Collision Course_NATO_ Russia_Kosovo.pdf

Collision Course

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Collision Course NATO, Russia, and Kosovo JOHN NORRIS FOREWORD BY STROBE TALBOTT

PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Norris, John. Collision course : NATO, Russia, and Kosovo / John Norris ; foreword by Strobe Talbott. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-98753-1 (alk. paper) 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Armed Forces—Serbia and Montenegro— Kosovo (Serbia) 2. Bombing, Aerial—Serbia and Montenegro—Serbia. 3. Operation Allied Force, 1999. 4. Kosovo (Serbia)—History—Civil War, 1998-1999—Participation, Foreign. I. Talbott, Strobe. II. Title. DR2087.5.N67 2005 949.703—dc22 2005002147 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2005 by John Norris All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2005002147 ISBN: 0-275-98753-1 First published in 2005 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

@r The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To my nieces and nephews: Ben, Caitlin, Joe, Adam, Anna, Joe IV, and James And to my love, Brenda


Contents

ix

Foreword by Strobe Talbott Preface

XV

xix

Introduction

1

k

Misadventure

2

Picking Up the Pieces

25

a

The Shuttle Begins

57

*^ The Dog Days of Spring

83

5

An Empty Chair, Nothing Off the Table

121

S

On the Mountain

151

i Belgrade

181

H Breaking Through

207

S

Deception and Confrontation

237

20

A Creeping Coup?

269

11

The Aftermath

289

X2

Conclusion: Hard Lessons

303

Bibliography

323

Index

327

Vll


Foreword by Strobe Talbott

The seventy-eight-day bombing campaign against Serbia in the spring and early summer of 1999 was the last major international conflict in the bloodiest of all centuries. It was also a first in several respects—the first time in fifty years of existence that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization went to war, the first time that a coalition of countries attacked a regime to end its brutalization of a national minority, the first time airpower alone was enough to ensure victory, and the first time that U.S. armed forces conducted a sustained military operation without suffering a single combat fatality. These distinctions of Operation Allied Force gave us a glimpse of a new feature of world politics and a new form of warfare. Slobodan Milosevic may be in the dock at the UN International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, but his species of predatory tyrant is not extinct. War will continue to be necessary from time to time as part of the larger effort to reverse aggression, stop the depredations of dictators, re-impose order on chaos, and more generally, defend the interests and enforce the norms of an abstraction that is trying to become a reality—the international community. To the extent that there is such a thing as an international community, it owes much to NATO. The alliance was founded for the sole purpose of deterring—and if necessary, defeating—the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact if they ever attacked the West. Yet by 1999, that country and that alliance no longer existed. Many commentators and some political leaders were asking whether NATO, having served its original purpose, should go into honorable retirement. The conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that the end of the cold war IX

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FOREWORD

did not mean the end of instability in Europe. Quite the contrary: the collapse of communist states—giant ones like the USSR and smaller ones like Yugoslavia—was accompanied by the increased danger of chaos and violence. The post-Soviet states were fortunate in that the leader of Russia, President Boris Yeltsin, was determined to resist the temptations of irredentism. He insisted on converting inter-republic boundaries into new international ones, even though that meant leaving millions of ethnic Russians in what were now independent states. The post-Yugoslav states were cursed in that their leaders, particularly Milosevic, saw an opportunity to redraw the map in blood, along ethnic and religious lines. NATO was slow in rising to the challenge but did so in 1995 by using diplomacy backed by force to impose peace in Bosnia. The United States and its allies had to bomb the Bosnian Serbs in order to get Milosevic and his henchmen to the negotiating table in Dayton—and they then deployed thousands of NATO troops to enforce the settlement achieved there. In 1998 Milosevic turned his brutality against those citizens of Serbia who happened to be ethnic Albanians living in the southern province of Kosovo. Once again, the West, with some support from Russia, tried diplomacy backed by the threat of force. This time it proved inadequate, so in 1999 the formula was reversed: NATO applied force backed by diplomacy. NATO would have launched the bombing campaign with the blessing of the UN Security Council if the Russian Federation had not threatened a veto. Yet even though the war began over the vigorous objections of the Russians, it ended in large measure because President Yeltsin and his special envoy, Victor Chernomyrdin, threw Russia's weight behind what were essentially American terms, endorsed by NATO, for stopping the bombing. In that respect, the war was both the most severe crisis in the first decade of post-cold war U.S.-Russian relations and the most dramatic instance of U.S.Russian diplomatic collaboration in that period. By going to war against Milosevic, the West was reiterating a principle that had been taking shape for several years: the sovereignty of individual states is not absolute; a national government that systematically and massively abuses its own citizens loses its right to govern; it is subject either to being put out of business altogether or having its authority suspended in that area of the country where it is running amok. The U.S.-led invasion of Haiti in 1994 was an early assertion of this principle and therefore a precedent for what NATO did in Kosovo five years

FOREWORD *

xi

later. A military junta that had carried out a coup against Haiti's first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was using terror and murder as instruments for controlling an increasingly desperate and restive population. Thousands of Haitians sought asylum in the United States by taking to the seas in rickety boats. In order to end a human-rights outrage and a humanitarian crisis occurring off its shores, the United States sponsored a resolution in the UN Security Council that made the restoration of democracy a goal justifying the use of force. With the support of the UN and the Organization of American States, the United States assembled a broad-based coalition, invaded Haiti, threw out the junta and reinstated Aristide. In the years that followed, Aristide abused his mandate, misruled and alienated his people. When he was driven into exile by a popular uprising in the spring of 2004, American troops and those from other countries returned to patrol the streets of Port-au-Prince and disperse around the country. Their presence, while a sobering epilogue to the U.S.-led invasion a decade earlier, did not negate its validity or change a grim but inescapable fact of international life: since there will continue to be states that are either a menace to their own people or to their neighbors, other states must, in concert, be prepared to step in and change the regime. In Haiti in 1994, that meant throwing out the junta and bringing back Aristide; in Kosovo in 1999, it meant ending Belgrade's rule in the province; in Afghanistan in 2001, it meant driving the Taliban from Kabul into the mountains; in Iraq in 2003, it meant toppling Saddam Hussein and replacing him with an American proconsul. The cases of Afghanistan and Iraq were complicated by the Bush administration's reluctance to cast its own policies in terms of continuity with its predecessors, especially its immediate predecessor, the Clinton administration. President Bush and his principal colleagues do not talk much about the ongoing obligation of the United States in Bosnia and Kosovo, since they campaigned against both in 2000 as examples of what they disparaged as the foolish business of nation-building. However, now that they are engaged in precisely that activity in Afghanistan and Iraq, Kosovo looks more like a model for what they may end up putting in place in those other states that American-led armies liberated from heinous regimes. Afghanistan came into the cross hairs of American military might because it was the base of operations for terrorists who attacked the U.S. homeland

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FOREWORD

on September 11, while Iraq became a target because the Bush administration accused Saddam of possessing large, illicit, and usable stores of weapons of mass destruction. As that pretext for the invasion has come under sharp questioning and as the United States seeks more help from the UN and NATO in providing security and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq, President Bush increasingly invokes the same rationale that President Clinton used for regime-change in Haiti and Kosovo: the defense of freedom, democracy, and decent governance. All the more reason, therefore, to study Kosovo for the lessons it offers for future such exertions of force. Among the standards that should be applied are: whether peaceful means of ending violence have been exhausted and therefore politics by other, violent means is justified; whether military action makes maximum use of regional and global institutions and derives maximum legitimacy from treaties and international law; whether it enlists as much participation in the war as possible from allies and ad hoc partners in order to ensure their participation in the reconstruction that will follow; whether it makes the best use of technology, not just for killing enemy leaders and soldiers but for not killing civilians; whether it is conducted in a fashion designed to reduce the danger of conflict spreading; whether the prosecution of the war is synchronized with diplomatic efforts to end the fighting; whether the terms of the surrender imposed on the defeated power are conducive to a stable and sustainable peace; and finally, whether the war makers-turned-peacekeepers are prepared to remain on the ground, in the region, and on the case for what will, almost always, be a very long time. By that checklist, the Kosovo war was far from perfect, but overall, it gets a passing grade (although by the last criterion—staying power—it gets an incomplete, since five years does not qualify as a long time). Kosovo, today, is a virtual trusteeship, a ward of the UN and NATO. It's a mess, but a manageable one, and nothing like the cauldron of ethnic cleansing and blood-feuding that it became in the nineties. Serbia, too, is far from a mature modern state, but it is staggering and lurching in the right direction—toward a functioning democracy and toward Europe. For all these reasons, the war in Kosovo deserves careful and continuing scrutiny, not just by military historians but by students of current events and anyone thinking about the future of war and peace. They will wonder how events looked and felt at the time to those of us who were involved. Thanks

FOREWORD

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xiii

to John Norris, they will know. The account he offers has an immediacy that can be provided only by someone who was an eyewitness to much of the action, who interviewed at length and in depth many of the participants while their memories were still fresh, and who has had access to much of the diplomatic record. All of us who had some role in the story told here have some reason for satisfaction as we look back, hope as we look forward, and gratitude to John for being part of the team and for writing this book.


Preface

The man from the CIA was a thin, edgy fellow, desperate for a cigarette after more than nine hours on the plane. His prognosis was grim; he conspiratorially declared that NATO's damage estimates were grossly inflated and that the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was being decimated. European political support for the air campaign was diminishing, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was hanging tough, and the war in Kosovo would end badly. It was a brilliantly sunny day at 29,000 feet in May 1999 as the pale blue and white U.S. Air Force jet shuttled us toward Moscow for another round of talks with the Russians on day sixty-three of NATO's war. My boss, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, was the lead American negotiator in the three-way talks attempting to strike a peace deal to end the war, and he headed a small team made up from the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and the State Department. I served as Talbott's director of communications, fielding a steady stream of requests from reporters eager for insight into the high-stakes diplomacy. Although one of the most junior members of the traveling team, I enjoyed a front-row seat for what would prove to be a climactic military and diplomatic showdown. The CIA analyst had plenty of reasons for pessimism. The better part of a million refugees had already been driven out of Kosovo, and more streamed toward Macedonia and Albania by the day. Serb forces continued to pillage Kosovo with seeming impunity. NATO had bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the Russian government was on the edge of collapse. Waning public support for the war and sharp internal splits threatened to end NATO's first sustained combat operation in embarrassing failure. Running his fingers through thinning hair, the CIA analyst leaned forward, not wanting his comments to be overheard by the rest of the team. With the morosely satisfied expression of someone that had predicted the xv

xvi it PREFACE

worst and was being proven prescient, he insisted that the agency had warned from the beginning that bombing alone would not force President Milosevic back to the bargaining table to resolve the status of the rebellious province of Kosovo. The analyst felt that arming the KLA as part of a proxy war against Belgrade was the only viable option. It had worked in Afghanistan against the Soviets; it could work in Kosovo against the Yugoslavs. I disagreed, but soon we touched down on the tarmac in Moscow. The team grabbed their belongings and a motorcade sped us downtown and back toward another set of marathon negotiations with our Russian and Finnish counterparts. One of my colleagues concisely summed up his opinion of the CIA analyst as we climbed into the motorcade: "Jackass." This book tells the inside story of the 1999 war in Kosovo, offering a behind-the-scenes portrait of the tumultuous events that took place from the first day of NATO bombing to the insertion of peacekeepers into the province less than three months later. These seventy-eight days were filled with Byzantine political, military, and diplomatic maneuvering between NATO, Yugoslavia, and Russia, much of which has yet to be made public. For example, this account details Washington's shadowy plans to open a direct negotiating channel to Belgrade and Milosevic at the height of the conflict and the conversations held between senior U.S. policy-makers and Yugoslav officials in that regard. During the bombing campaign, intensive talks among Russian, American, and Finnish negotiators repeatedly threatened to break down as deeply controversial planning within NATO to launch a ground war against Yugoslavia steadily gained momentum. Against this dramatic landscape, a secret Russian plan to push its forces into Kosovo took Western leaders by surprise and triggered a furious debate among NATO military officials about potentially intercepting these forces. Speculation that President Yeltsin had lost control of Russia's large and dangerous military machine was rampant, and the United States and Russia came closer to exchanging fire than any other time since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Ultimately, the events chronicled here nearly led to a ground war and culminated in an uneasy peace agreement, the deployment of some 50,000 NATOled peacekeepers, and international stewardship of a fiercely contested piece of Balkan landscape. With nations fighting a war while hamstrung by the awkward confines of alliance politics, the crisis quickly snowballed from a persistent diplomatic nuisance into a test of will for the world's most powerful military alliance. Similarly, as both the United States and Russia have sought to redefine

PREFACE ir xv ii

their relationship in the wake of the Cold War, the harrowing events of Kosovo demonstrate that the two nations remain in uncharted waters. As the two countries try to reconcile uneasy partnership and periodic opposition, Kosovo well illuminates both the importance and difficulty of this struggle. The account offered in these pages is built, first and foremost, on my personal recollections as I traveled with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott during his negotiations with Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. These unusual three-way talks were held amid a grueling pace of shuttle diplomacy in Helsinki, Moscow, Bonn, and Washington in an effort to forge the terms that Milosevic would have to accept to end the conflict/The opinions and characterizations in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily represent official positions of the U.S. government. I have augmented my personal insights with extensive interviews of senior White House, NATO, State Department, Pentagon, and other international officials central to decision-making during the conflict, as well as the considerable written record detailing the conflict. It would be impossible to fully credit all those who have offered assistance and welcome moral support in writing this book. A number of individuals deserve special recognition. Both John Bass and Phil Goldberg offered excellent insight and were wonderful coworkers during my tenure at the Department of State. Similarly, Toria Nuland was great help in piecing together the initial timeline of the hectic negotiations. John, Phil, and Toria represent the highest ideals of the U.S. Foreign Service. Mark Ramee of the State Department was of tremendous assistance in helping, with good humor, shepherd the book through the laborious interagency clearance process, and I could not have done it without him. My agents, Leona and Jerry Schecter, offered great guidance and steady encouragement when I needed it the most. I am eternally indebted to Strobe Talbott on fronts too numerous too count. He has been a terrific mentor and friend. Strobe has brought an abiding sense of graciousness, intellect, and compassion to all his endeavors. I also owe deep gratitude to Derek Chollet and his wife, Heather Hostetter. Derek waded through the roughest of drafts, offered a wealth of strikingly good advice, and consistently helped improve the text. I am lucky to have both him and Heather as such good friends. I would also like to thank Jason Forrester, John Raho, James Lares, and others who have always been such good editors, friends, and active members of the peanut gallery. Lastly, I would like to thank my family for all of their support over the years, and to thank Brenda Bradberry who has become such a special part of my life.

Introduction

Kosovo offers important lessons in how limited wars can burn out of control. Having decided to launch military action, NATO quickly found that faulty intelligence, personality conflicts, competing national interests, accidents, and the fog of war could quickly push events to a breaking point. Ideas that made sense on paper and in foreign ministries quickly dissolved into a harsher reality. Slobodan Milosevic, like any modern tyrant facing the collective might of Western power, felt no obligation to be constrained by the traditional rules of war. NATO soon found itself frustrated. Despite having the ability to crush all of Yugoslavia militarily, total war was not an option. The Alliance would have to survive a more treacherous landscape with a combination of force and diplomacy. NATO would not only have to carry the conflict on the ground; it would also need to win the broader court of public opinion.

Origins of War While many of the disputes in the Balkans have been mislabeled as "ancient ethnic hatreds," Kosovo probably comes closest to living up to the title. Disputes between Serbs and Albanians over control of the territory stretch back centuries. The region has deep symbolic importance to both ethnic communities, and the twentieth century was marked by a disturbing series of violent ethnic expulsions and counterexpulsions by both Serbs and Albanians in an effort to demographically dominate the region. These tensions also often took on religious overtones, with the majority of Serbs being Orthodox Christian and the majority of Kosovar Albanians being Muslim. xix

xx

* INTRODUCT I O N

Under Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution, Kosovo had been made an autonomous province within Serbia and was given broad political authority nearly on a par with Yugoslavia's six republics. However, ethnic Albanians continued to push for more extensive political rights, and Belgrade brutally put down student demonstrations in 1981. Relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo continued to erode with the rise of Slobodan Milosevic on the Yugoslav political scene. Indeed, Milosevic's extreme nationalist rhetoric, often directly targeted at Kosovar Albanians, propelled him to tremendous popularity in Serbia. Between 1989 and 1990, the Serb government further curtailed ethnic Albanian rights in the province, culminating with revoking Kosovo's autonomous status in July 1990. Despite such pressures, Kosovar Albanians largely practiced nonviolent resistance amid growing calls for independence, despite making up 90 percent of the province's population. With Yugoslavia splintering into smaller and smaller pieces at the end of the Cold War, Kosovo became destabilized. After watching the horrors in Bosnia, many Kosovar Albanians were convinced that nonviolence would not loosen Belgrade's tight grip. By the mid-1990s, a poorly organized militant guerrilla movement began to spring up in the Kosovar Albanian community. The most important of these groups, the KLA, was small and led by a motley collection of nationalists, clans, and criminals. The collapse of the government of neighboring Albania in 1997 then flooded Kosovo with cheap weapons and triggered harsh crackdowns by Serb police and paramilitary forces. Both sides continued to radicalize throughout 1998 with a steady stream of hit-and-run attacks by the KLA and Serb security forces. Against a backdrop of escalating violence, the United Nations (UN) reimposed an international arms embargo on Yugoslavia, and Kosovo became the subject of intense diplomatic discussions by the United Nations and a Contact Group consisting of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States. In September of 1998, a UN Security Council resolution called for a cease-fire and a drawdown in the number of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo. This plea fell on deaf ears, and fighting between Yugoslav forces and the KLA intensified. In October 1998, NATO authorized air strikes if Yugoslav security forces were not pulled back from Kosovo, and U.S. Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke launched a diplomatic mission to Belgrade in an effort to end the crisis. After a flurry of negotiations with Yugoslav President Milosevic, Belgrade agreed to have international civilian monitors deployed in Kosovo and

INTRODUCTION * xxi to pull back about one-third of its troops. NATO declared that air strikes would be launched if Milosevic broke the agreement, and the KLA was expected to cease its attacks as well. While Belgrade initially lived up to the terms of the October accords, the KLA quickly exploited the agreement and took control of military positions abandoned by the Serbs. In December 1998 and January 1999, a series of high-profile killings—by both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians—made clear that peace was not at hand. During February 6-17, 1999, the Contact Group convened peace negotiations at Rambouillet, France, hoping to bring both Milosevic and the disparate Kosovar Albanian factions to terms. The Contact Group pushed to restore Kosovo's autonomous status, deploy an armed international peacekeeping presence under NATO's direction, and eventually hold a nonbinding referendum on Kosovo's political status. Unfortunately, the Rambouillet talks—billed by some as a European version of the U.S.-led Dayton peace accords that ended the war in Bosnia—were doomed to failure. There was plenty of blame to go around. President Milosevic did not participate directly in the negotiations, and the delegation he sent to Rambouillet had little authority. Milosevic balked at serious talks as long as the Contact Group continued to demand that NATO peacekeepers be put on the ground. Despite the absence of Milosevic—Yugoslavia's key decisionmaker—the Contact Group made the questionable decision to forge ahead with the peace conference. Cohosted by the British and French governments in an opulent chateau in the French countryside, the Rambouillet talks verged on farce. The Kosovar Albanian delegation was sharply divided, mutually distrustful, and reluctant to accept the demands which the Western powers assumed the delegation would wholeheartedly embrace. The low-powered Yugoslav delegation drank heavily. The French spent a great deal of time and energy trying to keep NATO's own military brass out of the talks. The Clinton administration, facing a skeptical Congress, remained reluctant to commit U.S. ground troops to support a peace agreement—even though policy-makers knew American forces would have to be the backbone of an effective peacekeeping operation. NATO itself was divided on a range of issues (including potential UN control of peacekeeping) that were not resolved until well into the talks. Added to this, Russian negotiators hoped the talks would simply collapse, freeing them from worries that NATO would march into a country they considered in their sphere of influence.

xxii * INTRODUCTION In short, Rambouillet was a disaster. The talks were conducted appallingly poorly. While much of the difficulties stemmed from a decade's worth of mismanaged Balkans policy by the Bush and Clinton administrations working with their European allies, the dynamics at Rambouillet contributed directly to the failure of the talks. Western negotiators should have either kept the parties at the table until a deal was struck or backed their threats with a far more robust commitment to use force. The situation on the ground in Kosovo was out of control, and the major NATO powers should not have staged a high-profile peace conference without a better plan if the parties did not reach agreement. If Kosovo was as central to the security and stability of Europe as NATO would subsequently claim, the Alliance had done an abysmal job managing its last best hope for peace. Despite efforts to directly engage with Milosevic toward the end of the talks, Yugoslavia refused to sign the Rambouillet accords. It took heavy armtwisting before Kosovar Albanian representatives signed on March 18. Ultimately, Rambouillet could only be considered a success in one respect: There was now agreement among the Allies that they should launch air strikes against Yugoslavia.

The Players and Their Perspectives For Western powers, the Kosovo crisis was fueled by frustration with Milosevic and the legitimate fear that instability and conflict might spread further in the region. The evolving political aims of the Alliance and the changing nature of the transatlantic community also played a role. In that vein, it is useful to more broadly consider how NATO and Yugoslavia came to be locked in conflict over a scrap of strategically insignificant territory. In years past, Europe probably would have largely ignored the retrograde civil war that periodically flared in the small province. Yet, the very nature of Europe is rapidly changing, and the impact of that evolution is far reaching. NATO's large membership and consensus style may cause endless headaches for military planners, but it is also why joining NATO is appealing to nations across Central and Eastern Europe. Nations from Albania to Ukraine want in the Western club. The gravitational pull of the community of Western democracies highlights why Milosevic's Yugoslavia had become such an anachronism. As nations throughout the region strove to reform their econo-

INTRODUCTION * xxi ii mies, mitigate ethnic tensions, and broaden civil society, Belgrade seemed to delight in continually moving in the opposite direction. It is small wonder NATO and Yugoslavia ended up on a collision course. It was Yugoslavia's resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reform—not the plight of Kosovar Albanians—that best explains NATO's war. Milosevic had been a burr in the side of the transatlantic community for so long that the United States felt that he would only respond to military pressure. Slobodan Milosevic's repeated transgressions ran directly counter to the vision of a Europe "whole and free," and challenged the very value of NATO's continued existence. Many outsiders accuse Western countries of selective intervention in Kosovo—fighting on a hair-trigger in the Balkans while ignoring the Sudans and Rwandas of the world. This was hardly the case. Only a decade of death, destruction, and Milosevic brinkmanship pushed NATO to act when the Rambouillet talks collapsed. Most of the leaders of NATO's major powers were proponents of "third way" politics and headed socially progressive, economically centrist governments. None of these men were particularly hawkish, and Milosevic did not allow them the political breathing room to look past his abuses. Through predatory opportunism, Milosevic had repeatedly exploited the weakest instincts of European and North American powers alike. Time and again, he had preserved his political power because nations mightier than his own lacked the political resolve to bring him to heel. His record was ultimately one of ruin, particularly for the Serbs, as Yugoslavia dwindled into a smaller and smaller state verging on collapse. It was precisely because Milosevic had been so adroit at outmaneuvering the West that NATO came to view the ever-escalating use of force as its only option. No one should be surprised that Milosevic eventually goaded the sleeping giant out of repose. NATO went to war in Kosovo because its political and diplomatic leaders had enough of Milosevic and saw his actions disrupting plans to bring a wider stable of nations into the transatlantic community. Kosovo would only offer Western leaders more humiliation and frustration if they did not forcefully respond. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's view of Milosevic was probably best revealed when she said that, at a certain stage at Rambouillet, it was evident that Milosevic "was jerking us around." In early June of 1999, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer rather angrily responded to those who questioned NATO's motives. Fisher observed that he had initially

xxiv * INTRODUCTION resisted military action, but that his views had changed, "step by step, from mass murder to mass murder." Russia's perspective on Kosovo was drastically different, and tensions over Balkans policy well illustrate the often-manic nature of the Russian Federation during its struggle to redefine its place in the world. Torn between the demands of being a modern state and past habits, Russia continued to maintain an awkward posture between leftover Soviet practices and genuine reform. Deeply humbled by the painful dislocations of the post-Soviet period, Russia wanted to be respected but often resorted to simple, stubborn opposition to the West's agenda out of frustration and resentment. The Kosovo crisis came at a time of profound weariness in relations between the Russia and the United States. Russia had found the process of reform from the Soviet state far more demanding, painful, and sporadic than it could have imagined when the Berlin Wall fell. The economic crash of August 1998 had seemed yet another dismal sign of the corruption and weak institutions that had turned Russia into a second-rate power that seemed to be rotting from within. President Yeltsin's star was incredibly tarnished, and relations between Moscow and Washington had frayed like that of a couple thinking out loud about divorce. Much of Russia's anger during Kosovo stemmed from the fact that Russia enjoys religious and historical ties to the people of Serbia and from the ability of hard-line opponents of President Yeltsin to effectively exploit those links. However, Russia did little during the 1990s to help the people of Serbia shrug off the burdens of the repressive, kleptocratic leadership that drove the rump Yugoslavia further and further into despair. In reality, what Russia wanted most during the Kosovo crisis was to make itself heard. Long accustomed to being a great power, Moscow expected to still be treated as one. When NATO made clear that it would use force no matter what Russia thought, it cut national pride to the quick and fuelled intense public resentment. Given Russia's many internal troubles and the often-fragile nature of its newly redefined state, it is understandable why Moscow was deeply concerned by the precedent of Kosovo. Indeed, one need only to look at Chechnya to understand that there are "many Kosovos in Russia," as Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov argued. If NATO could bomb Kosovo, it might signal a future willingness by the Alliance to involve itself in Russia's internal affairs without a UN mandate. Yet, even given that understanding,

INTRODUCTION * xx v Russia did not take the necessary steps that would have allowed NATO to avoid having to use force. In many ways, the Russian decision to not put more pressure on Milosevic to take a deal at Rambouillet was a blunder. Russia should have either stayed away from Rambouillet completely or put more pressure on Milosevic to take a deal. Ultimately the breakdown in talks led NATO to use force and came to undermine the influence of the UN Security Council—one of Russia's few major trump cards in today's world. Through their fear of setting precedent for outside intervention in sovereign matters, the Russians actually created a situation where Kosovo became something of a model for such intervention. However, the Russian dimension was not handled well in the months running up to the war. Too often, NATO became fixated on disputes within the Alliance and expected the Russians to sign on the bottom line when its members emerged from a smoke-filled room. If NATO had gotten the Russians more engaged in designing the contours of Rambouillet, it might have avoided the split at the end of that process. Instead, NATO was fed up with Milosevic, Milosevic saw the West as a paper tiger, and Moscow was determined to make its presence felt. The table was set.


1

CHAPTER

Misadventure

The Green Light On March 23, 1999, the wheels were in motion for NATO to begin bombing Yugoslavia. Alliance military and diplomatic officials worked feverishly behind the scenes to finalize plans for a limited series of aerial attacks designed to bring Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic back to the negotiating table. Few realized that this course of action would propel the world's most powerful military alliance down a dangerously treacherous path. Over the next turbulent three months, more than 800,000 refugees would be scattered across southeastern Europe, planning for a NATO ground war would reach a crescendo, and Russia and the United States would drift perilously toward a direct military clash. Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, the outspoken and hard-charging engineer of the Dayton peace accords, traveled to Belgrade on March 22 in an effort to broker an eleventh-hour peace deal with Yugoslav President Milosevic. Talks continued on the morning of March 23, and in an unfortunate bit of diplomatic timing, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was simultaneously jetting toward Washington for a long-planned meeting with U.S. Vice President Albert Gore. Primakov was increasing in both power and popularity in Moscow, and it was widely assumed that he would succeed the ailing Boris Yeltsin in the Russian presidency. Primakov already exerted 1

2 * COLLISION COURSE

considerable influence, and Moscow's worldview appeared to be hewing steadily to the right under the guidance of the flinty former Soviet intelligence chief. Around nine-thirty in the morning of March 23 in Washington, Vice President Gore called Primakov as his plane made a refueling stop in Shannon, Ireland. Gore was pessimistic that Holbrooke could secure a breakthrough, and suggested that it might be better for Primakov to remain in Ireland, since the situation "did not look good." Despite Gore's entreaties, the plane refueled and Primakov continued toward Washington. In Belgrade, Ambassador Holbrooke—his considerable diplomatic skills aside—was deeply frustrated. Milosevic was unwilling to engage in serious discussion. Holbrooke, as he has often repeated since, informed the Yugoslav president that NATO's bombing campaign would be "swift, severe, and sustained." Unfortunately, it was not a threat either man fully believed, and Milosevic had every reason to assume that attacks would be neither sustained nor severe. Three months earlier, U.S. and British air strikes against Iraq in December of 1998—Operation Desert Fox—had amounted to little more than two days of bombing with little impact. Milosevic had studied Desert Fox, had met with Iraqi officials, and was convinced that attacks against Yugoslavia would be similar. Milosevic had also been leaked plans from a French military operative at NATO headquarters that made clear Operation Allied Force would be of limited scope. Even before the first U.S. cruise missile had been launched, Milosevic was sure that he could ride out any military campaign that the often-divided allies could mount. "I was disturbed by my briefings on targeting," Holbrooke observed, "As I said at the time, very loudly and clearly, the targets were not commensurate with the situation and the stake." In Holbrooke's words, "The initial targeting list was disgracefully weak." Around midday in Washington on March 23, the White House learned that Holbrooke's six hours of talks with Milosevic had not produced an agreement. While Holbrooke maintained his prospects for success as slim from the start, "10 percent or less," he pleaded to be allowed to continue the talks, but the White House directed him to pull out of Belgrade. In a discussion with National Security Advisor Samuel "Sandy" Berger after he left Belgrade, Holbrooke grimly observed, "I told you it wouldn't happen."

MISADVENTURE * 3 "Dick, we thought you were just low-balling the estimate because you always pulled out these miracles," Berger said. Holbrooke took Berger's response to represent "a very high degree of misunderstanding in Washington as to what we had done. Ten percent turned out to be high. There was no chance that Milosevic could have accepted our ultimatum at that point because of the way the negotiations had unfolded in France." With Holbrooke's ill-fated mission complete, Vice President Gore called Russian Prime Minister Primakov as his jet neared the Canadian coast. In even tones, Gore informed Primakov that NATO bombing of Belgrade would in all likelihood commence during his visit to Washington. The vice president emphasized that the Alliance had no choice but to act because Milosevic was slaughtering innocent men, women, and children with blood "dripping from his hands." Primakov responded calmly and with a distinct air of resignation, insisting that ultimately it would be NATO with blood on its hands, not the Yugoslavs. He claimed air strikes would cause needless death and destruction while devastating relations between Moscow and Washington. While Gore was supportive of Russian diplomatic efforts, he also made clear that he wanted Primakov to postpone his visit rather than break the trip off after arriving in Washington. "Well, I understand that is what you are going to do, and I think it is best that I not come," declared Primakov. The Russian plane promptly executed a U-turn a few hundred miles northeast of Newfoundland, and journalists everywhere had a convenient metaphor for the growing rift between Russia and the United States. According to Vice President Gore's national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, "Primakov understood that Vice President Gore was giving him a head's up at the earliest feasible time for us. The discussion did preserve a sense that we were aware of the Russians' circumstances and mindful of them—even though we were going to go ahead and do what we had to." The White House received a letter from President Yeltsin the same day, stating, "It is not a secret that if Kosovo explodes in flames, it could spread to the entire region." In writing to his old friend "Bill," the Russian president seemed equally angry and bewildered, "On what basis does NATO take it upon itself to decide the fates of peoples in sovereign states? Who gave it the right to act in the role of the guardian of order?" Saying that the situation


could lead "to the edge of a large-scale war," Yeltsin implored Clinton "to weigh all the consequences" before making a "fateful decision." Around eleven in the evening in Brussels, NATO's secretary-general, the lean and affable Spaniard Javier Solana, woke four-star U.S. Gen. Wesley Clark, NATO's supreme allied commander in Europe, to give him the green light to initiate air operations against Yugoslavia under the cover of darkness the next evening, March 24. Crucially, the mandate given to General Clark by the NATO ambassadors was open-ended; there would not have to be formal votes to subsequently intensify the air campaign. On the morning of March 24, President William Jefferson Clinton spoke with President Boris Yeltsin on the telephone. The two had developed a genuine bond over their seven years of working together, and that personal link had seen the United States and Russia through some difficult moments. However, the last time the two had spoken about Kosovo, during a phone conversation on October 5, 1998, Yeltsin had repeatedly and strongly insisted that any use of force against Yugoslavia would be "forbidden." Yeltsin had grown so frustrated that he eventually hung up on Clinton. With NATO poised to begin its air assault against Yugoslavia only hours later, their conversation was again rocky. The aging and hard-drinking Russian president had a notoriously volcanic temper and was recovering from a bleeding ulcer. Communists in the Russian Duma were mounting an impeachment effort against him on a variety of largely political charges only six weeks after Clinton had emerged from his own impeachment drama. NATO bombing would only offer Russian hard-liners more weakness to exploit. "Remember, winters are bad for Yeltsin," a senior NATO official recalled, "and he starts to pay attention and always get better in March and April. So Yeltsin wakes up to Kosovo, and he is on the verge of a major split with the West . . . everything that he rooted his presidency on—getting the major benefits of Western cooperation with minimal humiliation—was about to go out the window." Clinton began the conversation by appealing to Yeltsin's personal commitment to closer ties with the West, maintaining that a "communist dictator" like Milosevic should never come between them. Clinton was adamant that Milosevic had been given every opportunity, and that there was simply no alternative to bombing. The U.S. president suggested that once Milosevic came to his senses, the United States and Russia could renew diplomatic efforts. Yeltsin was not impressed, blustering in reply, "We can't let hundreds

MISADVENTURE * 5

of thousands of people die to control the words and actions of one man." Yeltsin also poured on the guilt, saying that the bombing would undermine efforts to "turn my people toward the West." President Clinton looked pained as Yeltsin's remarks were translated. Clinton was deeply concerned about the situation in Russia and, "taking a lot of crap from a lot of people," as one of his colleagues confided. Yet, while Clinton was sympathetic, he patiently spelled out how NATO had held off from using force for more than twelve months, and there was no longer any alternative. "Well," said President Yeltsin, "I've obviously failed to persuade the president of the United States. Goodbye." With that, Yeltsin hung up on Clinton during a Kosovo conversation for the second time in a row. After his talk with Clinton, Yeltsin released an official statement declaring, "in the event that the military conflict worsens, Russia retains the right to take adequate measures, including military ones, to defend itself and the overall security of Europe." NATO unleashed the first of its air strikes against Serb air defenses and other targets just after eight in the evening on March 24. NATO jets and cruise missiles struck some forty military targets and shot down three Yugoslav planes in the first night of Operation Allied Force. Using precision weaponry, the Alliance concentrated on Yugoslav air defenses while painstakingly limiting the risk to its own pilots. Indeed, the campaign was designed to limit potential NATO casualties to almost zero. In Brussels, General Clark addressed reporters. Clark had long advocated vigorous military steps against Belgrade, and the razor-thin, hyper-intense general declared that NATO would "systematically attack, disrupt, degrade, and devastate" the Yugoslav military. Behind the scenes, Clark, who had graduated first in his class at West Point and received a Silver Star for heroism in Vietnam, expressed little such bravado. He felt limited strikes would not turn Milosevic around and he wanted broader latitude to bomb key strategic targets. NATO's political leadership continued to restrain Clark, and the French government particularly was uncomfortable with high profile targets in Belgrade. While the French opposed going after key pieces of infrastructure, it must also be said that neither Clinton nor British Prime Minister Tony Blair were willing to spend much political capital to loosen the shackles on Clark. General Clark later telephoned Ambassador Holbrooke—who had traveled to Budapest after stopping at NATO headquarters—to complain that


he had been given "an impossible assignment." Clark was distressed when Holbrooke inquired about the possibility of a quick pause in bombing, leading the NATO commander to counter that there was "no need for a pause for diplomatic purposes" and that he would need at least five to seven more days before he could inflict any lasting damage. Clark railed that the bombing campaign was "pathetic" and would have no effect. Holbrooke insisted that immediately after the conversation he telephoned Washington to ask, "What the hell is going on?" but "they seemed oblivious to how weak the bombing was." While NATO's initial military strategy was modest, Milosevic's was anything but. As early as January 1999, the U.S. government had received indications from various sources in the region that the Yugoslavs were preparing for a major military thrust—codenamed Operation Horseshoe—against the Kosovar Albanians. The most extreme of the reports suggested that the goal of the operation would be to create a veritable tidal wave of refugees by expelling upwards of 800,000 Kosovar Albanians from the province. To their later chagrin, U.S. government analysts had dismissed these warnings as unrealistic. However, by mid-March it was clear that a large-scale Yugoslav troop deployment was underway in Kosovo and that Belgrade was positioned to launch an intensive ethnic cleansing operation if NATO began bombing. With the onset of NATO military operations on March 24, Yugoslav army, police, and paramilitary forces accelerated Operation Horseshoe with a ferocity that would catch the world flat-footed.

Limited Means At 2:15 in the afternoon on March 24, President Clinton spoke from the White House briefing room, announcing that NATO had "commenced air strikes against Serbian military targets in the former Yugoslavia." Having just emerged from the national ordeal of his impeachment controversy, Clinton argued that NATO's military action was necessary to stem a growing conflict and humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo. Clinton said of Milosevic: He has rejected the balanced and fair peace accords that our Allies and partners, including Russia, proposed last month—a peace agreement that Kosovo's ethnic Albanians courageously accepted. Instead, his forces have

MISADVENTURE * 7 intensified their attacks, burning down Kosovar Albanian villages and murdering civilians. As I speak, more Serb forces are moving into Kosovo, and more people are fleeing their homes. . . . Kosovo's crisis now is full blown, and if we do not act, clearly it will get even worse. The U.S. president suggested a series of amorphous objectives for the campaign: demonstrating the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression; deterring President Milosevic from continuing his attacks on helpless civilians; and damaging Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo. These highly subjective benchmarks were designed to allow NATO flexibility so that it could presumably cease bombing after Milosevic made a commitment to return to peace talks. In an address to the nation later that evening, President Clinton's speech was made most memorable by a single line, "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war." The phrase dismissing the potential use of American ground troops was included by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, who put the line in after consultation with the president—who did not object. However, there was little discussion about the formulation of the language, and the phrase was included primarily to ease congressional concerns about the operation. Sandy Berger explained the strategy: The initial decision to pursue this as an air campaign derives from two factors. One, we would not have gotten a plane off the ground—figuratively and literally—any other way. Two, I always believed that the air campaign stood a very good chance of working. We had a thousand-to-one advantage over Milosevic from the air once we took out his air defenses. It took us a while to ramp up, and NATO was a machine that had not been taken out of the garage for fifty years. But once we took out his air defenses, we could pound him every day. Berger added, "I honestly think that if we had not put that issue of ground troops to the side of the table at the beginning of the conflict, we would have had a divisive and disabling debate here." Secretary of Defense William Cohen added his perspective, "I saw no consensus in NATO for a ground operation. I saw no consensus or support for it in Congress. It was hard enough going up to the Hill even talking about a peacekeeping mission at the time." Conservative Republican Senator Don Nickles (R-OK) reportedly went so far as to tell President Clinton in a


face-to-face meeting prior to the bombing that it might be better to "wait until after the massacres had started before we do anything." Clinton's national security team was convinced that air power would work. Further, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency all concurred—despite their later and frequent protestations to the contrary—that a brief campaign would likely compel Milosevic to return to negotiations. As Secretary Albright declared on the first day of the war, "I don't see this as a long-term operation." The Clinton administration's faith in air power reflected the American public's ambivalence toward the war. While most Americans found Milosevic despicable, they were less certain dealing with him should fall to the United States. President Clinton read such public sentiment as tacit approval for a military campaign built around air power and an absolute minimum of casualties. Clinton's approach was measured, incremental, and fundamentally cautious. As a senior State Department official described, "The Clinton administration gets blamed for being untruthful about these things, or not having the courage of their convictions, but the fact of the matter is that this is a president that was coming off an impeachment trial, had very bad relations with Congress, and was still on very thin ice." However, Leon Fuerth later acknowledged, "There was certainly private recognition that in declaring publicly that ground troops were not an option, we had made a misstep." Similarly, Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg maintained, "I certainly understand the motivation for Berger's decision, and I don't disagree with his objective: to avoid making day one of the bombing a domestic debate about ground troops. But I think it is clear in retrospect that it was not done as artfully as it could have been." While Clinton administration officials were largely united in claiming that the fallout from the president's impeachment battle was not a distraction, Clinton's political travails did detract from his ability to marshal domestic and international support for putting a firm military threat on the table in the fall of 1998 and the first part of 1999. "It was inconceivable to the folks around the president that he was going to have a ground campaign in the run up to the war," one senior foreign policy official observed, emphasizing that some would have been quick to charge Clinton with using Kosovo to distract the public form his own scandals. This same official noted, "All through 1998, there was no way Clinton could make the case for the strate-

MISADVENTURE * 9

gic importance of the Balkans. . . . No one cared. AH they wanted to hear about was sex with an intern." While most administration officials realized that they should have created more ambiguity about the ground option, almost no one imagined that it would be needed. General Clark was virtually the lone voice to promote ground planning in March of 1999, and his views were so hawkish that his political superiors dismissed them. Between nervous Allies and a contentious U.S. Congress, most administration officials agreed that the political traffic simply could not bear even the threat of a ground invasion. This produced a dangerous dynamic: the reputation of the world's most important security alliance was now inexorably linked to a cause for which it was not sure it was worth fighting. Politics within NATO played a major role. The European members of NATO were deeply divided about the necessity and scope of military action—not to mention the preferred outcome of an operation. The bulk of the European Allies keenly distrusted the motives of the Kosovar Albanians, or as General Clark put it, "There was a sense among some that NATO was fighting on the wrong side" in a conflict between Muslims and Christians. French officials, in particular, were aggrieved by attacks against their traditional Serb allies. There was little consensus within NATO about how to deal with Milosevic. Divisions on everything from targeting to diplomatic initiatives threatened to unravel Alliance unity on a daily basis. Both the Italian and Greek governments faced intense domestic opposition to military strikes, a situation exacerbated because more than a quarter of the Alliance's sorties were launched from the U.S. air base at Aviano, Italy. The Greeks shared Orthodox heritage with the Serbs, and polls showed more than 95 percent of the population against bombing. While the newly elected German government of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder expressed its resolve as a point of national pride, it was equally clear that German public opinion was not primed for an extended conflict. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, enjoying a comfortable parliamentary majority, was the most resolute of the Alliance's political leaders, and he repeatedly maintained that thwarting Milosevic was a fundamental test for Europe. This led wags in the Clinton administration to joke that Blair was "willing to fight to the last American soldier." Given such strikingly different positions within NATO, it was evident that the war's outcome would hinge on the Alliance's cohesion. "There was


only one way that Milosevic could have prevailed," argued Sandy Berger, "and that would have been to break the unity of NATO." Given the way the Alliance stumbled through the first week of the war, it was no surprise that Milosevic saw this as a realistic goal. Much of the anxiety within the Alliance stemmed from the fact that the war, from its very onset, bore the hallmarks of misadventure. NATO members were deeply torn between rapidly escalating the bombing and quickly returning to talks with Milosevic. Cracks in NATO's facade appeared immediately. Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou called for a moratorium on bombing on March 25—only the second day of air strikes—and Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema declared, "The scenario is opening up for initiatives to return to the political track." Trying to put out the brushfire of political dissent at NATO headquarters, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana insisted that Alliance solidarity was "total and absolute." No one believed him. Making matters worse, other than downing a number of Yugoslav planes, NATO's military achievements were modest as rain and fog hampered fighters. Yugoslav planners had artfully concealed important military assets, and a collective gasp ran through the U.S. national security team as a sophisticated F-l 17 stealth fighter was downed over Serbia on the night of March 27. Fortunately, an elite U.S. special operations team whisked the pilot to safety before he could be captured. Footage of Serb civilians gleefully dancing on the plane's wreckage only added to the public perception of a halfbaked military campaign and harkened back to the disastrous scenes of soldiers being dragged through the streets of Somalia in 1993. Large rock concerts were held in the streets of Belgrade to demonstrate Yugoslav solidarity in the face of bombing, and doubts about President Clinton's ability to work with the military again rushed to the fore. Even more troubling were the scope of the Yugoslav offensive in Kosovo and reports of massive ethnic cleansing. NATO had badly underestimated the scope of Operation Horseshoe. Within days, tens of thousands of Kosovars were being forced to march to Macedonia and Albania. Before the first week of bombing was over, Kosovar Albanians were fleeing into Albania at an astounding rate of 2,000 an hour. Having tiptoed into a military campaign of carefully circumscribed political and military aims, NATO seemed bewildered by the ruthlessness of Serb operations.

MISADVENTURE * 1 1

The diplomatic effort to hold NATO together during these initial missteps was crucial. Sandy Berger noted: During the early part of the bombing, the president made the circuit of his fellow leaders continuously every day—he talked to British Prime Minister Blair, he talked to Italian Prime Minister D'Alema, he talked to Greek Prime Minister [Costas] Simitis, he talked to German Chancellor Schroeder. He spoke with D'Alema and Simitis a great deal, and they were the most courageous in standing up to enormous popular sentiment opposed to the air campaign. It took almost constant pressure from Washington and London to keep some of the smaller allies on board. Both Paris and Bonn were still supportive, and NATO's cohesion, while wobbly, was holding. Maintaining support for the bombing was a full-time job for NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, Secretary Albright, and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. Secretary Albright and her fellow foreign ministers were in almost daily contact. Telephone conversations between the major NATO foreign ministers—Albright, Cook, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini—took place with such regularity they were simply referred to as "quint" calls. Jim O'Brien, a young, thoughtful, and slightly mop-topped senior Balkans advisor to Albright, argued that while the secretary's efforts with the other foreign ministers were critical, "the number of dogs that didn't bark during the war was the real story." He added that while the other ministers were not that interested initially in daily discussions, "that would have been disastrous in a war like this, because we were trying to shape public opinion. To have a two- or three-day dispute over an issue would have amplified the sense that this was a war without objective." The foreign ministers spent a good deal of their time debating ways in which military decisions, including the selection of specific targets, would affect public support. While Milosevic was confident he could weather the bombing, he made his displeasure with the attacks well known. Still in Budapest, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke received a call from President Milosevic's chief of staff and foreign policy adviser, Bojan Bugarcic. Holbrooke had known Bugarcic for a number of years, and the Yugoslav was shaken and furious as he quickly


launched into a personalized tirade. He declared that the NATO bombing was "an attempt to wipe our nation from the face of the earth." With Holbrooke barely getting in a word, Bugarcic was adamant that Belgrade would never abandon Kosovo: "You should be ashamed; my children are now in an air raid shelter." Holbrooke countered that since Milosevic continued to deny the ethnic cleansing campaign, there was an "air of unreality to the conversation." He indicated that the bombing would continue until Yugoslavia instituted a cease-fire and accepted the deployment of international peacekeepers, dubbed "KFOR" or Kosovo Force. He added that bombing would "get much worse until you agree," but softened the blow by maintaining, "Kosovo would remain part of Serbia." Bugarcic exploded; NATO's attacks were "genocide, ruthless, cold-blooded murder. While bombs may continue to fall, NATO will have to occupy Yugoslavia to get its way. Serbs will throw bottles and rocks at the invading troops if that is all we have left." Holbrooke insisted that an invasion was not in the picture, but further bombing was. Bugarcic and Holbrooke have not spoken since. Bad news continued to roll in for NATO. On March 31, Yugoslav forces captured three U.S. soldiers along the Kosovo-Macedonia border, giving the Clinton administration a hostage crisis to add to its faltering military campaign. The bruised and beaten soldiers were soon transported to Belgrade and paraded before television cameras. Serb forces continued to drive virtually unopposed through Kosovo, with more than 120,000 Kosovar Albanians pouring into neighboring countries in less than a week. Not only was Slobodan Milosevic trying to rid himself of Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, he was effectively dropping a "population bomb" on Macedonia and Albania, fragile states in danger of being swamped by a sea of refugees.

Rage in Moscow During the early stages of the bombing, much of the diplomacy between Russia and the United States was conducted directly between Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Secretary of State Albright. Ivanov was a wily survivor of the Russian political scene and had been Moscow's diplomatic representative at the Dayton peace talks. The stout, bald-pated diplomat had risen steadily through the ranks, having served a tour of duty early in his

MISADVENTURE * 13 career in Cuba, and later having been posted as the Russian Ambassador in Madrid in the early 1990s. Capable of delivering an icy glare, Ivanov was a protege of Prime Minister Primakov, so much so that Yeltsin viewed the two as having "an iron alliance." He was known for an approach that was more bureaucratic than political, but like many of the officials in Moscow, Ivanov was tacking steadily to the right to better position himself if Primakov ascended to the presidency. NATO attacks on Kosovo, coming just three months after the U.S. and British bombing of Iraq, enraged Moscow's foreign policy community, which saw the strikes as geopolitical muscle flexing. For Albright, the scrappy, first-woman secretary of state, Milosevic's campaign of ethnic terror was an affront to the very notion of a civilized Europe at the end of the twentieth century and brought back echoes of World War II and her own family's flight as refugees from Czechoslovakia to Yugoslavia. Albright had a visceral antipathy to Milosevic and had been one of the most vocal advocates for using force against him. She described the war in stark terms to her colleagues, calling it a "fight between good and evil," akin to "defending the Holy Grail." Having built her reputation on an image of toughness, backing down before Milosevic would have been both a personal and professional humiliation. She was convinced that Milosevic, like a stereotypical bully, would back off after a sharp punch in the nose. But Albright's diplomacy was not fully thought through, and she had received little help from a Pentagon that viewed Balkan endeavors with extreme wariness. While Albright was fundamentally wrong in her initial assessment of Milosevic, she was willing to prosecute the war fully until he capitulated. On March 25, day two of the bombing, Ivanov and Albright spoke on the telephone, with the Russian foreign minister bemoaning, "Yugoslav forces killed 300 Albanians in Kosovo over the last year, and NATO has killed 50 people in one night of air strikes." Albright took sharp exception, insisting that Milosevic had "killed over 2,000 Kosovar Albanians in the last year, and displaced 250,000 people." As a senior State Department official observed, Ivanov was initially in denial: "There is no Serb offensive. There are no troops. There are no dead Albanians. The Albanians are not moving out. The bombing is driving them out." The Yugoslavs would even go so far later as to maintain that many of the ethnic Albanian refugees were paid "actors" who repeatedly departed and reentered Kosovo. Ivanov complained, "Milosevic will never say yes to negotiations under the current conditions. How can Russia stand by and watch NATO destroy


a sovereign nation? The only option is for strikes to end and talks to begin." The Russian foreign minister felt that Milosevic could never agree to a peace deal with "airplanes flying over his residence." Albright was firm: Bombing would not stop until Milosevic halted his offensive. After meeting with his top ministers at the Kremlin that same day, President Yeltsin declared, "Russia has a number of extreme measures in store, but we decided not to use them so far." Claiming to be morally "above America," the Russian president called for an urgent UN Security Council vote to stop NATO air strikes. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan—under heavy pressure from the members of NATO to stay out of the fray—quickly distanced the United Nations, and his organization would have no immediate role in bringing the war to an end. Annan declared that the six-nation Contact Group—consisting of the United States, France, Italy, Britain, Germany, and Russia—would be in the lead with regard to any talks. The Russian effort to introduce a UN resolution condemning the bombing was quickly turned back by a twelve to three vote, with only China and Namibia supporting Moscow. Russia moved quickly to curtail its official cooperation with NATO, recalling its ranking military liaison at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Gen. Viktor Zavarzin. Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, while making clear that Russia had no immediate plans to become embroiled in the conflict, placed Russian forces on higher alert and told reporters that Yugoslavia would be a "Second Vietnam." Senior Russian officials also hinted they might provide arms to the Serbs, saying that the NATO attacks potentially voided the existing UN arms embargo against Yugoslavia. In an uncharacteristically emotional outburst at a March 26 news conference, Foreign Minister Ivanov savaged the air strikes as "unconcealed genocide." Relations between Moscow and Washington were deteriorating rapidly. Much diplomacy in the preceding months had been focused not on the Balkans but on Iraq. Because the Clinton administration had expected bombing to be over quickly, decision-makers reasoned that disagreements with Moscow could be quickly patched up. More could have been done before the talks at Rambouillet to bring the Russians on board with a solution, but the United States had become bogged down with internal NATO debates. As one senior official complained, NATO expected "the Russians to sign up when we came out of the smoke-filled room." The Russians also made their share of mistakes, failing to anticipate that

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the collapse of the Rambouillet talks would lead to a protracted military confrontation. The Russians had approached the Rambouillet talks with a Cold War mind-set, hoping to pit the Allies against each other to produce a stalemate. Prime Minister Primakov had whipped up the military, intelligence, and foreign policy elites in Moscow for a showdown between Milosevic and the West rather than brokering a reasonable deal. A White House official bemoaned Moscow's approach, "The Russian foreign ministry was chronically nonconstructive. . . . They were just incredibly hostile toward whatever we were for." All of Russia's worst strategic fears converged in Kosovo. NATO, their old and recently expanded nemesis, was bombing orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, an area that Russia had once firmly dominated. NATO had gone forward with its air strikes without a UN Security Council resolution. NATO military superiority was vast and it was using sophisticated high-tech weapons while incurring zero casualties. Russia was already weak and dependent on Western financial aid. Russia's political system was in disarray, the army and intelligence services were shells of their former feared selves, and the Russian people were filled with searing bitterness from painful years of transition. From the Kremlin, the air war looked like American expansionism plain and simple. The view from Russia—and many other quarters—was that the United States and its allies were now committed to an ambitious new program of humanitarian intervention with NATO serving as the world's policeman. There were fears that the Pentagon would intercede everywhere from Chechnya to Tibet. In a poll shortly after the war began, about 90 percent of Russians felt that NATO had no right to launch attacks without UN authorization. A subsequent survey also spoke volumes: Close to 80 percent of respondents believed that it was only a matter of time before NATO attacked Russia. As Prime Minister Primakov had bluntly told Western diplomats, if they "accepted the Kosovo model, sooner or later we'll have this in Russia." Neither a seat on the UN Security Council nor its nascent links to NATO gave Moscow a veto over Western military operations. Few Russians believed that NATO would become militarily entangled in a place as strategically unimportant as Kosovo unless it was part of some grand scheme. In Moscow, that scheme was invariably directed against Russia, and the local press was rife with conspiracy theories: NATO was fighting the war to test new weapons systems; Washington was bombing to prop up


the strength of the U.S. dollar; NATO was using depleted uranium to poison Slavic genes. There was certain unintended humor in the conspiracy theories. As the rest of the world watched Kosovo for precedent, NATO leaders were gripped by a single thought: How the hell do we get out of this? In Moscow, one of the quiet champions of United States-Russian diplomacy—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov—called upon U.S. Ambassador James Collins for a "private moment" on March 27. Mamedov was a fifty-two-year-old diplomat noted for his intelligence, tough negotiating skills, and shrewd understanding of America, having served several tours of duty in the Russian embassy in Washington. Indeed, Mamedov was probably the foremost Americanist in the Russian foreign ministry. Mamedov had often served as a one-man political early-warning system for both Moscow and Washington, working diligently as a behind-the-scenes conduit to find win-win solutions. Mamedov's slightly doughy physique, disheveled appearance, and thick glasses belied a sharp mind well suited to navigate the treacherous waters of Russian bureaucracy. Mamedov warned Ambassador Collins, a burly, personable, and gravel-throated career diplomat near the end of a distinguished career, that the attacks against Yugoslavia were creating a dangerous political backlash in Russia. Pressure from the Russian Duma was growing intense to pull Russian forces out of the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and initiate substantial military assistance to Yugoslavia at a time when Yeltsin's impeachment proceedings continued to grind forward. Mamedov stressed that even President Yeltsin might react in "unpredictable ways" given such burdens. Russian officials had also suggested that a neutral figure like Pope John Paul II could be brought into talks to end the conflict. The call for involving Rome never gained traction, but the idea of involving a third party would. Underscoring the volatility of the situation in Moscow, unidentified attackers botched an attempt to fire a rocket-propelled grenade at the U.S. embassy before engaging in a brief gun battle with guards on March 28. Several thousand people had gathered outside the embassy when bombing had started, throwing rocks, eggs, and beer bottles at the compound. In a surreal moment, a man in armor mounted on horseback fired arrows at the embassy. Albright and Ivanov spoke on the telephone on March 28. Albright was incensed by Ivanov's comments that those responsible for the NATO bombing campaign should be "tried for war crimes," grumbling that she hoped

MISADVENTURE * 17

the remarks were for "domestic consumption." Ivanov insisted that Moscow and Washington had to find a way to immediately stop the bombing, or else the United States would likely face a "worldwide terrorist problem." The two quickly fell into a familiar patter, debating with some irritation about who was responsible for the violence in Kosovo. "The Milosevics of the world come and go," Ivanov declared; "they should not get in the way of the relationship between Russia and the United States." Albright countered that as long as Milosevic thought Russia would protect him, he had no reason to halt ethnic cleansing, "The way to get the bombing stopped is simple, Igor. Milosevic has to stop his military offensive, pull back military and security forces to preoffensive positions, and agree to negotiations based on the Rambouillet text." Ivanov did not think such a proposal was simple at all and again insisted that time was running out. He also made clear that he could potentially lose his job because of his inability to stop the bombing. "You won't like my successor," he intoned. The two spoke again the next day, March 29. President Yeltsin had announced that he was dispatching an unusually high-level team to visit Belgrade: Prime Minister Primakov, Defense Minister Sergeyev, Foreign Minister Ivanov, and the head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, Vyacheslav Trubnikov. The group would spend several hours in Belgrade, and then Primakov would travel to Bonn to meet with German Chancellor Schroeder. Ivanov said his meeting with Milosevic was built around two goals: "to stop the air strikes and to get the peace process started." The U.S. secretary of state underscored that it would be "very regrettable if the Russian trip to Belgrade was handled in a way that gave the impression Moscow was taking Milosevic's side." "Russia is not taking sides, we are pursuing our interests. Do you want us to just watch the NATO bombing continue without doing anything?" complained an exasperated Ivanov. Albright reiterated that there would be no talks or bombing pauses while the killing continued in Kosovo. Ivanov claimed that the reports of tens of thousands of people fleeing Kosovo were overdramatized and stressed that he would push for the return of international monitors to Kosovo, a reduction in the Serb military presence, and a return to negotiations. Albright questioned the timing of the trip, leading Ivanov to protest that Washington was "only interested in continuing the bombing." Albright countered that


Russia should spend more time getting "Milosevic to stop his aggression" and less "pressuring NATO to stop the air strikes." The dynamic between the two foreign ministers was difficult. Albright was engulfed in a political and diplomatic firestorm in Washington, as her handling of the Kosovo crisis was being greeted by a withering crossfire of criticism from fellow administration officials, the military, the Allies, and the press. If anything, this made Albright dig her heels in further. She made little effort to cast her arguments in a way that would help the Russians get out of the political corner into which they had painted themselves. For his part, Foreign Minister Ivanov had limited authority to make decisions and was determined to look tough. The result: Their discussions quickly became like "an old comedy routine," as a senior State Department official observed, with Ivanov playing "the hen-pecked husband saying, 'Madeleine, Madeleine, but Madeleine,' as she kept hitting him over the head."

Primakov Visits Belgrade On March 30, Primakov, Sergeyev, Trubnikov, and Ivanov traveled to Belgrade to meet with President Milosevic. Russia was trying to seize the diplomatic initiative, a move that set off a frenzy of discussion within the Alliance and triggered great concern that the Russians would emerge from Belgrade with minor concessions and quickly call for a bombing pause. Primakov was trying to exploit growing international appeals for NATO to initiate an Easter break in air strikes, either the Western holiday falling on April 4 or the Orthodox Christian Easter on April 11. The fact that the Russian defense minister and the head of the intelligence services were included in the delegation raised the troubling possibility that Moscow was also contemplating direct intelligence and military assistance to Belgrade if peace overtures fell through. Albright and her fellow foreign ministers dedicated a great deal of time to handling the Easter issue, and in the process it became obvious that NATO needed to better define its political objectives. The Italians and Greeks both wanted to halt air strikes for one of the Easter holidays. Italy's chief of defense had warned General Clark that the Italian government might only be able to sustain bombing for several more days. Adding further pressure, Pope John Paul II, American evangelist Pat Robertson, and the heads of the Or-

MISADVENTURE * 19

thodox Church called for a break in air attacks around the holiday. The French had also raised the matter, but French Foreign Minister Vedrine had been forthright in acknowledging the downsides of such an approach. Both the United States and Great Britain were adamantly opposed to any let up, and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger explained why: "We were afraid of a pause. Based on the Bosnia experience we knew that once there was a pause, even if there was an automatic snap back, it would be very difficult to get planes back up in the air." His deputy, Jim Steinberg, echoed those sentiments. "A lot of the strategy during the early part of the war revolved around shoring people up and trying to figure out how not to make Easter an artificial brake on the campaign's momentum." The issue of a pause came up again and again in the conversations between the core NATO foreign ministers. Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, stressing the religious significance of the holiday, repeatedly championed an Easter respite. Finally, according to Western diplomatic officials, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said pointedly, "You know, Lamberto, it would be an odd kind of Christianity that would pause bombing for several days so that other Christians could kill Muslims." With that trenchant analysis, the issue of a bombing pause was temporarily pushed to a back burner. During six hours of talks with the Russians in Belgrade, Milosevic expressed confidence the NATO offensive would soon crumble under its own weight. Primakov emerged from the session with a modest token from Milosevic. The Yugoslav president had agreed to pull back "some" of his forces and would guarantee the rights of Kosovar Albanians if bombing was stopped. Upon meeting with German Chancellor Schroeder in Bonn, Primakov declared that Milosevic was "ready, after the cessation of attacks, to find a political solution to all problems." Primakov added that Milosevic was willing to enter a dialogue with Kosovar Albanians and "create the conditions for the return of all peaceful refugees." Chancellor Schroeder held firm, saying that the proposals from Milosevic provided "no basis" for progress and calling the Serbian offensive in Kosovo genocide. Ivanov, speaking again with Albright after returning to Moscow, said he was "disillusioned" by the response from the Western powers. "Does NATO want to continue fighting and occupy Kosovo and separate it from Yugoslavia? You tell us to find a solution, and then you make harsher demands." Albright claimed that NATO did not want Kosovo's independence but also

20 * COLLISION COURS E

said, "NATO cannot stop the bombing until Milosevic stops ethnic cleansing, withdraws his forces, and agrees to international monitoring forces." "Milosevic claimed to be unsure who was killing the Albanians while the bombs fall," suggested Ivanov. "Do you think the Albanians are killing themselves?" fired back Albright. Since the Russians had announced the day before that they would be dispatching at least one, and perhaps several, military reconnaissance ships to the Aegean to monitor the conflict, Albright warned that there would be grave fallout if the Russians shared intelligence information with the Yugoslavs. Ivanov maintained that the ships would only be gathering information, not sharing it with the Serbs. However, Izvestiya reported that the Russian government was studying the possibility of sending air defense experts and military advisors to Yugoslavia in "the near future." In an April 1 letter to Clinton, Yeltsin suggested that NATO's actions threatened "to grow into a great calamity, and not only for the Europeans." Yeltsin instructed Foreign Minister Ivanov to seek to convene an emergency meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers. The Clinton administration was nervous about the prospect of such a meeting, and Albright told Ivanov that any such session would have to "deliver a meaningful and productive outcome." The United States did not want to convene a meeting to debate the merits of the air campaign. Albright also took pains to point out that Russia had supported many of the elements of NATO's current demands during the run-up to the conflict, such as full access for humanitarian organizations, free movement of refugees, and a progressive withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. Ivanov observed that total withdrawal of Serb forces was "the most difficult of those questions. If all the military units from one side are removed, only the KLA will remain. This amounts to saying goodbye to Kosovo." The Russian foreign minister wanted the KLA disarmed and said progress would be difficult while Belgrade feared a NATO ground invasion. Albright argued that an international peacekeeping force could ensure that neither Milosevic's forces nor the KLA took advantage of the situation on the ground. She assured Ivanov, "The president has no intention of introducing ground forces into Kosovo." "While there might not be any intention at present, there is no telling what the mood will be in the future about ground troops, so it is difficult to persuade Milosevic to withdraw," replied Ivanov.

