Deane-Drummond Fuentes Human Being and Becoming

Celia Deane-Drummond and Agustín Fuentes

Human Being and Becoming Situating Theological Anthropology Anthropology in i n Interspecies Relationships in an Evolutionary Context Much theology ignores anthropological studies and the centrality of evolutionary perspectives. Human beings’ evolutionary changes are envisaged as bound up 3 4 : with interspecies relationships and theological discourse cannot afford to be nar 9 2 : rowly anthropocentric. An analysis of both the differences and the common ground 6 1 y 6 between humans and other animals in their intertwined and entangled evolution g 1 o l 0 ary histories provides a provocative arena for a theological anthropology that is o 2 n k cognizant of such relationships rather than isolated from them. Here, we suggest h r c c a e M e b recent anthropological research in ethnoprimatology and human-other animal stud T e 9 i 2 g S ies combined with theoretical advances in thinking about human evolution opens , n i e r h u hnew ways of appreciating the deeper history of human becoming in the context up s T o i l M b of affiliation and interactions between human beings and other creaturely kinds. 3 t u 2 . h P g 5 i y 3 r b 1 . y d 8 p o e r 0 C 2 1. Introduction e . v 5 i l 9 e D s r e For much of the history of the Church, anthropology, when considered v E from a theological perspective, was not appropriated as a separate area of k r i inquiry, but was woven into other teachings on salvation, ecclesiology, or D

eschatology (e. g., Cortez eschatology C ortez 2010). While early writers, including including the t he postManichean Augustine of Hippo, reacted against a Gnostic rejection of the material as some kind of tragic accident, Augustine’s own focus on human sin and the means to remedy that fault has cast a long shadow over the history of Western Christian reflection on what it means to be human. The beliefs of Irenaeus of Lyon, for example, that human beings in their original state are immature and that they only attain immortality in their mature state through an experiential encounter with good and evil, have largely been forgotten (Behr 2000). But the focus on the human person in contemporary theology reflects to some extent a more general cultural turn to the self, with its associated emphasis on human existential experience. The prominent voices in Christian theology, at least those emerging from PTSc 1 (2014),

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a Western, cultural context, have, accordingly, been those that focus in an exclusivee way on particular questions about who human beings are and the exclusiv goals for a fully ful ly human life. Amongst those standing in the Roman Catholic tradition, scholars that have been particularly influential in this arena are Karl Rahner (1965; 1969, 365–70; 1975, 887–93) and Hans Urs von Balthasar ([1967] 2010), while Paul Pa ul Tillich (1973), Karl Barth1, and Wolfhar Wolfhartt Pannenberg (1985) have been bee n particularly dominant Protestant writers. Even Pierre Teilhard de Chardin ([1955] 1999; [1956] 1966), who was a paleontologist as well as a Jesuit priest, wrote in a way that focused almost exclusively on the significance of human beings, albeit in an evolutionary context. Yet their scholarship was largely crafted in a context where modernity continued to hold sway; 3 since then the post-modern cultural turn has opened up challenges to the 4 : 9 2 exclusivist exclusivi st focus on the human, and at least some contemporary contemporary theologians : 6 1 chall enge humanism understood understood in narrowly defined cat y 6 are beginning to challenge g 1 egories (Clough 2012). ‘Post-modern’ o ‘Post-modern’ therefore starts to equate with ‘post l 0 o 2 n khuman,’ opening up a space for a much deeper reflection on the significance h r c c a e M e bof the lives l ives of other species. spe cies. For John Gray (2002, 4), Christianity’ Christianity’ss cardinal T e 9 i 2 g error is in its assumption that humans are different from animals. animal s. The newly , S n i e r h u h s T oburgeoning field of animal studies takes in man manyy different subject domains, i l M b 3 t including, for example, animals in geography (Philo 2000), history (Roth u 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r fels 2002), sociology (K (Kuzniar uzniar 2006; Irvine 2004; Crist Cr ist 2000; Franklin 1999; b y 1 . d 8 p Fabre-V e-Vassas assas 1997), 1997 ), oArluke 1996), anthropology (Striffler 2005; Ingold 2005; Fabr e r 0 C 2 e . literature (Kuzniar 2006; Malamud 2003; Fudge 2003; Lippit 2000), as well as v 5 i l 9 e philosophy and critical theory (Fellenz 2007; Steiner 2005; Agamben 2004; D s r e v Atterton and Calarco 2004; Haraway 2003; Wolfe 2003; Baker 2000; Mallet E k 1999; Steeves 1999; De Fontenay 1998). Those engaged in religious studies r i D are consequently consequently also becoming rather more conscious of the importance of exploring other animals in terms of their significance for religious belief 2. 1

2

Karl Barth (1936–1977) dedicated four four volumes volumes of his Dogmatics to a study of of creation, creation, and in this respect paid p aid far more attention attention to it than some other scholars. His interpretation of the purpose and meaning of creation in terms of the covena covenant nt between God and humanity is one that has been most influential influentia l (see Vol. Vol. III/1, 42), even if such interpretations are now beginning to be challenged by theologians such as David Clough (2012, 1–25). A large volume entitled A Commu Communion nion of Subje Subjects: cts: Ani Animals mals in Religio Religion, n, Science and Ethics deals with different areas of religious belief and practice (Waldau and Patten Ethics 2006). The essays under the subheading ‘Christianity’ deal with bestiaries in heretical medieval writing, a philosophically philos ophically orientated orientated essay on Descartes, and one highlighting Christian spirituality spiritual ity and animals by Jay Jay McDaniel, who is heavily influenced influence d by process theology, but also absorbs what he claims is a ‘Franciscan alternative.’ McDaniel (2006, 132–45) largely follows Andrew Linzey in his critique of Aquinas, even while engag-

