AIR FORCE REVIEW Vol 2, No 1
THE ECONOMICS OF AIR POWER IN EXTERNAL SECURITY LTC ELMER R AMON PAF The security environment in the Asia- Pacific remains volatile and uncertain because of various factors including the overlapping claims in the South China Sea. Most if not all of the six countries claim ownership of part or of the whole Spratly Island Group are relentlessly pursuing their own respective interests. These countries include a hegemonic giant, considered to be pushing its position in spite bilateral and multilateral accords such as the UNCLOS. The pronounced interest of the United States to stay in the region is considered by other countries as constant. There is a perception that their presence will guarantee protection to its long-standing ally, the Philippines. On the contrary, even with the benefit of a Mutual Defense Treaty of 1947, there is no help expected based on experience in the past. Learning from the neglect of the country’s external capability, the AFP Modernization program, enacted in 1995, was envisioned to enhance the capability of the AFP to be a credible force that can defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. The law outlines the principles of total defense, defense-in-depth and an active defense as strategies for national defense. It calls for the enhancement of the capability of the air force and the navy as well as the army to address both the external and internal security concerns of the country. Recent world developments after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, makes security concerns a priority endeavor for most nations. In the local front, the communists, terrorists, the secessionist rebels, the Abu Sayaff bandits, as well as the perpetrators of transnational crimes continue to inflict a heavy toll on the economy. As a result, the AFP has stepped up its security measures to respond to this new wave of terrorism as well as to avert the international terrorist organization establishment of links with the local rebel groups. Nevertheless, the external situation has remained an immediate concern of the AFP. As the priority policy in the modernization procurement and equipment upgrade have been affected, there are quarters in the establishment that believe a shift is forthcoming in the emphasis from external to internal. However, that remains debatable since the overall outlook in the Asia- Pacific remains uncertain to the whole region. The expected vast mineral and oil reserves in the disputed territory and its importance as a navigational sealane are the primary interest for claims on the islands. For example, the Malampaya Project is a 4.5 billion-dollar project that has an undersea pipeline that delivers gas to power plants in Batangas province south of Manila. Malampaya has a confirmed reserve of 78 billion cubic meters of gas and 85
million barrels of condensate. Aside from the Malampaya site the Department of Energy announced last quarter 2001 the approval for drilling of at least seven oil wells in the country. In 2002, there are at least six ongoing offshore oil drilling projects including three in Palawan, one in Mindoro, one in Sulu and another in Cotabato. The recent completion of the Malampaya Project off the coast of Palawan, renews the importance of the security requirements in the western front. While it may not be the only site of oil and natural gas reserves in the disputed area, it is still one of the most important considerations. It is no wonder then that the claimant countries adamantly hold on to their interest in these islands and is likely to remain so for long. The Philippines continues to recognize the dangers that are posed by disputes over South China Sea, and the economic opportunities of a peaceful and secure environment. It is then strategically sound to defend these economic projects, as, mandated by our constitution. These reasons make it imperative for our government to do whatever it takes to address the issue. It is completely irrational to leave it to chance, and risk a security lapse. While diplomatic means could be an option to ease tension in the area, adequate force capability is needed to back-up the diplomatic initiatives. The question is, how then are we going to defend ourselves? And with what? It is disadvantageous if the Philippines downgrades the country’s defenses in the western front, because other claimant countries could take advantage of the weakened security posture. If the imbalance is not corrected, dire consequences would include an easy kill for the enemy and a loss by default by the country. As a consequence of a weak air force, whatever political, military and economic gains we have achieved, will be all for naught. Is this what our country deserves? Certainly not and we are not about to give up! Credible Air Power stands as the one option that will project defense-in-depth or the main attack platform for air defense. For instance, a squadron composed of 8 single-seat and four dual-seat f-16s, a land based radar and two surveillance/reconnaissance aircraft could also be used for command and control. The requirements are surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, for the meantime, will be beefed up with our present attack helicopters and transport aircraft. By the time we are engaged in the defense acquisitions would be forthcoming. On the whole, the cost of this fleet of aircraft is modest, considering the need to guard the 4.5 billion dollar project and similar other projects underway worth an estimated 26.3 trillion dollars. If this falls on deaf ears, are we then willing to take the risk? Either way we are already taking great risk. Until we are able to address our immediate concern of external defense, we cannot hope to achieve peace as well as secure environment for economic growth. It is imperative to address the immediate threats to our economic assets through well-considered but decisive and credible air power development.
COMMANDER'S CORNER:
Our Own Battleplan
Upon my assumption in 2000, I adjusted the PAF from being a credible air force to power that defines victory in peace or war. This vision, well founded on the tenets of air power, is underwritten by the PAF Modernization Program. To move towards that vision, I laid down three operational imperatives that apply to the broad range of our missions: brilliance in the basics, completion of the core, richness in results. All three had been defined for the guidance of our airmen. The overall strategy, however, that holds the three imperatives in relationship with other factors, has not been fully explained. To henceforth set the rule heading of the Air Force, I unveiled at the start of this year the FIRST FORCE Strategy, the PAF Strategy for 2002-2007. Its main feature is the declaration of the PAF’s core and shared competencies are the capabilities that render our service special and unique, that only we can best deliver, and which identify the Air Force. They form part of any modern Air Force’s basic doctrine. The shared competencies, on the other hand, are the capabilities common and essential to all major services. They include the development and application of doctrine, modern weapons systems, established bases, trained personnel and right organization.
Both core and shared competencies lie at the heart of our air power strategy. Unfortunately, all these years they have not been properly identified. As a result, while we have been gallant in service, we have been unable to call our shots and best possible “plays.” We have been content to merely serve our ‘functions” such as airlift, close air support, search and rescue, and others, which have relegated us mostly to a support role, and made us dependent on the hope that with new acquisitions, we will fly better. It’s time to face realities. The truth is, no matter how modernized we become, no matter how much we develop, as sought by RA 7898, we can never emerge truly victorious without first developing and perfecting our own “signature plays” and winning moves- using all available resources and opportunities. These “ signature plays,” these identified core competencies, are the main focus of the First Force strategy, whose ultimate aim is to progressively transform the PAF into the lead force in military missions as non-military engagements. For easier recall, I have embedded them in the very title “FIRST FORCE”: Force projection, Information advantage, Rapid response and mobility, Strategic impact, Tactical synergy, Force generation and support, Organizational brilliance, Research and applied innovation, Control of stations, and Empowered quality workforce. By design, the first five (FIRST) are the PAF’s core competencies- the defining strengths we must painstakingly develop, as well as the desired outcomes we must attain in all missions. But just as important will be our focus on the next five (FORCE), which underline our shared competencies. All of them are to be regarded as our key result areas. All of them are the PAFs’ principal means and ends. The “FIRST FORCE” will henceforth be the primary reference point for all operational plans, and it is ideal for PAF commanders, officers, and airmen could commit them to memory like Air Force personnel in other countries remember theirs. The yearly operational targets will change, but these ten bearings, these ten points in the PAF’s battle plan must stay.