MISADVENTURE * 21

At NATO headquarters, the United States and Great Britain were having difficulty getting France and Germany to agree to streamlined targeting procedures for General Clark, much less planning for a ground war. German Foreign Minister Fischer lamented to his colleagues that many Germans felt "NATO was bombing without any political initiative," while the Russians were trying to find peace. Fischer also noted that most Germans wanted a clarification of the Alliance's political goals. With the refugee situation growing increasingly severe—there were 200,000 people on the border by April 2 and between 100,000 and 200,000 more headed in that direction—the Germans made it clear that they would have a hard time saying no to the Russian proposal for a G-8 meeting. Fischer wanted the Alliance to forge a coordinated strategy for talks with the Russians and firmly establish NATO's bottom line. It was not until April 2—ten days into the bombing campaign—that NATO attacked its first targets in the heart of Belgrade, destroying the largely deserted ministry of interior headquarters. The decision to "go downtown" came only after intensive deliberations in Washington among that national security team and discussions between President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair, and French President Jacques Chirac. The uneasy consensus: Bombing had to be ramped up in an effort to get Milosevic to sue for peace. Yugoslavia's oil refineries, bridges, and trains were now fair game as NATO dispatched more ships, planes, and weapons. General Clark was realizing how difficult getting target approval would become. As he put it, "Every target—headquarters buildings, communications towers, ammunition storage sites, and military maintenance facilities—was, in one way or the other, likely to become controversial." General Clark complained that the first week of NATO bombing was marked by twenty-four-hour days, constant arguments, and repeated calls by officials at NATO and in Washington eager to stop the bombing. Clark's frustration was stark as he decried trying to manage a war with "no guidance, no leadership, and no direction to speak of." Clark was told by a senior officer at the Pentagon, "I don't know where this is going, to tell you the truth, Wes. They're looking for a way out back here." Clark added, "I was asking for Apache helicopters, I was asking for ATACMs missiles, I was asking for more aircraft, I was asking for approval to strike targets. I wasn't getting anything." Clark was being asked to meet four separate, and sometimes contradictory, objectives: slowing Serb forces in the field, minimizing collateral


damage, maintaining alliance cohesion, and incurring almost no casualties. Three of his four benchmarks were defensive, not offensive, in nature. The European and U.S. military officers charged with carrying out the air campaign were acutely discomfited. The deliberative and risk-averse approach foisted on them by civilian authorities was counter to their best instincts of how to wage war. Although NATO had overwhelming military superiority, its officers found they could bring little of this advantage to bear. Milosevic's police and army were adept at dispersing their forces and using civilians as shields. Although NATO controlled the skies, it remained reluctant to unleash the sorts of wholesale bombing that commanders thought would force Milosevic to yield. The Pentagon had again been propelled into a nether-war, where neither all-out combat nor total victory was on the table. With the Russian push for a G-8 meeting, as well as continuing calls for a bombing pause, NATO was vulnerable in one important respect: the conditions for ending the bombing were still up in the air. Indeed, the Alliance's objectives were remarkably ill defined. "There had been a lot of work but the demands had never been crystallized," Jim O'Brien observed. Milosevic seemed unlikely to accept the Rambouillet agreement as a whole, and the agreement itself was no longer relevant given the scale of violence and expulsions in Kosovo. In addition, a simple cease-fire would not effectively address the situation on the ground and would leave Milosevic in a better position than when the war began. During the first ten days of bombing, NATO issued a series of conflicting and poorly coordinated statements regarding its demands. There was talk of returning civilian monitors to the province, calling for a cease-fire, and putting a no-fly zone into place. However, as the immensity of the refugee crisis became clear, it was obvious that the nature of any international peacekeeping force in Kosovo would have to be far more robust than previously planned. It would no longer be a matter of deploying lightly armed monitors to keep an eye on two feuding groups. International peacekeepers would have to create sufficient security that refugees would actually feel safe returning. If refugees did not return, Milosevic would have won the battle of Kosovo. This hard reality dictated an approach quite different than embodied in the failed Rambouillet accords. The daily conversations between Paris, Bonn, London, Rome, and Washington were instrumental in helping forge NATO's central demands. Again, the Germans played a key role. Jim O'Brien explained, "It was through these

MISADVENTURE

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23

conversations that German Foreign Minister Fischer first proposed the formula—Serbs out, NATO in, the refugees allowed to return—that became the core of the objectives." On April 3, the five foreign ministers finally released a statement spelling out NATO's demands. Saying they wanted to ensure a "peaceful, multi-ethnic Kosovo in which all its people live in security," the ministers stressed that this could only be achieved by the "return of all refugees and therefore the deployment of an international security force, the withdrawal of Serb military, police, and paramilitary forces, and putting in place a political framework for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet accords." NATO was now committed to securing these goals and had accepted that there should not be a let up in bombing until they were achieved, a crucial step in maintaining Alliance solidarity. While lacking nuance, the demands were blessedly straightforward. Though this was a welcome and overdue step to clarify NATO's aims, many quickly accused the Alliance of going soft, mainly because the statement did not demand that NATO lead the peacekeeping effort—even though the ministers themselves widely recognized that only a NATO-led force would be effective. Further, many were concerned that NATO was no longer insisting that Milosevic sign on to the full text of the Rambouillet accords. However, the complex administrative arrangements of the Rambouillet accords were irrelevant as tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians were forced from their homes every day. A maelstrom of rape, arson, and murder raged across Kosovo, and NATO was finally circling the wagons.


2

CHAPTER

Picking Up the Pieces

Blame to Go Around During the first several weeks of the war, there was a general sense that the State Department had blown it and that nobody should trust its judgment. With military operations off to a shaky start, the Clinton administration wisely avoided public finger-pointing, but the situation behind the scenes was bruising. "I am getting killed in these meetings," confided Secretary Albright to an associate. Fellow administration officials were telling the hawkish secretary of state, "You misjudged this. You said Milosevic would take the deal; he won't take the deal. You thought he would bow down; he won't bow down. Now we have this humanitarian crisis." The mood among the national security team was grim, and nobody wanted to take the fall for a war that was threatening to end in disaster. In a steady stream of competing newspaper leaks, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency sought to pin the blame firmly on the State Department, leading one official to complain, "Basically every colonel and GS13 analyst claimed to have known exactly what was going to happen with the diplomatic end game and the expulsion of the Albanians. So I went back and read everything and there was nothing to suggest that it was true." The State Department was slow to defend itself and soon found itself being 25


squeezed out of the policy process. There were steady grumblings among U.S. military officers: It was easy for Albright to be tough when they had to take the risks. The State Department had not been alone in blowing it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, despite whatever reservations they may have later professed, had unanimously agreed to initiate air strikes. The intelligence community, while noting that Milosevic would likely step up counterinsurgency efforts against the KLA, had not predicted that Milosevic would stand firm against an escalating air campaign. One agency assessment from January 1999, made public in April of that year, concluded of Milosevic, "After enough of a defense to sustain his honor and assuage his backers, he will quickly sue for peace." Most of the national security team assumed that since Milosevic had been willing to bargain after military pressure in October of 1998, he would do so again. In a brilliant piece of press backgrounding, some of the other agencies had even begun to refer to the bombing as "Albright's war." It was a tag that stuck. The intense internal jockeying was mild compared to the savage condemnation that was quickly unleashed by the press and other critics. Richard Perle, a fiercely conservative former Reagan administration official, argued that President Clinton had assembled "the worst foreign policy team since the Second World War." Lewis MacKenzie, the Canadian general who had been in charge of UN troops in Bosnia in 1992, argued that NATO's strategy in Kosovo would "be used for generations as an example of how not to wage a war." Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger groused, "The formative experiences of the Clinton administration's key personnel were either in the trenches of the Vietnam protest movement, or in presidential campaigns—or both." He continued, "Suspicious of the role of power in foreign policy, they use it ineffectively and without conviction." Kissinger insisted there was no clear national interest in Kosovo but maintained that since NATO had placed its credibility on the line, it had to prevail. As TIME Magazine described it, critics saw Albright's war "as the latest example of an incoherent foreign policy driven by moral impulses and mushy sentiments, one that hectors and scolds other nations to obey our sanctimonious dictates and ineffectively bombs or sanctions them if they don't." Others wondered why the United States was damaging relations with great powers such as Russia and China at the expense of events in an inconsequential corner of the Balkans. British author Hugo Young was almost lyric

PICKING UP THE PIECES * 27

when he suggested that Kosovo represented a "slow disintegration of American purpose." Some directly blamed NATO for the growing refugee crisis. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott professed: We felt a little bit as though not only had we underestimated Milosevic's tenacity, but his smarts as well. The way in which he launched Operation Horseshoe was quite clever. He made it appear as if the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo was a consequence of NATO bombing rather than the cause of NATO bombing. This was outrageous and wrong of course, but it had a superficial plausibility that made it very good tactics. For an administration savvy in public relations, the Clinton team was caught off-balance by the refugee crisis. Yet, the intense public criticism had an important unanticipated benefit for NATO in that it created recognition that any outcome short of clear victory would inflict a heavy political toll, and few understood raw politics better than Bill Clinton. By driving such large numbers of refugees out of Kosovo, Milosevic had made it far easier to justify the escalating use of force—even for those Allies uncomfortable with coercion. Numerous Alliance officials cite exactly the same image—that of refugees being loaded aboard railcars and its stark similarity to the atrocities of World War II—as the moment when they realized there was no turning back. On April 6, the voluble and occasionally fiery-tempered national security advisor, Sandy Berger, outlined some of the choices President Clinton would face in the weeks ahead. Perhaps more so than any other member of the Clinton foreign policy team, Berger was finely attuned to his president's approach to the world: pragmatic more than ideological, deeply political, and shaded by a lawyer's careful sense of logic and restraint. Good or bad, Berger was Clinton's foreign policy alter ego. Berger was concerned that Milosevic would mount a "peace offensive" by using a partial withdrawal of his forces or the declaration of a cease-fire in an attempt to secure a bombing pause on Orthodox Easter. While Berger was pleased that the foreign ministers had reached agreement on a basic formula—Serb military out, international security presence in, refugees allowed to return home—he argued that NATO had to establish a more formal set of demands to protect against pressures to accept a half-baked deal. The national security advisor also outlined some of


the steps that would sweeten the pot for Belgrade, including demanding less than a total withdrawal of its forces from Kosovo, putting off final discussions of Kosovo's political status to a later date, establishing ethnic cantons, or tinkering with the composition of the peacekeeping force while ensuring that NATO remained "at its core." Having seen the bitter inadequacies of a UN peacekeeping force during the worst days of the Bosnia war, Berger was adamant that the command and control structure for any peacekeeping effort in Kosovo had to be dominated by NATO—not the United Nations. The Clinton administration began looking at its options if the air strategy did not succeed. They considered a range of alternatives: arming the KLA, creating a de facto partition of the province, or carving out safe havens in southern Kosovo. They also considered a long-term containment strategy where NATO would ratchet down air strikes, impose economic sanctions, and create a no-fly zone similar to the one in place in Iraq. In addition, they also considered a ground invasion. The National Security Council staff churned out innumerable papers that were discussed and presented to the president. President Clinton's usual response: "We need to hold firm. We need to stay the current route and see if that succeeds." However, it was also clear that even seven years into his presidency, Clinton was still uncomfortable exercising U.S. military force. The only group that had remained immune to Clinton's charms was the Pentagon. In the end, Berger argued that the military campaign would only be judged a victory if it met two central goals: providing a secure environment in Kosovo while allowing the people of the province substantial self-governance. He insisted that intensifying the air campaign was the only sound course of action and, by doing so, rejected the other alternatives. It did not take long for fears of a peace offensive by Belgrade to crystallize. On April 6, Kosovar Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, who had been placed under house arrest by Yugoslav forces in Kosovo, was strong-armed into releasing an "agreement" with Milosevic. The "joint cease-fire declaration" announced Belgrade's intentions to unilaterally cease operations against the KLA in keeping with the "greatest Christian holiday, Easter." Belgrade also declared that Rugova and the Yugoslav government would begin discussions on political agreement and Rugova would work with the Red Cross to establish a program for refugee returns. Many speculated that Milosevic, having


drained Kosovo of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians, was now eager to declare victory and return to the negotiating table. The day before, on April 5, the U.S. defense attache in Dublin had received a similar proposal from Yugoslav authorities. The Yugoslavs would agree to resume negotiations between Milosevic and Rugova with representatives from three neutral countries designated by the UN Security Council. The Yugoslavs would then commence a cease-fire, allow access for relief workers, and release the three captured U.S. servicemen to the Vatican. The Clinton administration quickly rejected both the public and private overtures from Belgrade, with NATO calling the offer "absurd" propaganda. The Alliance's swift response to Milosevic's proposal underscored how important it was that NATO had reached at least a basic agreement regarding the demands on Belgrade. Bombing would not stop without a troop withdrawal, the deployment of peacekeepers, and all refugees allowed to return home. While Berger and many others remained convinced that the air war remained the best way to secure NATO's goals, a small but vocal minority was emerging in favor of reopening the debate on ground troops. Behind closed doors, General Clark and British Prime Minister Tony Blair aggressively advocated that ground troops planning move forward, despite the vociferous opposition of the Pentagon and any number of European Allies. By April 8, the senior leadership of the State Department also unanimously weighed in for going ahead with ground troop planning. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, a former journalist and longtime Russia hand, argued to both Berger and Albright, "I know how hard it is, including with our allies, who are praying that we can avoid ground troops . . . but if the choice were between ground troops and accepting a weaker, more ambiguous, half-a-loaf outcome, I believe our first principle would argue for ground troops. And by the way, given a choice between taking over Kosovo and going all the way to Belgrade, I'm for the latter: get it over with, and get the son of a bitch." It was an opinion that Secretary Albright shared. Two of Secretary Albright's other senior advisors—Tom Pickering, the undersecretary for political affairs, and James Dobbins, the department's special advisor on Balkan affairs—also advocated moving forward with planning for a ground war. Pickering, the State Department's highest-ranking career officer and a seasoned veteran of some of the world's toughest diplomatic posts, came to the decision reluctantly, while Dobbins did so with enthusiasm. Pickering's unease was, in part, a product of his discomfort with the


possibility that U.S. forces would have to drive all the way to Belgrade. Such a reality would "alienate many Serbs for a long period, prove costly, and be divisive among our Allies and others, including the Russians." However, Pickering ultimately felt that there was "no other certain or near-certain alternative at hand." Dobbins counseled, "Until we take the plunge on ground troops, any efforts at a negotiated settlement can be no more than delaying or diversionary tactics, intended to occupy the Allies and placate the Russians. Only once the threat of a ground force is real can we expect our diplomatic efforts to produce real movement in Belgrade, Moscow, and New York." Dobbins saw ground troops as the only strategy under consideration that had a good probability of achieving NATO's "minimum objectives quickly and cleanly," and he pushed to have a decision on ground troops made within ten days, so that the matter could be resolved before a NATO Summit convened later that month. At a White House Principals Committee meeting on April 8, Berger suggested that unless NATO was willing to commit to a full-scale ground war it needed to actively pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis, and he made clear that this was his preferred option. The war had driven the gruff Berger to a terrible pace: eighteen-hour days, a bad diet, and a constant stream of telephone calls from early in the morning until late at night. Close to 400,000 refugees had now been pushed out of Kosovo, and both Macedonia and Albania were teetering badly. Secretary Albright noted that it would be difficult, both in terms of diplomacy and public opinion, to engage with Milosevic directly, and the core NATO ministers had agreed two days before to try to secure greater Russian engagement in the diplomatic efforts. There was a general sense that giving Moscow a greater diplomatic role would help minimize Russian domestic outrage and pave the way for the eventual passage of a UN resolution that imposed a settlement upon Milosevic. Jim Dobbins argued that while Moscow might not be able to deliver Belgrade, it could deliver the Security Council, and a council resolution embodying NATO's principles for a settlement, even somewhat watered down, could be a deal worth making.

Engaging Russia Trying to get Moscow to support NATO's demands would be no easy task. With the military campaign struggling, public dissent rising, and many Alii-

PICKING UP THE PIECES * 3 1

ance members expressing discomfort with the course of the war, Moscow was in no mood to compromise. Russian hardliners were convinced that the Alliance had stumbled into a trap. On April 4, Easter Sunday for Christians in the West, Ivanov sent Albright a letter asking that a meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers be convened without delay. He argued that without the consent of the Yugoslav leadership, peacekeepers in Kosovo were "out of the question." In reaction to the Russian call for the emergency G-8 meeting, it was agreed to convene representatives from the Contact Group—Russia, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy—in Brussels on April 7. The Russians refused to call it an official Contact Group meeting, saying that such a gathering was impossible while NATO's "aggression" was ongoing. Instead, the session would only be "a meeting of a group of states." On April 6, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Primakov spoke for some forty minutes in advance of the meeting, with Gore reiterating NATO's bottom lines and noting that while he did not want bombing to go on any longer than necessary, Milosevic had to give in. Primakov argued that NATO was pushing Milosevic in the wrong direction. Gore raised a more pressing matter: The United States had received indications through a number of channels that Russia was prepared to send military equipment and share intelligence with Belgrade. A Russian intelligencegathering ship was already headed for the region, and Moscow had announced on April 5 that that it would be shipping 120 trucks carrying nine hundred tons of "humanitarian assistance" overland, through Hungary, to Yugoslavia. While Russia's rhetoric had been hot, its national response to the bombing had been quite restrained. Direct military assistance to Belgrade would sharply escalate the conflict and drive a fundamental wedge between Russia and NATO. Vice President Gore repeatedly asked for assurances that Moscow would not provide aid to Belgrade, making clear such a move would devastate the U.S.-Russian relationship. This was basically a threat: the spigot of Western financial assistance propping up the Russian economy could easily be cut off. Primakov, never the most communicative, was disturbingly noncommittal on the matter. His resounding silence deeply perturbed the U.S. national security team, particularly given that Primakov was seen as a cold warrior willing to use whatever Machiavellian means he viewed necessary to blunt U.S. influence in Europe. On April 7, the Russian Duma adopted a resolution urging President Yeltsin to supply Belgrade with weapons. The measure passed 279-34—a


powerful demonstration of the general sentiment toward NATO in Moscow. Yeltsin's presidential spokesman Dimitri Yakushkin responded by insisting President Yeltsin felt the conflict in Yugoslavia could not be resolved militarily and that arms shipments would mean "a slow introduction of Russia into the war," leading to an "inevitable escalation of the conflict." However, two days later, Yeltsin himself warned that NATO should not push Russia toward a military response; "Otherwise, there will be a minimum of a European war or maybe even a world war." The same day, former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais told U.S. Ambassador Jim Collins in Moscow that if the bombing continued it could result in "irreversible structural changes in the domestic Russian political scene," clearly suggesting that the Communists and other reactionary forces could exploit swelling anti-Americanism. Chubais warned that the introduction of ground troops would have "catastrophic consequences," with Russia being left no choice but to offer Yugoslavia both "volunteers and arms." Chubais had repeatedly told Western diplomats, "You're not just bombing Milosevic, but Russian liberals as well." Also on April 7, senior foreign ministry officials from the Contact Group countries met in Brussels for three hours. It was the first real gathering of Western and Russian diplomats since the collapse of the Rambouillet talks on March 19. The respective representatives at the Contact Group meeting were largely the political directors from the countries, but the United States had sent Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to Brussels, largely so he could meet with his Russian counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Avdeyev, on the margins of the meeting. (Russia has more than one deputy foreign minister, and Avdeyev was the highest ranking.) The lean, intellectual, and slightly patrician Talbott had served as the administration's leading Russia hand since 1993, and he spoke Russian well. He had arrived at his post in large part because of a close friendship with President Clinton dating back to their time as housemates and fellow Rhodes scholars at Oxford in the late 1960s. Talbott had served as the Washington Bureau Cheif and foreign affairs columnist at TIME Magazine for more than twenty years and written a number of books on U.S.-Soviet arms control before entering government service. He and Avdeyev, joined by a number of colleagues, sat down for a breakfast meeting at the Hotel Royal Windsor in Brussels. Avdeyev was an interesting character study. He strived to dress and act like a Western


diplomat—often sporting a double-breasted Pierre Cardin blazer and Gucci loafers and usually speaking in soft tones. Yet under his carefully appointed, almost effete, appearance, lay an unreconstructed Soviet worldview. Avdeyev was not one to go beyond the talking points issued by Moscow, and he was not known as a problem-solver. Avdeyev was one of Talbott's least favorite interlocutors in the Russian government, and the deputy secretary viewed the Russian as little more than a snake oil salesman. Talbott had on more than one occasion joked that Avdeyev disproved the theory that "he had never met a Russian he did not like." The small breakfast meeting got off to a rough start as one of the Russian delegates spilled orange juice all over the table as he reached for a croissant. After some quick clean-up, Talbott began the session by starkly observing, "Part of the challenge is to see, at the end of this, whether the map of Europe still contains Yugoslavia." Talbott insisted that any solution had to "protect the fundamental rights of the Kosovar Albanians" by deploying international peacekeepers while seeking to preserve the borders of the current Yugoslav state. From the outset, Talbott was clear that the United States would "not be party to some sort of cynical partition plan that carves up Kosovo." Avdeyev was in a doctrinaire mood as he compared Kosovo to Afghanistan, saying that NATO should understand "the logic of entering war that you cannot get out of. Not everything will go as you predicted." In condescending tones Avdeyev suggested that the situation had become "a matter of face saving," adding, "We know what that's about; we used to be in the same situation." Avdeyev also claimed that Washington was "giving the Communists this big gift." In his soft voice and smarmy manner, Avdeyev tried to tell the Americans that he was going to save them. Talbott and Avdeyev also laid some more of the groundwork for their bosses—Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov—who planned to meet in Oslo, Norway, to discuss the crisis less than a week later. Avdeyev pushed for an Orthodox Easter bombing pause as a gesture of goodwill, and the two discussed some of the mechanics involved in passing an eventual UN resolution as the means to resolve the conflict. Ignoring some of Avdeyev's more provocative statements, Talbott reiterated the broad strokes NATO would demand to end the bombing: withdrawal of Serb forces, deployment of peacekeepers, refugees allowed to return, and further talks on Kosovo's political status based on the Rambouillet accords. The teams then broke off the breakfast to begin the official Contact


Group session at the German embassy, agreeing to meet again later in the afternoon. However, Avdeyev did not attend the Contact Group session, choosing to send a subordinate, Russian Ambassador-at-Large Boris Mayorsky. Tensions immediately surfaced. The French delegation was angered both that Avdeyev was not attending the meeting and that Talbott had met with him separately. The French were concerned that the United States and Russia would move discussion on Kosovo to a bilateral basis. Russian Ambassador Mayorsky presented the Russian position with a combination of cynicism, biting humor, and periodic flashes of anger. Mayorsky urged NATO to accept a Milosevic cease-fire proposal and suggested that any international presence in Kosovo would have to be largely humanitarian. The tensions at the gathering were only heightened when it became clear that Talbott was going to slip away from the meeting for an afternoon discussion with Avdeyev, leaving the French delegation apoplectic. Avdeyev and Talbott then met in the Russian embassy in Brussels. Avdeyev led off the session by telling Talbott bluntly, "I have the impression that the package you outlined earlier will not be accepted by Belgrade. It's not simply an impression; I'm convinced that your proposal won't be accepted. What will you do then? You're already building up forces. Are you going to bomb infrastructure, power plants, refineries for one week, two weeks?" "The core problem remains," Talbott replied. Russia's position is dictated by what Milosevic will and will not accept, but Milosevic has long since disqualified himself from being the arbiter of the solution. In fact, it is an open question to us whether we can reach a negotiated solution with Milosevic, but we are prepared to try. But we must do so on the basis of the conditions laid out by NATO. If Moscow insists that NATO bombing stop as a precondition for Milosevic meeting the demands, the process will go nowhere. As the meeting concluded, Talbott also delivered a clear warning regarding Russian military assistance to the Yugoslavs: "Alexander, this is an issue of life and death, especially for the United States and Allied personnel flying over Yugoslavia. As I've said before, this issue has the potential to ruin irreversibly the relations between us, as well as whatever chance we have to turn this situation to the benefit of the U.S.-Russian partnership." Avdeyev insisted that there was "no basis for suspecting cooperation," despite the direct evidence to the contrary.

PICKING UP THE PI ECES * 35 After the sessions, Talbott characterized Avdeyev's and Mayorsky's position to Washington in colorful terms: You crazy, short-sighted Americans have done it again. This is a new Vietnam. It's your Afghanistan. You don't have an exit strategy. We told you this was going to happen. You've created exactly what you said you wanted to deter. You've also acted in shameless disregard to Russia. You didn't take seriously our warnings that that your bombing the Serbs would stir up the ugliest and most dangerous passions inside Russia. Now in addition to having to worry about your military rampaging in the skies over Belgrade, we have to worry about our military going crazy and Zhirinovsky recruiting volunteers to go fight for our brother Slavs. U.S.-Russian relations, to say nothing of N A T O Russian relations, will never be the same. But we are as wise and forbearing and foresighted as you are foolish and impetuous and shortsighted; we are prepared to help you save face, to show you a way out of the dead-end where you've gotten yourselves stuck. While the N A T O and Russian positions remained far apart, there were growing efforts to forge a consensus between Russia and the West. T h e Germans had drafted potential language for a U N Security Council resolution, and Talbott felt that if the Russians could be persuaded to sign on to such a text and military pressure was maintained, Belgrade might accept an outcome that left Kosovo constitutionally inside Yugoslavia "while taking it administratively out from under Belgrade's control and puts it under the protection of the U N or some other mechanism." T h e April 7 Contact G r o u p meetings were followed by additional sessions of the G-8 political directors in Dresden on April 9 and 10 with Undersecretary of State T o m Pickering representing the United States and D e p u t y Foreign Minister Georgy M a m e d o v representing Russia. T h e political directors were trying to lay the groundwork for an eventual meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers. In a sidebar discussion with Pickering, Mamedov told Pickering that Russia understood that some form of international presence would need to be deployed in Kosovo, but Moscow was concerned about the nature of this force and the conditions under which it would operate. For example, Moscow preferred peacekeepers only be drawn from nations with which Belgrade still had formal diplomatic relations—meaning the major N A T O powers would not be on the ground. Russia still wanted a strong role for the United Nations and wanted Milo-


sevic to approve any deal. Mamedov made clear that both Ivanov and Primakov were trying to limit Kosovo's "collateral damage" to the bilateral relationship but that NATO had unleashed dangerous reactions in Russia. Mamedov felt that Yeltsin had been personally and politically hurt by the bombing, and viewed it as undercutting his close bond with Clinton. The Russian domestic fallout from the campaign continued to be intense because "the Czar is powerless to stop the war," as Mamedov put it. Yeltsin and Primakov saw the parallels to Chechnya as acute and wanted more to be done to disarm the KLA "terrorists." The deputy foreign minister added, "There are many enemies of better U.S.-Russian relations in Moscow, and Yeltsin needs our help to keep them from wrecking our mutual efforts. We can manage this with your help, but we may not be able to manage it without your help." Unfortunately, Mamedov would be effectively cut out of much of the decision-making on Kosovo. Ivanov himself directed Kosovo policy within the foreign ministry, and it would have been difficult for Mamedov to interject himself in the process since it was not an area of his expertise. Further, because Mamedov was Azeri by birth (Azerbaijan was a largely Muslim republic of the former Soviet Union), he was inclined to give issues dealing with Muslim separatists a wide birth. While Mamedov would keep his ear to the ground and periodically meet with U.S. officials, he had no line authority for policy and no political leverage and would not be able to be a major player in striking any accommodation between Moscow and Washington. Events in Russia highlighted the considerable tensions within its political system. Despite the situation in Kosovo—and in part because of it— Communists and nationalists in the Duma refused to delay the impeachment proceedings against President Yeltsin that were scheduled to begin later in April. Prime Minister Primakov also sent signs to the Communists that he might be willing to continue serving in his post even if Yeltsin were impeached—an overture that outraged the Russian president. On April 9, President Yeltsin signaled that he would not leave office without a fight as he told reporters, "Today Primakov is useful; tomorrow we'll see." President Yeltsin's behavior was becoming increasingly erratic. On April 9, after Yeltsin met with Gennadi Seleznyov, the Communist speaker of the Russian parliament's lower house, Seleznyov emerged to tell reporters that the Russian president had indicated that he would be retargeting Russian nuclear weapons at NATO capitals. Despite repeated calls from Western cap-


itals for clarification, the Kremlin was slow to respond. Belatedly, Foreign Minister Ivanov was left to disavow the whole matter, saying, "No orders concerning missiles have been issued." In a sign of growing regional tensions, the Russian shipment of "humanitarian aid" was blocked at the Hungarian border on April 10, amid suspicions that Moscow was attempting to provide military aid. Russian officials insisted that President Yeltsin was "extremely disturbed" by the Hungarian decision. After emergency talks between Russian and Hungarian officials, Hungary allowed part of the convoy to pass through its territory while denying transit to five armored trucks and a large amount of fuel. The ability of the Hungarians—NATO's newest member—to interdict the Russian convoy glaringly underscored the reality of NATO expansion for Moscow.

Enter Chernomyrdin On April 10 at the White House, a Principals Committee meeting was convened. The issue of ground troops was front and center, although its champions were limited. Sandy Berger acknowledged that the president's statement at the onset of the war about having "no intention" to send in ground troops had put them in something of a rhetorical box. However, he also defended the inclusion of the language in the speech, noting that even the threat of a ground war would have set off a firestorm of protest and division within NATO. Secretary of Defense Cohen, the lone Republican in Clinton's cabinet, was of the same mind as Berger. There were serious divisions within the Joint Chiefs about pursuing a ground war and he later remarked, "There could have been substantial casualties. And if we had started to suffer substantial casualties, I am convinced it would have turned into quite a contentious issue up on the Hill." The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Hugh Shelton, suggested that the talk of a ground war was misguided. He argued that if the Alliance ramped up the bombing and went after more important targets—including more sites in downtown Belgrade—air power would prevail. Shelton spoke in colorful language of "wanting to put a lot of hurting on Milosevic's ass," saying that it was time to "take the gloves off." NATO's timid approach during the initial phase of the war had created substantial tension between


Chairman Shelton, Secretary of Defense Cohen, General Clark, and their European military counterparts. Clark was requesting hundreds of more planes, and had reached the conclusion that the war could drag on for months and "might have to transform into a more conventional full-scale ground attack into Kosovo"—a view not shared by his superiors at the Pentagon. Clark was pushing to have a decision on ground troops made during April, so that a ground campaign could be launched by July. Berger suggested that there were three environments in which U.S. forces could enter Kosovo: first, a "permissive" setting resulting from a peace deal; second, the "nonpermissive" environment of a ground war; and, third, a submissive or "semipermissive" environment where some ground troops were simply needed to mop up the remnants of a Yugoslav army largely decimated by air attacks. Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg observed, "If we invade Yugoslavia, we're liberating Kosovo and can't give it back to Yugoslavia. If we do that, we own Kosovo, and sooner or later it's independent." This led the lanky, slightly shaggy-haired Steinberg, one of the younger members of the national security team, to make a pitch for arming the Kosovo Liberation Army, a prospect that made most of those in the room deeply uneasy—in large part because of the U.S. experience in arming Afghan resistance fighters during the 1980s. While the resistance fighters had proved a remarkably potent fighting force, Afghanistan remained destabilized and increasingly radicalized for years after the Soviet withdrawal, hardly a scenario NATO wanted to see in southeast Europe. Steinberg concedes, "I was the leading advocate of arming the KLA, because I thought a lot of the things that the ground option was designed to accomplish could be achieved a lot more quickly and effectively—and make Milosevic even more nervous—by moving in that direction and reserving the ground option. I recognized the downsides." Ambassador Richard Holbrooke expounded on the importance of opening up a better channel of communication with Belgrade and getting Milosevic some kind of message. He stressed the importance of finding a way to tie up Milosevic's considerable, and well-dispersed, financial assets. Holbrooke was of the mind that the Kosovar Albanians would continue fighting for independence for as long as it took and that they ran the risk of becoming a permanent guerilla resistance movement. "I strongly advocated planning ground-troop use, but opposed the actual deployment," Holbrooke claimed.


"I repeatedly told both President Clinton and Vice President Gore that I never thought we would have to invade and that we should just keep bombing. I strongly supported escalation of the bombing and I was quite vocal about that." The group struggled over whether NATO should simply dictate terms to Milosevic or whether they should open negotiations with him. The administration was convinced that getting any kind of "yes" from Milosevic would be daunting. Albright discussed her efforts to lay the groundwork with the Allies for a UN Security Council resolution authorizing "all necessary means" to bring Milosevic to terms, thus giving UN sanction to a NATO ground war. However, many of the Allies were reluctant to even discuss ground troops, and the possibility of getting the Russians and Chinese to endorse such a proposal was remote. The choices were unpalatable. If the United States negotiated directly with Milosevic, many would see it as a sign of NATO's weakness. If the United States sought to dictate terms to Belgrade, it might have to back the threat up with a ground war. In the end, the national security team once again agreed that air attacks should be intensified. Sunday, April 11—Orthodox Easter—came and went without a bombing pause. NATO bombing was light during the day however, with Belgrade largely spared attacks, a fact the Alliance attributed both to the weather and to "relative restraint, mindful of the Orthodox Easter celebration." The Alliance would immediately resume attacks on downtown Belgrade the next day. The number of refugees that had been driven from Kosovo now swelled to over half a million people. With diplomatic efforts to end the war showing little progress, more and more people sought to interject themselves directly in the peace process—a phenomenon quickly dubbed "envoy envy" within the halls of the State Department. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan informed the United States that he intended to appoint two special envoys for Kosovo who would be in frequent touch with Moscow, Washington, Brussels, and, eventually, Belgrade. Yugoslav foreign ministry officials had requested that Annan himself visit Belgrade and become more involved in diplomatic efforts. The last thing the Clinton administration wanted was the United Nations directly involved in negotiations, not trusting Annan to broker a deal that preserved NATO's bottom line. Indeed, senior Clinton administration officials had been deeply angered by a statement Annan had released on April 9 in which

40 * COLLISION COU RSE

he had expressed distress with "the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo and in the region, which must be brought to an end." Administration officials viewed the secretary-general's statement as disturbingly equivocal on who was to blame for the refugee crisis. While Washington publicly welcomed Annan's call for Yugoslav authorities to stop expulsions, withdraw its military forces, and comply with the terms of earlier agreements, Annan had also suggested, "Upon acceptance by the Yugoslav authorities of the above conditions, I urge the leaders of NATO to suspend immediately the air bombardments." Washington did not appreciate Annan dictating terms for ending the conflict, and this further heightened U.S. hostility toward an active UN diplomatic role. However, several of the Allies, particularly the French, continued to insist that any settlement needed to be wrapped in the broad authority of the United Nations. The trick would then become how best to secure an eventual UN Security Council resolution without giving the United Nations a meaningful role in the diplomacy. On April 11, President Clinton wrote to Yeltsin, insisting that none of the actions in the Balkans were aimed against Russia, and welcoming assurances that Russia would not allow itself to be drawn into military conflict. The missive called for both the United States and Russia to work diplomatically to end the war and suggested that Annan's statement placed the onus on Milosevic to take concrete steps to end the war. Ambassador Jim Collins delivered Clinton's letter to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov on April 12, and Secretary Albright was scheduled to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov the next day in Oslo, Norway. Mamedov, quickly reading the note, said that it was an "important letter" that would help pave the way for the meeting between the ministers, which Mamedov hoped would be a "watershed." Mamedov was pleased that Secretary-General Annan had released his statement, after what he said was much "plodding and prompting" from the Russians. Mamedov said that Russia did not want "to be gravediggers for the UN," and suggested that "personal chemistry" and "trust" would be paramount in Oslo. The Russian deputy foreign minister claimed that Russia was not clear on Washington's bottom line for getting the bombing stopped, and he wanted to see the two sides get down to specifics. He also made clear that Moscow would not "spit on itself" and simply reverse its positions at the United Nations to make things easier for the United States. No one

PICKING UP THE PIECES * 4 1

should expect "miracles" with regard to Moscow's ability to deliver Milosevic. That same day, April 12, Secretary Albright visited NATO headquarters in Brussels and met her fellow NATO foreign ministers and a number of representatives from the frontline states surrounding Yugoslavia. Albright reassured her fellow ministers that they would be kept in close consultation regarding U.S.-Russian talks. Albright also met with General Clark. Albright was plain-spoken: "Well, Wes, it's up to you. I've done my best and they've called it my war, and they've turned on me. Now they'll turn on you." While Clark and Albright were both embattled, it was Albright's meeting with the frontline states that made the most lasting impression on the secretary of state and her team. Both Macedonia and Albania continued to be overwhelmed with refugees; their very survival as nations was in question. Macedonia was concerned about the refugees shattering their own delicate ethnic political balance, while Albanians welcomed the refugees with open arms but empty pockets. The frontline states expressed a number of concerns but remained resolute. A senior diplomat characterized their position as "Look, we need Milosevic gone. We need to enter Europe and we can't do it with this guy running his little Mordor on the Danube. We can't say it to the western Europeans and we can't say it to our own publics." Yugoslavia's neighbors were every bit as hawkish as Clark and Albright. The attitude of the frontline states would galvanize a number of officials in the State Department to more aggressively push for overthrowing the Milosevic government; a position on which Albright needed little encouragement. In an effort to jump-start diplomatic efforts, Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov met on April 13 in Norway for over three hours of talks at a hotel near the Oslo airport. Ivanov continued to push for a bombing pause, a return to talks with Milosevic, and UN control over any peacekeeping presence. Albright held firm that the Alliance would not suspend bombing until Milosevic had agreed to all its demands, withdrawn his forces, and allowed a substantial NATO peacekeeping force to enter Kosovo—all positions that Ivanov insisted that Milosevic would never accept. In comments to the press after the session, both Ivanov and Albright put their best faces forward, insisting they had "narrowed their differences," with the secretary of state telling reporters the two had reached agreement on many of the basic principles for ending the conflict. However, the Russian foreign minister made clear

42 * COLLISIO N COURSE

that without "the agreement of the leadership of Yugoslavia," Moscow would not sign off on any peacekeeping operation. On April 14, in the wake of the Oslo meeting, some seventy-three Kosovar Albanian civilians were killed in an accidental NATO air strike on a refugee convoy within Kosovo. Serb officials rushed international film crews to the scene, and gruesome images of burning tractors and bloody body parts strewn across a rural road dominated the news. Was NATO only making it worse for the people it was trying to help? The NATO media operation sputtered as General Clark put out a series of contradictory statements, initially blaming the incident on the Yugoslavs and then later changing his story and admitting the incident was likely pilot error. The attack on the refugee convoy came hard on the heels of a NATO strike on a passenger train on April 12—captured in stark black-and-white gun camera footage—that had killed at least ten civilians. The Alliance faced increasingly hostile questions about its targeting procedures, and the daily Alliance military briefings were being dominated by calls for explanations of civilian deaths. Concerns were mounting about the humanitarian costs of an air campaign that seemed neither to be changing Milosevic's mind nor slowing his forces in the field. In Moscow on April 14, President Yeltsin launched an initiative to end the war with his unique personal stamp by appointing Viktor Chernomyrdin—Russia's bluff, beefy prime minister from 1992 to 1998—as his special envoy for the Balkans. It would prove to be an important breakthrough, although at the time it simply looked like one more person joining the parade of self-styled envoys trying to end the war. Chernomyrdin was an interesting choice, and Yeltsin selected him both because of his extensive experience in dealing with the United States and his close personal ties with Vice President Gore that had been cultivated through the GoreChernomyrdin Binational Commission, a body established in 1993 to foster long-term cooperation between Moscow and Washington. Chernomyrdin had enjoyed the longest tenure of any of the prime ministers to serve under Yeltsin, was the former head of Russia's natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, and was known for his street smarts and aggressive ability to bull things through Russia's unwieldy political system. Yeltsin explained that Chernomyrdin had "rescued me and helped me out many a time," and while Chernomyrdin's Western-leaning policies had often earned the antipathy of Communists in the Duma, Yeltsin believed that he was capable of delivering a peace deal.


Yeltsin discussed his choice of Chernomyrdin: "I suppose I couldn't have trusted any other politician at that moment. Chernomyrdin had enormous weight and authority in Yugoslavia, in the West, and in the eyes of the American political elite. This unique combination allowed him to establish a negotiating line oriented toward a single goal: the rapid halt of military action." While his personal skills may indeed have been ideal, Chernomyrdin was by no means a Balkans expert. Chernomyrdin's selection was also driven by Russian domestic politics and Yeltsin's struggle to stave off the Communistled impeachment effort. A key part of this plan was to deflate the presidential prospects of Prime Minister Primakov, who was hostile to Yeltsin's reform agenda and leading in polls for the presidential election that was slated to take place early in 2000. The Russian newspaper Kommersant Daily argued that Yeltsin "effectively appointed a parallel premier" to rival Primakov by bringing Chernomyrdin back into government. It was no surprise that Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov complained, "This person made a mess of everything in the country, but today he is assigned to the worst hot spot." The Chernomyrdin appointment starkly highlighted the depth of estrangement between Yeltsin and Primakov as the Russian president tried to rally his political allies around him for the impeachment showdown. Many of the oligarchs loyal to Yeltsin were concerned by Russia's eroding internal and international situation and fearful that a lasting schism with the West would damage their considerable financial interests. Despite his many weaknesses, Yeltsin was again taking audacious steps to project an image of strength as he desperately tried to salvage his ties to the West. Chernomyrdin began reaching out almost immediately. He quickly sent word to NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana that he was interested in meeting. Chernomyrdin suggested that Russia was willing to push Belgrade to accept a military presence in Kosovo that involved NATO—although not under a NATO flag—and was confident that he could get Milosevic to accept such an arrangement. Solana informed U.S. officials of the contact, and they responded that had no problem with a possible Chernomyrdin meeting, since he was an official Russian envoy. Chernomyrdin and Boris Ivanovsky of the Russian foreign ministry then met in Moscow with the U.S. ambassador to Russia, James Collins, on April 16. Ivanovsky had worked in Kosovo with U.S. Ambassador William Walker as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission in the period before the war had


erupted, and he was widely viewed by the Americans as having been assigned by Foreign Minister Ivanov to keep tabs on Chernomyrdin. Ivanov was anxious that Chernomyrdin would act independently of the foreign ministry and be too accommodating with the West. Chernomyrdin stressed that he wanted to find a constructive way forward and that he might visit Belgrade as soon as the following week. The eightyminute meeting was largely friendly, and Chernomyrdin emphasized that he was part of the larger Russian "team" working on Kosovo, although Prime Minister Primakov's name was mentioned only in passing. Chernomyrdin appeared surprised to learn the scope of the refugee problem in Kosovo and was taken aback to learn that close to a million people had been driven from their homes. He also indicated that he had spoken with the Yugoslav ambassador to Russia, Boris Milosevic (Slobodan's brother), who had taken a very hard line, particularly on the role of NATO in peacekeeping, and insisted that Belgrade could go no further than allowing "international observers" in Kosovo. In agreeing to continue consultations, Chernomyrdin stressed the importance of compromise and of finding solutions that created neither winners nor losers. Ambassador Collins was struck by the fact that Chernomyrdin did not call for an immediate end to the bombing. On April 17, Ivanov and Secretary Albright spoke on the telephone. Ivanov confirmed that they were considering sending Chernomyrdin to Belgrade, and he reassured the secretary that he and Chernomyrdin would "speak with one voice." Albright affirmed that Clinton would be placing a call to Yeltsin two days later, and noted that while talks had been constructive, they still had a way to go. Albright urged Russia and NATO to develop a unified position on the type of international security force that would have to be deployed in Kosovo, maintaining that as long as Russia did not agree to such a formula, "it was in effect prolonging the conflict." Ivanov, not surprisingly, pointed out that there were a number of factors prolonging the war, but cautioned that he could not speak to the composition of the peacekeeping force until some matters in Moscow had been resolved. In Macedonia, a very different and clandestine diplomatic initiative was unfolding. Ibrahim Rugova, the pacifist Kosovar Albanian political leader, still remained under house arrest by Serb forces in Pristina, Kosovo. Rugova, his wife, and their three children had been held since the end of March, with Serb police occupying their house. However, Milosevic had allowed Rugova's trusted aide and bodyguard Adnan Merovci to travel to Macedonia for


a sort of weekend leave. On April 17, Merovci came to see the U.S. ambassador to Macedonia, Chris Hill, in Skopje. According to Merovci, more than fifty police had initially swept down on the residence, herding the family into the basement, giving the impression that Rugova and the others would be executed. After a tense four-hour wait, one of the Serb officers had told Merovci that they were there to "protect" Rugova. Milosevic had then used Rugova for propaganda purposes in a subsequent visit by the Kosovar Albanian to Belgrade for a photo opportunity and the announcement of a potential cease-fire. Milosevic had jokingly told Merovci that he would be the prime minister under President Rugova in a Serb-dominated Kosovo government. Rugova had remained passive in the face of such intimidation. Merovci felt that Milosevic had no grand plan for resolving the conflict and had allowed him to come to Macedonia simply to demonstrate to Yugoslavs that their president was pursuing peace. Yugoslav officials had asked Merovci to convince other Kosovar Albanian leaders in Macedonia to return to the province to discuss potential peace efforts—a prospect that Merovci knew had "zero percent" chance of success. From what Merovci had seen, it appeared Milosevic alone was guiding decisions on the war, and from his conversations with Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic and Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, they had seemed far less enthusiastic about continuing the war. Merovci had spoken with Sainovic on several occasions, although never privately, and Merovci had asked him if he had any message that he wanted to convey to Ambassador Hill. Sainovic quickly inquired if there was any indication from U.S. officials that they would like him to send such a missive. Merovci said that there was not, so Sainovic suggested that if Ambassador Hill had any message to relay, he should send a note via Merovci. Merovci was scheduled to return to Pristina several days later, and he stressed that his highest priority was to get Rugova out of Kosovo. The next day, April 18, Ambassador Hill called Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to discuss the Merovci meeting. Hill was an old Balkans hand and had worked closely in forging administration policy both at Rambouillet and Dayton. Hill had an extensive network of contacts in the region, and probably had the best feel for Serb politics and personalities of any State Department official. The slightly owlish-looking Hill had an exceedingly dry


wit and was respected for his candid assessments and creative solutions to the region's problems. Hill asked if he should send a message back with Merovci. This was not the first time the Clinton administration was offered a back channel of communication with Belgrade, and it would not be the last. In early April, a deputy in the Russian State Duma approached U.S. Ambassador Collins in Moscow, maintaining that the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow, where Boris Milosevic was ambassador, had asked him to act as a secret intermediary with NATO to end the war. While that particular channel never materialized, it was the first of several signs that Belgrade was intent on reaching out and establishing direct links with Washington. Belgrade had also sent out a number of other feelers, and these lower-level signals were generally viewed in Washington as red herrings. The administration felt that if Milosevic were serious about entering direct negotiations, he would reach out to officials he knew well. Hill and Talbott, in consultation with Secretary Albright and National Security Advisor Berger, worked out the following formulation. Hill would send back a handwritten note to Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic, who had served as Milosevic's liaison with the earlier international Kosovo Verification Mission, suggesting that they keep the channel of communication open for future use and that Merovci could serve as a conduit. Hill's note stressed that the Yugoslavs should capitulate and that there was no chance they would prevail. While the interlude raised hopes in Washington that Milosevic's inner circle was starting to buckle, there would be no response from Sainovic.

Setting the Summit Stage As the war dragged on, a long-scheduled event suddenly took on new importance. On April 23-25 in downtown Washington the leaders of scores of countries were scheduled to gather for NATO's Fiftieth Anniversary Summit. Once planned as a grand gala with fighter jet overflights and black-tie dinners for forty heads of state, the war in Kosovo demanded a more somber tone. The potential for a major public rift among the Allies, particularly on the issue of ground troops, was of foremost concern. NATO would be in the global spotlight, and it could not afford to stumble. U.S. ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow, remarked, "I think all the Allies recognized the need to use the summit to show unity, not disarray,


and try to galvanize strategy. After the initial hopes of a rapid capitulation by Milosevic had faded, people realized we were in for the long haul and NATO could not accept anything less than victory. So everyone was receptive to the notion, which we had recommended, of changing the summit program." A war council was added on the first day of the meeting and blacktie dinners were canceled as the gathering took on a much more serious tone. It was far easier to trade business suits than to resolve the issue of ground troops. "The British were starting to put out that they wanted ground troops and the White House was apoplectic," a senior Clinton administration official explained. "They thought it undercut confidence in the air war's chances for success and forced them into a domestic discussion they didn't want to have." The White House had not even attempted to begin building public support for a ground campaign. British Prime Minister Blair was appalled by the lack of seriousness in the Alliance's approach to the conflict. The prime minister wanted NATO to attack higher-profile "regime targets" that would bring pain to Milosevic and his inner circle. Blair also wanted a smaller group of decision-makers to control Alliance targeting and planning, and most importantly, he wanted to see the plans for a ground invasion put back on the table. Blair's approach hit a nerve in Washington where officials remained deeply concerned about managing the downsides of the summit. Just when the debate on ground troops was gaining steam, the Clinton administration turned the discussion with the British into a strategy for how to best manage press relations for the two weeks running up to the summit—effectively slowing the decision on ground troops. Eventually, the deal worked out between Blair and Clinton was straightforward: Blair would tone down his rhetoric on ground troops, and the United States would have NATO Secretary-General Solana move forward with updating planning assessments for a potential ground campaign. A White House official admitted, "We spent a lot of time making sure ground troops were off the agenda at the NATO summit," adding, "This was also about perceptions in Belgrade and Moscow. We didn't want any hint that there was any division within the alliance." Prime Minister Blair was not the only one pushing hard for ground troops. General Clark remained convinced that the Alliance needed to win the war in Kosovo at all costs. The wiry, intense, former Rhodes scholar wanted to inflict maximum damage on Yugoslav forces using almost all means. He consistently argued that NATO needed to strengthen its forces,


attack from more directions, and take greater risks to strike Yugoslav forces. Virtually from the onset of the conflict, Clark had supported moving Apache attack helicopters into the theater to hunt and destroy tanks and troop concentrations, but the plan became bogged down in an embarrassing series of logistical difficulties and concerns about possible U.S. casualties. The relationship between Clark and Secretary of Defense William Cohen had badly deteriorated as a result of their split on ground troops. The tensions between the Pentagon and NATO's military chief are always an issue. While General Clark's post has always been held by an American since General Eisenhower first held the command, it is a unique position in that the general is also the commander of the troops from other respective nations under his authority. As Vice President Gore's National Security Advisor Leon Fuerth pointed out, "One of the things the government had to get used to was that though supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) is an American officer, wearing an American uniform, he wears two hats. He could not function effectively as SACEUR if the Europeans thought he was immediately owned and directed out of Washington. This is perhaps the single most delicate element of the relationship." These natural institutional tensions were only exacerbated by the fundamental disagreements between Clark and his Pentagon colleagues over the conduct of the war. While Clark is an extremely intelligent man, he had become so singleminded that it threatened to undermine his sense of political judgment. As a result, the Pentagon, viewing Clark as a bull in the china shop, increasingly kept the general at arm's length—a dangerous reality in a time of war. Clark opined of President Clinton and Secretary Cohen, "Wouldn't they have been able to make better decisions, and have them better implemented, I thought, if they brought the commander into the high-level discussions occasionally?" Clark added that in the early days of the conflict, he did not discuss overall strategy with Secretary Cohen or President Clinton "at all." President Clinton's trying relationship with the military made it even more difficult for the White House to effectively adjudicate between a reluctant Pentagon and an overzealous Clark. The situation reached a point where British military officials felt compelled to slip notes to General Clark regarding conversations between President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair regarding the use of ground troops, fearing that the NATO commander would get a diluted account of the discussions through his normal chain of command. Clark made his frustration

PICKING UP THE PIECES * 49 with the Pentagon clear to several senior officials at N A T O . T h e general felt that the Pentagon was blocking him at every turn, and Clark had been involved in a series of frustrating late-night calls with his superiors in Washington. Some at N A T O even joked that Clark was being forced to wage a threefront war, simultaneously fighting the Serbs, the Allies, and the Pentagon. Losing any one of those fronts had the potential to cost Clark the war. General Clark repeatedly told congressional leaders visiting N A T O headquarters that he felt a ground invasion of Kosovo would go relatively swiftly and that planning for such an effort was the only sure way to secure N A T O ' s goals. Clark was convinced that N A T O ' s choices lay starkly between ground forces and defeat. His insistent appeals were a clear irritation to his superiors. Both General Shelton and Secretary C o h e n felt that a ground invasion would require a massive effort, whose very scale might make its implementation better postponed until the next spring. C o h e n had also pointed out, with some merit, that moving forward with ground troops could potentially split the Alliance. T h e frosty relationship between Clark and his superiors put the W h i t e H o u s e in an awkward position. A senior W h i t e H o u s e official acknowledged: We didn't seek to adjudicate, because I think it would have been a serious breach with General Shelton and Secretary Cohen, not too mention the chain of command. We accepted that. But on the other hand, to be quite candid, we also believed that there were a lot of things that General Clark was saying that needed to be heard, and we were not sure Cohen and Shelton were allowing them to be heard. So we didn't purely back-channel with Clark in the sense of talking to him directly. We had ways, particularly through General Ralston's [the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] connection with Clark, to get a somewhat less contentious view of what was going on out there. N A T O Secretary-General Solana spoke with U.S. officials in the run-up to the summit. T h e good-natured former Spanish foreign minister was widely regarded as pragmatic and effective, and his strong interpersonal skills, political savvy, and center-left credentials made him an ideal candidate to hold together N A T O ' s frequently divided membership. Ironically, as a young Socialist politician in the 1980s, Solana had opposed Spain's entry into N A T O . Solana was deeply concerned that General Clark would try to


force the issue of ground troops to a head at the summit, opening a veritable Pandora's box that could sunder Alliance unity when it was most needed. U.S. officials assured Solana they would do their best to have Berger and Secretary Cohen restrain Clark. On April 17, just six days before the NATO Summit was set to convene, a small group of U.S. National Security officials gathered in the White House situation room. Secretary Albright, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, his deputy, James Steinberg, the vice president's national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, Strobe Talbott, Jim Dobbins, and several others convened to review the Alliance's objectives. Working from a paper drafted by Dobbins the day before, the group agreed that there were four objectives on which NATO "could not compromise": Yugoslav police and military forces had to leave Kosovo; the Kosovar Albanian refugees had to be allowed to return; international peacekeepers had to be deployed; and the province should enjoy self-government, but not independence. While the objectives seemed clear, how to achieve them was not. Berger remained pessimistic about a ground invasion, fearing a long guerilla conflict with the potential to be a military and political debacle. But to those who knew him well there seemed to be a slight softening in his position. Indeed, on April 13, President Clinton had met with congressional leaders at the White House, and during the discussion he pointedly had not ruled out the possibility of a ground attack. Leon Fuerth, whose boss, Al Gore, was gearing up for a presidential run, was hostile to any decisions that would tilt the United States toward the use of ground troops. As Fuerth commented, "I advised the vice president that I thought the air campaign would prevail, and that we should stick it out. He agreed. Of course the longer it went on, the more vocal some people were becoming about the need to go to a ground campaign, so we began to at least think through what a ground campaign would look like without taking a decision to go forward with it." Fuerth insisted that a more robust bombing campaign, including attacks on key infrastructure targets, would bring Milosevic to the negotiating table, and avoid the need for a ground war. He remained convinced that Milosevic's willingness to get out of the war would be linked to growing Yugoslav public dissatisfaction and pressure from his own inner circle. Others at the meeting, while acknowledging the risks of a ground war, asked a simple question: What if air strikes didn't work? Albright was a known hawk on the subject, and she had repeatedly weighed in favor of plan-


ning for ground troops. Jim Steinberg, the deputy national security advisor, also suggested that moving ahead with planning was a reasonable first step. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott argued that if their objectives truly could not be compromised, they had to be willing to use all the means necessary to secure those goals. This led to a discussion of putting forces into a "semipermissive" environment, where Milosevic's forces were largely defeated but ground forces were needed for mop-up operations. Once again the only consensus was that intensified air attacks should be given time to work. Despite the splits within the national security team, the ground troop option was inexorably gathering steam, primarily because every other alternative seemed so unattractive. The imminent NATO Summit triggered a flurry of diplomatic activity. On April 19, Foreign Minister Ivanov again lashed into NATO, calling the air campaign a "total fiasco" and referring to a refugee problem that "did not exist before March 24"—the day the air campaign began. Later that day, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin spoke on the telephone for some forty-five minutes, their first conversation since the bombing started. Clinton, in the Oval Office, led off by noting that Kosovo was one of the greatest tests for the Europe they had worked together to achieve. Clinton welcomed Chernomyrdin's appointment as special envoy and suggested that Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott engage as a counterpart to the Russian envoy. Yeltsin was calm, but in a foul mood, claiming that the developments of the previous weeks confirmed that the United States and NATO had "made a big mistake," that Milosevic would never capitulate, and that "instead of resolving the humanitarian problem, what has been achieved is a giant humanitarian catastrophe." Yeltsin also argued that the anti-American and antiNATO sentiment in Russia was growing "like an avalanche," and that great pressure was exerted on him to help Yugoslavia—particularly since NATO was seen as helping the Albanian fighters. Yeltsin insisted that Yugoslavia would not accept a military mission, especially a NATO-led mission, and suggested that "UN blue helmets" lead any peacekeeping effort. Clinton, while trying not to anger Yeltsin, emphasized how difficult it was for the Kosovar Albanians: "The Serb forces have burned all their villages, buried them alive, raped children, and there is no way they will come back without military protection." The U.S. president argued that NATO was the only force capable of effectively disarming the KLA, and he tried to reassure


Yeltsin that he would not approve going into Kosovo unless the mandate included protecting the Serbs as well as the Albanians. The Russian president suggested that Milosevic and a leader from the Albanian community needed to enter direct negotiations to end the war and suggested that a bombing pause would demonstrate Clinton's statesmanship, setting off some eye-rolling among the advisers listening to the call in the Oval Office. Both men agreed to have Talbott fly to Europe to quickly meet with Chernomyrdin, and Yeltsin closed the conversation by noting that the Communists who wanted to send armaments and troops to Yugoslavia were assailing him: "The Communists are calling for an unleashing of a European and wo rid-wide war, and I am absolutely opposed to that." In a cabinet meeting after the call, Clinton expressed his frustration on the issue of ground troops. He felt painted into a political corner by his initial statement that he did "not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war." Clinton testily noted to Sandy Berger that if he went ahead with ground troops he would be seen as a liar, and if he did not, NATO might lose the war. Clinton had berated Berger a number of times over the initial disavowal of ground troops, although he had not questioned the wisdom of such an approach at the time. Berger accepted the browbeating with weary resignation. Both General Shelton and Secretary of Defense Cohen made a pitch for intensified air strikes and debated the merits of hitting the "rock and roll bridge" in Belgrade where crowds frequently gathered to protest the air campaign. Cohen argued that unless NATO was willing to strike such targets with greater vigor—and create greater psychological and military pressure on the Yugoslavs—it might well find that ground troops were the only option left. In Brussels, General Clark acknowledged a fundamental split between the United States and its European Allies: "The United States was increasingly committed to the idea of strategic strikes, going after the heart of Milosevic's power. The Europeans, or at least the French and a few others, were more interested in limiting the strikes to Kosovo, trying to hit the ground forces and avoiding actions that might antagonize or damage Serbia further." At the end of the meeting, Clinton's temper had abated and he turned surprisingly upbeat. "I happen to believe the air campaign will work. I may be Pollyannaish, but I think it'll come out all right." The president also insisted, "I don't want our successors to deal with this part of the world only when there are problems there."


Despite the fact that the Pentagon now agreed some limited planning for ground troops should take place within NATO, the split between the Pentagon and Clark on the issue of ground troops was growing worse. On April 19, Clark pushed General Shelton on ground troops, expressing his hope that it would be an important behind-the-scenes topic of discussion at the summit. Clark felt that the troops needed to start deploying by June 15, and he emphasized that the issue would come up when he met at NATO headquarters with Prime Minister Blair the next day. Clark also inquired as to how he might contribute to discussions at the summit. According to Clark, this led a seemingly shocked Shelton to ask, "You're not coming to the summit are you?" Clark had long been scheduled to attend the event and it was certainly no secret. "Of course," replied Clark. "The SACEUR always comes to the summit, and besides if we are working the ground option behind the scenes, and there's some selling to do." "If that option is going to be sold, it will be sold by the president, not you," responded Shelton. A short time later, Solana called Clark, saying that he had heard from Sandy Berger that Secretary Cohen was uncomfortable with him attending the summit and felt that Clark was too busy to spare. Clark noted the split over ground troops, but since Clark was a NATO official as well as a U.S. military official, he had some latitude to go to the summit if Solana supported his attendance. Clark told the NATO secretarygeneral, "I feel I need to go." Solana replied, "Then I will support your decision, and I will inform Secretary Cohen." Clark would later admit, "Because I was coming in my NATO capacity, Washington did not feel it could simply order me not to attend. Had they done so, I would have had no choice but to remain in Belgium." Although Clark would indeed attend the summit, his chilly reception by the Pentagon, and Shelton's alleged lack of awareness about Clark's plans, were a clear indication of the depth of the estrangement. The Pentagon was doing its best to isolate Clark and his calls for ground troops. Increasingly, the two sides were simply talking and planning past each other, in what Clark called the "continuation of almost two years of tension" with the secretary of defense. Foreign Minister Ivanov spoke with Secretary Albright shortly afterwards,


and confusion over official travel schedules was also a problem in Moscow. The Russian foreign minister was unsure about Chernomyrdin's travel plans or even his exact diplomatic mandate. Ivanov expressed concern that Chernomyrdin would be a loose cannon, answering only to Yeltsin and effectively cutting the foreign ministry out of negotiations. Ivanov insisted that any negotiated settlement be worked out between him and Albright, leading some State Department officials to joke afterwards that the Russian foreign minister was concerned that "Chernomyrdin would become his Holbrooke"—a reference to the strained relationship between Secretary Albright and the independent-minded Richard Holbrooke. Holbrooke, still awaiting Senate confirmation as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, continued to work the phones from his home in New York and weigh in on policy. He repeatedly argued the merits of sending a message directly to President Milosevic through Greek intermediaries. Holbrooke recalled, "I wouldn't have been opposed to direct discussions with Belgrade, but if talks weren't with Milosevic, they wouldn't have led anywhere." However, Secretary Albright saw no utility in such talks and was concerned that Milosevic would view a direct overture as a sign of weakness. There still had been no response to the letter U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia Chris Hill had sent to Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, and the Department had discouraged other communications with lowerlevel Yugoslav intermediaries whose credentials were weak. Given their deepseated personal rivalry, Albright was eager to keep Holbrooke out of the process. The last thing she wanted was "Albright's war" to end in "Holbrooke's peace." On April 20, Holbrooke informed Berger and Albright that he felt that Milosevic had badly miscalculated: "His dreams for rejoining Europe as a full-fledged and accepted member are now gone." As Holbrooke put it, Milosevic now understood that he would never again be the man of Dayton "or even be able to leave his country without fear of arrest. Milosevic must realize that he has crossed an invisible line and cannot get back again." Fated to spend the rest of his days isolated in Yugoslavia, "Milosevic," Holbrooke maintained, "has pursued a policy in Kosovo that will cause the Albanians the maximum pain in the short run, but doom him in the long-term." Holbrooke maintained that if the administration wished "to avoid being pushed by events into either defeat or invasion, the bombing must intensify—and continue until the Serbs change their position, preferably by


changing their leader." While supporting preparations for a ground invasion, Holbrooke expressed concern that it was "a step from which there may be no exit." He insisted, "Our real goal, whether stated or not, must be a change in the leadership in Yugoslavia. While there is no hard information that suggests such an outcome, we should not preclude it." Holbrooke was also a realist: "while Milosevic's departure from power is the optimum outcome, policy must be based on the likelihood that he cannot be dislodged, at least not in the timeframe we seek, and it therefore may become necessary to negotiate with his regime once again. Thus the current administration position of remaining vague on the issue in public is correct." Holbrooke made it known that he was no fan of talks with Russia. "While we need to work closely with Moscow, it is a dream to think they will bail us out. In fact, giving them a central role in a negotiation would probably backfire, because they would support compromises that would be unacceptable. Our public rejection of these proposals could then increase the strain between us. In short, we should keep in constant and close communication with Moscow, but not let them become deeply involved in a serious negotiation—for the sake of the U.S.-Russian relationship." The agreement between Washington and London to update the assessment planning for ground troops also encountered some difficulties in the run up to the NATO Summit. The French had blocked an official effort to bring the matter to a formal vote, and, in the words of a senior U.S. official, "The French were strongly opposed to it, because they were scared to death of their public reaction to talk of a ground invasion." U.S. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger urged NATO Secretary-General Solana to move forward with updating the assessment under his own authority, which he did. This would allow both Clinton and Blair to point to the updating of ground assessments, as well as intensification of the air campaign, as examples of the Alliance's determination to prevail. Blair would secure an important step toward ground troops; Clinton would buy more time for air power. General Clark grudgingly admitted that the updated assessment was not "what I had hoped for," but he did see it as a positive development. On April 21 Secretary-General Solana told reporters that he had authorized NATO commanders to revise and update operational plans for a possible ground invasion of Kosovo. While Solana continued to insist that air strikes would work, and that NATO was still far from reaching a political decision to approve ground forces, updating the assessment was only "common sense."


