Liberalism and Democracy From Norberto

CONVERGENCIA

Luis Antonio Córdoba Gómez Liberalism and democracy ,

from Norberto Bobbio’s Bobbio’s perspective

Revista Revista de Ciencias Sociales

Liberalism and democracy from Norberto Bobbio’s Bobbio’s perspective Luis Antonio Córdoba Gómez Universidad del Cauca, Colombia Col ombia / lacordoba2004@ya l [email protected] hoo.es

Abstract: In the present article ar ticle an analysis is developed, approached from the political philosophy, philosophy, on

the conception the Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004) outlined outlined about two of the most important political traditions produced by the western culture and which are, without a doubt, pillars upon which modernity has been built: democracy and liberalism. From this perspective approaching and encounter points are identied, the same as the tensions that energize the relationship between democracy and liberalism as well as some contradictions that spur Bobbio’s Bobbio’s thought. Key words: Democracy, liberalism, political liberalism, liberal State, liberal democracy. democracy. Resumen: En el presente artículo se desarrolla un análisis, abordado desde la losofía política, en torno a la concepción que el lósofo italiano Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004) planteara acerca de dos

de las más importantes tradiciones políticas que ha producido la cultura occidental, y que son, sin duda alguna, pilares sobre los que se ha edicado la modernidad: la democracia y el liberalismo. Desde esta perspectiva se identican aproximaciones aproximaciones y puntos de encuentro, lo mismo que las tensiones que dinamizan la relación entre democracia y liberalismo, así como algunas contradicciones que per mean el pensamiento de Bobbio. Palabras clave: democracia, liberalismo, liberalismo político, Estado liberal, democracia l iberal.

ISSN 1405-1435, UAEMex, UAEMex, num. 48, September - December 2008, pp. 19-38

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Convergencia , num. 48, September -December 2008, UAEMex, Mexico

Introduction1

When we refer to the relationship between liberalism and democracy we commonly suppose or suspect that both political categories are close c lose to each other, either because they are too familiar to us or because, in other words, they are very common. The intertwinement that we suppose between them is nourished, obviously, obviously, by any discursive and ideological charge that, in the daily life acts, is spread having as source different origins (mass media, political politic al speeches, demonstrations, et cetera). Don’t we even mention a democraticliberal Weltanschauung ? Don’t Don’t we even refer nowadays to a liberal li beral democracy that not only stands triumphantly, but which is also pompously said to be healthy? Obviously, Obviously, one thing is to take for granted g ranted that this relationship rela tionship between liberalism and democracy exists, and another one, as it corresponds to the intellectual work that the the political political philosopher philosopher has to perform, is to demonstrate and clarify its meaning, to clarify at which historical moment and how the fusion took place, which divisions can be determined, what tensions arise, which bridges or ideological rapprochements ease establishing a conciliation that we could call effective, effective, as well as which conditions conditions of the political environment in the society encourage controversy. It is necessary to tackle these and other concerns concer ns given their signicance and complexity . The analysis and reection on these two political practices around which the current social and economic life revolve becomes a more important situation after the fall of the the real socialism that socialism that left liberal democracy without its natural antagonist. After all, such task involves the knowledge aspect, both in the ethical imperative that encourages us to continue speaking about things that have already been said, a part of it which is to assume detachments detachments or controversies controversies with ideas or points of view that are not shared, and with regard to the expectations that arise based base d on what is expected expecte d to be said. To take part in the theoretical debate as well as in the production of knowledge, whichever 1

The present article is part of the research project the author author develops inside Culture Culture and Politics Group ( Grupo ), which he belongs to. Said group is ascribed to the Grupo Cultura y Política department of Philosophy Philosophy of Universidad del Cauca and is recognized recognized by Colciencias Colciencias in Category B.

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the topic is, does not set us in the position of neutral or dispassionate subjects, subjec ts, but in the position of individuals who cannot establish radical detachments to the concerns that the political ux poses, poses, an issue of utmost importance if we bear in mind the the future of our societies societies.. For instance, when we have have the belief that we have just spoken little a about a specic problem, that we have have barely taken charge of it, not only can we cast doubt on the roles that have been performed, but we shall also understand that to undertake a task of conceptual clarication (extremely necessary) is, at the same time, big and challenging. But if we consider the opposite situation, that is, when we suppose we talk about something with great intensity, we don’t infer that there is more clarity or that the doubts had been cancelled once and forever. On the contrary, the invitation to the philosophical debate, as open and lasting attitude, leads us to continue asking questions, to continue persisting in nding new ways to comprehend, to continue looking for new alternatives of interpretation, because political philosophy denitely cannot be understood as a reason clause . In any case, a debate about liberalism and a nd democracy cannot be considered settled. This fact brings us face to face contemporarily with the presence of two political traditions that despite tending to be universalized,2 as in the economic eld capitalism globalizes, and nevertheless (that is, despite its almost unquestionable supremacy) its achievement stops being exempt of risks, difculties and incoherences. incoherences. As an example of this we could mention that democracy, democracy, understood as a way of intervention in the decisions of the society according to equity and participation principles, principl es, is being undermine undermined d by neoconservative and neoliberal tendencies in our countries. Tendencies that not only put on the same level the political struggle for power and the economic economic logic of of the market and the individual calculation (MacPherson, 2005), they have also launched the preventive preventive politics of the government of the elites.3 2

