BEING AND TIME
By Martin Heidegger
A Summary
This is an attempt to provide a short summary of this monumental and difficult work as an aid to students. I have tried both to summarise the main ideas - following the text and using Heidegger's terminology and language, while inserting in square brackets briefer and more colloquial summaries of some of the more opaque passages. Sometimes I have also added my own remarks to place some of the ideas in context. What remains is still a dense reading experience, partly because of the way Heidegger expresses himself, but also because of the number and variety of the concepts he introduces. Hopefully it will act as both an introduction as well as a resumé for readers.
Introduction: The Question of the Meaning of Being
I Sections 1-4, pp21-35 – Formulation of the Question of Being
[What is Heidegger setting out to do?]
He first looks at conventional misunderstandings of the term Being:
Being is usually supposed to be:
1 already included in the conception of an entity
2 indefinable,
3 self-evident
How can the question of the meaning of Being be formulated? Heidegger starts to answer this question form the standpoint of Dasein (literally 'being there'), that is, the entity which each of us is himself, which includes inquiring into our own possibilities. [Dasein is therefore the thinking entity central to man's existence or, roughly, our Human Nature.]
All sciences [or studies – since Heidegger goes beyond formal science] get to a stage in their researches where they start to question the philosophical foundations of the subject e.g. mathematicians study the foundations of analysis; physicists study relativity and the quantum theory; biologist study the origin of life; theologians the existence of God. Practitioners of the study (e.g. biology) are nowadays questioning the foundations of the subject (i.e. life). [So the being of any study depends on the assumption of a foundation, or basic concept the existence of which has to be assumed as a starting point for the study.] The details of these foundation concepts only become clear after the subject has been studied for a long time, so that the concept becomes genuinely demonstrated and grounded. The basic question for ontology is to ascertain the foundation concept i.e. Being. Understanding of its Being itself is a definite problem for Dasein. We know this Being through existence. Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence, and this is the foundation of its ontology.
II Sections 5-8, pp36-64 – Method and Design of the Investigation
[What is the problem left by these misunderstandings?]
What is Being?
It is associated with temporality. [Heidegger asserts this connection of Being and time at the beginning of the book, though it is not fully discussed until nearer the end.] Different realms of entities are distinguished in terms of time e.g. temporal entities such as natural processes and historical happenings, versus non-temporal entities such as spatial and numerical relationships. There are timeless meanings and timeless assertions. Dasein, as the Being of being, is also determined by temporality. Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present in a practical way. From the past comes tradition, which can have the effect of preventing Dasein from returning to the origin of the concepts it is using.
Being as a concept has not been properly investigated since Greek times – not by the Scholastic tradition or even in the Renaissance, when concepts such as Descartes ego cogito, the subject, I, reason, spirit and person were accepted without enquiry because of tradition.
Outwardly, entities are grasped in their being as 'presence' – i.e. they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time, the present.
Dasein can also be defined as that living thing whose Being is determined by the potentiality for discourse, itself in turn a manifestation of the potentiality for enquiry. This led Plato to the dialectic. But Aristotle and Parmenides took a separate course, associating Being with presence in the here and now. Heidegger is therefore sceptical of post-Aristotelian philosophy with respect to Being.
[The methods to be used in the investigation.]
Heidegger proposes that Being should be investigated by the technique of phenomenology.
What is phenomenology?
Etymologically, a phenomenon is an entity which is made manifest. Sometimes an entity may show itself as something which it is, or alternatively something which it is not. Heidegger calls the first a phenomenon, the second a semblance. A phenomenon differs from an appearance in that the former is an encounter, a showing-in-itself, while the latter is a reference relationship only.
Logos means letting something be seen in its togetherness [as a whole]. It implies that something is unhidden or discovered. Logos also implies reason and relationship. Heidegger defines truth as discovery in the sense of uncovering or revealing. When as observation harks back to something else to which it is compared by an act of judgment, then that something may be seen as something else, and not for what it is, and there is a possibility of covering up.
Thus phenomenology is the revealing of and concomitant reasoning about entities shown as themselves, not in their mere appearances. According to Heidegger, ontology is only possible through phenomenology. [In Being and Time, Heidegger seems to take phenomenology as meaning carefully described introspection.]
Division 1 Preparatory Analysis of Dasein in Its Ordinary Everydayness
I Sections 9-11, pp 65-77 – Dasein's Basic Position
Dasein is presence-at-hand [i.e. there] (existentia) rather than being-what-it-is [i.e. substance] (essentia) and it is mine [i.e. personal.] It can be authentic (something of its own), or inauthentic (i.e. not something of its own). Dasein cannot be defined by anthropology, psychology or biology, all of which assume Dasein without defining it.
II Sections 12-13, pp 78-90 – Being-in-the-World
We understand Dasein as Being-in-the-world. What is 'the world' in this sense? 'Who' is in the world? What entity? What is in-hood in 'Being-in'?
Taking the last first, what is meant by Being-in? 'In' calls for a spatial definition and being present-at-hand. It is a categorical locational relationship and not of the same character as Being as Dasein. Dasein can be thought of as Being-alongside the world. Heidegger calls this an existentiale relationship [by which he seems to mean a relationship based on a necessary and vital sense on Dasein's part of being in the world as opposed to an existentiell relationship, a relationship based on the plain externally observable fact that Dasein definitely is in the world.] Dasein has insideness, it encounters other beings in the world with which its destiny is bound up. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact, and the concept of the binding up of Dasein's destiny with other Beings Heidegger calls Dasein's facticity. [Facticity is thus roughly what you are stuck with by the nature of your position in the world, especially with respect to others.]
Dasein's facticity means that it becomes concerned with Being-in in various ways e.g. making use of something, undertaking, accomplishing etc. Concern implies at least a degree of apprehensiveness for Dasein, and indicates the possibility of Being made visible as care [in the sense of being concerned with things, having concerns.]
The concept of subject-object relationships does not coincide with the concept of Dasein and Being-in-the-world. Subject-object relationships are convenient only for knowing the world [i.e. observing, doing science], and even then knowledge gained in this way is not readily definable in terms of Dasein as Being. Rather, Being-in-the-world assumes that entities are interpreted, addressed, discussed and manipulated as part of Dasein's Being and not separate from it.
III Sections 14-24 (pp91-148) – Dasein's Interaction with the World
What is the world? Is it nature? Does it consist of substantial entities or entities with only value? Heidegger concludes that the world is not separate from Dasein, but is characteristic of it. Is there a common world? We use the term "world" in several ways in practical discourse. Heidegger decides to use it to mean the personal world of Dasein, and he uses the term worldhood to represent its significance [our take on the world, or our experience]. He is concerned, for the moment, to analyse only the world of "average everydayness".
Dasein exists spatially in the world – in a physical environment. After some speculation, Heidegger eventually decides that Dasein relates to its environment through equipment, and items of equipment also relate to one another.