3

CHAPTER

The Shuttle Begins

Fifty Candles for NATO On April 21, President Clinton hosted a late dinner for Prime Minister Blair at the White House. Blair and Clinton were meeting at a critical juncture, because there were already starting to be substantial doubts about the campaign. There were voices in the United States, including Senator John McCain and others, pushing for a ground option, and a number of the European countries were getting quite shaky. Blair had just spent several full days at NATO headquarters, and had approached his visit to Belgium with rolled up sleeves. A White House official, comparing his attitude to that of a managerial expert, said Blair arrived ready to get to the root of the problems "like a McKinsie consultant." In his discussion with General Clark at NATO headquarters, Blair had asked for assurances that the Alliance would prevail in the conflict, and Clark had pushed for an accelerated planning and deployment timetable for ground troops. Blair shared that conviction as he arrived at the White House to discuss the issue with President Clinton. Blair protested that NATO was not functioning as an effective military force, expressed his frustration with the Alliance's committee approach to waging war, and made the point "that this was clunky machinery that was not operating on all cylinders." He was also irritated by the Alliance's public 57


relations efforts, which he viewed as a disaster. Clinton agreed it was vital to deliver the right message to the public—something not happening as NATO's briefings continued to be dominated by discussions of collateral damage. The meeting occasionally turned testy as Blair tried to convince Clinton. Blair's frustration aside, the British were convinced that if they could work on the United States bilaterally, they could bring Washington along on the issue of ground troops. A White House official observed, "Most of us thought the ground troops issue would have been counterproductive at the summit, although Blair clearly disagreed, but most of us agreed that we needed a greater sense of conveying that we would do whatever it took to win." Clinton did his best to placate Blair without signing off on a ground war. Despite Blair's pleas, Clinton would not be pinned down. The U.S. president agreed that losing was not an option for the Alliance, but continued to assert that potential planning for ground troops should be kept in NATO channels and that more active air attacks could prevail. However, administration officials such as Secretary Albright and, increasingly, Sandy Berger, realized that if the air campaign did not achieve NATO's goals, the use of a ground force might be unavoidable. The meeting, while not resolving the ground troops issue, was key in narrowing the gap in the rhetoric being used by both the United States and Great Britain. Clinton and Blair agreed to put more operational resources into headquarters and to have the Pentagon detail a more robust planning staff to Brussels. It was agreed that the public affairs operation at NATO would be bulked up with additional staff from the White House and elsewhere. The two leaders developed a clear agenda for the summit, essentially dividing up the list of other NATO leaders that they would meet with individually, Blair half, Clinton half. The core strategy Clinton and Blair would sell to their fellow leaders would consist of updating the ground troops assessment, further stepping up air strikes, intensifying diplomacy, and more aggressively dealing with the media. Sandy Berger explained, "At that meeting both of them said to each other in effect, 'we cannot lose, no matter what this takes. We have invested NATO's credibility. We have invested U.S. credibility. We have invested British credibility, and we will do whatever it takes.' It was an important collective judgment. Obviously you make that judgment when you start, but it was clear that it was going to be a long haul, and they took that posture into the summit meetings."

THE SHUTTLE BEGINS * 59

Later that evening, Vice President Gore's national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, called Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. Apparently, Gore was eager to engage directly with Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin. Fuerth, Talbott, and Albright were all somewhat perplexed by the vice president's willingness to take on high visibility negotiations with the potential to become a major political liability. Not only could Gore find himself caught up in the twists and turns of trying to work out a deal with Milosevic, the vice president could also get caught in the middle of the increasingly unstable Russian political situation. The next day, April 22, Prime Minister Blair spoke with President Yeltsin on the telephone. The Russian president argued, "Instead of pressuring Milosevic you are strengthening his position. Instead of resolving the humanitarian problem, we are now dealing with a real humanitarian catastrophe." Claiming that the two sides were "backsliding into a military confrontation," Yeltsin declared a ground operation against Yugoslavia to be the "path to abyss." Blair continued to publicly insist that there would be no bombing pause and expressed his hope that Chernomyrdin could begin to turn Milosevic around. That same day, Viktor Chernomyrdin made his first visit to Belgrade as Russia's special envoy, meeting with Milosevic and his advisors for more than nine hours. Chernomyrdin felt the Yugoslav president was "calm and purposeful. He was confident that he was right, he would win, NATO would lose. His nation was supporting him, which was true at the time. There was no opposition. Everybody was in harmony." Chernomyrdin must have had few illusions that he could reach a quick peace agreement. Exploring the broad parameters of a potential deal, he suggested that a peace agreement would need to include the safe return of refugees, reconstruction and humanitarian aid for Yugoslavia, resuming negotiations on Kosovo's political status, the withdrawal of some Yugoslav forces, a pullback of NATO troops from the Yugoslav border, and the insertion of a UN-authorized peacekeeping force that included Russia. Milosevic said that he could accept some watered-down and lightly armed peacekeeping force if it were under a UN banner. In Washington, President Clinton and key members of his national security team met with NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana the day before the summit. Solana agreed that the gathering was perhaps the most important meeting in NATO's history and that unity was paramount. Solana felt that


reaching a final deal to end the war, particularly if it hinged on a UN Security Council resolution, would be difficult. As the conflict continued, the NATO ambassadors were vesting greater and greater responsibility directly in Solana, allowing him to act without formal votes. The allies consented to such an approach because it helped them avoid making politically awkward and controversial public choices about the war's conduct. Confronted with the high cost of losing, NATO members realized that enhancing Solana's authority was a convenient way to avoid the perils of micromanagement. Consequently, Solana carefully avoided putting matters up for a formal vote before the NATO ambassadors unless he was confident he had the necessary backing. The fact that NATO's nineteen member states were largely comfortable handing the keys to Solana—including working directly on targeting with General Clark—spoke volumes about the trust that Solana had engendered within the Alliance. Clinton stressed that by increasing the tempo and intensity of the air campaign, stepping up the diplomatic efforts, and tightening economic sanctions, NATO would prevail, and Solana was certain the other Allies would endorse such an approach because their political survival hung in balance. Solana also agreed that General Clark should be given more latitude in pursuing key targets. Clinton and Berger made clear that they wanted Clark to be fairly assertive in pushing the envelope for ground troop planning under Solana's effort to update the assessments. Despite his intense frustration, General Clark was gaining more authority to fight the war he wanted. Toward the end of the meeting with Solana, Sandy Berger's pager sounded: The news wires were reporting that Chernomyrdin had announced that Milosevic was willing to accept a "UN-led" force in Kosovo. The information set off a frenzy of activity and hand-wringing that Chernomyrdin, in collusion with Belgrade, was trying to sell NATO a bad deal. In Rose Garden comments to the press with Solana, President Clinton quickly rejected Milosevic's offer of a UN-led contingent. He also edged a careful rhetorical shade closer to the possible use of ground troops. When asked if peacekeepers could be deployed without Milosevic's consent, Clinton replied that it remained a hypothetical question, "but of course there are scenarios under which that could occur." Clinton called the decision to update the assessment "wise and prudent" and noted that Russia would be welcome to contribute peacekeeping troops. Further signaling the Alliance's willingness to escalate the conflict, NATO fighters attacked Serb State televi-


sion transmission towers that same day in a step that had been long and heatedly debated within the Alliance. On Friday, April 23, 1999, in a nearly deserted downtown Washington, D.C., forty-two heads of state gathered to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thousands of police cordoned off the eerily quiet streets on a day when the federal government and several Metro stops had been closed for the event. Although Russia and Belarus had canceled their participation, twenty-three different partner countries attended the summit, including all of the other thirteen former Soviet Republics. That morning, Secretary of Defense Cohen had breakfast with General Clark, and he came with a clear message: Tone down the talk of ground troops. Clark continued to press for beginning ground troop preparations by May 1—less than ten days away. Cohen was cool to the notion and, according to Clark, expressed, "his conviction that we would eventually get a diplomatic settlement, though not without more intense air strikes." The NATO commander assured the secretary of defense that he would not be a "skunk at the picnic," but Cohen was hardly convinced. Clark continued to chafe on the brakes being placed on his operation, and he felt that the resistance he encountered from Washington "was like running on the loose sand of the beach." At the summit, Alliance leaders were eager to project a unified public front to dispel the many reports of widening fissures within NATO. Gathering at the same location, the Mellon Auditorium in downtown Washington, where the NATO alliance was signed into existence fifty years before, President Clinton told the assembled heads of state that NATO would "not have meaning in the twenty-first century if it permits the slaughter of innocents on its doorstep." As leader after leader spoke, each was more robust than the one who had gone before. NATO's three newest members, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, all took notably hawkish stances. As National Security Advisor Berger recalled: I think it was very important that the nineteen leaders of the Alliance sat around a table and said to each other as leaders, "We will prevail. We will succeed. We cannot fail." I think Alliance solidarity was almost unbreakable after that. Because even those leaders under heavy domestic pressure had made a face-to-face commitment to their fellow leaders—and they were going to have to ride it out.


However, another White House official was more concerned by the rhetoric: "Propelled by Prime Minister Blair and his own speechwriters, President Clinton began saying, 'We have to prevail,' and as soon as you say that, and look at the instruments that are available, you had to look at a ground campaign." President Clinton also engaged in a series of side conversations with other NATO leaders during the summit. Greek Prime Minister Simitis told Clinton that Greece was willing to serve as an intermediary for possible negotiations with Milosevic, and he expressed concern that both Macedonia and Albania were in danger of economic collapse. Clinton suggested that there was no harm in the Greeks opening channels to Milosevic as long as they did not dilute NATO's demands, but the fear was that the Greeks were under such intense domestic pressure to end the war that they would endorse any deal. Simitis stressed that a ground campaign would be very difficult and that Greek public opinion was unified against any such operation, but he admitted that he would, "Never say 'never.' " Clinton also spoke with French President Chirac, who spelled out his reservations about a ground offensive, nervous about the impact it would have in Russia and concerned that Russian public opinion and radical elements within the Duma might force the Russians to intervene on the side of the Serbs, creating an uncontrollable situation. While Clinton shared Chirac's apprehensions about the situation in Russia, he argued that by supporting the effort to update planning assessments for ground troops they could create "healthy ambiguity" in Milosevic's mind and give a more intensive air campaign time to succeed. Clinton agreed the Alliance needed to work with Russia, but not to the point of softening its demands. Clinton also pushed to have the air campaign "go after what's important to Milosevic and his cronies, as well as taking risks. If Milosevic believes he is losing resources and military and financial support, he will turn." Clinton was splitting the poles between the French and British positions on ground troops, and trying to keep the irritation between the NATO capitals to a manageable level. A number of important agreements emerged from the NATO Summit. The Alliance consented to further intensify air attacks in the hope they would make the use of ground forces unnecessary. Hungary announced that it would allow its air bases to be used for strikes against Yugoslavia—giving General Clark one more angle from which to bring pressure to bear. NATO also announced an oil embargo against Yugoslavia, but the effort would


never gain traction in practice. There was also general agreement among the leaders at the summit to step up diplomatic efforts; including involving Russia in what Secretary Albright called a "double magnet" strategy. The first magnet would draw the Russians to NATO's position; the second magnet would use Russian influence to attract the Yugoslavs to a deal. It was cloudy how, and under whose aegis, such talks would move forward. The Washington summit will also be enduringly remembered for the Alliance's approval of a new strategic concept. The new approach emphasized an important shift: NATO would expand its mission from one largely defined by collective defense to embrace a much more sweeping mandate that included dealing with global security challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Ironically, it was the ongoing war in the skies over Yugoslavia that would be the first and sternest test of this more expansive vision of NATO's place in the world. The NATO leaders also spelled out their demands upon Belgrade with the greatest level of specificity to that date, and the terms were a clear outgrowth of the earlier agreements between the foreign ministers: A verifiable stop to all military action and the cessation of violence and repression in Kosovo; Withdrawal of military, police, and paramilitary forces; Agreement to station an "international military presence" in Kosovo; Unconditional return for all refugees; and, Provision of "credible assurance" that a political framework agreement would be established based on the Rambouillet accords. While the communique was designed to demonstrate NATO's unity and resolve, many perceived weakness where the Alliance had hoped to project strength. Foremost, the word "all" did not appear next to the demand for the withdrawal of Serb troops. Yugoslavia had some 40,000 troops stationed in Kosovo between army, special police, and other security forces—roughly twice prewar levels. Most reasoned that if a peace agreement allowed substantial Yugoslav forces to remain in Kosovo, refugees simply would not return. Further, if Yugoslav armed forces stayed in Kosovo, and the KLA continued resistance, peacekeepers would be inserted in the middle of an ongoing civil war. The other piece of language in the summit declaration that drew consider-

64 • COLLISION COURSE

able negative attention was the call for an "international security presence" that did not demand that NATO lead such a force. Instead, NATO had declared that it was "ready to form the core of such an international military force" with contributions from non-NATO countries. To some, the language sounded more like an offer than a demand. Lastly, the final provision that Milosevic provide "credible assurance" that he was willing to work toward a settlement of Kosovo political status led many to wonder what assurance Milosevic could provide that would be credible. Concerns over communique language aside, NATO had passed the summit test. In a stark public spotlight, the Alliance had provided a united front, agreed to more aggressive steps to prosecute the war, and redefined its strategic aims. The summit also underscored the difficulties ahead. Milosevic showed no signs of capitulating and many of those who had attended the summit feared that the Alliance's resolve—driven by public dissatisfaction with the air campaign—could still crack.

The Shuttle Shuffle On Sunday, April 25, the last day of the NATO Summit, Strobe Talbott, the deputy secretary of state and a notoriously early riser, dashed off a predawn note to Secretary Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger. "Chernomyrdin got virtually nothing in Belgrade. We haven't heard anything out of either the Russians or the Yugoslavs that suggests Milosevic's position has changed one whit." Talbott contended that Moscow's position was "one of absolute desperation and utter simplicity; they'll say 'yes' to anything as long as it has two results: an end to the bombing and their own return to center-stage as peacemakers." While warning of the dangers of being drawn into negotiations with the Russians over what they thought Milosevic would be willing to accept, he felt that it was "barely imaginable that we might actually be able to get the Russians on board with all, or almost all, of our own objectives and definitions of success." Talbott argued that talks with the Russians on Kosovo "could actually be worthwhile." President Clinton spoke to President Yeltsin during a long telephone conversation later in the day. Clinton took the call in a holding room just off the Mellon Auditorium. The timing of the Russian overture was no accident.

THE SHUTTLE BEGINS * 65 Moscow had clearly hoped that N A T O ' s unity would falter at the summit, and when that had not happened Yeltsin lurched back into the fray. "Yeltsin called C l i n t o n in a state of great agitation," Sandy Berger recalled. Yeltsin often had one point that he wanted to make and he would make it over and over and over again. He wanted Chernomyrdin to come over the next day to figure out how to stop the bombing. The president said he was certainly willing to have Chernomyrdin come over and meet with himself and Gore, but he reiterated that only Milosevic could stop the bombing and that the best way for Yeltsin to get that accomplished was for him to exert whatever influence he had on Milosevic. . . . The president was always concerned during this period that Yeltsin was vulnerable. He tried to convince Yeltsin that the sooner Russia came to the posture of putting pressure on Milosevic, the sooner this would end. A very energized Yeltsin took the lead. "I am calling on a Sunday, and this is a traditional day off for us. But it is not a day off for you and m e . " T h e Russian president insisted that Chernomyrdin had gotten Milosevic to accept four of N A T O ' s five demands while he was in Belgrade, but he then ticked off several points, including international reconstruction of Kosovo's economy and an international peacekeeping force under U N auspices, that did not match N A T O ' s terms. Yeltsin plunged on undeterred, and much of the conversation took on the form of a monologue by the Russian president. Yeltsin supported getting Deputy Secretary Talbott directly involved in some of the technical aspects of talks but argued, " T h i s will not be enough," and urged that the larger political issues be dealt with in direct negotiations between Vice President Gore and Chernomyrdin. Yeltsin suggested that the effort would give Vice President Gore a chance to shine in the diplomatic field, and produce a "good result" because both Gore and Chernomyrdin knew each other well. Yeltsin also claimed that once N A T O suspended bombing, there would be rapid progress on any outstanding issues, allowing for a face-saving and equitable resolution of the "tragic situation." Clinton was generally supportive but claimed that he could not make a c o m m i t m e n t before discussing the issue with his national security team: "I think that we should have Gore and C h e r n o m y r d i n talk on the p h o n e tomorrow, and what I would like to do is to have Strobe Talbott fly to see Viktor Stepanov-


ich [Chernomyrdin] Tuesday or tomorrow or whenever you want him to " goYeltsin interrupted. "I thought that after today's conversation we can tell the media that myself and President Clinton have found a common point of view on how we can solve this problem together." Clinton demurred and again suggested having Talbott fly to Moscow to meet with Chernomyrdin. Talbott was an intriguing choice to take a lead role in the negotiations. As a longtime Clinton friend who had served as the U.S. note taker for the majority of one-on-one meetings between Clinton and Yeltsin, Talbott was clearly a man who enjoyed the president's close confidence. But his longstanding role in shaping the administration's Russia policy had made him a polarizing figure in both Washington and Moscow. Many conservative critics claimed that the Clinton administration—and Talbott in particular—had taken an overly "romantic" approach to dealing with Russia in the wake of the Cold War, and his name had appeared prominently in a number of commentaries asking who had "lost Russia." The themes of these polemics were consistent: Clinton and his team were too soft to deal with Russia, overly dependent on a personal relationship with Yeltsin, and eager to turn a blind eye toward Moscow's official abuses, such as corruption. Talbott was an unabashed and consistent advocate of U.S. engagement with Russia and insisted, "I never lost sleep over the name-calling." He had played a personal role in working with the Russians during the successful effort to negotiate the nuclear disarmament of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, discussions over NATO expansion, and earlier peace negotiations in Bosnia. While the war in Kosovo was threatening to unravel Talbott's strategy of patient interaction with Russia, he remained committed to the escalating use of force against Belgrade. Yeltsin was angered the talks were not being kicked to a higher level and reminded Clinton of his government's restraint in not providing weapons to the Yugoslavs. Clinton then addressed some of the specifics, suggesting that the peacekeeping presence in Kosovo could be structured the same as the existing force in Bosnia, where a strong NATO contingent incorporated Russian and other international troops. He maintained that the only force capable of effectively disarming the KLA was the United States, and that a NATO presence would be instrumental in protecting Serb civilians. Clinton stressed that refugees would never return if the Yugoslav military was still in the province. The U.S. president also pushed back against the idea of a


bombing pause, saying that air strikes would only be suspended after Milosevic had met the demands of the international community. Yeltsin suggested that they would need to keep working on Milosevic as if they "were converting him to another faith," but again emphasized that there were elements within his military eager to offer aid to Belgrade. "You know that I am hearing concerns by our military who are talking about getting military servicemen to go and help Milosevic. You know I have condemned this in the strictest terms and convened my Security Council and said there should be no talk about that. Any general that speaks of sending troops to help Milosevic will be summarily dismissed." Yeltsin added that he had been forced to sack a commander of a military district in the Russian Far East who had been raising volunteers to help the Yugoslav forces; "All our law enforcement agencies and ministries are strictly under my command and report only to me. So there will be no surprises." Clinton tried a number of times to break in, without much luck. Yeltsin continued to stress the difficulty of the situation and how he was doing his best to cooperate. Clinton, finally interjecting, complimented Yeltsin on his energy and personal commitment to the diplomacy, but maintained that he could not dispatch Gore until he had spoken with him. Yeltsin reacted angrily. "Do not push Russia into this war. You know what Russia is. You know how it is equipped. Don't push Russia into this." "Wait a minute, Boris," Clinton cautioned, stressing that the European Allies could not just "wake up in the morning" and read about a peace deal in the newspaper. Yeltsin bemoaned the intensity of the anti-American sentiment in Moscow, and urged that Gore and Chernomyrdin meet quickly. Clinton stated that he would dispatch Talbott to Moscow immediately and also discuss the situation with Gore. In an oddly contemplative aside as they concluded their conversation, Yeltsin observed, "I was more talkative than you." "Yes," Clinton replied, "but we are going to do this." Strobe Talbott and Leon Fuerth spoke with Clinton immediately after the call. Clinton insisted that he was doing his best to protect the vice president, and Fuerth replied that he was not sure how much protection Gore wanted. Fuerth then phoned the vice president who was in Colorado for the funeral of the students killed at the Columbine High School shooting, and Gore was eager to engage the Russians. Clinton also seemed keen to put the process into motion, hoping that it might provide a quick fix to mounting political


problems. When Talbott and Fuerth briefed Secretary Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen on the conversation, Albright and Cohen were nervous. The potential political liability for Gore was tremendous and both Cohen and Albright were reluctant to see one of their superiors engage in direct negotiations over which they would have limited control. Despite Yeltsin's repeated push to have Gore take a lead, Clinton and his senior advisors ultimately resisted; having Gore take on such a role at the onset of a presidential campaign was too risky. A senior diplomat commented on Yeltsin's reasoning: "Gore is your heir apparent; Chernomyrdin is my heir apparent. They'll get together; they'll make a peace deal. They'll both win a Nobel Prize, they'll both become president and we'll all live happily ever after. That was Yeltsin's proposition. But we don't do things that way." Instead, President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright decided to dispatch Talbott and a number of senior U.S. military advisors to Moscow that same evening. Two of Talbott's aides had been standing outside the office where Clinton had been on the telephone with Yeltsin when suddenly Talbott emerged "like he had been shot out of a cannon." Without a word, Talbott hurried off in what appeared to be the wrong direction. "Strobe, where are you going?" his chief of staff, Phil Goldberg, called out. "Moscow," came the only reply. Before his hurried departure, Talbott stopped by the Finnish ambassador's residence in Washington to meet briefly with Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari who was in town for the NATO Summit. Talbott knew that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had been considering appointing Ahtisaari as a UN envoy for the Balkans, but Ahtisaari was cool to the overture. The Finnish president shared American concerns that Milosevic would "nickel and dime" any UN mediator, and he showed little interest in the post. While the meeting between the two men was largely uneventful, Talbott could not help but be struck by Ahtisaari's resolve, and their brief encounter would soon prove critical. Talbott and a small delegation left for Moscow on a military plane from Andrews Air Force base at ten o'clock that evening. As one of his staff recalled, "It was quite a moment. Here the president of the United States and the president of Russia just had a long conversation about a war in Europe and Strobe was leaving that night on a presidential mission on the chairman


of the Joint Chief's designated airplane to go to Moscow." As it turned out, the small delegation did not get the chairman's plane and took a C-20 instead, and the plane ended up needing repairs during a refueling stop in Iceland. Stuck with a long layover and scrambling to rearrange plans from the tarmac, the diplomats were not off to an auspicious start. After a delay of several hours, the team resumed its flight. On Monday, April 26, Chernomyrdin and Gore spoke on the telephone for over an hour. Much of the conversation was dominated by Gore reiterating the conditions that were spelled out by the NATO leaders at the summit, with Chernomyrdin enthusiastic to engage in serious negotiations. Chernomyrdin wanted to sit down directly with Gore and indicated that he could travel almost immediately to do so. The Russian envoy also emphasized that one element would be key to any deal with Milosevic: Some Yugoslav troops would need to stay behind in Kosovo. The two agreed to a face-to-face meeting in Washington early in May after Talbott returned from Moscow. A slightly bedraggled Talbott and his team arrived in Moscow that same day. On April 27, Talbott met with Foreign Minister Ivanov, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, Special Envoy Boris Mayorsky, and several others at the Russian foreign ministry. The quiet consensus within the U.S. delegation was that the negotiations were largely for show, designed simply to buy more time for bombing. Washington hoped to try and talk some reason with the Russians, lower the rhetoric, and show the Europeans that they were pursuing a diplomatic solution. Chernomyrdin continued to be the only direct channel to Milosevic, and the Europeans continued to be concerned that with day after day of bombing, there was no endgame in sight. One team member put the matter of coalition management bluntly, "The Allies would not hold firm on the bombing if the Americans did not take care of the Russians." Talbott spelled out the conditions established at the summit, and explained that his mission was to explore if the Russian and American positions could be brought closer together. Foreign Minister Ivanov claimed that as a result of Chernomyrdin's visit to Belgrade, Milosevic was willing to allow refugees to return to Kosovo, but he felt that the province's political status and the withdrawal of Serb forces were still sticking points. Ivanov was concerned that NATO peacekeepers would be a Trojan Horse for establishing long-term influence over the region, and noting what NATO had originally sold as "interim" security arrangements in Bosnia appeared "destined to


continue in perpetuity." Talbott countered that the West had little interest in an independent Kosovo, a position that Ivanov hailed as "serious progress." Not surprisingly, Ivanov also pushed for a bombing pause. Talbott said that a pause would be impossible until Belgrade had agreed to NATO's demands, adding, "Moscow needs to move beyond simply negotiating what it thinks Belgrade is willing to accept." Ivanov claimed NATO's bombing had shown no result, while Russia's diplomatic efforts were making progress, and that no war ever ended itself. In comments to reporters after the meeting, Ivanov took a hard line. "Put yourself in the place of the Yugoslav leaders," he said, "Would you allow the same people who destroyed your country to carry out the peacekeeping operation?" Talbott also spoke with Prime Minister Primakov on the telephone. Primakov insisted that the United States had made a "grandiose and tragic error. . . . The U.S. and NATO are mistaken if you think Milosevic will capitulate. Each day of bombing raises the potential for negative results which will render a peaceful resolution increasingly more elusive." A short time later, Talbott met with Chernomyrdin in a session that stretched for more than two hours. (Talbott, a good Russian speaker, usually dispensed with the translation of Chernomyrdin's comments from Russian to English, but would often have his own remarks translated back into Russian to ensure that no nuance of what he was saying was lost in what could sometimes be very technical comments.) Chernomyrdin opened the meeting by referring to his telephone call with Gore the day before. He felt there were substantial areas of agreement between the United States and Russia but that Milosevic's views also had to be taken into account. The special envoy's tone was nonpolemical, and he said that earlier in the day he had told President Yeltsin that he felt "a colossal amount of work" could produce an agreement. He cited the issue of troop withdrawals as an example of the challenges before them. NATO wanted all the Serb forces out; Milosevic wanted substantial number of troops to remain. A compromise was needed. He also cited the composition of the peacekeeping force as another area where the sides would have to meet halfway and sought to confirm that NATO was not pushing to topple Milosevic. Talbott pointed out that given Milosevic's long record of broken promises, continued military pressure was essential, but that NATO was neither demanding Milosevic's ouster nor Kosovo's independence. However, the Alliance would cooperate with the UN International War Crimes Tribunal,

THE SHUTTLE BEGINS * 71 and that body might eventually indict Milosevic. Chernomyrdin wryly replied that during his visit to Belgrade, he had heard that the Yugoslavs intended to bring similar charges against NATO. The Russian envoy made his pitch in folksy tones, as he argued that the "most important question" was whether the Yugoslav government would be able "to do anything" in Kosovo. "If the administration, police, border guards, law enforcement, and government are all off-limits, what will remain of Yugoslav control of Kosovo—when we agree that Kosovo should remain part of Yugoslav territory?" Talbott responded, "One of the tragedies and disgraces of the situation is that Yugoslavia under Milosevic has demonstrated that even when the international community wants to preserve national boundaries, states can still fall apart with cruel and stupid leadership. At Rambouillet, it might have been possible to leave some Serb border guards and some police and troops in Kosovo—but three quarters of all Kosovars have been driven from their homes, and they will not go back if they have to fear a nocturnal knock on the door by the Yugoslav army, police, or the guys with ski masks." Talbott suggested that perhaps a small number of unarmed Yugoslav guards might be allowed to remain at some historic sites. Chernomyrdin argued that Kosovo risked becoming a permanent ward of the international community. He took out a map, pointed to Kosovo's mountainous terrain, and insisted the Serbs would wage a relentless guerilla conflict against NATO, just as they had against the Nazis. He said that Russia had learned the same lesson in Chechnya and that it was wise to "never trust the generals, even in a time of war." In a one-on-one session with Talbott, Chernomyrdin confided: I'll tell you frankly that I'm truly worried about Al's [Gore] participation in Kosovo problem-solving, because it could either lift him to unprecedented heights, or bring him down—if not forever, then for a long time to come. For this reason, I want him to make the choice for himself; I've not insisted on Gore's participation as a condition for my own involvement. However, if it worked, it would be a plus for Gore as a statesman. Since Russia is not participating in the conflict, I see no benefit for myself personally. The Russian envoy argued that the real question facing them was, "Do Russia and the U.S. drive Milosevic deeper and deeper into the corner, or

72 * COLLISION COURSE do we give him a way out?" H e added, "It's precisely our sense of urgency that led to the telephone call from President Yeltsin to Clinton, and it was made at m y suggestion. I believe Al Gore and all other members of the U.S. administration need to participate in the negotiating process because the world c o m m u n i t y is awaiting results. I need to be equipped with the best possible arguments on possible compromises. Specifically, Strobe, I need to understand better the conditions for an end to bombing." " T h e y are very simple, Viktor Stepanovich," Talbott replied, using the Russian familiar form of Chernomyrdin's name. "Let me lay them out." First, Belgrade must agree to an end to the repression and deportations and expulsions it's carrying out in Kosovo; second, it must agree to withdraw all its forces from Kosovo—and that means police, army, and paramilitaries; third, it must agree to the deployment of an international security presence with NATO at its core; fourth, it must agree that the humanitarian organizations can come back; and, fifth, it must agree to a political process that will establish autonomy. If Belgrade agreed to all this, unambiguously, and if we saw, with our own eyes, that withdrawals had begun, then bombing could stop. Chernomyrdin jotted the conditions down and was eager for details. H o w long would the Serbs be allotted for withdrawal? H o w would the process be verified? W h a t form would Kosovo's new administrative and civil authority take? H o w would events be sequenced? T h e Russians, reflecting Yugoslav concerns, were very focused on disarming the KLA and discussing mechanisms for protecting ethnic Serbs. Talbott agreed that these were vital questions and vowed to quickly get answers. Stressing the difficulty of the issue for Belgrade, Chernomyrdin made a pitch for having N A T O forces stationed in Albania and Macedonia—but not in Kosovo. As Chernomyrdin put it, " T h e y would not have to be U.S. forces, but rather perhaps Swedish, Russian, Ukrainian, and other nations. Perhaps those N A T O countries that have been bombing could sort of hold back—you know, in Albania and Macedonia—and others, Greece, Turkey, perhaps, could be in the first wave that goes in." " T h a t doesn't sound workable," said Talbott. " T h e initial stage—the first wave, as you call it—is going to be especially important, especially dangerous, and especially requiring of a robust, serious force. We can't have Bel-


grade's vetoing who takes part, especially because they'll be interested precisely in weakening the force." "Well Strobe, we have to be flexible. You have to help us here. We need to find a compromise—not a compromise in the sense of a concession by you—but in something that works with all parties." "Viktor Stepanovich, let me be honest. We're beyond compromising with Belgrade. We did give-and-take diplomacy for fourteen months, and he not only didn't give—he used the diplomacy as a cover for killing people and shelling villages and driving people out of their homes. We'll have an open, back-and-forth conversation with you so that you'll understand where we can be flexible and where we can't. But when it comes to Belgrade, we're going to have to be very, very firm." Chernomyrdin pointed out that Milosevic could also be stubborn, and that it would be a disaster if NATO staggered into a ground war. Chernomyrdin agreed that he should put off seeing NATO Secretary-General Solana, and added that he wanted to give U.S. and Russian military experts some time to hammer out some details of a potential agreement before again traveling to Belgrade. He stressed that Milosevic was in total control, and warned that the Serbs would welcome a ground war because it would result in a "bloodbath." As the meeting with Chernomyrdin concluded, Talbott was left with a distinct impression that Chernomyrdin viewed him as something of a "delivery boy," and was eager to open direct talks with Gore. In communicating back to Washington to both Albright and Berger, Talbott saw both positives and negatives from his round of talks in Moscow. On the upside, neither Ivanov nor Chernomyrdin demanded a bombing pause as a precondition for further talks, and both seemed more willing to accept the logic of total Serb withdrawal. The deputy secretary felt that Chernomyrdin and Ivanov had begun to seriously explore what exactly "NATO at the core" would mean in practice. Talbott's list of negatives stretched as long as the positives. He found the Russians "cautious, modest, even pessimistic about being able to deliver Milosevic," while being "apocalyptic about the consequences if the bombing continues indefinitely—and cosmically so if NATO invades Yugoslavia." There was also disorder within the ranks of the Russian government. As Talbott described it, "The internal—shall we say 'interagency'—dynamics in Moscow are nothing short of bizarre. Ivanov, whom I saw first, treated my forthcoming meeting with Chernomyrdin as though it were a courtesy call


on a distinguished former personage; Chernomyrdin barely referred to the foreign minister or his ministry." These divisions would not soon disappear. On April 27, General Clark conducted a news conference in Brussels. Toward the end of the session, he fielded a question from John Dugberg of the los Angeles Times about personnel and equipment losses being inflicted upon the Yugoslav military. Clark replied that because Milosevic "is bringing in reinforcements continually from the Second Army" the actual troop level in Kosovo might actually be higher than at the beginning of the conflict "so if you actually added up what's there . . . you might actually find out that he has strengthened his forces." Clark's statements led to a spate of negative stories in the U.S. press on April 28 regarding the limited progress of the campaign and further infuriated Secretary of Defense Cohen, who was already angered by Clark's willingness to go directly to the national security staff to advance his policy positions. At a White House meeting that day, Cohen went so far as to discuss potentially relieving Clark of his command in the middle of the air campaign. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton, came to Clark's defense and noted that such a move would widely be seen as a public relations disaster. While Shelton's position won the day, he was told by Cohen to read Clark the riot act regarding his media appearances. According to Clark, Shelton called later in the day and told him, "Wes, at the White House meeting today there was a lot of discussion about your press conference. The secretary of defense asked me to give you some verbatim guidance, so here it is: 'Get your fucking face off the TV. No more briefings, period. That's it.'"

The Peace Offensive On April 28, Talbott traveled to Geneva, where he met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov during two long sessions, including a dinner at the Intercontinental Hotel. The two men had a strong working relationship and a genuine friendship. However, Mamedov again made clear that he would not be a central player in the Kosovo diplomacy and would only be available to do preview and wrap-up meetings on the margins of negotiating sessions to informally cover "political issues." Mamedov saw himself as providing a safety net for the discussions and professed with dark

THE SHUTTLE BEGINS * 75 humor that on certain issues the two sides were ultimately "doomed to agree." He also complained, "NATO is a small, petty organization which keeps Russia from having good relations with the other powers in Europe." One of Talbott's delegation, Toria Nuland, inquired if Russia would support a UN Security Council resolution that authorized the use of force if Milosevic ultimately refused to accept reasonable demands. Mamedov observed that Russia might be willing to do so, but wanted to make sure that any UN resolution "would include a specific commitment to suspend NATO air strikes if Milosevic meets the conditions." Talbott expressed concern that the Russians continued to feel there should be "no winners and no losers" in the conflict, claiming such an approach placed Russia on the wrong side of history. There was some speculation within the U.S. team that a UN resolution might help the Russians whether Milosevic accepted it or not. If Milosevic signed on, Russia would be heralded as a peacemaker. If Milosevic resisted and NATO kept bombing, it would make clear that Milosevic had no one to blame but himself for turning down a fair peace. Mamedov pointed out that political tensions in Moscow over Kosovo were running high and that many factions did not want to see an accommodation. He argued that Russians felt increasingly isolated, with almost a siege mentality, as NATO moved into the Balkans. The political climate that had made U.S.-Russian cooperation possible in the past had shifted, with many new players now in positions of power. Although the mood at the table grew edgy several times, Talbott concluded the meeting by stressing that NATO could handle the Kosovar Albanians if Russia could take care of Milosevic. Talbott later said of Mamedov's efforts, "He gave me plenty of cautions that there's no guarantee." Talbott saw the possibility of getting the Russians on board with a UN resolution as a long shot. However, he also understood that a UN resolution would have some benefits for Yeltsin's team in that it would "trump their domestic opponents who are accusing them of impotence" and arrest the dangerous decline in Russia's relations with West. Talbott would describe Moscow's diplomatic efforts as "the Russian equivalent of a Hail-Mary pass. I say: let's go for it, since the downside— while real—is no greater than that of bulling ahead without at least one attempt to play with the Russians." Talbott also saw intensive, high-visibility diplomacy with the Russians useful for the United States in at least three respects: It demonstrated NATO's interest in pursuing peace; it bought more


time for bombing; and "it could create openings that will actually, at some point, induce Belgrade to do the necessary." However, the deputy secretary of state also understood that "the Russians will devote the coming days and weeks to trying to lawyer us into interpreting our mantra on conditions so leniently that we'll end up lowering the bar and letting Milosevic off with a plea bargain." Flying quickly from Geneva to Berlin, Talbott met with UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan. Annan was preparing to head to Moscow and wanted to compare notes with Talbott before his trip. Talbott suggested that while Moscow was beginning to acknowledge the logic of NATO's demands, there was no evidence that Milosevic was any closer to capitulating. The United States wanted to make perfectly clear to Annan that NATO had to form the core of any military force in Kosovo and that the United Nations would not run the peacekeeping effort. Annan agreed, emphasizing that the United Nations did not want to repeat the debacle of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, where lightly armed international peacekeepers had been taken hostage by the Serbs. While Annan said many of the things the United States wanted to hear, he concluded the meeting by laying out what he called his "nightmare" scenario, with Milosevic concluding that he was trapped and refusing to yield. The conflict would then drag on through the summer and public support for the war would begin to ebb. Would NATO then soften its conditions? The secretary-general seemed to believe that Milosevic's resolve, or "ruthlessness quotient," was greater than that of the Alliance. Talbott insisted that the only way to make sure Milosevic came to heel was by remaining firm. As Annan arrived in Moscow on April 29, President Yeltsin reportedly complained to a closed-door meeting of his national security advisors that NATO no longer feared Russia. At the gathering, Yeltsin approved a new security doctrine that emphasized beefing up thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that had been unilaterally taken out of service earlier in the decade. The Russians claimed that the move had nothing to do with Kosovo, but it reflected growing anxiety over their declining international position. Annan held a long series of meetings in Moscow with Ivanov, Yeltsin, Primakov, and Chernomyrdin. Annan was pleased to find Yeltsin generally alert and engaged; as the Russian president told him, "You and I together can be invincible; we can end this thing." The secretary-general felt the Russians "all sang from the same hymnal" and underscored that despite Cherno-


myrdin's new role, Ivanov and the foreign ministry would have to sign off on any deal. The Russians repeatedly hammered home to Annan that the crisis could only be resolved by a "political solution" and that military disaster was looming. They pitched hard for UN control of peacekeeping. Ivanov noted that NATO troops would have to be involved and again floated the notion of stationing Alliance troops in Macedonia and Albania with "nonaggressors" deployed within Kosovo. Chernomyrdin announced that he would be making his second visit to Belgrade the next day—April 30—and stressed that the military presence would be among the key issues he would discuss with Milosevic. Russian Prime Minister Primakov told the UN secretary-general that the situation was defined by four "impossibilities": that Milosevic would capitulate; that the peacekeeping force be led by NATO; that negotiations could succeed while bombing continued; and that Kosovo could be turned into an international protectorate. Later that evening, Secretary-General Annan flew to London, where he again met with Deputy Secretary Talbott. The two men met in Annan's hotel room; it was crowded with staff members, several sitting perched on his bed. The Russians had made some progress with Annan, and he was troubled by the repeated assertions that Milosevic would not capitulate. The UN secretary-general floated the idea of a potential bombing pause, relaying Ivanov's proposal for a gesture of goodwill with a two-day break to pave the way for intensive negotiations. Talbott summarized Annan's view: "NATO will have to yield on some key points and make substantive concessions to Milosevic. Why? Because Milosevic is meaner and tougher than NATO; he's more stubborn; he's more willing to inflict death and destruction on his own citizens and soldiers—not to mention on his enemies, on the Kosovo Albanians and on his neighbors—than we are." Talbott pointed out that the Russians had not raised the issue of a bombing pause with him and expressed his hoped that the Russians were not trying to play the United Nations against NATO—which they were. The two men then decided they should have a more private conversation, and the staffers dutifully trundled out of the hotel room. Annan insisted that while the Russians were good negotiators, they were poorly positioned to serve as intermediaries in dealing with Kosovo. The UN secretary-general wanted to strengthen the role for potential UN special envoys in resolving the crisis, an appeal that was anathema to the United States


and Great Britain because both knew that Annan was eager to compromise. After kicking around the names of several possible envoys, Talbott expressed his displeasure that the secretary-general had made a number of statements that commentators were interpreting as an equal condemnation of both Milosevic and NATO. Annan insisted that his remarks had been misconstrued but warned that NATO bombing could create a "humanitarian crisis on a vast scale whose victims will be the Serbs." Annan pleaded with the United States to leave the United Nations some room to maintain its institutional integrity and independence. On April 29, Gore and Chernomyrdin spoke briefly the telephone. Chernomyrdin would visit the United States to meet with Gore on the heels of his next trip to Belgrade. Ivanov and Albright spoke shortly after. In yet another troubling sign of the communication gaps within the Russian government, Ivanov maintained that he could not comment on Chernomyrdin's discussion with Gore because he had not been briefed. He did acknowledge that Chernomyrdin would attempt to get clarification from Milosevic on three issues: the withdrawal of Serb forces, the creation of conditions that would allow refugees to return, and the establishment of an international military and civilian presence in Kosovo. Albright feared that Chernomyrdin would again announce some type of sham agreement with Milosevic while in Belgrade and then insist that NATO stop bombing. She told Ivanov that while she supported a political settlement, any agreement that did not meet NATO's bottom lines would be a dead letter, "We will not stop bombing just on the basis of promises from Milosevic." Ivanov decried, "Serbia is being destroyed by this one-way bombing," which led Albright to point to the terror Milosevic was inflicting on the Kosovars. April 30 brought a curious carnival of diplomatic activity to Belgrade, and signaled a renewed effort by Milosevic to launch a "peace offensive" to rattle Alliance unity. The Reverend Jesse Jackson and an entourage that included a U.S. Congressman of Serbian descent from Chicago, Rod Blagojevich (DIL), Landrum Boiling of the Conflict Management Group, and numerous religious leaders arrived in the Yugoslav capital to plead with President Slobodan Milosevic to release three American servicemen who had been taken prisoner by Serb forces on the Kosovo-Macedonia border on March 31. The Clinton administration had actively discouraged Jackson from making the pilgrimage, nervous that Milosevic would manipulate the visit for propaganda purposes. These concerns were reinforced as Jackson told reporters that he was eager to "break the cycle of violence," and that "in the end we


may be able to talk it out and not fight it out." Despite entreaties from National Security Advisor Sandy Berger to call off the trip, Jackson went ahead, leaving Berger furious. The first meeting between Jackson's entourage and Milosevic stretched for more than three hours, with Milosevic complaining that the United States had forgotten that the Serbs had stood with the Allies against Hitler in World War II. Milosevic also outlined a proposal for bombing to stop concurrently with other steps to end the war. Milosevic was widely known in diplomatic circles for his ability to charm Westerners, speaking fluent, albeit ungrammatical, English and saying exactly what his visitors usually wanted to hear. Jackson and Milosevic also took a private walk in the Yugoslav president's garden. At the end of the meeting, in a moment verging on the surreal, Jackson grasped Milosevic's hand and led the group in prayer, as he urged the Yugoslav president to release the three soldiers as "a bold diplomatic move." Jackson's visit was emblematic of the larger challenge facing NATO, as growing numbers of envoys, both official and self-appointed, trekked to Belgrade. Just as the airspace over Moscow was growing crowded with diplomats, the same was true for the Yugoslav capital. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Chernomyrdin, Orthodox churchmen, members of the U.S. Congress, representatives from the United Nations, Jesse Jackson, and other religious leaders were all rushing to Belgrade to offer their own solution to the war. "Envoy envy" reached a fever pitch. Milosevic was being presented with new negotiators and new peace plans almost every day, giving him more opportunities to exploit. As Jackson visited Belgrade on April 30, so did Chernomyrdin. Milosevic presented the Russian envoy with his own peace proposal that would allow Kosovo "autonomy," while insisting that NATO forces had to pull back from Yugoslav borders. Chernomyrdin, frustrated, asked Milosevic sharply, "Do you really think you can win this war?" "No," Milosevic replied. He also made clear that he did not intend to lose; a stalemate would serve him fine. He argued that no one had vanquished the Yugoslavs in 400 years. "Let them just try now; let them just try to stick their noses in here. A ground operation will definitely fail." Russian officials would later claim that in these early discussions Milosevic seemed eager for NATO to initiate ground operations because it would allow his forces an opportunity to inflict casualties and shake Western confidence. A

80 * COLLISION COURSE senior W h i t e House official asserted that while many critics felt that N A T O ' s initial decision to take ground troops off the table created a certain "sanctuary" for Milosevic: There was an equally credible argument, and the intelligence supported it, that there was nothing that Milosevic wanted more than to get us in a ground war, because they could start killing Americans when he couldn't in the air campaign. While there was a clear recognition of the value of the psychology of the threat of ground troops, we put much more emphasis on the notion that Milosevic wanted to drag us in, fight us on his own terms and nothing would please him more. T h e meetings between Milosevic and C h e r n o m y r d i n again stretched some nine hours, and upon returning to Moscow the next day the Russian envoy observed, "Belgrade shows constructive intentions, which can become a basis for further progress." However, noting the considerable gulf between the positions of Russia and N A T O , Chernomyrdin acknowledged, " W e consider the situation to be far from simple." In yet another sign of increasing regional tensions, a Russian plane carrying "humanitarian assistance" from Moscow to Belgrade was turned away as neighbor states refused to grant the Russian flight an air corridor. In an interview with United Press International on April 30, Milosevic made clear that he was in no hurry to accept demands. T h e Yugoslav president sounded like of some of the Western critics of the N A T O operation when he said, "America is a great country and Americans are great people. But your leaders are not strategic thinkers . . . They said let's b o m b Yugoslavia and then figure out what to do next." Milosevic, admitting, " W e are not angels," claimed that the N A T O effort was part of a larger plot to, "reestablish U.S. leadership in N A T O in the p o s t - C o l d War era." Milosevic maintained, "Rambouillet was not a negotiation. It was a Clinton administration diktat. It wasn't take it or leave it. Just take it or else." Asked if he would accept a U N peacekeeping force, he replied, "Yes, but no army," and stressed that peacekeepers should have " n o offensive weapons. We cannot accept anything that looks like an occupation." Asked his version of a reasonable compromise he replied, "First of all, cessation of all military activities. Second, simultaneity between the withdrawal of N A T O troops now concentrated on our borders in Albania and Macedonia, on the one hand, and the decrease


of our own troops in Kosovo from their present level of 100,000 to the normal garrison strength of between 11,000 and 12,000." Milosevic suggested that European countries that were not members of NATO, such as Ireland, would be acceptable peacekeepers, as would be Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Milosevic was convinced he could get a better deal than NATO had put on the table at the summit, and he was direct: "You are not willing to sacrifice lives to achieve our surrender. But we are willing to die to defend our rights as a sovereign independent nation." In a surprise move on May 1, President Milosevic announced the release of the three captured American servicemen to Jesse Jackson's delegation. This led Jackson to plead for Yugoslavia to receive "a night of peace from the bombs." Jackson also urged that talks to end the war commence immediately. President Clinton spoke with Jackson after he had secured the release of the prisoners, and Jackson urged Clinton to speak on the telephone with Milosevic. However, the U.S. national security team pushed back hard against the idea, arguing that it was more important than ever that the Alliance hold firm in the face of Milosevic's public relations effort. Ultimately Clinton and Milosevic only exchanged rather formulaic letters, while Jackson was able to bask in the publicity of his unlikely diplomatic success. NATO officials quickly made clear that the release of the three soldiers would not influence the air campaign. Shortly after Jackson left Belgrade, the Alliance launched one of its heaviest days of attack on Yugoslavia since the conflict had begun. Strikes on power facilities and other infrastructure targets cast large swaths of the country into darkness. This was part of a strategy to widen the bombing and bring the costs of the war home both to Milosevic's inner circle and the people of Serbia. With a touch of swagger NATO officials proclaimed to now have a "finger on the light switch in Yugoslavia." The strategy was not without risk. As Yugoslavia's citizens struggled to cope with a lack of water, power, and other basic amenities, concerns were mounting in Western capitals that NATO's bombing strategy was in violation of international law. Lacking UN authority for the bombing campaign, many commentators argued that any NATO bombing—much less high altitude attacks against urban areas—was a violation of international norms. To counter these claims, NATO officials continued to insist that they were acting as a collective of nations, guided by the NATO charter, to help stem egregious and widespread human rights abuses by the Yugoslav government.


The contest between the rights of sovereign states to be protected against unilateral interventions and the rights of individuals to be protected by the international community against the abuses of their own governments remains a contentious and ambiguous area within international law, and one in which Kosovo shed more heat than light. In a welcome sign of Alliance unity, French President Chirac declared in a nationally televised address to the people of France, "One can have no faith today in the Belgrade authorities; with all conscience, as far as I'm concerned, I see no reason to change strategy." The Alliance was scraping through yet another peace offensive by Milosevic. On May 2, Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov spoke on the telephone. Chernomyrdin was slated to arrive in Washington for talks with Gore the next day. Ivanov claimed Chernomyrdin would arrive with a proposal from President Yeltsin that "could lead to substantial progress." The two also discussed a draft UN Security Council resolution that would be considered by the G-8, although Albright insisted there was no point in convening the G-8 foreign ministers to discuss the matter unless they had a credible document from which to work. Vice President Gore also made clear to Chernomyrdin before the latter came to Washington that the continuation of the hostilities would make it increasingly difficult for the international community to maintain Yugoslavia's unity. In raw terms, if Milosevic continued to resist, a ground war and an independent Kosovo might inevitably follow.

4

CHAPTER

The Dog Days of Spring

Hammer and Anvil Viktor Chernomyrdin arrived in Washington on May 3 with succinct orders from Yeltsin: Find a way to end the bombing. Talbott and the Russian Ambassador to the United States, Yuri Ushakov, greeted the Russian envoy at Andrews Air Force Base. Upon touching down, Chernomyrdin told reporters that it was time "to take the step to dramatic diplomacy from bloody, protracted war." During the drive to the White House, the conversation between Chernomyrdin and Talbott was dominated by the Russian envoy's impressions of his visit to Belgrade. Milosevic seemed willing to accept some form of military force in Kosovo but did not want the operation dominated by NATO. Chernomyrdin brought Moscow's latest peace proposal: On an agreedupon day, Belgrade would announce the start of a withdrawal of its forces from Kosovo and NATO would suspend air strikes and provide guarantees that it would not commence ground operations. Kofi Annan would then promptly fly to Belgrade to work out the text of a UN Security Council resolution, and then the Yugoslavs, Annan, and Chernomyrdin would hold negotiations. After a UN Security Council resolution was adopted, NATO's military operation would officially terminate and a UN peacekeeping force would be deployed. There was little appeal in Yeltsin's plan, but the Russians were notorious for starting negotiations with a low bid. 83


At the White House, Chernomyrdin held a one-on-one meeting with Vice President Gore and then went into an Oval Office meeting with President Clinton, Gore, and other members of the national security team. Chernomyrdin was invited to continue discussions with Gore at the vice president's residence that evening, along with Sandy Berger and Leon Fuerth. Secretary Albright was unable to attend because the president was hosting a state dinner for Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, so Talbott was sent from the dinner to the meeting as Albright's proxy; he arrived incongruously attired in his black tuxedo and purple bow tie. Gore and Chernomyrdin had known each other for more than five years, and there was a genuine sense of friendship between the two. Gore's National Security Advisor Leon Fuerth commented on the relationship: "It was always first rate, and this is the point. Gore and Chernomyrdin never B.S.'ed each other and they each knew it. Chernomyrdin, to the extent that anyone can be, especially in his circumstances, was faithful to his commitments once he made them." Although sharing a certain bond, the style of the two men starkly contrasted. "Al is not the big bear hug kind of a guy," a senior U.S. official observed, "He is not the kind of guy you throw back shots of vodka with." Where Gore could be almost didactic, the Russian envoy was an earthy man, sometimes coarse, and not shy about using profanity or drinking during the talks. Chernomyrdin was gregarious, but his bouts of temper could come suddenly, and his ruddy face was that of a man of considerable appetites. Chernomyrdin had a Ph.D. in engineering and had worked as an operator and unit chief at the Orsk oil refinery before later going on to head the minister of the gas industry for the USSR and later Russia. In his manner, he had never fully shed the roughneck feel of the oil and gas business. There were growing tensions within Gore's staff about how best to deal with the Russians. Gore himself had fundamentally soured on Russia at some point, and recognized that the frequent corruption charges leveled at Moscow were a political liability. While still favoring general cooperation with Russia, Gore had a real wariness because the situation in the Balkans was uncertain and the political season was heating up. Sitting at a broad table, Leon Fuerth, Sandy Berger, and Strobe Talbott flanked Gore. Russian Ambassador Ushakov and Boris Ivanovsky, an advisor to Chernomyrdin from the Russian foreign ministry, sat on either side of Chernomyrdin. As he drew diverging lines on a piece of paper, the vice presi-

THE DOG DAYS OF SPRING * 85

dent argued, "We're at a fork in the road. This first way lies bombing, continued and accelerated. However, if the Yugoslav president took the other fork, he might maintain some sovereignty over Kosovo and benefit from long-term assistance to the region." Gore's National Security Advisor Leon Fuerth emphasized, "Chernomyrdin laid out the case for terminating the war on conditions less strenuous than the ones NATO had laid down, and he hit these points hard. I think it was his intention to see if he could shake the United States in its support for the NATO demands. Gore's response was detailed point for point, analyzing how the Russian proposal would create a situation less secure than the NATO proposals. I believe that Gore's response convinced Chernomyrdin that there was not very much room for bargaining about the terms. I also believe that the prior relationship between Gore and Chernomyrdin accelerated that conclusion, because they knew each other well enough that Chernomyrdin understood when he was in the presence of an absolute bottom line being presented by the vice president, as indeed he was." Chernomyrdin made a pitch for bringing a neutral international figure into the diplomatic efforts who could accompany him on his next trip to Belgrade. He asserted that Moscow, because of the intense domestic outrage over NATO's offensive, did not want to be seen "accepting Milosevic's sword." Introducing a third party would provide President Yeltsin with much-needed political cover, and having someone who could represent NATO's views would speed a possible settlement. Chernomyrdin suggested that Kofi Annan might play such a role. Under his scenario, Chernomyrdin would push Milosevic as far as Russia realistically could, with the neutral international figure more decisively making NATO's case. This would help Yeltsin avoid any appearance that he was betraying Yugoslavia while helping move the process toward a peaceful conclusion. Annan had been attempting to get a foot in the door of the diplomatic process for some time, and he would likely be receptive to the proposal. The lack of enthusiasm for Annan among the U.S. negotiators was immediately apparent, and Gore explained in no uncertain terms why NATO did not want Annan in such a role. Gore flatly stated that Annan would not be given a hand in negotiating the terms under which NATO's air campaign would be terminated. The fear was that UN involvement would dilute NATO's demands upon Belgrade—the exact reason the strategy appealed to the Russians. As the group snacked on finger food, much of the discussion

86 # COLLISION COURSE

continued to center on how to move peace talks forward, and under whose auspices such negotiations would take place. The session wore on for over two hours, and the group agreed to reconvene the next morning. As the Clinton administration officials made their way out to their waiting cars, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott suggested to Sandy Berger that Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari might make an ideal candidate for the type of "neutral" figure that Chernomyrdin wanted to bring in to the negotiations. Talbott was convinced that the Finn would be as tough as any NATO representative in dealing with Milosevic. Berger agreed that the Finnish president might fit the bill. On May 4, Secretary Albright, who later joined the breakfast meeting with Chernomyrdin, spoke with the UN secretary-general. She told Annan that Chernomyrdin continued to push for direct negotiations between Milosevic and Annan during a NATO bombing pause, but made clear her preference that the UN's involvement in the diplomacy be limited to the passage of a Security Council resolution. Annan agreed that he should not travel to Belgrade. Albright also expressed her concern with some of the names being considered by the secretary-general as UN envoys, and the relationship between the two continued to erode under the strains of the air campaign. Annan felt that Albright's approach was irrational in light of the situation on the ground, while Albright was concerned that Annan favored peace at any cost. A short time later, Chernomyrdin joined Vice President Gore, Berger, Albright, and Fuerth at Gore's residence at the Naval Observatory for an hour-long breakfast meeting over muffins and juice. Chernomyrdin again suggested that it would be helpful to bring a third party into the diplomacy. Gore and the others were cautiously receptive to the idea because it would give the diplomatic dialogue a broader patina of impartiality at a time when NATO was eager to gain international support—as long as the third party was not the UN. Secretary Albright suggested Finland's president, Martti Ahtisaari, as a third party to the talks between Russia and the United States to end the war in Kosovo, just as Berger and Talbott had discussed the night before. The reaction from Chernomyrdin was sharp and immediate. He loudly slapped his hand upon the table and exclaimed "Vot!—That's it." For the first time during their meetings, Chernomyrdin's beefy face was animated by the hope of a breakthrough.


Chernomyrdin approved of Ahtisaari, as did his superiors in Moscow. A new, unusual, and untested process of trilateral diplomacy had been born. For one of the few times during the more than eight weeks of bombing to that point, the United States and Russia had found common ground. As Talbott accompanied Chernomyrdin on his ride back out to Andrews Air Force Base, the Russian envoy was fixated on Ahtisaari's potential role, and he wanted the Finnish president to accompany him on a mission to Belgrade as soon as possible. Ahtisaari was well qualified for the unique role. The sixty-one-year-old president had long been an advocate of engagement with Russia, and because Finland was a neutral non-NATO country, it lent Ahtisaari an important voice of independence. The Russians were comfortable with Ahtisaari, and the Finns in general, because they were geographic neighbors and longtime political familiars. Indeed, the small town in Finland where Ahtisaari had been born became part of the Soviet Union at the conclusion of World War II. Chernomyrdin effused that he was "delighted" by the choice. "Ahtisaari was very convenient to me. We are neighbors, he is a charming person, a good politician, and it was a pleasure to work with him." Ahtisaari had met Chernomyrdin several times when he was prime minister, but he did not know him well. Ahtisaari also had a growing reputation as a peacemaker. He had been a career diplomat before ascending to the Finnish presidency and had a proven record of accomplishment in dealing with difficult negotiations in earlier jobs with the United Nations. The former schoolteacher had spent thirteen years heading the UN effort that led to peaceful independence for Namibia. His experience as the chief of the UN's Bosnia task force in 1992 and 1993 deeply shaped his views toward the Balkans, and the Serb hostage-taking of peacekeepers and the slaughter at Srebrenica powerfully formed his perception that the international community needed to act with resolve in dealing with Milosevic. Ahtisaari did not make his first foray into politics until 1994—when he returned from a peacemaking mission in Yugoslavia and won the presidency despite having never held elective office. Ahtisaari also enjoyed the benefit of having strong ties to the European Union, with the Finns scheduled to come into the rotating presidency of that body in July. His inclusion in the negotiations would allow the EU to feel like it had a seat at the table—while keeping the negotiating process free of extraneous players.