FIRST FORCE STRATEGY 2002 “Our strategic vision is for the Air Force to define total quality and culture of excellence through air power”
LT GEN BENJAMIN P DEFENSOR JR The idea that the Philippine Air Force fills the role in leading military and nonmilitary operations was intensified by the noteworthy achievements at the end of the year. However, the beginning of 2002 is a remarkable pronouncement of a new strategy aimed to significantly develop the Air Force in transforming into the nation’s First Force on the avenue of Air Power. A highly decisive, flexible, and versatile
quality Air Force capable and ready to lead in military and non-military roles in the security, defense, and development of the nation. The PAF Vision “Philippine Air Force defining victory in peace and conflict”. The PAF envisions a modernized Air Force as the leading force in the preservation of national sovereignty and the protection of territorial integrity as well as the principal partner in national development effort of the government. As such, the imperatives lie on the capability thrust and operational dynamism of the Air Force through the pool of airpower-driven airmen and highly trained competent leaders. In particular, the key factors in carrying out this vision is essentially founded on the organization’s brilliance in the basics completion of the competencies, and the richness in results despite the availability of meager resources at hand. Yet, the Air Force will continue to be faster, stronger, and better organization in service to the country and people. A quality Air Force defining victory in peace and conflict–this is the PAF Vision for a total span of five years, starting 2002. The PAF Objectives The PAF establishes objectives in the accomplishment of its mandated mission with emphasis on air power application. First, the decisive defeat of all armed internal threats through the application of applied operational doctrine in all kinds of force engagement. Second, the projection of air power s the nation’s first line of defense in protecting national territory and maintaining territorial integrity. Third, the protection of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) through active air defense. Fourth, the contribution to regional peace and stability through pursuing bilateral defense agreements within the region. Fifth, PAF will support and assist lead government agencies though progressive non-traditional engagement. Finally, to establish PAF as First Force in most missions through its established core competencies. The PAF Operational Concepts In pursuit of its objectives, the PAF acknowledges fundamental requirements to First Force Strategy as follows: Active Air Defense is the capability based on decisive airpower paradigm as applied to protect national territory, to deter enemy aggression, and to suppress enemy forces. Dynamic Interoperability is the synergistic optimization of forces engaged in theater for the effective accomplishment of PAF mission. It speaks of air power as a ‘force multiplier” in any armed engagement. Integrated Support entails sustainability of logistical requirement vis-à-vis available resources in any PAF engagement.
Joint Security is a collective commitment in the course of operations interlinked with other military forces, government agencies, non-military units, general public, and allies. Non-Traditional Engagement constitutes, socio-economic ventures, and relief and recovery efforts of the PAF serving as the primary partner of the government in national development and progress. Key Result Areas and Operational Targets Force Projection In peacetime, the Air Force will actively participate in securing the Malampaya Project through intensified maritime air patrols over zoning and security and economy to optimize resources. On operations against terror, the Air Force will proactively participate as well as support international peacekeeping effort. Finally, PAF will expand the role and capability for search and rescue in times of crisis and calamities. In times of conflict and increasing threat, PAF will project air defense through better radars, more fighters, and integrated Philippine Air Defense Control Center (PADCC) and Air Defense Alert Center (ADAC). The Air Force will interdict strongholds of terror and conflict and will support government effort against criminality and lawlessness in order to encourage foreign investors in the country. In the light of Internal Security Operations (ISO), PAF will employ and lead a new strategy based on air power operational application and provide active assistance and support to allies through bilateral defense cooperation. Information Advantage In the new era, information closely associated with technology is a decisive military tool. In this regard, the PAF will establish an Air Force-wide information advantage through inter/intra command connectivity. It will include the acquisition of modern platforms such as sensors, radar system, and aircraft. Similarly, the Air Force will integrate the management systems of personnel, logistics, and finance. Moreover, PAF will upgrade technical intelligence capability and will likewise develop computer security. Rapid Response and Mobility The PAF will adopt a wide-fast-response strategy in all scenarios and conditions of emergency, calamity, and distress. In order to achieve such undertaking, the Air Force will maintain above 75 percent operational readiness of aircraft under its inventory. Moreover, the adoption of new doctrine will effect the full utilization of air assets such as Sikorsky and Bell helicopters for combat and search rescue, and the PAF reservists and civilian volunteers for rapid response tasks and responsibilities will also be organized to support the Air Force. In tactical operations, PAF will increase the employment of SF-260 TPs. Also, quick reaction teams from 710th Special Operations Wing (SPOW) will be organized and employed fro combat in areas as required.
Strategic Impact As a result of the country’s growing dependence on aerospace and technological advances, PAF is envisioned to have the best potential and leverage in the future. Hence, the Air Force’s effort should gear towards its transformational role in the future. In line with this, the PAF will develop strategic impact by establishing new PAF doctrine covering strategic, tactical, and operational levels. The Air Power Institute will be activated to pursue doctrine development and further the study of air power application. Moreover, PAF will endeavor in enhancing air power consciousness among AFP personnel including concerned decision-makers in various government agencies. The PAF will push for the increase capabilities of Air Force Research and Development Center (AFRDC), as well as the establishment of a repair center of aircraft. Likewise, selected air bases and stations will be offered to selected commercial aerospace industries as growth centers. Tactical Synergy In jointness, the PAF produces the best synergistic effects–the AFP’s first force multipliers. In this regard, the PAF, guided by operational doctrine of decisive force engagement, will increase participation in joint exercises for greater interoperability. To optimize the advantages of cross training, the Air Force will actively partake in bilateral defense training such as the RP-US Balikatan. PAF will also increase the number of search and rescue and survival training for civilian volunteers ready to tap in any eventuality. Likewise, the reservist training programs will be redesigned for purposes of better application and field expertise. PAF will continue to increase exposure to non-traditional activities in support to government and nongovernmental organizations. Furthermore, PAF will pursue special projects with other law enforcement agencies to sharpen operational readiness to respond to peace and order. Force Generation and Support Force Generation and Support means any activity that sustains PAF operational readiness as a fighting force. It covers three areas, namely: Resource and Financial Management, Focused Acquisition, Upgrade and Maintenance, and Enlistment of Support. The Air Force will adopt IT Project Management and IT Delivery of Services. Likewise, changes in the procurement system will be instituted to implement a PAF wide cost-cutting strategy and to focus financial resources to core requirements. The procurement of quality personnel will be pursued to optimize expertise and competency. Eventually, PAF will upgrade aircraft and aircraft armaments support facilities to provide more capable weapons and support systems for tactical units. Additionally, the Air Force will push through with the acquisition of more fighters and transport aircraft and the commissioning of additional helicopters. However, upgrade will not only include equipment but also personnel in terms of training to keep the aircraft properly maintained. Organizational Brilliance Organizational brilliance in the Air Force means simplicity, flexibility, and responsiveness. Most of the time there exists, in all units, alignment between and among resources, systems, doctrines, structures, objectives, mission, and leadership directions. In order to make intensified air campaigns in the South, the Command will
establish a 4th Tactical Operations Wing in Davao to cover the whole area of Eastern Mindanao. Likewise, the Air Force will make further response through the activation th of the 740 Combat Wing that will lead in Internal Security Operations (ISO) in th certain areas of the country. Additionally, the 724 Explosive Ordnance Disposal and th the 726 K-9 Squadrons will be fully constituted for other special operation purposes. Research and Applied Innovation Air power is the great provider that allows all dimensions as well as other forces and agencies to optimize their respective contribution to national security. Behind the rise of air power is research and development or innovation. For this purpose, the Air force will break more boundaries with more of its developed precision guidance systems, critical aircraft and aerospace ground support equipment, aerial bombs and warheads, and automatic grenade launcher systems. Likewise, several conversion projects will be undertaken through the resourceful Air Force Research and Development Center (AFRDC). Command and Control of Stations The PAF aim is to project not only the name and discipline of its airman, but also the Air Force culture in every air base and station and a culture that is highstepping with the times reflective of effectiveness, efficiency and modernity. On the other hand, the relatively long period for base development will not in any way hamper the mandated mission of the PAF. Yet, the Air Force will continue to project additional bases and alternate stations in the western front. Eventually, the Air Force will continue to project additional bases and alternate stations in the western front. Eventually, the Air Force culture of excellence will surface in all PAF bases. Empowered Quality Work Force Given the expanding capabilities of the Air Force, every airman has to be steeped in the basics of air power, trained and motivated well, provided quality responsive education, and given the appropriate support systems to do his job and fulfill his purpose in the PAF. Hence, PAF has to provide the best to the airmen so they can give their best to the Air Force in return. In line with this endeavor, the Air Force will provide airmen better opportunities for training locally and abroad. Increase exchanges with foreign counterparts on matters of expertise will also be undertaken to advance their careers and broaden their mindset. Likewise, the Command will intensify the culture of excellence within the organization for the airmen to appreciate the basics of air power. In a nutshell, the FIRST FORCE Strategy responds to the challenge to make the Air Force the nations LEADING FORCE through a majority of airpower applications and best performance. Significantly, the inherent role of air power in the preservation of our national security and territorial integrity essentially propels the PAF in coming out with the FIRST FORCE Strategy. As stressed by Winston Churchill the rationale behind the existence of the Air Force: “Not to have an adequate air force in the present state of the world is to compromise the foundations of national freedom and independence…”
DEFINING DOCTRINE By Major Noel Lacambacal Patajo PAF Assistant Chief, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, GHQ
Doctrine is like a compass bearing; it gives us the general direction of our course. We may deviate from that course on occasion, but the heading provides a common purpose to all who travel along the way. This puts a grave burden on those who formulate doctrine, for a small error, even a minute deviation, in our compass bearing upon setting out, may place us many miles away from the target at the end of the flight. If those who distill doctrine from experience or devise it from logical inference in the abstract fail to exercise the utmost rigor in their thinking, the whole service suffers. I. B. HOLLEY, Jr
The preceding statement underscores the importance of doctrine and reminds us of the heavy responsibility of doctrine writers. Such responsibility, I suspect, may be the underlying reason why it is difficult to find dedicated doctrine writers not only within the Air Force but also within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Recently, the Commander-in-Chief, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo reminded the AFP of the importance of doctrine. The orders are clear and it is no longer needed to repeat what the over-all Commander desires regarding the AFP doctrine. began when then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 spearheaded the effort to print several set of manuals per major services. The effort was the “general direction” for the AFP. The Office of Special Studies of the Air Force, with guidance from J3 and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations, A-3, handled the Air Force manual writing and publication. Through the years, these manuals serve as the sole reference of the Air Force. When the AFP modernization began to take shape in the early 1990s, doctrine was not a major component. It was only during the subsequent deliberations that doctrine, as basis of modernization, became the acknowledge reference. The AFP, as well as, its major services has the manuals of the late 1970s to refer to. As such, it is fair to say that the AFP modernization has been anchored on doctrine. Currently, it is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Education and Training, J8 that is responsible for doctrine component of the AFP Modernization. Why is J8 handling doctrine development now when J3 used to be the main office responsible for doctrine
development? This is one aspect of AFP doctrine development that I intend to discuss in the future paper. But, what is doctrine? When I was still very much involved in doctrine development and overseeing the Air Force side of doctrine development, almost all Officers with varying rank level ask the same question. I believe that such question was posited not because of ignorance but of worry that doctrine definition has been blurred by time, technology, theories and most of all of their experiences.
