry’s most elementary treatise : « Here and there scholars have detected, say, a Stoic term and inferred a Stoic influence. The inference is always invali d, and the detective work usually amateur : some of the words which Porphyry uses had perhaps been introduced into the philosophical domain by Stoic thinkers for Stoic ends ; but by Porphyry’s day such immigrants had been thoroughly integrated, their remote origin forgotten »41 . B. often proves successful in his attempt to reject specific claims of Stoic influence in Porphyry’s Isagoge ; his arguments, however, are not always convincing. At Isag ., 7, 19-24 Porphyry presents his famous theory of individual predicates. The passage is a difficult and controversial one 42 ; yet it may safely be inferred that Porphyry conceives of each individual as being composed of a uni que assemblage of proper features ( a[ q roisma ij d iothv t wn ). There appears to be an overlap between Porphyry’s theory and the Stoic ij d iv w ~ poiov n ; however, B . rejects such conclusion : « The two theories have their similarities. But the Stoic theory makes no mention of sets of proper features, and it concerns not individual predicates but proper names. Porphyry is not simply reporting the Stoi c theory ; and there is no cause to suppose that his theory An dr on i cos et Alexan dr e. Vesti ges arab es et grecs in é di ts , « Arabic Sciences and Philosophy », 14, 2004, pp. 9-63 ; R. S HARPLE S , Alexander of Aphrodi sias on Un iv ersals. Tw o Problem ati c Texts ,

« Phr onesis », 50, 2005, pp. 43-55. F or the parallel between Alexander and Porphyry, cf. S TR AN GE , P l o t i n u s , P o r p h y r y cit., p. 962 n. 28 ; L. P. G ERSON , A r i s t o t l e a n d o t h e r P l a t o n i s t s , Cornell Uni versity Press, Ithaca (NY ) 2005, p. 85 ; R. S O RABJI , The Phi losophy of the Com m ent ators, 200- 600 AD. A Sou rcebook , II I, L o g i c a n d M et a p h y si c s , Cornell U niversity Press, I thaca (NY ) 2005, pp. 130 and 157. Further detail s in C HIARADONNA, Concetti general i cit. 40 P . H ADOT , P o r p h y r e et V i c t o r i n u s , vol. 1, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1968, p. 232 n. 6 characterises the I s a g o g e as « un extraordin air e mélange de noti ons platoni ciennes, aristotélici ennes et stoïciennes » ; see also D E L I B E R A, Porph yre. I sagoge cit., pp. XXVI I -XXX . 41 B., p. XI X. 42 On the Greek text, cf. B., p. 150 and F. A DE MO LLO , S o p h r o n i s c u s ’ so n i s a p pr o a c h i n g : Porph yry, I sagoge 7.20-1 , « The Classical Quarterly », 54, 2004, pp. 322-325.

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was elaborated on the basis of the Stoic theory »43 . While I fully agree with B.’s first assertion — that Porphyry is not simply quoting a Stoic doctrine —, I believe that there are very good reasons to suppose that Porphyry did take into account the Stoic theory of individuals. I will further attempt to elucidate this point by following a li ne of reasoning similar to the one I previously adopted. Porphyry’s elementary writings provide a partial and simplified version of theories which Porphyry expounds elsewhere ( i.e. in his non-introductory works) in detail. Both in the Isagoge and in the short I n C at . Porphyry regards individuals as combinations ( a[qroisma , Isag ., 7, 22; sundromhv , I n C at . , 129, 10) of proper features or qualities. In neither instance does Porphyry ever mention the Stoics ; besides, as B. correctly notes, Porphyry’s doctrine significantly differs from Stoic ijdivw~ poiovn . Porphyry, however, certainly took account of the Stoic notion of quality in his lost commentary on Aristotle’s Categories : Simplicius records Porphyry’s response to an aporia put forward by L ucius : « I n response to this problem Porphyry said, “Subject is twofold, not onl y according to the Stoics, but also accordi ng to the earlier phi losophers. For the qualityless matter, which Aristotle called body in potentiality, is the first meaning of subject, and secondly, what subsists commonly or peculiarly qualified ( o} koinw' ~ poio; n h] ij d iv w ~ uJ f iv s tatai )” »44 .

Porphyry, then, fitted Aristoteli an and Stoic notions about matter, qualities and ‘subjects’ within a single doctrinal framework. Not only did he adopt current terms of Stoic origin, terms that by Porphyry’s day were bereft of distinctive philosophical connotations ; but, at least in some cases, he also consciously made use of Stoic theories in his exegesis of Ari stotle’s Categories (cf. S I M P L ., I n C at . , 2, 8). The passage quoted above suggests that Porphyry integrated Aristotle’s theory of substance and the Stoic theory of matter and quality — the individual substance of Ari stotle’s Categories being conceived, then, as « what subsists […] peculiarly qualified ». While this passage does not focus on individual predicates, it may safely be inferred that Porphyry’s theory of i ndividuals as combinations of properties originated in this doctrinal context45 . Again, the Isagoge and the short I n C at . provide an elementary version of Porphyry’s theory of individually qualified substance; a more complete version of the theory was probably contained in the lost commentary Ad Gedaliu m , which clarified Porphyry’s allusion to Stoicism. B., p. 316. 44 S I M P L ., I n C at ., 48, 11-15 = Fr. 55 Smith. Tr ans. by F. A. J . de Haas, in S ORABJI , T h e Phi losophy of the Comm ent ators, 200-600 AD. A Sourcebook , III cit., p. 115. 45 Cf. R. C HIARADONNA, L a t eo r i a d el l ’ i n d i v i d u o i n P o r f i r i o e l ’ i j d iv w ~ poiov n s t o i c o , « E lenchos » , 21, 2000, pp. 303-331. 43