From the U.S. perspective, Ahtisaari was also ideal. Albright, Berger, and Talbott had confidence that the Finnish president would present NATO's conditions to Milosevic with clarity and resolve. President Ahtisaari would become an integral part of the diplomatic effort to end the war in a strategy Sandy Berger dubbed the "hammer and anvil." Ahtisaari would serve as the anvil, setting out NATO's demands of Yugoslavia. Chernomyrdin would be the hammer—driving home that Russia would no longer be able to protect Milosevic. It was envisaged that if they ever traveled jointly to Belgrade, Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari would not necessarily deliver identical messages in identical tones. Instead, the Clinton administration hoped that it would be able to get the Russians to take positions that were not contradictory to NATO's, with Ahtisaari filling in the details. Chernomyrdin's mere presence at the table would show Milosevic that he could no longer play Russia off against the Alliance. Ideally, in the end, Ahtisaari would be the one to take Milosevic's sword, the Russians would be granted a role in KFOR, and the horrors of a ground war would be avoided. However, the expectations of success for the trilateral talks were low. Talbott immediately contacted President Ahtisaari to see if he was interested in taking on the mission. Talbott said that their conversation needed to take place in "invisible ink" and that if the Finnish president declined, the "phone call never took place." Ahtisaari was enthusiastic in his own deliberate way. As he put it, the task was "difficult enough to interest me," but he and Talbott both agreed, "they would not bet any of their own money" on its prospects for success. The Finnish president felt that the diplomacy was designed to demonstrate Washington's seriousness about peace before being forced to move ahead with a ground war. "The failure of my effort would show to the world that Milosevic was a hopeless case. If I were to fail, the only remaining option would be a military one." In this sense, Ahtisaari viewed himself as something of a "sacrificial lamb" charged with determining if Milosevic would accept a peace, but he added, "I had made the decision not to run for reelection, so it was fairly easy for me to be of assistance." Ahtisaari welcomed the involvement of the Russians in the diplomatic effort, since they were the only ones who had maintained a close dialogue with Belgrade. He was also pleased that Chernomyrdin was a direct representative of Yeltsin and felt that because the Russian envoy was a man of inde-


pendent financial means, he would be far less vulnerable to political pressure from the Duma or the public. Acknowledging that Chernomyrdin would largely mirror Milosevic's interests, Ahtisaari used an old Finnish saying in justifying his diplomatic effort: "Trying to catch a salmon is always worthwhile—whether you catch it or not." Secretary Albright soon spoke with the UN secretary-general about Ahtisaari's role, and Annan's reaction was lukewarm, understanding that the proposal was, in part, a deliberate effort to freeze him out of the diplomacy. Despite Annan and Albright's mutual mistrust, the secretary-general eventually offered his reluctant support. Albright also approached the German government—which held the rotating presidency of the European Union until the end of June—to bless Ahtisaari's involvement from a EU perspective. The Germans were cautiously supportive but also wanted to make sure that a meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers would still be held in Bonn several days later to keep the Russians engaged. The Germans felt that otherwise frustration on the diplomatic front would continue to grow and spur a continuing pilgrimage of diplomats to Moscow. Talbott spoke with Chernomyrdin on the telephone during the morning of May 6. The Russian was excited, thinking in grand strokes, and he wanted to get the trilateral diplomacy moving. He suggested that Milosevic would accept a peace deal as long as he could maintain his hold on the Yugoslav presidency. However, a dispute about how best to structure Ahtisaari's involvement quickly bubbled up, with Chernomyrdin wanting the Finnish president to immediately join him on a trip to Belgrade, but Talbott preferring that Ahtisaari accompany Chernomyrdin only on a "climactic and breakthrough visit" to Belgrade. Talbott urged Chernomyrdin to speak directly with Ahtisaari. The United States did not want Ahtisaari to engage in a long series of shuttle missions, and felt that some of the differences with Moscow on the military elements of a peace agreement needed to be resolved before a joint trip to Belgrade. Immediately after that call, Talbott phoned Ahtisaari and stressed that it would only make sense for Ahtisaari to travel with Chernomyrdin to Belgrade once the United States and Russia had come closer to agreement. In what turned out to be a major communication lapse, the Finnish president expressed surprise that anyone had expected him to accompany Chernomyrdin to the Yugoslav capital as part of the process. Talbott explained Chernomyrdin's theory that the Russians wanted Milosevic to turn his sword over


to a neutral figure. Ahtisaari wanted more time to think about a potential trip to Belgrade and stressed that he did not want to end up playing "Sancho Panza to Chernomyrdin's Don Quixote." In Finland, President Ahtisaari called the U.S. ambassador to Finland, Eric Edelman, to the presidential palace to further discuss the situation. Edelman had formerly served as Deputy Secretary Talbott's chief of staff, and the two enjoyed a close working relationship. Ahtisaari was concerned with several operational considerations. "If we fly together into Belgrade would there be a bombing pause for a day?" He also noted that he did not want to fly to Belgrade on the same plane with Chernomyrdin, and told Ambassador Edelman that he had begun to make practical arrangements "to fly with my own team of experts." Ahtisaari felt that the agenda for negotiations needed to be "carefully agreed beforehand. Otherwise there is too much opportunity for mischief making." He also sensed that timing would be critical. "I think two weeks from today would be about the earliest one could contemplate travel, certainly not before the end of next week. The timing should be determined by real opportunity. We should not force the pace." Ahtisaari saw two possibilities: "One is that the Russians pave the way and then I go in and accept his pistol, as it were. The other possibility is that I go somehow to verify that what the Russians have gotten Milosevic to agree to is consistent with the terms agreed to by the Russians, the EU, the UN, and NATO. Either way, it seems to make more sense to go after Chernomyrdin has been to Belgrade." Ahtisaari then stepped out to take a call from Chernomyrdin, who declared, "your quiet life as president of Finland is now over, you will be taking on an important new task for all humanity." Chernomyrdin said that he was prepared to travel to Helsinki as soon as the next day to hold talks with the Finnish president, but Ahtisaari wanted to push the visit off until May 13— after Talbott had a chance for another round of talks with the Russians. Ahtisaari then suggested that perhaps the best thing would be to hold a threeway meeting—Talbott, Ahtisaari, and Chernomyrdin—"to make sure we all see eye-to-eye." Chernomyrdin was not pleased by the schedule: "Time is running out. We must get NATO to stop the bombing. It is not important to argue about how the war started, but rather it is important to end it." Eventually, Chernomyrdin agreed to travel to Helsinki six days later on May 12. Ahtisaari's decision to travel to Belgrade only when Russia and NATO had closed some of their outstanding differences was pivotal, and it would shape the course of the diplomacy for weeks to follow. Talbott, Ahtisaari, and Chernomyrdin


would need to engage in intensive talks before any joint mission to Belgrade could be launched.

A Bad Day for NATO In Moscow, President Yeltsin's erratic behavior was again the focus of attention after he offered rambling and barely coherent remarks on the war at a Kremlin awards ceremony on May 6: "No one—just let Clinton, a little bit, accidentally, send a missile. We'll answer immediately." Yeltsin continued, "We don't want . . . such impudence! To unleash a war on a sovereign state. Without Security Council. Without United Nations. It could only be possible in a time of barbarism." The next day at a wreath-laying ceremony, Yeltsin would stumble and nearly fall before being steadied by Defense Minister Sergeyev. On May 6, while the private lines of diplomacy were buzzing between Washington, Moscow, and Helsinki, the public focus was on Bonn as the G-8 foreign ministers—representing the seven leading industrialized nations and Russia—attempted to forge a statement of conditions for ending the crisis to which they could collectively agree, just as NATO had done at its summit. German foreign ministry officials had been particularly keen on the gathering, wanting to keep the Russians engaged while limiting their growing domestic political fallout from the war. However, Secretary Albright had warned her foreign counterparts, "While putting an end to this, we need to be very careful about how we do so." It was her view that "there are some who want to end this no matter what." The Clinton administration was hopeful that the negotiations between Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Talbott would ultimately be the mechanism that allowed NATO to move from the generalities expressed by the G-8 to the specifics that would allow Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to make their joint trip to Belgrade. The G-8 ministers issued a statement detailing their "general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis," but the communique was the lowest common denominator between Russia and the West. There was still considerable work to be done in bridging the gulf between their positions. The statement called for: An immediate end to violence and repression in Kosovo; The safe return of refugees;


Withdrawal of military, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; The deployment of an "effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives"; The establishment of an interim UN administration for Kosovo; and, A "political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo; taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA." The joint statement led many observers to question whether NATO was softening its demands. The word "all" was still not attached to the call for Yugoslav troop withdrawals and NATO was not designated as the leader of the peacekeeping force, largely because Foreign Minister Ivanov refused to sign any document granting NATO a primary role without agreement from Milosevic. Worse still for those who feared the Alliance was going wobbly, the statement called for the international civil and security presence in Kosovo to be "endorsed and adopted" by the UN. Similarly, the language on the process to be pursued in determining Kosovo's final political status was so open-ended that it could mean almost anything. While there was obvious utility in having the G-8 ministers express agreement, no matter how vague, the communique fueled disquiet that NATO was looking for an easy way out. The G-8 statement reflected its reality: a document drafted by committee to meet the political and tactical needs of both the respective G-7 members and Russia. NATO wanted to pull Russia more closely to its demands as part of its double magnet strategy; Russia wanted to be seen as a major diplomatic player on the world stage. After the agreement was announced, Foreign Minister Ivanov declared, "The situation is, at long last, back in the UN framework." As Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg noted, "The Russian people don't have an abiding affection for the Serbs. The one thing that the Russians cared about, and it was a constant during the administration, was being involved. They want a role; they want to be a partner." The G-8 ministers' meeting played out against the larger backdrop of a visit by President Clinton to meet with German Chancellor Schroeder on


that same day. Clinton had been making a short swing through Germany and Belgium to shore up the allies, bring attention the plight of refugees, and show support for U.S. troops. After a great deal of discussion on the importance of shoring up Macedonia and Albania with both financial and rhetorical support, Schroeder got to the bottom line: "Where are we going on Kosovo?" He wanted to know what would happen if Russian support for a UN Security Council resolution and a NATO peacekeeping force did not materialize: "Then what?" Clinton struck an optimistic note, "We have had nineteen countries moving in the same direction. Considering that everyone has their own constraints . . . it has worked very well." Clinton cited Alliance unity as one reason he was "much more cautious than Tony Blair in talking ground troops, even though I think it is a good way to keep Milosevic off balance." The U.S. president also stressed that NATO needed to get ready for winter, both in terms of potentially caring for refugees and by preparing "to introduce ground troops, if we determine that the risks are acceptable—the risks to Alliance solidarity, to our relationship with Russia, and, of course, to the troops themselves." As Clinton observed, "We will have to make some very hard decisions for October within the next four to five weeks. If this is not resolved in the next month, we will have some very tough choices to make." The day before, General Clark had briefed President Clinton on the military situation, and the NATO commander continued to push hard for robust military measures ranging from putting Apache attack helicopters in action to pushing forward with ground troop planning. Schroeder offered no illusions about the German view of ground troops, "This will be difficult for us, even impossible for us." While sympathetic to Schroeder's political difficulties with the ground option, Clinton felt that winter would inflict a devastating toll on both Kosovar Albanians and on NATO itself. "If we fail to plan for this, and then people starve and freeze, that is one thing that would break support for what we are doing." In almost desperate tones, Michael Steiner, a diplomatic advisor to Schroeder, noted that winter was long off, but the "problem of Alliance unity will be upon us well before that." As if to highlight Steiner's words, the NATO Alliance was dealt a profound setback to its military and diplomatic goals only a day later. Late in the evening on May 7—just one day after the G-8 ministers had stood in unity to issue a joint statement—NATO launched an attack on what it


thought was the Yugoslav federal arms procurement headquarters. Instead, missiles slammed into the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Three Chinese citizens were killed instantly and another twenty wounded in what the government in Beijing quickly assailed as a "barbaric action" and a "war crime." Coverage of the incident dominated media around the globe. President Clinton offered his "profound condolences," while Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon was left to comment, "There is no such thing as clean combat." For a variety of reasons, the Chinese refused to believe the attack was accidental. The British newspaper the Guardian subsequently alleged that the NATO attack was deliberate and that the Chinese embassy had been used to transmit Yugoslav military communications; both NATO and the Chinese strongly denied the respective claims. Chinese outrage at the bombing quickly manifested itself in organized demonstrations at the American embassy in Beijing that briefly turned the U.S. ambassador and his staff into virtual hostages among a sea of angry Chinese protestors. The embassy incident sent shock waves through NATO foreign ministries and resulted in a temporary ban on air strikes against downtown Belgrade. It also came only two days after NATO had suffered its first fatalities of the conflict when a U.S. Apache helicopter crashed in Albania during a training mission. For a dangerous moment it looked like the will of the Alliance to prosecute the war against Milosevic might be unraveled by a deadly mistake allegedly caused by a CIA planner using an outdated map. Secretary-General Annan spoke with National Security Advisor Berger and claimed that he was not backing away from supporting NATO's demands, but that he would have to be very hard-nosed and tough in his public statements about the air strike. Berger understood and the conversation went as well as could be expected. Pundits and commentators blistered the conduct of NATO's campaign with renewed vigor. NATO's decision to revisit targeting procedures—including temporarily taking Belgrade off the target grid—and widespread concerns within the Alliance about the drift of the campaign led both the Yugoslavs and Russians to believe that the West's unity was near the breaking point. That perception, combined with intense Russian anger over the incident, further chilled diplomatic efforts. Talbott admitted of the talks with Russia at that point, "I was expecting the whole thing to fall in on itself." Both Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and special envoy Chernomyrdin knew that, for the moment, they could not be seen as engaging in diplomacy with the West. Tactically, they


also hoped that the campaign might crumble under the increasingly critical weight of Western public opinion. Moscow quickly dispatched Chernomyrdin to Beijing for emergency consultations with the Chinese, and his comments on the embassy bombing were unusually understated: "I don't think it will lead to anything good." The response to the embassy incident within NATO, other than some obvious hand-wringing, was stalwart. While wanting to avoid such costly and embarrassing mistakes in the future, sentiment for abandoning the air campaign did not gather steam at NATO. President Clinton and French President Chirac spoke in the immediate aftermath of the embassy bombing, and American officials were enormously relieved that Chirac had been "tough as nails." Although still opposed to a ground invasion, the French president said that NATO needed to show "moral backbone" and that "the air strikes must continue" until Milosevic capitulated. The Alliance had painfully come to understand the necessity of fortitude. Milosevic, hoping to capitalize on the fallout from the embassy strike, announced a "partial withdrawal" of his forces from Kosovo on May 10. However, the pullout amounted to little more than several busloads of Yugoslav soldiers being dropped off at the border with Serbia in a photo opportunity. Milosevic also met with a former UN special envoy for the Balkans, Yasushi Akashi, in Belgrade and discussed a willingness to accept a lightly armed peacekeeping force in the province. NATO made clear the bombing would continue. On May 11, General Clark briefed the NATO ambassadors in Brussels on the status of the military campaign. All the ambassadors were concerned about the embassy incident, but Clark assured them that he had put in place new checks to avoid another such mishap. Clark was undeterred, and he explained that his highest priority remained attacking Yugoslav forces in Kosovo while pursuing the Milosevic regime at the strategic level. He wanted NATO to intensify its attacks with more planes, targets, and resourcefulness. While all the ambassadors expressed support for the air campaign, and even its intensification, there was a steady undercurrent of unease in the room about both collateral damage and what some perceived as unwillingness by Clark to take political direction. As German Ambassador Joachim Bitterlich argued, "The longer the air war lasts the more our political leaders need to know where we are." The urge by political leaders to micromanage the air war was persistent,


but Clark stated flatly that he took his direction from the ambassadors and that he would rely on them to tell him if he was "over the top." Clark continued to bristle at the many restraints he faced, as he grumbled to the assembly, "I can make the campaign as ineffective as you want it to be, as long as it does not endanger the lives of airmen." Clark also emphatically argued that NATO "should not sanctuarize Belgrade." Despite the embassy incident, the Pentagon made clear to Clark that he "should hit Milosevic very hard" for the next several weeks in an effort to break his will. As Clark explained, "We kept up the tempo, striking air defense, air fields, bridges, military facilities, radio relay sites, and petroleum facilities throughout Serbia. We just needed a fallback, a guarantee. That was the ground plan." Behind the scenes, Clark and his staff continued to debate the best plans for ground operations. Clark had explored a number of options for the use of ground troops, ranging from utilizing invasion routes through the plains of Hungary with some 200,000 troops to seize Belgrade and topple Milosevic to a far more modest effort using a much smaller force that would carve out safe havens for refugees within Kosovo. The central question facing Clark and his staff as they updated the NATO ground assessment was whether to direct forces solely against Kosovo or to march all the way to Belgrade. Moving against Belgrade would allow ground troops to cross far better terrain in Serbia and strike directly at Milosevic's "center of gravity"—an approach grounded in traditional military doctrine and the use of decisive force. However, the political fallout from such a major operation would be far more severe and the potential for the Serbs to wage a lengthy insurgency operation in the streets of Belgrade was a serious concern. Clark knew that whatever choice he made had to be well thought out or it would be "ripped apart by various factions in Washington." Even from his initial effort, Clark began to lean toward the middle, wanting to "seize and secure Kosovo" but not Belgrade, in a plan that came to be called "Option B-." Using 175,000 NATO troops largely staged from Albania and Macedonia, B- would drive all of Milosevic's forces from Kosovo in what was anticipated to be a month-long heavy offensive. This challenging military task would be hard to sell politically. With the aftershocks of the Chinese embassy bombing still reverberating, the State Department continued to wrestle with the possibility of opening diplomatic back channels to Belgrade. On May 11, Landrum Boiling—the head of a humanitarian organization who had traveled with Jesse Jackson to


Belgrade as part of the effort to get the three U.S. servicemen released—met with Secretary Albright in Washington. Boiling was the senior European representative for Mercy Corps International, a relief group headquartered in Oregon. Boiling had been stationed in Belgrade as a war correspondent in the last year of World War II and had long been involved in humanitarian efforts in the region. Boiling made clear that he had no desire to meddle in Albright's work and that he only sought to be helpful. Boiling had held a number of discussions during the previous three months, and particularly during his three days in Belgrade, with a Yugoslav official by the name of Bogljub Karic, who wanted to serve as a diplomatic intermediary with the West. Karic was a longtime Milosevic ally and close to his politically powerful wife, Mirjana (Mira) Markovic. Karic was the chief money manager for the Yugoslav regime, the deputy prime minister for privatization, and came from one of that country's richest families. Karic had approached Boiling several times, both before and after the bombing started, and said he wanted to pursue direct, but informal, talks between United States and Yugoslav officials. "Why do we need the Russians and Germans? It is the U.S. that counts." Karic insisted that Milosevic was ready to strike a peace deal largely along the lines of the terms spelled out by NATO. However, Karic stressed that Milosevic felt very strongly about several points. First, he would not surrender Yugoslav claims of sovereignty over Kosovo. Second, he would insist that there was some uniformed, armed Yugoslav presence in Kosovo after a settlement. Lastly, he would not withdraw all of, or even a majority of, the Yugoslav forces from the province before the bombing stopped, but he would agree to some mutually acceptable agreement for ending the violence. Karic suggested that Milosevic would push hard for minimizing NATO participation in peacekeeping, but in the end he would accept a substantial peacekeeping force that included contingents from Russia, a few neutral countries, and a minority NATO presence. Karic said that Milosevic wanted him to head a small team that would visit the United States to meet with "highlyplaced" officials to as a precursor to direct official talks. Karic, while insisting that he was no fan of Milosevic, pronounced, "There is now no alternative. He's the one you have to make peace with, and he's ready." Boiling made clear that he had no way of evaluating the seriousness of Karic's offer. Karic had frequently put out feelers to public and private figures in the West. To some, Karic suggested that he was willing to lead the


opposition to unseat Milosevic. To others, such as Boiling, he claimed he wanted to open a negotiating track for Milosevic. Clinton administration officials assumed Karic was simply hedging his bets to position himself no matter what happened to Milosevic. Karic did not carry much credibility with Washington, but as a member of Milosevic's inner circle, his entreaties were treated seriously. If nothing else, Washington reasoned that Karic might provide insight into the state of thinking in Belgrade. Ultimately, Albright decided that Bob Gelbard, a senior Balkans advisor at the State Department, should explore Karic's offer.

Primakov Felled On May 11, Strobe Talbott and a small delegation of officials arrived in Moscow. That evening, Talbott dined at the American ambassador's residence with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov. The atmosphere for diplomacy in Moscow was difficult, said Mamedov. "The environment has gotten a lot worse over the last four days, and the United States has to turn things around." Mamedov noted that the "substance alone was hard enough" and that the G-8 meeting in Bonn had made clear that significant differences remained between Russia and the West. The preimpeachment environment in Moscow was getting hot, at the same time Yeltsin-Primakov relations were deteriorating. Chernomyrdin had been concerned that he was being labeled as "too close to NATO" after his meeting with Gore in Washington, and he had turned the tables on Ivanov by claiming the foreign minister had caved in to NATO at the G-8 meeting. The bombing of the Chinese embassy had also provoked the Chinese to more aggressively insert themselves into the situation, leading some in Moscow to propose that Russia and China jointly give NATO an ultimatum to end the bombing. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine had been in Moscow to lay the groundwork for a visit from French President Chirac, and Mamedov said he had been tough and uncompromising, essentially telling the Russians that they could either be part of the solution or "get out of the way." The Russians had hoped for a more accommodating line from both Paris and Bonn and were taken aback that the embassy bombing had not opened more meaningful divisions within the Alliance.


There were concerns that President Yeltsin was on the verge of pulling the plug on the Chernomyrdin track and distancing Russia from the Kosovo diplomacy entirely. Suddenly it seemed that securing a breakthrough was less important than keeping the process, and Chernomyrdin's involvement in it, alive. Mamedov felt that the United States needed to demonstrate that it was making a credible diplomatic effort and not just throwing up a "smokescreen for more bombing." Mamedov also left Talbott with a rather ominous impression that further Russian political upheaval was afoot. The next day, May 12, Talbott met with both Chernomyrdin and Ivanov in separate meetings. At the same time, U.S. military officials traveling with the deputy secretary began negotiations with their Russian counterparts on the military aspects of any peace agreement. Three-star Air Force Gen. Robert "Doc" Foglesong, an assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the lead military official accompanying Talbott, and he huddled with a Russian delegation headed by Russian Gen. Leonid Ivashov that morning. Generals Foglesong and Ivashov were a study in contrasts. Foglesong was tall, angular, and athletic, a marathoner who kept himself in trim physical shape. Laconic in a western way, his laid-back demeanor masked a sharp intellect. Thoughtful, hardworking, and with the slight swagger of a lifelong fighter jock, Foglesong was a practical man. He had logged more than thirtyfour hundred hours flying F-15s, F-I6s, A-10s, and other aircraft, and he had even made several bombing runs over Yugoslavia during the war. Having worked closely with both Secretary Albright and other State Department officials, the general was comfortable with the interworkings of U.S. diplomacy. General Ivashov, on the other hand, was a throwback. A political general, his temperament was often that of an old-time Soviet military commissar. A heavy smoker, Ivashov's uniform often seemed a poor fit for his bulky frame. He was an unrepentant Communist Party hard-liner, with deep ties into the Russian intelligence hierarchy. Ivashov viewed the demise of the Soviet Union with anger and frustration that often burned uncomfortably bright, and he was the Russian intelligence community's senior operative directly involved in the Kosovo negotiations. As chief of the main directorate of the Ministry of Defense's Directorate for International Cooperation, Ivashov oversaw much of the ministry's involvement in key foreign policy issues such as arms control negotiations


and foreign weapons sales. Heavy-set, with receding dark hair, the heavybrowed and articulate Ivashov was nationalistic and deeply suspicious of the West. He had been one of the people pushing hardest to suspend all military ties to the West in the days following the onset of the bombing. Diplomats and military officials posted in Moscow frequently referred to Ivashov, only half joking, as "Evil-shov" and "Darth Vader." His anti-Western rhetoric was florid and his preferred style of negotiating was brinkmanship. Ivashov had grown hard-line as his career progressed, in large part because of the decline of the Russian military. Ivashov was a popular figure in Moscow and adroit at maneuvering within the Russian bureaucracy. Three issues were at the heart of the military talks between Generals Foglesong and Ivashov: what would it take to get the bombing stopped, the scope of Serb military and police withdrawal, and the composition and command structure of the potential peacekeeping force. The U.S. team was adamant that air strikes would only be suspended when Milosevic met all of NATO's conditions. The Russian officers stressed that the peacekeeping operation had to be led by the United Nations and that the core NATO powers not be given a prominent role on the ground. U.S. Brig. Gen. George Casey, who had been assigned to Talbott's team from the policy staff of the Pentagon, had also worked closely with General Clark's staff and his superiors back at the Pentagon to make sure that there was a clear understanding within the U.S. military as to its "redlines" with regard to the negotiations with the Russians. General Clark weighed in on the negotiation via e-mail saying he wanted "a genuine Serb withdrawal, total and fast, with no holding on to northern Kosovo. No compromise on NATO command and control of the force (the Russians could send in forces with the United States, as they had done in Bosnia.) No border controls by Serbs over refugee return." A participant in the first meeting between Foglesong and Ivashov observed of the session, "It was professional, correct, and largely pro forma. Ivashov was trying to do as little as possible with what he had been ordered to do. General Foglesong was very good. He was nonconfrontational and he did not take the bait. As we tried to work through the conceptual ideas, it became very clear that there was little agreement about what should happen and what should be included. So Foglesong flipped it around, and we began to mutually define things that we did not want the operation to be. It was more of a reductive process; that was the only way we could get started."


As their sessions progressed, General Ivashov made clear to Foglesong that he would need further direction from his political superiors before they could move forward. In more than ten hours of talks over two days, the U.S. team also saw some warning signs. There were fifteen to twenty Russian officials aligned on one side of the table for the discussions, about an even mix between Russian military and civilian representatives. "At the end of the second day, we get up and everybody shakes hands and we are about to walk out," recalled a U.S. negotiator, "and the Russian foreign ministry guys start introducing themselves to their counterparts from the Russian department of international cooperation at the defense ministry. As screwed up as our own interagency process can be, at least we have one." As Talbott met with Chernomyrdin, the Russian envoy remained in a difficult spot, eager to be the man to deliver a peace deal but acutely aware of the political risks of being seen as selling out to NATO. Chernomyrdin had dined with German Chancellor Schroeder several days before, and the Russian envoy was clearly taken aback by Schroeder's uncompromising posture and continuing commitment to the air war. Chernomyrdin once again suggested that NATO pause bombing and commence intensive negotiations with Belgrade. The Russian envoy acknowledged that such a plan was not ideal, and would leave Milosevic with considerable leverage, but he saw it as the best of a series of bad options. Chernomyrdin was also eager to travel with Ahtisaari to Belgrade. The Russian envoy objected to the demand for full withdrawal of Serb forces, and Chernomyrdin's advisor from the foreign ministry, Boris Ivanovsky, produced a laminated version of the communique from the NATO Summit with a flourish "worthy of a trial lawyer" as he pointed out that the word "all" did not appear next to the calls for Yugoslav troop withdrawals. Talbott countered, "There's no way to achieve the goal of returning refugees to safety if there are still armed Serbs running around intimidating peaceful Kosovars and drawing fire from militant ones." U.S. negotiators suspected that for the Russians the real problem with total withdrawal was that they could not get Milosevic to accept such a demand. Moscow did not want to be left in a position where its support for the total withdrawal of Serb forces could be used by NATO to strengthen the case for continued bombing or even a ground campaign. Talbott was scheduled to travel to Helsinki later in the day, with Chernomyrdin follow-


ing the next morning, and both men would meet separately with Finnish President Ahtisaari. Talbott then met with Foreign Minister Ivanov, who he found "markedly subdued and quite frank on being at his wit's end about what to do next." Ivanov plaintively asked, "Just tell me what we've got to do to end this war," feeling that Russia was increasingly trapped between Milosevic's bloodymindedness and NATO's "insanity." The Russian foreign minister stressed that the bombing was giving impetus to reactionary elements in Russia looking to push the United States and Russia into a confrontation "dangerous beyond all imagining." Ivanov felt that Milosevic would not give up and NATO would have no choice but to push forward with a ground war, compelling Russian extremists into ever more provocative actions. The foreign minister claimed NATO's generals were acting on autopilot: "Your military are digging themselves deeper and deeper into a hole, and there will be no way of getting out of it . . . Your intransigence is making our work more difficult. . . . You haven't given Milosevic a way out, and as a result you've left yourselves no way out. . . . There is no logic to continuing the bombing unless you really are bent on destroying the country—not just Milosevic, but the whole country." Ivanov went on at some length about the precedent of making Kosovo a "protectorate" removed from the control of the central government asking, "How can you call that Yugoslav sovereignty?" Like Chernomyrdin, Ivanov also urged a bombing pause followed by negotiations with Belgrade. Talbott objected and noted that such an approach "would simply mean that the Yugoslavs left their troops in place," with no commitment to withdraw or to allow a peacekeeping force to enter. Ivanov shrugged, looked as though he was chewing on an "especially bitter fruit" and said, "I know, I know—but anything is better than more bombing." At the end of the two meetings, Talbott had reached a simple conclusion, "Yeltsin is furious and desperate about the ongoing war. . . . So the boss has sent down word to the troops: stop this goddamn war—I don't care how, but stop it!" Talbott felt that Chernomyrdin might ultimately be the one to come around because "Yeltsin has told him to do whatever it takes to get this problem solved—and because Yeltsin has absorbed the cold reality of NATO's resolve." As Talbott concluded the session with Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister went out of his way to tell the deputy secretary that he was simply a


bureaucrat "with no political aspirations." The comment seemed odd, but it was only a matter of minutes before Talbott understood its significance. Reporters mobbed Talbott as he emerged from the dim interior of the Russian foreign ministry into the bright light of day. President Yeltsin had just fired Prime Minister Primakov, and would shortly nominate Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin as his replacement. The Russian Communist Party quickly called for street rallies to protest Primakov's dismissal, and there was press speculation that Foreign Minister Ivanov would be given a remote foreign posting because of his close ties with Primakov. Sergei Stepashin was in line to become the fourth Russian prime minister in only fourteen months—further fueling anxiety that an incapacitated Yeltsin was losing control of the political process. Stepashin, a boyish-looking bureaucrat, was a Yeltsin loyalist and viewed by many as "weak enough to be managed" by the president's inner circle. Although generally pro-Western, he had also been one of the leading advocates of prosecuting the first war against Chechnya in 1994 to disastrous results. He was known to work well with Chernomyrdin. Adding to the sense of political crisis, Primakov's dismissal came the day before the Russian Duma was to start deliberations on Yeltsin's impeachment. Primakov's firing signaled a no-holds-barred effort by Yeltsin to fight the Communists in the Duma for political supremacy, and he felt that "a sharp, aggressive move," such as dismissing Primakov, would unbalance his opponents even if it was seen as "unpredictable" and "absolutely illogical." Yeltsin argued, "Primakov was quite capable of uniting the politicians who dreamed of a new isolationist Russia and a new cold war." Primakov had been steadily gaining popularity in opinion polls as a possible presidential successor to Yeltsin, and his dismissal was designed to deflate both Primakov's presidential aspirations and the impeachment effort. Yeltsin explained his decision, "If I let this process go on, the slow slide toward the former Soviet methods of rule could turn Primakov's ultimate dismissal into a real civil conflict. It became clear that waiting until the fall, much less 2000, was simply impossible." In simultaneous confrontation with both NATO and reactionary elements within Russia, Yeltsin was besieged from both within and without. Primakov's firing angered many Russian officials in the defense and intelligence ministries, such as General Ivashov, who had once declared himself "Primakov's man in the ministry of defense." As Talbott noted at the time,


"Yeltsin is sending a powerful though immensely controversial and risky signal that he is not willing to let his legacy be shaped by the Communist agenda; for better or for worse, he judges a showdown with the Communists now as more propitious than waiting for one closer to the parliamentary elections in December." Later that same day, Talbott and his team left Moscow's political intrigue behind and made the short flight to Helsinki for his first official round of discussions with President Ahtisaari, with some of the delegation remaining behind to continue military-to-military talks. Over a dinner of moose steaks, the Finnish president gave assurances that he fully supported NATO's conditions for ending the war and was willing to make repeated trips to Belgrade if push came to shove. A large, stocky man, with limpid but penetrating blue eyes, Ahtisaari had an imposing physical presence, but increasing trouble with his knees gave him an awkward gait. His silver mane of hair was usually combed straight back, and his quiet, deliberate oratorical style would have been dour if not periodically leavened by flashes of sly humor. Talbott and Ahtisaari discussed the political situation in Russia, and Talbott briefed the Finnish president on his discussions with both Chernomyrdin and Ivanov. Periodically Ahtisaari's aides entered from another room and slipped him notes; the Finnish national hockey team was playing against Sweden in the world hockey championships, and Ahtisaari wanted to be kept abreast of the score. Much to Ahtisaari's pleasure, Finland went on to win the game. He hoped that it might be a positive omen. Chernomyrdin arrived in Helsinki the next day, May 13, after Talbott had briefly returned to Moscow to meet with the Russian envoy. Chernomyrdin began his meeting with Ahtisaari in a foul mood, noting that "many things had changed" since they had last spoken. The Russian envoy offered harsh comments about the Yugoslav president, saying that he never wanted "to go back and see Milosevic again," but also huffed, "No matter what I say, the Americans do not do anything differently." He expressed amazement at the "indifferent" U.S. attitude toward the United Nations, and appealed for a bombing pause. Ahtisaari, after letting Chernomyrdin vent at length, highlighted his own difficult experiences with President Milosevic during the Bosnia crisis. The Finnish president stressed that the world would not quickly forget the massacre of civilians by Serb forces in the UN safe haven of Srebrenica. Ahtisaari felt that the only sensible peacekeeping model was the NATO-dominated


arrangement already in place in Bosnia, and added, "I would not put one damn Finnish soldier into an operation that did not have a core of NATO forces with a heavy American presence." He also told Chernomyrdin, "Very many things remain unresolved. Not even the Americans have a very clear picture of how to proceed. Our effort is possibly the last opportunity to keep Kosovo a part of Serbia. That is something Milosevic had better understand." The two men also discussed Chernomyrdin's proposal to have significant numbers of Serb forces remain in Kosovo to defend historic sites. Chernomyrdin argued that there were some 8,000 sites in the province that would need protection, and that each would require three Serb soldiers for its defense, a formulation that produced a force of some 24,000 Yugoslavs— roughly the prewar deployment in Kosovo. Ahtisaari later joked to the U.S. Ambassador in Helsinki, "I think the Russians are counting every Serb hamburger stand" in drawing up the list of historic sites. Ahtisaari stressed that the longer the conflict wore on, the greater the damage would be both to Yugoslavia and to Russia's relations with the rest of the world. The Finnish president asserted that it was too early for him to travel to Belgrade and that he, Chernomyrdin, and Talbott should meet jointly the following week in Helsinki. Chernomyrdin again pushed for a bombing pause, and Ahtisaari countered that the matter was largely up to the United States and NATO and that it might not even be possible to get a bombing pause if they traveled together to Belgrade. Chernomyrdin asked Ahtisaari if he thought Talbott was of sufficiently senior rank to represent the United States in talks, and expressed a desire to see the deputy secretary replaced by Vice President Gore. The Finnish president dismissed the suggestion and argued that Talbott was a suitable envoy because of his close personal ties to Clinton. In Moscow, President Yeltsin met with President Chirac, who took a hard line, insisting that Milosevic would have to fully meet all of NATO's demands before the bombs would stop falling. Yeltsin complained to the French president, "You're continuing the ruthless bombing of Yugoslavia, and you're handing Russia a role as NATO's special courier to Belgrade to impose your ultimatums." The Russian president added, "We can't play these games, and we aren't going to play them. We demand that if you can't stop the bombing, you at least halt it for a time." Chirac then launched into a long discussion of France and Russia's com-


mon interest in preventing a "unipolar" world dominated by the United States. However, Chirac also insisted that Russia had to decide if it was for or against Milosevic, and that based on that decision Russia would either remain on the sidelines of international affairs or enter the modern world under Yeltsin's democratic leadership. Yeltsin countered that it was NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia that posed the greatest risk to democracy in Russia, but Chirac remained unconvinced. Russian hopes for cultivating the French as the "leading dissident" within NATO were again disappointed. Vladimir Putin, the national security advisor, commented that Russia was "not satisfied with its role as a technical courier." Chirac told reporters he felt that "nothing would be worse than if Russia left the negotiating process," although he maintained that Yeltsin had given no indication Moscow would do so. After a brief meeting with Chernomyrdin in Helsinki, Talbott flew to Geneva where he again met with UN Secretary-General Annan. Even before Talbott could raise the subject, the secretary-general said that he agreed that any peacekeeping presence would need to have a NATO command structure: "The last thing I want is a UN command. Don't worry: you won't find me trying to put blue berets on your troops." Annan also reasserted his willingness to support Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin's role in the diplomacy. "It's the only game in town," he said, "so of course I want to do everything to see that it works." He also indicated that he would not launch a UN special envoy to Belgrade in the middle of the trilateral talks. However, Annan was also increasingly pessimistic about the conflict's outcome, and about the efficacy of the trilateral diplomacy. The secretary-general had met with a number of the heads of humanitarian organizations who had passed through Belgrade in the previous weeks, and most felt that Milosevic continued to be "full of optimism and buoyancy," believing that he had fought the international community to a draw. As Annan asked Talbott, "Can the Alliance hold over the summer? Will public opinion hold that long? Worst case, NATO will be accused—including by its own member parliaments and publics—of destroying Yugoslavia and creating a humanitarian disaster. Milosevic feels that he has the Alliance on the ropes and becomes all the more intractable." Incidents of collateral damage were now generating more publicity than the refugee situation, and the conflict's endgame did not seem apparent, leading Annan to suggest that NATO had "a tough sell."


Underscoring Annan's point, the NATO Alliance again was hit with a high-profile incident of collateral damage that same day, as at least sixty Kosovar Albanian refugees were killed in a nighttime air strike as they camped alongside the road in Kosovo. While the Alliance had done an excellent job presenting a unified front to the Russians and the world, concerns and tensions over everything from targeting to planning for a ground war continued to threaten to unravel NATO solidarity. On May 15, Russian President Boris Yeltsin yet again survived a political near-death experience as the Duma deputies failed to impeach Yeltsin on any of the five charges against him. The closest vote, linked to the conduct of the war in Chechnya, fell only 17 votes shy of the 300 needed for passage amid widespread accusations that some parliamentarians had been bribed to abstain from voting. With Primakov ousted and the Communists again bickering among themselves, Chernomyrdin would have a brief window to reach out to the West. But while Yeltsin had successfully thwarted the impeachment effort, concerns were escalating that Russia was slipping toward chaos. That day, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott floated a controversial proposal to Berger and Albright. He proposed considering a forty-eight-hour pause in bombing if—and only if—the Russians would offer up-front commitment for a UN Chapter VII resolution authorizing the continued use of force against Yugoslavia if a peace agreement was not reached with Belgrade during the pause. Talbott noted some of the obvious pitfalls of his own proposal: Milosevic might see the move as a sign of weakness; the Russians might think it was a trick; and it could trigger wider pressure in NATO to extend the pause. Milosevic would also have time to reorganize and reequip his forces in the field. "In the face of all those dangers and downsides, the only conceivable justification for a pause would be if we could lock the Russians into a Chapter VII UN Security Council resolution that would help us not only in managing them but that would help with others, including our Allies, as the bombing presumably goes forward," noted Talbott. Such a UN resolution would allow NATO to use "all necessary means" to secure its aims and permit the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force under a unified command and control. Talbott recognized that the Russians would likely reject the proposal; "The only way that the Russians would ever consider such a thing is if they reach the point where they realize they face a fork in the road: They


either stay with Milosevic and are increasingly marginalized and humiliated, or they give him one last chance, then wash their hands of him." However, even if Moscow rejected the proposal, it could have some utility for NATO in that Russia would be forced to decline an opportunity for a pause. To test Russian and Alliance reaction to the initiative, Talbott suggested that Ahtisaari make the proposal to Chernomyrdin but pitch it as his own. Berger was intrigued by the approach but was not sure Secretary of Defense Cohen and Ambassador Holbrooke would be supportive. Berger and Talbott got along well, and throughout the crisis, Talbott jointly addressed most of his memos on the diplomacy to both Berger and Albright. After some changes by the deputy secretary, Berger shipped a bootleg copy of the proposal to the president in California. American Ambassador to Moscow Jim Collins sat down with Chernomyrdin on May 17. The burly Collins could be seemingly reserved, but he was deeply knowledgeable about Russia's political situation, and his outward appearance masked a warm personality. Behind closed doors, Collins was not shy about delivering blunt assessments of the often-chaotic scene in Moscow. Chernomyrdin began by arguing, "It does not make sense to expect Milosevic to surrender. He is not that kind of person. He knows NATO's plans and your determination, but we haven't gotten any signs he is getting nervous. Milosevic is preparing for a ground invasion. We have no signs that he will surrender, but he might be willing to begin negotiations." The Russian envoy was deeply frustrated by the lack of progress: "Russia is close to giving up. The peace process now goes only in circles, with no new ideas or approaches." Chernomyrdin noted that he would likely travel to Belgrade no matter what the outcome of his next round of meetings with Ahtisaari and Talbott in Helsinki. Chernomyrdin concluded by noting, "Russia has not changed its position. I will remain engaged and do all I can, but further steps are needed. We have been working on finding common ground between us, but we need to find some common ground with Milosevic as well. Russia has made much more progress with Milosevic than in dealing with the NATO countries." The same day, Talbott and Richard Holbrooke spoke to each other during a several-hour-long telephone conversation. The two had long been friends, and Talbott's low-key style stood in sharp relief to Holbrooke's public flair. Talbott often served as a peacemaker between Holbrooke and Albright during their running battles. Holbrooke bluntly expressed his reservations about


the trilateral diplomacy and a potential bombing pause. Holbrooke questioned the wisdom of engaging the Russians, feeling that they could not deliver Milosevic. "My concern was that the Russians were fronting for Milosevic, and that certain things they were demanding were unacceptable and that was the nature of my dialogue with Strobe. In particular, the phrase 'NATO at the core,' which Strobe hung on to, and which was extremely important, was one that we talked about a great deal. The Russians fought like crazy to get that phrase out, but my position was that that issue was nonnegotiable." Holbrooke added, "I thought we should keep bombing, and intensify bombing, and not yield anything to the Russians." Instead, he wanted the administration to deal directly with Belgrade. Talbott, who also wanted to see the bombing continued, could not get Holbrooke to fully support the trilateral process, but eventually the ambassador agreed to tone down his criticism. Holbrooke was in an awkward position. Because he was awaiting Senate confirmation for the post of U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, he was somewhat limited in his official role in the crisis. Given his natural intensity, he was not comfortable sitting on the sidelines. Holbrooke and Albright had a famously prickly relationship, and Holbrooke's periodic second-guessing on the conduct of the military and diplomatic operations did little to improve the atmosphere. Albright was convinced that Holbrooke continued to question her leadership in background discussions with reporters and sensed that Holbrooke was trying to distance himself from the Balkans policy that he had helped to shape. Indeed, Albright had directly challenged Holbrooke about some comments from "administration officials" to the press, and the ambassador's disdain for the handling of the Rambouillet talks was well known. Holbrooke had made his view plain: Rambouillet would not have ended in disaster if he had been running the show. However, both Holbrooke and Albright shared concerns about Talbott's bombing pause proposal. Some of her aides directly opposed the notion, and Albright suggested to Talbott that his paper be presented to the national security team as a concept rather than a formal proposal. Talbott quickly sensed that his plan was being hung out to dry.

The Ground Option Gains Steam At 6:30 on the evening of May 17, President Clinton and his national security team assembled in the cabinet room. Albright briefed the group on the


status of the respective diplomatic initiatives and stressed that the Alliance might need to maintain military pressure on Belgrade for months to come. Albright and her staff continued to push the issue of ground troops, and they were concerned that General Clark's updated planning assessment for ground troops was only a starting point. Unless the United States quickly deployed forces, the conflict would not be resolved before winter. Given the considerable logistical and diplomatic work that would need to precede a ground operation, Albright, like Clark, wanted to move in that direction as soon as possible. The secretary of state expressed concern about the growing number of self-anointed envoys enjoining the diplomatic efforts and pointed to calls by the Greek and German governments for an unconditional bombing pause as an example of the challenges they would continue to face. Albright then turned the discussion over to Talbott, who laid out the proposal for a bombing pause linked Russian support for a UN resolution granting Chapter VII authority. Not surprisingly, the plan sparked a vigorous debate, with Secretary Cohen leading the charge against it. He argued it would be impossible to keep the pause from being extended by the more diffident Allies, and it was a point of view that resonated with many at the table. Berger and his deputy, James Steinberg, supported the proposal. Albright, although commenting several times, never explicitly endorsed or rejected the plan. President Clinton appeared interested in the concept, but somewhat deterred by Cohen's opposition. Clinton indicated that he would make a final decision on the issue after the second half of the meeting. Talbott had to leave for Andrews Air Force Base for his flight to Helsinki, and he asked that the eventual decision be relayed to him upon his arrival in Finland. Much of the second half of the meeting was dominated by consideration of ground troops. General Clark had weighed in from Brussels that same day, having further scrubbed his preferred military option. Clark had told Chairman Shelton, "I have a feasible ground option that can be executed this campaign season. We will get all the refugees home. It's about 175,000 troops, with around 100,000 actually going into Kosovo to fight." Pushing the force through Albania and Macedonia, Clark would need seventy-five days to deploy troops and initiate major road and logistics upgrades. Informally petitioning the NATO defense ministers, Clark felt that the British could provide 35,000 to 50,000 troops, the French 10,000 to 20,000, and


the Italians some 3,500 men. The United States would provide the balance. Clark recognized that "we'd be struggling with the difficult terrain as well as with the enemy," but he felt that the approach would "enable us to win on the ground, deploy in time to finish the fight before winter and limited the U.S. contribution to roughly half the total force." B- was now officially Clark's preferred option. Upon his arrival in Helsinki on May 18, Talbott had still not received word of the decision from the White House on his plan. After speaking with Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg on the telephone, he was told that it was fine to discuss the matter with Ahtisaari but to hold back from raising it with Chernomyrdin. However, with the secretary of defense adamantly opposed to the plan, and with the secretary of state less than enthusiastic, the proposal would ultimately wither on the vine. In Helsinki, Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Talbott held more than seven hours of talks in their first trilateral sessions. Ahtisaari began the negotiations with a long presentation that set three goals for the negotiators: keeping a democratic and multiethnic Kosovo part of Yugoslavia; reintegrating Yugoslavia politically and economically with the rest of Europe; and economically reconstructing the entire western Balkans. Ahtisaari declared Yugoslavia a "failed country" that had "treated its own citizens so brutally and violated international norms so grossly" that Belgrade would enjoy only "partial sovereignty" over Kosovo. Ahtisaari's approach was no-nonsense, and he displayed a keen understanding of his interlocutors. An experienced diplomat, Ahtisaari knew that Chernomyrdin was determined, blunt, and more interested in sweeping concepts than fine details. The Finnish president also appreciated that Talbott's approach was quite different; detail-oriented and equally dogged, the deputy secretary approached the negotiations through the same patient perspective of the U.S.-Soviet arms talks he had so frequently written about during the Cold War. Chernomyrdin objected that Ahtisaari was "starting the talks from scratch." He preferred to "end the air campaign and continue talks." Chernomyrdin contended, "Now we simply need to decide whether or not to go to Belgrade." In what both Ahtisaari and Talbott hoped was a major breakthrough as the hours wore on, Chernomyrdin appeared to agree to two important concepts—NATO could form the core of the peacekeeping effort, and the withdrawal of Serb military and police forces would have to be total.


Despite the apparent progress, Ahtisaari remained unwilling to travel to Belgrade with Chernomyrdin until the three negotiators could reach agreement on a several-page document spelling out the exact terms Milosevic would have to meet to end the bombing. The abbreviated document would add specifics to the general principles expressed earlier both at the NATO Summit and in the joint communique issued by the G-8 foreign ministers. Ahtisaari jokingly referred to this at different times as both the "Reader's Digest" version of demands and "the ten commandments." After checking in with Moscow, Chernomyrdin indicated he still had some reservations about signing off on any such joint paper and ultimately he decided to launch his third solo trip to Belgrade on May 19. While in Belgrade, Chernomyrdin went into another set of marathon talks, lasting more than seven hours, with Milosevic and his senior advisors. Chernomyrdin would claim to have told Milosevic that the West would accept no less than NATO troops on the ground as peacekeepers, though it might be possible to have them operate under UN control. Chernomyrdin suggested that some broad coordinating council—one that would include Russia, the United States, and others—might be a suitable command structure. Milosevic welcomed Ahtisaari's involvement in the diplomacy and even suggested that the United States send a representative to any talks in Belgrade. While Chernomyrdin did not rule out the idea, the Russians were anxious that they would quickly be cut out of the diplomatic process if the United States and Yugoslavs moved to direct negotiations. Both Milosevic and the president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, feared that the West would pull a "bait and switch"—agreeing to one set of conditions and then imposing quite a different reality once troops were on the ground. President Milosevic insisted that NATO troops operating under a NATO flag would be an occupying army and was not assuaged by Chernomyrdin's assurances that Russia would also contribute troops. Milosevic understood that NATO would be in a stronger position than any contingent of Russian forces, and the Yugoslav president's conviction that he would not lose the war seemed to be increasingly in doubt. Chernomyrdin left the Yugoslav capital later in the day, and NATO air strikes sharply intensified in the wake of his departure. Upon returning to Moscow, Chernomyrdin claimed that Milosevic had taken "a step forward," but noted that the Yugoslav president continued to resist the notion of complete withdrawal of his forces. Yugoslav foreign min-


istry spokesman Nebojsa Vujovic announced, "The Yugoslav government accepts the G-8 principles as a basis for negotiations on adopting [a UN] resolution." Few saw this as a significant concession. Within the Alliance, frustration with both the diplomatic efforts and the debate over ground troops was mounting. On May 19, Deputy Secretary Talbott met with German Foreign Minister Fischer in Bonn, who suggested that diplomacy activity was akin to chewing gum: "at some point it loses its flavor." Fischer said that Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov was pessimistic about the trilateral talks, and suggested that eventually the West would have to confront the problem of whether it wanted to deal with Milosevic directly. Fischer felt that Milosevic had a "love-hate" relationship with the United States and because of his worldview would only finalize a settlement with Washington, "not with the Italian foreign minister, not with the French, not with the Germans, not with the Russians, and not with Ahtisaari." Fischer also pointed to the upcoming G-8 Summit in Cologne, scheduled for June 18, with trepidation. The G-8 Summit, like the NATO one that preceded it, was a long-planned event that Kosovo threatened to turn into a public-relations disaster. Chancellor Schroeder was horrified by the prospect that he would be hosting a summit—once pictured as a coming-out party for Germany's place in a new Europe—that would disintegrate into a political fiasco under the cloud of a looming ground war. The G-8 Summit, and the stakes involved in its relative success or failure, became a steady undercurrent in the negotiations. Everyone knew that in a month, the presidents of seven of the most powerful nations on earth would assemble—with or without Boris Yeltsin—and that Kosovo would be the central topic. Beyond that, the agenda was deeply uncertain. Fischer noted that 100,000 German war protestors had already registered with the Cologne police to demonstrate at the mid-June gathering, and the event was shaping up to be "a real adventure." German officials also bluntly told Talbott, "The public and the parliament will kill us" if they supported ground troops. The same day, another Principals Committee was convened at the White House. Secretary Albright had spoken with the French, German, and Italian foreign ministers the day before, and there had been little in the way of consensus. Fischer made clear there was no support in Germany for an invasion, suggesting that even debating the issue might undercut domestic support for air strikes. Despite the European concerns, Albright remained hawkish; she


wanted a ground force to strike all the way to Belgrade to topple Milosevic, even toying with the possibility of involving the KLA to augment a ground attack. Secretary of Defense Cohen suggested that the French were divided on the issue of ground troops, the Germans opposed, and the British obviously in favor. If the United States were to take the ground war out of NATO and mount a "coalition of the willing," the British and Turks would be the only obvious major partners. In contrast, General Clark (who was not at the meeting), felt that with U.S. leadership the other Allies would follow on ground troops; "we would have support from Great Britain, Italy, and eventually France. Germany was officially silent, but I was not worried about its likely support. If the United States and these countries went in, we could count on most of the smaller allies too." The British continued to express interest in planning for a ground campaign on a bilateral basis with the Pentagon, and argued—as had General Clark—that a go/no-go decision on ground troops might have to be made as soon as the end of May if an invasion was to be staged before the winter. The State Department was also eager to see planning move forward on a bilateral basis with London, contending that operational planning within the guise of the KFOR peacekeeping force was not realistic. The Pentagon was also willing to mount bilateral planning with the British but for a very different reason; by taking the planning away from General Clark they would be far better positioned to take a go-slow approach. Sandy Berger carefully reviewed the alternatives to a ground war: arming the KLA, lowering the demands upon Belgrade, or simply staying the course and further amplifying air strikes. It was obvious that Berger was still deeply uncomfortable with a ground war, but increasingly aware of the limitations of the other options. While the notion of a ground war was unappetizing for all those around the table, delaying an invasion until spring might be even worse. Few thought that the Alliance could maintain its cohesion through another nine months of aerial attacks. Caring for the hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees who had been driven from their homes through a long hard winter had the potential to be a humanitarian catastrophe, and air power alone would do nothing to reduce the suffering. A White House official acknowledged, "There were beginning to be questions about whether we were determined to prevail, and the ability to prepare for a ground war—even at the risk of casualties—became a credible barome-


ter of whether we were going to win and win on our terms." In a conflict that the United Nations had predicted would produce no more than 100,000 refugees, more than eight times that number had been driven out of Kosovo by rampaging Serb forces. Hundreds of thousands more Kosovars were adrift and desperate within Kosovo, low on food, and vulnerable to the cruelty of Yugoslav army and police forces prowling the countryside. Winter could prove harsh. The timing of a ground operation was crucial, and there was a great deal of discussion on the constraints that the onset of winter would impose upon such an operation. NATO was facing a "winter wall" and would need to launch a ground war by November if it hoped to avoid problems with snow in the mountains of Albania. There were also some doubts as to whether Clark could hold to the already tight schedule he had spelled out for moving forces into theater. As one White House official attested: I questioned if it was realistic because I thought it would take time for the political decision-making to begin the planning process, and then once in the planning process, you would have to have troop commitments and a force generation process. Countries would have to agree to make these forces available, and in some countries that requires a legislative process. Getting the logistics and command structure in place could also have been problematic. So, as we got closer, the schedule got packed and packed and you wondered at what point did you pass what was truly reasonable. The vice president and his staff also had serious reservations about a ground war, and Gore's national security adviser, Leon Fuerth, wanted to see air attacks against major infrastructure targets given time to generate more political pressure on Milosevic. The vice president and his staff were still leaning toward waiting until spring to launch any offensive. NATO now had more than 1,000 planes operating in its air campaign— almost triple the total deployed at the war's onset, and the air armada was growing by the day. In its determination to break Yugoslavia's will, NATO had steadily widened its target list, and Alliance bombs dropped with increasing frequency and destructiveness. Soon, 60 percent of Belgrade would be without water service, and Yugoslavia's three largest cities—Belgrade, Nis, and Novi Sad—would be without power. The citizens of Serbia were paying a spiraling cost for Milosevic's continued resistance, and Belgrade's early and


euphoric defiance of NATO, expressed in street-rally rock concerts and target symbols worn like badges of honor, had sharply faded. However, there were still complaints from a number of NATO officers that they were unduly restrained from pursuing high-profile infrastructure targets, particularly in Belgrade, and General Clark feared that "we had gone about as far as possible with the air strikes." Berger challenged Ambassador Richard Holbrooke for his read of the situation. Holbrooke, with his natural bravura, reiterated the three American redlines: all refugees allowed to return; all Serb forces out (although he was convinced Milosevic would do some cheating); and NATO at the core of the peacekeeping force. He thought that Milosevic would offer Chernomyrdin a UN force and attempt to drag UN Secretary-General Annan into the talks. The ambassador argued that ambiguity about the ground war had some diplomatic utility and supported Cohen's pleas to have the air campaign intensified. Holbrooke wanted to see NATO buy time before it came to a decision on the ground war, and seemed apprehensive about crossing that bridge with any finality. He firmly rejected the proposal to arm the KLA, arguing it would result in long-term disaster. Holbrooke also wanted to place more public emphasis on the need to overthrow Milosevic, but Berger felt that such an approach would raise unrealistically high expectations. This led to a brief debate on whether ground troops should march all the way to Belgrade or simply focus on Kosovo. General Shelton noted that taking Belgrade would obviously require a larger military force. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger then set the path forward. He asked the Pentagon to avoid formally raising the issue of ground troops at NATO headquarters in Belgium. Instead, he wanted the Department of Defense to find ways to buy time and give the administration several more weeks before being forced to make a decision on ground troops. "As we started to get into late May we were facing the prospect of winter and the fact that if Milosevic did not capitulate, 200,000 Kosovars would be up in the mountains freezing to death," Berger recalled, "And when you built back in the lead-time—which the military shrunk by a month in late May—we suddenly had an early June decision to make." After repeated conversations between Clark and Berger about the window for ground troop planning, Berger affirmed, "General Clark told us that thirty days had been added on to our lead-time. It was very bracing. Our decision was suddenly three weeks out."


Berger also wanted all decisions on ground troops, if they eventually went to NATO, to be made under the guise of beefing up the potential peacekeeping operation. By doing so, he again rejected the notion of moving ground troop planning into a direct bilateral channel between London and Washington. He also wanted the Pentagon to better explore the constraints that the Yugoslav winter would place on ground operations. Could the offensive begin in December for example, or would conditions simply be too bad? The tense relations between General Clark and the Pentagon were of serious concern to the White House, and Clinton administration officials worked to ensure that the lines of communication with Clark remained open while taking great care not to violate the Pentagon's line of authority. There was continuing apprehension that the Pentagon might simply stonewall on a ground force. As a senior administration official underscored, "In a war it is very dangerous to create two chains of command." This same official added, "There was no question that relationship deteriorated and trust was frayed on both sides. . . . For us to have developed a direct, separate chain to Clark would have been riskier." However, White House officials did speak with Clark and tell him that he should be doing as much planning as possible within the rubric of NATO because the United States needed to be ready for the ground option. General Clark, as the NATO commander, retained the authority to speak directly with President Clinton. "This was a trump card that I knew I could use to get the ground force briefing to the president at the appropriate moment. But I also understood that this would carry a very high price. It might not be playable more than once." The national security team agreed that air strikes should be ramped up even further, as time grew tight for making the hard decision on launching a ground war in Europe. The discussion on ground troops continued the next day, May 20, as Clinton met with several of his military advisors, including Secretary of Defense Cohen, the Joint Chiefs, and others from the national security team, including Secretary Albright. General Clark had flown in from Brussels to brief the Pentagon on ground planning as well. Elements within the Pentagon continued to express skepticism toward Clark's preferred option. Clark acknowledged that he had not "resolved the military's innate hankering to go deep into Serbia from the north, with a larger force, seeking a decisive military solution even at the expense of greater strategic and diplomatic difficulties. Many in the army disliked the idea of going through Albania en route to Kosovo. As one of the senior officers told me, only half joking, 'We


don't do mountains.' " The chief of staff of the Army was very nervous from a practical standpoint about going in entirely through Albania and had real concerns about the road structure and a range of other logistics issues. As Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg maintained, "It was not a question of whether, but how, that was most contentious" with regard to ground troops. Clark, in turn, raised valid questions about attacking Serbia proper. "What were we going to do with Belgrade when we got there? If the Serbs decided to resist, were we going to fight through the city block by block, using artillery and mortars?" Those sentiments were echoed by another senior administration official: "If you went for the whole enchilada, and went in through the north, you were actually taking on a much more difficult problem." The vision of guerillas firing rocket-propelled grenades out their apartment windows in Belgrade at NATO forces was not appealing. There was also discussion of entering Kosovo in a "semipermissive" environment. Under such a scenario, Yugoslavia's armed forces would be largely devastated by the continuing air attacks, and a ground force would only be needed for a mop-up. The Pentagon took a dim view of such semantics, and General Shelton dismissed the notion of sending ground forces into a semipermissive environment as akin to "being a little bit pregnant," and he added, "You do not get semi-shot." It was an opinion General Clark shared. "If we built our plan on this, entered, and found ourselves bogged down with organized resistance, we would lose time and take unnecessary casualties. I believed it was important to stand firm on the full military commitments." Secretary Albright was strongly in favor of a ground war, but felt dutybound to highlight some of the diplomatic fallout that would occur. Russia's reaction to ground troops would be intense, with a heavy domestic political backlash against Yeltsin. Some of the NATO foreign ministers continued to speculate that a ground war might result in Yeltsin's overthrow. Consensus within the Alliance on ground troops was elusive, and a ground war would further set back relations with China. The secretary of state also observed that if the military operation went all the way to Belgrade, as she preferred, the regional repercussions would be even more severe. European support for the Belgrade option was almost nonexistent. President Clinton did not tip his hand as to his own preference during the briefing, but he did not have long to make a choice. If operations were to be completed before winter snows made an assault more difficult, a deci-


sion on whether to begin preparations for a ground war—even by the most liberal estimates—would have to be made in June. As a result of this reality, Clinton and his team began to carefully adjust their public stance on the use of ground forces. The initial and categorical dismissal of using ground forces was supplanted as Clinton told reporters that he would, "not take any option off the table." While advisors at the White House insisted the president's statement did not represent a change in U.S. policy, it was clear that Clinton's carefully calibrated shift in posture was meant to send a message. As Jim Steinberg noted, the change in rhetoric also had some political utility. "In terms of domestic politics, it was a silly position to have people we needed on our side, like Senator John McCain, who supported the objectives of the war, criticizing us on ground troops. We needed all the support we could get, and since they were basically right, instead of fighting with them, it was easier to say, 'You're right.'" That same evening, General Clark received a call from Sandy Berger. "How long can we defer a decision, Wes?" "We need to start preparations on June 1," Clark replied. "That's when we need the decision. Now we don't need a decision to do a ground operation. That can come much later. We just need to decide to prepare for it, alert any reserves, begin the logistics movements and start everything in motion." Berger explored whether that date could be pushed back any further, perhaps buying two more weeks of time. Clark insisted, "Sandy, we can't. It's a seventy-five-day deployment, best case. That's no allowance for bad weather or screw-ups." Clark held firm to his June 1 deadline as the White House continued to string out a hard decision until the last possible moment. NATO's diplomatic and military offensive against Yugoslavia was entering a decisive phase.


