12. Knowledge and Power in Plato's Political Thought

International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 14(1), 51–77

Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought Thom Brooks International 10.1080/09672550500445137 RIPH_A_144496.sgm 0967-2559 Original Taylor 102006 14 Department ThomBrooks 000002005 and & Article Francis (print)/1466-4542 Francis ofJournal PoliticsSchool Ltd of Philosophical (online) of Geography, StudiesPolitics & Sociology, University of NewcastleNewcastle upon TyneNE1 [email protected]

Abstract Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his ‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the Republic as rule by philosopher-kings wielding absolute authority over their subjects. Their authority stems solely from their comprehension of justice, from which they make political judgements on behalf of their city-state. I call the second set of arguments Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his later thought, where absolute rule by philosopher-kings is undermined by the impure character of all political knowledge. Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power. Plato’s practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy in the best practical citystate. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal political thought, preferring a more practical political philosophy instead. Keywords: Plato; Socrates; Republic; idealism; constitution; democracy

I

Introduction

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his ‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the Republic as rule by philosopher-kings. The philosopher-kings wield absolute authority over their subjects. This authority stems solely from their complete comprehension of justice, from which they make political judgements on behalf of their city-state. The second set of arguments is what I shall call Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his later thought, although hinted at in earlier dialogues. According to this view, absolute rule by philosopher-kings is undermined by the impure character of all political knowledge.

International Journal of Philosophical Studies ISSN 0967–2559 print 1466–4542 online © 2006 Taylor & Francis http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/09672550500445137

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power. Plato’s practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy into the best practical city-state. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal political thought, reluctantly preferring a more practical political philosophy instead. Contrary to Straussian interpretations, I argue that the problem with philosopher-kings relates to the nature of political expertise, rather than speculation beyond the text about whether or not philosophers would want to rule.1 II

Plato’s Theory of Expertise II A

Crafts as Expertise

Plato believes that the opinions of some people are better than those of others (Crito 47a; see also Republic 494a).2 As a result, some people are assumed to be able to make better judgements. This point is fairly uncontroversial, unless Plato is attempting to argue that these persons have superior judgements about all matters – a view he rejects. The ability to make correct judgements stems from one of two sources: either right opinion or true knowledge. Acting from right opinion is akin to lucky guesswork, as the individual chooses correctly, despite a less than full comprehension of the subject-matter in question. On the other hand, when individuals make decisions from true knowledge, their choice is deliberately well-thought-out and not given to chance. For Plato, when we make judgements based on true knowledge our choice carries a certain authority that judgements based upon right or wrong opinion simply do not have. Thus, knowledge confers a special status on its holder (see Republic 583a, 584e–585a).3 The authority that is conferred is not political authority as such; instead, we might think of it as similar to assurance or certitude. For example, a medical doctor with true knowledge will speak with greater assurance on how best to treat a variety of ailments, as she will most likely be correct. On the other hand, a medical doctor with less than perfect knowledge can only attribute his success to an arbitrary judgement, a choice that will hardly win our confidence. We each possess some degree of expertise in one type of craft (techne¯ ).4 It is supposed that if a person needs to have his shoes repaired, he would do best to seek the advice of a cobbler. However, if this same person suffers ill health, a medical doctor ought to be consulted instead. Thus, it follows for Plato that we may only perform well at one given craft (Apology 22d–e). Plato believes that the crafts we choose are commensurable with our given nature, instead of the demands of the marketplace (see Statesman 286d–e).5 In addition, the crafts we choose complement the craft-related expertise of ]m e[rac

52

KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN PLATO’S POLITICAL THOUGHT

others in our community rather well, forming a natural division of labour from which all in a community benefit (Republic 370c). When each citizen does what he or she ‘is naturally suited for’, the city obtains a unity (Republic 423d, 433a). A city is virtuous when each of its citizens pursues his or her naturally suitable crafts (Gorgias 506d–e; Republic 433d).6 This unity breaks down when persons who ought to be engaged in one variety of craft activity are able to pursue a different craft, or no craft at all (see Republic 434a–b, 496a, 535c).7 In such a city, the community is transformed from a united whole to a community of independent persons – a sign of poor social organization (Charmides 161e–162a). II B

Expertise in Governance

For Plato, governance is one kind of craft. He calls this brand of expertise ‘the expert knowledge of kingship’ (Statesman 292e) and ‘the art of kingship’ (Statesman 308e, 311c; see Euthydemus 291d).8 Because it is a craft, only persons with a particular nature are suited to pursue expertise in governance. The right to rule is not conferred via majority approval or material wealth, but via expertise in statesmanship (see Euthydemus 291c–292c; Republic 426d, 477d–e; Statesman 292c).9 A person need not actually be a king to have this particular form of expertise (Statesman 259c, 292e). If we can only practise one craft well – and ruling is a craft – it will always be impossible for all citizens to rule together, and a minority will always be predisposed to rule (Republic 494a; Statesman 297b–c). Indeed, Plato assumes that only a few – or perhaps just one individual – will possess this knowledge in any given city-state (Statesman 297b–c, 300e; see also Republic 494a). Persons whose natures direct them best to pursue expertise in other crafts – such as slaves, retailers, or day-labourers – will forever be unfit to rule as a result (Statesman 289e–290b). For Plato, it is a common fact of life that people properly seek counsel solely from experts in a particular field.10 As a consequence, whenever we discern those who possess expert knowledge in governance, it is right that they should rule as this is the craft they naturally pursue best – just as those with expertise in trade skills ought to work as manual labourers (see Statesman 266e). The expert statesman alone transforms the naturally bestowed authority from certitude which all naturally have of their given craft to an authority that is political.11 In addition, the city-state with expert rulers as its sole authority enjoys natural unity to the fullest extent. Plato says: this is the constitution which alone we must say is correct. … All the others that we generally say are constitutions we must say are not genuine, and not really constitutions at all, but imitations of this one; 53


those we say are ‘law-abiding’ have imitated it for the better, the others for the worse (Statesman 293e; italics in the original) The constitutions of different varieties of city-states imitate expert rule insofar as they attempt to live by just laws (Statesman 300c–e). These attempts will fail because only persons naturally predisposed to governance can ascertain and implement just laws, whereas those who are not so predisposed may only ascertain just laws through lucky, but imperfect, guesswork (Statesman 293c, 300c–e). An assessment of various types of governance can only be based upon the ability a constitution has to imitate expert rule (Statesman 300e–302e). III

The Philosopher-King’s Right to Govern

How does Plato’s theory of expertise in worldly affairs relate to political institutions? This is one of the more hotly contested debates in the literature, particularly regarding Plato’s many criticisms of democracy. It must first be said that what Plato meant by ‘democracy’ was quite different from how we may understand it today.12 For Plato, a democracy is essentially a libertarian society in which each citizen can ‘arrange his own life in whatever manner pleases him’ (Republic 557b; see also 572d–e).13 Every citizen has a licence to do whatever he or she wants: ‘anarchy’ is called ‘freedom’ (Republic 557b, 560e). The share and scope of power held and exercised by each citizen would appear to be much greater than that held by contemporary democratic citizens. Nevertheless, both ancient and modern conceptions of democracy suffer from a similar problem in Plato’s view. In democracies, there is no prerequisite to rule, as one’s capability to govern is an irrelevant consideration (Republic 557e). As a result, all members are treated equally despite the fact that some are more capable of good governance than others (Republic 558c). All citizens share the task of governance in democracies. Therefore, the cobbler, the medical doctor, and the person with particular expertise in the field all have an equal say regarding governance. One result is that political judgements will be based by and large upon mere guesswork as sole rule by expert legislators is abandoned. Democracies are generally poorly governed as a consequence.14 Furthermore, Plato argues that democratic citizens are slaves to their passions in rejecting the exclusive rule of experts over the city-state’s affairs (Republic 561b–c).15 Democratic leaders act little better than ‘servants’ dedicated to the satisfaction of ‘the city’s appetites’ (Gorgias 517b). In a memorable passage from the Republic, we are told that the common people 54


