Maceda vs. Vasquez [G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993] Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months. Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts Held: COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES MUST BE REFERRED FIRST TO THE SUPREME COURT BY VIRTUE OF THE COURTS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER THEM. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question? In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Raquiza vs Castaneda Jr. [A.M. No. 1312-CFI, January 31, 1978] Facts: The Petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from the sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castañeda to another branch and administrative complaint against the same judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) rendering decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal (3) extortion by means of oppression; and (4) bribery. The court refers the administrative complaint to Justice Bautista of CA for investigation, report and recommendation. Issue: WON the petition and complaint against the Respondent will prosper? Held: IN ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES AGAINST JUDGES THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IS PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. The court reviewed the records, testimonies of the Witnesses, and other evidences submitted to the parties and find the recommendation of the investigator as fully supported with enough evidence to merit the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent Judge. The court held that a ground for removal of a Judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt most especially if it involves misconduct, corruption and incompetence. The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should disciplined for grave misconduct of any graver offense, the evidence presented against him should be competend and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to which respondent belong no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature. The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges against the respondent be dismissed for lack of merit.
Kilosbayan vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007] Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court. Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a natural-born citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings. F ACTS: This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be such. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. RULING: xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would haveto show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as wellas his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
Dulay vs. JBC [G. R. No. 202143, July 3, 2012] Facts:This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, filed by petitioner Famela R. Dulay against the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. Petitioner claims that the President of the Republic of the Philippines cannot legitimately, validly, and constitutionally appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, because the 1987 Constitution only empowers him to appoint members or Justices but not the Chief Justice. She adds that the Chief Justice should be replaced and designated exclusively from among their peers. Petitioner also contends that the JBC cannot be validly, legally and constitutionally headed by a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, because the Constitution specifically provides that it be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and no other. Issue: (1) Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the constitutional power to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and (2) Whether or not the JBC can validly be headed by a person other than the incumbent Chief Justice. Held: Petition is dismissed. Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides for the appointment of Justices and Judges, to wit: Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. x x x (Emphasis supplied) In interpreting the above-stated constitutional provision, petitioner considers only the Associate Justices as the "members of the Supreme Court" thereby excluding the Chief Justice from the President's appointing power. Said interpretation is baseless. A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial Department in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly shows that the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" and the words "Members" and "Member" are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme Court without distinction whether he be the Chief Justice or any of the Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices. Section 4 (l), Article VIII thereof defines the composition of the Supreme Court, namely, "a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices" who may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members; Section 4 (2) and (3) describe the manner of conducting
business in the Court whether it be En Banc or in division; Section 7 (1) enumerates the qualifications of the Members of the Court and the other members of the Judiciary; Section 11 provides for the security of tenure in the Judiciary; Section 12 states the prohibition on non-judicial assignments of the Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts; and Section 13 lays down the process of decision-making. In all of these provisions, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" was repeatedly used to refer not only to the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court but includes the Chief Justice. Thus, in Section 9 of the same Article VIII on the appointment of Justices and Judges, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" clearly refers to the fifteen Justices of the Court - one Chief Justice and fourteen (14) Associate Justices - who are within the appointing power of the President. Although decided under a different Constitution, we reiterate the Court's pronouncement in Vargas v. Rilloraza that "there can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required x x x to compose the Supreme Court are the regular members of the Court." We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner that the JBC can only be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and no other. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the JBC cannot perform its task without an incumbent Chief Justice. To follow this logic would lead to an eventuality where a vacancy in the Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy occurs in the JBC. We can likewise infer from this argument that if the Office of the Chief Justice is vacated, the same will not be filled because there will be no "incumbent Chief Justice" to act as Chairman of the JBC. We definitely cannot sustain these arguments. The principal function of the JBC is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list. Any vacancy in the Supreme Court is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. This 90-day period is mandatory. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the constitutionallynamed Chairman could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally-named ex-officio Chairman does not sit in the JBC. Considering, however, that complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power over the JBC, this Court should not be deprived of representation. The most Senior Justice of this Court who is not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice should participate in the deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally-named Ex-Officio Chairman, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, to wit:
Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief Justice. - In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Chavez vs JBC (G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012) Facts: The unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012 and the nomination of the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, as his potential successor, triggered the filing of the case. The petitioner assails the validity of the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) because in 1994 the composition the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only 7 members, the eight member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC (one from the Senate and one from the House of Representatives) with each having ½ of a vote. Then the JBC en banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and House of Representatives one full vote each. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition, setting forth that the framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned and decided on a JBC composed of only 7 members. Issue: Whether or not the Judicial or Bar Council should be composed of 8 members. Whether or not the Congress should have 2 representatives to the JBC. Resolution: The framers of our Constitution intended to create JBC as an innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, the adopted the holistic approach and hoped that in creating the a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of the government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the judiciary. Therefore to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote of one-half a vote each, would as one former congressmen and member of the JBC put it, “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.” As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of the Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the member of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one representative to the JBC. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The current numerical composition of the JBC is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The JBC is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one member of Congress will sit as