This universalization would be equivalent equivalent to the expansive waver of the democracy that Huntington explains (1994). 3 Antonio Ocaña (1991: 39) speaks about the democradura to make reference precisely to the conguration of of the democracy as the government government of elites.

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Convergencia , num. 48, September - December 2008, UAEMex, Mexico

Based on this ideological resource, what is indeed pursued is the neutralization of the democracy of of the masses and, therefore, therefore, the domestication of the harmful effects caused by the overow overow that are ascribed to the people when they act as the main political character (the risks of tyranny and despotism despotism of the majorities). majorities). So, the observance observance of the political practice, especially at the level of the Latin American countries where democracy is weak, seems to lead us to a naturalization of the dissolution process of the majority government’ government’ss principle in hands of of the selected minorities’ government; a matter that does not go unnoticed if we consider the consequences brought about about in relationship to the loss of legitimacy of the liberal democratic regimes in Latin America, and the tortuous evolution that they have had (including the denaturalization caused by the political class and its disruption, disruption, a task in charge of the armed forces) On the one hand, a certain state of mind of disenchantment is reinforced in the people’s imaginary, insofar as the participation is perceived as an unimportant act (useless, inefcient), regarding the incidence that the citizen may have in the nal decisions; that is, in the main decisions that have the congresses as scenery, where the demo-liberal political theory has shown to gather and renovate, in a representative way, way, the unity of the nation (as collective body). This kind of political demoralization is fed by the distancing that operates between the parliamentary assemblies, in whose members the popular sovereignty is delegated, with regard to the direct compromise that there should be with the voter, as well as with the rhetorical character that democracy embodies in reference to the materialization of the power of the people, no matter that those called to take part recast themselves in tactics such as the empty promises and vote poaching, with its corruption consequences (promising a post in the government in exchange for votes, exchange of privileges, etcetera). After all, it will be said that these and other faults are attributable to the fact that modern democracy cannot correspond to a direct exercise, which apart from being non-viable non-viable turns out to be very strange (if one wants, wants, extremely) for us. Much to the regret of Rousseau’s Rousseau’s ideal that yearned for the direct democracy democracy of the Greeks, Greeks, real democracy of modern men, as Bobbio will afrm, is only possible possible through the presence of diverse scales

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of mediation and compromise. compromise. But even even if the primacy of of the political guardianship of the rulers and elected over the people is argued, taking for granted the impossibility of the direct democracy (given the expansive expansive process and the increase of the societies), it is not enough (nor convincing) to reduce democracy only to procedural-political or procedural-electoral phenomena. Despite the fact that the electoral democracy contributes to reinforce the conviction in the civilized (and ( and successive) dispute for power that parties and political organizations start star t under the leadership the State provides, provides, it is true that it can’t be indifferent to us the concern on their social socia l effectiveness, that is, on its capacity to meet the demands and protests for justices that come from great layers of the population, which nowadays nowadays live in Latin America in marginalization and exclusion conditions. Can one consider that a governance exercise is effective, however however as democratic as it might be, that dodges, dodg es, that turns deaf ears to the practical practical controvers controversyy on the construction of of more dignifying and fair ways ways of life for the members of the society and, especially, especially, for the excluded majorities? The debate set out by Norberto Bobbio on liberalism and democracy

Despite the fact that in the current political and daily use of the words liberalism and democracy they seem to be equivalent, Norberto Bobbio, taking the ideas of Benjamin Constant as a support support (1820), establishes a historical distinction between both political forms: While democracy is previous to liberalism, in the sense that the ancient Greeks practiced it, liberalism follows the former, being characterized as a modern phenomenon. In any case, and despite the acknowledgement of the existent complexity, complexity, Bobbio points out that the liberal and democratic democrati c ideals would start to go hand in i n hand, insofar as freedom as freedom (as (as common destiny of men) and equality (as intervention of the people to dene the orientation of the society) become compatible with them. This exposition is supported by resorting to the explanation of a double differentiation: that it is not only about political categories that have different historical times, but that the separation separati on that there is between them has to do at the same time with the conception and experience of freedom, an aspect which represents a distance between ancient ancie nt and modern civilizations, but it also has to do with the conceptual meaning that political that political liberalism and liberalism and democracy

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have. While the rst stands in the lands of the restoration of the sense of individual independence, the second makes it from egalitarianism.