always look down at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bent over the dinner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate … their desires are insatiable … like a vessel full of holes. (586a–b) Persons ought to pursue their natural crafts only, which would result in a unified division of labour. Not all citizens should have a share in governance, as not all citizens share a natural predisposition for expert rule. In fact, there would not be a division of labour at all if they did share such a predisposition. Citizens are seen as craftsmen in more than one trade in democracies: one to make ends meet, the other, to obtain a share in power. In effect, such a share in power is illegitimate as non-experts have no given right to rule.16 Rather than ruling with an authority stemming from political expertise, the majority of democratic citizens are like ‘people groping in the dark’ (Phaedo 99b; see also Republic 520c–d).17 For Plato, monarchies are the best systems of governance, possessing ‘good written rules, which we call laws’ (Republic 576e; Statesman 302e). As is well known, Plato’s ideal monarchial city-state is to be ruled by philosopher-kings: men and women18 who rule for the sake of neither honour nor wealth, seeking only the advantage of the citizens they serve (Republic 347c, 347d, 412d–e).19 In essence, philosopher-kings are persons who naturally possess a disposition towards expertise in statecraft. Thus, only they should rule the city-state as only they have the necessary expertise, given that ruling is their exclusive craft. One obvious result is that the existence of philosopher-kings illegitimates governance by those predisposed towards other crafts. A less obvious consequence is that the philosopher-kings are entitled to make various political judgements, but not judgements of an economic variety – the pursuit of wealth is not the philosopher-kings’ craft, and they are barred from all but minimal economic activity20 (see Republic 416e).21 Thus, the ideal city-state clearly divorces wealth and power.22 Furthermore, Plato’s apparent dismissal of political economics as a craft is justified by a belief that virtue amongst the rulers alone will ensure the economic prosperity of the city-state: ‘Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence brings about wealth and all other public and private blessings for men’ (Apology 30b).23 In addition, an important reason why the city-state will be prosperous may be the unity of the state resulting from each person pursuing his or her natural craft (see Republic 351d). The virtue of philosopher-kings appears to be a direct consequence of the knowledge they possess (see Meno 87c, 88d, 89a; Phaedo 69b; Philebus 48c– 49a; Republic 427e–428b, 491e–492a).24 This not to say that non-philosopherkings lack virtue because of their lack of proper political expertise. On the contrary, all craftsmen are virtuous to the extent that they have knowledge, rather than either true or false opinion, making the city-state virtuous as a 55


result. If this is correct, it would appear that the philosopher-king’s licence to spread ‘useful falsehoods’ is a right within certain boundaries, provided that what is said is as commensurable as possible with the truth (see Republic 382a–383c, 389b–c, 414b–c).25 We may still reject the use of lies of whatever beneficial intent by those in power, but it is important to keep in mind that their subject-matter may only relate to the particular expertise possessed by philosopher-kings. An underlying assumption here may be that the members of most ancient Greek societies – and perhaps elsewhere – already pursued their proper crafts in the workplace. This might explain their relative absence from discussions of social organization. On the other hand, the crucial difference between the virtuous and illegitimate city-states is whether or not the rulers possess political expertise as their craft. If so, when Plato suggests that a whole city might be just by virtue of a small elite which is in power, a citystate is not virtuous solely on account of who rules (Republic 428e–429a, 431c–d; see Laws 691c). Rather, a city’s virtue is a result of all pursuing their proper craft, a situation where the difference between virtue and vice is a simple matter of installing proper rulers. IV

Is the Ideal Polis a Possibility?

Plato justifies the existence of philosopher-kings – the ideal monarchs – in a rather peculiar manner. After suggesting that the entire discussion of the Republic has been little more than a theoretical sketch, he tells us through Socrates that ‘the nature of practice’ is to attain truth less well than theory (472e–473a):26 Then don’t compel me to show that what we’ve described in theory can come into being exactly as we’ve described it. … Then next, it seems, we should try to discover … what’s the smallest change that would enable our city to reach our sort of constitution – one change, if possible, or if not one, two, and if not two, then the fewest in number and the least extensive. (Republic 473a–b) Socrates says that only one change would be necessary to achieve this task: philosophers must rule as kings or kings rule as philosophers (Republic 473c–d; see also 499a–d). The justification of philosopher-kings as experts in statecraft is to be seen as an attempt to have ideal theory exist as a social practice. Plato is quick to admit that ‘it is not impossible for this to happen’, but ‘it is difficult for it to happen’ (Republic 499d; see also 502b, c, 540d)27 (italics in the original).28 Thus, from the very beginning Plato came to question the 56


possible existence of a virtuously pure city-state composed of philosophers expertly trained in governance, invited to rule by a willing populace bowing to the philosophers’ special status as their rightful rulers: Glaucon: You mean that [the philosopher-king] will be willing to take part in the politics of the city we were founding and describing, the one that exists in theory, for I don’t think it exists anywhere on earth. Socrates: But perhaps, I said, there is a model of it in heaven, for anyone who wants to look at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. It makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take part in the practical affairs of that city and no other. (Republic 592a–b) Thus, the ideal city-state’s existence as an earthly, political practice may be compromised by its heavenly nature. The philosopher-king will only come to rule the ideal model ‘in heaven’ proposed and in ‘no other’ city.29 However, Plato’s argument for this does not rest on a kind of Straussian sense of ironic talk; it stems from the inexact nature of political expertise. The significance of these highlighted passages is the following. Plato seems surprisingly explicit about the utopian nature of the political philosophy spelled out in works such as the Republic. He acknowledges that practice attains truth less well than theory (472e–473a). He notes that a kingdom of philosophers is all but impossible to realize (see 499d). Furthermore, the Republic’s political philosophy is more in tune with ‘a model … in heaven’ than a realistic model on earth. Two things are particularly interesting here. First, Plato is not unaware of the utopianism of his political philosophy. Indeed, there are these hints and others I shall discuss in this section that make this quite plain. Second, Plato nevertheless takes the trouble to reveal and spell out this ideal political philosophical vision almost despite this fact. This view, for Plato, is truly how things ought to be in some grand sense. The problem with the view is that there are any number of barriers to its realization. I shall discuss these barriers in the next section. IVA

The Impurity of Expertise

Plato argues for a complicated dichotomy of soul and body, where the soul is loosely equated with ‘heaven’ and the body with ‘earth’ (see Theaetetus 176a–b). The soul is the location of our intelligence (see Phaedo 76c). The pursuit of ‘pure knowledge’ is impossible until we can ‘escape’ from our bodies and observe things in themselves by the soul alone (Phaedo 66d–e). 57


However, the separation of the soul from the body – the soul’s ‘freedom’ – occurs only at death (Gorgias 524b; Phaedo 67d):30 Justice and self-control do not shine out through their images down here, and neither do the other objects of the soul’s admiration; the senses are so murky that only a few people are able to make out, with difficulty, the original of the likenesses they encounter here. (Phaedrus 250b) If pure knowledge is ascertained by a soul only after the death of its body, it is impossible for corporeal beings to have pure knowledge of anything as a direct result. Thus, all varieties of human expertise possess impurity – including expertise in governing. Initially, Plato fails to see the positive import of experience to our understanding of the world. In the Theaetetus, he says: knowledge is to be found not in the experiences but in the process of reasoning about them; it is here, seemingly, not in the experiences, that it is possible to grasp being and truth. … We shall not now look for knowledge in sense-perception at all, but in whatever we call that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things which are. (186d, 187a; see also Republic 409a) A proper education is directed towards teaching students analytic skills, not facts. Later, Plato changes his mind, acknowledging that some crucial crafts – such as agriculture, medicine, military strategy, and navigation – require an expertise based upon deductive reasoning from experiences (Philebus 56a–b). Previously, such reasoning from facts was dismissed as impure and, hence, incapable of discovering truth. The purity and truth of something corresponded to its purity as a piece of knowledge, a knowledge we access via other means. Now we realize that some activities which are undoubtedly crafts – such as medicine or navigation – depend upon facts gleaned, at least in part, through experience.31 Thus, not all crafts possess the same precision as geometry or physics, while still being crafts in their own right (Philebus 57b).32 There are some crafts which have greater precision, focussing upon eternal entities – such as the Form of justice (Philebus 58e–59b, 61d–e; see also Phaedrus 247b–248b). On the other hand, there are other crafts which have less precision, focussing upon finite entities through empirical observation, such as medicine and, I shall argue, governance.33 Tellingly, Plato says: ‘To me at least it seems that our discussion has arrived at the design of what might be called an incorporeal order that rules 58