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Sec. 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
-FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents. Facts: The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure. Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having onehalf (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance. The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. Issue: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. Held: No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.” It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987] Facts: The petitioners who are duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over RTC branches in the National Capital Judicial Region, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the SC, from making any deduction or withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit that any tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provisions of Sec. 10, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the deduction of taxes from the compensation of the judicial officers constitute a diminution of their salaries which is in turn a violation of the Constitution. Resolution: Salaries of Justices and Judges subject to income taxation and the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David are hereby discarded. The Court en banc had re-affirmed the Chief Justice’s directive as follows: “RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. - The Court re-affirmed the Chief Justice’s previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of Justices of the SC as well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.” The clear intent of the of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment in income tax to members of the judiciary, so as to “give substance to equality among the three branches of the government”. The salaries of the members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. -SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY ARE SUBJECT TO TAX. Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder: "The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased." (Emphasis supplied). It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted. Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
People vs. Gacott, Jr. [G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995] Facts: Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated April 26, 1995. The decision of the court shall be recorded on the respondent’s personal record. Gacott filed a motion for reconsideration that the case not be recorded on his personal record for doing so will foreclose any chance for him to aspire for promotion in the judiciary in the future. Gacott contended as well that under Section 11, Article VII, administrative cases shall be decided by Supreme Court en banc in disciplining a judge. Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge. Ruling: NOT ALL DISCIPLINARY ACTION PROCEEDINGS NEED TO BE HEARD EN BANC. At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained. The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself. Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. — In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia: For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases: 6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both. This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted provision was maintained. Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven members. Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division. It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that: 2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). That guideline or rule in the referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a division thereof rests on the same rationale and applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter deal with situations like the one subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and circumspection. The basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the case at bar are hereby DENIED.
De la Llana vs. Alba [G.R. No. 57883, March 12, 1982] FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution. RULING: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
DISSOLUTION OF OFFICE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT OVER JUDGES. Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing Inferior Courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be, distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the stand-point of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the Judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded, the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the Inferior Courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.
Zandueta v. Dela Costa [November 28, 1938 G.R. No. L-46267] NATURE: This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said respondent FACTS: Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly-On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan-The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath-After his appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts-On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner-On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments ISSUE: WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to repossess the office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed statute HELD: When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued. The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, —which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him — , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be stopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.
In re Manzano [A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988] Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary. Issue: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned? Ruling: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution). Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. “Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Government’s executive machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control. In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence “we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
Consing vs Court of Appeals [177 SCRA 14 (1989)] Facts: Merlin Consing sold a house and lot to Caridad Santos. Provided in their contract of sale were particular terms of payment in which the purchase price shall be paid (installment basis, plus interest). In the process, Santos defaulted in her payments. Consing demanded for her payment and had planned to resort to court litigation. Santos expressed her willingness to settle her obligation. However, this is upon the condition that the Consings comply with all the laws and regulations on subdivision and after payment to her damages as a consequence of the use of a portion of her lot as a subdivision road. In response, the Consings submitted a revised subdivision plan. CFI Decision Santos was fully justified in refusing to pay further her monthly amortizations because although Consing submitted a revised plan and may have corrected irregularities and/or have complied with the legal requirements for the operation of their subdivision, he cannot escape liability to Santos for having sold to her portions of the roads or streets denominated as right-of-way. Contention of Consing: CA did not comply with the certification requirement. Purpose of certification requirement: • To ensure that all court decisions are reached after consultation with members of the court en banc or division, as the case may be • To ensure that the decision is rendered by a court as a whole, not merely by a member of the same • To ensure that decisions are arrived only after deliberation, exchange of ideas, and concurrence of majority vote Held: The absence of certification does not invalidate a decision. It is only evidence for failure to observe the requirement. There could be an administrative case on the ground of lack of certification.