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In the field of anthropology, particularly social anthropology, the focus on the human, to the exclusion of other animals, has also been prominent. Ethnographic research often casts other animals as tools, food, symbols, and other aspects of the human generated landscape (Fuentes 2012b; Mullin 1999). The option that animals may be agents in a human system and/or participants in joint niches is not a part of much traditional anthropological inquiry (Ingold 1994; Cassiday and Mullin 2007). However, because the multiple subfields within North American anthropology include biological, archeological, and zoo-archeological approaches, there has always been the hint of exchange between the human and other animals (Mullin 1999; Noske 1993). This takes both the form of investigation of the lives of those animals closely related to humans (primates) and that of those animals who 3 show up regularly and functionally in the human past (as archeological 4 : 9 2 remains). Recently, this small connection has expanded into a large interface : 6 1 with many (post)modern anthropological approaches increasingly involving y 6 g 1 o the inclusion of non-human others into the ethnographic and evolutionary l 0 o 2 n theorizing. k h r c a c e M e b As a result of this expansion, data from primatological, biological, and T e 9 i 2 g S anthropological endeavors are making it progressively clear that for hun , n i e r h u h s T o dreds of millennia humans have interacted with other animals as food, i l M b 3 t and friends, and that these interactions tell us something about being u foes, 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r human. These interfaces have often taken the form of inclusion in human b y 1 . p d 8 communities and integration into important facets of social and religious o e r 0 C 2 e . life. Today most human societies exist in complex forms of multispecies v 5 i l 9 e relationships (Cassiday and Mullin 2007; Mullin 1999) and there is growing D s r e v interest in the role that such relationships have played across human evo E k lution (Shipman 2011). Widening interest in animal studies, ecology, and r i D evolutionary science demands further scholarly and explicit engagement with inter-species relationships and the human niche by anthropologists and theologians (Deane-Drummond 2014b). In spite of these developments across the social and biological sciences, the tendency for theological anthropology is still doggedly (!) to resist taking account of the importance of other animal lives; if their importance is taken into account, then it is limited to consideration of how humanity needs to act in the light of current environmental problems, or through contemporary ing with Elisabeth Johnson’s neo-Thomist approach. His essay is important in as much as he weaves in ecological concerns through the notion of eco-justice. More recently, religious studies scholars have begun to think about not just the attention to animals in religious traditions, but also the religious significance of subjectivity of other animals (Deane-Drummond, Artinian-Kaiser, and Clough 2013).

254 Celia Deane-Drummond and Agustín Fuentes

debates on sexuality and the body (e. g., Ross 2012). While this is of course an improvement on not considering such wider questions at all, the basic premise of human meaning and becoming is still much the same. The argument of this paper is that there remains a glaring gap in standard theological anthropology such that we need to be far more cognizant of the importance of other animal lives in the very shaping and meaning of human becoming and being. Here, we suggest, more recent anthropological research in ethnoprimatology and human-other animal studies combined with theoretical advances in thinking about human evolution opens up new ways of appreciating the deeper history of human becoming in the context of affiliation and interaction between human beings and other creaturely kinds. 3 4 : 9 2 2. Negotiating Anthropology and Theology : 6 1 y 6 g 1 Theological traditions, while themselves highly diverse and often contested o l 0 o 2 n r k h a cin methodological starting points, are more often than not interested in the c e M e bway a particular account of the human or the soul has come to be accepted, T e 9 i 2 g S n , r even if it was first developed in a particular historical context. Non-reductive i h e h u s T oevolutionary anthropological and biocultural anthropology investigations i l M b 3 t (e. g., Fuentes 2009, 2013a) are interested not only in particular paradigmatic u 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r accounts of changes in human behavior and morphology across time, space, b 1 . y d 8 p oand cultures, but rather seek to include as diverse a toolkit and data source e r 0 C 2 e . repertoire as is demonstrably implicated by the central questions at hand. In v 5 i l 9 e as much as both anthropology and theology are interested in the significance D s r e v of history, human community, and the salient aspects of being human, there E k is some common ground between us. r i D

Moreover, for a theologian, the evolutionary insights of anthropology can inform the way a particular tradition is interpreted, so that if a tradition is reclaimed for a contemporary context it is understood through the hermeneutics of new knowledge arising from the sciences. Such a practice that could be broadly summarized as an engaged faith seeking understanding is not original but is common to all theological traditions that have sought to weave in some insights from philosophy and other sciences, while being critical of others. In a post-modern cultural context, the deconstruction of both the authoritative basis for faith traditions and the universalist claims of science open up the possibility of what might seem unlikely collaborative partnerships3. While we recognize there can be tension in methodological 3

Wentzel van Huyssteen’s (2006, 17–21) plea for transversality in a post-foundationalist


starting points, we argue that the points of interaction are creative for both disciplines, and that a trans-disciplinary approach (Fuentes 2013b) opens up new perspectives on a particular problem, in this case, human becoming and being. As an example of the potential for this type of engagement, we explore the potential impact for theology of interfacing with recent innovations in anthropology, namely, the human community niche and multispecies relationships.