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Porphyry adapts (and thereby modifies) a Stoic doctrine to fit a different (and in ou r eyes largely incompatible) philosophical framework (a basically Peripatetic analysis of sensible substances). B. posits a radical alternative: either (i) Porphyry is quoting a Stoic theory without any alterations, or (ii) he is simply ignoring Stoicism. By ruling out (i), B . infers (ii ). B.’s is certainly an elegant procedure, but also a n o n s eq u i t u r : what we know about the reception of Stoic theori es among imperi al and late antique authors often contradicts the positing of any such radical alternative46 . Indeed, countless instances are known in which Stoic terms are adopted without any trace of their original philosophical meaning ; but in many cases Stoic theories are neither faithfully reported nor ignored. Rather, such doctrines are integrated in a different philosophical framework : they are adapted and ‘misunderstood’ ; in turn, Stoic thought alters those doctrines by which it i s assimilated. B.’s scheme fails to grasp the subtleties of such a complex process of interaction. The very notion of a « philosophical l i n gu a f r a n c a » is highly controversial. The fact, for instance, that the same term or argument occurs in Porphyry and in Galen, Sextus, Alexander and Grammatical texts does not in itself prove that was not employed by Porphyry in a distinctive philosophical manner. Some interpreters have sought to infer philosophical influences from terminology. Whil e B. is correct in rejecting a similar approach, his alternative hypothesis (that Por phyry adopted a neutral l i n gu a f r an c a in which terms and arguments — whatever their origin may have been — had lost their distinctive phil osophical connotation) is equally unconvincing. It is certainly wrong to posit Stoic influences on the mere basis of terms li ke uJ p ov s tasi~. Yet the situation may vary : the mere fact that a commonly shared phil osophical terminology existed does not imply that different authors (or the same author in different contexts) a l w a y s made a use of a neutral l i n gu a fr a n c a 47 . Rather, one should seek to detect if (and where) current terms and arguments are used in a philosophically distinctive way (and ascertain just what that way might be). At Isag ., 1, 10-11 for example, Porphyry raises the question of whether genera and species subsist, or whether they depend on thought alone ( ei[ t e uJ f ev s thken ei[ t e kai; ej n mov n ai~ yilai' ~ ej p inoiv a i~ kei' t ai ). B. points out that ej p iv n oia is a quotidian term : the additi on of ‘bare’ and ‘alone’ is merely pleonastic and does not create a technical formula48 . ej p iv n oia is a famil iar term, employed by Cf. C HIARADONNA, Platoni smo e teori a della con oscenza stoica cit. A. A. Long’s remarks on the philosophical l i n gu a f r a n c a of Imperial philosophy are more nuanced, cf. A. A. L ON G , Ptolem y ‘On th e Criterion ’. An E pistem ology for the Practisin g Scientist , in J . M . D ILLO N , A. A L ON G eds., The Questi on of “Eclectici sm”. Studi es in Later Greek Phi losophy , Uni versity of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1988, pp. 176-207, esp. pp. 182-183. 48 Cf. B., pp. 40-41. 46 47

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authors of all kinds. While this is undoubtedly true, it does not rule out that ej p iv n oia and cognate (quotidian) expressions may be used by Porphyry in a distinctive philosophical sense. Porphyry employs ej p inoei' n and e[ n noia in order to designate the mental abstraction of an immanent incorporeal entity (I n P t ol . H a r m . , 14, 3 Düring; Sent . 42, p. 53, 2-3 Lamberz). Evidently, this does not imply that Por phyry always bestows the two terms with this specific philosophical meaning49 . However, ej p iv n oia v el si m i l i a might possess a ‘non quotidian’ meaning of this kind in p h i l o so p h i c a l l y si m i l a r contexts, such as P ORPH ., I n C a t . 75, 26-31 and 90, 30-91, 5. Indeed, I believe that this is the case: for in the above passages Porphyry is not alluding to quotidian or commonplace ideas. Rather, Porphyry is here seeking to provide an elementary account of a philosophically distinctive argument : that universal genera and species are immanent natures ‘thought of’ as universal when the soul extracts them from matter. Accordingly, the expression «bare thoughts alone» at Isag. , 1, 10-11 is not a mere pleonasm : as I see it, the addition of mov n ai~ and yilai' ~ serves to distinguish what depends on thought alone ( e.g. the chimera, or Stoic universals) from mental concepts with an objective correlatum , such as the e[ n noia of in P t ol H a r m ., 14, 3 Düring or the result of the act of ej p inoei' n at Sent . 42, p. 53, 2-3 Lamberz. At Isag ., 1, 10-11 Porphyry, then, is here raising the question of whether genera and species subsist (whatever the form of their subsistence may be) or are mere mental fictions (like Stoic universals) 50 . I do not venture to say that ej p iv n oia and yilh; ej p iv n oia acquire a technical meaning in the passage in question 51 ; yet — the elementary and simplified character of Porphyry’s allusion notwithstanding — I would definitely resist the conclusion that their use is necessarily neutral, commonplace, familiar and quotidian. I nstead of pili ng up example on example, I would li ke to address a further crucial problem : B. (like Ebbesen before him) accords a paramount importance to the absence of any explicit allusion to ‘Platonic’ an te rem forms in the Isagoge . Porphyry was a Platonist ; as such, he might be expected to i dentify To take an extreme example : ‘one’ is a quotidian term, but this does not prevent it from acquiri ng a distinctive philosophical meaning in Ploti nus’ E n n e a d s , where it designates the fi rst pri nciple. Obviously, thi s does not entail that Plotinus exclusively employs the term ‘one’ in the above sense. 50 Cf. S T OB ., I , 136, 21-137, 6 (SV F I 65) ; DI OG . L AËRT ., VI I 60-61. See A. A. L ON G, D. N. S E D L E Y , The H elleni stic Phil osophers , Universi ty Press, Cambridge 1987, pp. 179-183 (= L .-S. 30 A-I ). Cf. A. B RONOWSKI , T h e St o i c V i ew o n U n i v er s l a s , « Documenti e studi sulla tradizi one fil osofica medievale », 18, 2007, pp. 71-87. 51 Accordingly, I agree with B.’s criticism of my old (and now outdated) article E ssence et pr é di cati on chez Porph yre et Plo ti n , « Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques », 82, 1998, pp. 577-606 : cf. B., p. 40 n. 74. 49