The Nature of Doctrine Doctrine is a body of principles in any branch of knowledge. It is based on an accumulation of knowledge gained through experience, study, analysis, and test. Doctrine is dynamic. It varies from time to time, situation to situation. As such, it is considered to be the best way of doing things in the present period.
Military Doctrine Military doctrine is officially believed and taught as the best way to conduct military affairs. It is an authoritative statement of principles for the employment of military resources designed for continuing applicability in war and peace. It is founded primarily on the result of accurate analysis and interpretation of experience. In areas where there is no real experience to draw on, doctrines are formulated from the extrapolations of experience based on sound judgment, logic, intuition, and sometimes ‘gut feeling’. Military doctrines can be very dynamic and should change accordingly with the type of conflict, along with corresponding changes in the environment, political directions about the employment of military forces, and the doctrine of the threat force in that particular conflict.
Categories of Military Doctrine Military doctrines are divided into three categories: Environmental, Joint and Combined. Figure 1: STRUCTURE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE
Environmental Doctrine. Environmental doctrine is a compilation of beliefs about the best employment of military forces within a particular operating medium. The Armed Forces operate in three different environments – land, sea, and air – each with distinct nature and characteristics. The uniqueness of each environment calls for separate and specific doctrine that embodies the beliefs on how to use land power, sea power, and air power in their respective environments. Environmental doctrine is also known as Single Service Doctrine. Joint Doctrine. In relation to air power, joint doctrine provides guidance for employment of PAF forces engaged in joint operations with the other major services. It prescribes the best way to integrate and employ air forces with land and naval forces in joint military operations. Responsibility for the development of doctrines for certain types of joint operations is assigned to individual major services. The major service having primary responsibility for the development of doctrine for joint operations does so in consultation and coordination with the other services. Combined Doctrine. Combined doctrine establishes the principles, organization, and procedures agreed upon between the AFP and allied forces in combined operations. This type of doctrine is normally developed to support mutual defence treaties, agreements, or organizations and promotes compatible arrangements for employment of AFP forces in combined operations. In relation to air power, combined doctrines serves as a guide for the application of air power doctrine to combined operations, and describes the best way to integrate and deploy air forces with allied forces in coalition warfare. Inter-relationship. In modern warfare, the key to victory is jointness in planning and operations. However, fundamental to joint operation is single-service expertise. Therefore, single service doctrine is the backbone of joint and combined doctrine. It is only when single service doctrine is strong that the synergy of land, air and sea power can result in optimum combat power. Figure 2: The Levels of Doctrine
Levels of Doctrine Strategic Doctrine. Strategic doctrine states the fundamental principles for employment of air forces to attain national objectives in peace and war. It serves as a
reference or authority for all other doctrines; information for instruction in military service schools; material for public and internal information programs; and positions to support budgetary procurement programs. It establishes the framework and foundation for the effective use of air power. Operational Doctrine. Operational doctrine establishes principles and rules governing organization, direction, and employment of air forces in the accomplishment of basic combat operational missions in conventional and unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency and special operations, and various military tasks consonant with military preparedness. It embodies the concepts and principles derived from the strategic doctrines, serving as a guide for the air force in the organization and employment of its forces to perform its function in a particular type of conflict with authorised entitlements. Tactical Doctrine. Tactical doctrine establishes detailed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) that guide the use of specific weapons to accomplish specific objectives. It represents guidance on how the air force should be employed in engagements and battles. It should address how to accomplish tactical objectives and how combat situations such as threat, weather, terrain, and available weapons, influence tactics. Inter-relationship. The three levels of doctrine are interrelated. In air power doctrine, for example, they are neither mutually exclusive nor rigidly limited to precise boundaries. I am convinced that AFP officers will continue to search for the definition of doctrine. From the foregoing, allow me to echo Winston Churchill, who said: Those who are possessed of a definitive body of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions upon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking short views, and indulging their natural impulses as they are evoked by what they read from day to day. Military Air Power noted “The clarity and therefore the utility of doctrine is a direct product of how well language is used in writing.” Notes: 1.
Major Noel L Patajo PAF, Philippine Air Force Doctrine Writing Handbook, Canberra 1999.
2.
