Kerry Lugar Bill “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009” Purpose: In introducing this bill, Senators Kerry and Lugar aim to help transform the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, Kerry Ke rry and Lugar aim to build a deeper, broader, long-term strategic engagement with the people (and not just the leaders) of this vitally important nation. The Kerry-Lugar approach towards Pakistan emphasizes a long-term re lationship built on mutual trust and cooperation: only then will the people of Pakistan see the United States as an ally with shared interests and goals, such as defeating militant extrem ists that threaten the national security of both countries. For decades, the U.S. has sought to gain the cooperation of Pakistani decision-makers through military aid, while neglecting the needs of the population itself. Over the years, U.S. U.S. assistance to Pakistan has fluctuated with political events, sending mixed messages and leading most Pakistanis to question both our intentions and our staying power. Today, most Pakistanis believe the United States will cut and run when it serves our o ur purpose, a belief which undermines our long-term efforts to defeat extremists, foster democratic change, and support transparent and accountable institutions that promote security and stability in Pakistan.
A premise underlying the Kerry-Lugar approach is a simple thought-exercise. Following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, the United States devoted nearly $1 billion to relief r elief efforts and reaped a greater reward r eward in popular support than any amount of public diplomacy could generate. The sight of American servicemen and and women saving the lives lives of Pakistani citizens was worth ten times the cost of operating the Chinook helicopters. For a brief period, America was challenging the terrorists in a true tr ue battle of hearts and minds—and winning. Senators Kerry and Lugar believe that through through this legislation, we can recreate these conditions: conditions: We can materially and powerfully demonstrate the true friendship of the American people for the Pakistani people, without waiting for a natural (or man-made) disaster. The dangers of inaction are rising almost by the day. day. Since President Obama called on Congress to pass the Kerry-Lugar Kerry -Lugar bill in late March, the situation on the ground in Pakistan has deteriorated precipitously. Taliban fighters have imposed imposed their brutal rule far outside the border areas, and made inroads within 60 miles of the capitol. It will be Pakistanis, not Americans, who must ultimately decide their nation’s future. But we can help empower those
Pakistanis who are fighting to turn their country towards a path of moderation, stability, and regional cooperation. That’s the foundation of the Kerry-Lugar bill. Key Provisions of the Kerry-Lugar Bill on Pakistan
Triples non-military aid to $1.5 billion per year—as a long-term pledge to the people
of Pakistan. Authorizes $7.5 billion over the next 5 years ($1.5 billion annually for FY 2009 –2013) in non-military aid, and advocates an additional $7.5 billion over the subsequent 5 years; total 10-year amount (authorized and hortatory): $15 billion .
De-links military from non-military aid. In the past, past, security assistance always always overshadowed development aid: the Pakistani military m ilitary could bypass civilian authorities to focus policy on its institutional interests. Under Kerry-Lugar, economic assistance is Page 1 of 3
no longer the poor cousin to military aid. Rather than locking in a level of such aid which might not be in line with rapidly-changing Pakistani capabilities and commitment, the bill leaves the level of security aid to be determined on a year-by-year basis.
Conditions military aid on certification that the Pakistani security force s are: o
o
o
Making concerted efforts to prevent al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups from operating in the territory of Pakistan; Making concerted efforts to prevent the Taliban from using the territory of Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to launch attack s within Afghanistan; and Are not materially interfering in the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.
The non-security funds will be used for projects that benefit the people of Pakistan: o
o
o
Just and democratic governance, including police reform, equipping and training (up to $100 million allocated); independent judicial systems; political pluralism and rule of law; respect for human rights and promotion of independent media; transparency and accountability of government; anticorruption efforts; and countering the drug trade. Economic freedom, including sustainable economic growth and sustainable use of natural resources; investments in energy and water; employment generation; and worker rights. Investment in people, particularly women and children, including broad-based public primary and secondary education and vocational training; food security and agricultural development; quality public health; and higher education.
Requires benchmarks for measuring the effectiveness of U.S. assistance , including a systematic, qualitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved.
Requires the President to submit to Congress a detailed report outlining United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan.
Requires the President to submit a semi-annual report to Congress that describes in detail the assistance provided to Pakistan under this Act and assesses the effectiveness of U.S. assistance thus far, including any incidents of waste, fraud, and abuse.
Requires the Secretary of State, after consulting with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, to submit to Congress an annual report on the progress of the Pakistani security forces.
Authorizes new money for administrative expenses, $20 million for auditing expenses, and $5 million for the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan to provide humanitarian relief.
Urges accountability and transparent reporting of Coalition Support Funds.
Directs the Secretary of State (in consultation with other named officials) to su
bmit to Congress a comprehensive strategy for the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas.
Additional detail/explanation of provisions in the Kerry-Lugar Bill on Pakistan
Non-military aid. This is the heart of the bill—shifting the center of gravity in the U.S.Pakistan relationship from military to non-military engagement. The bill authorizes a Page 2 of 3
figure that more than triples the current levels of non-military funding. To insure that the aid reaches the people directly, as much as possible goes directly to projects such as improving the secular educational system, building clinics, drilling wells, reforming police, etc. Some of this money would be used in the border areas, but it would be available for projects throughout Pakistan. The ten-year timeframe (5 years authorized, 5 years hortatory) is intended to address persistent Pakistani fear that the U.S. is interested only in a short-term tactical (and highly transactional) relationship. The $1.5 billion annual authorization is intended not merely to enable measurable progress, but to signal a serious shift in policy : a true break with the practice of the past that provides some insulation from the vagaries of the budgetary process.
Military aid conditions. These conditions incorporate longstanding U.S. demands for increased Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and affiliated groups, and for the military to refrain from interference in the democratic process. They provide powerful leverage for the Administration to gain better results for the billions the United States spends. The bill takes no position on whether military aid will increase, decrease, or remain at current levels: That should be determined year-to-year, on the basis of need and cooperation. These limitations will pose no undue burden: any Pakistani regime unable to satisfy the benchmarks would be an unlikely partner for U.S. efforts, and there is a national security waiver which can be exercised w ith explanation, given in classified form if necessary.
Expanded engagement with the people of Pakistan. This is a key element of the overall strategy, but must rely on Administration policy implementation rather than on legislation. A deepened and broadened engagement would address issues of concern to the Pakistanis, rather than merely focusing on issues of concern to the U.S. We will not always agree with Pakistani interlocutors on such topics. But by insisting on a dialogue that is weighted almost entirely towards counterter rorism issues, we fail to provide the sort of respectful, open-ended engagement on which true cooperation is based.
Accountability and transparency for Coalition Support Funds (CSF). Currently, the U.S. supplies about $1 billion annually in CSF to Pakistan. The accounting and transparency of this program makes a true reckoning impossible: How much of the $6-7 billion we have spent on CSF so far has actually gone to its intended purpose (compensation for actual expenses incurred in combating Al Qaeda and the Taliban)? How much has been used for the normal operating expenses of the Pakistani military—or siphoned into the general budget of the state? The bill urges transparent accounting and tightened Congressional oversight.
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