harmoniously over a body possessed by a soul’ (Philebus 64b). Elsewhere we learn that the soul rules the body as its master when a soul and body are united (Gorgias 465c–d; Phaedo 80a). But the body is not to be a total slave to the soul. Instead, the soul relies on its body’s senses when it is ‘compelled to use them’ (Phaedo 83a). To borrow a well-known example from the Phaedrus, it is as if we are all charioteers steering two horses: one horse representing the good and the other horse its opposite (246a–b). Plato uses the example to discuss the activity of the pure soul managing its rational and irrational parts. However, we are told that the example speaks also to the combination of a soul and body as ‘a living thing’ that is bound by nature (see Phaedrus 246c–d; also Republic 439d–e). The importance of these passages is that they strongly suggest a unity composed of a pure and an impure part: the living human being is the unity of a pure, rational soul with irrational desires stemming from our body’s sensuous appetites. This unity is ‘an incorporeal order’, as it harmoniously rules a soul and body (see Philebus 64b).34 The control of our body’s appetites is referred to as ‘moderation’ (Republic 442d). Thus, a person with a proper comprehension of the true nature of knowledge, such as Socrates, is not an ascetic. Instead, the good soul directs a person to live a moderate life, refraining from indulging the whims of his or her passions (see Gorgias 491e, 507a; Phaedo 108a–d).35 The good life is commensurable with ‘the mixed life’ of moderation (Philebus 61b). As in individuals, the good citystate will practise moderation in its brand of mixed life, harmoniously unifying its rational and irrational parts within an earthly incorporation. IVB

How to Choose the Philosopher-Kings?

Even if we were to grant that philosopher-kings exist, Plato would still be faced with a number of grave difficulties. Chief amongst these is the ability of anyone to distinguish someone who is a philosopher-king from someone who is not. Previously, we saw that if governing is a craft, most people will have a natural disposition to pursue different crafts. Indeed, very few people have the necessary predisposition for expertise to be considered philosopher-kings (Republic 491a–b). If Socrates is an example, his advice to the members of the jury in the Apology is instructive: Indeed, gentlemen of the jury, I am far from making a defence now on my own behalf, as might be thought, but on yours, to prevent you from wrongdoing by mistreating the god’s gift to you by condemning me; for if you kill me you will not easily find another like me. I was attached to this city by the god. … Another such man will not easily come to be among you, gentlemen, and if you believe me you will spare me. (30e–31a) 59


The best scenario is a state of affairs in which the city-state’s previously established philosopher-kings know in advance a given population of children who possess the potential to become future rulers. Each child is observed throughout his or her life to determine whether or not s/he eagerly pursues ‘what is advantageous to the city’, unwilling to act otherwise (Republic 412d–e, 413c–414b, 537a, 539a–c). Those who fail to live up to these standards are to be rejected as rulers (Republic 414a, 538d–539a). Even if we were to grant the possibility that philosopher-kings could devise sufficient pedagogical methods for discovering their rightful heirs, an initial number of philosopher-kings must be known already. Thus, the selection and upbringing of potential philosopher-kings take place in a closed system, and we are given little advice as to how such a system might be established initially. The education of ruling elites is at the very heart of any city-state that wishes to continue functioning properly. This should not be surprising, for the philosopher-kings’ particular expertise is the raison d’être of their right to govern. This education is not for everyone, however, and the purity of those subjected to it is to be maintained rigidly. The reasons are that such an education is illsuited for persons who would do better at a different craft and that its extension to all would produce political corruption of great magnitude: Now, if cobblers become inferior and corrupt and claim to be what they are not, that won’t do much harm to the city … But if the guardians of our laws and city are merely believed to be guardians but are not, you surely see that they’ll destroy the city utterly, just as they alone have the opportunity to govern it well and make it happy. (Republic 421a) Thus, the education of those destined to be day-labourers does not necessitate the rigid supervision pertaining to the education of future rulers. The latter’s education is an important part of removing corruption from the philosopher-kings, apart from their inability to pursue wealth. In addition to a rigorous and selective education, another anti-corruption measure imposed by Plato is the necessity for communal living amongst the ruling elites.36 The general thought seems to be that if the ruling elites live a so-called ‘one for all and all for one’ lifestyle, then they will fail to see what they do on behalf of the city as anything but for the greater good. Controversially, Plato holds that women and children are to be held in common, itself ‘the cause of the greatest good for our city’ (Republic 464b). The communal lifestyle is purported to disallow the formation of divisive factions amongst the elites, which trickles down to an absence of division amongst the ruled (Republic 464d–e, 465b). This maximizes the practice of their craft: the rule of all for the good of the city-state. That said, Plato admits that this programme will ‘be hard to bring about in practice’ (Republic 502d). 60


The good derived from the sharing of spouses is the greater production of persons with a predisposition towards governance. Plato does seem to believe that natural talents are greatest among persons from noble families, as Plato, Socrates, Alcibiades, Charmides, and Critias are all from such families (see Alcibiades 120d–121d; Charmides 154d).37 Thus, for Plato, familial communism is not some absurdity of the Republic which he did not take seriously, as some claim.38 As formulated by Socrates, the problem is that individuals like Alcibiades and Socrates are mere private citizens, ‘as were our fathers’: this would never happen in Persia or Sparta, where more care is taken to ensure the purity of noble blood (Alcibiades 121a–d). Pure breeding must be a characteristic of the ideal city-state to foster in the best way the production of persons capable of expert governance (Republic 460b–c).39 As few persons are born with such a disposition – the great majority have dispositions towards countless other crafts – only members of the ruling elite are affected by this policy (Republic 457c–d; see also Statesman 265e, 267d–e). The production of children by parents sharing similar craft-related dispositions is usually a common, natural affair.40 However, the importance of ensuring that the rulers are true philosopher-kings born with the proper disposition necessitates interference by those in power to maintain blood purity. In fact, those in power select who has children with whom, not the individuals themselves through personal choice (Republic 458c–d). To ensure commonality of breeding arrangements and prevent the development of private family units arising within the ruling elites, a ‘considerable use of falsehood and deception’ becomes necessary (Republic 459c–d). Unfortunately for Plato, our inability to know a person’s true nature with absolute certainty condemns each and every city-state to eventual dissolution, mainly through inappropriate breeding between persons with different dispositions (Republic 546a–b).41 As a result, centralized restriction of sexual relationships is doomed to fail from the very start, aspiring to nothing more than staving off the inevitable. This is an additional way in which the Republic is fairly explicit about being a utopia, a utopia that could never fully succeed and take hold in the world in any sustainable sense. To be clear, this claim is not something implicit in the text, but spelled out at various points in it. There seems every reason to believe that Plato did think that these views constitute political society as it ought to exist, but also every reason to believe that Plato knew that such a society could never take root, certainly not in full. IVC

The Philosophical Pursuit of the Ideal Versus the Practical

Perhaps an even greater problem is that all true philosophers are too far removed from the lived experiences of their fellow human beings.42 In the Theaetetus, we are told: 61