Lt Col Charles M Westenhoff, USAF, Military Air Power The Cadre Digest of Air power Opinions and Thoughts, Maxwell AFB, October 1990
STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL VIABILITY OF EMPLOYING NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN AIR FORCE OPERATIONS LTC NESTOR P DEONA PAF (GSC) “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.” Giulio Douhet Introduction Today’s emerging warfare is characterized by two interrelated trends. One is the limited nature of conflict that gives premium on minimizing non-combatant casualties as well as collateral damage. The other is speed and precision, which entails the reduction of unintended or undesired effects through accuracy or by weapon especially designed to avoid such effects. The Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict have proven how the accuracy of weapons delivery systems limited the collateral damage that could otherwise have been prohibitive. The conduct of warfare has evolved through the centuries that wars were fought. In the Second World War, we have seen the maximization of weapons lethality with the use of nuclear weapons on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Weapons have become so lethal that it has even threatened the very existence of the planet. The fear of mass destruction thus provided the shift towards weapon that minimize rather than maximize lethality. Thus, the emergence on non-lethal technologies has the potential to alter the character and conduct of military operations. The interest in non-lethal weapons sprung from the need to have options appropriate to the changes in the threat environment and the expanding roles of the military. Though traditional enemies remain, there will be adversaries amidst high-density civilian populations against whom we need new methods in applying force. Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) therefore are extremely important as part of the scheme in addressing the changing nature of conflict. Evidently, the emerging concept of non-lethal warfare is attractive to political leaders and policy makers alike. Such a concept emphasizes the promise of waging a more humane war since it conserve life, resources and the environment. Thus, the prospect for this new generation of weapons resonates strongly with popular opinion that has grown increasingly averse to casualties as a consequence of military operations. Moreover, the relative reversibility of the effects of non-lethal weapons on targets compared to the longer lasting effects of lethal conventional weapons complement the former’s growing acceptability in military operations other than war. The Need for Non-Lethal Weapons The need for NLW in the Philippine Air Force is justified by several compelling reasons. First is the limited nature of warfare as well as the changes in the strategic setting and the threat environment where the demand to minimize casualties and collateral damage is increasing. Second is the expanding role of the military that now include
fulfilling missions in a variety of non-combat operations such as transitional crimes, peacekeeping operations and support to police operations. Third are the evolving domestic security threats where non-traditional actors such as civil society, interest groups, organized crime and terrorist groups are becoming key players. Fourth is the public sensitivity to the use of excessive force and aversion to casualties, thus, demands a conflict that is civilized and humane. Lastly is the enemy’s predilection to using human shields, hostages and minors as a deterrent as well as a political trap against the government. Applications in Air Force Operations The application of NLWs is a novel approach to minimize casualties and collateral damages in specialized Air Force operations. Thus, its introduction is in harmony with the government’s aversion to the use of excessive force and the public’s sensitivity to casualties and collateral damages during the conduct of military operations. Undeniably, NLWs can be introduced and applied in sertain PAF operational roles such as counter insurgency, peacekeeping operations, support to national police operations, support to other government agencies and civil disturbance operations. Selected PAF Missions and Applicable Non-Lethal Technologies NLT Technology/
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PAF Missions Counter insurgency Counter terrorism Peacekeepin g operations Counter drug Non-combat evacuation Disaster relief Civil disturbance operations Ground defense
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NLWs are not viewed as a substitute for lethal force. This suggests that forces equipped with lethal and NLWs shoul remain close enough for mutual support. It was emphasized that the employment of NLWs does not mean no zero casualties but rather an attempt to avoid fatalities and collateral damage. Criteria for Integration Several criteria for the integration of NLWs to the PAF were identified. These are political acceptability, operational utility, safety and cost effectiveness. Political acceptability enumerates the strategic rationale and advantages of NLWs. While operational utility prescribed the operational capabilities and desired qualities for NLWs to be acquired, safety, factors in suitability in situations where it is difficult to distinguish between friend or foe. Cost effectiveness strikes a balance between the desired effects and affordability given the constraint in the Air Force’s budget for weapon acquisition. Conclusion The employment of NLWs in PAF operations is viable in the strategic and tactical sense. The main rationale for the use of non-lethality at the strategic level is the enhancement of the political utility of force. Hence, NLW is attractive to political leaders and policy makers alike. The strategic utilization of NLW can enhance the flexibility of commanders as well as present more options for national decision-makers in conflict and crisis situations. In a tactical environment, NLWs are well suited in addressing the threat posed by an ill-defined adversary especially when the use of lethal forces will result to unacceptable consequences. In any armed confrontation, incidental and accidental casualties could not be avoided. The employment of non-lethal weapons does not guarantee a bloodless situation. It just minimizes the bloodshed. Neither are non-lethal weapons perceived to replace lethal arms in the foreseeable future. At this time it cannot be a substitute to the PAF’s conventional forces and lethal weapons capabilities. However, NLW can be integrated into the PAF capability to complement existing weapons in the Air Force inventory. What the Air Force could do is to systematically employ them to amplify their effects and reduce the reliance on lethal means. Hence, to meet the challenges of ambiguous situations, the PAF must consider non-lethal weapons options. Non-lethal weapons make available to the PAF forces a wider
range of responses to difficult and critical situations. More than that, non-lethality helps avoid criticism that would result from non-combatant casualties and thus enables the PAF to maintain the moral high ground. Recommendations The Air Force should take an active role in the long term planning and advocacy for the application of non-lethal capabilities. It may be appropriate for the Air Force to engage in undertaking the assessment of NLWs for specific mission needs. It is also proposed that non-lethal doctrines should be integrated with existing military doctrines to enhance the utilization of current military capabilities at hand. Similarly, the integration of non-lethality as a component of the PAF’s armed capability would require doctrine to govern their appropriate employment in future Air Force operations. The PAF’s choice and acquisition of non-lethal systems must be based on the following factors: First is the availability of the system and if it is deliverable. Second is the compatibility of the non-lethal systems to existing weapon systems and training processes. Last is the employability of the system to effectively save lives and contribute to mission accomplishment. Given the strategic and tactical viability of employing NLW in PAF operations, it is proposed that NLW development functions be absorbed by the Weapons Systems Development Directorate (WSDD) of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, A-5. this directorate shall have the primary responsibility of advancing the PAF NLW Program, making further studies on NLW applications and monitoring latest developments in nonlethal technology. th
To evaluate the operational employment of NLWs, the 710 Special Operations Wing could be designated as a test unit. The wing has been at the forefront of the PAF’s involvement in unconventional operations such as counter-insurgency, counter terrorism, counter-drug and civil disturbance control where NLWs employment fits in.
LTCOL NESTOR P DEONA PAF (GSC) was formerly the Director OSS, HPAF, currently, he is the Secretary of Air Staff, HPAF.
TO THE PAF FIGHTERS By 1LT CHIVAL CARLOS F ESCALANTE PAF
As technology allowed man to fly at altitudes which would not have otherwise been reached by his natural means, so are parallel advances making possible the increase in his sensory abilities. Already we have equipment that allow us to hear across distances and to see through walls. And one relevant landmark development is that of a portable see-in-the-dark gadget – the Night Vision Goggles (NVG). This device is fast finding indispensable application most particularly in the military. NVG actually isn’t as novel as, perhaps, the e-bomb or bio cloning, but its current employment in tactics is yet to be realized especially in our own air force.
Though undoubtedly beneficial these devices are, its compatibility with our present aircraft stands to be thoroughly considered before an assessment of its applicability can be readily made.
Night vision equipment actually saw its roots as early as the Second World War during which special scopes were used with the illumination from infrared lamps. This capability allowed a special advantage as various night operations went on unhindered under the cover of darkness. However, the scopes that were used, then, were laboriously heavy and the infrared lamps could be transported only aboard a vehicle. Eventually, the advantage that had once been enjoyed was eroded by the enemy’s own discovery of the scope’s technology. Not only did the infrared light sources give-away their positions, but its sheer immobility especially against restricting terrain obstacles proved to be its biggest limitation. Thus evolved development of NVG’s that were capable of operating even under passive lighting conditions, i.e. allowing the user to view in the dark using only ambient light energy available. These first generation of NVG’s were mostly used in the 1960’s during the Vietnam conflict.
Basically, the NVG gave the naked eye a glimpse of a poorly lit object by amplifying the little light energy in the ambient environment into a visible image. The gadget is useless under total darkness. What happens is a photo cathode in the NVG converts traces of light energy it captures into electrical energy. This electric charges are amplified through an electronic intensifier tube into magnitudes enough to project an image in the phosphorescent screen. The image on this screen is, then, focused through an ocular lens which makes the image visible to the user. Therefore, one does not actually “see through” an NVG but “looks at” a processed image. Generation one NVG’s can be easily bought in the U.S. for personal use costing anywhere between Php 20,000 to Php 35,000. But the only NVG’s allowed, however, for military aviation purposes are the generation III types. Commonly referred to as either the AVS-9 or F-4949, these goggles are more compact and amplify light more effectively. F-4949’s have been in use since the early 1990’s which should give us an idea of how adept its users are by now with its operation. Pilots using F-4949’s are trained to adapt to the inherent limitations of these devices. Images seen through an NVG is a monochromatic green (purposely so, as this is the color to which the human eye is most responsive). Users commonly expect a compromise in image clarity and sharpness granting that ambient lighting is no dimmer than at least one thousandth times a full-moonlit evening or that it is not totally dark. The most debilitating handicaps, especially for pilots, are the limited field of vision (FOV) of the F-4949 which is confined to 40and the compromised perception of depth. Research is still underway to improve FOV to at least 100 . But for now, pilots have to make a continuous sweep from left to right in order that as wide a field is monitored as possible. As for the sense of depth, pilots are trained to make do with various visual “hints” they see by their goggles to judge distances. Landings are either performed with close cockpit crew coordination and an elaborate computer-aided landing approach system. Otherwise, a pilot is required to flip-up and turn-off his goggles and land by more conventional visual aids. The issue, then, as to whether the F-4949 currently in use by USAF are presently applicable to PAF aircraft, more particularly the fighters, ultimately rests on the operational compatibility of these devices with our aircraft cockpits. Various criteria ultimately point to at least two questions: 1) Are the cockpit lightings sufficient for the fighter to satisfactorily monitor his instruments and manage his cockpit?; and 2) is the canopy transparent enough to allow the transmission of adequate infrared radiation to be picked-up by the NVG?