5

CHAPTER

An Empty Chair, Nothing Off the Table

Stalin's Dacha President Ahtisaari and Deputy Secretary Talbott arrived in Moscow on May 20 to meet with Chernomyrdin, fresh from his visit to Belgrade. Ahtisaari was eager to sit down with Yeltsin, but was told by officials that he "was in the hospital" and could not meet face to face. Instead, the two presidents spoke on the telephone, with Yeltsin beginning by reading a long prepared statement. "Russia does not want to be NATO's courier. It must be clear that if Russia's efforts continue to be ignored, we will leave the reconciliation process with all of its consequences. We can hardly continue our own peace effort with the number of victims constantly growing as a result of NATO's barbaric bombings." Ahtisaari made a pitch for a prominent NATO role in peacekeeping. "The Kosovo Albanians will not be pacified by bringing in Finnish or Russian troops. NATO troops are necessary for them to dare to return. I know, Boris, from my own experience—because I have headed a similar large operation myself—that such troops cannot be brought together on political grounds." The two men did not reach agreement, but Yeltsin concluded by adding, "If we resolve the last problems, we will put Milosevic in his place." 121


The U.S. and Finnish teams then sped in motorcades to the outskirts of Moscow to meet Chernomyrdin and his team at a remote, wooded, Russian government compound surrounding Josef Stalin's former dacha. It was uncomfortably hot, and the Russian capital had been suffering through a rare heat wave. Adding a touch of the surreal, the air was filled with fluffy white pukh—Russia's version of milkweed—that had drifted on the hoods of cars and windowsills like a light snowfall. There was some irony that Talbott, whose first professional career breakthrough had been translating the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev in the 1970s, should wind up conducting negotiations in the same building where many of that narrative's own scenes had taken place. While the dacha was a grand structure, it was garishly appointed. The staff room used by the U.S. delegation was decorated with a bright, overstuffed, orange, wraparound couch, a pink floor lamp with glass shades in the shape of flower petals, and an oversized but nearly empty cabinet. In the building's hallways, large, abstract, fabric floral paintings commissioned by Raisa Gorbachev hung on the walls, and long teardrop chandeliers loomed over the staircase. While Chernomyrdin offered Talbott and Ahtisaari little detail from his discussions with Milosevic, the Russian envoy claimed that he had strenuously advocated the necessity of a NATO-led peacekeeping force and that the Yugoslav president had accepted that the Alliance would have to be "on the ground" in Kosovo. Chernomyrdin even speculated that Milosevic might be "using him" in an effort to enter direct negotiations with the United States—a point not lost on Talbott, given the continuing debate within the administration about opening a back channel to Belgrade. As the talks continued at the dacha, Deputy Secretary Talbott employed a bit of theater to make a point. The American negotiator jumped up from his seat and dragged an empty chair to the side of the table as both Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin looked on quizzically. Talbott then explained. The empty chair represented the missing player in the talks: Slobodan Milosevic. What was he willing to accept? Where was he seeking compromise? How would he react to the proposals on the table? For all the energy and hours invested in the trilateral negotiations, Milosevic's intentions were shrouded. Chernomyrdin argued that the man in the empty chair demanded that some Serb personnel, particularly special police forces, remain in Kosovo. Talbott and General Foglesong were equally adamant that with regard to troop with-

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drawals "all" meant "all," particularly because the Serb special police had been involved in some of the worst atrocities. They maintained that only after a total withdrawal could some small number of Serb officials under the supervision of the KFOR commander return to the province. As Talbott argued, "If Milosevic maintains any control or influence in the province, it will repel refugees from returning, further radicalize Kosovo Albanians everywhere, and provoke the most recalcitrant elements of the KLA." Chernomyrdin also continued to push for broad UN control of the peacekeeping operation. To Talbott and Ahtisaari, an "umbrella" of UN authority sounded dangerously close to UN political control, a position they found unacceptable. Despite the anguished looks and whispered asides of his foreign ministry advisor, Boris Ivanovsky, Chernomyrdin continued to maintain that he was willing to accept a prominent NATO role in KFOR and near total Serb military withdrawal. Talbott and Ahtisaari felt they were making substantial progress. "Having the Finns involved made it much easier to knock down the Russian arguments," one U.S. team member asserted. "You had this great foil of a neutral, noncombatant, relatively objective player in the talks interested in a peaceful settlement and regional stability. You started to get the feeling that rhetorically we could turn it around on the Russians." Jim Swigert of the delegation expanded on the same point: "When we got into the questions of trying to put down on paper the points of commonality, Ahtisaari played an important role in helping the Russians see areas where there were common positions—having a third party in the room made it much more palatable for the Russians." That said, it was not clear that the Russian military and intelligence services—much less Milosevic—would agree to such terms. The three men agreed to meet again in Moscow the following week for another round of talks, hoping that they could find enough common ground to allow Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin to launch a joint mission to Belgrade. General Foglesong also held separate military-to-military talks with the Russians and Finns in Moscow. Finland was represented by Adm. Juhani Kaskeala, with General Ivashov again serving as the senior Russian military representative. The discussions generally followed the same lines as the discussion with Chernomyrdin, although General Ivashov took a much harder position on Serb withdrawals and NATO's role. Talbott and Foglesong


agreed to return with a specific set of details regarding NATO's operational requirements for KFOR. Deep fractures within the Russian government over Kosovo were obvious the next morning as Talbott and Ambassador Collins stopped by Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov's office before leaving Moscow. Ivanov wanted to be updated on the status of the talks with Chernomyrdin, and Talbott briefed him on the contours of the discussions, including Chernomyrdin's agreement that NATO would make up KFOR's core. Ivanov claimed to be "astonished," and protested that if Belgrade was prepared to "accept NATO, then that's up to Belgrade. But we can't." Ivanov carried himself with a certain prickly wounded pride, eager to show that he could step out of Primakov's shadow and be his own man. Having been trained in the Soviet system, and proud of his half-Georgian heritage, he was a determined negotiator. Talbott replied that if what he "thought was an understanding was in fact a misunderstanding" he should return immediately to the embassy and cancel the preparations for the meeting scheduled for the next week. "Hold on, hold on, Strobe," said Ivanov. "Let's call Viktor Stepanovich [Chernomyrdin]." So Talbott and Collins went into Ivanov's inner office, where the Russian foreign minister got Chernomyrdin on the telephone, apparently waking him. Ivanov relayed Talbott's account of the talks, and then listened to Chernomyrdin's answer. "Well, you see, Viktor Stepanovich, there's a difference between NATO countries and NATO as an organization." As Talbott and Ambassador Collins listened, Ivanov methodically walked Chernomyrdin back from his position. Ivanov then suggested that Talbott return to Chernomyrdin's office for another meeting. Talbott told Ivanov that there was no need to see the Russian envoy. "We can't do business with a government on this basis. I'm going back to the embassy to shut down preparations for next week." "Hold on, hold on, Strobe," said Ivanov again. "Why don't you go see Chernomyrdin and ask him directly if what you heard from him last night still stands and is the position of the Russian government. If he says yes, then that's the way it is." The deputy secretary resisted, saying that it was impossible to do business with a government in such disarray. Underscoring the unsettled nature of Yeltsin's government, Ivanov then received a call from Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin's office letting him know that he was not being fired. After brief congratulations from Collins and Talbott, Ivanov insisted that because he

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had not been involved in the previous evening's discussions, he could not "accept responsibility" for such a fundamental shift. After much back-andforth, Talbott reluctantly agreed to another meeting with Chernomyrdin. As Talbott left the foreign ministry, Boris Ivanovsky, the foreign ministry advisor who had been at Chernomyrdin's side during the previous day's talks, lingered in the hallways. The Russian foreign ministry had successfully reined in Chernomyrdin. Talbott began his subsequent discussion with Chernomyrdin by inquiring, "I only want to ask one question: namely, whether in the course of the six hours of talks yesterday, were you speaking with the full authority of the Russian president and leadership?" "Yes, of course. I understand the matter at hand. I am not a boy to be toying with such matters. At least from the Russian president, I have complete authority," replied Chernomyrdin. Talbott noted that he had "made a report to Washington on yesterday's discussions, but Foreign Minister Ivanov's remarks cast doubts over that report." He insisted that Chernomyrdin had to convey the notion of NATO at the core to Milosevic more forcefully and that there could be no ambiguity in that regard, leading Chernomyrdin to counter, "Milosevic believes that if this is a NATO operation only under a NATO flag, it would be an occupatron. The U.S. view was that NATO at the core meant a unified system of command and control and all forces under a NATO commander. Talbott, General Foglesong, and Brig. Gen. George Casey discussed the issue with Chernomyrdin and Ivanovsky for some three hours, with Ivanovsky passing the Russian envoy a steady stream of notes. Chernomyrdin wanted Russian peacekeeping forces to be exclusively under a Russian commander and stressed that if the War Crimes Tribunal indicted Milosevic, it could well bring an end to the negotiations. Eventually Talbott and Chernomyrdin agreed to resume talks again the following week as planned. In a private aside before Talbott departed, Chernomyrdin pleaded, "You've got to find a way out of this for us. We can't let all our efforts come to a crashing halt over this." In Washington, there was growing skepticism that Yeltsin was politically and physically strong enough to deliver a deal. The chaotic state of affairs within Russia made it impossible for Western negotiators to discern who held real authority in Moscow, further clouding the usual smoke and mirrors


of wartime diplomacy. Talbott and the others were reduced to negotiating with factions within the Russian political system and hoping that a deal might stick. Chernomyrdin's mandate continued to be fuzzy, and no one on the Russian side seemed sure exactly what authority Yeltsin had given to his special envoy. Because of Yeltsin's continuing health and drinking problems, access to the Russian president was limited, and it was unclear where he stood. The Russian military was only willing to support Chernomyrdin if he could get the West to accept a bad deal and would abandon him if he could not. Chernomyrdin seemed to speak only for Chernomyrdin, and he had a mandate that came from Yeltsin that he would renew from time to time. The foreign ministry was not an integrated part of his operation; the defense ministry even less so. It was clear to the U.S. team that Chernomyrdin and the foreign ministry were working on very different tracks, and there were constant questions about who actually represented the views of the Russian government. A member of the U.S. team observed, "Yeltsin did not like what we were doing—but he wanted to be done with it in a practical way, as did Chernomyrdin." Consequently, U.S. negotiators were desperate to show some progress and keep Chernomyrdin's role alive, knowing full well that any replacement would be far worse. As Talbott departed Moscow on May 21, NATO attacks killed nineteen civilians at a penitentiary in Kosovo. Serb guards then slaughtered another eighty Kosovar Albanian prisoners and blamed their deaths on NATO in a crude fabrication. The seemingly star-crossed series of collateral damage incidents continued the next day as NATO pilots hit a barracks in Kosovo, unaware that the KLA had occupied the building. On May 22, Talbott sat in the verdant backyard of his home in the Woodley Park section of Washington on a muggy weekend afternoon and wrote to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov: It is my hope that when Viktor Stepanovich [Chernomyrdin], President Ahtisaari and I meet on Wednesday, we'll all agree that it makes sense for the two of them to travel to Belgrade the next day. After consulting back here in Washington with Madeleine, Sandy and others, I'm reinforced in my conviction that the Chernomyrdin—Ahtisaari initiative may indeed help hasten a political settlement and a suspension of bombing. But that will only happen if there is total clarity between us—and with Milosevic—on what Belgrade must do.


Talbott felt that while Ivanov and others on the Russian team "kept saying we [were] adding conditions," clear operational details were necessary to ensure that a deal didn't "turn into potentially catastrophic misunderstandings amidst the blood-stained mud and ruins of Kosovo." That same day, the Clinton administration's efforts to engage with Belgrade directly took a step back as Robert Gelbard—the outgoing State Department special advisor for the Balkans—was scheduled to meet with the Yugoslav Minister without a Portfolio, Bogoljub Karic, the wealthy and shadowy Milosevic confidant who had been eager to engage in direct talks to end the war. However, Karic pulled out of the meeting at the last moment, claiming that he wanted to meet with the president, the vice president, or the secretary of state. Given Karic's lack of credibility, Gelbard informed the Yugoslav that such a meeting was not in the cards, but also indicated that the door remained open for direct talks between Washington and Belgrade. Landrum Boiling, the relief organization head who had first raised Karic as a possible interlocutor, then weighed in with the name of another potential Yugoslav intermediary—Bojan Bugarcic. Bugarcic was Milosevic's chief of staff and a foreign policy adviser and was the same man who had held the long angry telephone call with Ambassador Holbrooke right after the bombing had started. While Bugarcic had insisted in March, "You might destroy us, but we won't capitulate," he was now being considered as a secret negotiator to help end the war. Expectations remained muted for this new diplomatic track as Jim O'Brien, an advisor to Secretary Albright, explained, "I did not think those channels were serious. They could not take the weight of doing these talks. They were worthwhile for communicating, but that was it, and I think they demonstrated evidence of floundering and panic in Belgrade." O'Brien added, "If one of the channels looked credible enough, sure, but none of them did." The possibility of talking directly to the Yugoslavs was still being given serious consideration in Washington, and despite efforts to play down this contingency after the war, policy-makers understood it remained one of the three most likely end games to the war: a Russian-brokered peace deal, a direct negotiated settlement with Belgrade, or a ground war that would make further discussions irrelevant. As diplomats were aware, air power could do massive damage, but it did not provide, in and of itself, a mechanism for setting terms to conclude the conflict. The Clinton team wanted to keep an


open mind with regard to all possibilities, and the White House mulled its options for sending a senior U.S. representative to bilateral talks with Belgrade. Not surprisingly, Ambassador Holbrooke was prominent on that short list, as was Talbott.

The Hague Weighs In On May 25, an official plane with "United States of America" emblazoned across its side returned American negotiators to a sunny and warm Moscow. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott again headed the U.S. team, with General Foglesong as the group's senior military representative. Jim Swigert of the U.S. delegation, an expert on the Balkans and European affairs from the State Department, shared his initial impressions from several weeks of dealing with the Russians: I was struck by the initial huge gap between the U.S. positions and the Russian position—which began very, very close to that of the Serbs. But the Russians kept asking us back, and they wanted to talk to us, even though the message wasn't changing in terms of what we expected Belgrade to do for the bombing campaign to stop. That told me several things. One, the Russians were keenly interested for their own reasons in seeing a stop to the bombing. Two, they were eager to maintain a relationship with the United States despite the differences. Talbott had dinner that evening with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov at the residence of Ambassador Collins. Mamedov drove home several points, urging the West not to humiliate Russia at a time when it was willing to be part of the diplomatic solution: "Russia does not want to see the Cologne G-8 Summit turned into a disaster." Mamedov also wanted Talbott to reconsider his position on total withdrawal of Serb forces, feeling that even a token presence in the province would make Milosevic's agreement much more likely. Unbeknown to Mamedov, the Clinton administration was weighing just that option, but had been unable to reach a consensus. Mamedov also made a pitch for an ironclad and verifiable roadmap for stopping the bombing and deploying peacekeepers, asking that Russian peacekeepers be stationed in the northern part of Kosovo. Talbott was then pulled away from the dinner to take an urgent call on a


secure line from Sandy Berger in Washington. The national security advisor had explosive, but not entirely unexpected, news: the UN International War Crimes Tribunal would indict Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and some of his key aides within forty-eight hours. Berger was concerned with the potential fallout from the announcement, but both men agreed there was little choice other than to let the work of the Tribunal run its course. Talbott knew that the next day's trilateral negotiations had just become even more difficult. In Brussels, NATO ambassadors gathered to consider the number of troops its member states were willing to commit to a peacekeeping force. In a move that had been carefully orchestrated, the group approved expanding KFOR by 20,000 troops—to a total of 48,000. NATO officials cited the large number of refugees and the serious security concerns within Kosovo in justifying the larger force. Others read more deeply into NATO's actions and interpreted the swelling troop levels as a clear sign that NATO was building its forces for a ground war. Indeed, the additional troops would make it easier for NATO to assemble an invasion if that was its goal. NATO officials used carefully ambivalent language. NATO SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana insisted that the Alliance was simply "planning for success," and keeping all its options open. The decision to boost the forces predeployed in the region was shrewd, allowing the Clinton administration to placate both the hawks and doves within the Alliance. For the Greeks, Germans, and Italians, the rhetoric of "planning for success" made clear that the administration was still committed to finding a diplomatic solution. For Tony Blair and General Clark, the additional troops meant that planning for a ground war would continue. However, there were limits as to how much planning could take place under the guise of KFOR, and Clark could only go so far in his planning without specific troop commitments from the allies. Clark himself noted, "Some nations would need to call up reserves. This couldn't be fuzzed much longer." While beefing up the forces in Macedonia was seen by some as the tip of the spear, these troops would have had to wait three more months for the rest of the force to be assembled. The Russians, being worst-case planners, were alarmed by the growing number of NATO troops. As the trilateral negotiators prepared to resume on May 26 in Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Avdeyev told reporters that he was concerned talks only seemed to be "providing a nice screen for concealing the continuing aggression." Russian officials had forwarded a long and


polemic paper to the U.S. and Finnish teams over the weekend that had accused NATO of trying "to liquidate Russia as a global factor." Deputy Secretary of State Talbott started his day by meeting with Ivanov in a oneon-one session at the foreign ministry, as U.S., Russian, and Finnish military officials resumed their discussion on the military aspects of a peace agreement down the hall. Ivanov drew a map of Kosovo and the adjoining parts of Albania and Macedonia. He said he understood that NATO intended to put 50,000 troops inside Kosovo and that there would be an additional 20,000 NATO troops in Albania and Macedonia; "Is this correct?" he asked. Talbott demurred from engaging in a counting exercise, but did not contradict Ivanov. Talbott also noted that the peacekeeping force would not be solely composed of NATO troops and that nations such as Russia were welcome to participate. "Mr. Foreign Minister, let me now be equally candid. I received authoritative and definitive information overnight that we will have an interesting and complicating development soon. Louise Arbour [Chief Prosecutor for the UN International War Crimes Tribunal] is almost certain to announce indictments against the Yugoslav leadership tomorrow." Ivanov, wanting to know if the indictments would be sealed, asked simply, "Open or closed?" The indictment would be open, ensuring the charges were front-page news around the globe. "Whom are we going to be able to work with?" lamented Ivanov, shaking his head. The foreign minister questioned the motive and timing of the indictment, suspicious that the West had dictated the charges only to justify its military campaign. The Russians feared that the United States was trying to make Milosevic radioactive, leaving the United Nations and moderates in the NATO Alliance with little option but to stay the course with continued air, and perhaps even ground, operations. The question facing Ivanov and Talbott was operational: Should the United States and Russia continue to push Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin to launch a joint mission to Belgrade in light of the indictments? Ivanov, taking the news as well as could be hoped, felt it was imperative that the indictments not bring diplomacy to a halt. He felt the charges were a "complicating" factor, not a fatal setback. Talbott was more hesitant, sensing there would be a variety of views on the topic back in Washington, but he also remained generally supportive of the proposed Belgrade mission. Both men agreed the final decision on whether to travel to Yugoslavia would be up to Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin.


The pending indictment presented a challenge for both the Russians and, to a lesser extent, the Chinese. Both nations had consistently maintained that NATO's air attacks against Yugoslavia were illegal because they lacked UN authorization. The Western response to the charge had largely amounted to fast footwork. Western leaders pointed to the humanitarian catastrophe and gross human rights abuses as justification for their efforts and cited a hodgepodge of legal precedents and existing agreements in making the case that its actions were in keeping with international law. The Yugoslavs, Russians, and Chinese reasoned that if NATO could brand Yugoslavia a rogue state, they were free to brand General Clark and NATO Secretary-General Solana as "war criminals." One Russian diplomat in the trilateral talks had even joked that he thought Solana "would need a good lawyer" when all was said and done. But Milosevic's indictment quickly changed the calculus of tit-for-tat charges and countercharges. The body that the Russians insisted NATO answer to—the United Nations—was accusing Slobodan Milosevic and a cadre of his senior advisors of crimes against humanity. Neither the Russians nor Chinese could find succor in denouncing the actions of a tribunal they had created with their own Security Council votes. Talbott asked if Ivanov thought Milosevic was moving closer to accepting NATO's conditions, leading Ivanov to reply that, "Yugoslavia being Yugoslavia," it was hard to say. The foreign minister again pointed to the total withdrawal of Yugoslav troops and the nature of the peacekeeping force as the most sensitive issues for Belgrade. The Russians had considerably adjusted their earlier demand that tens of thousands of Yugoslav troops be allowed to remain in Kosovo, now suggesting that some 500 to 1,500 Yugoslav forces should stay behind to ensure that the KLA did not exploit a security vacuum in the province. Ivanov stressed that he did not think the withdrawal issue would be a "killer" that would derail an agreement. "We'll see," replied Talbott. Ivanov argued that NATO at the core was unacceptable to Belgrade because "if NATO occupies Kosovo, Milosevic has only two choices: to kill himself or to disappear." Talbott countered that NATO was not looking to provide Milosevic with options and certainly did not want to allow him to keep fighting in Kosovo. The deputy secretary claimed there were ways to give the peacekeeping operation, and particularly the Russian participation in such a force, an appearance of not being entirely dominated by NATO. The United States was willing to be creative in packaging KFOR—as long


as a NATO force was at its heart. If the peacekeepers could be wrapped in a cloak of UN authority that did not interfere with its military capabilities, there was little harm. However, both Talbott and Ivanov knew that the measures being offered to Moscow were largely cosmetic. It was hard to mistake 50,000 NATO troops under NATO command with robust rules of engagement as broad power sharing. After his meeting with Ivanov, Talbott and his team moved on to the Finnish ambassador's home to meet with President Ahtisaari. The residence had a pleasant Scandinavian sensibility and was filled with contemporary furnishings in a bright open space that felt out of place in Moscow. Talbott and Ahtisaari wanted to discuss the impact of the indictment in a secure location away from any potential electronic eavesdropping and headed into the communications room of the adjoining Finnish embassy, where they promptly managed to lock themselves in. While Talbott was concerned, Ahtisaari nonchalantly suggested they carry on, saying, "One of the good things about being president is that they never let me go missing for very long." The news of the indictment did not come as a surprise to Ahtisaari, who had spoken with UN Secretary-General Annan earlier in the day and been warned, "The lady in the Hague has resorted to a truly tough line." Privately, although Annan and Ahtisaari had known each other for years, the two were said to have an uneasy relationship. Ahtisaari continued to be annoyed by Annan's rather tepid support for his role in the trilateral talks, suspecting that the secretary-general was positioning the United Nations to take the lead in diplomacy if the trilateral talks collapsed. However, Ahtisaari also struck a somewhat sympathetic tone: "Secretary-General Annan genuinely thought that we could not do without the United Nations, and he wanted to secure his role in case the trilateral process failed." Ahtisaari weighed the impact of the indictment, knowing that he was faced with the unpleasant prospect of traveling to Belgrade and being seen shaking hands with Milosevic the same day the Yugoslav president was indicted. Ahtisaari was understandably nervous about how a trip would play out with his European Union colleagues, and although still tentatively open to the idea, he knew a great deal depended on Chernomyrdin. The two also discussed the possibility that a quick mission to Belgrade could be completed before news of the indictment became public. However, Ahtisaari still wanted to reach further agreement with the Russians on the "Reader's Di-


gest" version of NATO's demands before he committed to a trip, and it was unclear whether the three delegations could do so quickly. The two also discussed the notion of a solo Ahtisaari mission to Belgrade. As Ahtisaari reflected, "At this point it did not seem to me that the trilateral effort would be successful. If that [was] the case, [I felt that] I had better go to Belgrade alone and find out what that could produce." Talbott told Ahtisaari that if he traveled to Belgrade, he should be on the lookout for Bojan Bugarcic, the Yugoslav foreign policy adviser that Washington was considering for direct negotiations. The U.S. deputy secretary of state also informed Ahtisaari that he would likely soon be able to support something slightly less than total withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. The United States would not let a token presence of several hundred Yugoslav forces in Kosovo stand in the way of a peace agreement. However, the deputy secretary emphatically stressed that the Finnish president should avoid hinting at such a concession during the talks. The Department of Defense continued to have reservations about any Yugoslav stay-behinds, while the National Security Council was leaning toward supporting such an offer as long as the presence was truly minimal. As one U.S. negotiator emphasized, "It was all for show, it all got to the issue of sovereignty," but, "Whoever was left behind would be more difficult to protect than any demonstration of sovereignty would warrant." Any Serb forces left in the province would literally be under NATO's protective custody. After lunch, the U.S. and Finnish teams again sped in a motorcade to the outskirts of Moscow to meet Chernomyrdin and his team at Stalin's dacha. Talbott and Chernomyrdin went into a one-on-one meeting, and the Russian envoy appeared relatively ambivalent about the indictment, but feared that the charges would again make him a target for criticism in Moscow and Belgrade. He speculated that many Russians would view him as complicit if he were in Belgrade when the charges were announced, but he also did not want to see the diplomatic process collapse, because it would leave Yeltsin right where he started: furious about the bombing but unable to do anything about it. Neither Chernomyrdin nor Ivanov broached the subject of possible immunity for Milosevic as part of a peace deal, and neither man viewed Milosevic with any warmth. Russia and Yugoslavia, despite some common interests, were members of a mutual disdain society. Secretary Albright seemed to both sympathize and poke fun at the quandary of the Russians by telling reporters during the war, "I think it is not easy for anyone to be Milosevic's defense lawyer." But for the Communists and others who opposed


Yeltsin, NATO bombing presented a golden opportunity to turn things against the West. For Russians hoping to preserve their ties to the West, Slobodan Milosevic was a titanic inconvenience, and Yeltsin himself had called Milosevic "one of the most cynical politicians I have ever dealt with." Milosevic held Yeltsin in equally low regard, and Goran Matic, a Yugoslav cabinet member had complained, "Russia is following its own interests, trying to get back in good graces with the West. Every NATO bomb that drops on Yugoslavia has a Russian stamp on it." The Yugoslavs were also angry at Russian support for the Rambouillet talks that they viewed as a pretext for NATO bombing, and upset that Russia had largely withheld military and intelligence assistance. After a short break, the full trilateral meeting started around a large table at the dacha. As they sat down and exchanged pleasantries, Talbott asked Chernomyrdin why there was no "empty chair" at the table. The Russian envoy, equally well versed in theater, instructed that an unoccupied seat be placed exactly halfway between the Russian and Finnish delegations. The afternoon's meetings were significant in one important respect: Chernomyrdin and his colleagues from the Russian military would be negotiating jointly for the first time. Interagency coordination was never a Russian strength, and during the earlier talks, Russian military and diplomatic representatives had worked largely on separate tracks, only exacerbating the confusion. The Russian military delegation was again headed by Gen. Leonid Ivashov, the former Communist Party commissar in the old Soviet Army and head of the defense ministry's department of international cooperation. Ivashov was an unabashed hard-liner who proudly admitted that he had agitated for a military coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Gen. Viktor Zavarzin—Russia's liaison to NATO who had been called back to Moscow at the onset of bombing—also joined the discussions. The tensions between Chernomyrdin and Ivashov were obvious from the outset, and Chernomyrdin disparagingly called General Ivashov "Comrade Commissar" several times during the discussions. Chernomyrdin again stressed that bombing was strengthening anti-Western elements in Moscow and noted that some in Russia were eager for a strategic or military confrontation with NATO that would result in a "a sea of blood." His comments seemed directed equally at the U.S. and Russian military officials sitting around the table. It was clear the Russian military


was riding the brake, and the body language was such that the Russian officers looked physically uncomfortable whenever Chernomyrdin displayed any flexibility. The Russian envoy also grumbled that he did not appreciate making repeated and dangerous visits to Belgrade with little to show for his efforts. The Russian negotiators continued to resist the total withdrawal of Yugoslav troops, and expressed skepticism that Milosevic would accept such a deal. Talbott countered that if Milosevic could convert a small number of military stay-behinds into a genuine military power base in the province, NATO peacekeepers would have a potential disaster on their hands. KLA attacks on the Yugoslav soldiers would be a certainty and NATO would find itself in the middle of a civil war. Chernomyrdin again raised the proposal for a bombing pause that would be followed by intense negotiations with Belgrade, and his suggestion was quickly rejected. Talbott's plan for exchanging a brief break in air strikes for Russian support of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of "all means necessary" against Yugoslavia was not raised. The Russians also advanced a plan to have peacekeepers from neutral countries under UN command deployed in the traditionally Serb areas of Northern Kosovo, while NATO countries that had not been involved in the bombing campaign patrolled the rest of the province. Troops from the mainstay NATO countries such as the United States and Great Britain would remain in Macedonia and Albania to secure the border. Milosevic would reduce his forces to peacetime levels, but not totally vacate Kosovo. The proposal was quickly given the cold shoulder by the U.S. team, and Talbott was adamant: NATO at the core was one of the "family jewels." While NATO had clear preferences for the peacekeeping operation, its vision of Kosovo's ultimate status was carefully hedged. NATO wanted to keep Yugoslavia intact, and many of the Allies were firmly opposed to independence for Kosovo. NATO feared an independent Kosovo would trigger instability in Greece, Macedonia, Albania, and Bulgaria, while encouraging other secessionist movements to drag the Alliance into their violent liberation struggles. However, NATO also maintained that Belgrade was no longer fit to administer the province, or as Talbott put it, "We are firing Mr. Milosevic from managing Kosovo." Nobody in NATO liked the idea that Kosovo would become a quasi-protectorate for years or decades to come, but no one had a better option. In the middle of the talks, Phil Goldberg, Talbott's chief of staff, received


a call from Sandy Berger, who rather agitatedly asked why Talbott was continuing with the effort to get Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to go to Belgrade in light of Milosevic's indictment. Berger, who was known to get hot under the collar, complained, "I thought there were going to be consultations," and then hung up. Both Berger and Albright wanted to scrub any visit to Belgrade until after the dust from the indictment had settled, fearing that they would appear too eager for compromise with a war criminal. Talbott, having devoted considerable time and energy in trying to get Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin to launch a joint mission, was less categorical. He feared that abandoning the trip would effectively cripple the trilateral talks and open the door for the United Nations to take a more prominent role. Talbott then emerged from the meeting and spoke with Berger, Albright, and Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg in a tense twentyminute conference call. The deputy secretary did not want to pull the plug on a possible trip and argued that it was not a decision that was entirely Washington's to make. He noted that the two men could travel to Belgrade and back before the news became public and argued that abandoning U.S. support for the mission would jeopardize what progress they had been made with the Russians. Talbott felt that a trip delayed would become a trip that never took place. Despite his recommendations, Berger and Albright still had serious reservations. Steinberg, on the other hand, sided with Talbott. The four ended their conversation having resolved little and, in an awkward compromise, Talbott agreed to leave the U.S. position toward an Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin trip to Belgrade open. Berger called back a short time later after having spoken with Ambassador Holbrooke. While Holbrooke shared some of Berger's misgivings, he urged Berger to support his negotiator, and the national security advisor said he would do so.

The CNN Effect As the long session at the dacha ground on, it brought out interesting cultural differences between the delegations. The American and Finnish staff rooms looked much the same—people on cell phones, typing into laptop computers, and comparing drafts of different documents. In contrast, the Russian staff office was filled with men reclining, chain-smoking, and watch-


ing local game shows on a television with bad reception. During a meal served later in the day, the U.S. team almost uniformly declined the vodka that was provided, the Finns drank lightly, and the Russians ate and drank with gusto. Soon the debate between Berger, Albright, and Talbott was outpaced by events: CNN broke the story that Milosevic would be indicted the following day. Some of the U.S. delegation members in Moscow could not resist an obvious irony. The CNN reporter breaking the story was Christiane Amanpour, the wife of State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin. The fact that the indictment was now public did little to improve the already thorny discussions at the dacha. Chernomyrdin stepped out to take a call from Prime Minister Stepashin, who was in President Yeltsin's limousine as it was returning from the Moscow airport. Yeltsin was indignant, and he viewed the indictment as a direct slap designed to further embarrass him in the middle of talks. Both Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari soon backed away from the plan to quickly visit Belgrade. During the afternoon, Secretary Albright checked in with her fellow quint foreign ministers from France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. The indictment was of foremost concern, and there was general agreement it would cloud diplomatic efforts. Albright pointed out that the United States had always maintained that the tribunal would follow evidence wherever it led and that there was no choice but to be supportive of its decision. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer agreed. The charges were a matter of the rule of law, and the United Nations had created the tribunal—not NATO. The Allies would point to the indictment as a vindication of the assumptions underpinning their air campaign against Milosevic, but the foreign ministers agreed they should not demand Milosevic's ouster as part of a peace agreement. All five wondered how the news would play out in the court of public opinion. There was some hope the indictment would seriously weaken Milosevic and possibly lead to his downfall, but there was concern that since the tribunal was a UN body, the Russians might become more hesitant to support any UN resolution authorizing peacekeepers. On the positive side, the charges might make it more difficult for the UN Secretary-General Annan to dispatch his own special envoy to Belgrade. Later in the day, Albright and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook compared notes on the climate within the Alliance. Cook had returned from a visit with his French, Italian, and German counterparts and was upbeat after


his whirlwind tour, feeling that if all else failed, the Italians would consider participating in a ground war. The Germans indicated that their constitution made it impossible to send troops as part of a ground force absent a UN resolution, but they would probably not block NATO from moving forward. The British felt German resolve was growing, despite obvious political discomfort. Cook also felt that the French would support the use of ground forces, but only as a last resort. Albright, while pleased that unity was holding, did her best to temper British enthusiasm for ground troops, stressing the difficult political dynamic in many Alliance capitals. Both Albright and Cook recognized that trying to forge a peace deal as Milosevic was declared a war criminal was going to be difficult. Belgrade continued to keep lines of communication open with the Clinton administration. In Stockholm, the Swedish Deputy Political Director contacted U.S. Ambassador Lyndon Olsen, as yet another prospective secret Yugoslav envoy popped up. The Serb Press spokesman and head of the Yugoslav Policy Planning staff, Nebojsa Vujovic, had approached the Swedish ambassador in Belgrade, said that he had spoken directly with Milosevic, and that the Yugoslav president wanted to have the Swedes pass a message to the Americans. Milosevic wanted to open a direct channel of communication with Washington and noted that during Landrum Boiling's visit, the American had indicated American officials were open to the idea. Vujovic, in a calculated dig at Chernomyrdin, noted that a number of envoys had passed through Belgrade but that talks had led nowhere. Vujovic insisted that Yugoslavia did not want to insult the countries sending such envoys, but felt that direct communications and "exploratory talks" with Washington were necessary. He suggested the new diplomatic channel could rapidly lead to confidential talks between the United States and Yugoslavia in a neutral location such as Sweden. Vujovic claimed that Milosevic had designated him as the Serb representative to such talks and that he envisioned a high-ranking American counterpart for the talks, but not one of the "usual" interlocutors. The Swedish ambassador asked if that meant the Yugoslavs did not want to interact with Ambassador Holbrooke, and Vujovic confirmed that Belgrade preferred another mediator. Vujovic specifically mentioned Jim Swigert, a Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs who was traveling with Talbott, as a possible negotiator. "It might have made sense to move to bilateral discussions if we were sure it was the end game," Swigert would observe, but "as long as it seemed that Milosevic


was dug in and willing to tough it out, I was worried that Milosevic would interpret any positive responses to such signals as a sign of weakness." In a subsequent meeting several days later, Vujovic told the Swedish ambassador that Milosevic was eager to work out the details of a deal, including the structure of a peacekeeping force, troop withdrawals, and the role of the United States and the United Nations in refugee returns. Vujovic stressed that his mandate came directly from Milosevic and that his back-channel discussions would not come at the expense of other diplomatic efforts already underway. This message was soon passed back through Stockholm and on to Washington. The Swedish contacts came as Landrum Boiling, the N G O leader who had earlier met with Secretary Albright, sent a message back to the Serb leadership on May 28: The United States was potentially interested in opening up a secret channel for talks. According to Boiling, the message was delivered to Bojan Bugarcic the next day and discussed directly with Milosevic shortly thereafter. Milosevic reportedly recognized the offer as serious because of the names and telephone numbers associated, but he did not make a final decision. Within the Clinton administration, there was persistent skepticism that Milosevic would surrender to a neutral party such as Ahtisaari, and most of the national security team felt that Milosevic would try to preserve his own stature by engaging Washington directly. Milosevic would then be able to claim that he had reached a negotiated—not an imposed—settlement with NATO and improve his chances of holding on to power. However, there were political dangers in bilateral talks for Washington. Many in the United States would question peace talks with an indicted war criminal. Such negotiations would also create some tensions within NATO itself, as allies would be torn between eagerness to strike a peace deal and their own desire for a seat at the table. The Allies would likely have stomached such a process if it produced results, but they obviously preferred consultation. Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg was skeptical of direct talks. "We had nothing to negotiate. It would not have made it any more likely that Milosevic would concede. Once you offered it, Milosevic would assume, correctly, that you were prepared to negotiate. The beauty of the trilateral talks was that it was a structure designed to show that we would not negotiate. You had Ahtisaari there as the guy who could say, 'I talked to the Americans and they are not going to change,' and Chernomyrdin there saying, 'Well, Ahtisaari knows those Americans.'"


Back in Moscow at the dacha, those self-same trilateral talks continued as Ahtisaari, Talbott, and Chernomyrdin worked their way through a seemingly interminable series of meetings. They shared a late dinner of deep-fried fish and stayed in steady contact with their respective home offices. Small measures of progress appeared and receded as the discussions ran past midnight. At around one-thirty in the morning on May 27—after close to ten hours of talks—the negotiators at Stalin's dacha finally agreed to call it a night. Ahtisaari proposed holding a meeting later that same morning and letting "the dust settle" before deciding about a mission to Belgrade. Both Talbott and Chernomyrdin quickly agreed, since it would keep the diplomatic process alive while steering clear of the political fallout from the war crimes indictment. When they reconvened, the Finnish delegation would present a formal draft of the "Reader's Digest" version of the demands, which the U.S. team would help them prepare. With that, the bleary diplomats departed the wooded and dark compound. Talbott joined Ahtisaari in his limousine for the ride back through the deserted streets of Moscow. Ahtisaari wanted to go to Bonn to meet with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder if he did not travel to Belgrade, feeling duty-bound to report the current state of affairs to his colleagues in the European Union. The Finnish president also suggested that a journey to Belgrade would be more practical the following week, and he hoped that some additional time would allow the three sides to resolve their differences. Talbott returned to the Marriott Hotel a little after two in the morning and the hotel lobby and adjacent bar were filled with a fairly sordid collection of Moscow nightlife: expensive prostitutes hoping to land a Western businessman, local mobsters with girlfriends in stiletto heels, and European executives having a few drinks too many. Even at that late hour, the temperature in Moscow remained disturbingly warm, as the city continued to trudge through a record heat wave. The trilateral process, while not dead, seemed to be going nowhere. Despite the late hour, Gen. George Casey and Jim Swigert of the U.S. team joined the Finnish delegation at the Savoy Hotel to work on the paper spelling out the demands, a process Ahtisaari described as, "your words; our music." The U.S. delegation continued to move at a grueling pace, and exhaustion was setting in. Most of the team looked pale and unhealthy, having taken on a glazed and shell-shocked look from constant travel, too much coffee, and steady stress. One member of the team observed that the lengthy


talks often felt like a farce: "It was about buying time for bombing." This official added, "We thought that it was important to do anything we could to keep the Russians from jumping out the window. If this set of really frustrating, totally fruitless discussions was going to be the tonic—it was perfect, and we were all in love with it." The fear among the U.S. team was simply that the Russians "would never get religion." Despite the fatigue and frustration, the dynamics within the U.S. team remained good. The blizzard of travel and talks had created a sense of camaraderie. Because the talks with the Russians had never been given much of a chance, it seemed to pull the team closer together. The Russians were such difficult diplomatic partners that relations within the team seemed congenial in comparison. Much of the credit for the atmosphere belonged to Deputy Secretary Talbott and General Foglesong, both of whom set a positive tone and treated the group with equanimity. At three in the morning on May 27, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen arrived in Bonn to attend a secret meeting with four of his fellow NATO defense ministers on the sidelines of a security conference. The topic at hand: a potential ground war. Around ten in the morning, the group gathered at the German ministry of defense. The planning and logistics necessary to put a ground force in theater would be considerable, and it would be months before such a force could be deployed and ready for combat. Although the Alliance was enjoying its best bombing weather of the campaign, the specter of a dark and desperate winter was on everyone's mind. If NATO was unable to bring Milosevic to heel, and was left trying to airdrop relief supplies to refugees in the December snows of Kosovo, it would be everyone's worst nightmare. Although the widening air strikes were doing tremendous damage to Yugoslavia's infrastructure, economy, and quality of life, it was an open question whether they would break Milosevic's will. There was every indication that the Yugoslav president could hold on to power despite a ruined economy and a population in despair. The Yugoslav military continued to carefully husband its resources; tanks and troops were hidden in mosques and schools. There were even reports that the Serbs were herding old men in front of armored columns to prevent air strikes. While such tactics were deeply cynical, they were effective. NATO was expected to manage houseby-house precision with bombs dropped from an elevation equivalent to half


the height of Mount Everest, and there was increasing skepticism that air power alone would prevail. Cohen and the defense ministers of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—the five most powerful members of NATO—were briefed on roughly the same ground war options that had been presented to President Clinton the week before, although General Clark was conspicuously absent from the meeting. It was made clear that Clark preferred a ground invasion of some 175,000 NATO troops largely entering from Albania. British Defense Minister George Robertson was reported to have committed 50,000 British troops to a potential ground war during the meeting, telling his fellow defense chiefs that his ministry was prepared to send out 30,000 letters calling up reservists in early June. The French and Italian defense ministers indicated that they would participate in a ground invasion if it were absolutely necessary, and some in the Italian government had come to view the conflict like removing a Band-Aid: the more quickly it was ripped off, the better. The Italian government also continued to publicly disavow any role for Italy in ground operations. The sentiments of his fellow defense ministers notwithstanding, Secretary of Defense Cohen still had deep reservations. He was not a fan of the extended NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and he viewed Kosovo with a jaundiced eye. The Pentagon as a whole saw the Balkans as a dangerous long-term entanglement for U.S. forces, and Cohen was aware of the lack of support for a ground war both on Capitol Hill and in most European capitals. The Clinton White House remained deeply conflicted about the ground option. While increasingly realizing that failure was not an option, there was little enthusiasm for a protracted military commitment and the possibility of significant casualties heading into an election year. The savage political battles over impeachment had left Clinton poorly positioned to rally bipartisan support for a war that was not a pressing matter of national defense. Cohen argued to his fellow defense ministers for intensifying the air war and broadening the target list, and was mum about U.S. willingness to lead a ground war. After more than six hours of discussion, the defense ministers reached consensus on one important issue: They would need a decision on ground troops within a matter of weeks. They also took a series of steps to buy themselves all possible time before making that determination. They committed their forces to intensify the work of engineers upgrading roads in Albania so


they could handle heavy tanks and transports. The Alliance also initiated discreet discussions with countries in the region that could serve as a staging ground for forces. Hungary indicated a willingness to let NATO to use its territory to launch attacks if the Alliance would assure that it would use all necessary means to protect ethnic Hungarians in Yugoslavia. With the infrastructure improvements in Albania, coupled with the decision to expand the deployment of peacekeepers in the region, NATO officials felt they could push a final decision on ground troops to early or mid-June and still have enough time to launch a ground war before the onset of winter. After the meeting, Cohen immediately flew back to the United States, and news of the meeting soon leaked out. Cohen and NATO officials would remain tight-lipped about the session, saying only that it had produced an agreement to continue and intensify the air campaign. Through back channels, Clark would receive his own read-out of the meeting, and he continued to feel that if the United States led, the other Allies would follow.

The Germans Go Wobbly Back in Moscow after a brief sleep, the U.S. negotiators checked out of the Marriott Hotel by 8:30 in the morning on May 27. The team was scheduled to depart Moscow later in the day, but their onward destination was still uncertain and included five potential stops: Bonn, Geneva, Brussels, Vienna, or London. Because there was still a slim hope for a Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission to Belgrade that afternoon, both Vienna and Geneva would be convenient locales to meet the envoys as they emerged from Yugoslavia. Bonn was a possible stop because Ahtisaari wanted to report to Chancellor Schroeder. London and Brussels were on the list for similar reasons, because both British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and the NATO ambassadors wanted to be updated on the negotiations. As Ambassador Richard Holbrooke is fond of saying, diplomacy can be like jazz. Returning to Stalin's dacha after a brief meeting with President Ahtisaari at his hotel, U.S. negotiators resumed talks. Meetings could endure for two hours or twelve, and guessing the duration of the negotiating sessions took on the flavor of an office pool for the U.S. staffers. The Finnish delegation distributed the revised paper spelling out to the Russians the demands for ending the war, but unfortunately between the lack of sleep, multiple trans-


lations, and frequent revisions, they handed out the wrong version of the document. To make matters worse, about twenty minutes elapsed before the drafters noticed the discrepancy, and the confusion did little to improve the mood. The Russian negotiators were already irritated by some of the tough language contained in the draft and were further dismayed to have the Finns quickly request to swap versions. Staffers scrambled back and forth between the Finnish and American staff rooms explaining what had happened and making sure everyone had copies of the correct paper. Talbott was irritated by the delay, and those members of the U.S. delegation not involved in the drafting process took pains to stay out of his way. The deputy secretary very rarely raised his voice in anger, but emitted a telltale heavy sigh when frustrated. Eventually, the session got under way with the proper draft in hand. In an interesting development, Foreign Minister Ivanov joined Chernomyrdin at the talks, and the U.S. team was split on the meaning of his appearance. From a positive perspective, Ivanov's participation could help increase the likelihood that Russian government would speak with one voice. Others attributed more Machiavellian motives to Ivanov's presence, suggesting that he had been sent to ensure that Chernomyrdin was not too accommodating. Even with the broader representation, the talks quickly reverted to their circular nature. The Russians repeatedly objected to the notion that their forces would have to serve under NATO command and pushed for their own peacekeeping sector, "just as is proposed for the big NATO powers." Again, the Russians argued a bombing pause should precede any withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and insisted that KLA "terrorists" would exploit a security vacuum before KFOR could deploy. The Russians also produced their own draft of the demands paper, offering modest compromises on several issues, but hanging tough in opposing total withdrawal and NATO control of peacekeepers. Generals Foglesong and Casey patiently reviewed what they considered operational flaws in the Russian approach. The peacekeeping force needed to have a unified chain of command to be effective, and any withdrawal had to be verified before bombing would stop because Milosevic was fundamentally untrustworthy. NATO troops could move into the province quickly to ensure there was no security vacuum. Both Ivanov and Chernomyrdin were frustrated with the dry and technical approach of the U.S. team, and they insisted that the central issues before


the negotiators were fundamentally political, not operational. The Russians wanted to engage in higher-level horse-trading, and insisted that NATO's senior civilian leaders should be at the negotiating table. Once again, the trilateral talks had produced little. As Ahtisaari described, "The trip to Belgrade could be forgotten. The meeting made no progress; nobody was willing to make any concessions whatsoever." Chernomyrdin would make yet another solo mission to Belgrade to consult with Milosevic the next day, and Ahtisaari and Talbott would go to Bonn and meet with Chancellor Schroeder. Ahtisaari indicated that he would join Chernomyrdin for a trip to Belgrade, possibly as soon as the Tuesday of the next week. As the meeting concluded, Ahtisaari lamented to Chernomyrdin, "We missed an opportunity this morning, I would have gone today if you would have been willing to join me in a common script." As the U.S. and Finnish delegations hurried out to the front driveway, Talbott lingered for a moment on the third floor of the dacha as a small knot of nonplussed Russian military officers stood smoking cigarettes. Chernomyrdin appeared and asked to have a few private words with Talbott. The two moved off to a small side room near one of the dining halls. Five minutes later, the elevator opened and an agitated Ivanov and an aide hurriedly stepped out, joining Talbott and Chernomyrdin. Both Ivanov and Chernomyrdin expressed their mounting angst to the deputy secretary, arguing that the long series of talks had nothing to show for them. Phil Goldberg offered Talbott a gentle reminder that they needed to leave to avoid keeping Chancellor Schroeder waiting, and the impromptu meeting broke up. As they said their good-byes on the front steps of the dacha, the mood was surprisingly light-hearted, with the negotiators relieved to escape further long hours at the dacha. Chernomyrdin looked like a man running for office as he good-naturedly shook the hands of all those in the U.S. delegation. The Americans, for their part, wished him the best of luck in his journey to Belgrade. Talbott had Goldberg place a quick cell phone call to Secretary Albright—or "Momma Boss" as the Russians sometimes called her—from the steps of the dacha. The call went through and Talbott mischievously held out the telephone halfway between Chernomyrdin and Ivanov, creating a curious little moment. Which Russian should speak to the U.S. secretary of state first? Which of the two men was in charge? Ivanov quickly, and rather gracefully, suggested Chernomyrdin take the line.

146 * COLLISION COURSE a

Chernomyrdin held forth with the secretary in Russian for several minutes. Chernomyrdin was a big man, and the cell phone looked diminutive in his large hand. Chernomyrdin appeared to be enjoying his role, and he spoke in a grand voice as he joked with Albright. Chernomyrdin passed the cell phone to Foreign Minister Ivanov, and the contrast was vivid. Ivanov was tight-lipped, and his discussion with Albright lasted less than a minute as he told the secretary of state that he would call her later in the day. At The Hague, Louise Arbour of the UN International War Crimes Tribunal formally announced the indictment of Milosevic, President of Serbia Milan Milutinovic, Federal Yugoslav Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serb Interior Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic. The group was charged with masterminding the coordinated campaign of terror and violence that ethnically cleansed hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, and the indictment included reference to specific massacres that had been conducted in the province. Although the indicted were accused of directing murders and persecution, this initial indictment did not charge the Yugoslav leadership with genocide; later charges based on earlier events in Bosnia would do so. Justice Arbour declared that "the world is a much smaller place" for the indictees and noted that all states, including Yugoslavia, were under treaty obligation to hand the men over for trial. Arbour insisted that the indictment effectively precluded any talk of immunity for Milosevic. The official Russian government daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta assailed the charges and decried, "Washington's next step must be a land operation against Yugoslavia." In communications with Washington after the negotiators lifted off from Moscow—headed for Bonn—Talbott informed his superiors back in Washington that "Ahtisaari remains solid as an anvil," but "there continues to be not one iota of evidence that any of this diplomatic to'ing and fro'ing is having any positive effect whatsoever on Milosevic." Talbott also made clear, "If possible, we'd like to keep the Russians involved in the diplomacy, since their disengagement is not likely to be passive or benign; it's likely to bring with it an escalation of the wrong kind of engagement with the Serbs as well as active sabotage of our efforts." During the flight, Talbott turned to General Foglesong, "We may have to go to Belgrade at some point, are you with me?" Pausing for only a moment, Foglesong said, "I'll go."


With the trilateral talks continuing to bog down, dealing directly with Milosevic seemed increasingly likely. As members of the team telephoned Washington from the plane, they were repeatedly asked if they had seen an op-ed piece authored by Chernomyrdin that had run in that morning's Washington Post. They had not, and Chernomyrdin had not mentioned any such article at the dacha. Administration officials were furious with Chernomyrdin and concerned that his statement amounted to a deliberate attempt to sabotage the talks. They wanted to immediately call in the Russian ambassador in Washington to express their outrage. Talbott, having not read the article, argued for restraint, but when the deputy secretary finally got the op-ed in his hands before touching down in Bonn, Washington's consternation was understandable. "Just as Soviet tanks trampling on the Prague spring of 1968 finally shattered the myth of the socialist regime's merits, so the United States lost its moral right to be regarded as a leader of the free democratic world when its bombs shattered the ideals of liberty and democracy in Yugoslavia," wrote Chernomyrdin. In language eerily reminiscent of the Cold War he argued, "The world has never in this decade been so close as now to the brink of nuclear war." The next day in Washington, Tom Pickering, the Department of State's undersecretary for political affairs, called Russian Ambassador Yuri Ushakov into his office to complain about the article and questioned Russia's willingness to remain engaged in the diplomatic process in light of its rhetoric. Pickering queried whether the Russians were deliberately distancing themselves from the diplomacy, and he took particular issue with Chernomyrdin's parallel between NATO and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Pickering, a seasoned diplomat, completed his exhortations with an appeal to maintain strong U.S.-Russian relations. Ushakov, who could weather diplomatic browbeatings with an almost masochist zeal, did his best to reassure Pickering. He implausibly claimed that the publication of the article had taken him by surprise. Ushakov, avoiding comments on substance, assured Pickering that a full report of U.S. government concerns would be cabled back to Moscow, and that the Russians had no intention of breaking off talks. As the U.S. delegation's plane touched down at the Bonn-Cologne airport, it parked in a far corner of the facility, next to President Ahtisaari's aircraft. Ahtisaari's plane was rented from Finnish Airlines, which had demanded that the government take out a special insurance policy because of


the potential flight to Belgrade. Ahtisaari and Talbott were each accompanied by a single staffer as they quickly boarded a helicopter and headed for Chancellor Schroeder's office. The other staff members meandered out of the plane, and some took off their shoes and sat on a small strip of grass near the tarmac to soak up the sun. Domestic politics were making the Germans increasingly anxious about the war, and many journalists were suggesting that Chancellor Schroeder was growing desperate to find a way out. In mid-May, Schroeder had told reporters the use of ground troops was "unthinkable," that his government would block any such effort, and that the discussion over ground troops was a "specifically British debate." While German parliamentarians had suggested that Germany could not participate in a ground invasion without UN authorization, General Clark was convinced that he could sell his plan for a ground invasion within NATO, including to the Germans. However, the coalition of Greens and Social Democrats that had brought Schroeder to power was deeply uncomfortable with the war. Many of the party members had cut their teeth as antinuclear, pro-environment activists railing for years against Chancellor Helmut Kohl's conservative government. A May 13 special conference of the Green Party had degenerated into catcalls and egg throwing over Kosovo, and Foreign Minister Fischer had been struck in the head by a red paint bomb that ruptured his eardrum. Kosovo was a conundrum for European Social Democrats and American liberals alike. As much as they abhorred violence and the use of military force, they felt compelled to check Belgrade's gross human rights abuses. To do nothing was to turn a blind eye to terrible cruelty; to act meant harming innocent civilians. Chancellor Schroeder wanted to appear fully engaged in the diplomatic efforts as a means to reassure his restive supporters that he was doing everything possible to end the war. Schroeder's governing coalition was extremely fragile, and unless there was a diplomatic breakthrough by the Cologne Summit, some within the German leadership feared not only would public support for the air campaign collapse, the ruling coalition might as well. Schroeder had earlier told Ahtisaari that he thought the war might bring his government down by midsummer, paralyzing the European Union until the Germans ended their term in its presidency, and possibly forcing Ahtisaari to withdraw from his role. Ahtisaari wanted to make clear that he still had the EU's blessing in light of the indictment, and Schroeder was support-


ive—a peace deal was more important than the optics of dealing with Milosevic. President Ahtisaari later acknowledged that he could not take his role for granted, "It was not always easy for some of the other EU members to swallow the fact that a person from a small country like Finland, not a NATO member, was suddenly asked to be involved in the diplomatic efforts. I'm sure there were moments in this process where some of my colleagues might have been interested in withdrawing the EU mandate for my role." Talbott claimed that the trilateral talks were making substantial progress, but that there were still important differences that needed to be resolved before Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin could travel to Belgrade. While Talbott emphasized that the war had to be concluded on NATO's terms, he feared that Schroeder felt that stopping the bombing was more important than the terms on which it was stopped. After the meeting, Ahtisaari and Talbott helicoptered back to the airport, rousing their respective staffers out of their quiet reverie. The two teams then huddled for a meeting on the Finnish presidential plane. Ahtisaari repeatedly stressed the importance of NATO showing some flexibility on the issue of total Yugoslav troop withdrawal, arguing that a token residual presence would make Milosevic far more likely to take a deal. This prompted Talbott to ask for a few private words with the Finnish president. Ahtisaari then instructed his whole team, including the plane's crew, to exit the plane. Talbott gently took Ahtisaari to task, noting that he continued to explore the issue of Serb stay-behinds with Washington, but insisting that Ahtisaari needed to avoid the appearance of attempting to whittle down NATO's bottom line. Indeed, Talbott had argued back to Washington, "my inclination is that there is one pawn we should be prepared to sacrifice at the end of what would still be a checkmate. That would be to convert some of the slots designated for returnees into slots for carefully vetted, disarmed, and reconstituted stay-behinds; i.e., instead of making literally all Serb security types leave, we'd be prepared to identify a few of them that were not, as it were, indictable rapists, murderers, and ethnic cleansers, de-louse them, take away their side arms, give them new uniforms—and KFOR bodyguards—and let them stay in the agreed functions." However, Talbott had repeatedly emphasized in his public statements that Ahtisaari was not negotiating on NATO's behalf, and he asked the Finnish president to not make him a liar. Ahtisaari agreed to keep future discussions on the issue strictly between the two of them. With that, Talbott and his


team flew to Brussels, and Ahtisaari and his team headed north to Helsinki. During the flight to Brussels, Talbott spoke on a secure line with Sandy Berger, and expressed a note of alarm about the German "wobbliness." Berger was concerned by the different factions, both within NATO and the administration, pulling at President Clinton, while his own position on the ground war seemed to be slowly hardening. Where he had earlier dismissed the ground option as a recipe for a "quagmire," a land invasion seemed to be looming as the only way to secure a "must win" for the Alliance. During the afternoon, Secretary Albright spoke with British Foreign Secretary Cook, German Foreign Minister Fischer, and Italian Foreign Minister Dini in their respective capitals, and much of their conversation centered on the Russians. Albright noted that while Chernomyrdin had sounded helpful when she spoke with him as he was leaving the dacha, she found the aggressive tone of his op-ed piece "disturbing." Dini had spoken with Ivanov during the day; the Russian foreign minister was irritated by the indictment and complained that the West lacked the political will to find peace. Ivanov had emphasized that Belgrade was willing to accept the general conditions offered by the G-8, but was resisting the more detailed demands being offered by the United States until after bombing was suspended. The ministers pondered whether the Russians would abandon the diplomatic process altogether, a prospect that some viewed as unlikely given the upcoming G-8 Summit and Russia's continued need for financial assistance. There was a general agreement among the foreign ministers that the Russians were committed to one more round of trilateral talks and, if they did not see major progress, would likely abandon the process.

6

CHAPTER

On the Mountain

Patience Wearing Thin In Moscow, U.S. Ambassador Collins met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov on May 28. Mamedov was pleased that a "certain momentum" was building on the diplomatic front, but was concerned that the war crimes indictment had been a "stupid move" that would only serve those eager to launch a ground war. Mamedov stressed that the discussions between their militaries were having a very positive impact, and he felt such confidence building measures were vital at a time when overall relations were strained. He suggested that the cautious military reaction to some of the U.S. proposals reflected neither hostility nor indifference, merely the slowness with which the Russian bureaucracy could digest detailed proposals. Mamedov pushed for a Russian peacekeeping sector in the north of Kosovo, and went out of his way to note that the foreign ministry had not drafted Chernomyrdin's op-ed. That same morning, Viktor Chernomyrdin flew to Belgrade for his fourth mission to the Yugoslav capital. Commenting on the indictment before he left Moscow, Chernomyrdin complained, "We knew, we warned, we asked, 'Don't do this, because it will simply complicate the process.' But we are flying to Belgrade. We deal with the lawfully elected president of Yugoslavia and will go on dealing with him." The obviously frustrated envoy continued, 151


"We have been talking for over a month now, but, nevertheless, there is no result at all." Upon touching down in Yugoslavia he told reporters, "I am not satisfied with the fact that I have been to Belgrade for an umpteenth time but bombings are continuing." Chernomyrdin and his team were soon immersed in another marathon day of diplomatic discussions with Milosevic at the presidential palace. The Yugoslav president's calm demeanor of earlier meetings was frayed, but Milosevic had, as Chernomyrdin put it, "absolutely no reaction" to the war crimes indictment. Chernomyrdin felt that the Serb military did not give any signs of being in serious trouble, and he believed that it was preserving its assets as it busily prepared itself "for the worst"—a ground invasion. The Yugoslavs reportedly told Chernomyrdin that they would be ready "to kill two or three enemies for every Serb killed." After lengthy talks with Milosevic, Chernomyrdin told reporters that he and Milosevic had discussed the conditions for a Yugoslav pullout of its police and military forces and the introduction of UN peacekeepers. The Yugoslav president agreed to the broad G-8 principles for ending the war and left the impression that there he was open to discussion and a possible settlement. The Russian envoy declared that he was "very pleased" with his visit and indicated that Milosevic and he had "worked out in detail our actions for the forthcoming trilateral talks." While acknowledging that "We face the most difficult negotiations in the next few days," Chernomyrdin observed, "I hope that next time we will come to Belgrade together with Martti Ahtisaari. I am 95 to 97 percent sure of that." Chernomyrdin's departure from Belgrade highlighted another source of irritation for both the Russians and Yugoslavs: Every time the Russian envoy left Yugoslavia, NATO immediately intensified bombing. For the Yugoslavs, the vigorous attacks served as a powerful reminder of Russia's ineffectualness. One of the jokes making the rounds in Belgrade was that the only sure product of a Chernomyrdin visit was "a night in the bomb shelters." Foreign Minister Ivanov griped, "When Mr. Chernomyrdin visits Belgrade . . . with a mission that not only reflects Russia's interests, but the interests of many other countries too, the intensity of bombing reaches its peak. So that raises the question of who's trying to undermine the negotiations." Chernomyrdin complained directly to Talbott during the talks that "in the case of all three of his trips, he's gone, he's left and the strikes have intensified. He says the Yugoslavs have noticed, are wondering if there's a causal connection and are

ON THE MOUNTAIN * 153

questioning whether it's a good idea to invite him back." While NATO denied any such strategy, it was easy to imagine that General Clark felt compelled to bring intensified military pressure to bear after every unproductive diplomatic shuttle. After Chernomyrdin's departure, Yugoslav officials issued a statement calling for a negotiated settlement to the conflict and urged the UN to pass a resolution based on the general G-8 principles issued two weeks earlier. The press release insisted Yugoslavia's "sovereignty and territorial integrity" were not on the negotiating table. Any hope for a breakthrough was tempered by the fact that Milosevic continued to demand that United States, Britain, France, and other "aggressor" nations be excluded from peacekeeping. Officials in Belgrade also continued to push for significant numbers of Serb troops that would be allowed to remain in Kosovo, and it appeared Chernomyrdin's visit had produced few concessions. However, Milosevic's apparent willingness to accept the broad G-8 guidelines for ending the war quickly triggered a blitz of diplomatic activity. Secretary Albright quickly called British Foreign Secretary Cook to discuss the situation and both were skeptical, noting that Milosevic had shown no give on the two central issues: NATO at the core and total withdrawal. It was also pointed out that Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic had earlier made a similar statement about the G-8 principles that had amounted to little. Both ministers were concerned that the Germans, already eager to exit the war, might overreact. "Rhetoric alone" would not slow NATO's offensive, insisted Albright. A short time later, the core NATO ministers—Albright, Cook, French Foreign Minister Vedrine, German Foreign Minister Fischer, and Italian Foreign Minister Dini—held a conference call. Both Vedrine and Fischer were in Toulouse, France, in advance of a meeting between President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder scheduled for the following day. Cook and Albright, anticipating the French and German reaction to the news, took a tough line. Both observed that they had not heard from either Ivanov or Chernomyrdin and consequently had little insight into Milosevic's position. Albright suggested that they issue a general statement welcoming the "movement" by the Yugoslavs, but making clear that they would take no further steps until hearing from Chernomyrdin. The Allies had shared drafts of a potential UN resolution with the Russians, but like the trilateral talks, discussions had bogged down over total


withdrawal and NATO leadership of peacekeeping. Eager to generate more momentum for a peace deal, German Foreign Minister Fischer wanted to hold a meeting of the G-8 political directors to discuss the draft UN resolution before Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin traveled to Belgrade. He even suggested that the next round of trilateral talks be folded into a meeting of G-8 political directors. Albright, wanting to keep the United States clearly in control of the talks, argued that such a move was premature, pointing out that if the Russians weren't willing to compromise on a UN resolution, a high profile G-8 political directors meeting would accomplish little. Both Vedrine and Fischer pushed for a quick meeting of the G-8 to work on the UN resolution. However, both Albright and Cook were resolute: "We have seen and heard absolutely nothing whatsoever signifying real movement by Milosevic." They felt that acting without hearing from the Russians would be ill advised. Albright spoke with Cook several hours later. She had touched back with Talbott, and both were worried that the German proposal to hold a G-8 political directors meeting would undercut the trilateral talks. Albright was concerned by the near panic among some of her fellow ministers and felt that if NATO were not careful, it would provide the Russians with dangerous leverage over negotiations. Cook and Albright were convinced that concocting a peace deal within the framework of the G-8 would be a disaster. The two also discussed the possibility that Russian officials were encouraging Milosevic to keep fighting. Shortly afterwards, all five foreign ministers again conferred, and the conversation picked up where it had left off. Albright claimed that they were talking about a major shift in approach that risked jeopardizing the momentum created by the bombing and the indictment based on little more than a few news reports. French Foreign Minister Vedrine dissented and accused the secretary of being overly cautious. He wanted to take immediate action and informed his colleagues that the French and German political directors had drafted a statement referring to Chernomyrdin's Belgrade visit and suggesting Milosevic's announcement appeared "unambiguous and conducive to a settlement." The statement also announced a G-8 political directors meeting and invited Chernomyrdin to attend. Both Cook and Albright were united against the French plan, with Cook arguing they should not "stampede in a way that might extinguish progress." He counseled that it would be better to have Ahtisaari travel to Belgrade


before doing anything rash. Albright suggested that the Germans, as the chair of the EU, issue a far more guarded statement indicating that they would immediately contact the Russians to learn details of Chernomyrdin's discussions and to consult about the prospects for finalizing a UN resolution. Fischer, obviously frustrated, insisted that the onus for action was directly on the G-8 and emphasized the difficult climate of European public opinion. He even issued a sort of threat: If the ministers could not reach common ground, Chancellor Schroeder, as the European Union president, would act on his own. Albright, far from being cowed, made clear that any independent action by Schroeder as EU president was "unacceptable," and again asked why Bonn felt compelled to act in the absence of clear information. Fischer countered that Milosevic and Chernomyrdin were on the offensive and that the ministers "needed to do something." Cook dismissed this as over-dramatization, and suggested that the Allies needed to express "serious, not hysterical, interest." The secretary urged that they all wait until they had more information than the unconfirmed reports from Belgrade and suggested that Chirac and Schroeder reiterate NATO's conditions and stress the fact that Milosevic understood what he needed to do to fulfill those demands. Fischer reluctantly agreed. After a briefing at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Talbott and his fellow negotiators jetted toward Washington. During the flight, Talbott polled his delegation as to whether any of them thought Milosevic would soon accept NATO's demands. Most dismissed the notion outright; arguing that Milosevic could endure for some time, mainly because he was not concerned with the suffering of his own citizens; Milosevic had cards left to play. General Foglesong was the lone dissenter. Speaking slowly and with a faint touch of a drawl he chipped in, "I wouldn't be so sure about that. With what we have up in the air right now, the additional planes in the theater and the new attacks routes, it is—" Foglesong thought for a moment about how best to describe the armada of planes socked in over Yugoslavia—"it is awesome. I wouldn't be so sure he doesn't take a deal." During the flight, Talbott spoke with Ambassador Holbrooke. Holbrooke was agitated by the Chernomyrdin op-ed, and felt that it would be "unconscionable" to engage in further talks with the Russian special envoy after such outrageous statements. However, Holbrooke had dealt directly with Milosevic many times. Talbott disagreed with Holbrooke, maintaining that


NATO's demands were the real bottom line, not what showed up in the newspaper. Holbrooke was also surprised by the scope of the war crimes indictments, having not anticipated that some of Milosevic's inner circle, particularly Milan Milutinovic, the president of Serbia, would be brought up on charges. Milutinovic, a career Yugoslav bureaucrat and a close confidant with Milosevic, was well known to Western officials. Holbrooke had calculated that Milutinovic might be a useful negotiator for talks with Belgrade, but the indictment effectively precluded such a role. Holbrooke continued to be troubled by the course of the war, and relations between him and Albright were hitting new lows. In the United States, the media was delivering a dismal prognosis for the trilateral talks. The New York Times reported: Publicly, the Clinton Administration has applauded the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, a move that appears to change the Yugoslav's status from potential deal maker to pariah. But in private, administration officials say the indictment is likely to cripple their efforts to find a diplomatic solution on the current tracks—through the Russian envoy, Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, and the President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari. The indictment has much diminished the hopes of using Ahtisaari as a go-between who could win Milosevic's acquiescence in a settlement. The Times analysis suggested that the indictment would add impetus to those calling for the use of ground troops, and quoted an unnamed British official who suggested almost smugly that the indictment might "stiffen the spine" of the Clinton administration. Similarly, General Clark felt that the "indictment was a huge win," in terms of building support for a ground operation. The concern among U.S. negotiators was that reports proclaiming the death of the trilateral talks would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. While Talbott continued to argue to his superiors that the trilateral process should be given time to work, the clock appeared to be running out: If the next round of talks did not achieve a breakthrough, the pressure to try another venue for negotiations would be overwhelming. Indeed, the slow progress of the talks, a steady stream of incendiary Russian rhetoric, and growing domestic political pressure in both Moscow and Washington all combined to create an impression that the trilateral effort was an exercise in futility. Some on Talbott's team felt that the repeated Russian threat to abandon


diplomacy was a Persian bazaar tactic. Walking away from negotiations would not get the Russians any closer to getting the bombing stopped and might have the opposite effect by allowing NATO to argue that it had exhausted diplomacy and should move ahead with a ground war. Russia would be left to suffer on the sidelines, having made the case for its own strategic irrelevance. In Moscow, Foreign Minister Ivanov vented his frustration to the press on May 29. "I will put it straight, the situation is not easy at all. To be even more exact, it is hard. The efforts which are being made by Russia, and in particular by the president's envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, do not find any understanding or necessary support of NATO's leadership." Ivanov received a call from Albright a short time later, and the Russian foreign minister indicated that he would be meeting with President Yeltsin the next day. While Ivanov initially sounded upbeat about finding a solution to the crisis, he quickly added that weeks of arduous diplomacy had produced neither results nor demonstrable political cover. Albright tried to coax a report on Chernomyrdin's visit to Belgrade from the foreign minister, but Ivanov remained coy. "Russia is neither Milosevic's translator nor NATO's mediator," he insisted. "Finding a solution to the crisis is more pressing than Milosevic's state of mind." When Albright again pushed to get a sense of what had transpired between Chernomyrdin and Milosevic in Belgrade, Ivanov only hinted that a resolution to the crisis might be possible. Ivanov was eager to arrange a call between Clinton and Yeltsin to discuss the situation, as a means to pave the way for an EU representative (possibly Chancellor Schroeder), Chernomyrdin, and a "U.S. representative" to meet in Bonn. After such a gathering, Chernomyrdin, and perhaps Ahtisaari, could then head to Belgrade with "alternative proposals" to end the war. Ivanov stated flatly that he wanted a U.S. negotiator with more seniority at the next round of talks—Vice President Gore was his preferred choice. Albright pushed back. The terms for ending the conflict had been spelled out, a draft UN resolution was on the table, and Russia needed to endorse the demands that had been developed through the trilateral process. Talbott was authorized to speak on Albright's behalf, and the personalities of the negotiators mattered far less than whether NATO and Russia could close the gap on their positions. Albright was willing to pass on the Russian plea to engage Vice President Gore, but she was firm that its acceptance was unlikely.