We can use and manipulate equipment, and so it can be said to possess a kind of being we can call readiness-to-hand. Equipment is manipulable and at our disposal. We cannot appreciate this merely by observing equipment as an object. It enables practical action and has a "towards-which" [that is, a property aimed at achieving a specific goal] that is lacking in theoretical study unless the latter is aimed at becoming a practical method. The work which equipment and method contribute also has this practical, towards-which [goal orientated] property. Also, nature produces materials which can be used, and such materials thus also have a towards-which property even though they have not been purposely constructed by method. In fact, the world or environment is full of ready-to-hand entities for a purpose, and in that towards-which usefulness we can identify Being.
Is the world just the sum total of these useful entities? Heidegger does not answer this questions immediately. What he does say is that equipment which does not work is not ready-to-hand. It nonetheless exhibits presence-at-hand, since it is still there, if useless.
From equipment, Heidegger moves to signs and references, which are ready-to-hand. A sign is a kind of equipment which can give direction and revelation. Signs give reference, and many common types of sign refer us to the world which is already present-at-hand and is waiting to be discovered. An entity is discovered when it is assigned to or referred to something. Dasein thereby becomes involved with the being of the entity through what it perceives via signs.
The wherein [i.e. practical context] of an act of understanding that lets entities be encountered in the mode of existence that lead to their involvement in a towards-which [goal orientated] manner constitutes the phenomenon of the world. That is, Dasein undertakes the act of verstehen or understanding the world from the actors point of view, in a "wherein" manner [i.e. by discovery] of entities. This "wherein" in turn stems from "in-order-to", "towards-which" and "for-the-sake-of-which" motivations associated with Being-in-the-world. [In plainer English, discovery stems from doing things to achieve specific goals also with a larger end in view.] In its familiarity with these relationships, Dasein signifies to itself both its Being and potentiality for Being-in-the-world.
Heidegger then attempts a critique of earlier definitions of Being, particularly Descartes.
Descartes sees the extensio, in terms of spatiality, as constitutive of the world. He famously distinguishes ego cogito (I think) and res corperea (the body). He sees Being as an entity of substance, with dimensions in space. If we touch a surface it offers resistance, which Descartes sees as explicable in terms of dimensionality. If the surface moved away from our hands at the same rate as we touch the surface, we should feel nothing. Other characteristics (e.g. division, motion, hardness) are extensions of this argument. Descartes appears to think that Being is not dependent on these properties, which are only extensions in space. Being is, according to Descartes, bestowed by God. Thus he does not extend our knowledge of Being beyond the beliefs of the Catholic Schoolmen, or indeed Plato's Forms. Descartes concludes that Being does not affect us, and cannot be perceived. Only substance can be perceived through extension. In Heidegger's terms, Descartes therefore regards Being as a permanent presence-at-hand, something with which we are involved with through a barrier, separate from our minds, but nonetheless dependent on Dasein's way of behaving.
Heidegger admits that it is possible to argue that Descartes has, via the concept of the material entity, laid a basis for understanding the world in the mode of extensio. However, Heidegger denies that this understanding can reveal Being even if it leads to the concept of the entity as equipment which is ready-to-hand. He reasons that readiness-to-hand derived in this way is concluded from "thingness" [from the entity itself] whereas in his system it is concluded from the everyday actions and activities of Dasein. There is none of Descartes separateness, or duality.
Heidegger next considers his idea of spatiality in respect of Dasein.
Being ready-to-hand is associated with closeness. Equipment which is ready to hand belongs somewhere. Dasein discovers the regions in the environment circumspectively. Space is split up into places, and "spatiality has its own unity through the totality-of-involvements in-accordance-with-the-world which belongs to the spatial ready-to-hand". [By which he seems to mean that space is comprehended by us through our experience of a world in which we are able to do things.]
Dasein can cope with distance through de-severance, that is making farness vanish. De-severance is existentiale (i.e. a necessary structural or component part of Being for Dasein). Two entities have a measurable distance between them which we come across as part of the process of de-severing. Dasein has a primordial [i.e. natural in the sense that it is possessed by everybody as common experience] tendency towards closeness, which modern technology and working practices [even in Heidegger's time] are enhancing. Remoteness, however, cannot be computed – it is not the same as distance, but a product of concernful circumspection [presumably he means, feeling distant]. This is not mere subjectiveness, according to Heidegger, but rather the "true world" of Dasein i.e. the world in which Dasein has its Being. De-severance is a relation between Dasein and what is ready-to-hand; whatever is most concernful to Dasein is closest to it. [Dasein copes with de-severance by focussing on entities and, perhaps via technology, bringing them close.]
Directionality is also discovered by Dasein by circumspection and its concern for Being-in-the-World. It is also an existentiale.
So too is making room. Spatiality is discovered by making room. By making room, space is made accessible for cognition. Space is therefore in the world in so far as it has, by concerned circumspection, been disclosed as being-in-the-world. Dasein has spatiality as part of its Being. Comparing the same concept in Kantian terms, space is subjectively a priori.
Spatiality can be "intuited formally" in terms of measurements by extending Dasein's circumspection of space. In this way a metrical science of space can be established. This is equivalent to the Cartesian approach to spatiality but, according to Heidegger, in Cartesian philosophy the spatiality of what is ready-to-hand loses its "involvement-character", the world loses its "aroundness" and the environment becomes a world of nature only, and not the world of Dasein. The character of the ready-to-hand-is deprived of its worldhood [i.e. it takes a metrical, subject-object relation to Dasein, and Dasein loses its involvement].
Finally, much of space is unoccupied by either the ready-to-hand or the present-at-hand. It thereby embraces possibilities of Being until it shows itself to the world. [Presumably this means there is much of the World which remains only potentially knowable until it enters Dasein's concernful circumspection.]
IV Sections 25-27, (pp149-168) – Being-with-Others
In characterising the encountering of others one is still oriented by that Dasein which is in each case ones own. Being-there-too summarises Dasein's attitude to others, who are not just present-at-hand. Both Dasein and others are conceived by Dasein in terms of actions within the environment. There is a primordial [essential] spatiality involved: "I" is here, you are there, and he is yonder (locative adverbs). This in turn implies discovering and directionality.
Dasein-with is existentiale [the structure of existence]. As with circumspective dealings with [consideration of] the ready-to-hand, Dasein-with implies care or concern. Since others are in this case also Dasein, these entities can be said to be objects of solicitude [i.e care or concern].
According to Heidegger, there are two forms of solicitude: that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps ahead and liberates. (Solicitude can also be deficient i.e. not caring.) The equivalent of circumspection here is considerateness and forbearance. Significance is tied up with for-the-sake-of-which [the idea of a larger end in view] (even if it is deficient).
Being-with-others is concerned with others actions; they are what they do. The actions of others – perhaps not always definite others – affect Dasein so that it stands in subjection to others, who Heidegger calls the They. The significance of the They is enhanced by, for example, communication media. The They has a Being of its own, which leads to an averaging process. "The They presents every judgment and decision as its own. It deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability." In that way Dasein is "disburdened of its Being". "Everyone is the other, and no-one is himself." But the They is an existentiale, [part of life] and as a primordial [basic] phenomenon it belongs to Dasein's constitution.