Th e S-211, at least, operates with red interior lamps which is typical of all aircraft designed for night flying. By design, the spectral range F-4949’s is between 625 nanometers to 950 nanometers. Therefore, the imaging of red-lit objects such as cockpit instruments should, at least, be no problem. A complication may perhaps may be the ISIS D211 sighting system whose targeting reticle may either be invisible or produce unwanted glare to the NVG user. The latter, however, is more likely and is, as a matter of fact, the lesser of these two evils if indeed nighttime weapons delivery should actually be launched. The second question, admittedly, cannot be as readily answered. Most canopies, though visually transparent, have been known to block of a good amount of infrared light on which NVG’s are heavily dependent. Either our canopies be subjected to spectral evaluation or an actual NVG be directly tested on them at night. Admittedly, this study alone cannot provide an over-night conclusion as to whether our fighters are ready to embrace NVG as part of their tactics. The device may not provide the same impact as an on-board aircraft radar or a satellite-assisted surveillance system as aspired under our modernization thrusts. However, its relative cost presents this gadget as a practical complementary measure, if not a stopgap, towards improving the PAF’s effectivity in accomplishing its mission. REFERENCES: 1.
Maj Stephen C. Hatley USAF. “NVG’s Don’t Fly at Night Without Them”. USAF Flying Safety Magazine, Sept 2001. pages 4-9.
2.
http://www.night-vision-goggles.com
3.
http://nightsee.com
A PREVIEW OF THE PAF WOMEN PILOTS By 1LT LILIAN VICTORIA F DELA CRUZ PAF In an apparent move to provide equal opportunity the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, opened its doors in the early 90s to female who wanted to become aviators. To date, the Philippine Air Force has women pilots who are with the combat, instructor, rescue, tactical and transport fields. Since accepting female pilots into its fold, the number of female pilots in the Philippine Air Force continues to grow. Starting with only two females in 1994, the Air Force now has a total of 25 female pilots since 2000. However, the figure has been trimmed down to 23 following the deaths of two females in tragic accidents in 2001. When the Philippine Air Force opened its doors for female pilots, it initially wanted them to be involved with administrative and instruction flights. This explains why women pilots from the fist two classes of the PAF Flying School that had women were assigned as th instructor pilots with the then 100 Training Wing. It was only in December of 1996 that the Air Force welcomed female pilots into its th other flying units like the 220 Airlift Wing and the 505 Search and Rescue Group. The year after that, four out of the five female graduates of the PAF Flying School 97-Bravo carved history a new in the Philippine Air Force. The Air Force made an unprecedented th
Move of allowing female pilots to join the 15 Strike Wing as combat pilots flying the MG520 attack helicopters and the OV10A bomber planes. th
Recently, the 5 Fighter Wing made history when 2Lt Cecile Bernabe was accepted in the fighter jock’s kingdom as its first fighter pilot. Studies within the Command have been made to assess the feasibility of women pilots, particularly those who are being utilized as tactical pilots. th
For the female pioneers of the 15 Strike Wing, there was some apprehensions when they first reported to the Wing in June 1998. they had several questions in mind. Will they be able to see through their Combat Crew Training? Can they fit into the bastion of the male combat pilots, who have been for years been used to having only men th in the 15 Strike Wing? Their entry was actually well met as everything including combat flying undergoes change and female pilot officers are now welcomed in the Wing. Their entry was not about providing a point or making statement. They merely wanted to be treated as equals, like any other pilot trainee.
Then 2Lt Maribelle Belila and 2Lt Lilian dela Cruz were among the first of the four women who initially saw deployment in Zamboanga after they were checked out as pilots of the MD520MG helicopters in March 1999. Lieutenants Mary Grace Baloyo and Ma Rita Reduta, meanwhile were checked out as Combat Ready Pilots of the OV-10A Bronco aircraft seven months later. Their first deployment was in Palawan. Life, they believed, would never be easy as it involved tremendous adjustments. It took time before they saw deployment because modifications had to be made, particularly comfort rooms in the deployment areas. But then these concerns were swiftly soon addressed. Following the modifications made to suit both genders, the female pilots are no longer restricted to one Advance Command Post (ACP). They have been all over deployment areas in Mindanao-Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, Davao, Jolo, Palawan, Pulacan, Sanga-Sanga and Zamboanga. They have also flown combat missions from Kauswagan to Camp Abubakar in 2000, during the height of the Armed Forces campaign against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In 2001, they were also actively involved in various military campaigns to thwart the Abu Sayyaf Group.
FIRST FORCE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MALAMPAYA PROJECT 2LT CHRISTOPHER ALLAN M MENDOZA PAF The Malampaya gas field was discovered by Shell Philippines Exploration (SPEX) in 1992. However, it was not easily explored due to Shell Philippines Exploration service contract with Occidental Philippines. Nonetheless, when Shell acquired the remaining fifty percent (50%) of Occidental Philippines' interest in the service contract, it paved the way for the development of the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. The total investment required in the development of the Malampaya Project amounted around US$4.5 billion. This project represents the largest and most significant industrial investment in Philippine business. With explorations confirming the presence of 85 million barrels of condensate and at least 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the operation of the project will successfully supply gas available for power plant operations for the next 20 years. This is equivalent to 30% of the country's petroleum requirement for the same period which will surely allow the government a savings of around US$4.5 Billion. On the other hand, the project will not only improve the country's energy requirement but it is also expected to provide additional revenues in the amount of US$8.07 Billion. This is entirely based on a scheme where the government gets 60% of the total net proceeds as stipulated in the contract. In addition, the Armed Forces of the Philippines could also benefit from the Malampaya power project that will provide revenue stream for the defense establishment in line with its Modernization Program. A bill has been filed in Congress allocating to the AFP Trust Fund the share of the government from taxes and charges collected from the Malampaya project. However, a major consideration associated to Malampaya operation is the security and protection of the area of operation specifically related facilities and platforms. In line with this, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 72 establishing safety and exclusion zones around the area of the Malampaya operation. In addition, the Armed Forces of the Philippines was mandated to undertake the necessary measures in the implementation and enforcement of the established safety and exclusion zones.
The establishments of safety and exclusion zones prohibit the conduct of certain activities within the area without authorization from the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of National Defense (DND) and Shell Philippines, respectively. Moreover, an inter-agency committee was established to develop comprehensive strategy and plan in the effective implementation and enforcement of safety and exclusion zones. However, the main responsibility lies with the Armed Forces of the Philippines as mandated by the President and as being the defense force in the country. The security requirements by the operation of the Malampaya Natural Gas Project in the established safety and exclusion zones demand control of the air spaces, surface and sub-surface in the area in order to deter hostile intrusion. The concept of a joint security force will cover areas of possible threat and will be stationed near the facilities and platforms. Likewise, regular naval patrol and maritime air surveillance will be provided in the safety zones and adjacent exclusion areas. Undeniably, the western area of the Malampaya station, which is an international sea-lane communication, is vulnerable to covert intrusion in any form of attack. Furthermore, the ongoing activities near the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) pose another peril in the security of the Malampaya operation. Worst, is the intensified terroristic activities deeply involved in economic saboteurs such as the recent attack of World Trade Center and the destruction of Brazil's oil rig. The estimated Hydrocarbon deposits broken down as oil is about 1.748 billion barrels (US$26.220 Trillion) and as gas approximately 16,766 billion cubic feet (US$46 Billion). Hence, security must be provided for unhampered exploration. The Philippine Air Force has the primary concern of securing the country's outer zone of defense that involves active air defense. However, in the light of the Malampaya operation, there are still important aspects of air power application aside from tactical operations such as search and rescue missions, airlift operations, counter air operations, close air support and interdiction. Certainly, the development of air power as the primary defense posture of the country has limited its application in the internal security operations. Today, the Philippine Air Force struggles a strategic shift in the employment of air power capability towards external defense. The role of air power is inherently associated in the preservation of our national security and territorial integrity. The current security requirement of the Malampaya Gas Project illustrates the necessity of paradigmatic shift from internal concerns to external concerns. Indeed, the project is situated at a strategic doorway - characteristically adjacent to a critical area of sea-lane of communication and transportation. Though limited in resources and capability, the PAF continue to provide air assets committed in securing the Malampaya area in performing maritime patrols.