Laws and decrees, published orally or in writing, are things [a philosopher] never sees or hears. The scrambling of political cliques for office; social functions, dinners, parties with flute-girls – such doings never enter [the philosopher’s] head even in a dream … because it is in reality only his body that lives and sleeps in the city. His mind, having come to the conclusion that all these things are of little or no account, spurns them and pursues its winged way, as Pindar says … ‘in the heights above the heaven’. (173c–d; see Phaedrus 249b–e)43 Thus, the true philosopher is a completely non-political entity. Philosophers do not live a life centred on creating specific public policies, but live instead ‘a life of thought in the purest degree possible’ (Philebus 55a). As a result, a philosopher-king’s expertise stems from his full comprehension of justice in its purity alone, an impossibility given that the task is achievable by a disembodied soul alone. The expertise necessary for governing is a product not of looking at individual legislative practices, but of drafting laws in keeping with pure justice instead. I would argue that the philosopher’s pursuit of the ideal – rather than the practical – is one source of difference between Socrates and Plato, a conception of philosophy that Plato comes to reject, as I have tried to highlight.44 For example, Socrates says: I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians – so as not to say I’m the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries – to take up the true political craft and practice the true politics. This is because the speeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification but at what’s best. They don’t aim at what’s most pleasant. And because I’m not willing to do those clever things you recommend, I won’t know what to say in court. … For I’ll be judged the way a doctor would be judged by a jury of children if a pastry chef were to bring accusations against him. (Gorgias 521d–e) By ‘true politics’, Socrates wishes to mark a distinction from the standard practice of politics of his time.45 At this stage of Plato’s philosophical writings, politics is the exclusive craft of the soul (Gorgias 464b). However, Plato came to argue that the philosopher ought to be engaged in the world politically.46 As we have seen already, a potential problem is that political expertise is gained in part through observation of events in the world, necessitating reason’s appropriation of empirical data. Thus, it is an imprecise craft wedged between the earth (i.e., the empirical) and the heavens (i.e., the rational). 62


There is much reason to doubt the existence of philosopher-kings per se. A crucial difficulty I would like to focus on is Plato’s re-examination of crafts. All persons seek expertise in one particular sphere naturally suited to them. The philosopher-kings’ expertise in statecraft is gained via the apprehension of justice itself. The impossibility of success for earthly beings has already been discovered, but it is crucial to note that Plato came to adopt this view as well. He says that it is possible ‘to discern what the nature of justice is’ from the heights of pure philosophy alone. However, the application of justice to the living constitutions of our earthly communities is only possible via a practical philosophy (see Seventh Letter 326a–b, 328c). Political power is knowledge of a particular kind, composed of both purely rational and empirical parts (Protagoras 351a). The consequences of this are that perfect justice may never exist on earth as it is impossible to discern as a sensual being and the world in which we apply justice is not itself eternal, but contingent and ever changing.47 Thus, the management of a city’s affairs is a particularly arduous task, for the knowledge of statecraft is not an exact science, after all (see Seventh Letter 325c–d).48 In addition, it is often overlooked that when Plato ranks various constitutions of the soul from best to worst, the best constitution belongs to the philosopher – but the second best belongs to the monarch (Phaedrus 248d–e).49 The philosopher is at times equated with a ‘divine herdsman’, a person ‘greater than that of a king’ (Statesman 275c).50 The upshot is that it seems clear well before we get to the Laws that Plato’s ideal political philosophy – primarily spelled out in the Republic – is incapable of realization. Moreover, Plato is aware of the various barriers preventing the realization of his ideal political philosophy. However, what is interesting about this is that he will develop in the Laws another political philosophy, a more practical political philosophy, that will address these very concerns. Instead of setting out a vision of what the best political community looks like full stop, Plato directs his attention to laying out a vision of the best practical and realizable political community. This does not mark a rejection of his ideal political philosophy as the ideal, but only as a workable blueprint.

V VA

Practically the Best City-State Plato’s Rational Dictatorship

Like his use of ‘democracy’, Plato’s use of ‘monarchy’ may differ from how we might understand the term today. A monarchy is not merely a collection of one or more sovereigns ruling together, but persons ruling independently over a city-state in accordance with dictates of justice rather than their subjective whims (see Laws 856b). In fact, the ‘biggest enemy of the entire state’ is persons who wish to oppose this state of affairs (Laws 856b). A 63


monarch’s appropriation of justice in his judgements distinguishes his rule from those of democrats, oligarchs, or timocrats. Plato’s apparent rejection of democracy and warm approval of monarchy should not imply that he is, in fact, some kind of proto-totalitarian. On the contrary, tyranny is the worst political system in his view, as tyrants act in constant contravention of law and rational expertise (Republic 587b–c; see also Statesman 276e, 302e). For Plato, tyranny is characterized by random acts of terror (see Republic 579d–e).51 For example, a tyrant is described as a person who ‘always mutilates, kills and generally maltreats whichever of us he wishes’ (Statesman 301d). Tyrants are also prone to stirring up conflict, whether it be domestic or international (Republic 567a). Plato’s favouring of monarchy and aristocracy may be rooted in his family’s background. The initial Athenian democratic movement saw the end of kingly rule in Athens: the city’s last king was a relative of Plato’s father.52 Former members of the aristocracy were unsurprisingly critical of the new democratic institutions that negated their special social status. These former members, along with wealthy citizens, were probably relatively supportive of the overthrow of democracy by the Thirty at first.53 Plato provides a personal example: he tells us that when the Thirty came to power, he was invited ‘to join them at once in what seemed to be a proper undertaking’ (Seventh Letter 324d). After all, members of the Thirty were ‘relatives and acquaintances’ of his, such as the cousin – Critias – and brother – Charmides – of Plato’s mother (Seventh Letter 324d). How much of an influence were his family and friends on his political thought? Few cite an important letter from Plato to Perdiccas:54 If anyone hears this and says, ‘Plato apparently claims to know what is good for democracy, but though he is at liberty to speak in the assembly and give it his best advice, he has never yet stood up and said a word’, you can answer him by saying, ‘Plato was born late in the life of his native city, and he found the demos advanced in years and habituated by former advisers to many practices incompatible with the advice he would give. Nothing would be sweeter to him than to give advice to the demos as to a father, if he did not think he would be risking danger in vain and accomplish nothing. He would do the same about advising me, I know. If we seemed to him incurable, he would bid us a long farewell and refrain from advising about me or my affairs’. (Fifth Letter 322a–c)55 Plato’s disillusionment with Athenian democracy is heightened by its sense of self-certainty regarding the implementation of justice in its laws. At least from this passage, it seems clear that Plato’s primary problem with democracy 64


is with the absence of expertise in statecraft, a constant criticism in his political thought. Because it is an ‘incurable’ ailment, he searches elsewhere to bring about a revolutionary new style of governance. Plato turns to the empire of Syracuse to bring his model Republic to life, in a desperate bid to demonstrate its possibility (see Fourth Letter 320c–d):56 If in [Dionysius II’s] empire there had been brought about a real union of philosophy and power, it would have been an illustrious example to both Greeks and barbarians, and all mankind would have been convinced of the truth that no city nor individual can be happy except by living in company with wisdom under the guidance of justice, either from personal achievement of these virtues or from a right training and education received under God-fearing rulers. (Seventh Letter 335d; see also Republic 473d–e) First, it is important to note that what Plato desires is ‘a real union of philosophy and power’, when the community is administered within dictates set by rational justice, a fact overlooked in revisionist interpretations.57 Second, one particularly great achievement of the fusion of philosophy and power is its being an aid to convincing the majority of the practical success of a republic (Republic 498d). Furthermore, having a concrete example of a city ruled by philosophically enlightened rulers would benefit all humanity (Seventh Letter 336a–b). Before turning to the importance of popular opinion in realizing the just city-state, we should understand Plato’s method of unifying philosophy and power in the world. In Book IV of the Laws, he tells us that the quickest and easiest way to bring about a political transformation is through dictatorship, followed by constitutional kingship, then democracy, and, finally, oligarchy (710e). He then says: ‘Where the most influential element is both extremely powerful and numerically as small as it could be, as in a dictatorship, you usually get a rapid and trouble-free transition’ (Laws 711a; see also 711b–d and Eleventh Letter 359b–c). This method was not idle talk, but, in fact, precisely what he was trying to accomplish according to the many letters written to Dionysius II, the tyrant of Syracuse, attributed to Plato.58 In addition, Plato was aligned with Dion and was friendly with Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus and Assos in the Troad (see Fourth Letter 322c–323d; Seventh Letter 323d–352a; Eighth Letter 352b–357d). If we believe that the Seventh Letter is authentic, Plato seemed to think that Dion of Syracuse was the ideal candidate to bring the best possible state into existence.59 We are told that Dion ‘was in all things quick to learn … with a zeal and attentiveness I had never encountered in a young man’ (Seventh Letter 327a–b). Plato says: ‘now, if ever, might we confidently hope 65


