Complaint - Defense Distributed v. Grewal and Feuer

Case 1:18-cv-00637 Document 1 Filed 07/29/18 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED AMENDMENT FOUNDATION,

and

SECOND § Case No. 1:18-CV-637 § § COMPLAINT Plaintiffs, § § v. § § GURBIR S. GREWAL, individually, and in his official § capacity as Attorney General of New Jersey; MICHAEL § FEUER, individually, and in his official capacity as Los § Angeles City Attorney, § § Defendants. § §

COMPLAINT Plaintiffs Defense Distributed and Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., by and through undersigned counsel, complain of o f Defendants as follows:

I NTRODUCTIO NTRODUCTION N Pursuant to a license and other authorization from the State Department, Defense Distributed has published and will continue to publish Computer-Aided Design (CAD) and Computer-Numeric Control (CNC) files on its Internet servers in furtherance of its mission to promote firearms knowledge and possession. possession. The Second Amendment Foundation’s members and supporters are among Defense Distributed’s audience. New Jersey’s Attorney General (Gurbir S. Grewal) and Los Angeles’s City Attorney (Michael Feuer), have waged an ideologically-fueled program of intimidation and harassment against Defense Distributed. Grewal and Feuer have

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threatened and intend to drag Defense Distributed Distributed before all manner of far-flung far-flung criminal and civil tribunals in an effort to silence the organization. o rganization. Alas these state and municipal officers from across the country cannot veto Defense Distributed’s constitutionally-protected and federally-licensed speech. The Defendants’ threatened legal actions violate the First Amendment speech rights of Defense Distributed and its audience, including SAF’s members; run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause; infringe upon the Second Amendment rights of those who would make use of the knowledge disseminated by Defense Distributed; constitute a tortious interference with Defense Distributed’s business; and are in any event, federally pre-empted by Congress’s export control laws as well as Defense Distributed’s export license, by which the State Department has explicitly authorized the speech that the Defendants are seeking to silence. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees.

The Parties

1.

Plaintiff Defense Distributed is a Texas corporation organized under the laws of the

State of Texas, whose headquarters are located in Austin, Texas, and whose principal place of business is located in Austin, Texas. T exas. Defense Distributed was organized and is operated for the purpose of defending the civil liberty of popular access to arms guaranteed gu aranteed by the United States Constitution through facilitating access to, and the collaborative production of, information and knowledge related to the production of arms; and to publish and distribute, at no cost to the public, such information and knowledge on the Internet in promotion of the public interest. 2.

Consistent with the President’s role as Commander and Chief, and the delegation

of Congress’s powers under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, Congress has

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conferred the President with the exclusive authority to issue licenses and other forms of authorizations for the export of technical data on firearms controlled under the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq. The President has delegated this authority to the State Department. Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 2013. 3.

Pursuant to its exclusive exclusive authority under the AECA, AECA, the State Department issued issued a

license expressly authorizing the Plaintiffs to publish certain firearms files for “unlimited distribution” pursuant to ITAR § 125.4(b)(13). See Exhibit A. 4.

Further pursuant to its exclusive authority under the AECA, the State Department

issued an authorization under ITAR § 126.2 to allow every U.S. person to access, discuss, use, reproduce or otherwise benefit from technical data for the development, production, and/or use of firearms. See Exhibit B. 5.

Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., is a non-profit membership

organization incorporated under the laws of Washington with its principal place of business in Bellevue, Washington. SAF has over 650,000 members and supporters nationwide, including members in Texas, New Jersey, and Los Angeles. The purposes of SAF include promoting the exercise of the right to keep and bear arms; and education, research, publishing and legal action focusing on the constitutional right to privately own and possess firearms, and the consequences of gun control. SAF brings this action on behalf of its members. Cody Wilson, Defense Distributed’s principal, is a SAF member. SAF members seek to download the files shared by Defense Distributed, as well as use Defense Distributed’s facilities to share their own files with others 6.

Defendant Gurbir S. Grewal is the Attorney General of New Jersey. He is sued in

his official and individual capacities.

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7.

Defendant Michael Feuer is the City Attorney for Los Angeles, California. He is

sued in his official and individual capacities. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8.

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1332, 1367, 2201, and 2202. 9.

Plaintiff Defense Distributed resides within the jurisdiction of the U.S. District

10.

Venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. U. S.C. § 1391(b)(2), as a substantial part of

Court.

the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, and a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action, are situated within the Western District of Texas. 11.