The serious issue regarding the limited capability of the PAF to provide effective security for the Malampaya needs to be addressed by the National Government and Congress through the immediate acquisition of modern equipment. Moreover, the AFP must fully realize the importance of air power application as the vital cog of our national defense posture. In the global scene, the current war against terrorism waged by the United States against Afghanistan affirms the decisiveness of air power application in the settlement of modern armed conflict. Moreover, the painful and costly lessons of history during World War I and II, Korean War, Bosnian War and the Gulf War attested to the success of air power. The outbreak of war in Mindanao tailored by the secessionists group confirmed the airworthiness of the PAF roles as an independent and distinct force in the suppression of enemy forces.
In conclusion, the Philippine Air Force defines air power encompassing both military and economic endeavor. As a result, the PAF addresses both internal and external defense and serves as the partner of the government in national development efforts. Now, it's about time for the government to look for alternative sources of funds to implement the PAF Modernization Program to address in particular the Malampaya project and in general the Philippine sovereignty.
1 SPEX, "Malampaya Deep Water to Gas Project Brochures and Pamphlets", p. 3 2 Department of Energy and US DNR Technical Assistant Division
VIP FLYING IN AN UNFRIENDLY ENVIRONMENT BY CPT DANIEL M ESPIRITU PAF FLYING THE PRESIDENT INTO THE HEART OF SIERRA MADRE AND THE CORDILLERA’S
Flying the highest figure in the land is the job of the pilots and crew of the th 250 Presidential Airlift Wing. It is the President’s thrust to personally assess the needs of the least privileged Filipino people in the most remote part of the country. This intention sometimes does not give much options to the presidential pilots especially in flying to a place with probably the most unfriendly environmental condition in the archipelago. The unit’s mission is; “to provide safe, secure and effective air transportation to the President of the Republic of the Philippines, immediate members of his/her family, visiting heads of state and other local and foreign VVIP’s”. Flying the President requires the highest degree of safety, the ultimate achievable comfort, and maximum security. This th is the very reason why the original word “efficient” is changed to “effective” in the 250 PAW mission statement although it has been the usual word for several years. It is mainly because the word effective justifies the unit’s firm stand in mission accomplishment. Although to be effective and to be efficient is at the same time the primary consideration, efficiency can be traded off to effectiveness if the situation requires so. A firm stand that explains the doctrine of conducting ocular inspection and probing flight prior to the real McCoy. Ocular inspection on the planning aspect of a presidential engagement is a general assessment of all the landing zones (LZs) and surrounding environment on intended places of engagement. It covers selection and clearing of the safest and widest LZ, determination of fuel requirements based on the actual nature of LZs and other aspects essential to flight planning and performance of the mission. The inspection might be done by land or by air possibly involving a non-250 PAW air asset. On the other hand, probing flight is done to determine the actual time en route, to check suitability of LZs and to confirm if recommendations during the ocular inspection regarding improvement of the chosen landing spots have been done accurately. The flight requires the use of the same type of aircraft to be used on the real McCoy. This procedure on VVIP flying obviously involve extra efforts and additional resources to the extent of considering “back-ups to the back-up” but it guarantees the unit with 101% successful mission accomplishment. The recent visit of the President in the mountainous regions of Northern Luzon was indeed a th great challenge on the part of the 250 PAW, but with the employment of the right doctrine and with the unlimited tactics and skills of the Presidential pilots, the mission is a clear success.
TACTICS WILL COME ALONG AS SITUATION CALLS In the world of reality, there are times that even the most ideal doctrine can never be employed. This is proven consistent in the field of helicopter flying wherein terrain, weather condition, time constraint, limited resources, security situation, other environmental factors are the most likely the common causes. It was timed with most unpredictable trend of weather when the visit of the President took place in the rugged terrains of Sierra Madre and the Cordillieras from 29 December 2001 to 11 January 2002. The visit covered the provinces of Benguet, Ilocos Sur, Abra, Ifugao, Kalinga and the Pacific side of Isabela. It was on this pressing time when the Bluebirds, without intent, have overridden the ideal procedure in VIP flying which calls for the formulation of a tactical approach in VIP flying called, “the RoundRobin maneuver”. WHEN THE LESSER EVIL IS THE LAST OPTION (THE ROUND-ROBIN MANEUVER) In situations very far from the ideal, usually the flight commander is being pressed to the wall and made to choose the lesser evil as the last option. However, it should be an option that still could guarantee safe and successful mission accomplishment. The postchristmas Sierra Madre- Cordillera presidential mission is a scenario wherein the Roundrobin maneuver is best applicable.
This new tactic in VIP flying “ the round-robin maneuver”, is especially suited for mountainous regions as best described by the rugged terrain, high pinnacles and narrow ridges of the Sierra Madre and the Cordillera. It is a maneuver employed in multiple helicopter operation that rotates the members of the flight in the sequence of take offs and landings in areas of limited space. In this scenario the other members of the flight drop their passengers at the primary LZ before proceeding to the alternate LZ. The primary aircraft and the last aircraft to land will occupy the primary LZ. The Round-robin maneuver does not cater only to space-limited LZ’s, but it also increases the leverage in fuel reserve and lessen the airborne exposure of the VIP since it significantly reduces en route and loiter time. It also satisfies the consideration that the back-up aircraft (“B”) should always be at the side or nearest to the primary aircraft (“A”), either airborne or on the ground, due to its role as back-up and security aircraft. By protocol, in multiple helicopter operation, the primary aircraft (“A”) lands first, followed by the back-up aircraft (“B”) carrying close-in-security personnel, then the secondary aircraft (“C”), followed by the tertiary (“D”) etc. Oftentimes protocol in the sequence of landing is being waived in space-limited LZ’s. However, the proximity of “B”
to the primary aircraft must never be waived as much as possible due to its security function. CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT Definition: Primary aircraft - aircraft that carries the VVIP designated as “A”. Back-up aircraft – back up to the primary aircraft that carries close in and SRU (Special Reaction Unit, PSG) personnel designated as “B”. Secondary/Tertiary aircraft - back-up to the back-up aircraft that carries other VIPs designated as “C”, “D” etc. They will be rotated to act as “B” on the roundrobin concept. Primary LZ – landing zone and parking position for the primary aircraft while the VVIP is in the place of engagement. It must be on or near the place of engagement. Alternate LZ – alternate landing spot and parking position for other members of the flight after dropping their passengers at the primary LZ in mountainous areas wherein there is no access for land vehicle to the primary LZ. From the first departure point to the first itinerary, with a primary LZ that can only accommodate two or only one aircraft, C, D, etc. should take off ahead of A and B to avoid slowing down of A and B prior to landing. This technique will give enough time for C, D, E etc. To drop passengers at the primary LZ (wherein “A” and “B” will later make full stop landing) before proceeding to the alternate LZ. It also allows C, D, E, etc. To make advance route and weather recon for the primary and the back-up aircraft. It further facilitates the role of other VIPs with the flight, like military commanders and local officials who are designated to receive the President on site. During the take off to the second itinerary, A and B must take off first so that C, D, E, etc. can pick-up their assigned passengers at the primary LZ. Upon completing engine start, C, D, E etc. shall airborne immediately and make a “pattern” along the final approach of the pick-up zone. After take off, B followed by A, will then proceed and land ahead on the next LZ. After unloading its passengers, B must transfer to the alternate LZ, providing space for C, D, E, etc. to drop their passengers before they transfer to the alternate LZ. This time, the last aircraft to land will make full stop and occupy the space at the side of the primary aircraft and then become the new back-up aircraft. The new “B” shall now switch function and callsign with the original back up. In short, the proximity of an aircraft
to the primary aircraft will determine which aircraft will serve as the new back up that will take effect as soon as all aircraft have landed. Posting of placards beside each aircraft as enlarged manifest will solve possible complications in loading for the next itinerary. Same series of procedure shall be applied to the succeeding itineraries. Employment of the Round-robin concept will provide significant maneuvering flexibility and considerably reduce en route and loiter time. In the sense, it lessens fuel load requirement thereby increasing the much needed engine power available for a safe high altitude and confined landing. Furthermore, this maneuver reduces the exposure of the President to unnecessary risks when airborne in such mountainous areas of operation.