Based on this, Bobbio considers that the ancient a ncient understood (and lived) liberty as direct participation of the citizens in public affairs affairs and in the distribution of power, which which would give give rise (in practice) to the obedience and subordination of the individual to the political community (that is, the negation of the liberty by handing it over). In contrast to them, what the moderns did was exactly the opposite: the nal end is the defense of the individual liberty, as guarantee of the private life, which corresponds, also, also, to the adoption of ways of life framed in broader territorial contexts. In this respect Bobbio refers to that which Constant expressed and says: As a thoroughgoing liberal, Constant held that these two aims were mutually incompatible. Where everyone participates directly in collective decisions, the individual ends up being subordinated subordinated to the authority of the whole, and loses his liberty as a private person; and it is private liberty which citizen today demands of public power power (Bobbio, (Bobbio, 1993: 7).*

So that liberalism, in general sense, emerges then as a philosophy of change, as a kind of thought that causes (or fosters) fosters) transformations and that adopts progressive positions that are able to break all the factors that tend to paralyze the thought and the society (progress ideology). But in a more specic sense, that is, more political, liberalism will become a philosophy on the individual (as subject), and human liberty (as principle) an institutional philosophy on the form of the State. For Bobbio this is a shape that is symbolized in the regulation regulation of the exercise of the power, power, in the subordination subordination of the public powers to the controls (limits) established and dened in the written norms. So that when Bobbio mentions the liberal State he refers to a doctrinal point of view, view, according to which power, understood in neutral sense, that is, independently from who exercises it, has to be limited (in its use and functions).4 In these terms, the identication of the liberal State as limited limited * Source: Bobbio, Norberto (2005) “Liberalism and Democracy”, London: Verso TN (Translator’s Note) 4 For Norberto Norberto Bobbio this aspect marks a distinctive feature of the ancient civilizations, as for they did not set out the obligation of setting limits to the political power, as they did not also developed a theory about the rights.

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State is materialized in the State (or constitutional State ), which is ruled by State of Law Law (or the laws, by the supremacy of the norms with higher rank (the fundamental laws) created by men and that are contained in the political Constitutions (according to a positivization that is extensive to the natural rights); […] ‘liberalism’ denotes denotes a particular conception of the state, in which the state is conceived as having limited powers and functions, and thus as differing from both the absolute state and from what is nowadays called the social state (Bobbio, 1993: 7). Liberalism refers us to limits both in the power power and in the functions of the state. In respect respect of the limits of power power one speaks speaks currently of the rights-based , while the term minimal state is used in reference to the limit on function. Even though liberalism conceives the State as both lawful and minimal, one can have rights- based , non-minimalist states (as with the social state today), and also minimalist states which are not rights-based (as in the case of Hobbes’s Leviathan, in the economic sphere: a state which is at one and at the same time absolute in the fullest sense of the term, and liberal in its economics (Bobbio (Bobbio,, 1993: 11).

As it can be seen in the exposition of these comparisons, the liberal State, State, as an ordainment that accepts constitutional pluralism (which results in the division of powers and their limitation by means of the law) in order not to conceal freedom and individual rights (and therefore, emancipation), which liberal society considers signicant, becomes a minimal State . According to Bobbio, Bobbio, this minimal State is the opposite of a maximal State, that is, the Absolutist State, and by extension to the totalitarisms and to the State of social intervention.5

Nevertheless, one must must observe that said categorization of a minimal State used by Bobbio responds responds in fact to the historical emergence of the classic liberal State (leave to do, leave to pass: laissez faire, laissez passer ) that, in the interests of the defense of the economic freedom, will welcome the

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For the classic liberals (and today for the neoliberals) the aspiration of the State of well-being of controlling the whole society society,, through the enlargement of its intervention capacity, capacity, hand in hand with high doses of of dirigisme and paternalism, not only is to the detriment of the freedom, but it becomes the cause cause of the social problems and in a source source of ingovernance of the democracy itself.

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protection of the individual initiative and free competence.6 In doing so, it will contract the state intervention inter vention in the police matters, that fall in the realm of the public order and citizen security, security, which will situate the workers in a defenselessness labor situation towards the employers’ abuses and to the exploitation tion of the men by by men worsening of that which Marx calls the exploita Notice that Bobbio’s Bobbio’s assessment is only correct cor rect despite the fact that t hat that model of minimal State could be covered with constitutional robes (as State of law), and it would not necessarily make it democratic. We We must bear in mind that he so called “rules of the democratic game”, through which individuals take part in the democratic life, were not fully developed, that is, within the reach of all citizens. What are those rules which characterize democracy as a distinctive political regime, and even different, from liberalism? According to Bobbio, while liberalism 7 refers more to the role played by the State in relationship to the regulation of power and social coexistence, democracy (in its minimal sense) minimal sense) refers more to the mode in which power is shared and distributed, to the exercise exercise of the governance; to the capacity of the people to take part in the decisions deci sions taken in the society, society, according to operational proceedings inspired in the principles of popular sovereignty, sovereignty, political political equality of participation participation and, mainly, mainly, the prevalence of the ruling of the majority within the electoral systems. syste ms. To To that respect, Bobbio mentions: menti ons:

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These are assumptions assumptions of the economic liberalism , with which the productive processes, trade, generation of wealth and, therefore, therefore, the well-being and and the prosperity of the societies are conceived. The starting point consists in sustaining that what drives individuals is not the solidarity desire, but, on the contrary, contrary, egoism, the satisfaction of the needs and most immediate and close desires (the private interest, the search for wealth). For Adam Smith, his greatest exponent, no matter how these tendencies are constituted into natural laws (while they are decided freely by men, in their ways of behaving and thinking) thinking) they do not need the intervention of a regulating power power (that of the State). 7 He accepts the antagonism between the individual and society as something that not only is necessary but favorable, favorable, as long as it inspires competence and in the sense of the emulation, just as economic liberalism states. When applied to the political sphere it stimulates the political pluralism, pluralism, understood understood both in the sense of the presence presence of the variety of organized political groups, that co contend ntend for power, power, as the existence of a variety of points of view and opinions that encourage the public controversy and the collective debate.

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[…] ‘democracy’ denotes denotes one of the many possible possible modes of government, namely that in which power is not vested in a single individual or in the hands of a few, few, but lies with everybody ever ybody,, or rather in the majority major ity.. Democracy is thus thu s differentiated from autocratic forms such as monarchy and oligarchy (Bobbio, 1993: 7). […] A ‘democratic regime’ is rst and foremost foremost a set of procedural rules for arriving at collective decisions in a way which accommodates and facilitates the fullest possible possible participation of interested parties (Bobbio, (Bobbio, 1994: 9). I warn that the only way to understand understa nd each other when talking about ab out democracy democra cy,, with regard to its counter position to all modes of autocratic government, is to consider it as characte characterized rized by a set of rules (primary and fundamental) that establish who who is authorized to make collective decisions and under which procedures (Bobbio, 1994: 14).

These denitions, that hold that which is formal and procedural, allow highlighting the relationship that operates between the modern democracy and liberalism, liberalism, being the developmen developmentt of the former a consequence consequence of the presence presence of the latter, latter, that is, a result of the legal acknowledgement acknowledgement carried out by the constitutional State (rights-based State) in relationship to the individual liberties. The convergence also occurs as for democracy will end up restoring the fundamental fundamental rights, the freedom of opinion, of expression and participation participation (by means of the vote).

The favorable favorable conditions conditions for the citizen, as political subject of the democracy, democracy, to take part then in the election of its rulers or in the expression of opinions, opinions, will be complete complete with the universalizatio universalization n of the suffrage suffrage and with citizen guarantee, that goes beyond the private identities or certain specic conditions that determine det ermine the t he individuals (beliefs, political opinions, opinions, gender matters, sexual preferences, prefe rences, economic situation, ethnicity, ethnicity, etcetera). etcetera ). As well as the fact that for Bobbio democracy is not possible without a legal framework, it is also invalid if it is not accompanied by political pluralism, that is, the presence that diverse political politic al alternatives alter natives shall have, for the sake of being communicated to the citizens in order to make possible their deliverance and election, according to a majoritarian participation. But despite Bobbio’s insistence in the fact that democracy is a method, the procedural rules that contain it do not safeguard safe guard democracy from the contrasts contra sts with reality, that in

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the end are in charge of showing the contradictions into which democracy has fallen (the so called broken promises ). We shall remember that Rousseau (1993), for instance, is suspicious of the representativ representativeness eness of the democracy democracy as materialization materialization of that which can be called true democracy. In his opinion, the sense of the liberty is distorted distorte d when popular sovereignty ends up delegated in the elected, in order for them to decide for the people. To that respect he will answer saying that direct democracy, so praised by the Genevan philosopher, is non-viable and unfeasible (unreal); while, by contrast, the strength of representative democracy lies in the judgment capacity that the elected have: Representative democracy was fostered also by the conviction that the citizen’s elected representatives would be better able to judge the common interest than the citizens themselves, whose vision would be too narrowly focused on their particular interests (Bobbio, 1993: 36).