to accomplish that union, in the same persons, of philosophers and rulers of great cities’ (Seventh Letter 328a). He adds: What tipped the scales eventually was the thought that if anyone ever was to attempt to realize these principles of law and government, now was the time to try, since it was only necessary to win over a single man and I should have accomplished all the good I dreamed of. This, then, was the ‘bold’ purpose I had in setting forth from home. (Seventh Letter 328b–c; see also Republic 473c–d) This would confirm Plato’s belief in the Republic (473c–d) that the easiest and quickest way to transform a city-state into a just political order is to educate dictators so that they will possess expertise in statecraft.60 Rather than abandoning his Republic, Plato attempted to realize it by converting a dictator to his side rather than via his ideal political philosophy’s elaborate system of breeding. The transformation of dictators into statesman by education is also considered by Socrates in the dialogue Alcibiades. Socrates is very keen to influence the young Alcibiades to take up philosophical training prior to entering politics (Alcibiades 119b–120c, 132a):61 that is my greatest fear, that a love of the common people [rather than truth] might corrupt you. … Get in training first, my dear friend, and learn what you need to know before entering politics. That will give you an antidote against the terrible dangers. (Alcibiades 132a–b; see also Republic 430a–b).62 The lesson for future rulers is that they should be properly prepared through a philosophical education prior to holding political power. A proper education will serve as an anti-corruptive antidote to the unpredictable practice of managing state affairs. The transformation of a dictatorship into a practical fusion of philosophy with political power is not to be achieved by violence: ‘let him not use violence upon his fatherland to bring about a change of constitution’ (Seventh Letter 331d).63 Indeed, the ‘art of statesmanship’ is the peaceful, social interconnection of courageous and moderate citizens (Statesman 311b–c; see also Laws 628c–e). This disdain for violence has its precedent in Socrates’ well-known dictum in the Crito: ‘One should never do wrong in return, nor injure any man, whatever injury one has suffered at his hands’ (49c–d; see also Gorgias 469b; Seventh Letter 335a).64 Instead of violence, Plato’s chosen tool was persuasion to convert the masses to accept expert rule, as he came to realize later in life the importance 66


of popular approval and participation in governance.65 One of the earliest pieces of evidence is in the Crito: Socrates: My good Crito, why should we care so much for what the majority think?… Crito: You see, Socrates, that one must also pay attention to the opinion of the majority. Your present situation makes clear that the majority can inflict not the least but pretty well the greatest evils if one is slandered among them.66 Socrates: … They cannot make a man either wise or foolish, but they inflict things haphazardly. (44c–d) Socrates’ utter rejection of public opinion67 stands opposed to Plato’s later resignation at its importance in political affairs. Thus, while Plato would agree that public opinion is fickle, he would still join Crito in appreciating the significance of paying attention to the public mood. In the Second Letter written to Dionysius II and attributed to Plato, Plato tells us that he travelled to Syracuse in part so that ‘philosophy might gain favour with the multitude’ (312; see also Seventh Letter 325d–e). This thought was not confined to the various letters attributed to him, but was expressed also in the Republic: one reason for making the transition to philosopher-king rule in any city is the need to convince the majority of people elsewhere that this project is a practical possibility (498d–499a).68 Finally, it is important to recognize Plato’s position on the rule of law. As with popular consent to expert rule, his position appears contradictory. On the one hand, Plato argues that all members of the city-state except its ruler(s) are subject to laws as ‘[i]t would be absurd for a guardian to need a guardian’ (see Republic 403e; Statesman 294a–b). Dangerously echoing similar, more sinister and contemporary, arguments, Plato says: ‘In some cases, the rulers will themselves be obeying our laws, and in others, namely, the ones we leave to their discretion, they’ll give directions that are in the spirit of our laws’ (Republic 458c). Thus, in essence, the rulers’ own judgements serve for what the law is: the law is the expression of their exclusive will. Such a position is anathema to the rule of law as commonly understood today.69 Nevertheless, while it does appear that Plato is authorizing expert rulers to be lawless, what distinguishes the monarch from the tyrant is the monarch’s embrace of laws. If we accept its authenticity, Plato comes to argue that ‘responsible kingship’ requires ‘laws punishing kings and citizens alike if they disobey’ in the Eighth Letter (355d–e). Indeed, what law is in its fullest sense governs the actions of us all, lawlessness being the domination of ‘men and tyrants’ over the law’s content (Eighth Letter 354c). In 67


conclusion, if we accept that a justified, Platonic political order is a system governed by the rule of law, we must accept equally Plato’s unsatisfactory manner of dealing with legal revision by placing rulers outside the written codes they helped, in part, to fashion.70 VB

The Mixed Wine of Freedom

If this account of Plato’s practical political philosophy is correct, he must ultimately endorse some mixture of expert rule with popular consent. We find just such an endorsement in Book III of the Laws: Listen to me then. There are two-mother constitutions, so to speak, which you could fairly say have given birth to all the others. Monarchy is the proper name for the first, and democracy for the second. The former has been taken to extreme lengths by the Persians, the latter by my country; virtually all the others, as I said, are varieties of these two. It is absolutely vital for a political system to combine them, if (and this is of course the point of our advice, when we insist that no state formed without these two elements can be constituted properly) – if it is to enjoy freedom and friendship applied with good judgement. (Laws 693d–e; see Eighth Letter 353d–e; my italics)71 Thus, Plato appears to abandon his earlier belief that harmony in the citystate will be produced simply by each person pursuing his or her natural craft.72 Instead, harmony and freedom are said to thrive best when the state fuses monarchy with democratic institutions. Any state that is of one variety or the other will be disharmonious as a necessary result.73 Plato asks the question: how are these two different institutions to be reconstituted into one unified system? This new form of governance comprises a legislator and guardians of the laws. The legislator is unelected and properly educated for this office, responsible for making laws and persuading the public about how the laws serve justice (see Laws 823a). The guardians of the laws are common citizens who are democratically elected to enforce the laws of the city-state.74 In order to be candidates, individuals must submit themselves to a process of lengthy scrutiny to ensure that they will perform well if elected (see Laws 752d–754e, 755a–c).75 For Plato, the result is a compromise ‘between a monarchical and a democratic constitution’ fusing a ‘moderate authoritarianism’ with ‘moderate freedom’ (Laws 756e, 701e). There are a few things we can say about his moderate authoritarianism. First of all, Plato says that this system will ‘enjoy freedom and friendship applied with good judgement’ (Laws 693d–e). In the Republic, democracies are most characterized by freedom (557b, 562b– c). However, democratic freedom is something less than true freedom as it 68


more closely resembles anarchical lawlessness (Republic 462c). The main problem with democratic governance is that the citizenry are completely unscrupulous about who should make political judgements, allowing all citizens to participate equally in a task at some people perform better than others (Republic 557e–558a, 560b). Democracy requires responsible leadership to become a just political system: I suppose that, when a democratic city, athirst for freedom, happens to get bad cupbearers for its leaders, so that it gets drunk by drinking more than it should of the unmixed wine of freedom, then, unless the rulers are very pliable and provide plenty of that freedom, they are punished by the city and accused of being accursed oligarchs (Republic 562c–d; my italics) Democracies pursue freedom for its own sake without regard for corresponding responsibilities. Keeping in mind the common ancient Greek practice of always mixing wine with water prior to consumption, Plato opposes an ‘unmixed wine of freedom’ – a freedom to do whatever one pleases – perhaps for the reason that freedom is intoxicating: the citizens are more liable to become drunk and irresponsible. Plato does not forbid the consumption of wine – in this case synonymous with freedom – but he does forbid excessive consumption. Freedom is a good to be cultivated in one’s city-state, so long as it is constrained by ‘good judgement’ (Laws 693d–e). With leaders capable of good judgement, a city-state is in possession of good cupbearers and will be ruled with principled moderation, but enjoy widespread popular freedoms. Plato appears to endorse a degree of political transparency, as the best possible city-state should openly consult with its citizenry on a regular basis: whether [a city is] governed by one man or many, if its constitution is properly ordered and rightly directed, it would be sensible to give advice to its citizens concerning what would be to the city’s advantage. (Seventh Letter 330d–e)76 It would seem sensible to advise citizens on the best course of action, but not to decide in secret or force their compliance (see Laws 823a). A potential difficulty is that it is unclear how much accountability to non-experts Plato demands of rulers. He offers the following example: ‘Doctors provide the clearest parallel. We believe in them whether they cure us with our consent or without it’ (Statesman 293b; see also 296b–c). Expert rule justifies the imposition of the expert’s judgement on citizens irrespective of their consent.77 69