3. The Community Niche and Human Evolution

Human experience of the world, our Umwelt (von Uexküll [1934] 2010), 3 both constructs and is constructed by the interface between our social and 4 : 9 2 ecological lives. This view, via the perspective of niche construction the : 6 1 ory, is becoming common in modeling the evolution of human behavior y 6 g 1 o (Fuentes 2009, 2013a; O’Brien and Laland 2012; Barton et al. 2011). Niche l 0 o 2 n k construction is the mutual malleability between organisms and their envi h r c c a e M e b ronments. It recognizes the agency of organisms in their evolutionary pro T e 9 i 2 g S cesses, the construction, destruction, and modification of local ecologies, , n i e r h u h s T oinheritance of those modified ecologies, and the central role of feedback the i l M b 3 t u dynamics in evolutionary systems. Fuentes (2013a) connects this perspec 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r with a diverse array of fossil and archeological evidence to propose a tive b 1 . y p d 8 model system called ‘community niche’; an evolutionary meta-system that o e r 0 C 2 e . encompasses positive feedback systems at individual, subgroup, and com v 5 i l 9 e munity levels, demographic processes, and local ecologies. D s r e v The community niche is the spatial and social niche that includes the E k primary social partners, contexts, and ecologies with which humans inter r i D act. It is a group with shared kinship (biological and social) and social and ecological histories. It is the primary source of shared knowledge, security, and development across the lifespan. Community members share cognitive, discourse is relevant in this context. However, what we are attempting here is arguably rather different, in that it is the depth and richness of each disciplinary tradition that needs to be brought to bear in the discussion, even at the risk of opening up differences. Transversality, in as much as it tends to rely on rhetorical and performative tools that certainly resist too seamless a unification of knowledge or imperialisms of any kind, has distinct advantages over, for example, too ready acceptance of rather simplistic evolutionary forms of theism. However, the temptation for transversality is that it is hermeneutically bound to the common space between disciplines, rather than an exploration of the richness within that tradition. An alternative hermeneutical basis for interdisciplinary dialogue may need to be sought, for example, drawing on Paul Ricoeur, as postulated by Kenneth Reynhout (2013).

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social, and ecological bonds even in the absence of close spatial proximity through symbol, language, memory, hopes and shared beliefs. The advent of symbolic and metaphorical ways of thinking about the world, and eventually religious belief, brings the possibility of a shared religious life that would further cement these bonds. It is in the context of this distinctively human community niche that members of the genus Homo interfaced, interacted with, modified, and were modified by, social and ecological worlds during the course of our evolution. A central characteristic of this human niche is an obligate interdependence where being in community with one another is fundamental to successfully becoming and being human physiologically, socially, psychologically, (Brewer 2007; Fuentes 2013a) and, we would add, eventually religiously. 3 For humans, even early ones, their social relationships, landscapes, and the 4 : 9 2 biotic and abiotic elements they encounter are embedded in an experiential : 6 1 y 6 reality that is infused with a consistent potential for meaning derived from g 1 more than the material substance and context at hand. This results in a dis o l 0 o 2 n r ktinctive way of being in, and perceiving, the world for humans relative to h a c c e M e bother mammals, primates, and even Hominins: the human community niche T e 9 i 2 g S n , r (Fuentes 2012a, 2013a). i h e h u s T o One can develop the idea of community niche further, in order to include i l M b 3 t in a more explicit way both inter-species relationships and insights from u 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r the particular wisdom emerging from theological discourse. This is argu b 1 . y d 8 p oably an explicit discourse about how human communities eventually came e r 0 C 2 e . to consider themselves to be in relationships not only with each other and v 5 i l 9 e with other species, but also with God. Further, that relationship could have D s r e v served to re-define other relationships in the community in a way that was E k distinctive for human beings. In this way, theology is prompting anthropo r i D logical investigations into the community niche in new ways that would not otherwise have come so clearly into view. The community niche perspective provides a novel manner in which to consider the relationships between humans and other species and their saliency in our social and evolutionary processes. If humans incorporated other beings into the community niche as central actors, then they become important features of the ecological and social landscape. These other beings must, therefore, be considered as agential factors in the investigation of the evolutionary and social processes involved in being and becoming human in community. There is mounting evidence that this is indeed the case (Shipman 2011) and that examining the relationships between humans and certain other animals offers a particularly relevant key to understanding not just other animals but human beings. The significance of inter-species dynam-


ics for developing a contemporary theological understanding of the human cannot be underestimated (Deane-Drummond 2014a). If this is the case, then we need to create some degree of connection between anthropological/evolutionary approaches and theological ones in order to understand adequately the relationships between being human and being in inter-subjective relationships with other species. In this vein, the relationship between two central foci stands out: multispecies ecologies as part of the community niche and the theological articulation of the grounded distinctiveness of the human through a revised concept of the human soul and divine image bearing (Deane-Drummond 2012).

3 4. Other Species as Core Components of the Community Niche 4 : 9 2 : 6 1 Both anthropological and theological perspectives have a diverse set of con y 6 g 1 o siderations to take into account when it comes to understanding the mean l 0 o 2 n k ing h r c of the ‘nature’ of humans and other beings. Well-known anthropological c a e M e b work in this area has focused on the examination of perceptual and cos T e 9 i 2 g S mological ecologies of small-scale societies and their common tendency to , n i e r h u h s T o include other animals in metaphysical descriptions of basal selves and pro i l M b 3 t u cesses of being in the world (Ingold 1994; Ingold and Palsson 2013; Viveiros 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 rCastro 2012). In fact, Viveiros de Castro (2012) effectively demonstrates de b 1 . y p d 8 that, o at least for many Amerindian groups, the subset of beings that are con e r 0 C 2 e . sidered basally (or intrinsically) human, or ensouled, in the cosmological v 5 i l 9 e sense, often extends well beyond just Homo sapiens. Recent turns in anthro D s r e v pology have also become focused on the interrelatedness of humans and E k others in multispecies ecologies with an eye towards how humans envision r i D

and experience the ‘nature’ of non-human beings and how that frames the social, political, and economic contexts of interaction (Baynes-Rock 2012; Kirksey and Helmrich 2010; Kohn 2007; Fuentes 2012b). In certain Christian theological discourses the focus on other animals has interfaced with diverse traditions on the role of the soul and image bearing in thinking about non-human beings. Humans are able to engage in intensive physiological, behavioral, and emotional bonding with diverse members of their community, going well beyond the mother-infant or male-female friendship bonds in other primate societies (Fuentes 2009; Quinlan 2008; Spikins et al. 2010). Humans have expanded on basal primate social bonding behavior (Silk 2007) and amplified its importance in creating an intricate structure of social bonding involving complex social cognition (Hermann et al. 2007), which makes use