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genera and species with transcendent ideas. Y et the Isagoge does not mention ideas, and Porphyry’s short I n C at . expressly states that intelligible substances fall outside the scope of inquiry of Categories (which focuses on words signifying things and not on things as such) 52 . This apparently leads to conclude that Porphyry’s elementary logical works are metaphysically neutral : that they belong to Porphyry L and have no connection with Porphyry P. B. forcefully (and in my view successfully) argues against reading an te rem forms into some passages from the Isagoge . So for instance, B. suggests that despite the explicit mention of Pl ato at I s a g. , 6, 14, the ‘common man’ alluded to at Isag ., 6, 21-22 is not directly to be identified with the transcendent idea of man. No clear allusion to the intelligible metaphysical status of the ‘common man’ is here to be found ; and the term metousiva at I s a g. , 6, 21 does not in itself convey the Platonic notion of participation between different degrees of reality53 . As noted above, the same holds true for the passage on the pri ori ty of genera and species v s individuals at I s a g. , 17, 8-10. Does this mean that the Isagoge is a neutral, ontologically empty treatise bereft of any connection wi th Porphyry’s Platonism ? I n my view, the answer to the question is definitely ‘no’. At I s a g. , 6, 13-23 Porphyry presents a synthetic sketch of Plato’s division ; just before these li nes ( Isag. , 5, 23-6, 5) he explains that each single genus mirrors the structure of a genealogy in whi ch the su m m u m gen u s plays the role of origin ( a b u n o relation). As I argued elsewhere, such theories are not philosophically neutral : rather, they play a crucial role in M iddle and Neo-Platonic accounts of the hierarchy of beings 54 . This does not imply that one should detect a direct allusion to the Platonic scala en ti s in the above mentioned lines from the Isagoge : for Porphyry never mentions ideas in this passage, and nothi ng suggests that the ‘common man’ here is identical to the transcendent idea of man (on the contrary, much evidence would lead to the opposite conclusion). The least one can say, however, is that Platonism cannot easily be suppressed from a Porphyrian passage that explicitly mentions Plato. What I suggest is that Porphyry’s remarks on genealogical genera and Cf. P ORPH ., I n C at . , 91, 19-27. Cf. B., pp. 137-138. 54 F or a particularly close reference, cf. E n n . VI 1 [42], 3, 3-5 : cf. R. C HIARADONNA , Sostanza m o v i m en t o a n a l o gi a . Pl o t i n o c r i t i c o di A r i s t o t el e , Bibl ipol is, N apoli 2002, pp. 227-271. See the overview in J . M ANSFE LD, H eresiography i n Cont ext. H yppoli tu s’ ‘El ench os’ as a Source for Greek P h i l o s o p h y , Brill, Leiden 1992, pp. 78-109. I s a g. , 6, 13-23 may provide a hint of Porphyry’s treatment of division in his lost commentary on Plato’s S o p h i s t : cf. B OETH ., D e D i v ., 876D = P ORPH ., fr. 169 Smith. Cf. P. M ORAUX , D e r A r i s t o t el i s m u s b ei d en G r i e ch en v o n A n d r o n i k o s b i s A l ex a n d er v o n A p h r o d i s i a s , I, Di e Renai ssance des Aristotelism us im I . Jh. v. Chr. , De Gruyter, Berlin-N ew Y ork 1973, pp. 120-131 ; J . M AGEE , A n i c i i M a n l i i S ev er i n i B o et h i i ‘ D e d i v i s i o n e l i b e r ’ , Critical Edition, Translation, Prolegomena, and Commentary, Brill, Leiden 1998, pp. 000-000. 52 53

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division at Isag ., 6 represent a partial and introductory account of doctrines which can only fully be appreciated in the wider framework of the Platonic hierarchy of beings 55 . Evidently enough, Porphyry does not render the metaphysical background of his short account explicit : for the Isagoge is not a treatise on division, but an elementary treatise on notions that are useful for the study of division (among other things). This, however, does not imply the absence of an underlying metaphysical background : nothing suggests that Porphyry is aiming to strip the theori es he is examini ng in these li nes of the Isagoge of all ontological significance. While, for the sake of simplicity, Porphyry disregards the ontological framework behind such theories, this has nothing to do with the supposed philosophical neutrality of such theories with respect to Platonism. To sum up : it is certainly true (as B. has bri lliantly proven) that the common items which Porphyry mentions in the Isagoge are not Platonic forms ; yet this does not imply that such notions are philosophically neutral and ontologically empty. Besides, according to (Neo)Platonic ontology, Forms are neither universal nor ‘common’ 56 (at least not primarily) : whi le B. acknowledges this fact 57 , at the same time he implies that the absence of any direct connection between common items and transcendent Forms in the Isagoge is revealing of the ontological neutrali ty of the work. I disagree with B.’s conclusion : I beli eve that whil e it is true that common items are not identical with an te rem forms, this does not entail that common items are philosophically and ontologically neutral ; rather, common items have a different ontological status, the analysis of which is one of the aims of Porphyry’s Platonic philosophy (although a different aim from the study of transcendent entities). There is more to Neoplatonic ontology ( ontologies would be more correct) than what modern critics would usually admit, for Neoplatonic ontology extends down to the physical world — one should recall that Porphyry’s P l a t o n i c metaphysics include both transcendent and immanent (or ‘physical’) incorporeal entities. According to Porphyry, words stand for (‘signify’) sensible objects ; general terms stand for general concepts that depend on sensible objects. In his non-elementary works, Porphyry discusses the nature of this relation ( i .e . the ontological basis of his semantics) : our Cf. R. C HIARADONNA, P o r p h y r y an d I a m b l i c h u s o n U n i v e r sa l s a n d S yn o n y m o u s P r ed i c a t i o n , « Documenti e studi sulla tradizi one filosofica medievale », 18, 2007, pp. 123-140. 56 On the distinction between intelligible Forms and universals in Neoplatonism, cf. R. S ORABJI , U n i v er s a l s T r a n sf o r m ed : T h e F i r s t T h o u s an d Y ea r s A f t er P l a t o , in P. F. S T RA WS ON , A. C HAKRABARTI eds., Un iv ersals, Concepts And Qu ali ti es : New E ssays on th e M eani ng of Predicates , Ashgate, Aldeshot 2006, pp. 105-125. 57 Cf. B., p. 139. 55

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(discursive) general concepts, Porphyry argues, are post r em abstractions of immanent forms. Again, Porphyry’s claim that intelligible substances lie outside the scope of language (as stated at I n C at . , 91, 19-27) and discursive reasoning, is perfectly Neoplatonic : there is nothing ‘un-Platonic’ or ‘aPlatonic’ in Porphyry’s reasoning here. The ontology behind uni versal genera and species in Porphyry L, then, coincides not with the Porphyrian metaphysics of transcendent forms, but with the Porphyrian (physical) ontology of immanent forms. As noted above, Porphyry regards the Categories as a text specifically aimed at preparing for the physical part of phi losophy ; furthermore, what we know of Porphyry’s lost longer commentary A d G ed a l i u m confirms the impression that Porphyry made much use of physical doctrines in his interpretation of the Categories . Y et Porphyry’s physical ontology is part of hi s Platonism : accordingly, Porphyry L is by no means separate from Porphyry P. 2. P ORPHYRY ’S

SE T OF QUESTIONS : WHAT DOES P ORPHYRY ’S I S A G O G E PREPARE FOR

?