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, as distinct from the authentic-self. The Being of the authentic-self is therefore hard to discover since it is dispersed in the They-self. [That is, it is difficult to live life without being affected, for good or ill by what other people do and say]. The They are not mere present-at-hand things. They are an essential existentiale [part] of Dasein. "If Dasein discovers the World in its own way, and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then the discovery of the World and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of disguises with which Dasein bars its own way".
V Sections 28-32, (pp 169-195) – Dasein's state-of-mind or moods
In this chapter, Heidegger analyses Being-in as such.
Being-there invokes a state-of-mind, perhaps better translated as a frame of mind or mood. A state-of-mind is an existentiale [unseparable part] of Dasein. We are thrown into a factical situation [a situation we cannot change because we have inherited it] and naturally develop a frame of mind as a result. Heidegger speaks of the "throwness" of Dasein into its "there", and the facticity of its being delivered over. Even when Dasein is sure where it is going (it's "whither" and it's "whence") its mood or frame of mind brings a factical aspect to the situation. [So whatever we aim to do about the future, we cannot change how the past has affected our present situation, which is where we are starting from.] When mood clouds judgment, Dasein can counter it, but only with a counter mood; and Dasein is never free of moods. Dasein is disclosed in its throwness [shown up up by its lack of control of where it is going] by its moods.
Dasein's openness to the world is constituted essentially by the attunement of its moods. A mood or frame of mind has three consequences for Dasein:
since the mood is factical and existentiale, it makes a launch pad for Dasein to direct itself towards something;
moods depend on Being-in-the-world as a whole;
experience allows Dasein via moods to react appropriately (or, as the case may be, inappropriately) to situations e.g. fear allows us to identify threats.
"Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission of the world [we learn something] out of which we can encounter something that matters to us."
We react to the world and get to know it through experiencing frames of mind or moods, even though our reactions may be fallible and even though we may as a result make mistakes in our decisions and the way we deal with situations. Science and "theory" [and, presumably, also professional practice] would prescribe a more dispassionate approach to that which we normally take in life i.e. in our ordinary, everyday Being-in-the-world. Even the "They" have a collective mood – hence the Greeks love of oratory and democracy, which could be used to control and persuade the crowd. Thus, in ontological terms, the frame of mind is basic to Dasein. Dasein interprets life from moods.
As an example, Heidegger looks at fear as a specific frame of mind. Fearfulness is characterised by potential detrementality [our fear is in proportion to what we perceive as the threat to our Being]. Fear discloses Dasein in a primitive way. It bewilders us and can make us lose our heads. One can also fear for others.
Heidegger then moves on to Being-there as understanding. Understanding, like mood, is also factical and existentiale. It can take different forms e.g. it can be extended to explaining. Understanding characterises the merely possible rather the actual or necessary. By understanding we can, in the first instance, only prepare for the problem of possibility. Understanding can be said to provide the potentiality-for-Being, wherein the world is disclosed as possible significance and where its possibilities are exposed. Dasein understands itself in terms of possibilities as part of its throwness and facticity [in spite of not being entirely sure how things will turn out, better understanding gives us some grip on the situation.] Understanding can be authentic or inauthentic [we work it out for ourselves, or we go with the crowd].
Transparency relates to understanding in the same way as circumspection relates to concern and solicitude to considerateness. [i.e. the first term in each case is a natural consequence of the second].
Interpretation is the working out of possibilities discovered in understanding. Interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance – a fore-having [point of view] which fixes, as it were, the rules for the interpretation. Correspondingly, and consequentially, we also have a fore-sight and a fore-conception. That which can be articulated in a disclosure that we can understand, we call meaning. Meaning is another existentiale [necessary part] of Dasein.
Understanding comes from feedback (what Heidegger calls a "circle of understanding"). Such understanding also takes place against a background of wider interpretation. In our ordinary everyday activities, it is not always or even usually possible to gain wide understanding of very many things.
V Sections 33-34, (pp195-210) - Assertion
Assertion is derived from interpretation, and implies a statement of judgement, communicating or predicting a restricted view or something of definite character. Assertion hides the fore-sight and fore-conception [doubts] of conceiving, because statements are made in a fully developed way. Notwithstanding, the fore-sight and fore-conception are still there, albeit hidden.
There is a logical connection between understanding, interpretation and assertion which is rooted existentially in Dasein.
V Sections 34-38, (pp 203-224) – Dealing with Others
The fundamental existentalia which constitute the disclosedness [revalation, or being informed] of being-in-the-world are thus states-of-mind and understanding, which lead to interpretation and assertion. Assertion leads in turn to communication and language, and thence discourse and talk. "Discourse is essentially equiprimordial [i.e. exists together as equally fundamental] with state-of-mind and understanding. In discourse, Being-in and state-of-mind are made known, the latter especially in poetic discourse". Discourse (including non-verbal elements) has four existential components: what the discourse is about (the subject); what is said (the words); the communication (the assertion); and the making-known of experiences (patterning).
Hearkening, which is more than mere hearing, implies understanding and interpretation.
Idle talk is based on an approximate and superficial understanding on the part of the speaker. The means of communication is gossip, or passing word along so that inaccuracies creep in, enquiries are not made and the possibility of understanding the subject is closed off. In this way, the They prescribes what Dasein 'sees'.
The care for seeing [concern with getting to know things, discovery, or even just clarification of information] is essential to Being. From this starting point follows a desire for perception and thence curiosity. Being-in-the-world has concern, guided by circumspection, to discover the ready-to-hand and to preserve it as thus discovered. During rest (tarrying) curiosity is able to range more widely than the immediate ready-to-hand. In rest, Dasein seeks novelty rather than truth. It also seeks new environments. Care to discover what lies beyond the ready-to-hand, tarrying and thereby seeking the new are all components of curiosity which, unlike idle talk, seeks not to close off topics and interests. Idle talk is an inhibitor of curiosity to which Dasein must inevitably fall prey.
Heidegger sees an ambiguity, in that idle talk discourages curiosity, which implies being ahead of the game with which idle talk has not yet caught up, and study, which is by nature slow, and apt to cause Dasein to fall behind those who jump to conclusions with no study. Dasein's curiosity is therefore always in conflict with idle talk, and the thinker is at best only briefly and by chance in fashion.
But participation in idle talk is unavoidable, and so Dasein develops an inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world, where curiosity and study are absorbed by being-with-one-another. Heidegger calls this existential position falling.
Falling is characterised by:
Tempting – Dasein gets lost in the They of idle talkers;
Tranquilising – the They obviate the need for authentic understanding;
Alienating - Dasein is aware of losing potentiality for Being to the They;
Entanglement – of Dasein with itself (i.e. Dasein becomes confused e.g. by the contradictions of idle talk);
Turbulence – unsettled moving between these states.
VI Sections 39-42 (pp 225-244) – Dasein Overall.
Having analysed Dasein into various components, Heidegger looks at the possibility of structuring them into an overall concept. For this he takes anxiety as a starting point.