After Albright asked if Russia would abandon its position of giving Belgrade a "veto" over any agreement, Ivanov insisted that Moscow was negotiating in defense of its best interests, not Milosevic's. Ivanov returned to his central theme: It was time for people empowered to make decisions to meet and resolve the situation. He concluded the conversation by stating that if the United States wanted to unilaterally venture into the dangerous fields of Kosovo, Russia—which had problems enough of its own—would leave America to its own devices. Chernomyrdin and President Ahtisaari also spoke on the telephone. Chernomyrdin claimed that some progress had been made with the Yugoslavs, but avoided details. Like Ivanov, Chernomyrdin made a push to directly involve Schroeder in the talks and have either Albright or Gore replace Talbott. Ahtisaari was skeptical. The coordinated effort to get rid of Talbott was not gaining traction. Yugoslavia's acceptance of the G-8 parameters for a peace deal continued to reverberate around Europe, and the reaction within NATO highlighted the natural split within the Alliance: The United States and Britain were unimpressed, feeling the offer was trickery, and Germany and France wanted to convene the G-8, including Russia, to forge a common response to the announcement and speed work on a UN resolution. Highlighting these tensions, President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder did exactly what Albright and Cook had lobbied so hard against as they concluded their meeting in Toulouse: They declared Belgrade's announcement a step toward peace and called for an emergency meeting of the G-8 to assess if Milosevic was willing to accept the conditions for ending the air campaign. The statement by Chirac and Schroeder caused instant heartburn in London and Washington. Given continued Serb offensives on the ground and Milosevic's long history of broken promises, the Yugoslav maneuver looked like a ploy to exploit divisions within the Alliance. NATO military officials insisted there would be no bombing pause until all demands were met, as battles within the Alliance about how best to shape the upcoming week's diplomatic agenda continued. The Germans successfully lobbied to hold the trilateral talks in Bonn rather than Helsinki. The Germans also wanted a seat at the table, but succeeded only in securing agreement that Chancellor Schroeder could host a dinner for the negotiators at the end of talks. Speaking with Secretary Albright, German Foreign Minister Fischer noted that he had spoken with Ivanov, and the Russian had griped that


Washington refused to send a "decision maker" to the talks. The Germans continued to be concerned that the diplomatic process was on the verge of breakdown and felt that "if the United States is always seen as obstructionist, the result will be counterproductive." Fischer saw NATO entering the "Kosovo end game," and while he was convinced the Alliance would prevail, he wondered "at what cost victory would come." A short time later, Secretary Albright delivered the commencement address at Georgetown University, and she came out swinging: There are those who say it is not smart to stand up to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo because by so doing, we upset powerful countries. Others say it is not consistent because NATO does not intervene in every place where outrages are committed. Still others say it is not prudent because Kosovo is small and distant and the fate of its people shouldn't matter to us very much. To all this, I can only reply with a revered term of American diplomacy: Nuts. The speech was classic Albright: tart, pugnacious, and quick to place the defense of human rights at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. It was a perfect example of why Albright's substance and style had become a touchstone for her critics and allies alike. After the speech, Albright, Cook, Fischer, Vedrine, and Dini spoke again. Each had talked to Ivanov during the course of the day, and his message had been consistent: A deal was within reach and Chernomyrdin should meet immediately with Schroeder and a senior U.S. government official. Those talks would produce an agreement that could be taken to Belgrade by Chernomyrdin and presented to Milosevic. Albright battled to keep diplomacy within the trilateral track. Since their only reports of Milosevic's position came from Russia, they were working through a "hazardous filter." An independent voice such as Ahtisaari's would be crucial in determining Milosevic's real intent, and relying on the Russians to independently broker a deal, then hoping Milosevic lived up to its terms, was a dangerous leap of faith. Albright suggested that Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin, and Talbott meet as scheduled and then confer with Schroeder at the end of their session. Afterward, if the group agreed on the way forward, Ahtisaari would travel to Belgrade with Chernomyrdin. If further negotiations were needed, they could take place at the foreign minister level, with Ahtisaari's participation. While Fischer and Vedrine were displeased, the five foreign ministers eventually

160 # COLLISION COURSE

agreed that Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin, and Talbott would convene in Germany three days later. Schroeder would be the nominal host. Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin could then travel to Belgrade the following day. The G-8 political directors would gather later that same week and try to complete the work on a draft UN resolution and lay the groundwork for a G-8 foreign ministers meeting soon after. The United States and Great Britain had again rolled back German and French efforts to gain a seat at the negotiating table, but it remained unclear how long the Clinton administration would be able to maintain its role as NATO's lead, and lone, negotiator.

Jockeying for Position On Sunday, May 30, Yugoslav officials in Belgrade expounded on their view of a potential peace agreement. The Serbian minister of information told reporters that Yugoslavia had never opposed an international presence in Kosovo, but quickly added, "What cannot be accepted—never—is the occupation of our territory." The ultranationalist Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Vojislav Seselj, said he too would be willing to accept foreign troops in Kosovo. Sounding surprisingly flip he added, "If that is the price we have to pay for the war to end, we can let up a bit." Seselj indicated that peacekeepers should not be from NATO and that some Yugoslav security forces should be left to guard Kosovo's borders. On Monday, May 31, positioning for the talks continued. Chernomyrdin told reporters, "The week should bring a certain decision. . . . If everything proceeds according to plan . . . a framework for a positive solution for a Yugoslav settlement has been worked out." Prime Minister Stepashin told the Russian news agency Interfax, "There are signs that even this situation, which originally seemed to be intractable, may be settled after all." In the United States, President Clinton presided over Memorial Day ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery. Standing in front of crisply dressed soldiers, Clinton made his case for holding firm. "I know that many Americans believe this is not our fight. But remember why many of the people are laying in the graves out here—because of what happened in Europe and because of what was allowed to go on too long before people intervened. What we are doing will save lives, including American lives, in the future." While


Clinton's remarks were poignant, the setting in which they were delivered seemed to highlight the growing threat of a ground war. Clinton was anticipating a telephone call from President Yeltsin during the day, but Kremlin officials informed the White House that Yeltsin would be unavailable because of "scheduling" problems. The Russians then offered Prime Minister Stepashin as a replacement. After some internal debate about whether Clinton or Gore should handle the conversation, the White House agreed to have Stepashin speak with the president. Given his persistent health problems and Moscow's general turmoil, Yeltsin's sudden unavailability was of concern. As much as Western officials delicately avoided the subject, Yeltsin was a sick man struggling with alcoholism, and his grip on his faculties and presidential duties alarmingly faded in and out. While the Clinton team approached Yeltsin's health as if walking on eggshells, his infirmities were hard to deny. Even in tightly controlled press events, Yeltsin was erratic and often bellicose. His physical decline had become an embarrassing metaphor for the Russian state. However, one administration official defended the approach: "Were we supposed to tell reporters on background, 'We know the guy's a drunk, but he is the only drunk we got?' I don't think that would have helped." After brief pleasantries and apologies for his president being unable to take the line, Stepashin told Clinton the situation was increasingly volatile. He said that the Russians who had been in Yugoslavia spoke of "terrifying scenes of destruction and death. This tragedy has to be stopped." Stepashin reiterated Ivanov's plea to send someone more senior than Talbott to the talks, preferably Gore. "The choice of the representative is certainly up to you. It is important, however, that he be granted broad authority in order to be able to take decisions on the spot." While the Russians wanted a more conciliatory U.S. negotiator, their request was long on chutzpah. For months, the international community had been forced to deal with a dysfunctional Russian government that was often unable to render even basic decisions without internal discord. Debates between Ivanov, Chernomyrdin, and the defense ministry had repeatedly brought negotiations to a stop. No one in the Russian government was clearly in charge of Balkans policy, and Yeltsin had just suddenly dropped out of a call with President Clinton. These were not the hallmarks of a nation well positioned to demand that the United States send its most senior officials to engage in line-by-line negotiations.


The president, with Deputy Secretary Talbott hurriedly scribbling notes across the room, declined to send Gore to the talks. "I understand that you want someone who can speak for me and make decisions in Bonn, but the implication is that the people who are representing me, and particularly Deputy Secretary Talbott, cannot do that. That's not the issue. He does speak for me and my government." Clinton also noted that the real issue was "not what we can agree to, it is what Milosevic will agree to." Stepashin asserted that Chernomyrdin's visit to Belgrade had revealed the time was ripe for moving forward with specific proposals, and that Bonn would be an opportunity to take decisive action. He also hinted that Chernomyrdin would arrive in Bonn with a serious new proposal. Clinton cautioned that specific action to end the crisis would only be possible if the solution met certain redlines: the full and safe return of refugees, protecting the rights of Serb and Kosovar Albanians, and preserving Kosovo as autonomous within Serbia. Stepashin again stressed his hope that there would be a breakthrough during the week, and the two men concluded their conversation. After the call, Clinton joked with Talbott, "I guess you've gotten a reputation with those people for being a real hard ass. That's not what they say about you around here." The president felt that the Russians and Yugoslavs might be close to making a deal: "I'd bet they think they've got something lined up in Belgrade and they're getting ready to nail it." In a separate conversation, Berger, Albright, and Talbott debated the merits of continuing to engage the Russians in peace talks. Berger was growing skeptical that Moscow's positions had anything to do with Milosevic's real bottom line, and he feared the United States was being reduced to "a delicate negotiation with the Russians over what they think." The national security advisor was also concerned that Chernomyrdin—half of his hammer and anvil strategy—was in danger of becoming a "rubber hammer." Berger felt the trilateral talks had more to do with managing Russia's domestic political struggles than getting to Milosevic. However, he was optimistic that Belgrade was feeling the heat from the military campaign: "We were seeing in the intelligence, increasingly as we got into May, the noose tightening around Milosevic. There was a shift in public mood in Serbia that happened about the time the lights went out. People realized that this wasn't a grand cause; it was simply causing them suffering." Both Berger and Albright advocated giving Ahtisaari a more prominent


role while diminishing Chernomyrdin's. The Finnish president could serve as a direct emissary to Belgrade and provide an unvarnished report on Milosevic's mood and position. He could also press Milosevic to clarify his stance on issues such as the composition of a peacekeeping force and the withdrawal of his forces. In doing so, Ahtisaari would also be able to determine if the Yugoslav and Russian positions were identical. On the downside, such an independent mission would further alienate the Russians, perhaps end the trilateral process, and create the need for a new approach to "Russia management." Talbott continued to push to keep the trilateral talks alive. He felt that the Russians might actually believe they could deliver Milosevic and were trying to bring NATO and Belgrade's positions into alignment. He also suggested a second alternative: The Russians might be looking for an excuse to wash their hands of Yugoslavia. If Moscow deemed the diplomatic process dead and blamed the impasse equally on the United States and Yugoslavia, it could declare a pox on both NATO and Milosevic. Moscow could then position itself equidistant between NATO and the Yugoslavs, grudgingly accepting that some form of international action against Milosevic was inevitable. Talbott wanted to exhaust the Russia channel before abandoning it, but he realized "time was running out, and Chernomyrdin had perhaps one more trip to Belgrade." Shortly after the discussion with Berger and Albright, Talbott spoke with Ahtisaari on the phone. The Finnish president declared, "I'm ready to go now. I've come to the conclusion I should go to Belgrade on Wednesday whatever happens in Bonn." Berger and Albright's single envoy approach looked like the way forward. The Yugoslavs also weighed in on the diplomatic front, further exploring the notion of direct talks between Belgrade and Washington. Milosevic's chief of staff and foreign policy adviser, Bojan Bugarcic, called the State Department Operations Center and spoke with American Ambassador-at-Large James Pardew about the earlier message from Landrum Boiling. Pardew indicated, "This is a serious channel for your government to meet with Ambassador Dobbins, myself, or whoever, somewhere in Europe. Such a meeting has approval from the highest levels." The proposal for direct talks with Belgrade had generated some dispute within the Clinton administration. Holbrooke, Berger, and Jim Steinberg of the NSC were all willing to give direct talks a shot. All felt that, like it or


not, talks with Belgrade might ultimately be needed to end the war. Albright was more reluctant, fearing that the Yugoslavs were "venue shopping" to find the negotiators who would give them the best deal. While the National Security Council had initially felt that Ambassador Holbrooke would be the best U.S. representative for such talks, that plan was eventually dropped. Holbrooke was still awaiting Senate confirmation for his post at the United Nations, and another mission to Belgrade would be contentious. Further, Albright personally opposed giving Holbrooke such a role. Talbott, Ambassador Pardew, and Jim Swigert were all considered as alternatives. Bugarcic noted that—for the time being—he only wanted to confirm that the U.S. offer for talks was genuine. He inquired how soon a meeting could be arranged, and Pardew made clear that it could take place on literally a day's notice. Bugarcic also asked, "Is the venue here, in Belgrade, acceptable?" "I would have to ask. Can you meet somewhere else?" Pardew responded. "We have some problems here now, I'm not sure," Bugarcic laughed. "I have to check." Bugarcic noted that he would get "back in touch with you as soon as possible. I need to check things here and pass some information. I would prefer to deal with people I know." "OK, I wish you well," responded Pardew. "Well," Bugarcic laughed, "stop the bombing." Bugarcic called again about thirty minutes later and indicated, "We would like for you to come. The meeting would be here with my boss." Pardew said he would have to see if his superiors approved. He also asked if there was flexibility on the location or level of person at the meeting, leading Bugarcic to reply, "No, not really, not on location, and there is no point in meeting anyone else." The administration was moving ever closer to launching talks with Belgrade, and an uneasy consensus was emerging within the administration that if the trilateral talks faltered—as many expected they would—it might be time to engage Milosevic. At Andrews Air Force Base, Talbott and his team of negotiators prepared for the overnight flight to Bonn. The negotiators exchanged small talk as they stood on the steps of the VIP waiting area. General Foglesong caught a few minutes of the NBA playoffs on the television in the lounge, rooting for


the San Antonio Spurs. Outside, Jim Swigert of the team pulled out a cigarette. He explained to several of his fellow team members that since his wife frowned on the habit, he only allowed himself to smoke when he traveled abroad. When one of his colleagues helpfully noted that Andrews Air Force Base was in Maryland, not Europe, Swigert wearily explained that he had officially declared Andrews to be international airspace. Not much more than a quick cigarette later, the Air Force Gulfstream jet carrying the U.S. delegation was headed east, back toward Europe and unfinished business.

The Petersberg U.S. negotiators touched down at the Bonn-Cologne airport early in the day on June 1, and a motorcade quickly whisked them along a steep and winding road to the Petersberg, a German government guesthouse nestled scenically atop the Siebengebirge mountain range. In the aftermath of World War II, the Petersberg had been headquarters for the Allied High Commission administering Germany. At that time, locals, chaffing under restrictions imposed by the Allies, derisively nicknamed the Petersberg "Mount Veto." After extensive remodeling in the 1980s, the Petersberg had reopened as a guesthouse for official state visitors and a resort hotel. Its front veranda offered a sweeping panorama of the Rhine River and the city of Cologne and a spectacular setting for a round of make-or-break trilateral talks that President Ahtisaari said he knew "would be the last one." The U.S. delegation was the first of the three teams to arrive. The Russian and Finnish delegations soon arrived as well, and Talbott and Chernomyrdin headed into a one-on-one session, as last minute German pleas to be included in the sessions were rebuffed. The trilateral military experts began separate discussions. Gen. Leonid Ivashov was again the ranking officer representing the Russians, General Foglesong represented the United States, and Admiral Kaskeala represented Finland. Gen. Viktor Zavarzin, the former Russian military liaison to NATO, also joined Ivashov. General Ivashov, intent on laying down a tough marker to begin the talks, declared, "I have come to negotiate, not to capitulate." A member of the U.S. delegation discussed Ivashov's role in the talks: Because so much of what the Russians do, and so much of what their principals read, is controlled by the intelligence services, Ivashov had a very strong


voice as the formulator and leading edge of the grand conspiracy theory: Kosovo as U.S. domination of Europe and the world. Ivashov is very articulate, and I am sure he writes as well as he speaks, and he became the most articulate and influential spokesman for the worst of Moscow's zero sum theology. Given General Ivashov's temperament and unpleasant style, it was no surprise that many of the Finns and Americans had developed a distaste for him, with one U.S. negotiator calling him, "a crass, obnoxious, GRU [Russia's Main Intelligence Service] person who was never helpful on anything." As one Finn had plaintively asked an American during the talks, "Can you believe we've had to live next to these people all these years?" However, by that point, the teams had grown accustomed to Ivashov's abrasive tactics and assumed he was simply chest-thumping. General Foglesong turned the conversation to one of the major unresolved issues: the number of Serb forces that would be either allowed to stay in Kosovo or eventually return to the province to guard key historic sites. When Foglesong raised the issue of patrimonial sites, Ivashov sharply interjected, "You mean you haven't bombed all these yet?" General Foglesong had an even demeanor and was slow to anger, but his reply had a sharp edge: "No, despite the fact the Yugoslavs are hiding command posts, communications, and weapons at these sites, we have not bombed them." Ivashov shot back, "Why not? You are bombing hospitals." General Foglesong removed the reading glasses that he sometimes wore when studying text. He gestured toward Ivashov, the blood rising in his face. "I want to make things perfectly clear. We do not target civilian facilities. I categorically reject your charge, General, and I also highly resent it." Ivashov sensed that he had crossed the line, and did not challenge Foglesong. The atmosphere was so poisonous that it was clear the session would resolve little, and the meeting drew to a hasty close, having lasted less than ten minutes. General Foglesong, a professional, did not let the incident deter him, but he was annoyed. As Foglesong told several of the team members as they milled around after the meeting, "I have a pretty thick hide, but I was about ready to tell him to kiss my ass." For a week in which there were high diplomatic hopes, things were off to a rocky start. Any hopes that the remaining differences between Russia and the United States could be easily dispatched were dashed. At three in the

ON THE MOUNTAIN it 167 afternoon, the trilateral process got fully underway; Chernomyrdin led off the discussion by suggesting that passing a UN resolution should be the first step in the peace process and that such a process would allow the international community to test Milosevic's willingness to meet the broad conditions established by the G-8. The Russian envoy was adamant: After four inconclusive trips to Belgrade, he did not want to make a fifth without something to show for it. In a generic sense, Chernomyrdin's proposal was unobjectionable. The G-8 conditions were broad and nonspecific, and NATO would welcome UN support. However, Chernomyrdin's plan came with a catch—Russia and China would not support a UN resolution without a bombing pause. While Prime Minister Stepashin had claimed that Chernomyrdin would arrive at the Petersberg with a serious new proposal for ending the war, there was little appeal in his latest plan. Suspending bombing in exchange for a UN resolution whose text remained sharply in dispute was not much of a bargain. There was also no guarantee Security Council members like Russia and China would sanction the use of renewed force if Milosevic failed to meet the G-8's conditions—much less NATO's. Talbott and Ahtisaari explained that if NATO suspended its bombing before Milosevic met any demands, there would simply be no incentive for him to slow his military machine in Kosovo. Certainly, no refugees would feel comfortable going home in such an environment. Chernomyrdin's response was muted, and it seemed clear that the Russian envoy was not leading with his bottom line. However, as the negotiators discussed a possible UN resolution, the talks took an interesting twist. Chernomyrdin argued that they needed to move beyond the idea that he and Ahtisaari would take "separate but noncontradictory" scripts to Belgrade, where Ahtisaari would detail NATO's demands, but Chernomyrdin would neither explicitly endorse nor reject these conditions. Instead, Chernomyrdin was eager to establish a single, unified set of demands that, if met, would end the war. Chernomyrdin wanted a straightforward road map—encapsulating the joint positions of NATO, Russia, and the European Union—that he could take to Belgrade for his fifth trip. On its face, Chernomyrdin's proposal seemed like common sense. If Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin traveled to Belgrade, it was logical they should share a unity of vision, and Ahtisaari as well had long been eager to close the gaps between the positions of Russia and NATO. However, the drawbacks to such an approach were equally evident. The


lengthy trilateral talks had repeatedly verged on collapse because the three sides had been unable to agree on two sets of talking points that met the simple test of not being in direct contradiction. By trying to forge a set of truly joint demands, the negotiators would only make a hard job harder. Several people at the table pointed out exactly that dilemma, and defended the merit of developing two noncontradictory scripts. However, after some initial reluctance, the discussion began to revolve around a single text. The Russians presented a revised draft of the paper the Finnish and U.S. teams had developed the week before. If the three sides were going to concur on a common set of demands, the devil would be in the details. The Russian text again watered down the NATO demands. It did not insist on total withdrawal, and the language on "NATO at the core" had been excised, as had a number of measures designed to ensure military compliance with the agreement. Chernomyrdin suggested that many of the younger refugees would simply not want to go back to Kosovo once the war ended, and that since Albania was so desperately poor, many Albanians without documentation might sneak into the province. While there was some progress on the margins, none of the central issues had been resolved. The paper itself was something of a miracle of brevity, and its text was never more than two or three pages long. On several occasions, the drafters, using legal-sized paper and small fonts, had even been able to squeeze it onto a single page. Given such condensed language, every single word was a potential battlefield. Talbott revisited the notion of taking two different scripts to Belgrade, and for the next several hours the talks shifted to bilateral discussion between the U.S. and Russian delegations. Chancellor Schroeder was still scheduled to host a dinner for the negotiators later in the evening, followed by a large press conference. German foreign ministry officials were dismayed to learn that their chancellor would not be in a position to announce a breakthrough. The Russian and American teams continued their attempts to hash out the careful language of demands. Given Milosevic's long history of exploiting loopholes in diplomatic agreements, U.S. negotiators wanted to ensure the paper left no wiggle room. For example, General Foglesong not only insisted on the total withdrawal of Serb troops, but on a strict and rapid timetable for such a pullout, broad authority for NATO-led peacekeepers to use deadly force, and clear rules governing the small number of any Serb troops that might eventually be allowed to return. The Russians repeatedly countered


with softer language, claiming that Milosevic would be far more likely to accept looser terms that allowed him to save face. Not long before the dinner was scheduled to commence, Talbott joined Ahtisaari in his suite, followed a short time later by Chernomyrdin, and the three continued negotiations. The previous week's dynamics now played out in reverse. Ahtisaari was enthusiastic to go to Belgrade as soon as the next day to gauge Milosevic's reaction. Chernomyrdin dug in his heels, complaining that NATO had not made significant concessions, and insisting that a trip made no sense until they had developed an acceptable set of demands. Having a weak negotiating position, Chernomyrdin consistently tried to use emotional arguments. The Russians did not want to be associated with pressuring the Milosevic regime or to acknowledge that they were doing so. Chernomyrdin tried to gain ground by constantly recasting the same arguments. Talbott commented: I liked Chernomyrdin. I found him wonderfully Russian and kind of a blunt instrument. There were no great mysteries about what was going on. When he was being tactical I understood his tactics and I also understood the strategic goal, which I supported: to end the bombing. All I had to do, which was a lot, was to convince him that the way to do that was to accept these conditions. . . . I knew what he was up to. He wanted the best possible deal but still one that ended the bombing as quickly as possible, preferably before the Cologne summit. Just after 7:30 in the evening, Chancellor Schroeder's helicopter hovered above the lawn of the Petersberg as scores of journalists, security personnel, staffers, and curious onlookers crammed the elegant central lobby of the Petersberg. The peaceful mountaintop resort had taken on the atmosphere of a circus as reporters and camera crews jostled for position. Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin, and Talbott remained closeted in the Finnish president's suite, sending the German protocol officers into an escalating panic. Foreign ministry officials repeatedly went to the door of the suite to petition the three negotiators to come downstairs and greet the chancellor upon arrival. Senior aides to the trio repeatedly turned them away. "We are going off to eat dinner instead of carrying on with the important work," harrumphed Chernomyrdin. In a bit of comic opera, the protocol officers continued to scramble back


and forth between the door of the suite and the hotel lobby. Schroeder had landed and there were still no negotiators on hand. To the horror of the Germans, Chancellor Schroeder strode into the Petersberg's lobby, amid a brilliant fusillade of flash photography, to find no one. Several awkward and confused minutes passed as his aides debated whether Schroeder should go upstairs or simply wait. Eventually, the trio of reluctant negotiators made its way downstairs. Ahtisaari later noted the whole scene was "a bit embarrassing." At the dinner, Schroeder requested a status report on the talks and tried to engage in negotiations. He was disappointed that he would have neither a deal to announce nor a role in the talks. Talbott stressed that the international community needed to be firm with Milosevic and not send any mixed signals. The dinner was brief and Ahtisaari observed, "The atmosphere was rather lame, as the solution appeared to be out of reach." In the main conference hall, more than a hundred reporters and camera crews assembled for the press conference, but there was little news. Schroeder insisted that "Substantial progress has been made," but Ahtisaari, Talbott, and Chernomyrdin, wanting to get back to work, were tight-lipped. After the press conference concluded around quarter to ten, Talbott briefly participated in a conference call with Albright, Berger, and Jim Steinberg, who were all meeting in the White House Situation Room. Talbott briefed the group on the talks and was not optimistic about reaching a deal. A solo Ahtisaari trip was looking more probable. Talbott asked for clear instructions on how far he could go in reaching a deal, and he received authority to essentially put the issue of Russia's role in KFOR to the side while focusing on resolving the issues of NATO at the core and total withdrawal. The wiring diagram for how Russia participated in the peacekeeping force could be dealt with after they had made more progress on getting Milosevic to accept the demands. Talbott recognized that there might have to be direct discussions between NATO and Yugoslav military officials to finalize the technical details of any agreement. In the end, he was given continued authority to hammer out a position that would allow for either a joint trip to Belgrade or a solo mission by Ahtisaari, and again Jim Steinberg was a key ally. Not only was it down to crunch time for the peace talks but for planning a ground war as well. NATO Secretary-General Solana had spoken with Secretary Albright earlier in the day, and he had indicated that he would need a decision about which nations would participate in a ground offensive within


four or five days. Secretary of Defense Cohen had expressed some frustration with the slow pace of planning for ground troops at NATO headquarters, but Solana wanted to avoid putting a formal vote on ground troop planning on the table for fear that it might be rejected. From Solana's perspective, three or four countries would need to produce the bulk of the force, and some of them were already moving forward with preparations. Albright urged Solana to keep moving ahead at full speed, and both acknowledged the tremendous amount of work that would need to be done in the respective NATO capitals to bring everyone on board. Just after ten in the evening, the trilateral talks resumed. The throng of media and the large entourage that had accompanied Chancellor Schroeder had departed, and the Petersberg was suddenly deserted. For the weary negotiators settling in around the conference table, the long day would only continue. The marathon talks, heavy travel schedule, and intense pressures had frayed nerves and left the negotiators physically and emotionally drained as they soldiered on into the night. The Russian military officers were in a foul mood because they felt Chernomyrdin was too weak to deal with the West. Chernomyrdin was angry that NATO refused to make meaningful concessions. Ahtisaari and Talbott were frustrated that despite their best efforts the talks were on the verge of collapse. The exhaustion and aggravation provoked ever more colorful language from Chernomyrdin. The Balkans would be transformed into a vast "sea of blood." Kosovo would be NATO's Vietnam, its Afghanistan, its Waterloo. A ground invasion would result in tens of thousands dead. Serb guerillas would fight for a thousand years. Waves of terrorism would sweep across Europe. NATO had gone insane. The bombing had to be stopped. Talbott again suggested returning to adopting two noncontradictory texts. Russia did not have to endorse all of NATO's conditions; it only had to refrain from disagreeing with these demands in front of Milosevic. Chernomyrdin resisted. He wanted a single text to take to Belgrade. Chernomyrdin looked Talbott in the eye and said, "I want your word that if Milosevic agrees to this document that we're working on, if he agrees, then sticks by his agreement, if it's implemented, that the NATO bombing will stop." Talbott gave his word, but with a clear caveat: First there had to be full agreement on the demands. At the Petersberg, the clock rolled past midnight. The composition of the peacekeeping force and NATO's demand for total withdrawal of Serb forces remained at the center of disagreements. Around two in the morning, the


teams took a brief break. Some staff members used the opportunity to telephone their home offices, several sat in the lobby's overstuffed chairs blearyeyed and trying to focus, and others slipped out to the balcony for a cigarette. The conference room in which the negotiators worked was a disarray of papers, laptop computers, notebooks, and half-finished cups of coffee. The toll of the talks was obvious on the pale faces of the negotiators. During the break, President Ahtisaari lost his footing on a throw rug in the lobby, falling heavily on the hard floor. A small angry knot swelled on his forehead as aides scrambled to find an icepack. Chernomyrdin could be heard blowing up at Ivashov in a sidebar conversation, yelling, "I'm not anybody's puppet. You assholes can do this thing without me." Tempers continued to flare as the talks resumed. Chernomyrdin insisted, "I still don't understand what you want and what you're demanding . . . let's just get it simple." He spoke of not only abandoning the joint mission to Belgrade but of walking away from the diplomacy entirely. Ahtisaari made clear that he wanted to go to Belgrade with or without Chernomyrdin, and he carefully noted that if Chernomyrdin withdrew from the talks, it would not terminate his own involvement. Ahtisaari argued that NATO would have no choice but to go forward with more extreme military measures if Russia did not help Belgrade come to an agreement. Chernomyrdin himself repeatedly raised what he saw as the near inevitability of NATO launching a ground war, arguing that it would place NATO and Russia on a military collision course, and compared a potential NATO invasion of Yugoslavia to Germany's assault against Russia during World War II. Talbott and Foglesong both countered that while they welcomed a continuing role for Russia in the diplomacy, if Moscow gave up on negotiations, it would further bolster NATO's case for the use of force. As Talbott argued, "We are prepared for—indeed, we'd prefer—a diplomatic conclusion to the crisis, and the sooner the better, but only on our bottom line terms. We're equally prepared for a militarily imposed conclusion, however long it takes and whatever the military means." Milosevic's resistance could trigger a green light for the ground war. Both sides had gone as far as they were willing to go. Further progress was impossible without either Moscow or Washington making concessions, yet neither nation wanted to take that hard extra step. Chernomyrdin and Talbott were being asked the near impossible—they were trying to strike a deal without compromise.


It was at that late hour, almost 3:30 in the morning, that General Foglesong insisted that any set of joint demands would have to include specific provisions to ensure that Milosevic complied with the agreement. Milosevic would only be allotted one week for the total withdrawal of Serb troops and air defense systems, and the Yugoslav military would be banned from entering a twenty-five-kilometer "safety zone" along Kosovo's border. Chernomyrdin erupted, raging against "these new and unilateral U.S. demands." Foglesong countered that Chernomyrdin wanted a document that would end the war, and NATO needed to impose exacting terms to ensure that Milosevic abided by the agreement. Chernomyrdin, furious, closed his portfolio and stood up. Pushing away from the table, the Russian envoy looked as if he were going to quit the negotiations. Chernomyrdin was fed up with Talbott and Ahtisaari, with the obstructionist military officers in his own delegation, and with a process that kept him stuck in stuffy rooms for hours on end. With the blood rising in his face, he protested, "This is your war, it's not our war, and it's going to end in disaster for everyone, including you. You do this without me." What had been billed as a week for a breakthrough verged on breakdown. The Finns and Americans worked hard to calm the burly envoy. Talbott and Ahtisaari contended that the hour was late and that they were all fatigued. They praised Chernomyrdin and his tireless efforts, insisting the diplomacy was too important to abandon. Gradually, and to the obvious dismay of the Russian military officers, Chernomyrdin was soothed. The negotiators agreed that one of the problems was that the teams were working from a series of papers that had been repeatedly revised in different languages. They concurred that the teams should take their respective drafts, reconcile their changes, and translate the document overnight. Then, after a few hours of sleep, the working groups would reconvene at ten in the morning. At four in the morning on June 2, the session broke up for the night. The tired and dispirited negotiators drifted off toward their hotel rooms and slumber. The trilateral diplomacy appeared to be coming unhinged.

Should 1 Stay or Should I Go? The day lurched into action unmercifully quickly for Talbott. At seven in the morning on June 2, the telephone on his nightstand rang. A CNN corre-


spondent in Brussels had managed to patch a bedside call through to Talbott and wanted the deputy secretary to comment on reports from Moscow that the trilateral peace talks had ended in failure and the Russian delegation was preparing to fly home. Talbott, fighting through the cobwebs of sleep, and lacking any information on the actual situation, observed that he had been given no indication that the talks had terminated. He hastily concluded the interview. Talbott roused his staff to find out if the Russians were pulling out, which they were not. The claim appeared to have been spread by Russian officials eager to derail the talks. Around 9:30 in the morning, the still bleary-eyed working groups—absent Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Talbott— reassembled to pick up where they had left off the night before. U.S. team members blackly joked that they had become trapped in the movie "Groundhog Day"—forced to relive the same day over and over again. The day's first breakthrough came in the form of a single word. For the first time, the Russians had placed the word "all" next to Yugoslav troop withdrawals in their text. Moscow had agreed to a total pullout of Serb forces from Kosovo. The concession breathed new life into talks that had appeared doomed to failure only hours before. The possibility that Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari might travel to Belgrade, perhaps even later that day, had been revived. Yet, while Russian agreement on total withdrawal was crucial, the negotiations quickly stalled on other fronts. The composition of the peacekeeping force and the timing of a withdrawal in conjunction with the suspension of bombing quickly became sticking points. A large contingent of media was camped out on the front lawn of the Petersberg, and journalists anticipated that the day would lead either to a joint trip to Belgrade or the end of talks. Chernomyrdin's spokesman, Valentin Sergeyev, looking weathered and gaunt, told reporters that "new and partially unacceptable U.S. demands" were slowing the process. Between half past ten and noon, the working groups continued to haggle over details as Chernomyrdin was on the telephone with Moscow. While it was unclear to whom Chernomyrdin spoke, the dilemma facing the Russians was apparent. By pressuring the United States to spell out its demands in specific detail, Moscow had opened the door for shaping a joint document that looked a lot more like NATO's terms than Russia's. At noon, shortly before the full trilateral session was to resume, Cherno-


myrdin suddenly told both the Finnish and American delegations that the Russian language version of the demands was unacceptable. The day's progress was on the verge of being washed away. Around 12:30, Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Talbott resumed tense talks. Along the front drive of the Petersberg, the Finnish and Russian motorcades stood poised to speed to the airport. Separate Russian and Finnish planes were fueled up and ready to go, but it was uncertain if Chernomyrdin's destination would be Moscow or Belgrade. The demands were undergoing another evolution with the addition of two footnotes to the text. The additional terms that Foglesong had raised the evening before were included as a footnote spelling out the "further necessary conditions" that Milosevic would have to meet to secure a bombing pause, including the total withdrawal of Serb forces and air defenses and the deployment of an international security presence in Kosovo. The second footnote noted that NATO would constitute the core of the peacekeeping force. However, it also recognized that Russia's relationship to the peacekeeping force would be finalized in additional agreements, and that the Russian peacekeeping contingent would not be under NATO command. The thinking behind the second footnote was multifaceted. On one level, the U.S. and Finnish negotiators had always maintained the exact nature of the peacekeeping force was none of Milosevic's business. If Belgrade wanted the bombing stopped it needed to meet NATO's terms, and the Yugoslavs would not be given any say as to whether Kosovo was occupied by a purely NATO force, a UN peacekeeping operation, or some hybrid of NATO and Russian forces cooperating under a yet to be determined agreement. By agreeing to further discussions with Moscow on Russia's relationship to KFOR, the negotiators also removed the largest single stumbling block preventing Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari from traveling to Belgrade. Whether it was wise to defer resolving this fundamental disagreement before attempting a Belgrade mission was a matter for debate. The footnotes offered distinct advantages and disadvantages for both the United States and Russia. The Russians now had a clear roadmap for getting the bombing stopped. By putting the more onerous demands upon Milosevic and the matter of the KFOR's composition in a footnote, they also bought themselves a small measure of political breathing room. However, the Russians knew that the tough terms in the paper would mean that they would be seen by many as endorsing NATO's bottom line: all Serb forces


out; NATO troops in; all refugees allowed to return. Russia would be endorsing demands far tougher than any Milosevic had signaled a public willingness to accept. The footnotes posed complications for NATO as well. By formally expressing its demands, there was always the prospect Milosevic could find a loophole. He might fulfill some of NATO's demands, but not all of them, and create growing political pressure within the Alliance to offer a temporary bombing pause. Securing continued support for air attacks from Italy, Germany, and Greece in the face of partial concessions from Belgrade would be extraordinarily difficult. NATO might be forced to end its bombing without achieving its goals. General Foglesong continued to fight hard over the details. NATO's air strikes were growing more effective and the threat of a ground war was now credible—the Alliance could negotiate from a position of strength. U.S. officials at the talks felt that any agreement had to be clear, tough, and unambiguous. While Foglesong and Talbott were willing to put the language on NATO at the core in a footnote, they realized that a powerful NATO force on the ground would be the single most important element of a successful operation. The delegations continued to haggle, and the emotions within the Russian team ran increasingly high. Both Chernomyrdin and General Ivashov recognized that the talks were at a make-or-break point. Ivashov, who had come tantalizingly close to his goal of scuttling the talks, now saw all three sides pushing hard to finalize an agreement. The general was infuriated by the decision to yield on the issue of total withdrawal. The U.S. team was concerned that the Russian delegation was trying to drag the talks out so that it would be too late in the day for Ahtisaari to head to Belgrade on a solo mission. Foglesong noted that the day's window for flying to Belgrade was quickly closing, and he pointed out that NATO and Yugoslav military officials would need detailed flight plans to ensure the safety of the planes. General Ivashov became both more irritable and outspoken as the talks continued. He repeatedly challenged Chernomyrdin, but the Russian envoy was in no mood to brook interference. Dismissively waving Ivashov off, Chernomyrdin pronounced, "If you don't like these developments, go out in the hallway and smoke a cigarette." After silencing Ivashov, Chernomyrdin uttered the words many of the negotiators thought they would never hear: "The agreement is acceptable as it


stands." The Russian envoy suggested that he would not specifically endorse NATO's demands, but would indicate to Milosevic that they were the elements to which Belgrade had to agree for bombing to end. The path was clear for Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to travel to Belgrade. Ivashov, desperate, made a final gambit to derail the agreement. He announced loudly that he could not endorse the demands because they did not reflect the thinking of the Russian military and had not been approved by the Russian minister of defense, Marshall Igor Sergeyev. Yet again, the diplomacy was at a critical moment and the Russian team was in chaos. Ivashov's outburst was all the more ironic, given that Russian Prime Minister Stepashin had begun the week by pleading with President Clinton to send an American representative to the talks who was empowered to make decisions. Chernomyrdin bulled his way through and angrily lashed out at Ivashov. The deal would stand. Talbott, still harboring the affront that the Russians tried to have him replaced at the talks, declared that he wholeheartedly embraced the agreement as a plenipotentiary of the U.S. government. Ahtisaari also consented, and at 1:57 in the afternoon, it was done. Negotiators for Russia, the European Union, and NATO held in their hands a simple twopage document outlining the conditions for ending the air campaign against Yugoslavia. Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari would travel to meet with Milosevic that afternoon. The Finnish president observed, "I'm still surprised that it worked and so was Strobe. It was not easy for the Russians to accept the paper. If one looks at the discussions we had, there were very few issues that they were pushing that could be incorporated." He added, "I didn't believe for a moment that Milosevic would accept the paper, that's why I was telling Strobe to be prepared for the next round. Perhaps they would demand that at least Albright, if not Gore, get involved at that point." The demands struck at the Petersberg were a clear evolution of the earlier statements made at the NATO Summit and by the G-8 foreign ministers on May 6. Like the earlier proclamations, they called for an immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo, the safe return of all refugees, and establishment of an interim civil administration under the aegis of the United Nations. Beyond these obvious similarities, the paper contained a far greater level of specificity. The Yugoslav troop withdrawal was to include "all military, police, and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable," with seven days cited as


a rough time frame for a pullout. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb personnel—"hundreds, not thousands"—would be allowed to return to serve as liaisons with KFOR. NATO and Yugoslav forces were called on to establish a "military technical agreement" that would set specific timetables and ground rules for implementing the accord. International civil and security presences would be deployed in Kosovo, acting as "may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter," which would allow peacekeepers broad authority to use force. The short document's second footnote stressed, "It is understood that NATO considers an international security force with 'substantial NATO participation' to mean a unified command and control and having NATO at the core. This in turn means a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in consultation with non-NATO force contributors." NATO units would be under NATO command. However, the paper also made clear that "Russia's position is that the Russian contingent will not be under NATO command and its relationship to the international presence will be governed by relevant additional agreements." The paper had failed to resolve Russia's peacekeeping role, a development that would have explosive consequences. Yet it is also important to remember that few thought the text forged at the Petersberg would be the final say from either Moscow or Belgrade. Expectations that Yugoslavia would accept the agreement were low. Whether it would have been sage to demand closure from Russia on its participation in KFOR at that time remains to be seen. Resolving this additional, and very difficult, issue would likely have pulled the plug on talks already on life support. The document, through some deliberately vague wording, acknowledged Yugoslav sovereign authority over Kosovo, while effectively making the province an international protectorate for the foreseeable future. While the failed Rambouillet accords had proposed a nonbinding referendum related to Kosovo's status, the revised demands dropped all such references, and the province's status would be determined through an ill-defined future political process. Milosevic would be "fired" as Kosovo's administrator, but the Kosovar Albanians would not be given independence. NATO had maintained its careful strategic hedge. In their totality, the demands represented major progress for NATO. For an Alliance that often struggled to maintain its resolve, the conditions it set for Milosevic were largely unequivocal. Equally important, the oft-ques-


tioned strategy of diplomatic engagement with Russia had begun to bear fruit. While the Russians continued to bitterly oppose bombing, they had now acknowledged the precise conditions that would have to be met for it to stop. Russia had yielded on NATO's major points—total withdrawal and NATO at the core. The demands were tougher than anyone had reason to believe the United States could extract from the Russians. At the Petersberg, the U.S. and Finnish negotiating teams, momentarily stunned at having reached agreement, quickly swung into action, making sure everyone had copies of the final document and its proper translation. General Foglesong and his traveling assistant, Col. Guy Bourne, huddled with Russian and Finnish military aides as Foglesong pointed to Colonel Bourne and observed, "If you are flying into Belgrade, this man is your best friend. I would make absolutely sure he has your most accurate flight information. Your greatest danger is Yugoslav antiaircraft fire—those guys are pretty spooked, they will shoot at anything that moves." In a separate conversation, Foglesong gave Finnish Admiral Juhani Kaskeala a small but important slip of paper with several telephone numbers printed neatly across the page. Foglesong's instructions were simple: If they accepted the deal, the Yugoslavs needed to call General Clark to set up a meeting to finalize the military elements of an agreement. As the three teams spilled out of the conference room, several members of the Russian delegation were visibly upset. General Ivashov scowled and grumbled to his colleagues. Boris Ivanovsky, Chernomyrdin's foreign ministry advisor, told U.S. and Finnish negotiators, "Goodbye, that's all. Milosevic will accept this document, and I'll be fired. I'm going to Siberia." Amid the flash of cameras and shouted questions from reporters, President Ahtisaari departed the Petersberg around 2:30. Half an hour later, Chernomyrdin headed off. The American delegation was left, exhausted, attempting to interpret the sudden turn of events. A handful of team members ate lunch at a small cafe at the back of the Petersberg, trying to piece together why the Russians, as Toria Nuland put it, had "caved on everything." To a person, none of the team expected Milosevic to accept the demands as presented, and all expected further manipulations on his part. At best, the Americans hoped the mission to Belgrade might be the beginning of the endgame. As they ate their lunch, a tour bus dropped several score of German pensioners at the cafe for afternoon tea. The tired negotiators looked out of place and deflated among the sea of gray-haired women.


7

CHAPTER

Belgrade

Diplomacy and Force On June 2, National Security Adviser Berger assembled a group of distinguished international policy experts from outside the government at the White House to discuss Kosovo. Included in the briefing were former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and former NATO commander Gen. George Joulwan. Before the meeting, Berger had spoken with President Clinton, telling him that he would inform the group that the administration was prepared to use all necessary means to prevail in Kosovo, including ground troops. Clinton agreed with the wisdom of the approach, and the White House was now prepared to send its clearest signal to date that it was willing to move forward with an invasion of Yugoslavia. A decision on ground troops was close at hand as Berger pointed out: "We had a window of about two weeks from that point, not only to make that decision, but to rally the country and the Congress behind that decision. I think that we would have had some heavy lifting to do with the American people, some heavy lifting to do with the Congress—in a very short period of time—but we probably would have prevailed." It was no accident that Berger would choose to tip his hand to this particular group of outside experts. Most of the invitees felt the Clinton administration had been too timid in its approach to the war and had advocated moving forward with the 181


ground option. Berger insisted that victory would be secured "in or outside NATO," and "a consensus in NATO is valuable. But it is not a sine qua non. We want to move with NATO, but it can't prevent us from moving." Berger later added, "We had to prevail, even if it meant preparing for a ground option. We all recognized this." The comments by both Clinton and Berger need to be viewed in the context of the continued reluctance of Secretary Cohen to endorse the ground option and the splits between the Pentagon and Clark over invasion planning. In some ways, the Berger briefing appeared as a classic administration trial balloon. A hard decision on the use of ground troops was at hand, and the national security team wanted to gauge public reaction. If the ground option was universally unpopular, the administration would still be in a position to disavow such an approach. If it looked like ground forces were necessary and politically viable, the president could continue to shift his tone and make a high-profile case for invading Yugoslavia both within the Alliance and to the American public. Clinton was holding his decision until the last possible moment, and the operational window to successfully deploy forces into the region before the onset of winter was growing incredibly tight. After Berger's session, he chaired an internal meeting to discuss ground troops. There was a general consensus among White House officials that the war needed to be concluded in 1999. Maintaining an air campaign until the spring seemed untenable. The costs of an extended war—in terms of Alliance unity, politics, and refugee suffering—would be too high. Even Vice President Gore and his staff, who had initially been wary of the ground option, now argued that if it needed to be pursued, it should be done so quickly. Berger was convinced that only one option would ensure the war's conclusion before the end of the year. Berger also confirmed General Clark's assessment that a decision on ground troops would soon have to be made. However, General Clark was deeply concerned that he was being cut out of the decision-making on ground troops. He later complained that the "Army was campaigning furiously against Option B-," and he feared that the decision would be prepared against the ground option before he could get in to make his case. Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin traveled on separate planes to Belgrade— both wanted to be able to head in different directions upon departure. The pent-up frustration among the Russian delegation quickly spilled out during the flight, as Chernomyrdin and Ivashov reportedly engaged in a shouting

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match. Chernomyrdin was enraged by Ivashov's outrageous behavior during the talks, believing the military members of his team had been directly insubordinate. Ivashov bellowed back at the Russian envoy, arguing that Chernomyrdin's weakness in dealing with the West was nothing short of a betrayal. After the back-and-forth, Ivashov grumbled to one of his colleagues, "I'd like to kill that son of a bitch." After the war, Ivashov was blunt in describing his feelings. "I felt as if I were the defeated one. . . . I felt that evil was triumphing over good." Ivashov added, "We kept telling Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin that Talbott was a thief who was picking our pocket." Much of the tension within the Russian team stemmed from the continuing confusion over Chernomyrdin's mandate. Chernomyrdin, by most accounts, had been given a direct presidential sanction to find a way to get the bombing stopped, but his authority had never been formally conveyed to the foreign and defense ministries. During much of the crisis, there had been daily morning meetings on Kosovo with Chernomyrdin, Foreign Minister Ivanov, Defense Minister Sergeyev, and representatives of the intelligence services. Yet, despite those attempts at coordination, it was never clear who would have final say in the negotiations, making bureaucratic turf battles all too predictable. President Ahtisaari also questioned the lines of authority within the Russian team. "I was asking myself what conclusions one should draw from Ivashov's behavior. He had such a mandate that he could oppose the president's envoy and say, 'I cannot accept this, and neither should you.' I don't know where this mandate came from; it is still a bit of a mystery to me." Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic and a large media contingent greeted Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari at the Belgrade airport. As they sped to the presidential palace, the Finns were struck by the relative normalcy of life in Belgrade. There were people and traffic in the streets, and a few pedestrians talking on cell phones; other than a few heavily damaged buildings in the heart of the city, the Yugoslav capital was largely unscathed. After weeks of wild speculation in the European press that the Yugoslav president had suffered a stroke, been wounded, or slipped into deep depression, a calm and courteous Milosevic greeted Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari felt Milosevic looked the same as when he had last seen him in 1993. Joining Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and their respective delegations were senior members of the Yugoslav government including Milan Milutinovic, the president of Serbia; Mirko Marjanovic, the prime minister of Ser-


bia; Foreign Minister Jovanovic; Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic, the chief of staff of the armed forces; and Bojan Bugarcic, Milosevic's chief of staff and foreign policy adviser. Ahtisaari did not think the presence of such a large Yugoslav delegation augured well; he had found that Milosevic preferred to do serious business with few people in the room. It had long been speculated that Milosevic's cabinet was split on the conduct of the war. Milutinovic, Marjanovic, and Jovanovic were all said to be eager to strike a deal. General Ojdanic and the head of the special police forces, Interior Minister Stojiljkovic, wanted to continue the fight. The three delegations sat at a long rectangular table, separated from each other by a sprawling floral arrangement. Ahtisaari started the session by carefully noting that Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia, and he read the demands paper to Milosevic. He methodically covered the text, save the material that appeared in the second footnote concerning Russia's role in KFOR. Milosevic asked for a copy of the demands and was given one over the protestations of Chernomyrdin. It was a remarkable moment. Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin had gone from endless, abstract debates over NATO's demands to presenting Yugoslavia's senior leadership with the terms for its capitulation. While Milosevic had obviously been kept informed of the contours of an agreement as it evolved, to see NATO's terms set to paper—and to know that Russia had played a role in defining them—must have been bracing. Ahtisaari made clear that NATO would be at the core of the peacekeeping force and that KFOR would deploy across every part of Kosovo. He explicitly spelled out each of the demands. The reaction from the Yugoslavs was measured, and they responded with questions, not outrage. Milosevic, drawing on a cigarette as he spoke, asked why Yugoslav troops had to withdraw before the UN could approve a resolution. Ahtisaari explained that the entire agreement hinged upon the ability of NATO to verify that the demands were being met. Ahtisaari was also queried about Russia's participation in KFOR, and he noted that the issue of Russia's role in KFOR had yet to be resolved but that any accommodation would be consistent with NATO command and control. He also noted that the UN secretary-general was only willing to accept a robust deployment similar to NATO-led operations in Bosnia. President Ahtisaari essentially acknowledged to Milosevic that he was simply too slippery for the United Nations to handle. During a brief break, Chernomyrdin pulled Ahtisaari aside. He told Ahti-

BELGRADE it 185 saari that President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Stepashin were convinced the Yugoslavs were ready to make a deal. Chernomyrdin grasped Ahtisaari's hand and asked conspiratorially, "Is this for real? Do you really think they'll accept this?" While the Russians and Yugoslavs acted in close collaboration, Milosevic remained tantalizingly enigmatic. As the session resumed, some of the Yugoslav representatives expressed concern about the reference to the Rambouillet accord in the paper, noting that it was illogical for them to endorse a proposal they had earlier rejected. Ahtisaari countered that the Kosovar Albanians had signed on to the agreement at Rambouillet, and the paper mandated the KLA's demilitarization. This prompted Milosevic to launch into a long and invective-laced discourse on the KLA. "Serbs have always been the real victims in Kosovo,'.' he said. The KLA was "filled with terrorist criminals killing innocent Serb civilians, running guns and drugs for Muslim fundamentalists, the worst kinds of people." President Milosevic, Serb President Milutinovic, and Foreign Minister Jovanovic asked most of the questions. Milutinovic sounded irritated, while Milosevic conducted himself politely. They inquired suspiciously why the agreement referred to Kosovo having "substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," and not within Serbia. The Yugoslavs feared that if Montenegro broke away from Serbia, Kosovo would be in a position to argue that it was independent because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no longer existed. The three delegations covered subjects large and small. Why would an interim political authority be put in place? Would the withdrawal have to take place in exactly seven days? What about air defenses? If Kosovo was to remain part of Yugoslavia, why did NATO refer to the boundary between Kosovo and Serbia as a border? How many essential personnel would be able to return to Kosovo, and when? Would NATO or the United Nations verify the Serb troop withdrawal? The Yugoslavs did not question the matter of total withdrawal, and there was no mention of the war crimes indictment. Ahtisaari and his delegation answered almost all of the questions. Chernomyrdin did not raise any objections, nor did the military members of his team. Ahtisaari must have been pleased, and a bit surprised, by the restrained atmosphere. Milosevic was curious about the sequence of events, and Admiral Kaskeala spelled out NATO's proposal: The Serbs would withdraw; NATO would


verify that they had done so, and then the bombing would pause. NATO military planners knew Milosevic was good at the endgame, and they had always viewed the events around a bombing pause as particularly ripe for treachery. Chernomyrdin weighed in as well, indicating that the schedule for withdrawal would be set in a military technical agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia. The Russian envoy added that a UN Security Council resolution would need to be passed before those events could take place. Ahtisaari, gently but firmly, interrupted. A UN resolution would follow, not precede, an agreement on withdrawal and its onset. Chernomyrdin did not object to Ahtisaari's clarification, although it was not clear he agreed with it. The Finnish president also pointed out that the Yugoslav military would need to contact General Clark directly to discuss how withdrawals could proceed and that such a conversation should take place as soon as possible. Finnish Admiral Kaskeala slid General Clark's telephone numbers across the table. If the Yugoslavs wanted the bombing stopped, they had to call Clark. As time wore on, Milosevic dominated the conversation, unequivocally in charge. He was clearly suspicious that the agreement would provide NATO with a foothold to dominate Yugoslavia and remove him from power. "NATO is killing civilians, innocent people," he protested. "NATO is an aggressor and a murderer. We have not done anything wrong in Kosovo. I do not believe [the] western Alliance. They will not carry out this agreement. I just can't believe them. They will occupy Kosovo and drive away Serbs entirely. Kosovo will be lost forever." Ahtisaari countered, "That's why there is a condition about the presence of Russian troops. The U.S. and NATO agreed with it." Ahtisaari also noted that Finnish troops would take place in the operation and that of course Finnish and Russian troops would not fight each other; "What better guarantee might there be?" Milosevic then asked if the demands could be improved, and Ahtisaari replied that such an endeavor would be useless. The Finnish president insisted that neither he nor Chernomyrdin had authority to revise the text, and that the precise language before Milosevic represented the fruit of long and difficult negotiations. Showing quiet strength, Ahtisaari explained, "This is the best offer you will get," and made clear that if Milosevic continued to hold out, the terms would grow harsher, and NATO would have little choice but to escalate its military response. Grudgingly, Chernomyrdin concurred that further improvements in the

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document were unlikely. Behind the scenes, he was alleged to have also told Milosevic that it would not be long before the Allies were irrevocably committed to a ground invasion and that Russia would not be in a position to block NATO. "Is it really true that you cannot change this?" Milosevic asked the Russian envoy. "Yes," Chernomyrdin replied with a shrug. The long effort to get Russia to affirm NATO's demands had come to fruition.

Sleep for Ahtisaari; None for Berger It was growing late in Belgrade, and Milosevic had smoked more than half a pack of cigarettes during the discussions with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari. The Yugoslav president asked his guests to join him for a late dinner, but Ahtisaari demurred, suggesting that the Yugoslav president would instead want to confer with his colleagues. Because of the hour, both the Russian and Finnish teams would need to overnight in Belgrade, and the Russians appeared somewhat nervous about the prospect. One of Ahtisaari's aides noted that the staff at the Finnish ambassador's residence had all been evacuated except the janitor, but the president insisted that if they needed to, they could sleep on the benches of the building's sauna. This prompted Milosevic to offer one of his guesthouses to the Finns. The Russians would stay at a hotel downtown. The Yugoslav president informed the negotiators that he would meet with the leaders of several of the major Yugoslav political parties to see if they would support sending NATO's demands to the parliament for approval. Both the Finns and Russians knew Milosevic would only put the document before parliament for one of two reasons: Either he wanted to spread the blame for its acceptance or he wanted to use the legislature as political cover for rejecting the demands. Milosevic suggested the three delegations meet again the next morning around nine. The session had stretched more than four hours, and it took another curious turn: Milosevic offered President Ahtisaari the opportunity to present NATO's demands in an address to the Yugoslav parliament. It was a unique proposition. Ahtisaari, perhaps only for a fleeting moment, must have toyed with the thought of delivering a dramatic address to a clamorous Serb parlia-


ment in a final bold stroke to deliver peace. Few politicians have ever been offered more historic stages for their orations. However, Ahtisaari diplomatically evaded the proposal by noting that under Finnish law he was forbidden from entering his own parliament other than to open its first session every year. Consequently, Ahtisaari insisted, he made a point of avoiding parliaments as a whole. The session concluded. It had gone reasonably well, but it remained unclear if Milosevic would accede to the demands—much less abide by them. The Russian and Finnish delegations retired to their lodging. Ahtisaari described the scene at the Yugoslav guesthouse where he spent the night: "At half past nine, there was a brief power failure. At ten, an air raid alarm. After eleven, we heard antiaircraft fire, but did not see planes. The weather was warm, some lights could be seen in the city, and in the neighborhood voices of people happily celebrating were heard." Ahtisaari continued, "It sounds strange, but I slept well in Belgrade." Back at the presidential palace, Milosevic gathered his allies among Serbia's political leadership, a group that had controlled Yugoslavia for the better part of a decade, including Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic, the head of the Yugoslav United Left Party. Also in attendance was Vojislav Seselj, the chief of the Serbian Radical Party, and Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement. Draskovic had been ousted from the cabinet earlier in the conflict but had never completely severed his ties with Milosevic's inner circle. Milosevic ran Yugoslavia with an authoritarian hand, but took great care to wrap his actions in a gauze of democratic rhetoric. According to a Washington Post account, Milosevic told the others that there were few remaining alternatives and that they would not be able to withstand NATO indefinitely. Under the proposed peace plan, he argued, Yugoslavia would still exert sovereignty over Kosovo, although that authority would be largely symbolic in the short term. The United Nations would have a large role, and the peace accord would represent the will of the international community, not simply NATO's prerogatives. Rejecting the terms could mean the end of Yugoslavia as a nation. Milosevic wanted to accept the demands. Milosevic's wife was a notorious hard-liner, but she supported her husband. She argued that agreeing to the terms was not surrender, merely the abandonment of an ineffective policy. Seselj, a virulent nationalist, voiced strenuous objections: "The document means capitulation. It is a shameful

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document." This in turn angered Draskovic, the most moderate of the group: "This is the capitulation of your policy, of your dream of converting Serbia into a Gulag separate from Europe." Draskovic agreed that they should accept the demands. Milosevic asked Seselj to abstain from voting against the pact, but Seselj did not provide Milosevic any assurances. The meeting broke up soon after, with Milosevic having secured enough votes to push the agreement through. Theories abound as to why Milosevic decided to accept NATO's demands. Most frequently cited: the growing effectiveness of air attacks, the threat of a ground war, strikes on the electrical grid, and mounting divisions among Milosevic's inner circle. Some point to the resiliency of the KLA, Russian support for NATO's demands, and even the war crimes indictment as key factors. The least complicated rationale for his decision is probably the most compelling: The Yugoslav president calculated that the cost of continuing the war outweighed its benefits. Milosevic had determined that a peace deal was the best wray to ensure his continued hold on the presidency. U.S. negotiator Jim Swigert noted, "Having the UN involved gave Milosevic some cover and an ability to save a certain amount of face. He wanted to be able to tell his own people that he didn't surrender and didn't capitulate to NATO's terms, while portraying the outcome as a victory. It was a thin veneer that people saw through quite easily, but he did it for his own psychology." In Washington, the issue of ground troops was coming to a head. As National Security Advisor Sandy Berger remarked, "It was a race of diplomacy and force converging, and they were about to intersect." Secretary of Defense Cohen was doing his best to tamp down the growing speculation surrounding a ground offensive, as word had gotten out that a major White House meeting on the issue was scheduled for the next day. He assured reporters, "There is not a consensus for a ground operation," and Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon echoed those sentiments: "Nobody is talking, except the press at this stage, about sending an invasion force to Kosovo." However, both Cohen and Bacon's comments stood in stark contrast to those of Sandy Berger earlier in the day, when the national security advisor had told senior foreign policy experts that the administration was willing to pursue ground troops. The signals coming out of the Clinton administration were schizophrenic as it tried to keep a lid on the increasingly serious planning for an invasion.