The problem (a) raised above can now be addressed : what is the sense of Porphyry’s set of questions at I s a g. , 1, 9-12 ? Porphyry puts forward his list in order to make clear what kind of questions he is not going to answer. As B. puts it, « He mentions one of the banished problems »58 . I nstead of addressing such issues, Porphyry aims to show how the old masters (and the Peri patetics in particular) engaged with genera and species ‘logically’, as well as with other issues discussed in the treatise. Specialists have at times made too much of Porphyry’s li st in the attempt to detect vari ous technicali ties in his set of questions. B. forcefully rejects such conclusions, and convincingly refutes the idea that Porphyry’s list represents a series of answers to a specifi c question (the ‘problem of uni versals’). Rather, B. suggests that Porphyry’s li st «is a rough map of an area which Porphyry will not explore» 59 . While B.’s pars destru en s is compelling, his pars constru ens proves unpersuasive. H owever rough it may be, Porphyry’s map is neither random nor devoid of any connection ( pace B., p. 49: « some may wonder i f Porphyry raised a problem or rather a dust »). Despite B.’s doubts, internal connections can be traced in Porphyry’s catalogue of questions. Certainl y, Porphyry does not render all connections between his three sets of questions pedantically explicit. In the Isagoge one finds no interrogation of the kind : ‘Do genera and species subsist or depend on things ? If they subsist, are they bodies or incorporeal ? If they are B., p. 38. B., p. 39.

58

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incorporeal, are they separable or found i n perceptible items ?’60 . Yet, pace B., it is clear that this must be the connection between Porphyry’s set of questions : the link between the first and second set, in particular, is signalled by uJ f esthkov t a at Isag. , 1, 11 ; as for the third pair, the fact that Porphyry might here be alluding to incorporeal entities, while never expressly stated, clearly emerges from the context. By contrast, B. r emarks that some ancient authors regarded features and qualities as bodies61 . Porphyry, however, is not dealing with qualities, but with genera and species. Indeed, the Stoics conceived of qualiti es as bodies, but this has littl e to do with Porphyry’s quest ; as for Stoic universals, what best describes their status in P orphyry’s li st of questions is the formula «bare thoughts alone» at I s a g. , 1, 10-11. Moreover, it seems highly i mplausible for Porphyry’s catalogue to include some kind of enigmatic ‘bodily genera and species’ whi ch should either be separable or exist « in perceptible items and around them ». The syntax of these lines further suggests that Porphyry’s third pair of questions is subordinate to ajswvmata in the second pair. The syntactical structure of this passage is as follows : (I) the first pair of questions draws an opposition between subsisting items and bare thoughts alone; (I I ) the second pair is subordinate to; uJfevsthken , i.e. the first and more remote item of the first pair : this would not be clear, had Porphyry not added uJ f esthkov t a at 1, 11; (III) the third pair is subordinate to aj s wv m ata , i.e. to the second and closer item of the second pair : as this subordination plainly emerges from the context itself, Porphyry had no need to render it explicit as in the case of the second pair. B.’s doubts, therefore, are unwarranted. Porphyry’s list of questions can be seen to provide a catalogue of 4 modes of being: bare thoughts alone, bodies, separable incorporeals and immanent incorporeals. For the sake of simplici ty, Porphyry avoids discussing which of these four modes of being reflects the status of genera and species. What is the overall purpose of Porphyry’s li st of questions ? The answer to this problem, in my view, is straightforward : the li st provides a preliminary (but by no means obscure or allusive) map of Porphyry’s ontology, which includes transcendent incorporeals, immanent incorporeals (along with their abstractions, e[ n noiai or ej p iv n oiai ), and bodies (cf. Sent . 1, 2, 3, 19 and 42) 62 . B., p. 44 correctly remarks that the two clauses ej n toi' ~ aij s qhtoi' ~ kai; peri; tau' t a at I s a g. 1, 12 are « two expressions for the same thing ». 61 Cf. B., p. 45. 62 R. Goulet in L . B RISSON E T ALII éd., Porph yre. Sent ences , É tudes d’intr oduction, texte grec et traduction française, commentaire, I I , Vrin, Pari s 2005, p. 504 ( ad Sent . 19, p. 10, 6 L amberz) notes the connection between Porphyry’s set of questions at I s a g. , 1 and the classification of incor poreal entiti es at Sent . 19. For an overall account of P orphyry’s ontology and metaphysics, cf. M.-O. G O ULE T -C AZÉ , L. B RISSON , Le systèm e phi losoph i qu e de Porp hyr e dans l es ‘Sent ences’ , in B RISSON , Porph yre. Sent ences cit., I , pp. 31-138. 60

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Fictional thoughts ( yilai; ej p iv n oiai ), I believe, are added to this catalogue for the sake of completeness (before asking what ki nd of subsisting items genera and species might be, it is necessary to envisage the possibility that they might not exist at all). Perhaps, fictional thoughts also feature in the list because a renowned philosophi cal school (that of the Stoi cs) maintained that (universal) genera and species were mere mental creations. Assuredly, no ‘problem of universals’ lies at the basis of Porphyry’s catalogue (although the later tradition read Porphyry’s list as a set of answers to such a problem) 63 . Porphyry’s list, however, certainly possesses a distinctive philosophical meaning and is not ‘mere dust’. Porphyry is here beginning an elementary treatise on a well-defined set of notions (genus, species, difference, property, accident). I n order to make it clear that his discussion wi ll be of an elementary and introductory sort, Porphyry explains, by way of example, that in naming genera and species his treatise will refrain from elucidating the nature of such objects. Porphyry also provides a list of possible solutions to the question of what genera and species might be; his list, therefore, is not a random one : it rather constitutes a short catalogue of modes of being which includes (in a preliminary and simplified, but by no means philosophically neutral way) Porphyry’s ‘map of reality’64 . But why should Porphyry choose to focus on these five items? This question leads to the title of the present paper : what is Porphyry’s Isagoge ? Why did Porphyry write this short treatise? And just what does the Isagoge prepare for ? It is worth quoting the opening lines of Porphyry’s treatise: « I t being necessary, Chri saorius, even for a schooling in Ari stotle’s predications, to know what is a genus and what a difference and what a species and what a property and what an accident — and also for the presentation of defi nitions, and generally for matters concerning division and proof, the study of whi ch is useful, — I shall attempt, in making you a concise introduction, to rehearse, bri efly and in the manner of an introduction, what the older masters say… »65 .