In falling, Dasein constantly turns away from itself under the influence of the They. This is disclosed by a state of mind associated with this turning away which is, Heidegger contends, anxiety. He sees anxiety as a state of mind developed from care. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with being free for the authenticity of its being i.e. "the freedom of choosing for itself and taking hold of itself". Anxiety individualises Dasein. This individualisation brings Dasein back from its falling and makes manifest to it that authenticity is a possibility for its being. [Going against the crowd is not easy, and so anxiety is likely to be the result].
These entities are held together in a structure or unity. Since Being is an issue for Dasein, being free for its own most potentiality and possibilities follow. Heidegger calls this Dasein's being-ahead-of-itself. Given the ubiquity of facticity, this can be extended to being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world. [When we want to do things, it is against a background of, and is strongly influenced by, our own background and other people's influence.]
Willing, wishing, urging and addiction are also ontologically rooted in Dasein through care. Heidegger is at pains to point out that care manifests itself in various guises. It is always present as concern, but also more overtly as cares of life, devotedness, solicitude, care for others, care for oneself, etc.
Dasein as care has antecedents in the fable of Cura (which appears in Goethe's Faust, but which is actually much older). Cura (care) shapes a body (being) to which Jupiter gives spirit and Earth gives substance. The body (being) is given to Cura by Saturn, the god of time and also the chief of the gods, for as long as she lives. Thus care dominates being during its lifetime ("temporal sojourn in the world"). [This fable is actually a masterly summary of the ideas behind Beong and Time.]
VI Sections 43-44, (pp244-273) Dasein and Reality – Reality
What are the pre-ontological [basic] characteristics of entities in this environment [mature people in the world]? Dasein understands and interprets the world through all entities that are disclosed to it. Conventionally, the Being of what is ready to hand gets passed over, and entities are conceived merely as a context of things that are present-at-hand. [We don't concentrate on the moment, are not mindful, but drift off to things around us.] Being conventionally acquires the same meaning as Reality. This sort of reasoning "forces the general problem of Being in a direction that lies off the course."
The question of Reality requires in depth analysis. First, Heidegger pours cold water on Kant's attempts to investigate the reality of the external world. He goes on similarly to criticise idealism. Idealism, while not requiring physical presence-at-hand suffers from the same naivety as realism: insufficient understanding of Dasein's character, which is concern with the phenomenal world. Both realism and idealism are concerned with the present-at-hand [the world around us] and do not include any ontological role for [concern with what Being is about in respect of] Dasein. Instead , Heidegger takes a lead from previous (Cartesian-based) analyses by Dilthey and Scheler, and proposes that the experiencing of resistance, that is, the discovery of what is resistant to one's endeavours, is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of the world. [Discovering things about the world is often hard work]. So Dasein "pushes-up" against entities in the world. This process of discovering Reality assumes that the world has already been disclosed in general, that there is nothing new but what is waiting to be pushed up against. There is no need for Descartes' reason that he knows he exists because he can think. Dasein already exists, and can discover the world through pushing-up against entities already within it and an accumulation of knowledge so obtained is a basis for his conscious thinking. [Like most modern thinkers Heidegger is here rejecting dualism, or the separation of the mind (as "a ghost in the machine", as Gilbert Ryle puts it) from the body].
As we have seen, entities are related to Dasein through care [our concerns] and Reality is also.
Next, Heidegger examines truth.
Truth has traditionally (from Aristotle) been defined in terms of agreement between assertions (in turn based on judgmental observations) about objects. Truth tests look for a concordance between observations, or more accurately between intellectual perceptions.
Heidegger moves away from subject-object reasoning of this kind. Assertion, he claims, is a way of Being-towards a Thing. Perceiving a Thing demonstrates nothing else but that it is the very entity one has in mind in one's assertion. What is demonstrated by perception is only the Being-uncovering of the assertion. Truth is thus associated with uncoveredness or disclosedness. He says: "To care belongs not only to Being-in-the-world, but also to Being-alongside entities in the world. The uncoveredness, or disclosedness, of such entities is equiprimordial with the Being of Dasein and its disclosedness". [Unless we deliberately set out to deceive, we tell it as it is, or at least, as we perceive it].
This state of affairs has consequences. Heidegger sees factical Dasein, thrown into the world and falling among entities for which it cares and is concerned with. It follows that "that which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in which it has been disguised and closed by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity." In our primitive desire to know things, and because of our factical state and falling mode, we can be deceived by others or by lack of a full picture. Because of Dasein's falling, Dasein uncovers entities which must then be recovered: "Its state of Being is such that it is in untruth." According to Heidegger, "it is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it… [and] assure itself of its uncoveredness again and again". If disclosedness is repeatedly uncovered and preserved by Dasein, it is there for future reference and interpretation. [While we might naturally tell it as it is, that doesn't mean we are giving an accurate picture of what is going on. There are many snares to deceive us, not least other people. We therefore need continually to check on what we are asserting]. Thus, something like the traditional definition of truth as agreement between assertions has been derived by a
different argument.
Why must we presuppose that there is something called truth? What does it mean to presuppose? It means to understand something for the sake of which Dasein is. [Or, making an assumption]. Notwithstanding, Dasein's Being-in-the-World is only possible because of its care and concern for entities in the world, and this requires the discovery of entities circumspectly. The factical state of Dasein's throwness and falling require a search for the disclosedness of entities that in turn must be uncovered repeatedly. Although events compel Dasein to live in untruth for much of the time, the activity of discovering the truth is central to Dasein's cares and concerns. "The Being of truth is connected primordially with Dasein. Dasein is constituted by disclosedness, and is understood in terms of care and disclosedness."
[Or, for practical purposes, we need to tell it as we perceive it, with proper checking, so that our interests and concerns will thrive].
Division 2: Dasein and Temporality
Section 45 (pp 274-278) – What More Do We Need to Know About Dasein?
Is characterising Dasein as care a primordial [complete and sufficient] interpretation of Being? Such an interpretation must go further than a characterisation against a hermeneutic [merely interpretative] background. Dasein must also be understood in terms of its total possibilities. Dasein has only been examined so far at a point in average everydayness, between birth and death; it has not been studied against the whole span of life. What we have so far is thus only a snapshot of Dasein. We need to introduce the concept of time to look at the whole drama as it unfolds, so to speak, in its totality.
Time is tied up with Dasein's Being towards death, which is what defines this totality. Time is thus an important issue for Dasein. It follows that "care must use time, and must reckon with time".
I Sections 46-53 (pp279-31) – Being-Towards Death
Dasein always has something outstanding which has yet to become actual. As long as Dasein is an entity, it has never reached wholeness. Heidegger calls this Being-not-yet. At the point of death, Dasein's experience of Being reaches a conclusion, but the actual situation of death is beyond the scope of phenomenological investigation.
What can be investigated is being-alongside death, a situation in which others usually retain a mode of "respectful solicitude" [sympathy] towards the deceased, even though the dead person is not something which is ready-to-hand. But this situation is far from experiencing dying by proxy. Death is mine, and mineness and existence are both "ontologically constitutive for death" [need to be considered in terms of what our own death means personally].
