1. Morales v Binay PRINCIPLES Final Decisions of the Ombudsman in Administrative Cases – Rule 43 to the CA Interlocutory order of the Ombudsman – RULE 65 to the CA Final Resolution of the Ombudsman recommending filing of criminal case – Rule 65 to the supreme court CONDONATION DOCTRINE ABANDONED Reading the 1987 Constitution together w ith the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases. To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different te rm is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In t his jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 19 87 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos 293 to apply to administrative offenses PRESIDENT’S POWER TO GRANT CLEMENCY C LEMENCY IN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES
From Llamas v. Orbos The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage o f Article VII, Sect ion 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason w hy the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the Pre sident can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfe itures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive e xecutive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. REQUISITES VALID PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION BY OMBUDSMAN
The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770: Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, w ithout pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied ) In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely: (1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement: (a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) The charge would warrant removal from t he service; or (c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. FACTS: Binay preventively suspended. Applied for TRO with the CA. CA issued the TRO to suspend implementation of the preventive suspension because of condonation doctrine ISSUE: Can the CA issue a TRO against the interlocutory order of preve ntive suspension issued by the Ombudsman? Disputed Provision: Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full: Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
According to Ombudsman: The SECOND paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly
this Court which has the sole jurisdiction j urisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. RULING: FIRST PARAGRAPH The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except t he Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding w hereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely mere ly a provisional 120 remedy for and as an incident in the main action." Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a suspension of an action while the main case r emains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of t he provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief. The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of t he Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. 121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. 122 Note that the t he Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act o r omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. SECOND PARAGRAPH: "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law." As a general rule , the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: ( a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a gener ally worded provision, and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal. By the same principle, the wor d "findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would there fore refer to any finding made by t he Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 ex cepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the dec ision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors o f judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, ( b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to . In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. S uch a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135 There should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other . In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office o f the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law. SECOND PARAGRAPH UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari , grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of t he judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Sect ion 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni 137 (Fabian) In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurre nce in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 o f the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Co urt, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. Consequence of invalidity. In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.149 In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court.
2. Villagracia v Shariah Court PRINCIPLE: Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one o f the parties is not a Muslim.
ISSUES: 1. whether a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where o ne of the parties is not a Muslim. 2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of the parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and 3. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action filed by a Muslim against a non-Muslim if the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons. RULING: The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts41 wherein
the parties involved are Muslims: ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x (2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over: xxxx (b) All other personal and real act ions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d)42 wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entr y and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and Thus, Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim: Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. Application of Civil Code does not cure lack of jurisdiction The application of the provisions of the C ivil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code, customary contracts are construed in accor dance with Muslim law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from customary contracts. In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court t aking cognizance of the action. This is the reason w hy the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved are Muslims. Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Co urt had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the P hilippines in resolving the action. WHEN CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS APPLY TO NON-MUSLIMS True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly prohibits nonMuslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code,52 provisions of the Code on marriage and divorce apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized according to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code,54 a person of a different religion is disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by operation of law and regardless of Muslim la w to the contrary, the decedent’s parent or spouse who is a nonMuslim "shall be entitled to one-third of what he or she would have received without such disqualification."56 In these instances, non-Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57 2. respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction ov er the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void. 3. Under the judicial system in Republic Act No. 9054,97 the Shari’a Appellate Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts. He should have filed his petition for certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court. This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong 106 that "until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the [Court of Appeals] stations preferably composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals] Justices."108 However, considering that To m a w i s was not yet promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari o n August 6, 2009, we take cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for c ertiorari in the exercise of our original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.109 Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A Jurisconsult in Islamic law or "Mufti" is an officer with authority to render legal opinions or "fatawa"110 on any questions relating to Muslim law.111 These legal opinions should be based on recognized authorities112 and "must be rendered in precise accordance with precedent."113 In the Philippines where only Muslim personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the Qur’an and Hadiths is necessary to assist t his court as well as Shari’a co urt judges in resolving disputes not involving Muslim personal laws.