Nevertheless, Plato did fully recognize the right of any member of society to question the rule of law, so long as the law is obeyed (Statesman 299b– 300c). Persuasion was his chosen instrument of agreement in the end, not coercion (Republic 548b).78 In fact, the person with expertise in governance ought to persuade each member of an Assembly individually, rather than force their acceptance (Alcibiades 114b). The reason for this may be that the governance of any city ought to work towards the good of the citizens, not the interests of those in power.79 VI

Conclusion

How ought we interpret Plato’s arguments for philosopher-kings alongside his endorsement of moderate authoritarianism? Perhaps the best way of understanding this dilemma is to say that Plato’s ideal political philosophy calls for the justified imposition of expert judgement in a way that his practical political philosophy does not.80 In the former, philosopher-kings rule over a city-state on account of their relatively perfect comprehension of justice and its demands. Their knowledge of justice confers an unequalled authority of judgement on them in political affairs. In addition, their right to rule is readily acknowledged by the ruled. On the other hand, in his practical political philosophy, Plato came to see the great difficulty of making such judgements, as statecraft is not the pure science he thought it was at first. Instead, the best possible ruler – rather than the ideal ruler – must receive a philosophical education, but such an education cannot hope simply to determine political decisions within the neat confines of ideal justice, but to judge within the contingent world of earthly possibilities. The upshot is that the best possible rulers will still possess an expertise superior to their subjects, entitling the ruler to provide political judgements. However, this ruler will not command the absolute authority from absolute knowledge that a philosopher-king possesses. As a consequence of this gap in expertise, the ruler’s authority is partly undermined and the public earn a right to be involved in the political process. Moreover, Plato recognizes the importance of readily establishing his political objectives through a philosophically trained dictator. He believes that the citizenry will be more receptive to his objectives if they can be seen to take hold, rather than remaining mere theory alone. Plato ultimately favours his practical political philosophy as the best manner of bringing about the best possible city-state, rather than the idyllic city-state. In addition, he is fairly clear that the ideal city-state is an ideal that cannot be realized and sustainable well before we reach later dialogues, principally the Laws. In fact, these barriers to the realization and sustainability of his ideal city-state are taken into account and addressed in what I have simply called Plato’s practical city-state, a political community that is far more likely to take hold in the world in his own view. Plato never rejects 70


his ideal political vision as the best picture of how a political community ought to exist. He does, however, reject his ideal vision as a viable option for political reform.81 University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK Notes 1 My critical views of Leo Strauss as a historian of ideas are similar to S. B. Drury’s views. (See S. B. Drury, ‘The Esoteric Philosophy of Leo Strauss’, Political Theory, 13 (1985), pp. 315–37.) 2 All references to Stephanus numbers in Plato’s works are to Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 3 ‘[R]eason is our king, both over heaven and earth’ (Philebus 28c). 4 Justice is ‘doing one’s own work and not meddling with what isn’t one’s own’ (Republic 433a–b, 441e). On techné, see C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 5 There are three primary varieties of crafts which people choose according to their personality types: the philosophical choose philosophical crafts, the victoryloving choose victory-loving crafts, and the profit-loving choose profit-loving crafts (Republic 581c). 6 See Rachana Kamtekar, ‘Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic: Plato’s Two Principles’, History of Political Thought, 22(2) (2001), pp. 189–220. 7 ‘[I]n a well-regulated city’ everyone ‘has his own work to do and no one has the leisure to be ill and under treatment all his life’ (Republic 496c). Elsewhere, Plato suggests that the day-labourer who does not work for the benefit of the community loses a right to exist in it, as if he is unable to work because of illness he should ‘either recover his health or, if his body couldn’t withstand the illness, he’d die and escape his troubles’ (Republic 406d–e; see also 407c–e; George Klosko, The Development of Plato’s Political Thought (New York: Methuen, 1986), p. 153). In addition, Plato calls ‘the greatest of all evils’ a city-state that allows any one of its members to become ‘a poor person without means’ by selling all he owns (Republic 552a). 8 See George Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, Journal of Politics, 43 (1981), p. 378. 9 I would agree with Klosko that ‘the central motif of the political theory of the Republic [and elsewhere] is putting philosophical intelligence in control of the state’ (Klosko, The Development of Plato’s Political Thought, p. 172). 10 For example, Socrates says: ‘In emergencies – if at no other time – you see this belief. When they are in distress, on the battlefield, or in sickness or in a storm at sea, all men turn to their leaders in each sphere as to God, and look to them for salvation because they are superior in precisely this one thing – knowledge. And wherever human life and work goes on, you find everywhere men seeking teachers and masters, for themselves and for other living creatures and for the direction of all human works. You find also men who believe that they are able to teach and to take the lead. In all these cases, what else can we say but that men do believe in the existence of both wisdom and ignorance among themselves?’ (Theaetetus 170a–b). 11 See Gregory Vlastos, ‘The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy’, Political Theory, 11 (1983), p. 503, and Robin Waterfield, ‘Introduction’, in Plato, Republic, trans. R. Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),

71


12

13 14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21

22

p. xxv. This agrees with Reeve that, for Plato, ‘[p]roper political rule is proper psychic rule’ (Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, p. 262). Democracy is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down; see my ‘A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism’, Politics 22 (2002), pp. 152–62; Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices’, Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), pp. 5–34; and Michael Saward, ‘Reconstructing Democracy: Current Thinking and New Directions’, Government and Opposition, 36 (2001), pp. 559–81. Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), p. 300. See my ‘Plato, Hegel and Democracy’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, forthcoming. In a well-known, albeit brief, passage from the Statesman, Plato argues that democracy is the most preferable form of governance, but only amongst unlawful regimes (303a–b). As we shall see later, Plato continues to hold this view in his later thought. Thus, Strauss is wrong to say that ‘every utterance of the Platonic Socrates is ironical’. (See Leo Strauss, ‘The Liberalism of Classical Political Philosophy’, Review of Metaphysics, 12 (1959), p. 428.) Cf. Terence H. Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 229. While he disagrees with much else he has to say, Socrates appears to agree with Callicles that ‘the people who institute our laws are the weak and the many. They do this, and they assign praise and blame with themselves and their own advantage in mind. They’re afraid of the more powerful among men, the ones who are capable of having a greater share, and so they say that getting more than one’s share is “shameful” and “unjust”. … But I believe that nature itself reveals that it’s a just thing for the better man and the more capable man to have a greater share than the worse man and the less capable man’ (Gorgias 483b–d; see also 486d–487a). Two further difficulties are (1) a great number of people falsely believe that they possess this knowledge (Philebus 48c–49a) and (2) the masses are more keen to win than to pursue truth when engaged in a philosophical investigation with one another (see Gorgias 457c–d). While Plato was not a feminist in any conventional sense, he did fully support the inclusion of women as guardians and kings in the ideal city-state alongside men (see Republic 455d–e, 456d–e; also see Ernest Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (London: Dover, 1947), pp. 144–9, and Bruce Rosenstock, ‘Athena’s Cloak: Plato’s Critique of the Democratic City in the Republic’, Political Theory, 22 (1994), pp. 363–90). On the difference between philosophers and non-philosophers, see R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, Plato’s Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (London: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 134–65. The guardians and philosopher-kings are paid solely through taxes (Republic 416e–417b). It is assumed that this system will not be abused to benefit a material lifestyle beyond basic needs, as the separation of wealth and power is meant to remove corruption from the ruling elites. Plato does not want to suggest that the pursuit of wealth in the workplace should justify great riches or poverty for any craftsman. Indeed, the more wealth one acquires, the more difficult it is for anyone – including an ordinary labourer – to pay attention to his or her craft (Republic 421d–422a). Similarly, if one is living in poverty, attention to one’s craft is compromised in favour of mere survival (ibid.). A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work (London: Methuen, 1937), p. 277.

