G.R. No. L-23174
September 18, 1967
CONCEPCION MACAING!IL, petitioner, MACAING!IL, petitioner, vs. "ON. NICASIO #A #A$CO, $CO, %&'(e o) t*e Co&rt +rt It/0e o) R/, &eo Ct r/0*, PRO5INCIAL S"ERI++ O+ RIAL /' S"ERI+ + O+ EON CI$#, CI$#, IRENE E LEON /' *er *&b/', 5ICEN$E LLANES, respondents. LLANES, respondents.
Teoflo V. Ogsime or petitioner. pe titioner. Lea T. Castelo or respondents.
+ERNANO, J.: The principal principal legal question question posed by this original petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is one of procedural due process. It arose from the applicability of an order for demolition of April 18, 1!" to the house of petitioner, such order arising from the #nality of a judgment in $ivil $ase %o. &'(8!! of the $ourt of )irst Instance of &ue*on $ity, thereafter a+rmed by the $ourt of Appeals in $A'.-. $A'.-. %o. 11!'-, petitioner contending that she has not a party to such a case and was denied a chance to intervene therein. The petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was #led with this $ourt on /une 1, 1!", petitioner stating that she was a resident of and with postal address at 0loc'2'1"8, 2ast Avenue 3ubdivision, 4inahan Area, 5iliman, &ue*on $ity, 4hilippines. As respondents, she named the then acting /udge of $ourt of )irst Instance Instance of -i*al, &ue*on $ity 0ranch, the the 6on. %icasio %icasio 7atco 7atco the then 4rovincia 4rovinciall 3heri9 of -i*al and the 3heri9 of &ue*on $ity and respondent spouses Irene de :eon and ;icente :lanes.1 It was then alleged that on )ebruary s 6omesite and 6ousing $orporation ?herein referred to as the 466$@, a copy of which writ of e=ecution as well as the #nal decision of the $ourt of Appeals a+rming the lower court decision being included as anne=es. < Then on April 1(, 1!", respondent spouses as plainti9s in the above $ivil $ase %o. &'(8!! #led an ex-parte motion for a special order of demolition, which motion was set for hearing on April 18, 1!", on which very day, the order of the court granting the same was issued addressed addressed to the 3heri9 of &ue*on $ity to demolish the houses e=isting in the premises of the land in question, which have been erected or occupied by squatters, and thereafter deliver the same to the spouses. Bpon being served with such order of demolition on /une 1, 1!", petitioner the ne=t day immediately #led an urgent petition to lift the alias writ of e=ecution e=ecution and order of demolition with preliminary preliminary injunction alleging that she is not a squatter on the :ot in question, she having acquired her rights and interest over the said :ot by virtue of -esolution %o. CD dated 5ecember 18, 1(, and again by virtue of -esolution %o. ((D, dated Eay 1!, 1!1, and that all of said -esolutions were duly passed upon by the 0oard of 5irectors of defendant 466$, and her house having been improved by virtue of the authority of the eneral Eanager of the 466$ to secure for herself a building permit from the authorities concerned, and that her rights over the said :ot in question were acquired after due investigation of her quali#cation to acquire the same with priority over any other person or persons who are not occupants of the subject :ot, more so as to persons who are disquali#ed in accordance with law and that granting arguendo that plainti9 spouses did have a conditional contract to sell e=ecuted by defendant 466$, the same was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation misrepresentation or in connivance with some well placed employees of the 466$ and that such contract is against the law, referring to the 466$ $harter as amended, and the many established policies of the said overnment $orporation, which facts could have been duly proved by petitioner if, only, she was impleaded in the complaint, or given a chance to intervene . . . . " It was then asserted that although a decision was rendered in the instant case, the same should not bind petitioner because, as already stated, your petitioner had not been impleaded in the plainti9>s complaint, or at least, given a chance to intervene . . . . 4etitioner, in the said urgent petition, liewise invoed the principle that respondent spouses did not e=haust the administrative remedies before #ling the action and that the court was in error in declaring null and void -esolution %o. ((D of the 466$ in her favor as shown by an 2=ecutive 5irective of )ebruary
Irene de :eon. 3he then reiterated that the decision in $ivil $ase %o. &'(8!! could not in any way bind her for not being a party in such a case and that to allow respondent spouses to tae possession of the lot in question and remove petitioner>s house and other improvements legally constructed thereon by virtue of such order of demolition dated April 18, 1!", would not only cause great and irreparable injury, but would also cause injustice to her by depriving her of her property without due process of law. Fn the date originally set for the hearing of such urgent petition on /une s contention that she could not be bound by the judgment and that the refusal to lift the alias writ of e=ecution and the order of demolition, without hearing the matter as alleged in said petition and without receiving any evidence and her ejectment from the lot in question of which she was in actual possession would constitute a deprivation of property rights without due process of law. ! The 4rovincial 3heri9 of -i*al and the 3heri9 of &ue*on $ity were made respondents for they threatened to enforce said writ of e=ecution and order of demolition, as a matter of fact advising petitioner that unless a restraining order from a competent court could be secured, her house would be demolished.C 3he then alleged that to enforce the writ of e=ecution and order of demolition would be to wor unwarranted hardship and irreparable damage and injustice upon her without having been accorded her day in court, reiterating that thereby she would be deprived of her property rights without due process of law as she was a stranger to such a case never having been made a party to it. 8 3he then #led this petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, there being no appeal. 3he liewise e=pressed her willingness to post a bond su+cient in amount as may be determined by this 6onorable $ourt conditioned for the payment of damages that may be awarded in case the writ for preliminary injunction prayed for be found unmeritorious. 