3. Tumpag v Tumpag FACTS: The CA dismissed, without prejudice, the com plaint for recovery of possession and damages that the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) because the complaint failed to allege the assessed value of the disputed property in the case. Attached, however, to the petitioner’s complaint was a copy of a Declaration of Real Property showing
that the subject property has a market value of P51,965.00 and assessed value of P20,790.00. The CA was fully aware of this attachment but still proceeded to dismiss the petitioner’s complaint ISSUE: WON the dismissal is proper HELD: NO
In the present case, we find reason not to strictly apply the above-mentioned general rule, and to consider the facts contained in the Dec laration of Real Property attached to the complaint in determining whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the petitioner’s case. A mere reference to the attached document could facially resolve the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered lengthy litigation on this point unnecessary. 4. Sebastian v Lagmoy PRINCIPLE: MTC has jurisdiction regardless of the amount involved in the barangay settlement even if it exceeds P200,000. The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court " as the forum for the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts regardless of the amount . FACTS: Barangay amicable settlement to pay P250,000. S ettlement was not repudiated within 10 days. Settlement was not enforced within 6 months. Complainant Angela filed a motion for execution in the MCTC one and a half years after the execution of the settlement. MCTC rendere d a decision in favor of complainant for P250,000. Respondent Michael appealed to RTC. Respondent’s arguments:
(i)
(ii)
an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the Lupon within six (6) months from date of settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by o rdinary civil action in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for execution; and (ii) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00
RTC granted the appeal and dismissed Angela’s case. Angela appealed to the CA. CA granted the petition and set aside RTC’s decision.
Respondent’s arguments on appeal:
i. ii. iii.
that the kasunduan cannot be given the force and effect of a final judgment because it did not conform to the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay law the kasunduan is merely in the nature of a private document. that since the amount of P250,000.00 - the subject matter of the kasunduan - is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00, the kasunduan is beyond the MCTC's jurisdiction to hear and to resolve.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved; 2. Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final judgment; and 3. Whether or not the kasunduan can be enforced. RULING: Under Section 417, LGC provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a period often (10) days from the se ttlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement; or second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than six (6) months from the date of settlement has already elapsed. Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement could be done on mere motion of the party entitled thereto before the Punong Barangay .10 The proceedings in this case are summary in nature and are governed by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and could only be resorted to through the institution of an action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court. 11 The proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the R ules of Court. Motion for execution sufficient in form and substance as an initiatory pleading
A perusal of the motion for exec ution, however, shows that it contains the material r equirements of an initiatory action. First , the motion is sufficient in form 12 and substance.13 It is complete with allegations of the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action; the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant; it
contains the prayer for the MCTC to order the execution of the kasunduan; and there was also a verification and certification against forum shopping. Furthermore, attached to the motion are: 1) the authenticated special power of att orney of Annabel, authorizing Angelita to file the present action on her behalf; and 2) the copy of t he kasunduan whose contents were quoted in the body of the motion for execution.
It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the pleading are the allegations in the body and not the caption.14 The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.
Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable sett lement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration often (10) days from the date of its execution, unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court. Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party's failure to repudiate the settlement within the period often (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation. The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to enforce the kasunduan regardless o f the amount involved.
The Court also finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTC's jurisdiction to enforce any settleme nt or arbitration .award issued by the Lupon. We again draw attention to the provision of Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the lapse of the six (6) month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court. The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the " appropriate city or municipal court " as the forum for the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts, S ection 417 made no distinction with respect to t he amount involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts regardless of the amount .