Cf. DE L I B E R A, Porp hyr e. I sagoge cit., pp. LXII-LXXV. If my interpretation proves correct, the traditional reading of Porphyry’s five items as « quinque voces » (for the history of which, cf. B., p. XI I n. 14 ; DE L I B E R A, Porph yre. I sagoge cit., pp. XL I I -XL II I ) is misleading. 65 P ORPH ., Isag. , 1, 1-8 : “Onto~ aj n agkaiv o u, Crusaov r ie, kai; eij ~ th; n tw' n para; ’Aristotev l ei 63 64

kathgoriw' n didas kaliv a n tou' gnw' n ai tiv gev n o~ kai; tiv diafora; tiv te ei\ d o~ kai; ti i[ d ion kai; tiv sumbebhkov ~ , ei[ ~ te th; n tw' n oJ r ismw' n aj p ov d osin kai; o{ l w~ eij ~ ta; peri; diairev s ew~ kai; aj p odeiv x ew~ crhsiv m h~ ou[ s h~ th' ~ touv t wn qewriv a ~, suv n tomov n soi parav d osin poiouv m eno~ peirav s omai dia; bracev w n w{ s per ej n eij s agwgh' ~ trov p w/ ta; para; toi' ~ presbutev r oi~ ej p elqei' n , tw' n me; n baqutev r wn aj p ecov m eno~ zhthmav t wn, tw' n d ’ aJ p loustev r wn summev t rw~ stocazov m eno~ .

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The text is not entirely clear : its syntax leaves some room for ambiguity. In quoting the text, I chose to follow B.’s translation 66 . Th;n tw'n para; ’Aristotevlei ., 1, 1-2 may either refer to Aristotle’s treatise kathgoriw'n didaskalivan at Isag Categories or to Aristotle’s theory of categories. From a certain point of view, this makes little difference: for «a schooling in Aristotle’s predications would no doubt take the form of a reading of Aristotle’s Predications» 67 . From a different point of view, however, the issue of whether Porphyry is here alluding to Aristotle’s treatise or not is significant : were Porphyry alluding to Aristotle’s Categories at the very beginning of the Isagoge , this would lend support to the hypothesis that Porphyry’s treatise is an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories . While no degree of certainty is possible in this regard, it seems to me that B. is right in suppressing the capital letter. Porphyry, after all, is here presenting a set of topics for the study of which his investigation on species, genera, difference, property and accident represents a necessary (or necessary and useful) background : Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, therefore, is listed as the first item of a set which also includes (the doctrines of) definition, division and proof. Since Antiquity, however, commentators have regarded the Isagoge as an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories . As noted above, B. correctly argues against such an interpretation 68 on the grounds that Porphyry portrays his own work as being propaedeutic to the study of logic : « Students of philosophy in late antiquity generally started with logic ; and students of Platonic philosophy started with Ari stoteli an logic — and so with Ari stotle’s Organon . […] Porphyry’s essay, written as an introduction to the study of logic, was thereby and introduction to phi losophy — and hence thereby an introduction to the Categories . But it is not an I nt rodu ction th e the Categori es »69 . While B.’s reading proves generally correct 70 , it remains unconvincing in certain (significant) respects. B.’s claim that « students of Platonic philosophy Cf. the excell ent discussion at B., p. 25. The syntactical pr oblems of these li nes, however, are irrelevant for the purposes of the present discussion. 67 B., p. 26. 68 Despite B.’s authoritative refutation, the traditional interpretation of the Isagoge still finds its champions : cf. S. B OBZIEN , A n c i e n t L o g i c , in T h e S t an f o r d E n c y c l o ped i a o f P h i l o s o ph y , Summer 2007 Edition, E. N. Z ALTA ed., UR L = : « Two of the commentators deserve special mention i n their own ri ght : Porphyry, for writing the Isagoge or I n t r o d u c t i o n (i.e. to Aristotle’s Categories ), in which he discusses the five notions of genus, species, differentia, property and accident as basic notions one needs to know to understand the Categories ». 69 B., p. XV. 70 On the Isagoge as an elementary introduction to logic (and, indirectly, to the whole of philosophy), cf. [E LIAS ], I n I s ag . , XXV I , 1-3 ; XX XV I I , 12 Westerink (cf. B., p. XVI ). Among mondern scholars, cf. C. E VANGELIOU , Ari stotle’s Doctri ne of Predicables and Porp hyry’s ‘I sagoge’ , « J ournal of the Hi story of P hilosophy », 23, 1985, pp. 15-34. 66