of neuroendocrinological, symbolic, and behavioral processes (Mackinnon and Fuentes 2011; Fuentes 2013a). This is proposed to be a major adaptive process in our evolutionary history (Chapais 2009; Fuentes 2009; Spikins et al. 2010; Sussman and Chapman 2004) and is central in the human community niche (Foley and Gamble 2008; Fuentes 2013a; Gamble et al. 2011). However, humans, unlike other social beings, regularly extend this physiological, social, and symbolic bonding pattern beyond biological kin, beyond reciprocal exchange arrangements, beyond mating investment, and even beyond our own species (Fuentes 2009; Haraway 2003; Mullin 1999; Olmert 2009; Shanklin 1985). This very ability has recently been proposed as a significant factor in human evolutionary success (Shipman 2011). Humans in many parts of the world regularly invest significant social, eco 3 nomic, and energetic efforts in, and participate in real physiological bonds 4 : 9 2 with, their non-human companions (Haraway 2003; Kohn 2007; Olmert : 6 1 y 6 2009; Shipman 2011; Solomon 2010). There is substantive evidence that the g 1 inclusion of non-human others into the human community is relatively old o l 0 o 2 n r kin human history and that other species make up key aspects of the human h a c c e M e bsocial worlds (Shipman 2011). We suggest that these social, symbolic, and T e 9 i 2 g S n , r physiological relationships between human and other animals are a wor i h e h u s T othy focus for the anthropological and theological gaze as our histories and i l M b 3 t futures intertwine in the community niche. u 2 . h P g 5 i y 3 r b 1 . y d 8 p o e r 0 C 2 e . 5. Human Co-ecologies/Co-existence in Community with v 5 i l 9 e Species: A Few Examples D s r e v E k Recent anthropological work provides a particularly important r i D

Other

insight into the role of other animals in the human community. In order to think effectively think about our relations with others and how this resonates with and influences our evolutionary, anthropological, and theological approaches to a multispecies reality, a few examples of the depth and prevalence of such interfaces are necessary. a) Humans and Other Primates

Humans and other primates share diverse and complex relationships (Fuentes 2012b). The geographic spread of human-other primate overlap is broad, occurring throughout sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Northern Africa and the circum-Mediterranean region, South and Southeast Asia, Japan and Southern China, Central and South America. Fossil evidence demon-


strates deep overlap between humans and other primates: We have coexisted and interacted throughout these regions from the initial emergence of our own genus (Homo) (>2 million years). Recent and ongoing research on the human-other primate interface includes sites in Asia, Africa, and South America, even Europe, and there are a number of cross site studies including those involving foci on co-ecology, spatial and behavioral overlap, and bidirectional pathogen transmission (Cormier 2011; Fuentes 2012b). For example, macaque monkeys (genus Macaca) and humans share a particularly intensive relationship and interact in a dynamic, and deep, ecosystem across much of South and Southeast Asia (Fuentes et al. 2011; Fuentes 2010; Fuentes et al. 2005). This examination of the human-macaque interface reveals a range of behavioral, physiological, ecological, and cultural 3 contexts that influence and shape the relationships. The cultural modifica 4 : 9 2 tion of the landscape by humans impacts pathogen transmission patterns for : 6 1 both species and the population genetics of the macaques. After millennia y 6 g 1 o of overlap between human populations and macaques, it becomes evident l 0 o 2 n that k the relationships between anthropogenic landscapes, including their h r c a c e M e economic b and political histories, are central factors in the macaque distri T e 9 i 2 g S bution, behavior and ecology, and that the co-ecological processes influence , n i e r h u h s T o human health, livelihood, and even religious practice (Fuentes 2010, 2012a; i l M b 3 t u Jones-Engel et al. 2008). 2 . h P g 5 i y 3 r b 1 . y d 8 p o e r 0 b) Humans and Dogs C 2 e . v i l 5 9 e Humans share a particularly long and intensive intertwined history with the D s r e v genus Canis (dogs) (Haraway 2003; Olmert 2009; Shipman 2011). From the E k ‘camp following’ wolves almost 30,000 years ago, to fully domesticated dogs r i D

hunting and living with human populations 14,000 years ago, to the canine ‘family members’ common across many human societies today, canids have been a central aspect of the human community. Across this time frame, humans and dogs have ‘co-domesticated’ one another, impacting and being impacted by mutual ecologies, behavioral processes, and even physiological interfaces: We have played mutual roles in each other’s evolution (Fuentes 2009; Hare et al. 2002; Haraway 2003; Olmert 2009). Dogs are highly attuned to human gestural communication, so much so that they do better than chimpanzees or other primates in interpreting and following the human gaze and in extracting information from human action (Hare et al. 2002; Hare and Tomasello 2005). Dogs exhibit strong recognition of human empathic states, experience empathic contagion from humans, and are able to effectively elicit interaction and empathic responses


from humans, even those with various neurological and socio-cognitive deficits (such as autism) (Solomon 2010). While the social bonds between humans and their companion animals is well documented in industrialized societies and many in the developed world see their pets as family members (Nagasawa et al. 2009), these intensive and deep relationships between dogs and humans are not limited to the urban or industrialized pet-owner context. Work by Eduardo Kohn (2007) shows us that dogs are an important aspect of the spiritual and daily lives of many peoples. Dogs are an important aspect of Runa life, assisting them with hunting, being part of the daily social interactant sphere, and acting as important members of a shared spiritual ecology. For the Runa, dogs, like many living things, have a soul and 3 are considered to have a form of consciousness. Because of this ensoulment 4 : 9 2 and their central social and practical context in daily life, the Runa practice a : 6 1 y 6 form of relation with dogs that involves talking to them and including them g 1 in aspects of their spiritual-ethnopharmacological practices (via hallucino o l 0 o 2 n r kgens). As particular, and ensouled, co-members of their society, the Runa h a c c e M e bexpect certain kinds of moral and ethical behavior from their dogs (i. e., T e 9 i 2 g S n , r not be lazy, not be violent, not overly waste energy on sexual activity, etc.). i h e h u s T oAlso, as dreams are central to the Runa’s understanding of the communica i l M b 3 t tion between diverse aspects of the world, and dogs are part of the Runa’s u 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r social sphere, the interpretation and appropriate reaction to dog’s dreams is b 1 . y d 8 p oan aspect of Runa society. Specifically, Kohn demonstrates a mutual inter e r 0 C 2 e . face between dogs and an Amazonian ethnic group, the Runa, wherein their v 5 i l 9 e social, spiritual, and ecological lives are inextricably intertwined in what is D s r e v for both species a ‘natural’ system 4. E k Such evidence points to the range of research that shows that the bond r i D ing between humans and dogs is both historically and physiologically deep rooted. Dogs and humans share a deep and evolutionarily relevant relationship; in many locations and in many ways dogs are members of the human community (Olmert 2009). c) Humans and Large Predators