5. Clidoro v Jalmanzar FACTS: Original partition case filed in 1988 in the RTC. CA affirmed and modified the decision on November 13, 1995. In 2003, a complaint for revival of judgment was filed. Defendants filed a MTD for lack of c ause of action. Their arguments: 1.) The petition, not being brought up against the real partiesin-interest, is dismissible for lack of cause of action; 2.) The substitution of the parties defendant is improper and is not in accordance with the rules;
3.) Even if the decision is ordered revived, the same cannot be executed since the legal requirements of Rule 69, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has not been complied with; and 4.) The Judgment of the Honorable Court order ing partition is merely interlocutory as it leaves something more to be done to complete the disposition of the case RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action because the plaintiffs were not the original parties, the original defendants were already deceased and so were their beneficiaries. ISSUE: whether the complaint for revival of judgment may be dismissed for lack of cause of action as it was not brought by or against the real parties-in-interest. RULING: lack of cause of action is not enumerated under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court as one of the grounds for the dismissal of a complaint. Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be made on the ground "that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action." The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth ofthe material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff's complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling there on should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. In this case, it was alleged in the complaint for revival of judgment that the parties therein were also the parties in the action for partition. Applying the foregoing test of hypothetically admitting this allegation in the complaint, and not looking into the veracity of the same, it would then appear that t he complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as t he plaintiffs in the complaint for revival of judgment (hereinafter respondents), as the prevailing parties in the act ion for partition, had a right to seek enforcement of the decision in the partition case. n action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being e xecuted upon motion of the prevailing party. It isnot intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits o f the judgment debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct fromeither the recovery of property case or the reconstitution case [in this case, the original action for partition], wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the m erits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. x x x10 With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that there would be instances where the parties in the original case and in the subsequent action for revival of judgment would not be exactly the same. The mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the the complaint for revival of judgment are different from the names of the parties in the original case would not necessarily mean that theyare not the real parties-in-interest. What is important is that, as provided in Sect ion 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they
are "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Definitely, as the prevailing parties in the previous case for partition, the plaintiffs in the case for revival of judgment would be benefited by the enforcement of the decision in the partition case. ALSO, In Basbas v. Sayson,12 the Court pointed out that even just one of the co-owners, by himself alone, can bring an action for the re covery of the coowned property, even through an action for revival of judgment, because the enforcement of the judgment would result in such recovery of property. Thus, as in Basbas, it is not necessary in this case that all of the parties, in whose favor the case for partition was adjudged, be made plaintiffs to the action for revival of judgment. Any which one of said prevailing parties, who had an interest in the enforcement of the decision, may file the complaint for revival of judgment, even just by himself.
6. Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Strait v Reyes PRINCIPLE: legal standing of animals In light of the promulgation of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the R esident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition. 7. Jacinto v Gumara PRINCIPLE: Who signs verification and certification of NFS FACTS: Plaintiff executed SPA so that his lawyer will sign the verification and certification of NFS RULING: It is true, as petitioner asserts, that if for reasonable or justifiable reasons he is unable to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping in his CA Petition, he m ay execute a special power of attorney designating his counsel of record to sign the Petition on his behalf. In Altres v. Empleo,29 this view was taken: For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting noncompliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping: 1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that str ict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. H, however, for reasonable or j ustifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. TN: [T]he following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. xxx [T]he determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign xxx, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."56 (NISSAN CAR LEASE PHILS., INC. VS. LICA MANAGEMENT INC. AND PROTON PILIPINAS, INC. (G.R. NO. 176986; JANUARY 13, 2016)
8. Soliman v Fernandez PRINCIPLE: Limitation on power of court under RULE 17, SECTION 3 to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute - Case must not be dismissed for failure to move for pre-trial by plaintiff, Clerk of Court should set the case for pre-trial and issue the Notice of Pre-Trial
RULING It has long been established and settled that the question of whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute is mainly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.25 Pursuant to Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a court can dismiss a case on the ground of failure to prosecut e. The true test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff is