Despite the preached wisdom of the representatives, insofar insofar as virtue that is attributed to them, unlike the primary concerns that supposedly characterize the masses, that does not free them from committing lack of political responsibility with the elector, nor inoculate them towards the fact that those representatives before being obligated to the nation as a matter matt er of fact choose to establish strictly particular covenants and compromises. Neither is the representative democracy unaware unaware of phenomena such as that in which decisions are focused in organizations, elites or in transnational corporations, just as it happens nowadays under the neoliberal model, which is unaware of the indifference indifference of of the citizen, citizen, of the corruption of the political political customs customs,, of the presence presence of uninformed uninformed and non-politically non-politically educated educated citizens citizens,, of the formation of several several circles of of power, power,8 et cetera. We We can’t can’t forget that in the base of the articulation operated between liberalism and democracy lies the contradiction (and, therefore, there fore, the problem of complementarity) between the individual individual and the social, which which reects the 8

The allusion to the fact that democracy has not represented re presented previously a unique center of power (a centripetal society), but that it has given given place to a plurality of powers (a centrifugal or polycentric society as Bobbio Bobbio calls it), is called by Dahl (1993) as the formation of a poliarchy .

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conict stated between individualism and individualism and organicism, to which Bobbio refers. Liberalism acknowledges that conictive conictive and egoist nature of the human being and insists in the primacy of the liberty, liberty, in the vigilance of the power of the State to preserve the individual independence, in order to organize the coexistence in the middle of the multiplicity. multiplicity. In turn, modern democracy planned as initial orientation, from its origins, origins, the extension of power to the greater amount of people, the concerned directed towards towards the common good and the collective order, the maintenance of the social unity, unity, the demand of results in the exercise of the governance.

At this level of the debate proponed by Bobbio, Bobbio, it seems then that we are pegged to the oor or anchored to a xed position. On the one hand, because even though we can well accept that liberal democracy is not immune to the crisis, without disregarding that it has survived to many, it does not seem convincing (nor credible) to say that it enjoys good health, although we also coincide in saying that it is not dying. The main difculty lies more in the standstill into which Bobbio comes: If the representative democracy, democracy, which is said to be in a constant state of transformation, has no alternatives (at least no better ones, but worse), how can one preach the natural state that it owns, when the evidence that reality provide us with indicates that democracy does not seem willing to reform itself? The risks of Bobbio’s Bobbio’s position refer us to, on the one hand, the idea that democracy democracy,, in terms of political political form, has a kind of internal strength strength wherein its dynamics and vitality rest. But insofar as it tends nowadays to become dominant, without natural contraries in sight (as (a s it would be the case of socialism that encouraged political antagonism in the world), world), the task of transformation looms within a clear horizon, but it is framed more within a grey rmament. After all, representative democracy nowadays, brought to power by by the political neutrality of the liberal State criterion, has taken sides on the side of the defense of the status quo and the dominant power.

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The contradictions and disagreements between liberalism and democracy

The intellectual intellectual personality personality of Norberto Bobbio Bobbio 9 is located within the scene outlined by the discourses produced, after afte r World World War War II, around democracy, democracy, understood in the modern sense. His though is nourished by the political experience associated to the struggle carried car ried out against the fascist regime of Mussolini, by its identity with the need of moralizing politically the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and by the inuence received rece ived initially from Marxism, with regard to the rescue of the role that the proletariat plays as political force of transformation and change. From his resignation to the direct political life and his admission to the academic world, within the undertaken reection on liberalism, democracy and socialism, Bobbio started to highlight in one of his main theses that accompany and characterize his political philosophy: that Marxism, despite the innovation that it provided to the comprehension of the political life (from which conict, antagonism, violence and domination are not uninvolved), fell short at the moment it underestimated the meaning that democracy and liberalism as political conquests have, have, that cannot be ignored if one thinks in the consensus on the desirable society (and on the idea of social justice and better life). That underestimation that Bobbio attributes to Marxism turns against the Italian philosopher. philosopher. Marx did not believe in the ideals of the bourgeoisie 9

Italian philosopher and jurist (1909-2004) that since his youth took part in the antifascist resistance, initially as member of of the Justice and Liberty Liberty ( Giustizia ) movement, Giustizia e Liberta lead by brothers Nello and Carlo Roselli, and later in the National Committee for the Liberation of Papua, Papua, as a consequence he was arrested two times. He was professor in the Camerino, Camerino, Siena, Papua and Turin universities. universities. He joined j oined the last one in 1948, heading the Philosophy of Right chair, once the Action Party Party was dissolved and from which he was a member since its creation in 1943. In 1984 he was appointed life senator by Alessandro Perini. According to José María Gonzáles García, in Norberto Bobbio one can observer three stages: in the rst one he will highlight the differences between the Western Western democracies and the socialism established in the old USSR; in the second, the debate is focused in the debate with Marxism; in the third one (from the 80’s), the reection will have to do with modern democracy.