This action involves actions taken by Defendants in New Jersey and Los Angeles

with respect to the Plaintiffs’ business, activities, and property in Austin. Therefore, venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. U.S. C. § 1391(b)(3), because there is no district in which this action may otherwise be brought, and both Defendants are subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction.

Defendants’ Threats of Legal Actions Against Defense Distributed Distributed

12.

On July 26, 2018, Defendant Grewal sent a letter to Defense Distributed’s

headquarters in Austin, Texas. 13.

The letter “directed [Plaintiff] to cease and desist from publishing printable-gun

computer files for use by New Jersey residents.” See Exhibit C. 14.

Grewal asserted that publishing these files would violate New Jersey’s “public

nuisance laws.” Id. 15.

Grewal’s letter closed with a clear and present threat: “Should you fail to comply

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with this letter, my Office will initiate legal action barring you from publishing these files before August 1, 2018.” Id. 16.

In a press release, Grewal explicitly reiterated that threat: “Attorney General

Grewal threatened Defense Distributed with ‘legal action’ if it fails to comply with his demand.” Grewal also expressed his belief that “[p]osting this material online is no different than driving to New Jersey and handing out hard-copy files on any street corner.” See Exhibit D. 17.

On July 27, 2018, Defendant Feuer caused to be filed in this Court, in the case of

Defense Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1:15-CV-372-RP, a letter addressed to the Hon.

Robert Pitman, who was then presiding over that case. See Exhibit E. 18.

The letter, at Dkt. 109-1, expressed Feuer’s belief that Defense Distributed’s

publication of files “would pose po se a direct d irect and immediate threat to public pub lic safety in the City of Los Angeles, and cause numerous violations of California and City laws designed to protect the public from gun violence.” Id. 19.

Feuer noted that “[as] the City’s chief lawyer and prosecutor, it is [his] job to

enforce the gun laws of the City and California.” Id. 20.

Feuer added that “Defense Distributed’s blueprints” may violate California civil

and criminal laws. Id. 21.

Feuer threatened Defense Distributed with legal action: “his office is authorized to

file lawsuits to ‘enjoin’ the manufacture, importation, or possession of an undetectable firearm.” Id.

22.

Feuer expressed his intent to seek to intervene in that case, for the express purpose

of silencing Defense Distributed. Id. 23.

To convey this message, at least two of Feuer’s attorneys appeared telephonically

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during an emergency hearing before Judge Pitman. (At that juncture, the City of Los Angeles was not yet a party to the case, nor had it even filed a motion to intervene.) 24.

On July 28, 2019, Feuer released the following tweet from the @CityAttorneyLA

Account: “City Atty Mike Feuer & @ManhattanDA Cyrus Vance, Jr. to @StateDept: NO #DIY #guns! #gunviolence #GunControl #gunsense !!https://goo.gl/L377y3 https://goo.gl/L377y3 @ProsecutorsAGV.” See Exhibit F.

25.

That tweet linked to a press release from the Prosecutors Against Gun Violence,

which is chaired by the Los Angeles Angeles City Attorney and the Manhattan District District Attorney. Attorney. It stated that Defense Distributed’s “blueprints should not be published under any circumstances.” See Exhibit G. 26.

On information and belief, Plaintiffs anticipate further legal actions from the

Manhattan District Attorney. Plaintiff Responds to Defendant Grewal

27.

On July 27, 2018, Plaintiff responded to Grewal. See Exhibit H. Plaintiff explained

that the “Letter takes only vague and general positions regarding nuisance and negligence law.” Plaintiff also explained that “all actions contemplated by Defense Distributed are fully protected by the First Amendment, and [Grewal’s] attempts to prevent such actions constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint and otherwise violate the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution.” Plaintiff added that “the Letter constitutes an unlawful threat, in violation of Defense Distributed’s Constitutional rights,” and “demand[ed] that [the Defendant] withdraw the Letter.” 28.

Plaintiff conveyed to the Grewal that “at this time Defense Distribute will attempt

to restrict files made available on the internet to prevent download within New Jersey.” Plaintiff

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stated that “this [modification] should not be construed as an acknowledgment of the validity of your position, and Defense Distributed reserves all of its rights in this regard.” Great, Irreparable, and Continuing Harm

29.

But for Defendant Grewal’s letter, Defense Distributed would freely distribute the

files in New Jersey. However, Defense Distributed has taken steps to prevent the distribution of files in New Jersey because Defense Distributed reasonably fears that Defendant Grewal would pursue civil enforcement proceedings against Plaintiff. See Exhibit H. Users with New Jersey based IP Addresses are currently blocked from accessing the files. See Exhibit I. 1 30.