culpable for want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.26 As to what constitutes “unreasonable length of time,” this Court has ruled that it depends on the circumstances of each particular case and that “the sound discretion of the court” in the de termination of the said question will not be disturbed, in the absence o f patent abuse.27 The Court, however, in the case of Belonio v. Rodriguez,28 held that: The power of the trial court to dismiss an action for non-prosequitur is not without its limits. If a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff is not present, as in this case, courts should not wield their authority to dismiss. Indeed, while the dismissal rests on the prerogative of the trial court, it must soundly be exercised and not be abused, as there must be sufficient reason to justify its extinctive effect on the plaintiff’s cause of act ion. Deferment of proceedings may be tolerated so t hat the court, aimed at a just and inexpensive determination of the ac tion, may adjudge cases only after a full and f ree presentation of all the evidence by both parties. In this regard, courts are reminded to exert earnest efforts to resolve the matters before them on the merits, and adjudicate the case in accord with the relief sought by the parties so that appeals may be discouraged; otherwise, in hastening the proceedings, they further delay the final settlement of the case. In Malayan Insurance Co, Inc. v. Ipil International, Inc., 30 this Court held that the failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested to obtain from the court the relief prayed for in the complaint. The presumption is not, by any means, conclusive because the plaintiff, on a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause for such failure. We also note that in the trial court, petitioner as defendant was in delay in filing his answer yet the court showed some leniency in admitting his answer despite of the delay. We find no reason why respondent as plaintiff should not be granted the same leniency for his failure to move for pre-trial. For after all, and to underscore the point, the resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC31provides that: “Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Br anch Clerk of Court shall issue a notice of pre-trial.” Dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute is not the result stated in the rule. The trial court is required to proceed to pre-trial through the notice of pre-trial and setting the case for pre-trial by the Branch Clerk of Court. On a final note, we emphasize that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.32 This is in line with the time-honoured principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to ar gue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as basis of decisions. 9. Ching v Ching PRINCIPLE: Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of t he plaintiff. Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim , the following requisites must be present: (1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court; (2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim; (3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and (4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former. FACTS: First case - complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the Regional Trial Court of Manila – Branch 6. Complaint later amended to "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, ExtraJudicial Settlement of Estate and the Ce rtificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Pr eliminary Injunction. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. First case dismissed. RTC Branch 6 gave petitioners 15 days to file complaint. Second case (2002) - a complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra -Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed in RTC Branch 20. Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and RTC Branch 20 dismissed the second case without prejudice. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground of two-dismissal rule Third case - complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreeme nt and Waiver, Affidavit of Extrajudicial Agreement, Deed o f Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Pr ayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" in RTC B ranch 6. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res jiidicata, litis pendencia , forum-shopping, and failure of the complaint to state a c ause of action Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias failed to file t he appropriate pleading within fifteen (15) days in the first case , he violated the order of the court. This, they argue, made the original dismissal an adjudication upon the merits, in accordance with Rule 17, Section 3, i.e., a dismissal through the default of the plaintiff. Hence, they argue that when respondents filed the second c ase and then caused its dismissal, the dismissal should have been with prejudice according to Rule 17, Section 1, i.e., two dismissals caused by the plaintiff on the same claim. ISSUE: whether the first case was a dismissal due to fault of plaintiff RULING: Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults; it does not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiffs default, the trial court's instruction to file the appropriate pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file t he appropriate pleading, the trial court does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing the case still stands.
The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant. SECOND CASE Under Section 5 of the same rule,75 a party may re-file the same action or claim subject to certain exceptions. Thus, when respondents filed the second case, t hey were merely refiling the same claim that had been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to dismiss the second c ase, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiffs instance. Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before the service of any responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of right that is not subject to the trial court's discretion. In O.B. Jovenir Construction and Development Corporation v. Macamir Realty and Development Corporation :76 [T]he trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground 7 THIRD CASE When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one prior dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the defendants. While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Sect ion 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be examined to deter mine before the rule may apply, as in this case. Even assuming for the sake of argument t hat the failure of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file the appropriate pleading in the first case came under the purview of Rule 17, Se ction 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal in the second case is still considered as one without prejudice. In Gomez v. Alcantara:79 The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the me rits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice.80 (Emphasis supplied) In granting the dismissal of the second c ase, the trial court specifically orders the dismissal to be without prejudice. It is only when the trial court's order either is silent on the matter, or states otherwise, that the dismissal will be considered an adjudication on the merits.