Prudential Bank vs. Castro [A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988] On November 16, 1984, respondent Regional Trial Court Judge Jose P. Castro of Quezon City rendered a decision in Civil Case No. Q-42349, entitled: "Macro Textile Mills Corporation vs. Prudential Bank and Trust Co., et al.," Acting on the letter-appeal, dated June 6, 1988, filed on behalf of respondent Judge by his children, seeking clarification of the Decision of June 5, 1986, on whether or not the Order of this Court forfeiting all of said Judge's retirement benefits and pay "exclude the monetary value of his accumulated leave credits which he earned during his thirty six (36) years of service in the government, the last eleven (11) years of which were spent in the Judiciary," and praying that the same be so excluded considering their need for funds for the continuing medication of respondent Judge, now afflicted with liver cancer on its terminal stage, the Court RESOLVED, out of humanitarian considerations, and following the precedent in Cathay "WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES: " Respondent Judge is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. He may, however, enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he has earned during the period of his government service. This decision is immediately executory." THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION MUST CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION THAT THE CASE HAS BEEN REACHED IN CONSULTATION DOES NOT APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES. The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the
collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No. R510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an oversight. But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.
Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio [GR 186652, October 6, 2010] Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, herein respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations. The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error. The CA set aside the DOJ Secretary’s resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondent’s petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based). Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of “courts of justice”, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ. Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals. Issue: 1. Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power. 2. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power. Held: 1. No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasicourt, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused. 2. No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.
Macario Tayamura vs IAC [G.R. No. 76355, May 21, 1987] ** In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for review . . . shall be refused due course . . . without stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. MINUTE RESOLUTION DOES NOT NEED TO BE SIGNED BY THE JUSTICES NOR TO CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 13, ART VIII. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. Remedial legislation to meet this problem is also pending in Congress. In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the full time and attention of its Clerks of Court and other key officials. Its officers do not have the time to answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntled litigants questioning decisions and resolutions of the Court and involving cases deliberated upon and resolved by the Court itself. As earlier stated, all resolutions and decisions are actions of the Court, not its subordinate personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility for all its acts. Its personnel cannot answer and should not be made to answer for acts of the Court.
Nicos Industrial Corp. vs. CA [G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992] FACTS: The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners co mplain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals. January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much to be desired, substantially complies with the rules. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s decision is unconstitutional HELD: WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with law. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION MUST STATE CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED IS AN ADDITIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS. It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just
leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. In one case, this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a decision rife with irrelevant details, castigated the trial judge for his "extraordinary verbiage." Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its ruling and, having done so, ends. INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT. It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters." As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have already observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that — The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis. The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case. DISMISSAL ON LACK OF JURISDICTION DOES NOT REQUIRE A STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED, BUT WHEN DISMISSAL IS COUPLED WITH OTHER
GROUNDS LIKE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, THE COURT MUST COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this established principle. However, the rule would be applicable only if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some other additional ground is invoked. A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale. Regarding this second ground, all the trial court did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135." It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Its conclusion was remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA [G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998] FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun. The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner. The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract. RULING: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED MEMORANDUM DECISION IS ALLOWED UNDER THIS JURISDICTION. The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco v. Permskul, this Court held that the following memorandum decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the requirements of Section 14 Article VIII of the Constitution: "MEMORANDUM DECISION After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts reference the findings conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. "WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto." (Emphasis supplied.) This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier case of Romero v. Court of Appeals, where the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals adopted the findings and disposition of the Court of Agrarian Relations in this wise: "We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial court's factual findings and the soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a
spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision." (Emphasis supplied) Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single spaced pages. THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION APPLY ONLY TO PHILIPPINE COURTS, BUT NOT TO FOREIGN COURTS. Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
Borromeo vs. CA [G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990] NATURE: Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS: Before 1933, defendant [Jose A. Villamor] was a distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller who was the agent of the Insular Lumber Company in Cebu City. Defendant being a friend and former classmate of plaintiff [Canuto O. Borromeo] used to borrow from the latter certain amounts from time to time. On one occasion, defendant borrowed from plaintiff a large sum of money for which he mortgaged his land and house in Cebu City to pay some pressing obligation with Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller filed a civil action against the defendant and attached his properties including those mortgaged to plaintiff, inasmuch as the deed of mortgage in favor of plaintiff could not be registered because not properly drawn up. Plaintiff then pressed the defendant for settlement of his obligation, but defendant instead offered to execute a document promising to pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of ten years. Liquidation was made and defendant was found to be indebted to plaintiff in the sum of P7,220.00, for which defendant signed a promissory note therefor on November 29, 1933 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, agreeing to pay as soon as I have money'. The note further stipulate that defendant 'hereby relinquish, renounce, or otherwise waive my rights to the prescriptions established by our Code of Civil Procedure for the collection or recovery of the above sum of P7,220.00. * * * at any time even after the lapse of ten years from the date of this instrument'. After the execution of the document, plaintiff limited himself to verbally requesting defendant to settle his indebtedness from time to time. Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the execution of the document as there was no property registered in defendant's name, who furthermore assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of ten years. After the last war, plaintiff made various oral demands, but defendants failed to settle his account. CFI: Villamor ordered to pay Borromeo (represented by his heirs) the sum of P7,220.00 within ninety days from the date of the receipt of such decision with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the expiration of such ninety-day period. CA: reversed CFI ruling ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the ruling of the CFI in finding the lack of validity of the stipulation amounting to a waiver in line with the principle "that a person cannot renounce future prescription" HELD: YES! Between two possible interpretations, that which saves rather than destroys is to be preferred. It is a fundamental principle in the interpretation of contracts that while ordinarily the literal sense of the words employed is to be followed, such is not the case where they "appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties," which “intention shall prevail” (Art. 1370). The terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order (in this case the contested stipulation) should be separated from the valid and legal contract when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties.
-MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE ALLOWED BY THE CONSTITUTION. The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta (148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" (Italics supplied). This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. The Court ordinarily acts on the incidents or basic merits of three hundred (300) to four hundred (400) cases through its three Divisions every Monday and Wednesday when the Divisions meet and on one hundred (100) to one hundred twenty (120) cases every Tuesday and Thursday that it meets en banc or around one thousand (1,000) cases a week. It is only on Fridays and week-ends that the members of the Court work in their separate chambers or at home because the Court does not meet in session — either in Divisions or En Banc. For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.", where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions." In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for review . . . shall be refused due course . . . without stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a petition
and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. MINUTE RESOLUTION DOES NOT NEED TO BE SIGNED BY THE JUSTICES NOR TO CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 13, ART VIII. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. Remedial legislation to meet this problem is also pending in Congress. In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the full time and attention of its Clerks of Court and other key officials. Its officers do not have the time to answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntled litigants questioning decisions and resolutions of the Court and involving cases deliberated upon and resolved by the Court itself. As earlier stated, all resolutions and decisions are actions of the Court, not its subordinate personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility for all its acts. Its personnel cannot answer and should not be made to answer for acts of the Court.