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liberty, not not because they did not represent the ideological strength of human emancipation, but because it implied the emancipation of some men (the bourgeoisie) bourgeoisie) to the the detriment detriment of the negation of the liberty of other (the (the proletariat). proletariat). Neither Marx believed in the neutrality neutrality assumption of the liberal State and its unbiased capacity to referee in the society, according to which all citizens are treated equally. So that, as Bobbio reafrms, liberal democracy supposes a consensus on the political order, it ruins (eliminates) the antagonism, the conict and the constraint that are natural to power, power, the political hegemony and domination. It shall be highlighted that the defense defense of the demo-liberal institutions supposed by Bobbio Bobbio has an Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon longing. longing. Regarding the emphasis set in the conception of man and social life, the Italian thinker thinker is supporter of making them gravitate in the pragmatics pragmat ics (the offered results and advantages) for the individual rights, rights, the political pluralism, the universalization of the suffrage, the constitutionalization constitutionalization of the State, among among other other referents. referents. Some of them exude in Hobbes’s Hobbes’s works (1996) or in those of Locke (1973). To To drink in the fountains of classic liberalism allows Bobbio to make a political displacement (from initial left positions to a latter centrism) and to state a conciliation with the original Marxism under under the form of the liberal-socialism . But behind this conciliatory position, what Bobbio really does is to warn about the dangers of the extrapolations, the radicalisms and the political overows that derive derive from the practical application of the Marxist principles such as that of the dictatorsh dictatorship ip of the proletaria proletariat t , as for the fact that it would congure a power without limits, limits, located on the sidelines of regulation. It would also suppose a questioning of the opening sense that Machiavelli gave to politics (as for pure passion, pure personalized power game according to the usage of techniques for its conquest or preservation), which allows Bobbio to set politics in the eld of its relationship with the State. It is certain that the proposed conciliation (the liberal-socialism), which is not exempt from contradictions, despite the fact that it works better in the theoretical plane than in the practical, has the virtue of proposing a line of analysis that that tries to escape from from the interpretative interpretative logics of of the political tensions, seen as irreconcilable given the unavoidable antagonism that motivates them, which would seem that set us in the way way of a certain

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way, it make us ask ourselves if in the direct political idealism . In the same way, politics that articulation he proposes is directed in the sense of of the recovery of the social democracy or if, in future terms, it would be related more with the possibility of considering an advanced socialism socialism (renewed), built with the political signicance that not only comes from the working class but in general from the excluded and subordinated, and who nowadays, in Latin America, seem to show signs in the political experiences of Hugo Chávez, Lula da Silva and Evo Morales. It is necessary to make several clarications on the last aspect. The rst is that I refer to a socialism of new lineage , insofar as it is a distinction label, as a political experience that, from being or becoming real, would differentiate itself, at least in the scale of time, from vivid socialism, for instance, in the countries of the Iron Curtain. The second is that I refer to a probability, that is, to something that cannot be understood as an accomplished fact or better said, in the best of the circumstances, as something that would would appear to be a consolidation process, in a manner of speaking.

The third is that speaking on a new socialism would imply to refer to a tendency and/or political alternative that certainly leaves room for, in the broad sense, although also diffuse, the mobilization of imaginaries and representations, where it is possible to think the realization of justice and the redistribution of wealth, as well as reconcile what historically seems to have become an irresolute tension: the individual freedom and the collectivism, the private interest and the general interest. This babbling tendency would be framed, apart from that, within the conicts, the contradictions, the ambiguities and the features that make Latin American societies more dynamic. The fourth is that despite the responses to the several questions and expectations that one bears considering the possibility of a new socialism in socialism in the future, they correspond more to the scrutiny of history, we we see ourselves in the need of turning to the previous political experiences that the Western Western world has seen, and which nourish the disenchantment with modernity. modernity. It is from its political pedagogy that certain mistrust and suspicion derives with regard to the new political promises made from other shores, in which reconciliation is stated as that which up to the current moment turned irreconcilable.

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In fact, fears and challenges, both theoretical and practical, come to the fore. Just Just consider how the exacerbation of the political empowerment of the masses, nourished by a rampant populism and in signicant doses of authoritarianism authoritari anism and power power concentration, concentration , could imply leaps and abstractions with regard to the democratic constitutional order and, therefore, of their values and principles, just as the liberal theory has postulated. These threats come either from several sides, beyond the location of forces and actors in the political spectrum that is, both from left and right. Now then, after these clarications, clarications, we shall say that a part of the questions that arise have to do with the reading that can be done on the implications around the Bobbio’s Bobbio’s conception on the logic of the dominant power, that is, with regard to their justications and legitimacy. Is his point of view, view, his criticism, conservative? Is it a reection of a political stance that, in the defense defense of the status quo, quo, aims at perceiving the consequences derived from the political decadence of the liberal institutionality institutionality,, when it shows to be deaf and reluctant reluctant to listen to the social outcry of change? Does Bobbio reect a kind of moral conscience conscience that calls for a containment of the change, to the alert, to the prevention prevention of dangers related to the political political excesses and incompetence that are attributed to the masses, when they extol the democratic egalitarism? Or, on the contrary, it is a brilliant invitation to think in the political political transformation transforma tion of the democratic societies, from the primate of the moderate and gradual change instead of the revolution? Is it a call to settle the debt that democracy has with society, that is, to achieve what up to now is a non-fulllment history or, on the contrary, what is aimed is to think in what democracy should provide?