But for Defendant Feuer’s letter, Defense Distributed would freely distribute the

files in Los Angeles. However, Defense Distributed has already taken steps to prevent the distribution of files in Los Angeles because Defense Distributed reasonably fears that Defendant Feuer would pursue civil and t enforcement proceedings against Plaintiff. Users with Los Angeles based IP Addresses are currently blocked from accessing the files. See Exhibit I. 31.

Notwithstanding its efforts to placate the Defendants, a legitimate controversy

exists between Defense Distributed, and Defendants Grewal and Feuer, as to the legality of Defense Distributed’s conduct. Defense Distributed can reasonably expect a continuing campaign of harassment and intimidation aimed at silencing it and tortiously interfering with its business. 32.

Defense Distributed is entitled to appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief

against all further acts of harassment and intimidation by Grewal, Feuer, and all others who may act in concert with them. COUNT O NE

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Defense Distributed also blocked access to the files from IP addresses based in the following foreign countries: Islamic Republic of Iran, Belarus, Myanmar (Burma), Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 R IGHT IGHT OF FREE SPEECH —U.S. CONST. AMEND. I 33.

Defendants’ threats of legal actions are invalid on their face, and as applied to

Plaintiffs’ public speech, are an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).

34.

Defendants’ interruption and prevention of Plaintiffs from publishing the subject

files, under color of law, violates Plaintiffs’ P laintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, causing Plaintiffs, their customers, visitors and members significant damages, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 35.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, and an award of

damages and attorney fees, against Defendants.

COUNT TWO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “DORMANT” COMMERCE CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8 36.

The threatened legal actions would not only require Plaintiffs to cease sharing files

on its Texas-based servers within New Jersey and Los Angeles, respectively, but would also prohibit Plaintiffs from sharing the files within within Texas, and other states. 37.

The Supreme Court has recognized that the “Commerce Clause . . . precludes the

application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.” Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 38.

Through the threatened legal actions, New Jersey and Los Angeles “project[s] its

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legislation” into other states, in violation of the “Dormant” Commerce Clause. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583 (1986). See also Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103–04 (2nd Cir. 2003); Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 237 F.

Supp. 3d 997, 1025 (E.D. Cal. 2017); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 958–59 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 39.


files on its Texas-based servers, under color of law, violates the Plaintiffs rights to freely participate in intrastate and interstate commerce under the “Dormant” Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 40.

Defendants’ actions have caused Plaintiffs, their customers, visitors and members

significant damages, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dennis See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991). 41.


damages and attorney fees, against Defendants.

COUNT THREE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 R IGHT IGHT TO K EEP EEP AND BEAR ARMS —U.S. CONST. AMEND. II 42.

The fundamental Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms inherently

embodies two complimentary guarantees: the right to acquire arms, and the right to make arms. 43.

If one cannot acquire or create arms, one cannot exercise Second Amendment

rights. Infringing upon the creation and acquisition of arms of the kind in common use for traditional lawful purposes violates the Second Amendment, as applied to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. District of Columbia v. v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008); McDonald

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v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

44.

By forbidding Defense Distributed from distributing files that concern the lawful

manufacture of firearms, Defendants are violating the Second Amendment rights of Plaintiffs, their customers, members, and visitors. 45.


files, under color of law, violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, causing Plaintiffs, their customers, visitors and members significant damages, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 46.


damages and attorney fees, against Defendants

COUNT FOUR THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2 PRE-EMPTION BASED ON EXPORT LICENSE ISSUED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT 47.

Consistent with the President’s role as Commander and Chief, and the delegation

of Congress’s powers under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, Congress has conferred the President with the exclusive authority to issue licenses and other forms of authorizations for the export of technical data on firearms controlled under the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq. The President has delegated this authority to the State Department. Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 2013. 48.

Pursuant to its exclusive exclusive authority under the AECA, AECA, the State Department issued issued a

license expressly authorizing the Plaintiffs to publish certain firearms files for “unlimited distribution” pursuant to ITAR § 125.4(b)(13). See Exhibit A.

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49.

Further pursuant to its exclusive authority under the AECA, the State Department

issued an authorization under ITAR § 126.2 to allow every U.S. person to access, discuss, use, reproduce or otherwise benefit from technical data for the development, production, and/or use of firearms. See Exhibit B. 50.