In most ecosystems today, humans are considered top tier predators and across much of the planet, competition with humans has led to an overall decline in large predator populations. However, this pattern of relation4

This type of multispecies cosmology system is fairly ubiquitous in Amerindian, especially, Amazonian groups (Viveiros de Castro 2012).


ship was, and is, not always the case. We know a relationship with predators played a significant role in shaping the evolutionary pressures favoring specific behavioral and ecological adaptations against predation, including extremely high levels of cooperation (Fuentes et al. 2010; Hart and Sussman 2005). We also have reason to believe that our ancestors began to track and follow predators and to interface with them behaviorally in a manner beyond a predator-prey relationship as part of their foraging strategy. As humans began to emerge as top tier predators themselves in the last few hundreds of millennia and as our population densities grew more recently (in the last ~10,000 years), the ecological relationship balance tipped in our favor and the overall size and density of large predators decreased across the globe. The fossil record firmly supports the notion that humans and 3 predators have mutually influenced one another, co-evolving over millions 4 : 9 2 of years (Hart and Sussman 2005; Shipman 2011). : 6 1 y 6 The relationship between humans and predators has been, and is, com g 1 o plex, but it is not always conflictual and at times might even be mutualistic. l 0 o 2 n For k example, Yirga et al. (2012) focused on hyena and human overlaps in h r c a c e M e Northern b Ethiopia, which showed a mutual relationship involving domestic T e 9 i 2 g S animals, carrion, the hyenas, and local peoples. Marcus Baynes-Rock (2012) , n i e r h u h s T o found an even more intertwined relationship between humans and hyenas in i l M b 3 t Ethiopian city of Harar. His research documents a mutualistic relation u the 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r between humans and two clans of hyenas in the old city of Harar, where ship b 1 . y p d 8 for ogenerations humans have tolerated the nocturnal presence of hyenas in e r 0 C 2 e . the city itself and have integrated hyenas into their mythos and socio-eco v 5 i l 9 e nomic realities. Simultaneously, the hyenas structure their activity patterns, D s r e v behavior, and social lives around the pace and patterns of the Harari. In this E k case, rather than in competition or ubiquitous conflict, hyena and human r i D coexist in an entangled, multispecies ecology. d) Thinking with Other Animals

Borrowing from the ethnoprimatological approach (Fuentes 2012a, 2012b), we can posit a core suite of assumptions about human-other animal linkages. It is a reality that humans and other animals have participated in a myriad of interfaces and that these relationships form a key aspect of being human and are directly relevant to understanding the processes in human communities. Rapid and monumental niche construction by humans in the last few millennia has altered ecosystems ushering in the Anthropocene, meaning that basic ecological parameters for all life must include the interface with humans as a central factor. In order to effectively study such human-other

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animal relationships, multi-disciplinary approaches are central. If we are particularly interested in human perceptions of, and entanglements and communion with, other beings then integrative approaches that include other animals can be brought to the fore and integrated with an evolutionary approach wherein community is a central locus. The anthropologist Pat Shipman argues that the connection to other animals should be considered as a central aspect in what makes humans human. She argues that a defining trait of the human species has been a connection with animals that has intensified in importance since at least the onset of stone tool making some 2.6 million years ago. … Our connection to animals is so deep, so old, and so fundamental that you really can’t understand human evolution and nature without taking it into account (Shipman 2011, 12–13).

3 4 : 9 2 While part of her intent is to focus on the patterns, processes, and impacts : 6 1 y 6 of domestication, this statement also encompasses the broader mutual ecol g 1 o l 0 ogies that are increasingly common across our histories. We suggest that o 2 n r k h a cthis view is enriched if we consider the inclusion of other animals into the c e M e bhuman community niche. T e 9 i 2 g S If the community niche is the spatial and social context including pri n , r i h e h s u o i l T mary social partners and ecologies with which humans interact, then the M b 3 t ethnographic record demonstrates that in many cases other species are an u 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r intrinsic part of it. If the community shares ‘kinship’ and social and eco b 1 . y d 8 p ological histories, then the members, humans and otherwise, are potentially e r 0 C 2 e . substantive contributors to its shape and action. This view provides a mode v 5 i l 9 e of modeling the agency other species might have on evolving human sys D s r e v tems. Here certain other animals cannot be simply seen as an aspect of the E k environment that provides some form of selection pressure or as part of the r i D

human exploitation of the environment, such as a crop raider, a vector for a pathogen, or a source of protein. Rather, other animals share in the mutually mutable interface between individual humans, their social networks, and their ecologies as central actors who both impact and are impacted by the evolutionary processes at play. If this is the case, then the development of understandings of human behavior and beliefs in human communities where other animals are members will be more robust when those other animals are more agentially included in the assessment. We suggest that seeing humans and other animals as co-participants in shared ecologies, evolutionary trajectories, and communities can enable enhanced understanding and interpretation of current theoretical and epistemological approaches. Employing such an approach may also create a better chance for arriving at significant and comprehensive answers to ques-


tions about sustainable co-existence for humans and other beings in the 21st

century. However, a key question emerges: How are we to interpret this in theological terms?