The not-yet of Being-not-yet does not have the same ready-to-hand characteristics as the not yet of saving to pay a debt, for example. The remaining debt is ready-to-hand [there to be cleared and under our control]. Nor is it like the revealing of the remaining quarters of the moon, which are present-at-hand [out there somewhere, not something we can change]. It has more in common with the teleological [purposeful] process of fruit ripening, in so far as that which emerges is neither ready-to-hand or present-at-hand [meaning, presumably, while inevitable not something we can ultimately change]. However, when fruit ripens it exhausts its specific possibilities. Dasein at death, by comparison, may remain unfulfilled. In what sense is death the ending of Dasein? None of the above similes help much in answering that question. Also, Dasein is in a sense always constantly at an end, and at a beginning. Each day is the last day of the beginning of its life, and the first day of the rest of it. Hence we must define what we mean by "end".
Our general understanding of death is from the standpoint of life – we have no other opportunity to view it. So we can understand the way in which death enters into any particular Dasein as a possibility of its Being. Death can only be understood existentially from the standpoint of Being-towards-the-end.
We must then show how existence (Being-ahead-of-itself), facticity (Being-already-in) and falling (Being-alongside) are related to death (Being-towards the-end).
Death is inevitable, and therefore part of Dasein's throwness. Dasein legitimately experiences anxiety and care in respect of death. (This is not to be confused with fear of demise.)
How is the concept of death, which is "not to be outstripped", dealt with by the They in idle talk? In idle talk, the They level off death as an occurrence of every day, which belongs to nobody in particular. But the They also try to ignore the fact of death, and "do not permit the courage for anxiety in the face of death". Authentic Being-towards-death becomes inauthentic fleeing in the face of death. [People don't want to talk about, or even think about, death.]
Dasein also tries to cover up death while recognising it as an empirically established certainty. The They say that death is certain, but not yet, and in so doing ignore the possibility of death at any moment. This attitude also enters into Dasein and so Dasein has an inauthentic Being-towards-death derived mostly from the They.
Is an authentic being toward death possible, and how can it be characterised? Death is not present-at-hand or ready-to-hand, but a part of Dasein's Being. Dasein cannot die without relinquishing its being – which includes relinquishing existence, facticity and falling. But Dasein can understand death as a possibility and confront that possibility as its own. In so doing, authentic Dasein is non-relational, that is, it ignores the They and concentrates on its own existence. It sees death as a possibility not to be outstripped and therefore something which puts its own facticity into perspective.
How can Dasein maintain this awareness of authentic Being-toward death? Heidegger considers that this is only possible through anxiety. Given all of these components, Dasein could adopt authentic Being-towards death. This may not always be possible in practice.
The discussion of death resumes and is extended in chapter III.
II Sections 54-60 (pp312-348) – The Voice of Conscious and Resoluteness
Heidegger sees the voice of conscience as important in rescuing authentic Dasein from the They. He gives an existential definition of conscience, relating it to disclosure of Dasein itself, and thence to an inner call to Dasein, or a summoning. The existence of the voice of conscience might be disputed but the concept seems to Heidegger to stand up because authentic Dasein wants to understand itself, and chooses to do so. He calls this deliberate choosing to be oneself resoluteness.
Heidegger's version of conscience differs from Kant's. It is not a "Kantian court of justice" or a psychical state or feeling, but a discourse internal to Dasein that gives information. [Heidegger doesn't see conscience necessarily as a feeling of moral guilt, but as a way of as seeing ones performance].
Where does this call come from? Heidegger says "from me yet from beyond me". This can only be Dasein in its uncanniness i.e. the authentic state of mind of its anxiety in feeling not-at-home. Conscience will therefore sound like an alien voice calling Dasein away from inauthenticity and idle talk. Conscience manifests itself as the call of care. It is potentiality-for-Being. [How am I doing with my concerns?]
Where does the idea of guilt come from? Common sense suggests various origins e.g. a sense of owning, or of being responsible for. It is actually the basis for a lack of something in Dasein in its conduct toward others, or a failure to satisfy a requirement which applies in some way to Being-with-others in the World.
Guilt therefore implies a nullity in relation to a potentiality for Being – something which has not been done which ought to have been done. Dasein in its throwness exists as one possibility rather than another. Herein lies a nullity in that Dasein finds itself in one state when it could have been in another, perhaps many other, alternative states. Dasein therefore has choices closed off; it lacks choices it might once have had. This is not the same as Kantian or any other moral guilt – Heidegger is not talking about either ethics or morality. Thus care, as the basis of Dasein's Being experiences a sense of nullity in Dasein's throwness. Caring Dasein feels lost, uncanny, as if something is missing.
[In summary, Heidegger seems to be saying that guilt in his sense is a process which starts from thrown Dasein as anxiety and care, encountering a feeling of uncanniness or not being at home, caused by something not done (a nullity), which then causes Dasein to hear a call – the call of conscience.]
Heidegger further emphasises that "Dasein makes possible its own Being guilty, which remains closed off from the They". This implies that Dasein has the freedom to answer the call of conscience. Freedom implies choice which is turn implies guilt. It also follows that Dasein has to want to have a conscience, which also implies a wanting to repair the nullity, and thence to action. Guilt and the call of conscience thus regulate action. Conscience is a call to action through concern. While this concern is a product of Being-with-others in the world, it is not a product of listening to idle talk. Therein lies the road to an authentic conscience.
Wanting to have a conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety. Conscience is silent or reticent, and projects itself on Dasein's Being as guilt. To be authentic in this process, Dasein must be resolute in the sense defined above, that is, choosing to understand. This projection implies a search for truth, and also authenticity. Conscience is thus the driver of Dasein's authentic Being-with-others.
Heidegger thus connects several ideas that he has previously investigated to show that the mineness of conscience does not preclude concern for others but rather promotes it, provided the idle talk and consorting with the inauthentic actions of the They can be avoided. "Only by authentically Being-their-selves in resoluteness" can people authentically be with one another.
Finally, Heidegger defines a situation as a space into which Dasein is moved by resoluteness. Dasein in its throwness does not necessarily aim for the situation; conscience deposits it there by inducing Dasein to take action (which might be mental or physical).
III Sections 61-66 (pp 349-382) – Dasein and Temporality
Heidegger has introduced Being-towards-Death, which he calls anticipation, and also potentiality-for-Being, which he calls resoluteness. How can these two concepts, introduced in the previous two chapters, be brought together? Is "anticipatory resoluteness" [maintaining a forward-thrusting attitude to life which we know to be finite] an authentic possibility [something we can convince ourselves of using our own thinking and not from hearsay]?
He first launches into a discussion of temporality. This is not the ordinary understanding of time as measured by clocks and calendars. Instead, Heidegger connects time with resoluteness, seeing the latter as Dasein working through guilt to release its authentic Being-towards-Death. He says: "By resoluteness, we mean letting oneself be called forth to one's ownmost Being-guilty. Being-guilty belongs to the being of Dasein itself and we have determined that this is primarily a potentiality for Being." [This sort of activity is not best measured by a concept of time which measure off the minutes or years – it is a more subjective concept, requiring us to move forward into situations, many of which will give rise to choices and the inevitable guilt which arises.]