However, while the dismissal of the seco nd case was without prejudice, respondents' act of filing the third case while petitioners' motion for reconsideration was still pending constituted forum shopping. FORUM SHOPPING and TWIN-DISMISSAL RULE When respondents filed the third case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the second case was still pending. Clearly, the order of dismissal was not yet final since it could still be overturned upon reconsideration, or even on appeal to a higher court. Moreover, petitioners were not prohibited from filing the motion for reconsideration. This court has already stated in Narciso v. Garcia83 that a defendant has the right to file a motion for reco nsideration of a trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss since "[n]o rule prohibits the filing of such a motion for reconsideration."84 The second case, therefore, was still pending when the third case was filed. The prudent thing that respondents could have done was to wait until the final disposition of the second case before filing the third case. As it stands, the dismissal of the second case w as without prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. I n their haste to file the third case, however, they unfortunately t ransgressed certain procedural safeguards, among which are the rules on litis pendentia and res judicata. Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule, an exam ination must first.be made on the purpose of the rule. Parties resort to forum shopping when they file several actions of the same claim in different forums in the hope of obtaining a favorable result. It is prohibited by the courts as it "tr ifle[s] with the orderly administration of justice."90 In this case, however, the dismissal of the first case became final and executory upon the failure of respondents' counsel to file the appropriate pleading. They filed the cor rect pleading the second time around but eventually sought its dismissal as they "[suspected] that their counsel is not amply protecting their interests as the case is not moving for almost three (3) years."91 The filing of the third case, therefore, was not precisely for the purpose of obtaining a favorable result but only to get the case moving, in an attempt to protect their rights. It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original controversy between t he parties has long been mired in numerous procedural entanglements. While it might be m ore judicially expedient to apply the "twin-dismissal rule" and disallow the proceedings in the third case to continue, it would not serve the ends of substantial justice. Courts of j ustice must always endeavor to resolve cases on their m erits, rather than summarily dismiss these on technicalities
10. Absolute Management v Metrobank PRINCIPLE: Does the counsel require SPA at pre-trial to represent client not just as counsel but also as personal representative FACTS: Counsel for respondent attended pre-tr ial to represent client but without SPA. Petitioner w as declared in default. The default order was questioned before the CA. CA ruled that the presumption in
favor of the counsel’s authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one. A lawyer is not even
required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts pe rformed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, the court,on its own initiative or on m otion of the other party[,] [may] require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client. RULING: in those instances where a party may not himself be present at the pre-trial, and another person substitutes for him, or his lawyer undertakes to appear not only as an attorney but in substitution of the client’s person, it is imperative for that representative of the lawyer to have "special authority" to make such substantive agreements as only the client otherwise has capacity to make. That "special authority" should ordinarily be in writing or at the ve ry least be "duly established by evidence other than the self serving assertion of counsel (or the proclaimed repre sentative) himself." Without that special authority, the lawyer or representative cannot be deemed capacitated to appear in place of the party; hence, it will be considered that the latte r has failed to put in an appearance at all, and he [must] therefore "be non-suited or considered as in default," notwithstanding his lawyer’s or delegate’s presence. 11. YKR Corp v Phil Agri-business Center PRINCIPLE: RULE 35 Summary judgment To determine whether summary judgment was properly re ndered by the court a quo, we shall examine if the following requisites under Rule 35 of t he Rules obtain in the case at bar, viz.: 1. there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and 2. the party presenting the motion for summary j udgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law A “genuine issue of fact” is an issue “ which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
a sham, fictitious, contrived or false c laim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real o r genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. x x x When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. In Section 10, Rule 8 thereof, there are three ways of making a specific denial: (1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in t he complaint, the truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in t he complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder; and, (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial. With respect to the aforesaid third form of denial, this Court ruled in Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals34 that the defendant’s contention that it had no knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the deed of exchange was an invalid or ineffectual denial pursuant to the Rules of Court, as it could have easily asserted whether or not it had executed the deed of exchange attached to the petition. Citing Capitol Motors Corporations v. Yabut, 35 the Court stated that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary x x x The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserte d, is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably true. FACTS: Request for Admission served. Petitioners YKR Cor poration and then seven out of the ten Yulo heirs responded to the Request for Admissions by making no categorical admission or denial of the matters set forth in the Request for Admissions allegedly because all the records of YKR Corporation have been taken by the PCGG when they were sequestered. Court held that the matters requested for admission “ought to be within the personal knowledge” of YKR Corporation and seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs. ISSUE: is summary judgment