6. The Animal and Theological Anthropology: Context and Cautions

There are, of course, perceived dangers in surmising too close an association between human beings and other animals in a way that has alarmed more traditional Roman Catholic writers. So, the late Roman Catholic

Archbishop Józef Życiński vigorously denied that either religion or ethics 3 4 could be evolved capacities and accused secular writers like Peter Singer : 9 2 and post-human authors such as Gregory Pence and Thomas Regan of put : 6 1 ting humans and other animals on the same continuum in the name of anti y 6 g 1 o l speciesism. Crucially, he argued that once this boundary is weakened then 0 o 2 n k humans lose their special place and dignity, and he supplemented his argu h r c c a e M e b ment by a long list of advanced characteristics that he believes are specific T e 9 i 2 g to S , n i e rhuman cultures, including altruism (Życiński 2006). But if humans and h u h s other o animals have co-evolved, shared, and influenced each other’s ecolo i l T M b 3 t and existed in community, as we illustrate above, there are consider u gies, 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r scientific flaws in this position. There are also theological ones as well. able b 1 . y d 8 p o Following traditional Roman Catholic teaching, Karl Rahner suggested e r 0 C 2 e . that in the human person something new and original appeared on earth, v 5 i l 9 e but D s r e v E k r i D

he also firmly believed that this should not jettison the basic meta-

physical framework of how God acts in the world. Rahner holds that in the ensoulment of the first human, and indeed of every human person, God actively enables finite beings to transcend themselves, in a transcendence that is self-transcendence, so, coming from that person, but at the same time involving God such that its becoming moves beyond and above itself. Rahner is attempting to envisage infinite reality as constituting finite real-

ity without becoming an intrinsic constituent of the finite reality as such. So, on the one hand, the infinite reality is free and detached from the act of becoming, but also providing the foundational ground for human selftranscendence. But Rahner is also a clear enough thinker to recognize the paradoxical elements in making such a statement, for how can divine reality be both free and belonging fully to the finite? Accordingly, he takes up a different slant in his argument and presses for a new way of thinking about human cognition, such that human beings are cognitively ordered towards a horizon of transcendence, rather than a specified object as such (Rahner

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1965, 83). He believes, further, that such an orientation towards transcendence is an essential factor in all intellectual knowledge, and a precondition of its possibility. In this way, he claims that “the orientating term of transcendence moves the movement of the mind; it is the originating cause, the fundamental ground and reason for the mind’s transcendental dynamism” (Rahner 1965, 86). But at the same time, Rahner still somewhat tenuously holds to the idea that the absolute Being is the cause and ground of human self-transcendence, even if intrinsically immanent in the finite, and even if not therefore considerable as a movement within absolute Being as such. He is therefore able to claim that in self-transcendence the person “attains its own proper nature”; humans become, in other words, themselves (Rahner 1965, 89). Hence, on the one hand, Rahner argues for a measure of both con 3 tinuity between human beings and other animals, but also a measure of dis 4 : 9 2 continuity as well. His argument resonates to a degree with anthropological : 6 1 y 6 approaches that emphasize both evolutionary continuity and similarity and g 1 also highlight the adaptive divergences that make particular species, such o l 0 o 2 n r kas humans, distinctive. But while his approach is interesting in pointing to h a c c e M e bhow human beings can be thought of as distinctive without introducing a T e 9 i 2 g S n , r dualistic notion of a separated soul, his stress is on the transcendent human i h e h u s T operson in a way that is still decidedly Kantian and does not take sufficient i l M b 3 t account of the lives of other animals, their subjectivity, and the possibility u 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r that they are agents in the humans niche and thus integral points of connec b 1 . y d 8 p otion for the human person. e r 0 C 2 e . On the other hand, we might consider Thomas Aquinas who was heavily v 5 i l 9 e influenced not just by the work of Aristotle, but also by his teacher, Albertus D s r e v Magnus, who devoted a major work to the study of other animals (Magnus E k 1999a, 1999b). In thinking about how a theological anthropology can inter r i D face with anthropological approaches and include other animals as significant aspects of the human experience, it is instructive to explore the original Summa Zoologica of Albertus Magnus. His account is meticulous, for the time, and includes a commentary on morphology, physiology, and anatomy. Far less space, comparatively speaking, is spent on an explicit discussion of the human animal, so that human animals are discussed in a way that is interwoven with aspects common with other animals. He discusses the Aristotelian idea that the soul is in the semen, meaning that through it animals have the power of generation. But this sets up a contrast in that the rational soul is caused by the intellect, rather than through the generative powers of the semen, characteristic of the sensible soul (Magnus 1999b, book 16, chapter 12, § 65). According to Albertus Magnus, human beings are exceptions to other animals in having a ‘rational soul.’ What is interesting here is


that Albertus seems to want to separate the rational soul, which “has nothing in common with the operation of a bodily organ in any way whatever” and the intellect, which is “divine, that is perpetual and uncorruptible” (book 16, chapter 12, § 67). But like Aristotle, he departs from Plato in naming the vegetative and sensible soul as having a form of potency in the material as such, rather than an external potency. Although only a small fraction of the book is devoted to an explicit study of human beings, he has no problem in speaking of animal virtues, for “every perfection and imperfection in animals exists in accordance to their perfect or imperfect participation in the animal virtues” (book 21, chapter 1, § 1). But there is a qualification: For him, perfection is measured relative to human beings, so that “we should first determine what the true nature of 3 the most perfect animal is” (book 21, chapter 1 5, § 1). The perfection of the 4 : 9 2 vegetative soul and the sensible soul comes, for Albertus Magnus, through : 6 1 participation in reason in some way. He is prepared, however, to label virtues y 6 g 1 o according to the gradations of the soul, so that: l 0 o 2 n r k h a c and chastity are present according to the functions of the vegetative soul; c Temperance e M e b humility and gentleness, however, and likewise fortitude and many other virtues, are T e 9 i 2 g present S according to the desires and angers of the sensitive soul. This could only be the n , r i e h u h if the vegetative and sensible souls were in the human according to the being (esse) case s T o i l b of M the intellectual soul, for otherwise the soul would not be receptive to a good rational 3 t u 2 h (book 21, chapter 1, § 2). . P order g 5 i y 3 r b 1 . y p d 8 The o idea of a nested hierarchy makes sense, so the triangle to a quadrangle e r 0 C 2 e . is the relationship of vegetative to sensible soul. The perfection of humans, v 5 i l 9 e then, was perceived in relationship with the powers shared with other ani D s r e mals that are taken up and transformed by reason. v E k r For Aquinas the particular reasoning powers of humans that leads to i D the idea of a rational soul impacts on the claim that only human beings are