Resoluteness deals with the ready-to-hand, and tackles life factically and resolutely, bringing Dasein to a current situation which it can hold for true. Each situation becomes disclosed and cannot be "calculated in advance or presented as something present-at-hand which is waiting for Dasein to grasp it." We move through time by taking note of important events and situations.
Death is the end of existence, the ultimate nullity [situation in which there is more to by done but no opportunity to do it]. By facing death, Dasein, who continually faces nullity through guilt, and deals with it through resoluteness, can ensure that its "authentic existence can no longer be outstripped by anything." Authentic "thinking about Death is a wanting-to-have-a-conscience" and this resoluteness is the same as having a potentiality for being as a whole. There is always guilt and nullity, and there are unpredictable situations. Death is certain, but its timing is unpredictable. Death is part of life, and resolute trying, and listening to the call of conscience will lead Dasein forward through a series of choices to the ultimate end.
Anticipatory resoluteness of this kind is not a way of escape from the problems of life or death. It is more about taking control of one's life by dispersing self concealments, facing up to things, and being true to oneself. That way lies resolute action built on a sober appreciation of the factical situation. Dasein can authentically make its own way in the world undiverted by trivia. That way, says Heidegger, lies joy. Thus by analysing care, death, conscience and guilt, Heidegger suggests a basic recipe for the authentic way of life.
Nonetheless, there are still problems – chiefly to do with understanding mental states and other internal phenomena. He proceeds to analyse the "full structural content of care".
Earlier, care was associated with Dasein being-ahead-of-itself, Being-already-in, and Being-alongside. [We perceive our concerns in life in terms of how they will work out in the future, what is going on in the present, and from the outside, where we think we are now.] Being-ahead-of-itself leads to Being-towards-the-end. The call of conscience summons care towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which leads to anticipatory resoluteness. Death, conscience and guilt are thus all anchored in care. [As we move through life towards death, we use our conscience and sense of guilt in terms of leaving some things at least undone along the way.] But how can all this be conceived as a unity? Heidegger sees the concept of "I" as unifying.
Kant defined "I" in the same res cogitans way [in a way totally related to the mind] as Descartes. But Kant admitted that "I think" has to mean "I think something", which introduces objects into the argument. So we are back to a mere "I" plus a present-at-hand world, as opposed to Heidegger's Being-in-the-world or care. Heidegger defines Being-in-the-world as something which does not keep saying "I" (i.e. as a world which is not subject centred) but which is instead is concerned with care [presumably, a Being concerned with doing things].
So, Heidegger's answer to the key question: "What makes possible the Being of Dasein and therewith its factical existence [the possibility of living a satisfactory life and creating a list of achievements]?" is "anticipatory resoluteness" [an ability to move forward in spite of a sense of the limitations of life, especially of its eventual closure in death]. This means "future coming towards", so that Dasein is "authentically futural". Anxiety and guilt are inevitable, so are facticity and throwness. Only in the present can Dasein resolutely seize action. "This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as temporality. Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality is the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness made possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care." [To do all this, we need to be able to see our present in terms of out total lifespan, with its problems, things left undone, anxieties and guilt.]
It is worth emphasising again that by defining temporality in this way, Heidegger is not primarily concerned with the common sense and scientific definitions of time. Heidegger's time is subjective and concerned with Dasein making choices in the present which will be, and are intended to be, instrumental in defining the future. Time does not just go by at an even rate – some moments are more important and precious than others. Heidegger refers to the conjunction of finitude (future), falling (present) and facticity (past). He sees authentic Dasein as care standing resolutely in anticipation at a temporal junction, with a fixed past but a range of possible futures.
Concern with time is so much constitutive of Being-in-the-world that Heidegger goes on to analyse the concepts he enunciated in Division 1 in terms of temporality.
IV Sections 67 – 71 (pp 383 - 423) - Examination of Everyday Dasein in Terms of Temporality
He starts from the temporality of understanding. Here the term understanding means, according to Heidegger, "projecting towards a potentiality for being". In understanding, one's potentiality for being is disclosed so that one knows what one is capable of. It is futural because Dasein is thrown into it as a possibility. This is Dasein being-ahead-of-itself. Where authentic, it is anticipation; where inauthentic it is awaiting. Authentic understanding is the enthusiasm of a researcher or discoverer. Inauthentic understanding is mere wondering or curiosity. Heidegger waxes almost poetic: "To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a present in accordance with which a resolution discloses the situation." This is a "moment of vision", a "rapture which is held in resoluteness".
In the temporality of state of mind Heidegger says that understanding is never free floating but is always associated with some state of mind, which in turn is a result of Dasein's throwness. State of mind is nonetheless related to Dasein's recent history, or "having been". For example, fear is awaiting something bad or evil. In fear, one panics, becomes confused, forgets things, and loses one's grip on factical matters. A panicky person behaves unidirectionally and unconstructively, that is, in a bewildered fashion. So the temporality of fear is a forgetting of what has been learned factically, is inauthentic.
Anxiety differs from fear. Its factical position is related to throwness and the uncanniness of the every day. This uncanniness is associated with an inability to be certain of what is significant in the world, so that entities recede into nothingness. Anxiety is the mood that discloses areas of insignificance or nullity in the world, a nullity which is of concern for Dasein. This concern "signifies that one is letting the possibility of authentic potentiality for being be lit up or revealed". A bringing-back is involved, but not the forgetting which is characteristic of fear. Anxiety, like fear, is grounded in the past, but in addition it allows Dasein to grasp its present and future with authenticity and resoluteness. [Anxiety differs from fear because it examines the past and looks for gaps, or unknowns which need to be anticipated. It does not panic and confuse fact with imaginings.]
The temporality of hope (by which Heidegger appears to mean false optimism) is similar to fear, but grounded in an expectation of good rather than evil, and therefore tending to be inauthentic.
A "pallid lack of mood" is inauthentic abandonment to throwness and falling, that is, to the present. But equanimity springs from resoluteness and authentically attaining situations or moments of vision. [Things need to be faced, not ignored.]
In the temporality of falling, Heidegger looks specifically at curiosity, and leaves aside idle talk and other ambiguities that he has previously associated with falling and the present. Heidegger describes falling as a leaping away from the present, or a fleeing. Dasein is stuck with throwness and its inauthenticity and curiosity leaps ahead unless brought back by resolution.
In the temporality of discourse, the ecstasies [states] of understanding, state of mind and falling come together and merge into the care structure [are compounded into a specific concern]. Discourse and disclosedness both express the whole meaning of the care structure, and so develop all three temporal ecstasies (i.e. temporal states). [It's good to talk.]
The temporality of transcendence [the difference between what we assume from experience and what we learn from empirical demonstration or proof] is a complex area, and Heidegger devotes some seventeen pages to it.