Valdez vs. CA [G.R. No. 85082, February 25, 1991] This is a case of double sale of real property where both vendees registered the sales with the Register of Deeds and each produced their respective owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title to the property. Spouses Francisco Ante and Manuela Ante were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at 20th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City, with an area of approximately 625.70 square meters as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 141582 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Said spouses executed a special power of attorney in favor of their son, Antonio Ante, a lawyer, authorizing him to execute any document conveying by way of mortgage or sale a portion or the whole of said property, to receive payment and dispose of the same as he may deem fit and proper under the premises. Antonio Ante offered to sell the lot to Eliseo Viernes, who was occupying the same with the permission of Ante. Viernes, however, turned down the offer as he did not have money. Antonio Ante then told Viernes that he will instead sell the property to Pastor Valdez and Virginia Valdez. Antonio Ante had the said lot subdivided into Lot A with an area of 280 square meters and Lot B with an area or 345.70 square meters, each lot having its corresponding technical description. On June 15, 1980, Antonio Ante, as attorney in fact, executed a deed of sale of Lot A in favor of spouses Pastor Valdez and Virginia Valdez, for and in consideration of the amount of P112,000.00 On February 12, 1987, in the same capacity, Antonio Ante sold to said Valdez spouses, Lot B for the amount of P138,000.00. The Valdez spouses demanded from Antonio Ante the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 covering said two (2) lots. Ante promised them that he will deliver the title to them in a few days. In the meanwhile petitioners started fencing the whole lot with cement hollow blocks in the presence of spouses Eliseo and Felicidad Viernes. Except for the gate, it took them two weeks to finish fencing the whole lot. On said occasion the Viernes spouses were informed by the Valdez spouses that they were fencing the same as they purchased the land from Antonio Ante. As Ante failed to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate of title demanded by the Valdez spouses, the latter filed their affidavit of adverse claim over the subject lot with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on September 6, 1982 as the vendees of the property. Upon inquiries made, the Valdez spouses learned that Antonio Ante had delivered the owner's duplicate certificate of title as a collateral to one Dr. Camilo Garma of Purdue Street., Cubao Quezon City to secure his rentals in arrears in the amount of P9,000.00. On September 13, 1983, upon the prodding of the Valdez spouses, Antonio Ante wrote to Dr. & Mrs. Garma to request them to entrust the owner's duplicate copy of the title of the questioned lot to the Valdez spouses with the assurance that Ante will pay his indebtedness to them. The Garma spouses turned over to the Valdez spouses the said owner's duplicate certificate of title after said Valdez spouses paid for the obligation of Antonio Ante to the Garma spouses. The Valdez spouses then proceeded to register the two deeds of sale dated June 15, 1980 and February 12, 1981 7 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City by presenting the owner's duplicate copy of the title. They were, however, informed that the said owner's duplicate certificate of title had been declared null and void per order of Judge Tutaan dated November 10, 1982. They also found out that spouses Francisco and Manuela Ante earlier filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title and to declare null and void the lost owner's duplicate certificate of title. The Valdez spouses also discovered that the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 141582 and in lieu thereof issued TCT No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes on the basis of a deed of assignment of the same property dated February 17, 1982 executed by Antonio Ante in her favor. When Virginia Valdez inquired from Antonio Ante why he executed the said deed of assignment when he had previously sold the same lot to them, Ante replied that they could sue him in court. Thus, the Valdezes filed their adverse claim over the lot covered by TCT No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes. They filed the complaint in Barangay office of San Roque, Quezon City against Felicidad Viernes but as no amicable settlement was reached, the Valdezes filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking among others, that the order dated November 10, 1982 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City authorizing the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title in the name of Francisca Ante be declared null any void; that the deed of assignment dated February 17, 1982 executed by Antonio Ante in favor of Felicidad Viernes be cancelled and revoked; that TCT No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be cancelled and declared null and void; that the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be ordered to reinstate, revalidate and give full force and effect to the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 in the name of spouses Francisco and Manuela Ante and declare petitioners as the true and lawful owners of the property; ordering respondents Viernes and all persons claiming right under them to vacate the property, and to pay damages and costs to petitioners.