The Defendants’ threatened legal actions conflict with the State Department’s

exclusive authority and seek to interfere with this federal licensing framework. See Exhibits C, D, and E. 51.

In a press release, Defendant Grewal expressly stated that he seeks to override the

federal government’s licensing framework: “The federal government is no longer willing to stop Defense Distributed from publishing this dangerous code, and so New Jersey must step up.” See Exhibit D. 52.

New Jersey and Los Angeles can no more prohibit the operation of a federally

licensed export framework than could Maryland prohibit the operation of a federally chartered bank. See McCulloch v. Maryland , 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 53.

The threatened legal actions are preempted based on Defense Distributed’s Export

License that was issued by the State Department. 54.

“[I]f an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the

court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).

55.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants’ threat of

legal actions that are pre-empted.

COUNT FIVE THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2

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EXPRESS PREEMPTION 56.

Through federal export control law, Congress has expressly expr essly preempted state law.

57.

Therefore, the threatened legal actions are expressly preempted by federal export

control law. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). 58.



59.


legal actions that are pre-empted.

COUNT SIX THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2 FIELD PREEMPTION 60.

Congress has occupied the entire field of export control law.

61.

Therefore, the threatened legal actions are preempted by field preemption. See

English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).

62.



63.


legal actions that are pre-empted by federal export control law.

COUNT SEVEN

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THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2 CONFLICT PREEMPTION 64.

The threatened legal actions would stand as an obstacle and would frustrate the

accomplishment of objectives authorized by federal export control law. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council , 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000); Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 738-742 (N.D. Ill. 2007).

65.

Therefore, the threatened legal actions are preempted by conflict preemption.

66.



67.


legal actions that are pre-empted by federal export control law.

COUNT EIGHT TORTIOUS I NTERFERENCE NTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS 68.

Defensed Distributed receives advertising revenue from its file-sharing system

through contracts with third-parties. third-parties. In the past, these revenues have exceeded $75,000 per annum. 69.

Defendants willfully and intentionally sought to interfere with those contracts.

70.

Defense Distributed has taken steps to prevent the distribution of files in New

Jersey and Los Angeles because Defense Distributed reasonably fears that Defendants Grewal and Feuer would pursue civil and criminal enforcement proceedings against Plaintiff for doing so. 71.

The willful and intentional actions of Defendants Grewal and Feuer have

proximately and directly caused damages to Defense Distributed’s contracts.

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72.

The willful and intentional actions of Defendants Grewal and Feuer have resulted

in actual damages. 73.

Defendants’ conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes tortious

interference with contracts. See ACS Inv’rs, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex.1997). 74.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants’ tortious

interference with contracts. con tracts.

COUNT NINE TORTIOUS I NTERFERENCE NTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE CONTRACTS 75.

There was a reasonable probability that Defense Distributed was to enter into

contract(s) to do business with other third parties in New Jersey and Los Angeles. 76.

The threatened legal actions constitute a wrongful, deliberate, willful, intentional

or otherwise tortious interference with prospective contracts in New Jersey and Los Angeles. 77.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants’ tortious

interference with prospective contracts.

PRAYER FOR R ELIEF ELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that judgment be entered in their favor and against Defendant as follows: 1.

A declaration, and injunctive relief, to prevent Defendants’ threatened legal actions

that violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; 2.


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that violate the Dormant Commerce Clause; 3.


that violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; 4.


that are preempted based on Defense Distributed’s Export License that was issued by the State Department; 5.


that are expressly preempted by federal export control law; 6.


that are preempted by field preemption by federal export control law; 7.


that are preempted by conflict preemption by federal export control law; 8.


that tortiously interfere with contracts, and damages to be determined for Defendants’ tortious interference with contracts; 9.


that tortiously interfere with prospective contracts, and damages to be determined for Defendants’ tortious interference with prospective contracts; 10.

Actual damages in an amount according to proof at trial;

11.

Attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

12.

Any other further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

The Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial.

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Dated: July 29, 2018 Alan Gura Virginia Bar No. 68842* Gura PLLC 916 Prince Street, Suite 107 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 703.835.9085 / Fax 703.997.7665 [email protected] *Admission pro hac vice pending

Respectfully submitted, /s/ Josh Blackman Virginia Bar No. 78292 1303 San Jacinto Street Houston, Texas 77002 202.294.9003/Fax: 713.646.1766 [email protected] Counsel of Record

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Complaint - Defense Distributed v. Grewal and Feuer

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