Hasegawa & Nippon vs. Kitamura
GR No. 149177 (November 23, 2007) FACTS: Nippon, a Japanese consultancy firm providing infrastructure support to foreign governments, entered into an Independent Contractor’s Contract (ICA) with Kitamura on April 1, 1999 with a period of one year. Kitamura is a Japanese national permanently residing in the P hilippines. He was hired to work on the Southern Tagalog Access Road project of the DPWH. Kitamura was named as the project manager for the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement projec t of the DPWH but was later informed that Nippon will not automatically renew his contract and will only be engaging his services until the substantial completion of the Southern Tagalog project, w hich is until the expiration of his contract. Kitamura sued Nippon and Hasegawa for specific performance and damages with RTC Lipa City. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction claiming that the claim for improper termination could only be heard in the courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. RTC denied Nippon’s motion. The RTC’s decision was upheld by the CA. Issues: 1. W/N the finality of the CA’s decision barred the filing of the second petition 2. W/N Hasegawa was authorized to act o n behalf of Nippon only on the certiorari petition filed with the CA 3. W/N the verification and certification was defective 4. W/N Rule 65 was the proper to question the RTC’s motion to dismiss 5. W/N the RTC had jurisdiction despite the fact that the ICA was entered into by and between two Japanese nationals, written in Japanes and executed in Tokyo, Japan Held: 1. No. The CA’s dismissal of the case due to a defective certificate of non-forum non-forum shopping and nonstatement of material dates was a dismissal without prej udice. Nippon can re-file the petition with the appropriate attachments and material dates stated t herein, within the prescribed period. 2. Yes. Nippon already submitted an updated Authorization for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company in the instant petition. The court found the same as sufficient and in compliance with the Rules. 3. Yes. Hasegawa only signed the petition on his behalf and not on behalf of Nippon. This is because the Authorization issued him was only issued by Nippon’s President and CEO and not the company’s Board of Directors. While technical rules of procedure are designed not to frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases. 4. No. It is a well-settled rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and c annot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari under Rule 65 or mandamus. The appropriate course is to file an answer, interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, and to proceed to trial. In case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. Petitioners’ case does not fall among the recognized exceptions to this rule. 5. Yes. Jurisdiction over subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. To succeed in its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims. Here, Nippon did not raise the claim that RTC had no jurisdiction vested by law. Instead, it raised as grounds the principles of lex loci cele brationis and lex contractus, which do not apply to jurisdiction but to choice of law. Neither can the principle of forum non co nveniens be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss as it is not included as a ground in Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Second, discretion lies with the trial court whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine, based on the facts of the particular case. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on t his principle, requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a m atter of defense.