proper HELD: This answer is a permissible way of making a specific denial under the Rules. In ruling on the issue of whether a genuine issue of fact exists, there was no mention of any circumstance or situation upon which the court a quo derived its conclusion that the matters requested for admission “ought to be within the personal knowledge” of YKR Corporation and seven out o f the ten Yulo Heirs. We cannot thus properly ascertain whether the facts which the latter could not make any truthful admission or denial are so plainly and necessarily within their knowledge. Considering that petitioners YKR Corporation and the remaining six out of the ten Yulo heirs were deprived of their day in court, the court a quo should have made its ruling as to the non-existence of genuine issues of fact by clearly stating its basis both in fact and in law and not on purely conje ctural determinations, i.e., that “the m atters requested for admission ought to be within the personal knowledge of YKR Corporation and [the then] seve n out of the ten Yulo Heirs”40 and that “they ought to have made allegations of any knowledge or information as to the nature of such right or interest, or at the very least denied PABC’s ownership or right to possession over the subject properties.” 41 To be sure, YKR Corporation and the the n seven out of the ten Yulo heirs tendered an answer which is a permissible form of making a specific denial under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules. The court a quo itself stated in the assailed June 30, 2009 Resolution that “this form of response to a Request for Admissions is allowed by the Rules.” 42 Even respondent PABC – the party that moved for summary judgment and which has the burden to prove that there are no genuine issues of fact in the case at bar – did not submit any supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions to prove that the matters requested for admission “ought to be within the personal k nowledge of YKR Corporation and [the then] seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs.”
12. People v Castillo
PRINCIPLE: Remedy from order of quashal of search warrant by the trial court, MTC can issue search warrant even for offenses outside of their jurisdiction FACTS: MTC of Cagayan issued a search warrant for suspected violation of RA 9165. RTC quashed the warrant because the offense involved was outside the j urisdiction of the MTC. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari under RULE 65 to the SUPREME COURT from the order of the trial court quashing a search warrant Arguments: petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He also argues that the petition should have been filed by the State, through the Office of the Sol icitor General, and not petitioner Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor RULING: REMEDY for order of quashal of search warrant The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by petitioner in questioning the quashal of the search warrant as the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge that ordered the said quashal. In his allegation that the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on the proper courts authorized to issue a search warrant, petitioner has shown that the quashal of the search warrant was patently and grossly done. In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 2 0 this Court ruled that an exce ption exists to the general rule that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court assailing any adverse order of t he RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, t hus: The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the petitioners therein could ar gue its case in lieu of the OSG: From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor Ge neral. As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and not the Office of the Solicitor General, such technicality can be relaxed in the interest of justice. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. MTC jurisdiction to issue search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction
ISSUE: whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a search war rant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in the affirmative RULING: It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when any o f its elements are found to be wanting. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in wr iting and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; ( 4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically desc ribes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Necessarily, a motion to quash a search war rant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as ( 1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 22 Sec. 2. Co urt where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for searc h warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. (b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the c rime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the r esultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.24 Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present. 13. De Leon v Hercules Agro-Industrial PRINCIPLE: no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. 14. Ombudsman v De Los Reyes PRINCIPLE: Remedy for decisions of the Ombudsman; When Rule 65 petition for certiorari is proper remedy from decisions of the Ombudsman Final decision – Appeal Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals
RULE 65: a) in administrative cases that have become final and unappealable where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary; to the Court of Appeals b) in criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation to the Supreme Court It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed to the Co urt of Appeals under Rule43 of the Rules of Court.53 Indeed, certiorari lies to assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion.54 Grave abuse of discretion involves a "capricious and whimsical exercise of j udgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction."55 It must be shown that the Office of the Ombudsman exercised its power "in an arbitrary or despotic manner — which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention."56 The prevailing view is that the remedy o f certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman is available only in the following situations: a) in administrative cases that have become final and unappealable where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary; and b) in crimi nalcases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation.57 Furthermore, the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and is only granted when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. . . .