As the evening of June 2 wore on in Washington, the slightly disheveled Sandy Berger toiled away in his White House office, scribbling intently on a yellow legal pad. In his hands was the draft of a document that could fundamentally alter the course of the war. "I stayed in the White House most of the night writing a memo to the president outlining what our options were if Milosevic did not raise the white flag—and none of them were very good," says Berger. Berger sketched out three possible options. The first was to arm the KLA. However, Berger felt that, much like the United States's effort to arm the Afghans to fight the Soviets, the threat of eventual blowback and intensified conflict from a proxy war was too profound. Berger argued arming the Kosovars "would cause a chain of events that would produce a war that would last for years." The second option was to put off a ground invasion until the spring, giving the air campaign longer to succeed and allowing NATO more time to mobilize its troops and heavy equipment. Berger also viewed this approach as unworkable. Protecting and assisting the hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanian refugees in Albania and Macedonia during the dead of winter would require a massive effort. The hundreds of thousands more Kosovar Albanians homeless and trapped within the borders of Kosovo would face appalling hardships. Alliance unity would be extraordinarily difficult to maintain through seven or eight months of continued bombing. The third option was the one that the White House had long hoped to avoid and General Clark had repeatedly advocated—a ground invasion of Kosovo with a force of some 175,000 ground troops, including roughly 100,000 U.S. soldiers: Option B-. Most of the troops would spearhead up through Albania and Macedonia. It would take close to three months to assemble the tanks and troops that would drive Yugoslavia's forces from Kosovo. However, one White House official claimed, "I think there was tremendous resistance to, and skepticism about, General Clark's specific plan." The Pentagon had good reason to be uneasy about a ground war. Yugoslavia was well defended, with a professional army and defenses designed to withstand a Cold War assault. Serb forces had already demonstrated a willingness to commingle civilian populations with military assets, and Yugoslavia's geography was unforgiving. Few of Yugoslavia's neighbors wanted to serve as staging grounds, and only Albania, with a miserably deficient road system, was eager for that duty. To invade Yugoslavia from the broad plains bordering Hungary was the

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easiest option from a military perspective, but since such an approach would entail an entry into Serbia proper, it would commit the Alliance to seizing all of Yugoslavia, not just Kosovo. Berger maintained, "I think the president had crossed the Rubicon in his own mind that if that was necessary he would launch a ground war. It would have been a very costly and expensive proposition, with 100,000 to 150,000 American troops going up over those mountains. I think it was an enormous undertaking and one that was not desirable if there was an alternative. Once we were on the ground, our advantage would go from 1,000 to 1, to more like 3 to 1." "It was a pretty depressing memo," Berger observed. "I said we basically should go ahead with what Clark had proposed" if the mission to Belgrade by Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin failed. Berger felt strongly that President Clinton would agree with his conclusions to move forward with a ground war. "The president, I think, had made clear to me in principle that we could not lose." At the White House, the clock slipped past midnight. Berger was recommending to President Clinton that the United States move forward with troop deployments and the other steps necessary for a ground operation. Although the national security team had yet to forge a consensus on the ground campaign, and there were still intense debates within the military about Clark's plan, Berger felt that there was no choice but to put the wheels in motion. As Berger toiled away at the White House, Milosevic again met with President Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin at nine in the morning in Belgrade. Chernomyrdin told Milosevic in a private conversation that if he had specific objections to NATO's demands, he should write them out and Russia would raise them in the UN Security Council. As they sat down with President Ahtisaari, Milosevic launched into a rambling lecture on Kosovo, Bosnia, and the merits of Serbia's democratic process. The monologue was familiar to Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin; this was Milosevic as historian, play actor, black humorist, and demagogue. Ahtisaari grew impatient as Milosevic's well-worn exhortations dragged on, and he curtly interrupted, "What's the situation?" Milosevic was taken aback. "Our paper," Ahtisaari continued, "Whether you like it or not, you cannot come up with a better document. Viktor Chernomyrdin and I have worked hard for hours and hours. What's the situation with regard to the paper?"


Milosevic leaned back in his chair, pausing for only a moment of reflection before calmly replying: Mr. President, the answer to your question, as representative of the European Union, it is our position that we are going to make a proposal to parliament. We will send the document to parliament and have an answer by eleven in the morning. I hope the parliament accepts your side's proposal. The Yugoslav side has accepted the document you brought. Parliament should accept this agreement because it says important things about Yugoslav sovereignty and the role of the United Nations. The Yugoslav government has accepted the document you have brought. Milosevic's comments were delivered with little flair, and he added almost as an afterthought, "This is the first step in building peace." Without missing a beat, the Yugoslav president then resumed his long oration on Serbian history and the collected misfortunes of his people. Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin, and their delegations were stunned. Milosevic then again asked Ahtisaari if he had any interest in attending the session of parliament scheduled to begin at ten, and the Finnish president declined. Milosevic suggested the parliamentarians "would approve the proposal as a proposal for peace." The session of Yugoslav parliament that followed was the first meeting of that body since March 23—the day before the air campaign had begun— when Milosevic had offered the Rambouillet accords to the parliament for their approval, while working to ensure that such an endorsement would not be forthcoming. The June 3 parliamentary debate over NATO's demands was closed to the press and the public, but there were numerous reports that the session threatened to degenerate into fistfights during a raucous debate. Ultimately, the legislature ratified the agreement by a vote of 136 to 74, with most of the 74 votes against the agreement coming from Seselj's Serb Radical party. After the emotional ballot, Seselj hinted darkly that KFOR would not "feel safe in Kosovo." After the parliamentary vote, Ahtisaari and his team returned to the president's office for a short meeting with Milosevic and his senior leadership. Just before the meeting began, air raid sirens blared across the city. General Ojdanic, the Yugoslav army chief of staff, had attended the session the night before dressed in civilian clothes. For this gathering, Ojdanic was joined by several other generals, and all appeared in full uniform. Milosevic, slightly

BELGRADE * 193 ruffled by the acrimony expressed on the floor of the legislature, did not look as calm as he had the night before. Milosevic had good reason to be anxious. Another large swath of Yugoslavia—like Slovenia, Bosnia, and Croatia before Kosovo—was slipping from his control. Losing Kosovo was all the more damaging given that the Yugoslav president's rise to power had been engineered through xenophobic appeals that portrayed the province as the Serb people's religious and cultural cradle. Milosevic sat down at the broad conference table directly across from President Ahtisaari and Special Envoy Chernomyrdin. Speaking in measured tones he announced, "The federal government and the parliament have approved the peace offer you have brought us." Yugoslav General Ojdanic, the hardened combat veteran who had personally directed the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians, was near tears. Milosevic had handed his sword to Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin. Ahtisaari requested a copy of the document that was ratified by the parliament, to ensure that it was identical to the terms they had brought from the Petersberg, and he again stressed that the Yugoslav generals needed to contact General Clark to arrange a military meeting to finalize the details of a withdrawal. "Parliament adopted the conditions without any statement. I was surprised very much," Chernomyrdin later observed, "Why wasn't there any statement or request? I didn't expect it." The meeting at the presidential palace was brief, and both the Finnish and Russian delegations soon sped to the airport. Before their departure, the Finns met with Foreign Minister Jovanovic, who Ahtisaari knew well because the two had worked together when Ahtisaari served a diplomatic posting in Namibia. Ahtisaari stressed that anything short of full compliance by the Yugoslavs would be unacceptable. "The president made a decision yesterday. The details will not stand in the way," claimed Jovanovic. "You'd better see to it, or there will be grave consequences," Ahtisaari replied. "The details will not be a problem," insisted Jovanovic. Ahtisaari found Jovanovic gracious for a man who had just been forced to "drain a bitter cup." The Finnish delegation yet again reiterated the importance of placing a call to General Clark to arrange a meeting between NATO and the Yugoslav military, prompting Jovanovic to plaintively inquire, "Can't we call someone other than that barbarian Clark?" Chernomyrdin


and Ahtisaari's planes departed a short time later, Ahtisaari's bound for Cologne, Chernomyrdin's for Moscow. Back in Washington, Sandy Berger was concluding what he called, "the longest night" of his tenure as national security advisor in the early hours of the morning of June 3. Later in the morning a secretary retyped his scribbled notes, and then the "go/no-go" memo was officially formatted and sent over to the Oval Office for a decision by the president. "As I was working on this memo at four or five o'clock in the morning, the telephone rang, and I learned that Milosevic had agreed to the terms," says Berger, and his relief is evident to this day. "I'm glad that we did not have to go to the ground option. We would have won, but it would have been terribly costly, and the legacy of that in terms of American engagement would have been very, very lasting."

No Champagne At the Petersberg, the American delegation greeted the CNN reports that the Yugoslav parliament had accepted the deal with equal parts amazement and skepticism. Every cell phone carried by the team immediately started ringing. Of all possible contingencies, the delegation was perhaps least prepared for success. No one had thought Milosevic would throw in the towel, and the sketchy reports of the rapidly unfolding events in Belgrade were assumed to be some sort of ploy. Just after noon—before Milosevic had sat down with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari—Chernomyrdin had called Talbott from Milosevic's office. Talbott described the conversation: It was Mr. Chernomyrdin calling me from right outside of Milosevic's office, he was calling me on a cell phone and kind of whispering to me, and I could hear voices jabbering away in Serbian in the background, and Mr. Chernomyrdin said, "I think we've done it," and he said, "Now we've got to implement. Can you, Strobe, make sure that your military, and that means NATO high command, is prepared to deal directly with the Yugoslavia high command and work out the terms so that there is a cessation of hostilities?" and I said, "Absolutely Viktor Stepanovich, I will get on it right away." In Washington, the White House Situation Room placed 6:30 A.M. telephone calls to the Clinton administration's national security team informing

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them that the Yugoslav parliament had approved the accord. This triggered a flurry of telephone calls across Washington and across the Atlantic. In short order, Secretary Albright spoke with Talbott, Foglesong, Secretary-General Solana, Foreign Ministers Fischer and Cook, Foreign Minister Papandreou of Greece, and Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy of Canada. Albright and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook were also wary of Milosevic's intentions, with the secretary of state arguing, "If the Serbs have merely accepted one point from column A and one from column B, which is possible, there will still be a big push to stop the bombing and have a de facto pause." When Cook noted that there was already "quite a demand" to halt the bombing with the news that Milosevic had accepted NATO's terms, Albright made clear, "That's not the deal." Albright urged the Alliance to exercise caution and avoid proclaiming any sort of victory until representatives spoke directly with Ahtisaari, and both ministers wanted to make sure that KFOR was ready to enter Kosovo on short notice. Both agreed it would be unacceptable for NATO to keep bombing simply because it was unprepared to move peacekeepers into place. Cook also wanted to ensure that targeting was limited to minimize the risks of collateral damage at such a crucial juncture. The German foreign ministry would later weigh in with a similar request, much to the irritation of General Clark who wanted to sustain maximum military pressure on Belgrade. Cook and Albright also discussed the Russian role in the peacekeeping force and were adamant they needed to avoid any arrangement that would partition the province. They also agreed that if KFOR deployed quickly the Russians would not have time to bring in troops—an added benefit. In Moscow, a weary and resigned Chernomyrdin told reporters, "We did everything that had to be done," noting that a UN Security Council resolution would be needed to finalize the agreement. General Ivashov, on the other hand, later complained, "Each of us should answer this question in his own soul: Have we betrayed Yugoslavia or not?" Ivashov's answer to that particular question was not in doubt, and the general maintained Yugoslav troop withdrawals would "threaten the lives of the 250,000 Serbs living in this region." For his part, President Ahtisaari was flying to Cologne for two reasons: first, so he could meet with Talbott and debrief him on the discussions with Milosevic; and, second, so he could report to the EU heads of state who were gathered in Cologne for a regularly scheduled meeting. After consultations


between the State Department, the Pentagon, NATO headquarters, Helsinki, and the U.S. delegation at the Petersberg, it was determined that Talbott would meet Ahtisaari when he touched down at the Cologne airport before the Finnish president headed downtown to brief the EU. Talbott and his delegations would then continue on to Brussels, where they would brief the NATO ambassadors. As Talbott's delegation sped toward the airport, the American team and German foreign ministry officials engaged in an ugly spat regarding the logistics of the meeting between the deputy secretary and Ahtisaari. The Germans, as hosts of the EU gathering, did not want Talbott to meet with Ahtisaari before the Finnish president briefed his fellow heads of state. Schroeder was eager to sell the potential peace deal as a triumph of German diplomacy and hoped to push any meeting with Talbott to the margins. Indeed, the Germans had started proclaiming the potential peace deal as "the Petersberg Agreement" in an effort to put Schroeder's stamp on the diplomacy. German officials suggested Ahtisaari could brief Talbott in the limousine as the Finnish president headed downtown. Adding insult to injury, they recommended Talbott be dropped on a street corner several blocks from the hall where the heads of state were meeting, and take another vehicle back to the airport—all so he would not be photographed emerging from the car at the event. It was finally agreed that Talbott would meet with Ahtisaari at the airport with no media present. The U.S. delegation arrived at the airport about thirty minutes before the Finns' plane touched down, and waited in a large white VIP tent that had been set up just off the tarmac for arriving EU dignitaries. The accommodations resembled a corporate tent at a major sporting event, as white-jacketed waiters served refreshments for a sparse crowd. A row of European flags fluttered outside, and twenty German motorcycle police in Day-Glo vestments assembled in formation ready to guide Ahtisaari's motorcade downtown. A little before 6:30, the Finnish plane touched down. As it taxied to a stop, the motorcade swung around to the foot of its steps. In the lead limousine, Talbott, his executive assistant, Phil Goldberg, and the German chancellor's foreign policy advisor, Michael Steiner, continued to debate about how a meeting should be arranged. Eventually, they agreed that Steiner would go up the steps and greet Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari gestured to Talbott from the top of the steps that he should come aboard as well, but Talbott had assured

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Steiner he would not. Once on the plane, Steiner told Ahtisaari that the French had complained about the prominent role the United States had played in the war and its diplomacy and asked the Finnish president to break the news of the peace deal "to Europe before America." After several minutes, Ahtisaari creakily worked his way down the steps and climbed into the car with Talbott. With sirens blaring and lights flashing, the twenty motorcycles and the motorcade set off. However, Ahtisaari was equally keen to talk to Talbott, and the motorcade only traveled several hundred yards before it lurched to a stop. Much to the dismay of the Germans, the two men simply sat in the car and talked. The motorcade drivers, like the heads of state downtown, waited. Ahtisaari indicated that Milosevic had accepted the document "as is—no change, no dilution, no ambiguity" and that General Clark's numbers had been relayed along with clear instructions. However, as one member of the U.S. delegation, sounding a bit like Yogi Berra, admitted, "I didn't believe it until we saw the Finns at the airport, and then I still didn't believe it." Ahtisaari and Talbott knew that they would get little in the way of peace for a more extended exchange and soon concluded the harried meeting. Ahtisaari's motorcade screamed toward downtown Cologne and his eagerly awaiting fellow heads of state. Before boarding the small Air Force jet that would take him to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Talbott spoke with President Clinton, Berger, and Albright from his car. Several of Talbott's staffers stood outside on the tarmac in a light rain as the day's light dwindled. Talbott told the president that Ahtisaari was confident that Milosevic's acceptance of the deal was genuine, but the deputy secretary stressed that the Serbs still had to prove themselves. Clinton agreed the administration's public posture should remain muted with "no popping of champagne corks." At a quarter after seven in the evening, the U.S. plane lifted off from Cologne for the short flight to Brussels. Talbott and Albright spoke again in a curt conversation after the plane was airborne. Albright was irritated that Talbott had been the one to deliver the news of a peace breakthrough to the president. Just before eight, the U.S. plane touched down in Brussels. The U.S. ambassador to NATO, Sandy Vershbow, greeted Talbott at the plane and asked, "Strobe, is this too good to be true, or too true to be good?" After rushing to NATO headquarters, the deputy secretary was greeted by a wall-to-wall crush of journalists. Although accustomed to press attention, the team realized that the events had suddenly spun into a worldwide media


event. Without taking questions, Talbott headed to Secretary-General Solana's office. Solana and Talbott were close friends, and Solana had labored mightily to maintain cohesion within the Alliance during the course of the air campaign. His low-key style was a much-needed complement to General Clark's hard-charging intensity: Solana was allowed to play the good cop to Clark's bad. In the small waiting area outside the secretary-general's office, Talbott and Solana greeted each other with a bear hug, the sense of relief and emotion stark on their faces. This was the first moment the two men dared hope there might be light at the end of the tunnel. During their short meeting in Solana's office, General Foglesong showed Solana a copy of the paper with Clark's telephone numbers that he had given to Admiral Kaskeala, and Solana, almost shyly, asked for his own copy, noting that it might be a nice thing to put in a scrapbook some day. Around 8:30, Solana and Talbott walked downstairs to brief the NATO ambassadors, and Foglesong slipped away from the group to see if the Yugoslavs had called Clark. Talbott began the briefing as the nineteen ambassadors and their staffs packed the large hall. General Clark had yet to arrive. Talbott told the ambassadors that Ahtisaari had said that Milosevic had accepted the demands and urged the ambassadors to quickly forge a military technical agreement with the Yugoslavs to finalize arrangements for troop withdrawals and suspending bombing. He made clear that Milosevic's actions would have to be "confirmed, clarified, and verified," and that NATO should avoid proclaiming, "success, victory, or peace." Praising Russia for its role in the diplomacy, the deputy secretary insisted that there was no misunderstanding with Moscow as to the meaning of NATO at the core, although arrangements for Russia's peacekeeping role would have to be worked out. As Talbott spoke, General Foglesong appeared and slipped Talbott a note: The Yugoslavs had called General Clark to arrange a meeting. Talbott slid the note to Solana. As Talbott finished his presentation, General Clark strode purposefully into the room, sitting at the head of the table next to Solana. All tycs turned to the wiry general, as Solana asked him if he had any news that he wished to report. Speaking in clipped tones, Clark informed the ambassadors that he had just received a telephone call from Yugoslav Army chief of staff, General Ojdanic. Excited whispers swept through the room. A crisis that had the

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potential to unravel the Alliance appeared to be defusing. All the clashes of ego and policy could be forgiven if victory was at hand. The Yugoslavs wanted to arrange a face-to-face meeting, and Clark indicated that such military technical talks would establish instructions for withdrawal and spell out a more detailed annex to the demands reached at the Petersberg. NATO's supreme commander assured the allies that the agreement would give KFOR wide discretion to use force and Clark, with a barely discernible hint of a smile, noted that Ojdanic had initially invited him to Belgrade for talks. Clark declined the invitation, suggesting that the Yugoslav capital was an inappropriate setting for discussions. Clark's unwillingness to travel to Yugoslavia for talks had an added benefit: Alliance officials would be spared meeting directly with any indicted war criminals, because none of them would dare venture out of the country. The NATO commander recommended that the two sides gather on the Kosovo-Macedonia border. Ojdanic had proposed holding the meeting two days later, leading Clark to reply, "I'll meet with you when you want. However, every hour we don't have the meeting is another hour I will spend dismantling and destroying your military machine." Ojdanic then suggested moving the meeting up a day. To a group of ambassadors that was visibly relieved with the prospects for peace, Clark then urged a step they greeted with disbelief: He wanted to further escalate air strikes until Milosevic's forces had quit Kosovo. Clark would not get such authorization, but there were clearly fears that Milosevic still had more tricks up his sleeve. The German ambassador, Joachim Bitterlich, citing a proverb that encapsulated the sense of both enthusiasm and caution that suffused the room, observed that it was wise "to never praise the day before the evening." While NATO hoped that everything would work out for the best, recent history had been full of bitter Balkan lessons. From the disaster of UNPROFOR, to the slaughter at Srebrenica, to the deaths of special envoys, reporters, and countless civilians, the bottom line in Yugoslavia had been constant: Every sin was imaginable, every word could be turned treacherous, every victory could be undone. Most of the assembly appeared to concur that the first of NATO's 50,000 peacekeepers might be able to enter Kosovo within a week—if Milosevic held up to his end of the bargain. As the meeting concluded, Talbott and Solana again hugged outside the hall. General Clark was in a different state of mind, and he and General Foglesong engaged in an intense eyeball-toeyeball discussion about the military technical talks. Clark had not been en-


tirely pleased with the document that the U.S. negotiators struck at the Petersberg, claiming that it had "maintained the redlines I had established, but just barely." As he put it, "It is the fear of every commander, I suppose, that what was won on the battlefield would be lost at the peace table." Clark then turned his attention to Talbott. "I hate to be the bearer of bad tidings, Strobe, but Milosevic is going to cheat—you watch; he'll play us for a sucker." The general pressed his case for intensifying the military campaign, and complained that Washington continued to drag its feet on ground operations. Talbott was taken aback that Clark was pushing the ground option on the same day that it appeared Milosevic might have capitulated. Clark's approach again made sound military sense but was directly out of line with what the political traffic would bear. At 10:30, Talbott conducted a brief stand-up press conference in the front hallway of NATO headquarters before his departure. The foyer was clogged with cameras and reporters. Since the text of the agreement passed by the Yugoslav parliament was public, there was great interest in the document's footnote and its potential ambiguities. Talbott only took two questions and was quizzed regarding the outstanding differences between Russia and NATO over Russian participation in KFOR. He suggested the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia provided a good model of cooperation, and most in NATO assumed that Russia would end up acceding to a similar deal. Conventional wisdom was that Yeltsin would again force his generals to accept some thinly disguised NATO command. However, Milosevic's rapid capitulation had caught NATO by surprise, and there would be far less time to reach an accommodation with Russia than anyone had imagined. With the press conference concluded, the delegation hustled back into its motorcade as a heavy rain started to fall, and they lifted off for Helsinki a short time later. In the Rose Garden, President Clinton declared: Movement by the Serbian leadership to accept these conditions, established by NATO and the international community, is, of course, welcome. But based on our past experience, we must also be cautious. First, we must have clarity that the Serbian leadership has fully accepted these conditions and intends to fully implement them. Until then, and until Serb forces begin a verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo, we will continue to pursue diplomacy, but we will also continue the military effort.

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After his statement, the president quickly turned and stepped away, ignoring the shouted questions of reporters. The president met in the late afternoon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a meeting that had originally been scheduled to discuss the option of using ground troops. General Clark, the most vocal advocate of that option, had not been invited to the gathering. Instead, the session largely focused on the possible deployment of peacekeepers, and the follow-up necessary to strike a military technical agreement. However, Clark would subsequently complain, "In the June 3 White House meeting that I was not allowed to attend, General Dennis Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, was reportedly briefing the president that he didn't feel it would be possible for the army to deal with the rugged terrain of northeast Albania." Given the diplomatic events, it was agreed to put off a final decision on ground troops for ten more days. Another engineering battalion would be deployed to Albania in an effort to buy more time, and air strikes would be intensified if Milosevic backed away from a deal. National Security Advisor Berger's memo recommending a ground war was on hold. NATO air strikes continued into the night, although they were scaled back and concentrated in the areas of Kosovo where fighting on the ground was still intense. All targets posing a significant risk of collateral damage were avoided, particularly those in Belgrade. Behind the scenes, military officials indicated that bombing would be restrained as long as Milosevic appeared to live up to the deal. If the Serbs quickly began a withdrawal, a bombing pause could come within days. French President Chirac publicly noted that European Union leaders had agreed that while NATO bombing should continue until there was a full Serb withdrawal, it should be limited to "strictly military targets." General Clark's pleas to further escalate pressure on Milosevic fell on deaf ears. Just before two in the morning on June 4, the plane carrying the U.S. negotiators touched down at the largely deserted airport in Helsinki, Finland. Eric Edelman, the U.S. ambassador to Finland, greeted the group. His work as a constant conduit between the U.S. and Finnish governments had been an invaluable contribution to the diplomatic process. At four in the morning, just as the sky was growing light around the horizon, the last of the team members celebrated the day's event with a vodka toast from their mini-bar and retired for the evening. At nine in the morning, the U.S. ambassador to Russia, James Collins,


called Talbott. The deputy secretary and the ambassador discussed the situation in Russia, where the peace deal was being greeted by a buzzsaw of criticism. Gennady Zyuganov, the Russian Communist Party leader, belittled Chernomyrdin as an "opportunist" and declared the agreement an outrage. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev publicly disassociated the ministry of foreign affairs from the agreement, complaining to reporters the demands were a "vague formulation" that allowed NATO to continue bombing. Chernomyrdin aggressively defended his actions, arguing Russia's weak strategic position left it with "two options: either to stop the war by political methods or to fight, to put on our greatcoats and march ahead." Speaking about the potential of Russia waging war in the Balkans, Chernomyrdin added, "I don't think that this way suits the Russian people today." Chernomyrdin later stubbornly added, "My whole life people have been trying to push me aside. Those who can push me have yet to be found." Chernomyrdin called Talbott a short time later. Ahtisaari had invited the Russian envoy to meet with him and Talbott in Helsinki, but Chernomyrdin explained he would be unable to make the trip because of the continued political fallout. Chernomyrdin apologized, and both Talbott and Ahtisaari were sympathetic. President Clinton and Secretary Albright would call Chernomyrdin to congratulate him on his efforts later in the day—small comfort for the embattled envoy. Albright also spoke on the phone with Foreign Minister Ivanov. Citing the diplomatic breakthroughs with satisfaction, she observed that President Yeltsin would achieve a major triumph if Milosevic followed through with his promises. She asked Ivanov to use his influence to ensure that Milosevic lived up to his commitments, and noted that a verifiable troop withdrawal could allow NATO to conclude bombing in a matter of days. Ivanov was restrained, suggesting that the military talks between NATO and Yugoslavia would follow their due course, and that Russia's involvement was unnecessary. He tiredly maintained that Russia could "neither speed the withdrawal of Serb troops nor stop NATO bombs." The G-8 foreign ministers were scheduled to gather in Cologne two days later in an effort to finalize a UN Security Council resolution, and the two discussed the possibility of meeting before that session. Ivanov insisted Russia would not work on a resolution until the bombing stopped, while Albright countered that any delay in passing a UN resolution would slow the implementation of the peace deal and rob President Yeltsin of his diplomatic achievement.

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Albright also inquired if the Russians intended to send a representative to the military talks at the border between NATO and Yugoslavia, and Ivanov said he could not answer with any certainty until after he met with Yeltsin the next day. Albright insisted that it would be a shame if Russia could not be a part of the final steps of the victory, leading Ivanov to respond acidly that "victory" was not an appropriate term to describe the situation. In Helsinki, the U.S. and Finnish delegations gathered in a high-ceilinged and decorative hall on the second floor at the presidential palace in Helsinki around two in the afternoon. Given the harried nature of their airport meeting, Ahtisaari and Talbott still had a lot they wanted to discuss. General Foglesong led off the meeting with a piece of welcome news: A large delegation of Yugoslav military officers—forty stars worth—was headed to the talks at the Macedonian border. It seemed unlikely that Milosevic would dispatch such a senior group if he were not serious about finalizing an agreement. Foglesong briefly discussed the contours of the military talks that would take place at the border, which he, as well as several Finnish military representatives, would attend. The first task was to get the Yugoslavs to agree to the modalities for the withdrawal of their forces and air defenses and then to have them sign off on the KFOR mission. General Foglesong suggested that agreement on the core issues could potentially be reached within a matter of hours, with some final details being resolved as the withdrawal moved forward. Ahtisaari was pleased the G-8 had begun work on a draft UN resolution, and he urged Foglesong and his fellow NATO officers not to leave the border talks until they had an agreement. The meeting paused for a moment as Derek Shearer, the former U.S. ambassador to Finland—and Talbott's brother-in-law—called to congratulate Ahtisaari on his diplomatic efforts. Ahtisaari was self-deprecating as he turned an American movie cliche on its head: "They did all the work. I was the mailman—but as you know from the movie, the postman never rings twice." Foglesong turned to the question of integrating Russia into KFOR, and Ahtisaari pointed out the Russians had to get on board quickly or risk exclusion. There was some doubt that the Russians could actually be ready to move peacekeepers into place in a matter of days, and, like Cook and Albright, the group at the presidential palace agreed that it would be easier to negotiate Russia's role once KFOR was in place throughout Kosovo. The two delegations retired to a different room for lunch, and dove was

204

it

COLLISION

COURSE

the main course—quickly leading to a number of jokes about devouring the bird of peace. The negotiators were lighthearted, exhausted, and slightly punch-drunk. The meal was punctuated by a call from President Clinton, who congratulated Ahtisaari on all his hard work. The Finnish president again demurred that he was "just the mailman," leading Clinton to note that Ahtisaari was "the biggest, strongest mailman I've met in a long time." Just before 5:00 P.M., the U.S. delegation split up at the airport, with Generals Foglesong and Casey, joined by Colonel Bourne, heading for the border talks, while Talbott and the others returned to the States. In Washington, Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon signaled that 2,000 U.S. Marines, the first of the 7,000 American troops slated to participate in KFOR, were aboard three ships bound for Greece. Bacon announced that the Marine expeditionary units would be able to off-load in Thessaloniki, Greece, within forty-eight hours. Secretary Albright spoke with British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook near midday. Strains were still pulling at the Alliance. French President Chirac had complained that the United States and Great Britain continued to direct air strikes more broadly than the NATO ministers had agreed, while Clark was upset that he could not bomb more aggressively. Timing was also becoming a problem. The French insisted they would block NATO from moving forward with finalizing a military technical agreement with Yugoslavia until a UN Security Council resolution had been adopted. However, U.S. officials made clear to the French that bombing would continue until the Serbs withdrew from Kosovo and that, in turn, the Serbs would not commence withdrawal until there was a military technical agreement. It was also pointed out that Milosevic could manipulate any rifts within the Alliance and create further trouble between NATO and Russia. Late in the day, the core NATO foreign ministers spoke on the telephone. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine indicated that the French would no longer block a military technical agreement from moving forward. The group also discussed the possibility the Russians might boycott the G-8 meeting to finalize a UN resolution. German Foreign Minister Fischer saw three possible choices: The Russians could change their mind and attend the G-8 meeting before the bombing stopped, the meeting could be canceled, or NATO could suspend bombing to jump-start the diplomacy. Cook and Albright immediately vetoed any bombing pause. Albright pushed further in the opposite direction, arguing KFOR needed to be ready to deploy in Ko-

BELGRADE * 205 sovo if the Serbs withdrew whether a UN resolution was ready or not, a suggestion that Vedrine vehemently opposed. Dini, Cook, and Albright countered that the G-8 had never insisted that deploying peacekeepers required UN approval if an agreement was reached with Belgrade. All pointed out that the Alliance would look incredibly foolish if it failed to deploy peacekeepers after bombing for more than two months for the right to do so. It was agreed the Russians needed some time to sort out their internal situation and that a G-8 meeting should be proposed for June 6 or 7, which would allow time for U.S., Japanese, and Canadian representatives to travel and begin further work on the resolution behind the scenes. The foreign ministers reasoned that the Russians—who had spoken so many times of the dangers of a security vacuum in Kosovo—would not stand in the way of a granting KFOR a UN mandate.


8

CHAPTER

Breaking Through

On the Border On Saturday, June 5, NATO and Yugoslav military officials gathered in the town of Blace, Macedonia, in an effort to finalize the remaining military details of the peace agreement. NATO officials had high hopes the pact could be secured quickly. Gen. Mike Jackson, the British commander of KFOR, had placed his headquarters on twenty-four-hour deployment alert, and the Alliance was willing to suspend bombing as soon as Yugoslavia deactivated its air defenses and began pulling out its troops. NATO pilots had already sharply reduced attacks on Yugoslavia and significantly curtailed their rules of engagement. Several cars carrying Yugoslav officials and a security detail were supposed to arrive around nine in the morning to begin discussions, but delays cropped up immediately. The Yugoslav delegation raised concerns that the small cafe that NATO had designated for the talks was not fully in the neutral zone between Kosovo and Macedonia, leaving them vulnerable to assaults by KLA forces. The talks eventually began around eleven when the Yugoslav delegation entered the Europa 93 snack bar, a drab two-story building on the border. The ranking officers in the Yugoslav delegation were Gen. Obrad Stevanovic, the assistant secretary of the interior, and Gen. Blagoje Kovacevic, 207


representing the general staff. Other Interior, Army, and foreign ministry officials rounded out the Yugoslav team. The fact that Stevanovic and Kovacevic led the Yugoslav team was a direct consequence of the war crimes indictments, since the two men's direct superiors—Serb Interior Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic and Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic—risked arrest if they traveled out of Yugoslavia. The negotiators sat at a U-shaped table, with the Yugoslavs across from General Jackson and a number of other NATO generals, including Doc Foglesong. Finnish Admiral Kaskeala also joined the talks. Early in the session, the Serb delegation was presented with a six-page document outlining the terms for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav security forces. Most of the discussion centered on the logistics of a Serb pullout, and Yugoslav officials expressed concern about trying to organize and commence a withdrawal while air strikes were ongoing. This was a legitimate issue, since many of the normal preparations for withdrawal—such as the massing of troops and transports—would make these forces vulnerable. NATO officials assured the Yugoslavs that they would not be attacked during withdrawal, but General Jackson made clear that NATO bombing would sharply escalate if Belgrade reneged on the deal. Jackson's incredibly weathered face showed little emotion as he delivered his ultimatum: Unless the document was promptly signed, Yugoslavia's water, telephone, and electrical systems would be destroyed. The Yugoslavs expressed a number of practical concerns with the document, including the seven days allotted for withdrawals and the forty-eighthour period for dismantling air defenses. Several times during the meeting, both Yugoslav and NATO officials excused themselves from the restaurant to engage in radio conversation with their superiors. NATO officers present at the initial meeting found the Yugoslavs cooperative and workmanlike, and it looked like they were close to accepting the peace agreement. General Jackson even said that there was some flexibility with regard to granting additional, but very limited, time to withdraw troops and air defenses. However, the Yugoslav officers balked at finalizing an agreement, claiming that they lacked authority to accept the clauses that dealt with NATO's role in KFOR. Around four in the afternoon, most of the Yugoslav delegation headed back over the nearby border, saying they needed to consult with their leadership. When they did not return for several hours, it was agreed that the talks would resume the next day. After the five-hour meeting, KFOR spokesman

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Lieutenant Colonel Robin Clifford was optimistic, telling reporters that NATO and the Serbs had concurred on all except "one or two minor details." As the border talks took place during the day, some 2,000 British and German peacekeeping troops arrived in Macedonia. Ken Bacon announced that the contingent of 2,200 U.S. Marines had not yet arrived in Greece but that he expected "they will arrive tomorrow afternoon or evening." However, Thessaloniki—the main Greek port of entry for troops and supplies designated for KFOR—was fast becoming a bottleneck. The Greek government had suspended off-loading operations at the port in an effort to minimize widespread public anger over the air campaign in the run-up to the elections for the European parliament scheduled for eight days later, on June 13. The Greeks had not indicated publicly when they would lift the ban, but they had reassured NATO officials that the troops would be able to transit. Both the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Nick Burns, and Deputy Secretary Talbott had lobbied Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou on the subject with limited results. Very early in Washington on June 5, Secretary Albright spoke on the telephone with Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and Foreign Ministers Fischer and Dini to discuss a difficult set of interlocking diplomatic issues. Albright suggested that if the Yugoslavs finalized a military technical agreement the next day—Sunday—the G-8 could then meet to discuss a Security Council resolution on Monday and NATO could declare a bombing pause. However, the Germans were concerned that if Serb forces withdrew—but did not sign a military agreement and the G-8 could not agree on a Security Council resolution—there would be no legal basis for KFOR's deployment. Albright, Dini, and Cook countered that since Milosevic had accepted the document Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin had brought to Belgrade, which directly endorsed a peacekeeping force, there was already sufficient legal basis for dispatching KFOR. Unfortunately, the diplomacy was becoming increasingly circular and dominated by disagreements over sequence. The Russians did not want to talk about a UN resolution until the bombing stopped. NATO was unwilling to stop bombing until it had proof the Yugoslavs had begun their withdrawal. The Yugoslav military didn't want to begin withdrawals until the bombing stopped and it had assurances KFOR would be in place to keep


the KLA in check. Even some of the Allies were reluctant to put KFOR into place until there was a Security Council resolution. NATO military planners insisted that if the Serbs withdrew, KFOR had to deploy, with or without authorization. NATO would look ridiculous if it won the war but refused to keep the peace. All of the foreign ministers agreed that, at a minimum, it would be helpful to have the Yugoslavs sign a document indicating they accepted an international security presence. The group was also acutely aware that Russia's role in KFOR had not been resolved. There was some hope the Russians would be more conciliatory once the air campaign was completed, but NATO knew it had to move ahead with or without Russia. There was deep anger in Moscow that the bombing was still going on despite Milosevic's apparent willingness to accept the deal, and there were even fears that the Russian foreign ministry might go so far as to reject the agreement that Chernomyrdin had helped craft. Nevertheless, later in the day, Foreign Minister Ivanov indicated that he would attend a G-8 meeting in Cologne on Monday. President Ahtisaari called Milosevic in Belgrade. It was the first of a series of conversations between the two men over the following days concerning sequencing issues and the border talks. Milosevic insisted that it was not necessary to finalize a military technical agreement to get the bombing stopped. He felt that it should suffice if the Yugoslav military began to withdraw and the United Nations passed a Security Council resolution. Ahtisaari made clear that no UN resolution would be passed until a military technical agreement was signed and the withdrawal had begun, leaving Milosevic to grumble, "We were not terribly pleased by your peace offer, as you know." On Sunday, June 6, the border talks between NATO and Yugoslavia resumed at 8:30 in the morning at a new location, a large tent at Kumanovo airport, a French airfield just east of Skopje, Macedonia. Yugoslav Army Deputy Chief of Staff Gen. Svetozar Marjanovic joined General Stevanovic of the Ministry of the Interior and General Kovacevic of the army as the senior Yugoslav representatives. The Yugoslav position began to shift as the talks got underway. General Marjanovic increasingly limited the discussion to focus on details surrounding the troop withdrawal, efforts to disarm the KLA, and the eventual limited reintroduction of Serb forces into Kosovo. The Yugoslavs insisted that the broader aspects of the military technical agreement—such as the nature of the international peacekeeping force— could not be resolved until after a UN resolution had been passed. The dele-


gation had new instructions from Belgrade, and the endgame to the war seemed to be dissolving into a Catch-22. Yugoslavia would not sign a military technical agreement without a UN resolution. NATO was equally adamant that bombing would continue until there was an agreement at the border and the onset of a withdrawal. Milosevic and the Russians both appeared to be having second thoughts about the demands to which they had agreed, feeling they might get better terms in a UN resolution. The atmosphere at the border talks further deteriorated with the arrival of Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Barmyantsev, the Russian military attache from Belgrade. Upon his arrival, Barmyantsev immediately went into a private meeting with the Yugoslav delegation. After the talks resumed, the Yugoslav officers continued to backpedal. General Marjanovic suggested that Yugoslavia reduce its troop levels in Kosovo down to prewar strength of some 15,000 to 20,000 until after a UN resolution was passed, a plan that seemed to come directly from the Russians. The Yugoslav delegation and the Russian attache were also eager to flesh out Russia's role in KFOR. Would Russian troops be given their own sector? Would they be under an independent command? Both the Russians and Yugoslavs urged a large contingent of Russian forces be placed on the northern border of Kosovo, a suggestion that quickly led to the familiar counterarguments about the dangers of partition. Moscow and Belgrade eagerly revisited the same issues that Chernomyrdin had earlier resolved. In some cases, Barmyantsev openly encouraged the Yugoslavs to reject NATO's terms, and the Russian general insisted that foreign troops could only enter Kosovo with UN authorization. In the afternoon, a NATO spokesman announced there would be a two-hour break to allow the Yugoslavs to "reassess their position," and a short time later, Col. Carmine De Pasquale, the head of the Italian KFOR contingent, announced, "Problems have cropped up that can only be resolved by the president of Yugoslavia." When the meetings resumed, the Serbs continued to insist that there could be no forward movement without a UN resolution, and that their troop strength should only be reduced to prewar levels so civilians would be protected until KFOR deployed. The Yugoslavs also wanted all references to KFOR removed from the military technical agreement, and suggested that the United Nations would need to spell out the scope of the duties for peacekeepers. Such an approach would allow Belgrade to maintain 20,000 troops in


Kosovo, get the bombing stopped and then use the Russians to block the UN resolution and KFOR's deployment. In essence, the situation on the ground would be the same as before the war—except the better part of a million Kosovar Albanians would never be able to return home. General Jackson quickly rejected the Serb proposal. The increasingly rancorous tone of the talks sparked a torrent of diplomatic and political activity. President Clinton, who was spending the weekend at Camp David, quickly returned to Washington, and he spoke on the telephone with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Canadian Prime Minster Jean Chretien, and Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema. Afterward, Blair announced, "The Serbs should not underestimate our total determination to see this thing through, and we still have the forces and the weapons in the area, and the planes, if necessary." In Brussels, the NATO ambassadors discussed the stalled border talks and considered the possibility of dropping leaflets on Belgrade explaining to citizens why the peace deal had foundered and why bombing would be intensified. The group discussed both the hardening Russian position and the unsavory prospect of deploying KFOR without a UN resolution. While the French insisted such an approach was "unthinkable," others recognized that there might be no alternative. Secretary Albright and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook debated asking President Ahtisaari to travel to Belgrade to clarify Milosevic's position, and both agreed that concerted action between Belgrade and Moscow was behind the setbacks. Bombing might need to be intensified within twentyfour hours. President Ahtisaari, who had planned to travel to China during the day to seek Beijing support for a UN resolution, abruptly postponed his trip. Albright spoke with Foreign Ministers Vedrine, Dini, and Fischer, as well as Foreign Secretary Cook, in a conference call later in the afternoon. They agreed that the Yugoslavs needed to abide by the terms spelled out at the Petersberg; permitting Russia to renegotiate the deal through the mechanism of the UN Security Council was unacceptable. As one of the ministers bemoaned, all the progress of the previous several days seemed to have evaporated, "like the last seventy days never happened." The fear was that with Chernomyrdin on the sidelines, Milosevic might again believe that Russia had a veto over NATO. President Clinton wrote to Yeltsin expressing his own concern with developments and asking the Russian president to keep their work on track.


President Ahtisaari again spoke with Milosevic on the phone, and the Yugoslav president continued to resist the need for signing an agreement at the border. Milosevic argued that he was being blackmailed, and Ahtisaari pointed out that the Yugoslav president was the only one who could ultimately get the bombing stopped. Ahtisaari maintained that the talks at the border had soured when Russian Lt. Gen. Barmyantsev had appeared, but Milosevic insisted that he could not control the talks "far away in Macedonia." Milosevic claimed that NATO had no right to negotiate the parameters of KFOR, feeling such a decision should rest with the United Nations. The tone of the conversation gradually turned harsher, and eventually an agitated Ahtisaari argued that because of Milosevic's attitude, "We will not get anywhere. We are about to return to day one." Milosevic was stonewalling. Secretary Albright departed Washington in the evening for Cologne to meet with her fellow G-8 foreign ministers to forge a draft UN resolution, and with the continued difficulties at the border talks, the process had a new urgency. At the Kumanovo airport in Macedonia, the border talks had taken on the demeanor of the trilateral negotiations, slipping past midnight, as Sunday turned into Monday, June 7. The Yugoslavs continued to insist that seven days was not enough time to withdraw and that thousands of their forces should be allowed to stay until the United Nations authorized KFOR. For ten hours, the respective delegations haggled over the military technical agreement, and the Yugoslavs seemed content to move neither forward nor back, leading to speculation that they were stalling to buy more time for mop-up operations against the KLA. At three in the morning, the talks collapsed, and both sides were quick to point fingers. Standing outside of the camouflaged hangar General Jackson declared, "Our job has been to translate the political agreement into a workable military reality on the ground," but the "Yugoslav delegation presented a proposal that would not guarantee the safe return of all the refugees or the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces." The KFOR commander announced, "NATO, therefore, has no alternative but to continue, and indeed intensify, the air campaign until such time as the Yugoslav side are prepared to agree to implement the agreement fully and without ambiguity. . . . I frankly have no more to say to them." Both General Clark and General Jackson were now of one mind: NATO


needed to amplify its attacks to send an unambiguous message to Belgrade that the Alliance would use all necessary means to secure its terms. With his brief statement completed, General Jackson turned sharply and headed for a nearby helicopter, and, over its whine, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Nebojsa Vujovic also spoke to the press, "We will continue with our constructive effort, and we are ready to talk further." Vujovic insisted that the NATO proposals called into question "the full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo is an integral part." The Yugoslav delegation piled into their cars and headed back over the border into Kosovo. NATO responded to the breakdown in the talks at the border by striking targets around Belgrade for the first time since Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin had left Yugoslavia's capital four days earlier. Cruise missiles hit an oil refinery on the outskirts of Belgrade and NATO attacked military barracks and an airfield in Serbia, but not all in NATO were comfortable with the return to a more aggressive military posture. French President Chirac feared intensified Allied attacks might compel the Russians to balk from sending Ivanov to Germany for the G-8 meeting, and there appeared to be implicit agreement within NATO to not ratchet air strikes up to their highest levels as long as Ivanov stayed at the negotiating table. However, General Clark was chafing at what he felt was a weak response, arguing, "We're encouraging Milosevic to stall by not following through with the ground option." That morning he directed that all the engineering units dedicated for Option B- continue to flow toward Albania, insisting, "We had to use this period to intensify the pressure on Belgrade." Clark appealed to Chairman Shelton for permission to return to Washington so he could "work on the naysayers" in the Army who continued to object to his plans for a ground campaign.

Building the Trojan Horse As the sun came up in Pristina, Kosovo, there were reports of Yugoslav forces looting Kosovar Albanian homes and businesses—a perverse but positive sign troops might be preparing to pull out. There were also reports from within Kosovo that the Serbs were trying to destroy evidence of atrocities by digging up mass graves and relocating bodies, a charge substantiated by


NATO aerial photographs. During the day, President Ahtisaari and Milosevic again spoke on the telephone. It had been decided that the Finnish president did not need to visit Belgrade, and Ahtisaari found Milosevic in a more constructive mood. Milosevic told Ahtisaari that, despite the lingering difficulties, he felt that a deal would soon be reached at the border. Ahtisaari conveyed this message directly to the G-8 foreign ministers shortly before departing for his rescheduled trip to China. The G-8 foreign ministers gathered in Cologne to collaborate on the details of a Security Council resolution, and Foreign Minister Ivanov arrived in Germany grousing, "NATO is trying unilaterally to say in this document [the UN resolution] that an international force will be based on NATO units and have the right to use force," which was true. The G-8 foreign ministers met in a lunchtime session at the Petersberg—the site of the earlier talks between Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Talbott. In a side conversation, Ivanov pressed Albright to finalize an agreement on Russia's role in KFOR by resuming U.S. and Russian military-to-military talks in Moscow. After speaking with Berger and Talbott, Albright told Ivanov that the United States was prepared to continue negotiations as soon as the draft UN resolution was complete. The United States was not willing to hold the UN resolution hostage to a final agreement on Russian participation in KFOR. The Russians arrived at the Petersberg with some twenty objections to a draft UN resolution that was thirty-three paragraphs long. Early in the G-8 session, Ivanov told his colleagues that agreeing to some of the terms in the agreement would exceed both his authority and instructions, leading some of the ministers to fear further discussions would be fruitless. Albright relayed back to Washington that Clinton should call Yeltsin to urge him to give Ivanov clear marching orders. The remaining disagreements were an outgrowth of the earlier trilateral dialogue. Russia still objected to any mention of NATO constituting the core of the peacekeeping force and preferred broader language that placed overall authority with the United Nations. Ivanov sought to have the peacekeepers' authorization limited to a single year, at which point it would be subject to renewal. The other ministers recognized if KFOR required annual reauthorization, it would only be a matter of time before that approval could be blocked. Ivanov objected to peacekeepers and civilian authorities being granted Chapter VII authority, which would allow for the robust use of force. Albright and the other ministers countered that Chapter VII authority was ab-


solutely essential to make KFOR effective. Because NATO forces would be the ones in harm's way, the Alliance wanted to ensure its forces had the broadest possible discretion to use force when they saw fit. They were adamant in opposing any arrangement where both the NATO commander and UN authorities had to approve the use of force—the "dual key" model that had made UNPROFOR in Bosnia a debacle. The timing of events also remained central. The continued Russian reluctance to finalize a resolution raised fears that any pause in bombing would allow the Russians to take a "go slow" approach to granting UN approval for the peacekeeping effort. If NATO stopped bombing, and the Russians continued to drag their feet, Milosevic would be given time to exploit his advantage on the ground without fear of military reprisal. British and American officials continued to insist that if the Serbs started to withdraw, KFOR had to deploy regardless of whether or not the United Nations had signed off. Other NATO members, foremost Germany and France, were appalled by the thought that NATO might deploy peacekeepers without UN authorization, particularly at a time when that mandate seemed within reach. The Russians seemed to understand that if push came to shove, KFOR would likely deploy without their support. President Clinton called President Yeltsin from Washington. Clinton stressed that the situation was at a critical juncture and that Russia and the United States stood on the verge of a great achievement. Clinton immediately noticed that Yeltsin sounded either sick or drunk, or both, and the Russian president—not known for his mastery of English—answered some of questions even before they were translated. Yeltsin acknowledged that the two sides had come a long way and that the only thing remaining was to finalize their work. Clinton agreed and noted that if the G-8 could produce and agreement on a UN resolution that day, everything would be fine. Clinton wanted to ensure Ivanov was doing everything possible to reach an agreement and pointed out that Yeltsin was setting the stage for a great Russian diplomatic triumph. Yeltsin observed that it would be extremely dangerous if they did not resolve the matter. Again, President Clinton agreed and noted that he had urged Albright and the other ministers to do everything within their power to strike a deal. He hoped Yeltsin would similarly compel Foreign Minister Ivanov, and Clinton claimed that if an agreement on the resolution could be reached, the details of sequencing could be resolved. The beginning of a withdrawal


would allow for a bombing pause, passage of the UN resolution, and then the deployment of peacekeepers. Clinton stressed the urgency of impressing upon Milosevic that backsliding was unacceptable and claimed that if Milosevic had lived up to his word, the bombing would have already stopped. Both presidents agreed to ask their foreign ministers to redouble their efforts. Back at the G-8 meeting, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine proposed a solution to the sequencing dilemma similar to the one set forth by President Clinton: A UN resolution would be finalized and ready for approval, but the vote on its passage could be delayed until NATO confirmed troops were withdrawing. The other ministers, including Ivanov, expressed some concerns but generally agreed such a formulation could break the impasse. Albright pushed to conclude the negotiations, but Ivanov deferred, insisting that, despite Yeltsin's assurances to Clinton, he still had not received instructions from Moscow on a number of key points. The long and somewhat frustrating session concluded with the ministers agreeing on the majority of the resolution's text, but the Russian's still objecting to five critical points: Chapter VII authority for peacekeepers; mandated cooperation with the war crimes tribunal; the scope and nature of the peacekeeping force; the total withdrawal of Yugoslav forces; and the duration of the mission's authorization. The group agreed to reconvene the next day. Vice President Gore spoke with Chernomyrdin on the telephone several hours later and again raised the matter of the UN resolution: "Viktor Stepanovich, we are so close, and I admire so much what you have done. The remaining differences do not seem insurmountable and time is of the essence." Chernomyrdin did not think that Milosevic would "backtrack on his commitments," but noted that Russia would "still commit all our efforts and resources" to prevent the Yugoslav president from exploiting the situation. Gore pleaded to have Yeltsin call Ivanov and give him clear instructions. While Chernomyrdin was sympathetic, he mentioned sheepishly that he was "not able to directly contact President Yeltsin," but remained "confident he will issue the proper authority."

Cloak and Dagger As the diplomatic efforts to break the gridlock continued, the Russian government was moving forward with a dramatic and secretive plan with the


potential to shatter the peace deal and bring Russian and NATO forces into a direct clash. While some of the details remain shadowy, the Kremlin tasked the Russian military and intelligence services to come up with a covert strategy that would enable Russia to both save face and secure a better bargaining position with NATO in Kosovo. Hurried planning was undertaken between the Russian Ministry of Defense, general staff, and intelligence services. Foreign Minister Ivanov was not involved in putting the strategy together and was conspicuously kept in the dark about the potential operation, although there is wide speculation that Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev was privy to some of the discussions. Key players in the closely held decision-making included General Staff Chief Anatoly Kvashnin; Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev; Russia's representative to NATO, Gen. Viktor Zavarzin; the head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, Vyacheslav Trubnikov; and the Russian military attache in Belgrade, Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Barmyantsev, who was representing Russia at the border talks between NATO and Yugoslavia. The group devised a simple but direct plan code-named Operation Trojan Horse. A brigade of Russian soldiers serving as peacekeepers in Bosnia would cross overland through Serbia and seize Kosovo's largest airfield at Slatina. This was a key strategic bridgehead and would allow Russia to bring in paratrooper reinforcements to bolster its initial force. Once the Russian troops were in place, it would be very difficult for NATO forces to move them out without risking a direct military confrontation. The troops at the airfield would then facilitate the immediate arrival of at least 600 Russian paratroopers flown to the site from Russia aboard six IL-76 transport planes. Russia would be able to negotiate its role within KFOR after having already created new facts on the ground. The operation, as drawn up by Russian security establishment, called for the troops to enter Kosovo simultaneously with KFOR. Once this forward deployment was in place, an additional 7,000 to 12,000 Russian airborne troops would be readied for immediate deployment, potentially leaving Russia in military control of much of the traditionally ethnic Serb portions of northern Kosovo. The plan would also provide an opportunity for Yugoslav forces to remain in the northern portion of Kosovo if Moscow and Belgrade wished to partition the province. Thousands of Russians troops on the ground would provide Moscow and Belgrade with effective control of large


swaths of Kosovo and humiliate NATO at what was supposed to be its moment of greatest triumph. The plan was beautiful in its simplicity. It would demonstrate Russia's ability to rapidly project force and provide much needed leverage in negotiating command and control arrangements with NATO. The surprise operation was also designed to show Russian voters that President Yeltsin would not be pushed around. The Russian military attache to Belgrade, Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Barmyantsev, played a key role in coordinating the potential troop movement with the Yugoslavs, and his role in planning the operation also helps explain why the military technical agreement talks had stalled. President Yeltsin broadly endorsed Trojan Horse while asking few questions about its operational details or international ramifications. As one Western official observed derisively after the war, the Russian military and intelligence services knew "how to present something in a way and a time to get approval—you send the bottle of vodka in first, and then the memo." However, Yeltsin did make clear that the ministry of defense and the intelligence services would be held accountable if the operation failed. The operation carried serious risks, yet remarkably little consideration was given to its broad foreign policy implications. While some Russian advisors were reported to argue the plan could easily backfire, because it would give NATO further justification for obstructing Russia, Trojan Horse was a dangerous and impulsive plan pieced together by military and intelligence operatives with little foreign policy input and a heavy emphasis on Russian domestic politics. Yeltsin said that he gave broad approval for the plan on June 4. Debating the merits of the operation in his memoirs he reflected: I hesitated for a long time. It seemed too dangerous to send our men in early. Furthermore, why were we demonstrating military boldness and waving our fists after the fight was over? Still, I decided that Russia must make a crowning gesture, even if it had no significance. It was not a question of specific diplomatic victories or defeats; it was a question of whether we had won the main point. Russia had not permitted itself to be defeated in the moral sense. It had not let itself be split. It had not been dragged into the war. This last victory was a sign of our moral victory in the face of the enormous NATO military, all of Europe, and the whole world. I gave the order: go. President Ahtisaari would later argue that he felt the only reason that Milosevic accepted the agreement that he and Chernomyrdin brought to Bel-


grade was because of the Russian plan to potentially partition the north of Kosovo and place it under Russian and Serb control: I could not find any other reason why Milosevic took the deal. I was continually asking myself, "Why did he agree?" And I could not find anything other than the Russian plan. I tried to see some logic in the events, because in the negotiations, the Russians were in favor of division and having their own sector. They could not agree on the command structure of KFOR at the Petersberg because they had a plan to rush their troops to Kosovo immediately. Around June 7, the commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, Maj. Gen. Roman Yepifanov, told his troops they needed to prepare to move on short notice. Because the operation was designed to influence negotiations with NATO, Moscow had told General Yepifanov that he would have to remain highly flexible—it was possible his troops would need to cease, hold, or accelerate their operation on a moment's notice. The wheels were in motion.

Reaching Agreement On Tuesday, June 8, the G-8 ministers began their second day of meetings on the draft UN Security Council resolution, having moved their discussions from the Petersberg to the Guerzenich—a medieval banquet hall in Cologne. Foreign Minister Ivanov arrived ready for business, with a complete set of alternative language for addressing those issues still in dispute. The Russians had again consented to a total withdrawal. The other ministers quickly huddled to review Ivanov's proposals, hoping to strike a careful balance between the risk of offending the Russians and the dangers of watering down the resolution. Once the session resumed, Foreign Secretary Cook spiritedly advocated the entire resolution be placed under Chapter VII authority, and Ivanov continued to object. During the long discussions, Ivanov and others periodically left the room to telephone their respective capitals for further instruction. Around five in the afternoon, Ivanov barged into the conversation of several of his fellow foreign ministers. In what Cook later described as a "tense" scene, Ivanov blamed the United States and NATO for the impasse at the


border talks, and huffed that if America could not move the situation forward, "Russia would." With that, Ivanov indicated that Moscow would vote in favor of the draft resolution as it stood immediately after NATO suspended bombing operations. The logjam was broken. The group spelled out the sequence of events that would follow. First, the draft resolution would be completed. Second, the military technical agreement would have to be finalized at the border talks. Third, the Yugoslav forces would begin a full withdrawal. Fourth, once NATO verified the pullout had begun, it would stop bombing. Fifth, the UN Security Council would adopt the resolution. Sixth, KFOR would move into Kosovo. While the Russians had softened the tone of the resolution's text and moved some of its more important language into annexes, the document hewed closely to the broad strokes of the earlier demands. The resolution was mandated under Chapter VII authority, allowing for the broad use of force, and instructed the UN secretary-general to appoint a special representative to coordinate civil affairs—ranging from elections to reconstruction—in Kosovo. The resolution certified, as had the conditions paper, that an agreed-to number of Serb personnel could return to Kosovo after the withdrawal was completed. The civil and security presences were authorized for an initial period of one year—but the mandate for these operations would not automatically expire and were "to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise." On balance, NATO had preserved its bottom lines. However, the resolution's language caused a degree of subsequent confusion and concern. While the main body of the resolution authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force under UN auspices, it did not refer to NATO's core role. Secretary Albright and others were quick to point out that the second annex to the resolution—the paper drafted by Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin, and Talbott and included in its entirety—was explicit in spelling out NATO's centrality. Albright told reporters, "It is in the appendix to this resolution that it has NATO at the core, and NATO will be the military leader." Alliance officials also pointed out that they were rapidly moving forward with deploying KFOR and that it would include at least 44,000 NATO troops—clear NATO domination. It is reasonable to question why the Alliance ministers "buried the lead" with the reference to NATO not appearing until the second annex. By the same token, this clause was still included and explicitly endorsed by the Russians—no small feat.