1D Fn /uly 1(, 1!", a resolution giving due course to the above petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, liewise granting the prayer for preliminary injunction upon posting a bond of 41,DDD.DD, was issued by this $ourt. In the answer to the petition #led on August C, 1!", respondents sought to meet the due process question squarely by the allegation that in the aforesaid $ase %o. &'(8!!, upon the #nality of which both the writ of e=ecution and the order of demolition were issued petitioner could have appealed the order . . . denying the motion for leave to intervene . . . . Eoreover, respondents deferred to another civil case, &'("11, wherein respondent spouses as plainti9s #led a complaint against the 466$ to compel it to e=ecute the conditional contract to sell covering the disputed lot and restraining it from awarding or selling the same to one of the defendants, petitioner herein, alleging further that after they sought to have the said case dismissed without prejudice, the defendant 466$ having e=ecuted a conditional contract to sell in favor of the wife, respondent Irene de :eon, which motion was granted in an order of respondent /udge %icasio 7atco on Eay s 6omesite H 6ousing $orporation, 466$ for convenience, an application to purchase the latter>s lot
property to one $oncepcion Eaabingil who, as a squatter on the lot, claims to have a preferential right in the matter of awards. 0ut before this -esolution %o. CD could be implemented and the property formally awarded to Eaabingil, 4lainti9 5e :eon #led with the $ourt of )irst Instance of &ue*on $ity a complaint for injunction doceted as $ivil $ase %o. &'("11 against the 466$, Eaabingil and three others. Bpon application, a Jrit of preliminary injunction was issued by that $ourt temporarily enjoining the 466$ from implementing said resolution. At a pre'trial conference in said $ivil $ase &'("11, the 466$, duly represented by its authori*ed o+cers and representatives, agreed to reconsider -es. CD and to respect the award previously made in favor of 5e :eon, and, pursuant thereto, passed and approved -esolution %o. "D which authori*es the award of the lot in dispute to plainti9 5e :eon. Eaing good its commitment, the 466$ on Earch s de#nition of procedural due process. ThusG 0y the law of the land is more clearly intended the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.1 This $ourt in a 1<" decision, Lope$ ". %irector o Lands , after quoting the above added that due process contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, a9ecting one>s person or property. It is satis#ed according to another leading decisionG If the following conditions are present, namelyG ?1@ There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it ?<@ jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding ?@ the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard and ?"@ judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. 1" The due process concept is thus a vital living force in our jurisprudence. It was so announced in an impressive number of decisions, not all of which need be recounted here. )idelity to such a view has been reinforced by time. Thus in Cua&cong ". !eng'engco ,1( decided in 1!D, this $ourt through the then /ustice, now $hief /ustice, $oncepcion declared that acts of $ongress, as well as those of the 2=ecutive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings su9ering from the same Kaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding. Fnly lately, this $ourt through /ustice 0eng*on reiterated that the due process clause is designed to secure justice as a living reality not to sacri#ce it by paying undue homage to formality. 1! A 1(C decision, Cru$cosa ". Concepcion ,1C is even more illuminating in so far as the availability of the remedy sought is concerned. In the language of this $ourt, speaing through /ustice /.0.:. -eyesG The petition is clearly meritorious. 4etitioners were conclusively found by the $ourt of Appeals to be co' owners of the building in question. 6aving an interest therein, they should have been made parties to the ejectment proceedings to give them a chance to protect their rights and not having been made parties thereto, they are not bound and can not be a9ected by the judgment rendered therein against their co' owner $atalino $ru*cosa, /r. . . . . Two due process cases deal speci#cally with a writ of e=ecution that could not validly be enforced against a party who was not given his day in court, !icat ". (e&es ,18 and )amo& "s. *atingolo .1 According to the formerG The above agreement, which served as basis for the ejectment of Alipio 3icat, cannot be binding and conclusive upon the latter, who is not a party to the
case. Indeed, that order, as well as the writ for e=ecution, cannot legally be enforced against Alipio 3icat for the simple reason that he was not given his day in court. )rom the latterG The issue raised in the motion to -angar is not involved in the appeal for it concerns a right which he claims over the property which has not so far been litigated for the reason that he was not made a party to the case either as plainti9 or as defendant. 6e only came to now of the litigation when it was forced out of the property by the sheri9, and so he #led the present motion to be heard and prove his title to the property. This he has the right to do as the most e=peditious manner to protect his interest instead of #ling a separate action which generally is long, tedious and protracted. 4etitioner was therefore right in assertion that the separate and collective e9ect of the Jrit of 2=ecution and Frder of 5emolition . . . and the respondent 4rovincial 3heri9>s threat to enforce Lthe sameM is to wor unwarranted hardship and irreparable damage and injustice upon the 4etitioner who have not been accorded her day in court. It would as claimed be tantamount to a deprivation of her property rights without due process of law. 3he is entitled to redress. This petition for certiorari and prohibition must be granted. 4etitioner>s right to due process must be respected. This $ourt could go even further. This petition for certiorari and prohibition could be utili*ed to determine who has the right to the disputed lot. This approach of resolving the issue is not without precedent. #rancisco ". Cit& o %a"ao ,
Concepcion+ C.,.+ (e&es+ ,.*.L.+ %i$on+ aalintal+ *eng$on+ ,./.+ !anche$+ Castro and 0ngeles+ ,,.+ concur. aldi"ar+ ,.+ too no part.