72


23 This may be a difficulty, as some studies suggest that the durability of institutions of governance is in large part determined by individual states’ economic performance (see Michael Bernhard, Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock, ‘Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival’, Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), p. 797). As a result, it may be economic performance which grounds the stability of a system of governance, not vice versa as Plato suggests. 24 See my ‘Better Luck Next Time: A Comparative Analysis of Socrates and Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism on Reincarnation’, Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion, 10 (2005), pp. 1–25 and Klosko, The Development of Plato’s Political Thought, p. 165. 25 Arguably, philosopher-kings would only tell useful falsehoods as an instrument of last resort, given that ‘[t]hey must be without falsehood – they must refuse to accept what is false, hate it, and have a love for the truth’ (Republic 485c; see Kateri Carmola, ‘Noble Lying: Justice and Intergenerational Tension in Plato’s Republic’, Political Theory, 31 (2003), pp. 39–62, and Daniel Dombrowski, ‘Plato’s Noble Lie’, History of Political Thought, 18 (1997), pp. 565–78). 26 Even later – in the Republic’s Book VIII – Socrates says: ‘for, after all, we’re only sketching the shape of the constitution in theory, not giving an exact account of it’ (548c). 27 See Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, pp. 185–6. 28 Even more difficult to implement on his count, Socrates commands that all children over the age of 10 be sent out from the city to be re-educated, completely separated from their family (Republic 540–541a). 29 Plato offers various pieces of evidence for the suggestion that only someone divine has the authority to rule, based upon his or her comprehension of justice. Three points worth noting are: (1) the ‘gods are our guardians’ (Phaedo 62b); (2) philosophers become ‘as divine and ordered as a human being can’ (Republic 500c–d); and (3) the philosopher-king has ‘a divine ruler within himself’ (Republic 590c). 30 If wisdom ‘is a kind of cleansing or purification’, it is at least a purification of the soul in severing itself from a body in an important sense (Phaedo 69b–c). 31 See Richard Ketchum, ‘Plato on the Unknowability of the Sensible World’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 4 (1987), pp. 291–305. 32 Plato offers a good example in a conversation between Socrates and Plutarchus: ‘Suppose, then, there is a person who understands what justice itself is and can give the appropriate definitions and possesses the same kind of comprehension about all the rest of what there is. – Let that be presupposed. – Will he be sufficiently versed in science if he knows the definition of the circle and of the divine sphere itself but cannot recognize the human sphere and these our circles, using even in housebuilding those other yardsticks and those circles? – We would find ourselves in a rather ridiculous position if we were confined entirely to those divine kinds of knowledge, Socrates! – What are you saying? Ought we at the same time to include the inexact and impure science of the false yardstick and circle, and add it to the mixture? – Yes, necessarily so, if any one of us ever wants to find his own way home’ (Philebus 62a–b). 33 It is also important to note that Plato uses Socrates to make all of these statements, perhaps causing another problem for the Straussian revisionist interpretation. 34 Norman O. Dahl, ‘Plato’s Defence of Justice’, in Gail Fine (ed.) Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 211.

73


35 The highest form of ignorance is ‘being overcome by pleasure’, not doing what is pleasurable (see Protagoras 357e–358c; also Third Letter 317c–d). Pleasures are likened to children ‘who don’t possess the least bit of reason’ (Philebus 65c). 36 Guardians of the city are forbidden to own property and to have private rooms, living together ‘like soldiers in a camp’ (Republic 416d–e). The philosopherkings are chosen from the ranks of the guardians (Republic 525b). 37 Socrates says: ‘“And it is quite right, Charmides, that you should be superior to the rest in all such things”, I replied, “because I don’t suppose that anyone else here could so readily point to two Athenian families whose union would be likely to produce a more aristocratic lineage than that from which you are sprung … [one] side of the family is not a bit inferior to the other”’ (Charmides 157e–158a). There are early reservations about Critias’ ability to pursue truth at the expense of reputation (Charmides 169c–d; see also 172d–e). We also have strong reservations about Charmides’ temperance at the conclusion of the dialogue which bears his name (Charmides 176c–d). 38 See Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) and his student Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1968). 39 See Taylor, Plato, p. 275. 40 Plato says: ‘The moderate, I think, look out for people with the disposition they themselves possess, and so far as they can they both marry from among these and marry off the daughters they are giving away back to people of this sort’ (Statesman 310c–d). 41 This is coupled with the fact that persons perfectly matched naturally produce a given number of children having a lesser nature (Republic 546a–e; see Rod Jenks, ‘The Machinery of the Collapse: On Republic VIII’, History of Political Thought, 23 (2002), pp. 21–9). 42 Observed quite well by Callicles: ‘Philosophy is no doubt a delightful thing, Socrates, as long as one is exposed to it in moderation at the appropriate time of life. But if one spends more time with it than he should, it’s the undoing of mankind’ (Gorgias 484c; see 486a–b). 43 Socrates says further: ‘they say Thales was studying the stars, Theodorus, and gazing aloft, when he fell into a well; and a witty and amusing Thracian servantgirl made fun of him because, she said, he was wild to know about what was up in the sky but failed to see what was in front of him and under his feet. The same joke applies to all who spend their lives in philosophy. It really is true that the philosopher fails to see his next-door neighbour; he not only doesn’t notice what he is doing; he scarcely knows whether he is a man or some other kind of creature?’ (Theaetetus 174a–b). 44 See Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, p. 374, and Mary P. Nichols, ‘The Republic’s Two Alternatives: Philosopher-Kings and Socrates’, Political Theory, 12 (1984), p. 271. 45 Socrates says: ‘Polus, I’m not one of the politicians. Last year I was elected to the [Athenian] Council by lot, and when our tribe was presiding and I had to call for a vote, I came in for a laugh. I didn’t know how to do it. So please don’t tell me to call for a vote from the people present here’ (Gorgias 473e–474a). 46 Plato says of his own life: ‘Above all I was ashamed lest I appear to myself as a pure theorist, unwilling to touch any practical task’ (Seventh Letter 328c). 47 See Paul Stern, ‘Tyranny and Self-Knowledge: Critias and Socrates in Plato’s Charmides’, American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), pp. 399–412. 48 A society may come into crisis through lack of resources, war, or plague, which suggests that there are factors beyond the rulers’ knowledge of justice at stake in a city-state’s survival (Laws 709a).