COUNTERING TERRORISM: AIR COMMANDO AGAINST ASYMMETRIC THREATS CPT OTTO THOMAS AM PACIA HISTORY AND PROFILE
According to Rudolf Levy in a manual for Crisis Management (1978), terrorism is not a new phenomena; its use for various reasons has been practiced for many centuries. History and legends have shown that terrorism with guerilla warfare and hostage strategies have been in use with varied degrees of success practically since the beginning of the history of man. As early as 512 BC, military leader Darius was defeated by guerilla activity by the native Scithians. Alexander the Great was known to devise special strategies to combat terrorism and guerilla activities. The Roman Empire has its problems with continued subversive activities and terrorism. Since the invention of gunpowder and with it the firearm, the bomb and the booby-trap, terrorism has become a sophisticated tactic used together with military operations often used as a political tool. Terrorism has undergone a series of reorganizations and redefinitions. TERMS: Terrorism – the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, often political or ideological in nature, through instilling fear, intimidation or coercion. It usually involves a criminal act often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims. A systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion.
Anti-terrorism – preventive measures taken to reduce the probability of a terrorist act occurring. Counter terrorism – are offensive reactive measures taken to respond to terrorist acts including gathering of information, and threat analysis. Crisis Management Teams – concerned with the plans, policies. procedures, techniques, and controls for dealing sudden violent acts of terrorism.
Special Operations – are actions conducted by specially trained organized, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic or psychological objectives by non-conventional means in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas. Commando – a military unit trained and organized as shock troops especially for hit and run raids into an enemy territory. Proactive – plan of action ahead of time. A contemporary terrorist very seldom acts on his own, he belongs to a group or an organization, is motivated by some sort of political philosophy and in all cases embraces some cause. There is, in most cases a theoretical – political or religious program of motivation to justify the existence and the tactics of the organization. The present terrorist organizations in most cases have capable leadership, professionally trained in the art of science of the “fifth column” warfare. In many cases these terrorist or guerilla organizations serve as fronts for other political or foreign which may not wish to be directly identified with the particular terrorist activity or cause. Today’s terrorist/guerilla activities are generally identified within four basic categories: 1.
Nationalistic Movement. Fight for independence from foreign domination, freedom movements and self determination movements.
2.
Right Wing. Since the end of World War II, there have been a number of right wing organizations here and abroad. However, the use of terrorism against the general population has not been used extensively. Normally the right wing terrorism is directed at a particular group of people. In many cases the right wing ideology is further identified with Nationalist Movements.
3.
Left Wing. A survey of world terrorist activities has produced a proof that most of the terrorist activities are directly identified with left wing organizations and communist international movements. Fundamentalists/ Extremist/Separatist – In a guise of promoting religious beliefs and ideology, this group has ingrained within their offspring the world of violence and machismo.
Terrorist activity is aimed at the general population by which the terrorist organization seeks to influence or destroy the established system. Terrorist acts have a direct influence on the social structure; it erodes the trust in the established social system and fosters insecurity among the people, showing that their present government is inept in the matters of security and cannot defend them or provide adequate protection. PORTRAIT OF A TERRORIST In combating terrorism, we must first of all get into a terrorist’ mind. We must determine who they are, what their motives are and how would they possibly accomplish their indoctrinated threat to our society. Since terrorism has not only been a localized issue, it has garnered greater perspective in civil society when the World Trade Center has been hit twice through the use of an aircraft.
A terrorist could be categorized as Crazy, a Criminal or a Crusader. Today’s terrorist has probably had training in the use of weapons, explosives, booby-traps, small group fighting, as well as in the specialized tactics of hijacking (sea jacking), assassinations and kidnapping. The terrorists receive these instructions together with political and ideological indoctrination at training camps in Libya, South Yemen, North Korea, Russia, Cuba, Afghanistan and a number of other places. Today’s terrorism is internationalized and the Socialist World Organization is supporting the terrorist movements with their trained leaders, advisers, and monetary support. The terrorist groups operate throughout the world with continuous contact with the “Mother Organization”. CRISIS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Shown below is the crisis conceptual framework base on the DND-AFP CRISIS MANAGEMENT DOCTRINE: The Proactive Stage includes the following: Prediction (Threat Analysis); Prevention (Operation Security, Personnel Security and Physical Security); Preparation (Planning, Organizing, Training, Equipping, Maintaining Readiness). Once a crisis situation erupts, reactive stage starts. It includes the following: Implementation of the Contingency Plan, Initial Action, Action, then either Negotiation or Tactical Action Intervention then finally Post Action.
PROACTIVE
ACTIVE
REACTIVE
Prediction
IMPLAN of Contingency Plan
Preparation
Initial Action Prevention
Action
Preparation
-Negotiation -Tactical Action
and Submission of POR
CRISIS ACTION PLAN Military units must have a Crisis Management Action Plan to enable them to react in cases when crisis incidents occur. Generally military commanders plan, organize, train, equip and maintain operational readiness. They must organize negotiation, operations, service support and a public affairs group. They will provide procedures for their immediate activation when the need arises. Once a situation arises, we simply cannot be caught flatfooted. The MOVE, SHOOT, COMMUNICATE, SEE and other prerequisites are being addressed to as of this writing. And since we do have an effective, potent and readily deployable force to conduct counter terrorist operations and other types of special operations throughout the country, training must be sustained to sharpen further our S5 (SKILL, SPEED, STRENGTH, STAMINA and STABILITY). The Air Force’s Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) are already capable of the following: conducting hostage rescue operation involving group of hostages, particularly in urban and rural settings; be deployed within short notice anywhere in the country; conduct special operations and infiltrate or exfiltrate by air and land. Currently, the need to develop and fine tune our anti-hijacking capability is a must in the next two to three years which must be addressed to. The desired modern and sophisticated equipage is not a “nice to have” thing but necessary tools to accomplish our mission which is to neutralize terrorists. We must likewise have real time intelligence once a crisis is there. Countering terrorism is to foresight the worst possible scenarios of terrorism like biological and chemical warfare, suicide bombers, and other means of creating trouble. This we have been preparing for. But one message remains the same and that on our end our will to fight these threats couldn’t be eroded for we have the sincere and dedicated people who will give trouble makers what they deserve. References: Crisis Management for US Marshall (1978) Info kit on the Course on Internal Armed Conflict (NDCP) Update on the Trends of Terrorism (OA-2) DND-AFP Crisis Management Doctrine
THE 205TH TACTICAL HELICOPTER WING ON THE ECONOMY OF FORCE 1LT JASON T BUERANO PAF
From a distance they look like birds flying in flocks darkening the skies, but as they come closer, you will see not birds, but a dozen UH-1H (Huey) helicopters gallantly flying in formation, off to perform a single mission. But those golden days of the “Hueys” in the 1980’s have long gone. The drastic decrease of UH-1H helicopters in the early nineties attributed to its aging frame and the difficulty in the availability of its vital components slowly depleted the number of the Huey helicopters in the Air Force th inventory. The 205 Tactical Helicopter Wing being the home of the Hey, adapted with the situation and made a good strategy in the deployment of the remaining twenty three (23) UH-1H in their fleet. With the AFP’s need of utility helicopters to carry personnel and logistics and to bring them to places where other means of transportation cannot reach th and fix-wing aircraft cannot land, the 205 THW is indeed facing a great challenge in accomplishing its mission of conducting Tactical Air Operation to support AFP forces and perform socio-economic flights to support the government in nation building. With limited air assets and logistics to support the operation of eight (8) Army Divisions and Three (3) Marine Brigades and with more than 7,100 islands to cover, the th task seems difficult to meet. Thus, 205 THW have come to economize the use of its assets by strategically deploying them parallel with the AFP’s ground forces distribution and in a manner in which each of them can promptly support the other in cases where a greater number of Hueys are needed. This in turn maximizes the use of our remaining assets in answering all needs. Current situations in Mindanao where massive troops deployment has been going on, have resulted in three (3) Army Divisions and three (3) Marine Brigades simultaneously conducting sustained combat operations to end the lawless activities of the Abu-Sayaff Group, the need for Huey helicopters increases in this th area. Reacting on this matter, the 205 THW sent an additional three (3) more aircraft from the Visayas to augment this need, thus the total number of Huey helicopters in the south th was increased to ten (10). This ,means that the 205 THW is in the position of providing the best that it can in areas where it is needed most, but at the same time, not underestimating the situation on secondary targets by deploying five (5) aircraft in Luzon, two (2) in Palawan and six (6) in Visayas.