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started with Aristotle’s logic, and so with Aristotle’s Organon » might be true, but only of Platonist students after Porph yry . While later Neoplatonic schools adopted a well-codified school curriculum which included Aristotle’s treatises71 , the study of Aristotle’s O r g a n o n was definitely n o t part of a standard Platonic curriculum before the time of Porphyry 72 . What we know of the M iddle-Platonic reception of Ari stotle in no way suggests that students of Platonic schools started with Ari stotle’s O r g a n o n . Significantly, Porphyry appears to be the first Platonic commentator on Aristotle’s logical treatises (and on Aristotle’s treatises t o u t c o u r t ) 73 . Indeed, students of Peripatetic philosophy generally started with Aristotle’s Organon ; but again, this was neither a neutral nor a generally accepted practice before Porphyry’s time. L ittle is known about the study of logic i n M iddle Platonism ; some evidence can be found in Alcinous’ D i d a s k a l i k o s . The work contains an important section on ‘dialectic’ and its various parts ; signifi cantly, Alcinous’ lists are similar to Porphyry’s list in the Isagoge . In one passage, Alcinous mentions division, definition, induction and syllogism ( D i d ., 3, 153, 30-32) ; in another, division, definition, analysis, induction and syllogism ( D i d ., 5, 156, 31-33) 74 . Alcinous, however, does not regard Aristotle’s O r g a n o n as a guide for the study of logic. Alcinous’ treatment of logic is elementary and probably based on handbooks ; most significantly, Alcinous does not mention Ari stotle. The D i d a s k a l i k o s rather attributes the discovery of logical methods gori es , fasc. I, par I . H ADOT , P. H ADOT , P. Cf. I. H ADOT , Sim pli ci u s. Com m ent ai re su r l es Caté H OFFMANN , C. L UN A , Leiden, Brill 1990, pp. 21-47, 63-93 and, more recently, C. D’A NCONA , I l n eo p l a t o n i s m o a l e ss an d r i n o : a l c u n e l i n e e d el l a r i c er c a c o n t e m p o r a n e a , « Adamantius », 11, 2005, pp. 9-38. For the ongoing debate cf. the papers coll ected in C. D’A NCONA ed., T h e L i b r a r i es o f t h e N e o p l a t o n i s t s , Br ill, L eiden 2007. 72 Cf. D’A NCONA , N e o pl a t o n i s m o a l es sa n d r i n o cit., p. 23 : « Sia la presenza di Ari stotele nel curriculum tardo-neoplatonico […] sia la crescente elaborazione dei modi di accesso ai testi filosofici e scientifici autorevoli […] appaiono allo stori co come caratteri distintivi del pensiero post-plotiniano ». 73 Cf. G. K ARAMANOLIS , P o r p h y r y : T h e F i r s t P l a t o n i s t C om m en t a t o r o n A r i s t o t l e , in P. A DAMSON , H. B ALTUSSEN , M. W. F. S T ON E eds., Phil osophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabi c and L ati n C o m m e n t a r i e s , Bulletin of the I nstitute of Classical Studies Supplement 83.1., L ondon 2004, vol. 1, pp. 97-120. 74 F urther parallels in J . W H I T T A K E R , Alcinoos. Enseignement des doctrines de Platon , I ntroduction, texte établi et commenté par J . Whi ttaker, traduit par P. L ouis, L es Belles Lettres, Paris 1990, p. 80 n. 31 ; J . DI L L O N , A l c i n o u s . T h e H a n d b o o k o f P l a t o n i s m , Translated with an I ntroduction and Commentary, Clarendon Pr ess, Oxford 1993, pp. 58-59 ; 72-73. According to E LIAS , I n I s ag . , 36, 32-34, the Isagoge is useful for introducing student to (a) every branch of philosophy, (b) dialectical methods, and (c) the theories on categories developed by Aristotle and other phil osophers. Concerni ng this passage see E VANGELIOU , Ari stotle’s Doctri ne of Predicables and Por phyr y’s ‘I sagoge’ cit., p. 29. 71

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to Plato : an apparently wi despread beli ef that was also shared by Galen (who was not, at any rate stri cto sensu , a Platonist) 75 . Accordingly, Alcinous claims that Plato has outlined the ten categories in the Parmenides and elsewhere (D i d ., 6, 159, 43). Alcinous, therefore, knows about the doctrine of categories, but does not attribute it to Aristotle. The reception of Aristotle in imperi al Platoni sm before Porphyry is a complex matter 76 . On the whole, it might be argued that Aristotelian or Peripatetic doctrines were either (mostly tacitly) incorporated in Platonism or vehemently rejected. K nowledge of Aristotle’s treatises appears to have been limited77 . The situation radically changed with Plotinus and Porphyry. Plotinus has a solid knowledge of Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition : in his treatises, he constantly alludes to Peripatetic doctrines and makes an extensive use of Aristotle’s works. Plotinus’ attitude, however, was critical : as I argued elsewhere, Plotinus aimed to prove that Aristotle’s theories are wrought with problems and inner contradictions which can only be solved v i a the adoption of ‘Platonic’ philosophical tenets ( i.e. by turning to intelligible forms and their distinctive causality) 78 . Significantly, one of the most important targets of Plotinus’ polemics is the theory of categories ( E n n ., VI 1-3 [42-44]). At the opening of the Isagoge , therefore, Porphyry — pace Barnes — was not foll owing a standard practice of the Platonic school ; rather, he was laying the foundations of what became a Platonic school practice after him. Porphyry, it may be inferred, was also tacitly reacting against his master’s anti-Aristoteli an polemics. The difference between Porphyry’s attitude towards Aristotle and that of the previous Platonic tradition was already outli ned by Karl Praechter in his magisterial review of the C om m en t a r i a i n A r i s t o t el em Graeca . I t is worth quoting Praechter’s words : « From the fact that Plato on occasion made use of thi s or that form of argument, it was taken as proof that he had also established this form theoretically ; and in this manner they [ scil . the M iddle-Pl atonist authors, such Cf. A L C., D i d . , 6, 158, 17-18 and 39-40, 159, 43, etc. ; G ALE N , PH P , 9.9 = V.796-7 K . ; I n s t . L o g . 15, 10 =38, 1 ff. and 18, 2 = 45, 14ff. K albfleisch. Galen’s attitude, however, is far mor e complex (Galen also composed extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works). For an overview of Galen’s contributi ons to logic, cf. J . B ARNES , Galen on Logic and Therapy , in F. K UDLIE N , R. J. D URLING eds., G a l en ’ s M et h o d o f H ea l i n g , Br il l, L eiden 1991, pp. 50-102. 76 See G. K ARAMANOLIS , P l a t o a n d A r i s t o t l e i n A gr eem en t ? P l a t o n i s t s o n A r i s t o t l e f r o m A n t i o c h u s t o P o r p h y r y , Clarendon Presso, Oxford 2006. 77 Here I disagree with K ARAMANOLIS , P l a t o a n d A r i s t o t l e i n A g r eem en t ? cit. 78 Cf. C HIARADONNA, S o st a n z a m o v i m en t o a n a l o gi a cit. ; I D., P l o t i n o e l a c o r r e n t e an t i a r i s t o t el i c a d el p l a t o n i s m o i m p er i a l e : a n a l o g i e e d i f f e r en z e , in M. B ONAZZI , V. C E LLUPRICA eds., L’eredità p l a t o n i c a : St u d i s u l p l a t o n i s m o d a A r c es i l a o a P r o c l o , Bibliopolis, Napoli 2005, pp. 235-274. 75

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as the author of the D i d a s k a l i k o s ] succeeded, beginning with these few points, in claiming essentially all of Aristotle’s logic as Plato’s. It is with this that Porphyry broke. Now Aristotelian logic as such, and not covered in Platonic colours, formed the basis for the study of philosophy in the schools of the Neoplatonists as well, and thus the exegesis of Aristotle also came to hold an extremely important place in the Pl atonic school, whi ch it never lost »79 .