74


49 Equated with the lawful king is the ‘warlike commander’ (Phaedrus 248d–e). 50 This view is at great odds with the Straussian reading, stated well by Klosko: ‘According to Bloom and Strauss, however, this [the Republic] is an impossible ideal. Even if someone with the potential to be a philosopher-king should arise, he would not willingly leave his life of philosophical contemplation to rule. To force the philosopher to rule would be to commit an injustice against him, and so the ideal state is impossible because its existence must rest upon an injustice to the philosophers’ (George Klosko, ‘The “Straussian” Interpretation of Plato’s Republic’, History of Political Thought, 7 (1988), p. 290. See also Bloom, The Republic of Plato, pp. 407–10, and Strauss, The City and Man, p. 124.). 51 See Hannah Arendt, The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000), p. 119. 52 Plato’s mother Perictione ‘was connected with Solon’ (W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. IV, Plato: The Man and his Dialogues, Earlier Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 10). 53 For example, wealthy citizens were expected to pay the full costs of state functions and celebrations, the number and cost of events decided upon by elected political leaders. 54 Perdiccas was the king of Macedon from 364 to 359 BCE. 55 Scholars have often wondered why Socrates chose to live almost exclusively within Athens’ city walls associating himself with various members of the notorious Thirty. The decision to live and die by the laws of democratic Athens was not made arbitrarily. In the Crito, Plato says through Socrates that whenever we choose to live in a city, we choose to obey its laws at one and the same time (51e; see also Apology 19a; Terence H. Irwin, ‘Socrates and Athenian Democracy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), pp. 184–205, and Vlastos, ‘The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy’, p. 498). The law is crucial to improving the constitutions of the young men of Athens (Apology 24e). This is not to say that Socrates was supposedly fully supportive of Athenian democracy: he often criticized its greatest hero, Pericles (Alcibiades 118c–119c; 122b; Gorgias 516b–517c). According to Plato, Socrates even recounts being elected once to the Athenian Council, although he was completely ignorant of how to participate as a member (see Gorgias 473e–474a). In the Republic, when Adeimantus asks ‘which of our present constitutions do you think is suitable for philosophers?’, Socrates answers: ‘None of them. That’s exactly my complaint’ (497a–b). Why, then, did Socrates choose to stay in Athens? Perhaps the answer lies in the Gorgias: ‘[in Athens] there’s more freedom of speech than anywhere else in Greece’ (461e). In short, there does not seem to be any clear answer to the question, although the greater existence of freedom of speech in Athens may have made it most suitable for a social critic like Socrates. 56 Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, pp. 365, 371. 57 See Strauss, The City and Man, p. 124; Bloom, The Republic of Plato, pp. 407–10; and Allan Bloom, ‘Response to Hall’, Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 317–19 . My view agrees with Klosko, ‘The “Straussian” Interpretation of Plato’s Republic’, p. 279: ‘[Strauss] seems not to realize how seriously the acceptance of Plato’s Epistles undermines his view of the Republic.’ 58 Thus, it may be surprising to discover that, for Plato, idealism alone cannot bring about a just order (Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 160; see also Nickolas Pappas, Plato and the Republic (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 200). 59 Perhaps unfortunately for Plato, Dion’s ascension to power never materialized (Seventh Letter 324b, 327a–328d, 351c–e). 60 Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, pp. 379–81.

75


61 Socrates often proclaimed his love for Alcibiades, a love meant to improve the 20-year-old Alcibiades as moral person rather than to satisfy Socrates’ physical desires (Alcibiades 103a–104a, 106e, 122b, 123d, 131c–132b; Symposium 213d– 223d). In addition to Alcibiades, Socrates was highly attracted to Charmides (see Charmides 154b–d; also Alcibiades 131c–d). Both Alcibiades and Charmides were members of the Thirty. 62 This dialogue concludes with the foreshadowed words: Alcibiades: I’ll start to cultivate justice in myself right now. Socrates: I should like to believe that you will persevere, but I’m afraid – not because I distrust your nature, but because I know how powerful the city is – I’m afraid it might get the better of both me and you. (Alcibiades 135e) 63 See Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, p. 384. 64 W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. V, The Later Plato and the Academy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 185. 65 For a different viewpoint, see Irwin on ‘Platonic Love and Platonic Justice’, in Terence H. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 311–13. 66 The ‘present situation’ is that Socrates has been condemned to die by the newly installed Athenian democracy (see Apology 38c and Crito 43a–44d). 67 The best example of what was probably Socrates’ particular disdain for public opinion may be the Cave analogy (see Republic 513e–519d). The analogy’s implication that philosophers have a duty to come back into the cave as the people’s rightful rulers in an attempt to spread truth may be more characteristic of Plato. 68 This view contrasts sharply with S. Sara Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). She says: ‘Neither Letter 7 nor Letter 8 lend support to the view that Plato entered Syracusan politics in an effort to “realize” the plan of the Republic. Both display Plato’s concerns to distance himself from a mistaken interpretation of his interest in Syracusan affairs’ (p. 150). 69 Plato also suggests the impossibility of there being a rule of law: ‘That law could never accurately embrace what is best and most just for all at the same time, and so prescribe what is best … practically nothing in human affairs ever remains stable, prevent any sort of expertise whatsoever from making any simple decision in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all time’ (Statesman 294b). The problem may simply be with his idea of law as something eternally true. The fact that laws seem to require revision over time is not a reason not to have laws, but instead it reveals a need to have some mechanism for revising them when such revision becomes necessary. Plato does not seem to reject this position, but he appears to believe that the rulers’ duty to revise the law of their city-state licenses their freedom from constraint by the laws’ prescription. 70 Barry Weingast is quite right to point out: ‘Because laws and political limits can be disobeyed or ignored, something beyond laws is necessary to prevent violations. To survive, the rule of law requires that limits on political officials be selfenforcing’ (Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), p. 262). Thus, we must always entrust those in political authority with some degree of self-policing.

76


71

72 73

74 75 76

77

78 79

80 81

Plato seems to assume that such officials would police themselves without any countering influences. If correct, this appears to contradict interpretations by Darrell Dobbs, ‘Socratic Communism’, Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), pp. 491–510; Richard Holway, ‘Achilles, Socrates, Democracy’, Political Theory, 22 (1994), pp. 561–90; Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I, The Spell of Plato (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945), pp. 86–119; Arlene W. Saxonhouse, ‘Democracy, Equality, and Eidê: A Radical View from Book 8 of Plato’s Republic’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), pp. 273–83; and C. C. W. Taylor, ‘Plato’s Totalitarianism’, in Fine, Plato 2, esp. pp. 281–2. See Catherine Pickstock, ‘Justice and Prudence: Principles of Order in the Platonic City’, Telos, 119 (2001), pp. 3–16. According to John Burnet, Plato’s fusion of legal kingship with legal democracy is a combination of Persian monarchy and Athenian democracy, ideally (John Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato (London: Macmillan, 1964), p. 239 and n. 1; see Laws 699e and Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. IV, p. 301). There are a number of other elected offices in addition, such as ‘generals’ and ‘calvary-commanders’ (see Laws 755c–d, 756a–b). In Plato’s view, ‘to put incompetent officials in charge of administering the code is a waste of good laws … doing [the city-state] damage and injury on a gigantic scale’ (Laws 751b). Plato’s authoritarianism might be best characterized as an ‘accountable authoritarianism’ or a ‘sceptical authoritarianism’. (See my ‘A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism’, Politics, pp. 152–62 and my ‘Can We Justify Political Inequality?’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 89 (2003), pp. 426–38.) Plato says shortly afterwards: ‘And whether they [the expert rulers] purge the city for its benefit by putting some people to death or else by exiling them, or whether again they make it smaller by sending out colonies somewhere like swarms of bees, or build it up by introducing people from somewhere outside and making them citizens – so long as they act to preserve it on the basis of expert knowledge and what is just, making it better than it was so far as they can’ (Statesman 293d–e; see Gorgias 466b–c). Moreover, persuasion is to be directed at ‘the soul’, not the body (Phaedrus 270e–271a). ‘Shouldn’t we then attempt to care for the city and its citizens with the aim of making the citizens themselves as good as possible?’ (Gorgias 513e). Often he uses the analogy of the steersman, acting for benefit of ship and sailors (see Alcibiades 117c–e, 135a–b; Republic 341c, 488a–489b; Seventh Letter 351d; Statesman 296e–297b, e, 299a–e; also see Laws 639b; Phaedrus 246a–247c). In these analogies the ‘ships resemble cities and their attitude to the true philosophers’ (Republic 489a). Here too we may be led to the belief that people ought to follow the true philosopher’s judgement against their will. I therefore disagree with Rosenstock’s belief that Plato’s dichotomy is between the philosopher and the tyrant (Rosenstock, ‘Athena’s Cloak’, p. 383). I have benefited greatly from the comments of Joy Chaudhuri, Jack Crittenden, Peter Jones, Graham Long, John Rose, Michael Shaw, and, most especially, Fabian Freyenhagen on previous drafts of this article. The article was presented at the Society for the Contemporary Assessment of Platonism at the American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division) annual meeting and the Newcastle Political Philosophy Workshop.

77

12. Knowledge and Power in Plato's Political Thought

Recommend Documents