He starts from the concept of the ready-to-hand as equipment set out in Division 1. Equipment generally is inconspicuous and works together with other equipment. In using equipment, there is an awaiting in the sense of a towards-which [doing something to achieve a specific goal]. When equipment is working properly, we tend to forget about it; it only becomes obtrusive when it ceases to work. "In the making-present which awaits and retains, the towards-which and in-order-to are shown up...When awaiting meets making-present, Dasein finds something which is missing…This is how Dasein comes upon things in an alien world in temporal terms." [Heidegger is really making things difficult here by insisting in talking entirely in temporal terms. What he seems to mean is that time passes uneventfully when equipment is working properly, but when it breaks down we start to look at the past, what in our experience might have gone wrong, and to worry about the future which the equipment will not now deliver. All of this, of course, taking place in the present].
Heidegger applies this analysis to the practice of science. In existential terms, science discloses entities or beings. In non-existential terms it is an interconnection of propositions counted as valid. Circumspective concern with the ready-to-hand becomes modified into the theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within the world. But theory does not depart from consideration of the ready to hand. It may involve inspection of results of using equipment, or involve its own praxis. Intuition and circumspection are involved. [Scientists use instruments and equipment to examine the world, and evolve theories, but how the the second evolves from the first is important.]
The bringing of the object of concern close by interpreting it circumspectively is deliberating, a praxis which illuminates Dasein's factical situation at the time of the inspection in the environment of concern. For deliberation, the entity does not have to be ready-to-hand, because by bringing the environment closer the entity is made present. While the involvement character of the ready-to-hand does not get first discovered by deliberation, it nonetheless gets brought close by it in such a manner as to let that in which it has an involvement be seen circumspectively as the very thing. [In other words, deliberation makes an otherwise merely present-at-hand entity effectively ready-to-hand. The temporal argument here is similar to that for understanding and a situation or moment of vision is reached in a similar way.The aim if using equipment and instruments is to find out about the world around us, and effectively to bring it closer to us.]
Theory follows from this: If a hammer is too heavy, then we understand a statement to that effect from the environment in which we are using the hammer. But if the hammer is said to have mass only, without reference to it as equipment used in a particular environment, then we have developed a decontextualised piece of theory about the hammer as a present-at-hand object. The argument is basically the same as for the practice of mathematical physics, which was of course the cutting edge discipline in the scientific world when Heidegger was writing Being and Time. In this practice, Dasein is transcendent [presumably the subjective observer of the objective facts exhibited] and the being of the entities under consideration [presumably energy, mass, space, bodies in space] are objectivised and thematised in mathematical terms.
Heidegger also seems to anticipate Kuhn's later hypothesis that science has a paradigmatic character. Science is possible because its practititioners understand that there are no "bare" facts which can be conceived independently of other facts. The (mathematical) relationships linking these facts into a theory lie in the fact that the entities it takes as its theme are discovered by "prior projection of their state of Being". In other words, concepts are seen as related as long as they fit into a model (which may or may not be mathematical). Discovery of further facts or the beings of entities may change the model, and lead to another paradigm.
The world, according to Heidegger, is there in the midst of the three ecstasies or states of temporality [factical past, present falling, and future finitude]. Dasein has limited freedom within the ecstasies and therefore within the world to make choices. Dasein has to do its best to understand the world in the ecstatic unity of the "there" [here and now].
The temporality of spatiality is constituted by directionality and de-severance (i.e. bringing close). Space is determined by Dasein's facticity, and moves with it, moving in the direction of equipmental concern. De-severance means the bringing close of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. All of this was set out in Division 1. What temporality adds to this is not immediately clear, but it is connected with the concept of space as where we live, and what we are acquainted with. We speak in spatial terms – the term Heidegger uses for illustrating our present ecstasy is, for example, falling. To us, ordinarily, space appears to be time independent, and our everyday consideration and conception of space and our use of it in conversation make it essential for our view of our environment and our being-in-the world.
Finally, Heidegger considers the concept of everydayness that he used throughout Division 1 to set up his model for Dasein. He worries that the emphasis he placed on it in his analysis may have set the whole model on the wrong track by leaving out the effect of temporality. However, the basic method of hermeneutics is to take a model and subject it to different considerations depending on the conditions and environment. And this is what Heidegger has done. There may be other further considerations on could make in other contexts.
V Sections 72-75 (pp 424-444) – Temporality and Historicality
Life is a succession of momentary actualities. The question arises as to what extent Dasein exists as the sum of these actualities, as opposed to its existence as present-at-hand in the here and now.
The specific stretching along of Dasein in life Heidegger calls historizing. The question of Dasein's connectedness is the ontological problem of historizing, and historicality is the quality of historizing. Historiology, on the other hand, is the science or study of history.
Heidegger reminds us that resoluteness is a projecting of oneself upon one's own Being-guilty – a projection which is "reticent and ready for anxiety" [Dasein has a past, and from this past it faces the future albeit with a degree of uncertainty]. But authentic Dasein's resoluteness gains its authenticity from anticipation of the future.
So what makes a person? What is a life? Heidegger contends that it is not merely the sum of individual moments from which we learn nothing. Rather, from the process of historizing and experience of events, authentic Dasein can learn self-constancy and an approach to the future. Furthermore, only a creature such as Dasein who is temporal could live a life that is historical in the sense Heidegger is using the term. Time is built into Dasein's nature, and it uses this to both look back to its birth as well as forward to its death. Dasein will make choices about how to spend its life, and these can only be based on its historizing, although these choices may by authentic or inauthentic.
Heidegger summarises his previous comments on throwness, and eventually concludes that historizing lies in authentic resoluteness which allows Dasein to move into grasped finitude in a "possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen". [What this seems to mean is that if Dasein makes resolute choices based on calm ("reticent") assessment which builds up a heritage of experience which it has chosen but is nonetheless an inheritance.] Heidegger calls this "existing fatefully in the resoluteness that hands itself down". Some of the inheritance will be experience learned from accidents, happy or otherwise; some will be derived from Being-with-others. Dasein's moving on in this fashion Heidegger terms destiny. Heidegger also talks of fate, which he seems to see as Dasein riding the rapids of guilt, conscience, freedom and finitude which reside "equiprimordially in the Being of an entity" in the form of care.
Of course, Dasein's historicality is made up of circumstance as well as choice. Dasein exists in its throwness in a factical situation which, if it is resolute and authentic, it accepts, and, in the light of which it makes further choices (and presumably accepts further unavoidable accidents). Authentic Dasein is, therefore, realistic about its position and future prospects. Even inauthentic Dasein cannot avoid the choices. Even if the choices are not made explicitly they are nonetheless made implicitly because to do nothing or to go with the crowd is still a choice.
Heidegger thus justifies his concentration on the concept of authenticity – choices have to be made: one abdicates authenticity and therefore part of Being if one does not actively make them.