I do not wish to discuss the motivations (to my mind both philosophical and ideological) behind Porphyry’s attitude towards Aristotle 80 ; I only wish to single out some of the notable features of Porphyry’s Aristotelianism, in order to shed li ght on the first lines of the Isagoge . Porphyry i s a commentator of Aristotle’s treatises, and this suffices radically to distinguish his work on Aristotle from that of previous Platonists. Porphyry composed extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories , De in terpr etati one , Physics , etc.81 . It can safely be inferred that Porphyry aimed to integrate such treatises and their doctrines into his ‘universalizing’ Platonism 82 ; accordingly, it would be wrong to suggest that Porphyry’s integration of Aristotle into Platonism was limited to logic and that it entailed an ontological neutralisation of Aristotelian doctrine. Rather, Aristotle’s ontology was part of Porphyry’s inclusive Platonism, although Porphyry never suggested that Plato and Aristotle held the same views 83 . All this obviously implies a process of modification, simplifi cation, etc. Porphyry, nevertheless, appears to have been sober in his exegetical attempts, and never to have attempted to read ‘Platonic’ or ‘Pythagorean’ theories into those of Aristotle. Porphyry instead aimed to show that Platonism could ‘naturally’ integrate Aristotle’s doctrines. A fragment on principles surviving from Porphyry’s lost I n P h ys . aptly illustrates his attitude: Porphyry here points out that Aristotle had only considered the immanent form, while Plato had also postulated the separate form, thus establishing the ‘paradigmatic’ principle 84 . The most interesting example of K . P RAE CHTE R , Review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, « Byzantini sche Zeitschrift », 18, 1909, pp. 516-538, Engli sh translation i n S O RABJI , A r i s t o t l e T r a n s f o r m ed cit., pp. 31-54, esp. p. 35. 80 Cf. H. D. S AFFRE Y , Pou rq u oi Po rp hy re a-t-i l é di téPlo ti n ? Ré pon se pr ov i soi re , in L. B RISSON E T ALII , La Vie de Plotin , II, Vrin, Paris 1992, pp. 31-57, reprinted in H. D. S AFFRE Y , L e né op l at on i sm e apr ès Pl ot i n , Vrin, P aris 2000, pp. 3-26 . 81 Cf. the complete li st of Porphyry’s exegetical works on Ari stotle’s phil osophy in K ARAMANOLIS, P l a t o a n d A r i s t o t l e i n A g r eem en t ? cit., pp. 338-339. 82 On Porphyry’s ‘universalising’ Platonism, cf. D. J . O’M EARA , Pythagoras Revived. M athem atics a n d Ph i l o s op h y i n L a t e A n t i q u i t y , Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989, p. 27. 83 M ore details in K ARAMANOLIS , P l a t o a n d A r i s t o t l e i n A g r eem en t ? cit., pp. 245 ff. 84 P ORPH . a p u d SI M P L , I n P h ys . , 10, 32-11, 2 Diels = fr. 120 Smi th. Cf. K ARAMANOLIS , P l a t o a n d A r i s t o t l e i n A g r eem en t ? cit., pp. 272-273. Parall els in J . M ANSFE LD, Plato, Pythagoras, Ari stotle, the 79

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Porphyry’s attempt to integrate Aristotle and Plato (or, rather, Peripatetic and Platonist theories) is probably his epistemological excursus in the C o m m en t a r y o n P t o l em y ’s H a r m o n i c s : here an Aristotelising abstractionist theory of knowledge and science is described as being propaedeutic to the intellectual knowledge of true beings (which Porphyry describes by paraphrasing Plato’s Seven th L ett er ) ; furthermore, Porphyry’s account presents abstraction as the first step in the (‘Platonic’) process of recollection 85 . Nothing of this was completely new : already Alcinous, for instance, had conceived of ‘induction’ ( ej p agwghv ) as a means to awaken the inborn memory of transcendent ideas86 . Porphyry was indeed relying on a previous, prePlotinian method of blending Peri patetic tenets into Platonism ; yet Porphyry developed and refined previous exegetical tendencies: his harmonisation of Aristotle with P lato is based on a detailed acquaintance with both Ar istotle’s treatises and the Aristotelian commentary tradition. An endeavour of this kind was new in the Platonic tradition. The same holds true for Porphyry’s views on definitions, genera and species. C L E M . AL E X ., Strom ., VI I I records (Mi ddle-)Platonic school doctrines 87 , and includes an interesting allusion to the status of objects of definition : definitions are here said to pertain not to sensible things or ideas, but to universal concepts (C L E M . AL E X ., VI I I , 19, 2) which (as suggested by J aap Mansfeld) apparently derive from immanent forms 88 . Such a view appears strikingly similar to the Porphyrian doctrine according to which universal genera and species are post r em abstractions of immanent i ncorporeal natures. Porphyry, however, does not simply quote a school theory, but engages in a detailed exegesis of Aristotle’s Categories and Physics . In his I n Pt o l . H a r m . , Porphyry develops an elaborated account of definitions, and presents i n r e forms as the primary objects of the oJ r ismov ~ ; physical entities are here portrayed as the real correlatum of logical and epistemological notions. This is by no means a commonplace or neutral view ; and the Ari stoteli sing Peri pateti cs, the Stoics, and Th ales and hi s Follow ers “On Causes” (Ps.-Plu tarch us ‘Placit a’ I 11 a n d S t o b a eu s ‘ A n t h o l o g i u m ’ I 1 3 ) , in A. B RANCACCI ed., A n t i c h i e m o d er n i n e l l a f i l o s o f i a d i et à i m p e r i a l e, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2001, pp. 17-68. 85 Cf. esp. P ORPH ., I n P t ol . H a r m ., 14, 4-6 and 15, 1-6 Düri ng. Fur ther details i n the studies

mentioned above, n. 39. 86 Cf. A LCIN ., D i d ., 158, 1-4. Discussion and further references in C HIARADONNA, P l at o n i s m o e teoria della con oscenza stoi ca cit. 87 Cf. M ANSFE LD, H eresiography i n Cont ext cit., pp. 62-63 : « The source our sources used by Clement belong with the M iddle Platonist scholastic li terature ; what is more, his account has preserved details deri ving from the learned discussions of the first century B CE and the first two centuries CE some of which can only be paralleled in Simplicius’ much later I n C at . ». 88 Cf. M ANSFE LD, H eresiography i n Cont ext cit., p. 63 n. 15.