15. Luzon Devt Bank v Krishnan PRINCIPLE: Whether deposit of real property in lieu of cash or counterbond is allowed to discharge a writ of attachment RULING: NOT ALLOWED In their petition, petitioners contend that it has the option to deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to secure any contingent lien o n its property in the event respondent wins t he case. They argue that Section 2 of Rule 57 only mentions the term "deposit," thus, it cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash. We rule in the negative. Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in w hich the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient
to satisfy the applicant’s demand or the value o f the property to be attached as stated by the applicant,
exclusive of costs." Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff enforcing t he writ shall without delay and with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from exe cution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’ s demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs." From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ o f attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that petitioner’s argument that it has t he option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is unmeritorious. Apropos, the trial court aptly ruled that while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for the reason that a party seeking a stay of the attachment under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount" is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of money as the word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money.
16. Villanueva v JBC PRINCIPLE: FACTS: Petition for certiorari and prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief filed against Judicial and Bar Council to assail constitutionality of requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts RULING: 1. Certiorari and prohibition broader in scope and re ach - issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions 2. Mandamus not proper - does not issue to control or review the e xercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct
3. Declaratory relief not proper - [T]he purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to set tle issues arising from its alleged breach." In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. 4. Supervisory power of the Supreme Court - the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court’s power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules ar e followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have t he discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the wor k done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.12 Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the m atter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
17. Carolino v Senga FACTS: Petition for mandamus to compel payment of retir ement benefits ISSUE: Is mandamus proper RULING: A writ of mandamus can be issued only when pet itioner's legal right to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matte r of law.29 A doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same. The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the RTC was for t he payment of his terminated retirement benefits, which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on the part of the respondents to pay such claim, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such payment.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before t he same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.34 However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal.35 This is because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.36 Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility. 37 Here, the question raised is purely legal, i.e., what law should be applied in the payment of ret irement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial relief can be sought. 18. Sps Manzanilla v Waterfields Industries FACTS: Unlawful detainer case. MTC and RTC r uled in favor of Spouses Manzanilla, the lessor. But CA reversed and ruled there was no cause of action because there was legal compensation of the rental deposit and the rental arrears. ISSUE: WON there was a cause of action RULING: YES For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, t wo requisites must concur: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued. Implied in the first r equisite, which is needed to establish the cause of action of the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation of the contract of lease entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease conditions alleged to have been violated. Thus, in Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the evidence needed to establish the cause of ac tion in an unlawful detainer case is (1) a lease contract and(2) the violation of that lease by the defendant. the CA acted on its mistaken notion as to when a cause o f action arises. It did not base its deter mination of the existence of the cause of action from the fact thatWaterfields failedto pay rents from December 1997 to May 1998. Toit, the cause of action in this case only arose after the contract was terminated and the rental deposit was found sufficient to cover t he unpaid rentals. This is erroneous since as already discussed, it is the failure to pay rent which gives rise to the cause of action. Prescinding from this, the CA’s acknowledgement that Waterfields failed to pay rent, as shown by its declaration that the latter is the debtor of the spouses Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid rentals, is clearly inconsistent with the conclusion that no cause of action for ejec tment exists against Waterfields. Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract due to nonpayment of rent. It therefore follows that the cause of action for unlawful detainer in this case must nece ssarily arise before the termination of the contract and not the other way around as what the CA supposed. Indeed, in going beyond the termination of the contract, the CA went a bit too far in its resolution of this case.
19. Silverio v Silverio
RULING: the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator. It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. Asearly as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, w hich is not authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser. There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics ours) Our jurisprudence is there fore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 20 06. Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner. In reversing the intestate court’s or der annulling the sale of the subject properties, t he CA noted that
said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the appointment of petit ioner as administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
20. Tujan-Militante v Cada Deapera Tujan-Militante v Cada Deapera TOPIC: HABEAS CORPUS, Jurisdiction, enforceability PRINCIPLE: Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.