We We can also ask if the analysis that deals with the proceduralism of the representative democracy, democracy, as one of the outstanding notes in the minimal denition denition of democracy democracy that Bobbio suggests (and for which it is more important to analyze who holds the domination instead of who exercises it, with which legal tools it is made), introduces an important note, and distinctive, in reference to the conception of power. power. And if the answer is negative, then is it that we assume that the issue is a whim introduced for the delight of academic and intellectual agents?

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If we coincide in the thesis that human life would lack lack sense if we renounce to the idea of freedom (in the classic liberal sense) or to the demanding right to equality of the oppressed (in the Marxist sense), in the same way that to avoid making the terrible mistakes caused by the despotic and totalitarian experiences, that is, in order to avoid the abuses of power, their exercise requires the design and existence existence of regulatory mechanisms, the task of thinking thinking the construction of a democratic political political order (where (where the practices can be socialized to the whole society, instead of reducing it to closed spaces) a challenge continues being built for the political thought. I think that Bobbio’s challenge, according to the co-constructive proposal, of advancing towards a “liberal-socialism”, that does not destroy (but integrates) the best part of the liberal democracy and the demands for change, hand in hand, hand, up to where it is possible, of the empirical evidence that provide us the political reality, will consist in being able to achieve an break-even point in the antagonism that is unleashed when conservadurism is exacerbated (which accompanies liberalism) and the revolutionary radicalization (that accompanies the longing for change). Nevertheless, Bobbio seems to commit an abstraction as for the fact that said effort of conciliation cannot be considered if a leap in the vacuum is made, that is, on the sidelines of a capitalism that nowadays, nowadays, under the ideological leadership of the economic liberalism, nds itself in a globalizing globalizing process (expansive (expansive to the whole planet), hand in had with the ideological sacralization of the competence, the individualism and the market, the latter seen see n precisely as the (Córdoba Gómez, 2006: 132). mother mother of all democra democracies cies (Córdoba This, This, of course, course, sets on trial the the vitality itself of the political political philosophy philosophy so long as it requires the restor of creativity in order to be able to arrange the enlightening discourses of the political practices that outline new orientation routes and and new courses courses of action, in spite spite of the risk of making mistakes mistakes.. Political philosophy has to continue being an open forum to dialogue, to the critical debate, if we want to interpret well the spirit of our days, days, marked by by the increasing complexity and uncertainty. We We are compelled c ompelled to do so given the ingovernance and ineffectiveness of democracy to solve social problems, problems, th edistortion of equality and the participation participation in hands of the multiplication multiplication of political political mediators, mediators, of of the political political oligarchies oligarchies,, of the struggle started

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between the elites (Schumpter, 1971), of the technocrats and bureaucrats. bureaucrats. We We could only renounce to that task if we end up accepting certain historical fatalism that derives from Bobbio’s exposition. expositio n. It consists either on be satised with the democracy democr acy we have (as we know it), because essentially essent ially there are not choices before us, there are not desirable options or, in other words, because any other alternative is unthinkable; or we shall continue dealing with a democracy that refuses to be improved (to go deeper), because it, in an inexorable way, is trapped within its own contradictions and labyrinths, which not only deny it in itself, but that do not not allow it to come out of that whirlpool that imprisons it. Bibliography

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Bobbio, Norberto (1993), Liberalismo y democracia , Bogotá: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Bobbio, Bobbio, Norberto (1994), ( 1994), El futuro de la democracia , Bogotá: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Bobbio, Bobbio, Norberto (1995), (1995) , “¿Que alternativas a la democracia representativa?, re presentativa?, in Santana Rodríguez, Pedro [comp.], Las incertidumbres de la democracia , Bogotá: Foro Nacional por Colombia. Bobbio, Norberto (1995), “Las disoluciones de la democracia”, in Santana Rodríguez, Pedro [comp.], Las incertidumbres de la democracia , Bogotá: Foro Nacional por Colombia. Círculo de Lectores (1984), Historia Universal. El siglo del liberalismo , volume II, Bogotá. Constant, Benjamín (1820), “De la liberté des anciens compareé à celle des modernes”, in Collection complète des ouvrages , vol. IV, IV, part 7, Paris: Librería Béchet. Cordero, Rolando (1995), “Socialismo y liberalismo: Química o alquimia?”, in Santana Rodríguez, Pedro [comp.], Las incertidumbres de la democracia , Bogotá: Foro Nacional por Colombia. Córdoba Gómez, Luis Antonio (2006), “El desencanto político con la modernidad: las razones interpretativas de una crisis”, in Filosofía política : Crítica y balances, Popayán: Popayán: Universidad del Cauca. Bobbio, Bobbio, Norberto (1995), (1995) , “La democracia como valor universal”, in Santana Rodríguez, Pedro [comp.], Las incertidumbres de la democracia , Bogotá: Foro Nacional por Colombia. Dahl, Robert (1993), La democracia y sus críticos , Barcelona: Paidós. Paidós. Dahl, Robert (1994), ¿Después de la revolución? , Barcelona: Gedisa. Dubet, Francois (1995), “Democracia política y democracia social: ruptura de un vínculo”, in Santana Rodríguez, Pedro [comp.], Las incertidumbres de la democracia , Bogotá: Foro Nacional por Colombia. Dussel, Enrique (2006), 20 tesis de política , Bogotá: Siglo XXI, CREFAL. CREFAL. Farrel, Martín Diego (1997), Utilitarismo, liberalismo y democracia , México: Fontamara.