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character of Porphyry’s treatment is revealed, among other things, by an allusion to A RISTOT ., Metaph ., H , 2, 1043a14-2289 . L et us now r eturn to the opening lines of the Isagoge . Porphyry presents his work as an elementary treatise on notions pertaining to the study of logic and its various branches. The assertion that Porphyry’s Isagoge represents an introduction to the study of ‘logic’ is perfectly true when properly understood. I t is crucial to note here that as far as imperi al and late-antique authors were concerned, the philosophical study of ‘reasoning’ was not confined to the abili ty to produce logically correct deductive inferences. In their view, logic entailed m o r e than this. M ichael Frede, for instance, has aptly observed of the internal complexity of Galen’s concept of ‘rational method(s)’ that : « I t involves the supposed ability of reason to determi ne the kinds of things there are in the nature of things and their distinguishing marks by the method of division, the ability to recognize similarities between things in a methodical way which will allow one to determine the genera of things and the most general truths about the various kinds of things, and the ability to define things, not just names, but things as they essentially are in the nature of things »90 .

It is by no means surprising, therefore, that the surviving fragments of Galen’s lost treatise O n d em o n s t r a t i o n not only focus on syllogisms and defi nitions, but also include large sections on epistemology, physics, biology, etc.91 Logical methods were by no means neutral : a commonly shared set of terms, notions, theories and arguments certainly existed, but the way in which different authors made use of it entailed well-defined philosophical views on the nature of knowledge and reality. Alcinous’ logical and epistemological sections, elementary as they may be, cannot be understood outside the Platonist metaphysical framework of his work. Likewise, Galen’s discussion of logical methods is directly related to his views on (medical) Cf. P ORPH ., I n P t ol . H a r m ., 11, 21-26 Düring. More details in C HIARADONNA, P l a t o n i s m o e teori a della con oscenza stoi ca cit. 90 Cf. M. F REDE , On Gal en’s Epi stem ology , in V. N UTTON ed., Galen : Problem s and Prospects , Uni versity Press, Cambri dge 1981, pp. 65-86, repr. i n M . F REDE , E s sa y s i n A n c i en t P h i l o s o p h y , Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, pp. 278-298, p. 292. On the simi lariti es between Galen’s conception logic and the M iddle Pl atonic tradition, cf. i b i d . ; T. T I E L E M A N , Galen’s Concept of Di alecti c and t h e M i d d l e Pl a t o n i s t B a ck g r o u n d : T h e A r g u m en t o f P H P B o o k I I ’, in M . V E GE TTI , S. G ASTALDI eds., S t u d i d i s t o r i a d el l a m ed i c i n a a n t i c a e m ed i ev a l e i n m em o r i a d i P a o l a M a n u l i , La Nuova Italia, Florence 1996, pp. 49-65. 91 Cf. I. VO N M Ü L L E R , Über G alens W erk vom Wi ssenschaftl ich en Beweis , « Abh. Bayer. Ak. d. m on str ati on ’ Wi ss. M ünchen », 20, 1897, pp. 403-478 ; R. CHIARADONNA, L e tr ai téde Gali en ‘Su r l a dé et sa po sté r i téta r do -an ti qu e , in R. C HIARADONNA, F. T RABATTONI eds., Physics and Phi losophy of N a t u r e i n G r e ek N eo p l a t o n i s m , forthcoming. 89

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knowledge and nature; the same also holds true, among other, for Alexander of Aphrodisias’ ‘logic’, which i s part of his overall essentialist account of reality 92 . Logical methods, however, may also entail something less than the study of valid argument forms. For all of their differences, Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias share the view that logic is ‘useful’. Both claim that the study of logic i s not to be pursued as such : rather, they argue, logic should only be studied insofar as it is useful to construct proofs which, in turn, are useful for science (or theoretical phil osophy). I n accordance with this utilitarian view, perfectly vali d arguments might be said to exist, the study of whi ch is not part of logic because they are not useful for knowledge 93 . ‘Logic’, therefore, is not presented by these authors as an autonomous branch of human thought. E vidently, the epistemological, physical or ontological background of any logical method of enquiry is not always accorded the same prominence. Complex works such as Galen’s lost treatise O n d em o n s t r a t i o n or Porphyry’s lost Ad Gedaliu m certainly included large (and in our view ‘extra-logical’) sections on physics and epistemology. Porphyry’s Isagoge is designed to provide a more elementary treatment of notions propaedeutic to the study of logic. I t is then by no means surpri sing that Porphyry does not engage in any in-depth discussion on the ontological background of such notions. This, however, as I have argued, by no means implies that a similar background is missing: Porphyry is rather leaving it aside for the sake of simplicity. Porphyry’s non-elementary works show that his ‘logical’ theories rest on a well-defined ontological foundation, which mostly (though not exclusively) 94 pertains to Porphyry’s Aristoteli sing analysis of the physical world and of i ts immanent incorporeal principles. 3. C ONCLUSION : P ORPHYRY ’S

LOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO TH E STUDY OF LOGIC

Porphyry’s Isagoge can be seen to serve as a preparation for the study of logic or logical methods, following the footsteps of ‘the old masters’ (the Peripatetics in particular). Porphyry’s discussion here is indeed of an elementary, introductory and general sort ; in this respect, it possess a ‘logical’ character. The Isagoge might therefore be described as a ‘logical’ introduction to the study of logic. As I argued, the adverb logikwv t eron is likely Cf. M. R ASHED , E s s e n t i a l i s m e. Alexandre d’Aphrodi se ent re logique, physiqu e et cosm ologie , De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2007. 93 I wish to refer here to the excellent discussion in J . B ARNES , Galen and t he Uti lity of L ogic , in J . K OLLESCH , D. N ICKE L eds., Galen un d das hellenisti sche Er be , Steiner, Stuttgart 1993, pp. 33-51. 94 Concerning Stoic inf luences, cf. above. Pl ato’s division was also part of the ontological background of Porphyry’s logic, as I s a g . , 6, 13-23 clearly shows. 92

What is Porphyry's Isagoge

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