The PAF, sensing the greater need for Utility Helicopter has come to acquire an additional five (5) UH-1H helicopters through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and made th a program to upgrade and recover more Huey helicopters from the 410 Maintenance Wing storage. The arrival of five (5) UH-1H helicopters from the EDA will strengthen the th 205 THW capability. With a total of twenty-eight (28) Huey helicopters now under our inventory, we are able to provide better service to the AFP and Country. In line with the th ground troops disposition, 205 THW is planning to deploy the 28 aircraft in the following distribution. LOCATION LUZON
UNIT TH
207
THS
NO OF ACFT 8
CJVAB
2
TARLAC
1
LUCENA
2
CAUAYAN
1
PALAWAN VISAYAS
TH
208
THS
2
BACOLOD
2
MBEAB MINDANAO
TH
210
TH
TH
2
TH
2
DAVAO
206
COTABATO JOLO ZAMBOANGA TOTAL
1/1 12
TH
208
Two (2) Army Division
2
210 /208
CAGAYAN DE ORO
Three (3) Army Division
2 8
ILOILO
TACLOBAN
AFP GROUND FORCES DISTRIBUTION
2 TH
TH
206 /208
2 3/1 28
The integration of the newly acquired five (5) UH-1H helicopters and the th completion of the ongoing Huey upgrading and recovery at 410 MW combined with the th excellent managerial expertise of our Commanders, the 205 THW will soon bounce back to its golden years; a Wing accomplishments, a force to reckon with and a partner in nation building, provider of faster and better services to the nation
The Chief of Air Staff
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSE L REYES O-6444 AFP is a distinguished member of the Philippine Military Academy Class of 1973. He is also a graduate of various local and international courses such as Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering, Master in National Security Administration, Safety Officer Course and Squadron Officer Course in Maxwell, Alabama, USA. He was a recipient of the Distinguished Graduate Award for exemplary performance when he completed his Defense Management Course in 1984 and CGSC in 1993, respectively. Further, he attended several seminars such as International Humanitarian Law, Visiting Forces Agreement, UNCLOS, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management to name a few. A well-experienced pilot and bemedalled officer, BGEN REYES held numerous command and staff positions both in the Air Force and the AFP. His career is ripened with numerous field assignments and combat experience from the northernmost to the southernmost part of the country. Among them were as Chief for Plans and Program (L-5), th AFP LOGCOM, Director, DME (A-6), Commander, CASF 10, Director for Operations, 15 SW, Chief, Division Staff, 3AD, Commander, Task group Valentine, Commandant of PAF Flying School, Secretary Joint Staff, GHQ AFP and Chief of Operations (A-3). In his previous position as Secretary Joint Staff, he made remarkable GHQ Staff actions. And as Chief of Operations (A-3), he outstandingly pushed up operational readiness posting the highest OR rates of PAF air assets. He assumed the position as Chief of Air Staff last 01 December 2000, succeeding BGEN Lamberto E Sillona. He is concurrently the Chairman of various PAF boards and Special Committees. He is also an Ex-officio member of the PAF Modernization Board and ViceChairman of the PAF Doctrine Board, respectively. He is the youngest General in the whole AFP today. His friends and classmates dub him as the "Epitome of Excellence".
Q. How do you see your role as the Chief of Air Staff in the overall operations of the Philippine Air Force today?
A. Basically, the role of the Chief of Air Staff remains the same as it was before, that is, primarily to supervise, direct, coordinate and orchestrate the work (not the staff officers) of the coordinating and special staffs in order to carry out the CG, PAF’s intentions. There are also times that I decide within the level entrusted by the CG. One notable change now, is that the operations of the PAF have become a bit complex due to the advent of additional roles the Air Force has portrayed for the last few years. CMO, Sports, Special Operations, Rescue and other socio-economic activities all related to nation building have taken larger roles in the PAF’s overall operations. With more roles to perform amid limited assets and resources, we have to make do on what we have. Q. How do you relate your present position with your previous positions both in the headquarters and in the field? A. The position of CAS compels me to view things on a macro level. I am now directly involved in the wider scope of decision-making with the end view of attaining what is good for the whole Air Force and not just for a single unit in particular. You have to see the bigger picture first before casting your share in top-level decision making or policy making. Unlike in the field where all you have to do is focus in accomplishing your unit’s mission, here at HPAF as CAS, you have to deal with a lot of variables to be able to satisfy the PAF needs in its entirety. Q. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo stressed the importance of the AFP doctrines in her speech during the AFP Anniversary (Dec 2001), as the Chief of Air Staff, how do you see your role in the doctrine development of the PAF? A. As Vice-Chairman, PAF Doctrine Board and an Ex-Officio Member of the PAF Modernization Board, it is but fitting that I assume an active role in the doctrine development of the PAF. Doctrine Development stands as one of the main components of PAF Modernization. As such, the PAF Doctrine Board and its subcommittees are assured of my full support in the furtherance of appropriate doctrines for the PAF. In fact, I was the advocate of the Night Surface Attack Doctrine and the th Special Operations Training Doctrine at 15 Strike Wing wherein we have introduced the use of new tactics for the OV-10 aircraft to further increase its effectiveness in combat. Lately, the reconfiguration of the SF-260TP into a light attack mode which I have fully supported, hence a formulation of new applicable doctrine, is another manifestation of my commitment to this field. I firmly believe that continuous doctrine development is one area that should be given more focus for salient reasons that cannot be overemphasized. Q. As Head and Members of various boards/committees in the Air Force, what is your perception on the PAF Modernization priorities? A. We have to be very realistic in setting up our priorities. What do we urgently need and what resources are available? We should be aware of the present economic condition of the country and from there; we can gauge on how far we can go. The question is: do we have enough funds for the multi-million dollar priority list? If this could not be realizable within the next 5 years or so, then we have to reprioritize and opt for the attainable ones. We need modern equipment suited for current operations and near future situation, i.e. ISO, maritime patrol, transnational & terrorists threats among others. Q. What are your future plans both in your career and your leadership in units of PAF and AFP?
A. Life and career is a journey. It is a journey through rough and sometimes smooth roads. Of my 33 years in the service, I have traversed a lot of those roads and perhaps lucky enough to be a survivor. I don’t have any specific plans for the remaining 5 years of my career. What I have are broad ones. My personal outlook is to work the hardest and give my best shot on every assignment entrusted to me. One should not expect rewards, promotions, recognition or any form of accolades in doing things for he might get deeply frustrated. If you get recognize for a job well done, it's fine; if not, fine too. The idea is to go on positively come what may…anyway it is good for your heart.