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Fernández Santillán, José (1988), Hobbes y Rousseau. Entre la autocracia y la democracia , Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Fernández Santillán, José (1997), Filosofía política de la democracia , Mexico: Fontamara. Gargarella, Roberto (1997), “Bases ideológicas del sistema político representativo”, in Crisis de la representación política , Mexico: Fontamara. Gargarella, Roberto (1999), Las teorías de la justicia después de Rawls , Rawls , Barcelona: Paidós. Gonzáles, Gonzáles, José María (1992), “Límites y aporías de la democracia representativa en Norberto Bobbio”, in Gonzáles, José María and Fernando Quesada [coords.], Teorías de la democracia , Barcelona: Anthropos, Colección Pensamiento Crítico, Pensamiento Utópico. Hobbes, Thomas (1996), El Leviatán. O la materia, forma y poder de una República eclesiástica y civil , Madrid: Alianza. Huntington, Samuel (1994), La tercera ola: la democratización a nales del siglo XX , Barcelona: Barcel ona: Paidós. Locke, John (1960), Tratado Tratado sobre el gobierno, gobierno , Madrid: Aguilar. Locke, John (1973), Tratado Tratado sobre el gobierno, gobierno , Madrid: Aguilar. Macpherson, Crawford (2005), La teoría política del individualismo posesivo: de Hobbes a Locke , Madrid: Trotta. Maestre, Agapito (1992), “Reexión para una ética en democracia: discurso ético y utopía”, in Gonzáles, José María and Fernando Quesada [coords.], Teorías de la democracia , Barcelona: Anthropos, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana. Montesquieu, Charles-Louis (1963), Del espíritu de las leyes , Barcelona: Altaya. Mouffe, Chantal (1995), “La democracia radical, moderna o postmoderna”, in Santana Rodríguez, Pedro [comp.], Las incertidumbres de la democracia , Bogotá: Foro Nacional por Colombia. Mouffe, Chantal (2001), “La política y los límites del liberalismo”, in revista La Política , num. 1, Barcelona. Ocaña, Antonio (1991), “Las apuestas de la democracia”, in Estudios. Filosofía, Historia, Letras , num. 24, Mexico: Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.

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Occheto, Achille (1995), “Sobre el concepto de democracia mixta”, mixt a”, in Santana Rodríguez, Pedro [comp.], Las incertidumbres de la democracia , Bogotá: Foro Nacional por Colombia. Rosetti, Giancarlo (1993), “Ahora la democracia democrac ia está sola”, in Anderson, Perry Perr y, Liberalismo, socialismo, socialismo liberal , liberal , Caracas: Nueva Sociedad. Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1993), El contrato social , Barcelona: Altaya. Ruiz Miguel, Alfonso (1983), Filosofía y derecho en Norberto Bobbio, Bobbio , Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales. Schumpeter, Joseph (1971), Capitalismo, socialismo y democracia , Madrid: Aguilar. Luis Antonio Córdoba Gómez ; candidate to Doctor in Contemporary Anthropologies, within the agreement subscribed between the University of Caua and the Colombian Institute of Anthropology and History (ICANH). He holds a position position as professor professor of the department of Philosoph Philosophyy at the University of Cauca, Colombia. His main research lines are: democracy and political parties, democracy and liberalism, and political culture, representations, discourses and imaginaries. He is coauthor of the texts “Las vueltas del presidente” , Cali (1994) and “Filosofía política: Crítica política: Crítica y balances” , Popayán (2006). He is author author of the articles “Municipio colombiano y clientelización política Popular Development of Cali Foundation Foundation (2000); local: apuntes local: apuntes para un balance”, Popular “Contribuciones al debate sobre descentralización, apertura política y clientelismo en el municipio colombiano”, colombiano”, unpublished, Popayán (2000).

Sent to dictum: 08th October, 2008 Approval: 6 th July, July, 2008 2 008

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Liberalism and Democracy From Norberto

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