After trial on the merits before which the Antes were declared in default, a decision was rendered by the trial court on April 9, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the complaint is dismissed as against defendants Vierneses, and defendants Antes are hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff, as prayed for in their complaint, as follows: Defendant Antes are hereby ordered to pay actual damages in the amount of P250,000.00 to plaintiffs. Defendants Antes are hereby ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00. Defendants Antes, are hereby ordered to pay P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. SO ORDERED. Not satisfied therewith the Valdezes interposed an appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on September 12, 1988, affirming in toto the appealed decision, with costs against the appellants. Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Valdezes ------------An examination of the decision of the trial court dated April 9, 1986 shows that there are no findings of facts to serve as basis for its conclusions. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates as follows: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also provides clearly as follows: Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments. — All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court. (Emphasis supplied.) That is the reason why this Court, through Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988, reminded all judges "to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced." Of course, when a petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court is denied due course, or is otherwise denied, it is not necessary that such findings of facts be made. However, the denial must state the legal basis thereof. In the present case, the three-paged decision of the trial court contained in the first two pages a statement of the allegations of the pleadings of the parties and enumerates the witnesses presented and the exhibits marked during the trial. Thereafter, the trial court arrived at the following conclusion: After considering the evidence on record, this Court finds that plaintiff have failed to prove their case as against defendant Felicidad Viernes, but proved their case against defaulted defendants Antes. The Court finds that there is no sufficient proof of knowledge or bad faith on the part of defendant Vierneses, and on the basis of existing jurisprudence, a third person who in good faith purchases and registers a property cannot be deprived of his title as against plaintiff who had previously purchased same property but failed to register the same THE DECISION SHOULD NOT ONLY MAKE A CONCLUSION OF LAW, BUT SHOULD STATE THE FACTS AND THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW. This is not what is contemplated under the Constitution and the Rules as a clear and distinct statement of the facts on the basis of which the decision is rendered. The foregoing one-paragraph statement constitute a mere conclusion of facts and of law arrived at by the trial court without stating the facts which serve as the basis thereof. Indeed the conclusion of fact therein that petitioners had not registered the sale to them is traversed by the records which show on the contrary, petitioners earlier registered the sale to them. The court statement in the decision that a party has proven his case while the other has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the Constitution and the rules to be clearly and distinctly stated. Unfortunately, the appellate court overlooked this fatal defect in the appealed decision. It merely adopted the alleged findings of facts of the trial court. Although it made some findings on how the deed of assignment in favor of respondent Viernes came about, it is far from complete and is hardly a substantial compliance with the mandate aforestated. As it is now, this Court has before it a challenged decision that failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts on which it is predicated. This Court has said again and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual findings of the lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. But as it is, in this case, the Court has to wade through the records and make its own findings of facts, rather than further delay the disposition of the case by remanding the records for further proceedings.
Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998] Before the Court is pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of petitioner and denominated as a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of September 10, 1997. This resolution does not in the least depart from or enervate the specific prohibition against second motions for reconsideration [1] Which are applicable thereto. Considering however, the increasing practice by defeated parties of conjuring scenarios which they blame for their debacle instead of admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court is constrained to once again express its displeasure against such unethical disregard of the canons for responsible advocacy, with the warning that this insidious pattern of professional misconduct shall not hereafter be allowed to pass with impunity. Indeed, petitioner has gone to the extent of attributing supposed errors and irregularities in the disposition of this case to both the Court of Appeals and this Court, with particular allusions amounting to misconduct on the part of counsel for respondent private corporation and with specific imputations against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla in connection therewith. These will hereafter be discussed in light of the records of this Court and the vigorous disclaimer of counsel for said private respondent. Petitioner's unbridled remonstrations are directed at the fact that its petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision of respondent Court of Appeals[2] was denied by this Court for failure to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment.[3] This was arrived at after due consideration by the Second Division of this Court of the merits of the challenged decision and the extended resolution of respondent court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof, the arguments of petitioner in his present petition for review on certiorari, the joint comment of respondents, the reply of petitioner, and the joint rejoinder of respondents, as well as the respective annexes of said pleadings. Indeed, the parties had all the opportunity to expound on and dissect the issues in this case, and in some instances even the non-issues, through the liberal admission by this Court of such pleadings. Petitioner then filed a 24-page motion for reconsideration, and this Court required respondents to comment thereon, after which petitioner’s reply filed without leave was nonetheless admitted, and to which, on leave sought and granted, respondents filed a joint rejoinder. All these pleadings, just like those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, were so extensive, to the point of even incorporating new and modified issues, as to cover all