Finally in this analysis of historicality, Heidegger emphasises the concept of repetition. This recalls Nietzsche's "eternal return" which some interpret as an instruction to consider life's decisions carefully in order to ensure that the experience is worth repeating. In Heidegger's version, repetition is more akin to learning from experience. He speaks of the "struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated". He speaks also of repeating and handing down examples which "are rooted in the future" (i.e. from which Dasein can learn). Dasein must "pull itself together out of its dispersal" to achieve authentic historicality and "think up for itself a unity in that which 'together' is embraced" [Dasein must, accepting the inevitability of fate and the lesson of historicality, get its past lessons together, decide what it can do, and project itself resolutely into the future.]
[This is not mere "life manual" advice on Heidegger's part. He has shown, by his arguments, that we have individual histories based on unavoidable choices and circumstances: we can only be resolute on the basis of that which we have learned, so we have no other option but to move forward with some project which we deem appropriate on that basis. The only option is between authentic future choices (i.e. ignoring idle talk and fads) and taking decisions based on experience, particularly repeated experience of the possible.]
V Sections 76-77 (pp 444-455) – Temporality and Historiology
Heidegger next looks at historiology i.e. the study of history.
Historiology is not just a series of facts but is related to Dasein's historicality. Dasein sees history in its own way, it relates to it, and can learn at least possibilities from it. These possibilities, which involve a degree of selection of what is studied, generally relate to the future, and therein derive their usefulness.
Heidegger examines Nietzsche's proposal that there are three kinds of historiology: monumental, antiquarian, and critical. He concludes that all three are also extant in the historicality of Dasein. When Dasein chooses resolutely, it is open to the monumental possibilities of human existence. Repetition seeks to preserve this, which is the antiquarian mode. By comparing these conclusions to the present, a critique is established. This series of resolutions and repetitions makes for a hermeneutical situation for Dasein.
The relationship in which historiology illuminates historicality establishes historiology as part of care, and therefore as part of the being of Dasein. Heidegger sees this as the authentic mode of historiology.
To underline this argument, Heidegger examines the comments of Count Yorck on Wilhelm Dilthey's analysis of history.
Dilthey was older than Heidegger, who would have studied him. His attempts to understand the historical dimension of human experience were clearly relevant to Heidegger's present concern to link historiology and historicality. Heidegger does not directly examine Dilthey's writing, but concentrates instead on constructive criticisms of them made by Count Yorck in correspondence with Dilthey.
For Dilthey, the present is always enriched by awareness of the past and anticipation of the future. This is close to Heidegger's concept of historicity. Dilthey's project was to use the study of history to enhance explanation and understanding of the human condition. Science can provide explanations of natural phenomena, but not necessarily understanding of mankind. Dilthey saw the study of history (what Heidegger calls historiology) as instrumental in this process. Seeing elements of history in different contexts is also important, and so a hermeneutical approach, which repeatedly looks at historical situations in different contexts and from different points of view is, according to Dilthey, the way to proceed. This process clearly has much in common with Heidegger's.
According to Heidegger, Count Yorck's criticism of Dilthey centres on his definitions of scientific method and the problem of understanding what actually happened. Heidegger pursues Yorck's criticism in some detail, and concludes that Yorck makes a good point when he emphasises the ontical interpretation of history [what actually happened], and its connection with Dasein's historicizing [people's interpretation of it in their present context].
This gives support to Heidegger's own view, that historiology can only be pursued in an authentic fashion if it is done with sufficient humility and in relation to Dasein's historicality. As well as bolstering his own point of view of historiology, the very nature of the hermeneutical discussion process could have been what Heidegger was trying to show.
VI Sections 78-82 (pp 456-486) – Dasein and the Public Conception of Time
Dasein "reckons with" (i.e. copes with) time as one of its concerns. It does this even without the use of clocks or calendars. Dasein has a temporal foundation. We express time in the present – "making present". We retain the past and await the future. This is readily understood in ordinary discourse about the "now" as datability.
Dasein interprets time concernfully. It allows itself time, but it does not necessarily measure time as a series of moments, or "nows". A situation is more likely to be stretched-along and Dasein, as factically thrown into that situation, can take its time or lose it.
The clock or calendar is, however, factically necessary for ordinary life and its use is related to temporality as its reason for being. Indeed, datability arises from the movement of the Sun as ready-to-hand equipment. Dasein, as care rooted in temporality, needs the Sun as an important ready-to-hand tool to discharge its concernedness, care and temporality. The Sun and the sundial associate time with movement in space. There is a space-time linkage in Dasein's concernedness. Time, as related to the Sun, is also related to changes in the natural world which in turn have a bearing on Dasein's temporality.
Heidegger considers clock time in detail. He concludes that it is "that which is counted and made present in such a way that this making present temporalises itself" It suggests a "retaining and awaiting which are horizonally open to the earlier and later". The significance and datability of the "now" are also important. Time is that which is counted which comes to associate itself with the retaining and awaiting of temporality. For some, a series of "nows" stretch off to infinity. The They, who are inauthentic, do not properly consider Death and understand time in this way.
Heidegger goes on to consider Hegel's concept of time in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical as "intuited becoming", a transition from being to nothing and from nothing to being. Becoming is both arising and passing away. According to Heidegger, Hegel sees time as "self-external, not grasped by the Self and so intuited". [Kant had a similar view when he said that time and space are both a priori.]
Heidegger's conception, is different. Temporality makes existence possible. Temporality temporalises world time; history historizes historical time; and factical existence falls from temporality. So temporality and time give rise to existential possibility. Time is not intuited by Dasein, it is much more than that: Dasein bases its existence on time.
VI Section 83 (pp 486-488) – Further Work Needed
In the final section, Heidegger reconsiders the question with which he started his book: the Being of entities in general.
He hints at a strategy for tackling this problem. He warns against the danger of seeking a solution through consciousness, and against reifying consciousness. Nor can one seek answers through formal logic. Rather, he suggests that the way probably lies in searching for the ontology of ontology itself – which he has hitherto sought through the concept of Dasein and the ready-to-hand. However, he seems unsure that even that route will lead to answers – we shall only know if we try it. He ends with a series of speculative questions about the role of temporality in the Being of entities. The last two enigmatic sentences ask: "Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?"
So Heidegger's project at the beginning of Being and Time has only been partly met: he has looked only at the human way of being, but no further. The promised two further Divisions were never written as such, although answers to his more general question may possibly be found in part in some of his later work. (Mulhall, in his book, make some suggestions on where to look.)
Dasein is nonetheless likely to be a starting point in any quest to discover the basic nature of ontology itself. So is temporality. But Heidegger seems to think that at least one further circuit of the hermeneutical circle will be required before we know if this starting position is even reasonable.
A work of philosophy – like an work of art – is never finished.
FURTHER READING
The translation used in their summary is "Being and Time" by Martin Heidegger, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, first published in 1962 by Blackwell.
Also consulted and worth reading are:
"Heidegger and Being and Time" by Stephen Mulhall, first published in 1996 by Routledge
and
"Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time Division 1"
by Hubert L Dreyfus, first published in 1991 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
I am also grateful to Pat and Peter Bailey of Kings Heath, Birmingham, UK for many long and illuminating hours of discussion of this difficult but rewarding book.