capable of bearing the image of God. Hence, while Aquinas does seem to acknowledge that other animals weakly bear the image of God “in the manner of a trace,” for Aquinas only the rational creature that has an intellect or mind is the resemblance sufficient to be termed true bearers of the image of God, and this is such that those areas of human life, such as spiritual, bodily, or imaginative ways of knowing, are only ever capable of bearing a “trace” of the image (Aquinas 1964, qu. 93.6) 6. He also, in a fascinating way that reflects at least in part a common evolutionary understanding of human 5

6

This chapter is headed, significantly, “On the Highest Perfection of Animal Which is the Human.” Charles Camosy (e. g., 2013) has argued that other animals need to be included in the category of image bearing.

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origins, suggests that one of the prime differences between humans and other animals is in relation to their ability to walk upright; they have “a posture more suited to contemplation of the heavens” (qu. 93.6). In this way, he concludes that image bearing in the rational aspect of human nature bears the image of the divine in two ways. First, in relation to the divine nature, “rational creatures seem to achieve some sort of portraiture in kind, in that they imitate God not only in his being and his living, but also in his understanding.” Second, in relation to being an image of the uncreated Trinity, the rational creature “exhibits a word procession as regards the intelligence and a love procession as regards the will” (qu. 93.6). Other creatures certainly bear a likeness to God, in having “a certain trace of intelligence that produced them” and “a clue that these realities may exist” when it comes to 3 word and love, in the way that a house shows something of the mind of the 4 : 9 2 architect (qu. 93.6). : 6 1 Aquinas did not have the knowledge that we now have of the relative y 6 g 1 sophistication of the cognitive acts of intelligent social animals, nor the o l 0 o 2 n r kunderstanding of co-ecologies and evolutionary histories that we now have h a c c e M e baccess to. He also did not have access to the diverse and substantive literature T e 9 i 2 g S n , r on the interwoven lives of humans and other animals across multiple soci i h e h u s T oeties and histories, nor the evolutionary literature demonstrating humans’ i l M b 3 t phylogenetic connections with other primates, and mammals. It behooves u 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r us then, in a theological anthropology, to fill some of these gaps and create b 1 . y d 8 p othe link with evolutionary and anthropological discourse that acknowledges e r 0 C 2 e . other animals’ agency in the ecosystems and social lives, in the community v 5 i l 9 e niches, of human beings. D s r e v Wolfhart Pannenberg (1985, 27–31) opens his discussion of anthropol E k ogy in a promising enough vein by acknowledging the problematic nature r i D of body/soul dualism and the person “in nature,” commenting on Konrad Lorenz’ synthesis of empiricism with a Kantian transcendental approach, and thus leading to his idea of innate behavioral patterns in all living things. It is in this context that Pannenberg (1985, 33–35) turns to the pioneering work of Jacob von Uexküll, who, more than other scientists at the time, recognized that an animals’ experience of the environment was a crucial element in response patterns. Importantly, he recognized that in von Uexküll the Umwelt or environment is not simply the surroundings as such, but the subjective and interactive experience of creatures in regard to those key features of the environment that were most relevant. But in human beings, this world is largely shaped not so much by the innate characteristics that define responses in other animals, but by the cultural world in which human beings exist, influence, and are influenced by. For Pannenberg (1985, 34–35) this


then leads once more to a gap between human beings and other animals, where the ‘instinctive’ drive in human beings is thought to be suppressed or deficient, and such that Arnold Gehlen, Max Scheler, and Helmuth Plessner all developed anthropological theories based on the particular ‘openness to the world’ in Scheler or Gehlen, or ‘exocentricity’ in Plessner. But all these theories presuppose that human beings are somehow in their self-consciousness free from their environment, and in Scheler this is joined with a formulation of that freedom in terms of God and the interjection of spirit. Gehlen’s solution was more secular, but he spoke in terms of the deficiencies of the human instinctual realm that had to be compensated by civilization. Pannenberg (1985, 43–79) was sufficiently well versed in contemporary research of his time to recognize deficiencies in these models, and so turns instead to 3 J. G. Herder, who laid out an alternative based on a theological interpreta 4 : 9 2 tion of the human through the category of the image of God. But this takes : 6 1 Pannenberg on a trajectory of consideration of the social world of human y 6 g 1 o beings understood eventually in cultural and religious terms, leaving the l 0 o 2 n world k of other animals, co-ecologies, and their significance for the human h r c a c e M e b condition far behind. T e 9 i 2 g The challenge, then, for a theological anthropology, and for any sincere , S n i e r h u h s T o anthropology, is to find a way of taking the evolutionary history of human i l M b 3 t u beings and our enmeshed world of other animals sufficiently seriously. For a 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r theological anthropology, the key is to not simply conform theology to secu b y 1 . p d 8 lar onorms in a way that removes the particular contribution of theology to a e r 0 C 2 e . discussion of the human person. This is extremely difficult in practice, not v 5 i l 9 e least because the aims of anthropological research and theological research D s r e v on human beings are different. But we suggest there is a way of incorporating E k the insight of what might be termed the new wave in anthropology outlined r i D above such that other animals become recognized in their distinctive variety and forms of flourishing in their relationships with human beings, especially as part of the human community niche. One possible theological interpretation is therefore to situate all creatures, human and other animals, in a theo-drama where human beings are distinct in that they are capable of a high degree of self-consciousness, but where they are envisaged as one actor alongside other actors (Deane-Drummond 2009, 2013, 2014). The inspiration for the basic concept of theodrama emerges from the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar, but in extending it out into the wider creaturely world, his overall anthropology takes on a very different emphasis. Such non-human actors are not, then, denied the possibility of subjectivity, but the overall intent of the drama is one that is guided by the central act, namely, the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus


Christ. According to this perspective, during the long path of evolutionary change there is a combination of both contingency, as in the meandering path of evolutionary change, and constraint, as witnesses in features of constraint within which that change takes place 7. But further, it is in the encounter of human beings with each other, with God, and with other animals that human becoming is shaped. The religious life could be thought of as the culmination of the trajectories through different community niches, perhaps now for the first time showing the ability to disconnect from the very world from which humankind has emerged. But if religion does take this step it could lead to the undoing of humanity, for, set free from recognition of a bounded life, humans become free to reinvent themselves according to an imagination that is detached from the creaturely world. Instead, that imagination needs to be inspired in and through knowledge of ourselves as creatures with other creatures, recognizing the unique capability for selftranscendence, but guarding that gift with care, lest in its pulling away from the natural world it become humanity’s greatest weakness.

3 4 : 9 2 : 6 1 y 6 g 1 o l 0 o 2 n r k h a c c e M e b T e 9 i 2 g S n , r 7. Conclusions: Implications of the Multispecies Interface i h e h u s T oin the Community Niche i l M b 3 t u 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 r While human-other animal overlaps are deep in time and rich in diverse b 1 . y d 8 p ooutcomes, current evidence suggests that human economic and political e r 0 C 2 e . v realities influence habitat alterations and ecosystems in ways such that other 5 i l 9 e animals are increasingly forced into more intensive contact with humans. D s r e v While a few such systems are potentially sustainable, most are not and most E k other animals are more and more likely to end up on the negative end of the r i D

benefits of our mutual interfaces (Fuentes 2012b). As humans, we are a particular type of animal – a mammal – and a particular type of mammal – an anthropoid primate. If we consider humans as animals in our thinking about ecosystems, then our relationships with other animals in those ecosystems become part of the intellectual landscape for any anthropology (sensu lato). As noted above, there is no doubt that in many human societies, and across human history, other animals have played central ecological, physiological, and symbolic roles. However, because of our particular adaptive histories, including our special ability to modify and alter ecologies and our complex theory of mind and obligate linguisti7

Here we are considering the dialectic between Stephen Gould’s views and that of Simon Conway Morris. For discussion, see Deane-Drummond (2009, 10–24, 283).


cally-mediated perceptual lifeways, we commonly perceive a structural and objective distinction between human beings and other beings: Too often in both anthropology and theology, we attempt to ignore a central part of our Umwelt . This distinction creates difficulties in understanding the organization and salience of naturecultures and mutual ecologies (Fuentes 2010; Haraway 2008) that characterize the multispecies relationships we exist in. It also constrains our abilities to think together and individually as disciplines about what it means to be human in the world. One possible mechanism to ameliorate this conflict is to provide a more substantive space for other animals in our understandings of the human community. What we are proposing in this paper is different from the classic anthropological approaches that look at the relationship between humans and their 3 domestic animals, or animal totemism, and symbolic relationships between 4 : 9 2 animals and religious practice. In those approaches, animals are core parts : 6 1 of the environment incorporated and used by human groups to achieve par y 6 g 1 o ticular ends (consciously or not). Few and far between are studies that grant l 0 o 2 n some k agency to the animals involved, as the intellectual gaze, the point of h r c a c e M e b orientation, assumes an anthropocentric reality wherein humans, as a spe T e 9 i 2 g S and as beings, do not share an evolutionarily, or perceptually, relevant cies , n i e r h u h s mutualistic o agency with the beings they interact with (Deane-Drummond, i l T M b 3 t u Artinian-Kaiser, and Clough 2013; Fuentes 2012a). 2 h . P g 5 i y 3 rOne way to ameliorate the tendency to ignore the depth and resonance b 1 . y p d 8 of the human-other animal relationships might be to provide a more open o e r 0 C 2 e . and enriched understanding of the perceptions, contexts, and ensoulment v 5 i l 9 e in other beings, and what that might mean to a Christian theology and D s r e v to an applied anthropology. We have argued in this paper that integrating E k anthropological insight into theological reflection on the meaning of the r i D human opens up in a new way closer consideration of why, and how, modern humans experience the world as they do. In future work, we hope to demonstrate that the corollary to this, the opening of some anthropological approaches to influence from the theological perspectives on the human experience and the inquiry into what it means to be a human person, can enrich anthropology’s methodological toolkit and expand the kinds of interfaces and exchanges between the disciplines. The analysis of both the differences and common ground between humans and other animals in their intertwined and entangled evolutionary histories provides provocative ground for a theological anthropology that is cognizant of such relationships rather than isolated from them. Perhaps, surprisingly, contemporary theologians have rather too readily ignored such anthropological studies and focused simply on individual Homo religious in isolation

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from the community niche in which human beings are based and the wider evolutionary community with other evolving beings. If our becoming is so much bound up with interspecies relationships and responses to what it means to shape and yet be shaped by a particular way of being in the world, then theological discourse cannot afford to be narrowly anthropocentric in its orientation. Rather, theology, if it is to be genuinely humanizing, needs to reflect upon and contribute to building diverse forms of living in a community niche that is aware of its deep roots in evolutionary history.

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Życiński, Józef. 2006. “Bio-ethics, Technology and Human Dignity: The Roman Catholic Viewpoint.” Acta Neurochirurgica Suppl. 98:1–7. Celia Deane-Drummond University of Notre Dame (Notre Dame, IN, USA) [email protected] Agustín Fuentes University of Notre Dame (Notre Dame, IN, USA) [email protected]

Deane-Drummond Fuentes Human Being and Becoming

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