FACTS:
Application for writ of habeas corpus filed by respondent Cada-Deapera against petitioner TujanMilitante for custody of her minor daughter Criselda. Petitioner Tujan-Militante resides in Quezon City with the minor. Summons were not se rved but the writ was served in Quezon City to Tujan-Militante. Petitioner’s arguments:
Petitioner Tujan-Militante moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction relying on Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains that the habeas corpus petition should have been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over her place of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be found. Respondent asserts that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC which provides that a petition for a wr it of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court and the writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to w hich the Family Court belongs. She also argues that the court has no jurisdiction over her person because summons was not served. ISSUE: 1. whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition filed by respondent who resides in Quezon City 2. whether or not the Court validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda when only the writ was served but not the summons. HELD: Jurisdiction
Considering that the writ is made e nforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of t he writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought. The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, C aloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela. In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as here. In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to t he same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner re sides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule. Section 3 and Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC
Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain reading of
said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus: Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the F amily Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where the minormay be found. Service of Summons: Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that t he summons was improperly served, suffice it to state that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
21. Salibo v Quezon City PRINCIPLE: 1. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is c ontinuously being illegally detained. 2. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.] 3. Habeas corpus is the remedy when a person is arrested without a warrant o f arrest and an information filed against him without preliminary investigation
FACTS: A warrant for Butukan S. Malang was issued in relation to the Maguindano massacre. Petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer P olice Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang but he was arrested then and there. Thus, Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Br anch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the P etition on the merits. Warden filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals. Salibo argues that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority to hear r espondent Warden on the Return, the trial court’s Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal before this court.
ISSUE: Is habeas corpus the proper remedy in cases of mistaken identity? Should a habeas corpus proceeding delegated by the CA to the RTC be appealed to the CA or the SC? RULING: Propriety of remedy Petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash I nformation apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a
Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case. A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S . Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another per son named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Appeal
An application for a writ of habeas cor pus may be made through a petition filed before t his court or any of its members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or any of its pre siding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.53 A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54 The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the pet ition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court. In Saulowhen a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty.65 However, once the superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower court, not of the superior court. Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to dete rmine the merits"74of petitioner Salibo’s Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court o f Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court
with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts,75 respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
22. Mendoza v People PRINCIPLE – Probable cause There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge t hose whom he believes to have committed the c rime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise st ated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.32 The difference is clear: The exec utive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arre st should be issued. In People v. Inting:33 x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the war rant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied) While it is within the trial court’ s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on
hand, it is only for the purpose o f determining whether a warrant of arre st should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding. 23. Enrile v Manalastas
PRINCIPLE: The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law. FACTS: Complaint for less serious physical injuries filed in MTC. MTC found probable cause. Accused filed motion to quash but it was denied by MTC. Accused filed a petition for certiorari with t he RTC. RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari. Accused filed a petition for certiorari to the CA for the RTC dismissal. CA dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy since the petition for certiorari with t he RTC was an original action and the proper remedy to it was an appeal. RULING: CA dismissal proper Firstly, considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original action, the dismissal of the petition for certiorari on May 25, 2004, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration onJuly 9, 2004, were in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such, the orders were final by reason of their completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more to be done by the RTC.17 The proper re course for the petitioners should be an appeal by notice of appeal,18 take n within 15 days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.19 Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. S uch choice was patently erroneous and impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extra ordinary reliefs to address jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress is that the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the denial of the motion to quash correct , for it would be premature and unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the supposed failure by the complainants to prove the period of their incapacity or of the medical attendance for them. Indeed, t he time and the occasion to establish the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance would only be at the t rial on the merits. Petition for certiorari of the MTC denial of motion to quash NOT PROPER in the first place The proper recourse of the petitioners was to enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and should the decision of the MTC be adverse t o them in the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal from the judgment and assign as er ror the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.33 Certiorari was not available to them in the RTC because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.
People v Jimenez People v Pareja People v CA Pilipinas Shell v Romars Intl Gases Corp MCMP Construction v Monark Equipment People v Espineli