possible aspects of the case to subserve the partisan views of the parties. Since no additional and substantial arguments were adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought, the Court resolved to deny the motion on January 26, 1998.[4] It defies explanation, therefore, why petitioner would still insist that the parties should further have been allowed to file memoranda, an obvious ploy to justify a resolution giving due course to its petition, while simultaneously insinuating that its pleadings were not read. Indeed, petitioner would even dictate how this Court should have acted on its petition, with the improbable theory that because the case had progressed to the rejoinder stage, the petition must be given due course and a decision be rendered thereafter in its favor. This it tries to buttress by the palpably erroneous submission that since respondent court reversed the decision of the court a quo, this Court is duty bound to determine the facts involved. Firstly, this is a deliberate misstatement of our jurisprudence which merely holds that, in such a case, this Court may at its option review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals instead of being bound thereby. Secondly, and worse for petitioner, there is no conflict in the factual findings of the two lower courts as the Court of Appeals actually adopted the findings of fact of the trial court. In its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner now tries a different tack by lecturing this Court on its theory that the “minute resolutions” it assails are supposedly in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the present Constitution. In characteristic fashion, it insinuates that such procedure adopted by this Court is a culpable constitutional violation and can be subject of impeachment proceedings. Petitioner is, of course, free to believe and act as it pleases just as this Court may likewise be minded to take the appropriate sanctions, for which purpose it would do well for all and sundry to now imbibe the consistent doctrines laid down by this Court. MINUTE RESOLUTIONS. As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al, it has been stressed that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' decision. This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al., and further clarified in Munal vs. Commission on Audit, et al. that the constitutional mandate is
applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised "are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
Mendoza vs. CFI [G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973] Facts: In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title. During pendency of the application before the land registration court, Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. The registration court rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza. The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz – who was not a party to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a “third party”. HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. First of all, it was proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz pursuant to their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title. “SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The interested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the register of deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. . . . A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion
that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with in this case. Dissenting Opinion (Justice Aquino): It is not lawful and just that the two lots in litigation should be registered in the name of Daniel Cruz. The registration in his name is not proper because he did not intervene in the land registration proceeding; he did not defray the expenses thereof, and he has not paid to Generoso Mendoza, or his widow, Diega de Leon, the sum of P6,000 as the price of the parcel of land. -MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF STATEMENT OF FACTS AND LAW. That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration objecting to our dismissing the petition through a minute resolution. It is his contention that there should be an extended decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is had on the constitutional provision requiring a decision by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, what is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs." What must then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in the early case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, the decision spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon which its disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, the above decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following: "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions have been held to refer only to decisions of the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar."
It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the situation is subjected to a searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is really involved is just a mere incident in the prosecution of petitioner. Had he prevailed, he would have been entitled to provisional liberty. Under the circumstances, as the facts of the case clearly demonstrate, with the plea for habeas corpus being unavailing, we felt that a minute resolution which certainly would require less time than a fullblown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely, the leniency shown the parties to dwell at length on their respective contentions should disprove any suspicion that the decision arrived at was reached without according the parties the fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way, foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we deemed that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application. In that sense, a minute resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a constitutional command.
Francisco vs. Permskul [G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989] An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started out as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question squarely presented to the Court is the validity of the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original condition. 1 The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the submission of position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining the complainant and holding that the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney's fees, plus the Costs. 2 This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum decision reading in full as follows: MEMORANDUM DECISION After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. 3 When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. 4 He is now before us to fault the respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His contention is that it violates Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution. This provision reads as follows: Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter, Section 14 has been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has been virtually restored to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to all courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose has always been the same, viz., to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws. According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial court should be revoked for non-compliance with the abovequoted constitutional mandate. He asks that the case be remanded to the regional trial court for a full blown hearing on the merits, to be followed by a decision stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For his part, the private respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum decision as authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals, 6 Which sustained the said law. REQUIREMENTS DECISIONS.
FOR
THE
VALIDITY
OF
MEMORANDUM
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision. It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation. The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.