Others took issue with the fact that NATO's demands had evolved from the earlier, and failed, Rambouillet accords and further muddied the issue of Kosovo's political status. The UN Resolution created a civil presence to promote "the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo." This civil authority was to take full account of the demands paper and the Rambouillet accords, as it oversaw and organized the development of "provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections." The final status of Kosovo was left open, with the civilian representative charged with "facilitating a political process" whose exact nature was left uncertain. The resolution dropped the proposal for a nonbinding referendum on Kosovo's ultimate status after three years, as had been included in the Rambouillet proposals. By turning Kosovo into a de facto international protectorate, NATO had simply pushed the issue of Kosovo's status down the road, an understandable decision given the overall difficulty of the situation, but one that may have deleterious consequences over the long term. The Balkans offer all too many examples of problems left for a later day that have only amplified in their intensity, consequence, and violence. The UN resolution also did not clarify Russia's role in KFOR, with that issue again set aside for later negotiations. The matter of how the KLA would be disarmed would also need to be formalized in a subsequent agreement as well. But on balance, the UN resolution was tougher on Belgrade than the Rambouillet accords. It demanded the total withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the insertion of a large and robust international peacekeeping force with an open-ended mandate. Reaction within NATO to the UN resolution was jubilant. German Foreign Minister Fischer called the agreement "a genuine breakthrough" and "a very decisive step toward peace." Ivanov was relieved but not pleased: "This sort of document hardly ever satisfies those who take part in the negotiations." At the White House, President Clinton spoke on the phone with President Yeltsin for the second straight day, and again the Russian president sounded badly under the weather. The conversation began with mutual congratulations, and President Yeltsin credited himself with telling Ivanov that he should not come back from Germany without a deal. Clinton said that he was thrilled that they had reached agreement, and Yeltsin made clear that he felt Russia had lived up to its end of the bargain; Clinton now needed to

BREAKING THROUGH

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stop the bombing. However, the U.S. president cautioned that the military technical agreement with the Serbs first had to be finalized. Yeltsin's mood immediately soured. "Bill, just a second, Bill." Yeltsin insisted that they had agreed that once the resolution was completed, the bombing would be stopped. Yeltsin grumpily inquired if Clinton was drawing back from their agreement. Clinton tried to calm Yeltsin, and reassured him that as soon as the Yugoslav troops began to withdraw things would work out. Strobe Talbott and his team would be dispatched to Moscow to finalize the details of Russia's involvement in KFOR. There were further signs that Serb forces in Kosovo were preparing for a withdrawal, as heavy military transport vehicles were mobilized and Yugoslav officers in Pristina were spotted loading trucks with furniture and personal effects. The Serbs also reinforced positions in western Kosovo in what looked like an effort to protect their flank in case of a withdrawal. At a Pentagon briefing, a reporter noted that KFOR would be ready to deploy in a matter of days, and that no Russian troops were pre-positioned in the area, leading to an inquiry if KFOR would move into Kosovo without the Russians. "That is safe to assume, yes," spokesman Ken Bacon dryly replied. Bacon also told the press that U.S. Marines would be ready to deploy into Kosovo within ninety-six hours of receiving orders to move, although they still remained at sea, hoping to offload at the Greek port of Thessaloniki before moving over land to their temporary base in Macedonia. Pentagon officials noted that if the Yugoslavs started withdrawing within forty-eight hours, U.S. troops would not be ready to be part of KFOR's vanguard, largely because the Greek government had delayed disembarkation. British and French officials also noted with some satisfaction that KFOR would be ready to go before that time—with or without the U.S. forces. All eyes turned again to the Kosovo-Macedonia border, where talks on a military technical agreement resumed at a little after nine in the evening of June 8 at the muddy military heliport near the town of Kumanovo, Macedonia. The first hours of the meeting were spent with the Yugoslav officers reviewing changes that NATO officials had made in the draft document. The issues of border control, the size of a buffer zone along Kosovo's border, the timing of the troop withdrawal, and bombing pause continued to dominate discussions. The proposed buffer zone would ensure that air defenses, particularly surface-to-air missiles, were kept far enough away from Kosovo's border with Serbia that NATO planes could patrol without threat while pushing


Yugoslav troops further back into Serbia, reducing the potential for crossborder adventurism by Milosevic. The Yugoslavs tried to reopen the issue of total withdrawal by insisting that they needed Yugoslav security forces at Kosovo's borders to ensure they maintained their sovereignty. General Foglesong and the others countered that Milosevic had already accepted total withdrawal in his sessions with Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin and accused the Yugoslavs of stalling. The Yugoslav officers also insisted that seven days was simply too brief a period to withdraw all their forces, given fuel shortages and the threat from the KLA, preferring seventeen days for a pullout. NATO planners were unsympathetic, pointing out that most of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had been driven out of Kosovo had crossed the province in a matter of days. Several times, General Foglesong, Finnish Admiral Kaskeala, and a Yugoslav representative crossed over to the Serb side of the border and sat in a small cafe in side discussions designed to jump-start the process. Once again, the talks labored past midnight as an expectant world awaited news from the camouflage tent. The discussions were painstakingly detailed, and coordinating the finer points of a massive troop withdrawal necessitated consideration of road conditions, timetables, exit routes, and methods for verifying the pullout. The negotiators pored over maps and aerial photos and consulted with military engineers. The talks finally adjourned around seven in the morning on June 9—without an agreement. President Ahtisaari again telephoned to prod Milosevic. To the Finnish president's frustration, Milosevic quibbled over a series of largely minor and technical points contained in the border agreement. Milosevic and Ahtisaari went back and forth at length on sequencing issues, the UN resolution, and border security. After several testy exchanges, a still recalcitrant Milosevic declared that he would keep the process moving forward. In Cologne, Albright started her day by meeting with Foreign Minister Ivanov at seven in the morning at the Renaissance Hotel, joined by Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, Ambassador Mayorsky, and several senior State Department officials. Ivanov almost immediately asked when the United States wanted to vote on the UN resolution. Albright noted that a quick vote might not be possible owing to changes that were being proposed by the Chinese who were urging, as the Russians had, that KFOR's mandate be limited to a year, with the possibility of subsequent renewal. The Chinese


were also trying to soften the language criticizing Yugoslavia and to limit the circumstances under which force could be used by peacekeepers. The Russian foreign minister suggested that if the sequence of events to which they had already agreed was altered, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin would need to concur on the new timetable. Ivanov did not want Russia to be forced to abstain from voting for the UN resolution, and he spelled out the sequencing as he had understood it. The draft resolution would be sent to New York. The military technical agreement would then be signed. The withdrawal would begin and the air strikes would be suspended. The UN resolution would then be passed and KFOR could deploy. Subsequently, the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces would be completed. Finally, NATO's military operation would be formally terminated. Albright agreed and pointed out that the Serbs were the only complication, since Milosevic's generals seemed to be working hard to undermine an agreement. Ivanov questioned why the bombing could not be suspended immediately, leading Albright to point to the sequence he had just detailed—a withdrawal needed to commence before bombing stopped. Ivanov observed that Russian public opinion was blithe to the intricacies of diplomacy and UN voting procedures, and stressed that he had already surpassed his own authority in the matters before them. He asked what would happen if the resolution was passed but the bombing continued, and the secretary reiterated the bombing would pause when there was a withdrawal. As long as Milosevic did not resort to any stunts, there would be no problems. The discussion turned to Russian participation in KFOR. The secretary agreed it was an important topic, noting she was dispatching Deputy Secretary Talbott and a team of military experts to Moscow later that day for talks on Thursday and Friday with Ivanov and Russian military officials. Ivanov indicated that he would be headed out on a tour of the Baltic capitals on Friday, giving them limited time, and Albright asked for assurances the Russian negotiators would be provided with clear instructions. Ivanov noted that even the hawkish General Ivashov thought the discussions were going well. The border talks resumed around midday on June 9, allowing negotiators only several hours of sleep, and the increasingly edgy military representatives plowed over familiar ground. During the course of the afternoon, it again appeared the discussions might collapse as the Yugoslav delegation announced they needed to consult with Belgrade and promptly left the base. NATO officers speculated that they might not return, and a NATO spokes-


man announced to the media that the talks had adjourned for the day. But the Serb officials traveled only as far as the border crossing where they made a series of telephone calls to Belgrade, and they returned to the base an hour later. Negotiations resumed. Just before ten at night, General Jackson emerged from the tent to address the media. "I have some very good news," he said. He announced that a military technical agreement had been signed: "NATO's resolve in conducting a sustained air campaign has finally achieved this agreement, and now it is time to look ahead." With that, Jackson briskly folded up the prepared statement, told reporters there was no time for questions, and strode quickly off into the night. He again boarded a helicopter waiting to whisk him from the scene. Yugoslav General Marjanovic also spoke briefly with reporters, and his words were nearly drowned out by the sound of Jackson's departing helicopter as dark storms clouds hung low and lightning roiled the sky in front of the tent. "It means the war has ended," Marjanovic said, "The policy of peace has prevailed, the policy of peace which is conducted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and President Milosevic." The Yugoslav general also declined to take questions. In the six-page military technical agreement, the Yugoslav military had agreed that an international military force, commanded by a NATO general, would occupy the province. General Jackson, as KFOR's commander, was given extraordinarily broad sanction, with "authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo"; including the use of military force. The agreement outlined a strict timetable for withdrawal, with the first of the Yugoslav forces to depart northern Kosovo within twenty-four hours and calling on all 40,000 Serb troops to pull out via four designated exit routes by June 21. NATO and the Yugoslavs had split their difference on the time allotted for the pullout, ultimately settling on eleven days. The agreement also established a five-kilometer buffer zone within Serbia that would be considered a "no-go" zone for Yugoslav forces, again splitting the difference between the positions of the two negotiating teams. In addition, all aircraft and air defense systems had to be pulled back from a twentyfive-kilometer zone that extended beyond the province border into the rest of Yugoslavia. KFOR was given control of the borders with Albania and Macedonia, ensuring that Yugoslavia would have no voice in determining


what refugees would be allowed to return. It was agreed that NATO Secretary-General Solana would declare a bombing pause if the Yugoslavs began a pullout from northern Kosovo within twenty-four hours, meeting the first phase of the agreement's demands. NATO could resume air attacks if General Clark determined that the Yugoslavs failed to meet any of the terms of the agreement—a light tripwire. Although the KLA was not mentioned in the agreement, the Yugoslavs were given direct assurances that the rebels would be demilitarized, and those guarantees were crucial in allowing the agreement to move forward. In signing the agreement, NATO had assumed responsibility for Kosovo's security. For better or worse, the Alliance had made the daily operations of the province its own problem. General Clark was upset that some of the terms of the military technical agreement had been softened and he complained to the Pentagon, "Mike Jackson doesn't have enough strength on the ground to make an opposed entry on the ground if there is a problem with this agreement." He also complained, "The real weak point was that NATO command and control was not explicitly recognized. That meant we would still have to work with the Russians to define their participation." In Yugoslavia, state-run television interrupted broadcasts to report the agreement: "Dear viewers and listeners, the aggression against Yugoslavia is over." For the first time in ten weeks, the streetlamps of Belgrade blinked on, as cheering crowds shot fireworks into the night air. Drivers joyously honked car horns as soldiers fired antiaircraft tracer bullets into the sky. The Yugoslav capital was awash with relief. In Washington, the Pentagon reported that the roughly 2,000 Marines that had been waiting off the coast of Greece had finally landed, and were prepared to move into Macedonia. Additional elements of U.S. forces would be arriving on transport planes from Germany, and moving over land through Albania. Secretary Albright, who was in Cologne, spoke with Foreign Secretary Cook late in the day. Secretary-General Solana was getting pressure from some of the Allies to declare an immediate pause in the air campaign and notify UN Secretary-General Annan he had done so. Albright felt that such a move was premature because General Clark would not be able to verify the Serb withdrawal until the light of day. Both the United States and Great Britain urged Solana to hold firm until morning. Deputy National Security Adviser Jim Steinberg called Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, who was airborne for Moscow, informing him that the mili-


tary technical agreement had been signed. In one of his more demonstrative moments, Talbott let out a whoop of excitement, surprising his colleagues on the small Air Force jet. Soon General Foglesong called the plane from the Macedonian border to share the good news as well, and he informed Talbott that he would link up with the deputy secretary in Moscow. For the small team of U.S. negotiators, it looked like the mission to Moscow would bring closure to their diplomatic odyssey. They only had to finalize the details of Russia's participation in KFOR, and the existing peacekeeping arrangements in Bosnia seemed to offer a clear road map for such a deal. The plane carrying the U.S. delegation toward Moscow headed steadily eastward into the fading light, and the members of the traveling team drifted into various states of half-slumber in the comfortable confines of the Gulfstream jet. Yet, as Talbott headed to Moscow, Russian peacekeepers in Bosnia were poised awaiting secret orders to rush toward Kosovo.

Back to the USSR? NATO air strikes came to a standstill with the formal acceptance of the military technical agreement. Although there were still reports of sporadic Yugoslav artillery fire, NATO officials dismissed the activity as defensive cover. At half past seven in the morning on Thursday, June 10, Talbott's delegation touched down in Moscow. As the team's motorcade sped toward downtown one more time, the group was energized. With the finish line in sight, and back in their rhythm of travel, they were able to shake off their collective weariness. The visit was slated to be a brief one, with the delegation planning to return to the States by the weekend. As the team sat down with Ambassador Collins at the Marriott Hotel, Talbott asked the ambassador if it was possible to pick up a bottle of champagne to present to Chernomyrdin when they met later in the day and, as he put it, "Get something nice, nothing local." The U.S. delegation then went in two directions: Half the team headed for the military-to-military discussion on the details of Russian participation in KFOR, and the others, including Talbott, went to meet with Chernomyrdin. At eleven in the morning, in room 503 of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military-to-military talks began. Before the meeting, General Ivashov told reporters, "The Russian contingent is under Russian com-


mand," adding, "it cannot be otherwise." General Ivashov was in an uncompromising mood as the discussions got off to a rocky start. Ivashov wanted the United Nations to be given broad control over the military operation—a position directly at odds with the UN resolution his own foreign ministry had just endorsed. He also insisted that Russia be granted its own geographic sector to patrol in Kosovo, just as was slated for the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy. Ivashov saw no way Russia could serve under NATO's command. With some irritation, the negotiators reviewed why each of Ivashov's demands was unacceptable. The Russian Ministry of Defense had put out a series of contradictory signals regarding the number of troops they would be willing to commit to KFOR—ranging from 2,500 to 10,000 soldiers. Few analysts thought Russia could afford to muster 10,000 troops in the Balkans indefinitely without financial assistance from the international community. There were also reports in Moscow during the day that Defense Minister Sergeyev had issued preliminary orders for airborne troops from three divisions to prepare to deploy to Kosovo. Around noon, Talbott met with Chernomyrdin in his office in the Gazprom building. Both men were relaxed and upbeat. Chernomyrdin's role was largely completed and he was not taking part in the negotiations on Russia's role in KFOR. Chernomyrdin laughingly gave the deputy secretary a hard time about his reservations at the Petersberg concerning forging a single set of demands to take to Belgrade, and the Russian insisted that the group uncork the bottle of champagne to celebrate the conclusion of their joint efforts, despite Talbott's objections that many things could still go wrong. Chernomyrdin told the deputy secretary, "We've been through something very difficult and very dangerous, but we avoided something much, much worse." Around the same time as Talbott and Chernomyrdin met, the Russian Duma convened to condemn Chernomyrdin's efforts and the peace agreement as a whole, passing by a large margin a nonbinding resolution requesting President Yeltsin sack Chernomyrdin as special envoy to Yugoslavia. Sergei Ivanenko, a centrist parliamentarian, maintained that Russian defense and foreign ministry officials had presented materials suggesting Chernomyrdin "made a number of concessions that were not necessary." After their meeting concluded, Talbott and Chernomyrdin held a short press conference and the Russian envoy was immediately quizzed as to his reaction to the vote. Chernomyrdin thanked the parliament for its opinion and calmly noted, "I


work for the president, and not the Duma." Chernomyrdin felt that an accommodation would be worked out for Russian participation in KFOR and that "Russian troops will have their own zone of responsibility, most probably close to Kosovo's administrative border with Serbia." Talbott carefully made the distinction that Russia would not be given its own sector in Kosovo, but would have an area where its role was "manifest." Asked about the possibility of a unilateral deployment of Russian forces, Talbott stressed that such a move would be "quite dangerous." Around two in the afternoon, the military talks at the foreign ministry recessed for a two-hour break. U.S. negotiators were concerned by the hardline Russian approach and feared that if the talks collapsed the Russian government might refuse to vote for the UN resolution. The team agreed that they should string the talks out long enough for the resolution to be passed. In Kosovo, the 40,000 Yugoslav army and police forces began to withdraw. Moving out from carefully concealed positions, military and police forces laughed and flashed victory signs at television cameras as their convoys headed toward Serbia. The roads quickly became clogged with military vehicles and fleeing Serb civilians. For many Kosovar Serbs, the notion of living in Kosovo without the protective cloak of Yugoslav armed forces was unthinkable. The returning refugees would want to settle blood scores, and Serb civilians would be attractive targets. The onset of the withdrawal triggered a series of interlocking events. Not long after the pullout began, NATO Secretary-General Solana declared, "Milosevic has complied with the five conditions the international community has placed," and he instructed General Clark to suspend NATO air operations. UN Secretary-General Annan was also informed of Solana's determination. Solana declared, "It is a great day for the Alliance," as he warned both Milosevic and KLA that "violence or noncompliance by any party will not be tolerated." The KLA quickly announced a cease-fire. In Washington, at just after ten in the morning, President Clinton spoke from the White House briefing room: "NATO has suspended its air campaign against Yugoslavia. An international security force, including American troops is preparing to enter Kosovo." President Clinton spoke briefly with President Yeltsin on the telephone, and Clinton thanked Yeltsin for his work. He noted the Serb withdrawal had commenced, the bombing had been suspended, and passage of the UN resolution was imminent. Yeltsin observed, "It would have been a real trag-

BREAKING THROUGH * 231 edy for us if our ways had gone in different directions, because we have been working for many years." The relieved Russian president enthused, "I would like to hug and kiss you." "Thank you, Boris," Clinton replied. "Our friendship will never be broken as long as we are honest with each other." The two men did not discuss the continuing difficulties in resolving Russia's role in KFOR, and there was no hint of the Russian troops who were scrambling to deploy from Bosnia. In Bosnia, the commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent called an urgent meeting of his senior staff to discuss the closely guarded Trojan Horse operation's move into Kosovo. The march was provisionally scheduled to begin the next day—June 11—at four in the morning. In New York, the United Nations lurched toward formal approval of the Security Council resolution. Most of the twenty representatives to the Security Council gave speeches—stretching over five hours—with the overwhelming majority defending passage. In Belgrade, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic addressed the nation from the presidential palace. Dressed in a blue suit, he stood stiffly before an ornamental fireplace and declared to the people of Yugoslavia, "Dear citizens, the aggression is over. Peace has prevailed over violence." Milosevic spoke of the Yugoslav people as heroes, and testified to the honor of those who had died defending the state: We have not given up Kosovo. The Group of Eight most developed countries of the world and the United Nations guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country. . . . The Belgrade agreement has closed the open issues of the possible independence of Kosovo at the time prior to the aggression. The territorial entirety of our country cannot be threatened. We have preserved and succeeded in defending the country because we brought the entire problem to the summit of the world authority, the United Nations, and handed its resolution to be sought under UN auspices and in keeping with the UN charter. KFOR troops—18,500 out of a force expected to eventually grow to over 50,000—were poised to move into Kosovo. NATO military officials said British and French troops would be the first to enter the province, with U.S. forces not far behind. General Jackson announced, "We shall be off quite quickly, and what we do in Kosovo, I assure you, will both be robust and quite even-handed." NATO flirted with the notion of moving its forces into


Kosovo as early as the morning of the next day, Friday, with British forces massed at Skopje securing the main highway running from Pristina to the border in a helicopter lift. However, NATO officials delayed the plan largely because they were still waiting for U.S. Marines to arrive from Greece. The United States, having carried the bulk of the campaign's military load, did not want to see European forces go into Kosovo without them. General Jackson was infuriated by the delay, although at the time, a setback of thirty-six hours seemed of minor consequence. It looked as if all the carefully choreographed diplomacy was neatly falling into place. Events were unfolding as scheduled, and all of the parties to the agreement—the United Nations, the Yugoslavs, the KLA, NATO, the G-8, and Russia—seemed to be honoring their commitments. In Moscow, just after five in the evening, Deputy Secretary Talbott headed to the Russian White House for a meeting with the new prime minister, Sergei Stepashin. Stepashin had worked at senior levels in the intelligence services, had the pale, bland features of a lifelong bureaucrat, and was an unproven quantity in his role. Stepashin began the session by noting that he hoped Talbott had brought "good news" and said, "It appears that we have avoided an escalation in Kosovo just as we avoided such an escalation in the Cuba crisis long ago." However, he added, "I understand from Defense Minister Sergeyev that the talks between our military representatives are complicated and experiencing some difficulties," largely, he felt, because U.S. military planners continued to push for Russian participation along the lines of the model used in Bosnia. Stepashin also observed that Germany's harsh treatment at the end of World War I by the Allied powers fueled the extremism that brought Adolph Hitler to power. He was quick to observe that while the comparison to Weimar Germany was obviously not exact—and he was emphatic in assuring that no Hitler would rise in Russia—he stressed, "The psychology is similar." Talbott went out of the way to object to Stepashin's analogy, insisting that the comparison was inaccurate "strategically, historically, and morally." An aide walked in the room and passed Talbott a note: The UN Security Council had passed the Kosovo resolution by a vote of 14-0, with China abstaining. Shortly after the UN vote, NATO ambassadors put another piece of the puzzle in place by issuing the final activation order, or "ACTORD" in NATO parlance, for KFOR. This activation order effectively transferred command of these troops from their national commands to KFOR and Gen-


eral Jackson. With authorization orders in place, NATO announced it was poised to enter Kosovo by Saturday. Prime Minister Stepashin raised several non-Kosovo issues that he thought should be addressed before Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin met at the G-8 Summit scheduled for ten days later. The imminent G-8 Summit drove the diplomatic process on a number of levels. Everyone in the meeting knew that in ten days, Yeltsin and Clinton would likely be in the same room, and Kosovo would be an important topic. Some saw the summit as hardening the position of the Russian negotiators at the military talks, because they knew Clinton wanted to arrive in Cologne with a deal in hand. The Russians could use the potential embarrassment of a failed summit as leverage with an American president who saw himself as a peacemaker. Others saw less strength in the Russian position, arguing that the peacekeeping effort would move forward regardless of Moscow's stance and that Russia's military was in no position to turn the affair into a test of wills. The last thing the Russian hard-liners wanted was for Clinton and Yeltsin to negotiate the final aspects of peacekeeping arrangements, because the U.S. president had already proved that he could secure favorable deals when dealing with Yeltsin directly. Talbott suggested to Stepashin that Russia and the United States were potentially in a "win-win" position. He shared the news that the UN resolution had passed and observed that the international community's goals had been achieved through an effective combination of diplomacy and force. Talbott noted that although Moscow had consistently and eloquently opposed the bombing, it had been Russian diplomacy that helped broker the peace. The deputy secretary stressed operations were moving into an equally important phase. The military teams had been working together for weeks trying to resolve how Russia could participate in KFOR, and they would continue their efforts the next day, but NATO's bottom line was unchanged: The arrangements had to provide a secure environment and be militarily effective. KFOR had to be in every geographic part of Kosovo, with a NATO commanding officer who received instructions from the North Atlantic Council. Talbott said he appreciated Russia's desire to have its troops based in the northern part of Kosovo, but partnering these forces with other international contingents, including those of NATO, was vital. He also noted that General Foglesong would arrive from the border talks in several hours, joining General Casey for the negotiations with Ivashov.


Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev weighed in with a few thoughts, contending that the Russian Federation Council might not approve funding for Russian peacekeepers if they were operating under such conditions. He also claimed that with the passage of the UN resolution, it would not be long before troops moved into Kosovo: "If we keep talking and talking, KFOR will get all the goodies." He insisted, "We need to agree on the Slatina area with its airport as the area where we will be present." This caused Stepashin, with some irritation, to quickly cut off the deputy foreign minister. Stepashin conceded there would be NATO troops and generals in every sector, but remained less satisfied with KFOR's command and control arrangements. With that, the meeting concluded. The U.S. team felt that the meeting with Stepashin had gone as well as could be hoped, and while the prime minister was still unhappy about NATO's overall control of the operation, he was reassuring about Russia's cooperation. The military-to-military talks reconvened at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. General Ivashov, no longer restrained by Chernomyrdin, gruffly presented his bottom lines: Russia had repeatedly compromised, now NATO needed to do the same. KFOR must not deploy until there was an agreement on Russia's role, and if NATO moved into Kosovo before an agreement was reached with Moscow, Russia would have no choice but to unilaterally deploy. While accustomed to Ivashov's negotiating style, the U.S. delegation was alarmed. During the last half-hour of the session, General Casey tried to summarize those areas where there was agreement between the teams, but even that effort was stillborn. The Americans still wanted to string out the process, but the situation was deteriorating. Upon his departure from the ministry, General Ivashov asked reporters, "What is Russia supposed to do, are we to beg for scraps from NATO?" Talbott and his team headed for Spaso House, Ambassador Collins's residence. Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev had tried to call Talbott on an urgent basis, but ended up speaking to Ambassador Collins. Avdeyev had passed on a set of principles concerning Russian participation in KFOR and suggested there could be a synchronized deployment of peacekeepers—even without an agreement on the Russian role. He also stressed the need for integrated political control over operations, with Russia being given its own sector and a voice in senior-level military decisions. In addition, Avdeyev passed on a paper that placed great emphasis on the Russians being given a role at


the Slatina airfield, and a member of the U.S. delegation admits that at that point, "There was a lot of confusion as to where Slatina even was." Although Avdeyev's credibility was never high, this was one of the first points at which U.S. military officials began to seriously consider the possibility that Russian troops might move from Bosnia into Kosovo. Between eight and ten, Talbott held two long briefings for the media at the ambassador's residence. There were repeated questions on the progress in finalizing an agreement with Russia and the deputy secretary maintained, "We feel very strongly, and I think our Russian colleagues agree, unity of command is very important, and unity of command means all of Kosovo will be under one command arrangement." He added, "Russia is not interested in a partition of Kosovo." In the middle of the session, General Foglesong and Colonel Bourne strode into the room, fresh from the military technical talks in Macedonia. Foglesong wore a flight suit—his favorite travel attire. At around a quarter past ten, the second press conference concluded. The U.S. delegation milled around upstairs in a living room as Foglesong and Bourne shared a few stories from the border, snacking on finger food and drinking beer. While Foglesong was concerned that Ivashov seemed "to have a whole new lease on life," and the state of the talks with the Russians was of obvious concern, General Ivashov's threats were nothing new. The American delegation headed back to the hotel, hoping to get a rare full night's sleep. Back in Washington, President Clinton addressed the nation at eight in the evening and told his fellow Americans, "Tonight for the first time in seventy-nine days, the skies over Yugoslavia are silent. The Serb army and police are withdrawing from Kosovo. The one million men, women and children driven from their land are preparing to return home. The demands of an outraged and united international community have been met." Clinton continued: When I ordered our armed forces into combat, we had three clear goals: to enable the Kosovar people, the victims of some of the most vicious atrocities in Europe since the Second World War, to return to their homes with safety and self-government; to require Serbian forces responsible for these atrocities to leave Kosovo; and to deploy an international security force, with NATO at its core, to protect all the people of that troubled land—Serbs and Albanians alike. Those goals will be achieved.


Yet, when the bombing had begun on March 24, Clinton had emphasized three altogether different military objectives: demonstrating the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression; deterring Milosevic from continuing and escalating attacks on civilians; and damaging Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future. Clinton's comments were flawed by needless political sophistry. There was no need to duck the fact that NATO's goals, and the means to achieve those aims, had evolved because the situation on the ground had dramatically changed.

9

cHAPTER

Deception and Confrontation

Cheshire Cats Around one in the morning on Friday, June 11, General Casey was the first of the U.S. negotiators in Moscow to have his dream of a good night's sleep shattered, as the telephone broke the silence of his hotel room in the Moscow Marriott. The U.S. liaison to the Russian contingent of peacekeepers in Bosnia, Maj. Ken Chance, relayed urgent news: A Russian battalion of some 186 peacekeepers in Bosnia was preparing to move. The NATO division commander in Bosnia would later specifically request that the Russians refrain from crossing into Serbia, but he knew there was no legal restriction preventing them from doing so. General Casey informed some of the other team members of the news, and the day was off to an alarming start. As a U.S. diplomat pointed out, "We had picked up that there were preparations by the Russians to move part of their force, but there was no indication of where they were going or what they were doing." Because the U.S. delegation was somewhat isolated in Moscow, Washington was more aware than the team that trouble was brewing. Just before four in the morning in Bosnia, almost six A.M. in Moscow, the Russian forces left their base, traveling overland with a convoy of vehicles toward the border with Serbia. Russia's ultimate intentions were murky, but the move sparked furious contingency planning within NATO. General

237


Clark stressed, "The danger was that if the Russians got in first, they would claim their sector and then we would have lost NATO control over the mission." At nine in the morning, Talbott met with Ivanov at his office. The foreign minister maintained that Russia had two options: It would either secure an acceptable deal with NATO for participating in KFOR or it would not send troops to Kosovo. The foreign minister assured Talbott there would be no unilateral deployment of Russian forces. Talbott replied that while Russian participation in KFOR was not necessary, NATO viewed it as desirable, and General Foglesong would work to facilitate a deal. The deputy secretary proposed that a Russian unit jointly deploy with a U.S. unit as the Serbs completed their withdrawal—a process that would take eleven days. This would allow the Russians to move into Kosovo with KFOR, while not prejudicing the ongoing discussions about the command and control arrangements for Russian participation. Talbott raised the movement of Russian forces in Bosnia. The Allies were very concerned about the situation, and he cited the need to brief the North Atlantic Council of NATO as one of the reasons he would be departing Moscow later in the day. He also asked that Russia keep the lines of communication with NATO open. Ivanov maintained the troops were simply preparing either to participate in KFOR or to be brought home; which course they took would be determined by NATO's willingness to put an acceptable formula on the table. Ivanov appeared relaxed and his tone was nonconfrontational. Talbott expressed his hope that the bilateral relationship would soon be able to move on to matters beyond the Balkans, and he would subsequently characterize the meeting as his best exchange with Ivanov in two months. Unfortunately, the atmosphere at the concurrent military talks was sour as General Foglesong, General Ivashov, and Finnish Admiral Kaskeala met in a small gathering. Foglesong made clear that NATO would play the lead role in KFOR, and that a NATO nation would be in charge of every sector. Ivashov countered that there was nothing in the UN resolution that gave NATO such a role and that Russia had the right to take troops to Kosovo without NATO's permission. Ivashov insisted his direction came directly from President Yeltsin and that "if agreement can not be reached, Russia could well operate without cooperation. We could get our troops in two hours to the sector which we have planned for ourselves." Foglesong replied,

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION

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"If you intend to operate alone, this is a threat. I will have to report this to Washington." Three separate times Ivashov insisted that six hours after NATO-led forces moved into southern Kosovo, Russia would unilaterally enter northern Kosovo. Ivashov scowled, "We don't have to ask NATO for permission. We have the right to act. If NATO intends to bring 50,000 people to Kosovo, we will bring 10,000." As one member of the U.S. delegation observed, "We were getting this very smug, 'You come in here and try to dictate to us, that's fine.'" In a sidebar conversation, a Russian officer warned General Casey that if NATO deployed, the Russians would as well: "If you guys think you can go in and set up and get completely organized and then simply tell us where to go and what to do, you are wrong. Because we have capabilities and assets and we can put people on the ground and if we have to, that's what we'll do." The Americans could not help but notice that some of the Russian generals looked like "the cat that swallowed the canary" when the topic of the Russian forces from Bosnia was brought up. The meeting resolved little, and the Russians continued to demand their own sector and reject the command and control arrangements offered by NATO. The U.S. military delegation relayed their concerns both to General Clark and the Pentagon. As a complement to Trojan Horse, Russian diplomats approached the Hungarian and Ukrainian foreign ministries with a low-key request for overflight clearance for six Russian IL-76 transport planes to transit to the Balkans. The Russians presented a manifest claiming that the planes would be carrying little more than ten-man crews. Remarkably, the Hungarian officials greeted the request as a routine matter, while Ukrainian officials were immediately suspicious. A short time later, the Russian news agency Interfax reported that 300 Russian paratroopers would be flown to Yugoslavia that day, and Russian television announced that Russian paratroopers of the 106th Guards Airborne Division had arrived at Ryazan Dyagilevo airport to fly to Kosovo. General Ivashov observed, "The defense ministry already had plans, proposals ready to put into action. Let's just say that we had several bases ready to leave within two hours." The Russian Trojan Horse was now rolling toward Kosovo from both Bosnia and Russia proper. Moscow hoped to soon have the better part of a thousand Russian forces on the ground in Kosovo, effectively stealing a march on the world's most powerful military alliance. After not firing at each other in anger during more than four decades of Cold War, Russia and


NATO were lurching toward the brink of a major confrontation in an effort to deploy peacekeepers. In Moscow, the entire U.S. delegation gathered at the foreign ministry to compare notes; the session with Ivashov had been every bit as contentious as Talbott's meeting with Ivanov had been agreeable. The situation appeared to be a replay of earlier moments in the crisis: The Russian military opposed a deal, but Moscow's political leadership was holding its nose and working in a more or less collaborative fashion with the West. At eleven in the morning, the U.S. delegation headed to the Kremlin to meet with Vladimir Putin, the low-profile Russian national security advisor and the nation's future president. Putin, while coming across as well prepared and capable, did not seem to be immersed in the details of the Kosovo negotiations. Putin gave the impression of a young Russian politician with some promise, and he was gracious to Talbott for his role in the diplomacy. The national security advisor also took some credit for the decision to have Chernomyrdin appointed special envoy. The deputy secretary pointed out that he knew the bombing of Yugoslavia had put tremendous strains on the Russian political system and U.S.Russian relations. President Clinton knew this as well, and that Russia had seen its "NATO nightmare" become reality. Talbott cited Yeltsin's "courageous" diplomatic effort as key to resolving the conflict. At that moment, Talbott was handed a note by a colleague with an update on the military talks back at the foreign ministry. Calling the reports of Ivashov's threats about a unilateral Russian deployment "strange and ominous," Talbott insisted that the general's stance was directly at odds with the positions taken by Foreign Minister Ivanov and Prime Minister Stepashin. Talbott pointed out that Putin was the last official he was meeting with before he left Moscow and asked if the national security advisor could get the matter clarified. The deputy secretary argued that a unilateral deployment would run the risk of sparking a military confrontation. Putin downplayed the situation, saying that Russia's "state position" had not changed, and dismissing the threat with a simple, "Who is this Ivashov?" Insisting that the general was simply making an "emotional outburst," and was poorly versed in "complicated political aspects," Putin argued that the two sides needed to proceed consistent with earlier understandings and clarify when and how Russian units would enter into the province. He stressed that there

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 241 were problems regarding NATO's proposed command structure but that, "military cooperation would continue to be 100 percent." Saying that Putin's comments were "music to his ears," Talbott pressed Putin for an appropriate expression to clarify the Russian position in the coming hours, especially since he was scheduled to brief the NATO ambassadors several hours later. Putin promised to see that a statement was released and that, "it will be done before you reach the airport." "Good. I will be listening to the radio," replied Talbott. The U.S. delegation was scheduled to leave Moscow just after noon. Because the military talks had not been finalized, it was assumed the team would spend the weekend in the States and then return to Moscow. None of the Russian officials expressed any desire to have the delegation remain to continue the dialogue, and at half past noon the U.S. plane lifted off from Moscow. As one of the U.S. negotiators remarked, "It was my first taste of Vladimir Putin. We had been told by Putin an hour before that by the time we reached the airport, he would issue a statement that assured the world that they would not go into Kosovo. I'm still waiting for that statement." Yet, despite the fact that Putin had not issued a clarifying statement, the delegation was in a good mood: They were leaving Moscow, KFOR would deploy shortly, and the diplomatic efforts had largely been a success. In several hours they would be in Brussels and then onward toward the United States. On the plane, Talbott even bet General Foglesong that General Ivashov would be dismissed by the end of the day. It was a bet that he would lose. As the U.S. delegation was boarding its plane, General Clark was receiving permission from the Pentagon to explore possible military responses to the Russian move. Clark did not want NATO to have waged a seventy-eight-day war only to cede its control of northern Kosovo to an ill-equipped bunch of Russian soldiers able to rush into the province. Clark was adamant: NATO should not give ground, particularly given that the Russians were obviously acting in concert with Milosevic. According to Clark, he quickly called Solana and explained the situation. "You must get to the Pristina airfield first," argued Solana, and Clark asked for confirmation that he had authority to do so. "Of course, you have the authority. You're the supreme commander." Clark then called Washington looking to line up his support at the Pentagon for preemptively taking the Slatina airfield, making clear that events


would become "sensitive and sticky." Clark explained, "This was a substantially different set of circumstances than what had been contemplated twelve hours before. And so, everything was in motion at once—tactical planning, strategic planning, and policy-level political decisions. Everything was churning." Clark quickly raised Gen. Michael Jackson, head of KFOR, and told him, "This is a warning order, but I want you to get ready to move by air to occupy Pristina airfield." Clark ordered Jackson to prepare to execute a plan he said he had on the shelf. Four airborne companies would arrive and land by helicopter into the Pristina airport as soon as possible to ensure, as Clark put it, that the Russians were "properly greeted." Further south, Secretary Albright was at the Stenkovac One refugee camp in Macedonia celebrating the NATO victory. She told the wildly cheering crowd, "Milosevic and the Serbs have lost control over Kosovo. You will go home and be able to live a decent, normal life." After enduring months of blistering criticism, Albright—twice herself a refugee as a child after being forced to flee Czechoslovakia—must have felt considerable vindication walking among the sea of exuberant faces and seeing a child holding a sign that said, "I love America." KFOR was now ready to go. Some 1,500 more NATO troops had arrived in Macedonia during the day, bringing the total in that country close to 18,000. Twenty U.S. Apache attack helicopters landed near Skopje, Macedonia. In a number of locations, NATO troops were only 300 yards from the Kosovo border. The largest international ground troop operation since the Gulf War was poised for action, as many of the peacekeepers continued to express irritation at having to wait until the U.S. Marines arrived. The original plans for KFOR's entry into Kosovo were straightforward. NATO had always intended to first secure the Slatina airfield outside of Pristina, which would become KFOR headquarters—the same prize the Russians had set their sights on. Simultaneously, helicopters would ferry troops to secure the mountainsides on either side of the route into Kosovo. An initial contingent of French troops would secure the city of Pec, with German forces taking Prizren, the British Pristina, the Italians heading into the north of Kosovo, and the United States moving toward Gnjilan in the East. Within Kosovo, the Yugoslav military was quitting the province, and the skill with which the Yugoslav army had concealed many of its assets was apparent as large numbers of military vehicles came out of hiding. Departing

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Serb forces continued to loot homes and businesses, and military and civilian convoys clogged the roads. The fleeing Serb civilians were reminiscent of the Kosovar Albanians who had been driven from their homes in the weeks and months before, but the Serbs enjoyed an important distinction—they were fortunate enough to leave with many of their possessions. Moscow continued to move forward with its mobilization. Incredibly, Hungary granted overflight clearance to the six Russian military transport planes. NATO's newest member had treated the request as a formality and not raised the matter in Brussels or reviewed it at their own senior political levels. However, the Ukrainians continued to delay granting clearance. If Russia wanted to avoid a major act of aggression against a neighbor state, it needed clearance from both nations to move the planes to Kosovo. Russian military planners scrambled to explore alternative routes for the planes as Moscow stepped up its diplomatic pressure on Kiev. The convoy of 186 Russian troops from Bosnia crossed the Drina River, entering Serbia around 10:30 local time—just as Talbott and his party departed Moscow. Yugoslav police and military officials made every effort to facilitate the Russian troop movement by keeping the roads free of retreating troops and refugees. In addition, Serb military officers reportedly rode in every third vehicle in case the convoy was somehow disrupted. Yugoslav citizens along the roadways cheered the light armored vehicles and trucks speeding toward Belgrade. Aboard the Air Force jet, the U.S. delegation got its first signal that something had gone seriously awry when they received an urgent message that General Clark needed to speak with Talbott. Soon a secure conference call was initiated from the plane that included Talbott, Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg, and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joe Ralston. That call was followed by a subsequent discussion between Sandy Berger in Washington, Albright in Macedonia, Talbott on the plane, and a number of other senior officials. All were shocked and angered by the developments, recognizing that the Russians might shatter the peace deal and lead to Kosovo's partition. Sandy Berger observed: My reaction: You don't have one goddamn minute to enjoy a victory in this business. You at least wanted to have a drink and have one night off. Instead, we went from one tense situation to another. We didn't know what the Rus-

244 * COLLISION COURSE sian intent was, and the information was conflicting as to where they were going, whether they would stop in Bosnia or go to the airport. I was very concerned that at the end of all this we not have a Berlin situation in Kosovo, with a Russian sector of Serbs and the very partition that we could have had at the beginning of all this if we had wanted. We thought it was very serious. Another White House official expressed Washington's reaction even more bluntly: "We were pissed as hell."

U-Turn II The mood on the Gulfstream jet had turned apprehensive. Berger pushed to have Talbott return immediately to Moscow, "raise hell," determine Russian intentions, and negotiate a final agreement on Russia's role in KFOR. With the decision made, Phil Goldberg informed the U.S. Air Force pilots flying the Gulfstream G-5 to return to Moscow and the plane executed a sharp bank over Novgorod, Russia. There was obvious irony in the plane's U-turn. When NATO had begun its bombing campaign, then-Russian Prime Minster Yevgeny Primakov had been flying to Washington for consultations with Vice President Gore and was forced to conduct a similar aerial maneuver. The team knew reporters would be quick to seize on the parallel, and several suggested an important difference: Primakov had turned around to break off discussions; they were returning to engage. It was small comfort. Just after noon in Macedonia, Albright spoke with Foreign Minister Ivanov in an edgy conversation. The secretary of state, having been informed of the Russian troop movement, raised strong objections. Ivanov countered, "There are no Russian forces in Kosovo." He maintained that Russia was eager to reach an accommodation with NATO, but the discussions had been halted by Talbott's departure. He felt the differences between Russia and NATO were largely political, not military. In an effort to calm the situation, Ivanov claimed, "Madeleine, there will be no surprises." Albright informed him that Talbott was returning to Moscow to resume talks, and Ivanov maintained that the Russian troops would not enter Kosovo without an agreement. He also argued that Russia needed to be granted its own sector— just as was being accorded the NATO powers. He felt that since Russian troops would not operate under NATO command, a separate Russian sector was only logical.

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 245 The secretary emphasized that it was unlikely that Russia would be given its own sector, but that the matter should be negotiated with Talbott and General Foglesong upon their return. She revisited the central dilemma—the Russian troops rolling across the Yugoslav interstate—and asked for further reassurances regarding their intentions. Ivanov replied that he "needed to get more information on the situation," but was firm in declaring that there were no immediate plans to enter Kosovo. In reality, Ivanov was likely to have been flying blind: Most indications were that he was in the dark about Trojan Horse. Ivanov was concerned that NATO would enter Kosovo before reaching an agreement with Moscow, effectively freezing Russia out of KFOR, and he pointed out that the demands paper had mandated a special role for Russian forces. Albright welcomed a Russian role but demanded that it be under a unified command, and she asked what General Ivashov knew about the situation. Ivanov said that he had spoken to Minister of Defense Sergeyev, who had indicated that the negotiators in the military-to-military talks had discussed several possibilities, including placing Russian forces in part of Pristina. Ivanov, playing wronged, said that the American military negotiators had arbitrarily dropped discussions of the Pristina option and then departed Moscow shortly thereafter. Albright asked who had authorized the movement of the Russian soldiers, and Ivanov indicated that President Yeltsin, as Russia's commander in chief, had ordered the move. He explained that Yeltsin thought there would be an agreement with NATO and wanted to be ready to move simultaneously with KFOR. Ivanov reminded Albright that Russia, unlike NATO, did not have forces stationed on the border and needed to take the necessary steps to be prepared to fulfill their commitment. Ivanov reiterated that the troops would not enter Kosovo, and said, "Madeleine, you can go back to visiting the refugees with peace of mind." He closed the conversation by stressing that Russia needed to be granted an equal role in Kosovo. A short time later Albright told reporters: The foreign minister said that he understood that there was to be a unified command; that was something that had been agreed to and was part of the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari document and then a part of the Security Council resolution with its annexes. He also said that this was a preliminary step so that if and when they become part of the international force they are ready to


deploy. They did not intend to deploy into Kosovo before an agreement about how they would fit in with the rest of the peace force. Based largely on the Albright—Ivanov conversation, Vice President Gore told Good Morning America, "We have been absolutely assured" that the Russians would not push the troops into Kosovo before command and control arrangements were reached. Despite the soothing comments, a sense of alarm gripped the Alliance. Talbott's delegation touched back down in Moscow just after two in the afternoon local time, and the motorcade carrying the delegation raced behind a police escort directly to the Russian foreign ministry. The cars pulled in the ministry's drive, but the group remained in the vehicles; it was not clear that Ivanov was available to receive them yet, because he was meeting with the Austrian foreign minister. One delegation member muttered, "Fuck you" in general direction of the ministry, then joked that the team could then return home after having sent out an official cable indicating, "Strong Message Delivered to Russians." Irritated with the delay in the face of a crisis, the team then rushed to the U.S. embassy, assembling in Ambassador Collins's office. On the wall behind Collins's desk hung a small gag gift from his staff—the Concern-ometer. The meter had two gauges, one that measured the level of concern in Washington, the other in Moscow. The implicit punchline: Washington was often up in arms for no apparent reason. However, as the U.S. officials contemplated how to respond to the Russian provocation, both dials of the Concern-o-meter were off the charts. As the team sat down, they were transfixed by the CNN live broadcast of the Russian convoy speeding down a Yugoslav highway. Jubilant Russian soldiers flashed three-fingered Serb victory salutes to crowds and many of the fifty vehicles in the convoy had their "SFOR" insignias from Bosnia sloppily painted over with "KFOR." A senior administration official later joked that it looked "like a bunch of guys on a fishing trip." However, as Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg pointed out, "It was a dangerous move, and by any conceivable motivation, threatened to undue the balance at a very sensitive time. People were very concerned that this was part of some deal that had been cut with Milosevic." Because of the sensitive nature of the deliberations, the team headed into the "tank"—the embassy's most secure facility, designed to be impervious to

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 247 electronic eavesdropping. Looking like a Gulfstream trailer wedged into a large room, the tank was cramped and uncomfortable, but invaluable for the purpose it served. Talbott and General Foglesong immediately made a series of secure telephone calls to Washington. Talbott spoke twice with Sandy Berger and Foglesong spoke with General Ralston of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the secure communications facility at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, it felt like the Cold War had returned with a vengeance. Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg commented, "There were obviously discussions about whether there were steps SFOR could take to block the Russian movement and whether there was some kind of military strategy there. Second, there was an awful lot of attention on blocking the air operation, because we were getting reports that transports were being prepared, and this was validated by the later Russian requests for overflight clearances." U.S. officials had gotten wind that the troops from Bosnia "might be an advance party for an airborne operation that would go into the Pristina airfield and potentially partition the country," as General Clark put it. Paratrooper reinforcements would make a Russian presence in Kosovo far more militarily significant than the small and lightly armed force moving across from Bosnia, and General Clark was of the opinion that NATO needed to beat the Russians to the punch. Gen. Joe Ralston called Clark and told him to refrain from launching a major military operation toward Slatina. "Send in a small element; this shouldn't be a military confrontation, just explain that this is for coordination and information flow. Of course, you'll have to tell the Serbs." Clark was concerned that if the force sent to the airport was too small, it "might be pushed aside by either the Serbs or the Russians." Clark then spoke with General Jackson, who said he had about 600 paratroopers ready to go and that he would inform the Serbs of his intent to move about an hour before they deployed toward the airport. Clark was still pushing for a more robust force to move to the airfield, perhaps including U.S. Marines, and the Pentagon seemed to support his proposal. Clark then spoke again with General Ralston at the Pentagon and told him that the NATO helicopters could lift off as quickly as thirty minutes. The U.S. military was increasingly convinced that the Russian military was acting on its own, like a coup "but worse" as Clark suggested. NATO's supreme commander recommended paratroopers immediately deploy to preemptively seize the Slatina


airbase, and frantic preparations were undertaken to finalize a counter operation. U.S. diplomatic and military officials in both Washington and at NATO headquarters scrambled to exert diplomatic pressure to prevent the Russians from receiving overflight clearances from the nations bordering Kosovo. The assistant secretary of state for Europe, Mark Grossman, placed a flurry of calls to American ambassadors and the foreign ministries in the region in effort to block the overflight requests, as did the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Sandy Vershbow. In Hungary, the U.S. charge quickly met with his Hungarian counterparts and was horrified to discover that, not only had the Russians requested overflight clearance, but the Hungarians had already granted it. The flight status of the Russian transport planes was unclear, and it was feared they might have already left Russia and entered Hungarian airspace. The Hungarian ministry of foreign affairs issued urgent instructions to block any flights that had not yet taken place. In Sofia, the U.S. embassy contacted the Bulgarian foreign ministry with its concern that the Russians might seek overflight clearance. The Bulgarians informed their U.S. counterparts that they had already told the Russians they should not bother seeking permission and that any approval process would be an extended one. In Ukraine, the issue was more complex. The Ukrainians told U.S. embassy officials that the Russians had indeed asked for clearance, but that it had not yet been granted. They were under a great deal of pressure from the Russians, and they noted that it was hard for them to deny access when Hungary—a NATO member—had already approved passage. U.S. officials did their best to dissuade the Ukrainians, who continued to uneasily straddle the fence. Back in Moscow, around five in the evening, the U.S. delegation proceeded to the Russian ministry of foreign affairs. As it was near the close of business on a Friday afternoon, the building's lobby was empty except for two security guards and two janitors scrubbing the marble floor with a foulsmelling cleaning solvent. Given the frantic atmosphere, the largely deserted ministry seemed oddly discordant. Foreign Minister Ivanov kept the group waiting while he fielded a number of telephone calls, including one that he later said was from President Yeltsin. Around 5:30 the meeting began on the fifth floor; the Russian negotiators were in a buoyant mood, dictating the pace of events for the first time during the war. Ivanov began the session by noting that in his earlier conversation with

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 249 Albright, the secretary had been under a mistaken impression that Russia had entered Kosovo when, in fact, Russia was merely pre-positioning its troops to allow for a synchronized entry. Russia would not move into Kosovo without an agreement with NATO, but the foreign minister was dismayed that the earlier discussions had produced little progress. Ivanov had told President Yeltsin that the remaining differences were largely political and had not been fully resolved either in the demands paper or the UN resolution. Ivanov expressed confidence the military teams could work out the logistics, but Minister of Defense Sergeyev had told him the options presented by the United States would subject Russia to NATO command. The Russian foreign minister complained, "Your scenario is that NATO will deploy into five sectors while negotiations with Russia are continuing—then NATO will already be in Kosovo and Russia will be left begging for entry. The United States needs to understand that what you are offering to Russia is demeaning." Asserting that Russia sought a peaceful agreement, not confrontation, the foreign minister argued for a role that would place the Russians on more equal footing— not in terms of the number of its forces or geographic control—but through joint leadership of the command and control structure. Talbott replied that the Russian troop movement had "created, at minimum, a perception problem that we need to address. It looks like Russia is moving unilaterally without an agreement with NATO, or is getting ready to do so, and it looks as though Russia is moving into Kosovo not as part of an international effort to protect all Kosovars, including Albanians, but as the protectors of the Serbs." He insisted such a move would "snatch defeat from the jaws of victory," and quickly change a "win-win" situation into a "win-lose" dynamic. The deputy secretary pressed Ivanov, "I want to confirm. Russia is preparing to go into Kosovo as part of an agreement with NATO—but not preparing to go in unilaterally. Correct?" "Yes," responded Ivanov. "In that case, me and my team are prepared to facilitate an agreement and to work with Russia to establish parameters acceptable both for Russia and for NATO." Talbott also expressed irritation with the fact that the Russian troops on C N N were flashing Serb victory signals—hardly the behavior of impartial peacekeepers—and he took exception to the suggestion that only "political" factors blocked a deal. He argued that Generals Foglesong and Casey had gone out of their way to accommodate Russian concerns and


pointed out that the military technical agreement granted General Jackson broad authority over all troops in Kosovo. Talbott proposed a two-part solution. First, the group would forge an interim agreement that would allow Russian forces to join KFOR's initial deployment in an orderly fashion. Such a joint deployment could take place quickly, and under this temporary arrangement Russian forces would operate in Kosovo using the same command and control arrangements that already governed the existing peacekeeping relationship in Bosnia. Second, the negotiators would finalize the details of Russia's long-term participation in KFOR. The two-track approach would allow peacekeepers to immediately move into Kosovo, while giving negotiators sufficient time to work out a fair overall plan. Talbott underscored that he was not asking Russia to violate its fundamental interests. The concept of unified command demanded that KFOR have a single commander and that this commander be a NATO officer. There had to be a NATO headquarters in every sector, and providing Russia with an independent sector would not be militarily effective. Within those constraints, there were ways to spare Russian forces from having to report directly to NATO: The Russians could answer to an intermediate commander from a non-NATO country who would serve as a liaison between the Russians and NATO command. Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev entered the room and passed a note to Ivanov. Ivanov read the missive and sharply queried Talbott, "Where are the Marines now? Are they in Greece?" Ivanov had heard NATO would imminently move into Kosovo; the Russians had perhaps even gotten wind of Clark's effort to scramble NATO paratroopers. It was a delicate question for Talbott—the last he had heard before entering the meeting was that General Clark was prepared to preemptively seize the Pristina airfield. Talbott had no way to know the status of the operation and argued, "I don't know the disposition of all Allied forces, nor is that issue relevant to our current discussion. KFOR is coming into Kosovo soon. There is no doubt, mystery, secrecy, or surprise about that fact. We have repeatedly told you that deployment would be on day two or three after the military technical agreement was signed, and we are now at day two."

Dueling Paratroopers Debates over how to respond to the Russian operation raged within NATO. General Clark and General Jackson were sharply split over Clark's plan to

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 251 have paratroopers seize the Slatina airfield. Clark's deputy, Gen. Rupert Smith, said that General Jackson had a number of concerns about the potential operation. Jackson argued that seizing the airport might spark a direct clash with the Russians or the Serbs and unravel the military technical agreement. He also feared that the Serbs might destroy the bridges along the route from Macedonia and isolate the NATO troops at Slatina. Jackson felt that the Russians posed little tactical threat, and NATO could work around them. General Jackson observed, "We were staring into a possibility, let me put it no more strongly than that, a possibility, of confrontation with the Russian contingent which seemed to me probably not the right way to start off a relationship with Russians who were to become part of my command." General Clark viewed the threat as more substantial, fearing that if the Russians seized the airfield and brought in reinforcements for the battalion from Bosnia, Moscow could wrest control of an important part of Kosovo. The Russians could station their forces in the North of the province, create a de facto partition, and use their military and intelligence presence to disrupt NATO operations. There was also speculation that Milosevic was eager to have the Russians seize control of the mines at Mitrovica and Trepca, an important source of income for Yugoslavia. A short time later, General Shelton spoke with General Clark, telling him, "The British want to hold." Secretary Cohen joined the telephone call and inquired what Clark's commanders thought of the operation; Clark replied, "They think it is high risk and so do I." Clark argued that he did not want to see the "operation prematurely canned." As he maintained, "It seemed to be up to the military to correct the Russian view by changing the facts on the ground, if we could." However, Clark soon learned that not only were the British uneasy with the operation, but the French had pulled their paratroopers from participating. Clark would need to scramble to find replacements, and General Jackson expressed reluctance to take the airfield without a full-strength contingent. NATO planners were also concerned that even if they took the airfield, the Russians could fly troops into Serbia proper and then simply travel overland to Kosovo. Adding to the sense of anxiety, Clark received a report that Russian planes had taken off and were attempting to enter Hungarian airspace. The battle over Russian overflights was at full pitch. The government of Hungary, having, in the words of a NATO diplomat, "screwed up," was greatly relieved to find that Russian planes had not already flown through its airspace. The Hungarians asked Russia for additional information and


maintained that it would be impossible to move forward until they had received a more detailed manifest. Reluctantly, the Russians informed Hungary that each of the six planes would be transporting 100 soldiers and their weapons. This led the Hungarians to insist that since troops were involved, they would need to secure parliamentary approval for the flights and to inform Moscow that it would not be possible to put the matter to lawmakers before June 15. At NATO headquarters, there were also concerns that the Russians might go ahead with overflights without clearance. It was not clear if the frontline states were prepared to intercept the Russians, although some might have felt obligated to try. At six in the evening in Kiev, officials of the Ukrainian ministry of foreign affairs informed the Russians that they approved overflight clearance, with a flight window of seventy-two hours. However, the Russian airborne troops still had no place to go; the Hungarian clearance had been revoked before Ukrainian approval had been secured. A fundamental element of Operation Trojan Horse was coming unglued, and it was no accident. As the prime ministers and foreign ministers of Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary wrestled with the question of overflight clearance, they made a conscious decision that their national interest was better served by assisting NATO than Moscow. Back at the ministry of foreign affairs in Moscow, the lengthy meeting between Talbott, Foglesong, and Ivanov ground on. Talbott reminded Ivanov that if an agreement could not be reached with Russia, KFOR had no choice but to deploy. Delaying deployment would be disastrous, making the need for an interim agreement on Russian participation imperative. Talbott stressed that negotiations over the final disposition of Russian forces could continue, and that Chernomyrdin had often spoken of a "zone of responsibility" for the Russians, not a separate sector. Ivanov replied, "If nothing is clear on the long-term option, Russia might only enter Kosovo to find that we are forced to withdraw. In that case, it would be better not to enter." Talbott asked if that meant the Russians were establishing a linkage—no interim arrangement without a long-term deal—and he argued that such a precondition would lead to diplomatic gridlock at a time when KFOR had to deploy. General Foglesong maintained that an agreement for an interim joint deployment could be worked out within hours or, at most, a few days. Russia and the United States would agree to collaboratively enter a selected geo-

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 253 graphic area, and the two countries would maintain a mutual presence while finalizing a long-term arrangement. The troops would live side by side, and both Russian and U.S. forces would be expected to handle tough duties. Such an arrangement would not prejudice the ultimate outcome of the talks and would prevent, as Foglesong put it, "the wrong people from getting shot." Turning to the long-term arrangement, Foglesong argued for unity of command, a principle he felt any soldier would endorse. One commander had to sit at KFOR's apex and the peacekeepers had to operate under shared rules. Foglesong suggested a model where Russian forces would report to a Russian deputy commander and Russian staff officers would serve with the KFOR commander—a similar but more far-reaching arrangement than in Bosnia. Foglesong argued that Russian proposals for a Russian sector with a Russian commander—who could reject orders from the KFOR commander—were unacceptable. Talbott added, "If there were an area in Kosovo where a Russian commander had ultimate control; that would lead to a bad result. The area would become a magnet for Serbs who wanted to live under the protection of Russia. That would include some good people, but also some bad people. It would also be a magnet for violent Albanians—KLA extremists, terrorists, and assassins. Milosevic would try to use this area as a cat's-paw or staging area for fifth column activities in Kosovo." The deputy secretary's bottom line: "We would prefer that Russia not come in at all, if you cannot find agreement with NATO. Of course, it would be better if Russia was in from the beginning, but this is up to Russia." The subtext was clear: the international community could not trust Russia to serve as an impartial peacekeeper. Ivanov observed that while Russia's arrangements with NATO worked fine in Bosnia, Kosovo was a different situation. He insisted that Russia did not want to create new problems because it already had enough of its own, including in Chechnya. He claimed to appreciate the importance of unity of command, and argued that while Russia wanted a sector, it did not demand to be the only force in the area and that NATO forces might even be permissible. The delegations took a break as Foglesong took a call from General Shelton, and Talbott relayed an update on the talks back to both the State Department and the National Security Council. As the meeting resumed, Talbott noted that he had passed on to both the secretary and the president


Ivanov's assurances that Russia would not unilaterally deploy. The meeting again paused as Ivanov stepped out to take a telephone call from Defense Minister Sergeyev. During the break, General Foglesong drew a diagram of a possible command structure for Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov and Ambassador Boris Mayorsky. Russian forces could report through a senior Finnish commander, and the Finns would report to General Jackson. The Russians, Finns, and a major NATO power, most likely the United States, would all operate in the same sector, and Moscow would be able to say Russian troops did not report directly to a NATO official, although the Finns would still be under the immediate command of Jackson. As Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov glanced at the chart he noted that he did not think Russia could put its troops under Finnish command and suggested that while Foglesong's efforts were well intentioned, they were too complex. Was it not possible "for NATO to find some small place" where Russian forces would not pose a danger? As Foglesong began to answer, Ivanov returned and asked to speak with Talbott alone for a moment, but the deputy secretary brought Foglesong along for the discussion. As the three men walked back into Ivanov's office, they agreed the Russian military needed to be brought into the discussions. The core U.S. delegation would go with Ivanov to the ministry of defense to continue negotiations. Talbott suggested that any final disputes might have to be resolved at the ministry of defense level, between Minister of Defense Sergeyev and Secretary of Defense Cohen, just as their respective predecessors, Secretary of Defense William Perry and Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, had negotiated the final arrangement for Bosnian peacekeeping. It was decided those U.S. delegation members not traveling to the ministry of defense would go out the front door of the foreign ministry to distract the large media contingent outside, as Talbott, Foglesong, Casey, Nuland, Goldberg, and Ambassador Collins were spirited out the back of the building. A little after eight in the evening, the other U.S. team members ducked into waiting cars with a wave of the hand and a round of no comments, as Ivanov's motorcade sped toward the ministry of defense. In Macedonia, General Clark still had paratroopers on a fifteen-minute standby to rush to the Slatina airfield, but he continued to find political approval for the operation elusive. At the ministry of defense, Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev, Army Chief of Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, General Ivashov, and several other senior officers

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 255 joined Ivanov and the U.S. delegation. Sergeyev, the sixty-one-year-old overweight defense minister with wispy white hair was generally regarded in the West as a relatively pragmatic interlocutor, although he was deeply angered by the NATO bombing campaign. Sergeyev, born in eastern Ukraine, had served in the military for more than thirty-five years and was far from the picture of health, with his weight, drinking, stress, and heavy smoking all taking a toll. He was a confident and intelligent negotiator, and, although willing to compromise in a relaxed atmosphere, he was known to grow more stubborn when surrounded by hard-liners such as General Ivashov. Ivanov opened the session by observing the situation was of deep concern to the presidents of Russia and the United States. "We are at an important moment. This is going to be a lengthy operation, so it's important that it be right, that it be thought through from day one. It is not in anybody's interest to allow a conflict between us because there is already a conflict going on in Kosovo. The international security force has to create security, not become a cause of insecurity. This is a critical moment; NATO is getting ready to deploy." "It has started deploying," insisted Defense Minister Sergeyev. Ivanov continued, "We have two options, either independent deployment or we reach an agreement to act in coordination and synchronize our actions. It would be best if things were coordinated; it would send the right signal." Ivanov had quickly abandoned the notion that Russian forces would not enter Kosovo without an agreement. Ivanov argued that participation needed to be equitable and that, while Russia respected NATO's rules, it had its own policies regarding subordination of its military. Ivanov urged the group to move forward quickly because NATO's deployment would soon make further negotiations senseless. Talbott countered: Russia's role should be equitable, responsible, and the peacekeeping force should be effective. Effectiveness is the only standard motivating the plan that we will put before you. I like the Russian word "' bezopastnosf—it means absence of danger. The objective is to eliminate danger for every inch of Kosovo for the returnees and for the peacekeepers themselves. From the political, diplomatic, and military perspectives, that is the standard we have brought to bear in reviewing all aspects of the operation. There is only one thing that


Minister Ivanov has said that gives me pause and that's the possibility of an independent deployment. Foglesong returned to the two-tier approach: First reach an interim arrangement for the Russian forces already on the ground, allowing the United States and Russia to jointly deploy in a nearly simultaneous operation, and then resolve the ground rules for broader Russian integration into KFOR. Foglesong gestured to a copy of the command chart that Sergeyev was holding, "I want to note the urgency with which we are approaching this issue. You know that usually our military presents beautifully printed colored charts. Not this time. This time we have something done by hand." Sergeyev wanted to know, "Will Russia be given its own sector?" Talbott replied that there were sectors in which Russia could responsibly participate, but Sergeyev insisted that unless each country had a sector where its soldiers were fully responsible, they would bear "no responsibility." Sergeyev asked whether Russia would have a chance to participate in KFOR's planning and senior decision-making—what he called "equal rights"—and noted that the UN resolution did not mandate that Russian forces be dispersed across sectors. The peacekeeping relationship needed to be determined by a political decision between NATO and Russia, and Sergeyev then returned to Ivanov's earlier formulation: If a fair agreement could be reached, Russia would participate; if they were unsatisfied, they would not become part of KFOR. Adding comments in a loud and authoritative tone, the chief of staff of the army, Kvashnin, insisted that the operation would only be equal if Russia was included in KFOR's senior leadership. Kvashnin enjoyed close ties to Yeltsin, and the fifty-two-year-old general had risen quickly through the military ranks. However, he had a relatively poor reputation among many military observers who questioned his abilities, particularly after his performance as overall commander of Russia's first offensive against Chechnya, where he had combined appallingly heavy-handed tactics with shortsighted strategic judgments. Despite his unpopularity, Kvashnin was steadily growing in power and was increasingly assertive in challenging the authority of Defense Minister Sergeyev. As with a number of other senior military officials, his disposition toward engagement with the West had seriously dimmed after Operation Desert Fox against Iraq and the onset of the Kosovo campaign. As the first

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 257 general staff chief born after World War II, Kvashnin had worked his way up through the ranks commanding tank units and presented a stark contrast to many of his fellow generals in one respect: As a former champion bicyclist, he remained in good physical condition. Sergeyev echoed Kvashnin's sentiment, arguing Russia needed to have a hand in the planning and execution of KFOR operations. In essence, Sergeyev and Kvashnin were pleading for Russia to enjoy the same rights as a full NATO member, with a veto over military operations. Neither Talbott nor Foglesong considered such an idea even remotely acceptable. Foglesong, after joking that he had seen more of Ivashov than he had seen of his wife in the preceding weeks, argued that he was putting a proposal on the table that combined a genuine compromise of elements favored by both Russia and NATO. Sitting next to Sergeyev, he patiently walked the minister of defense through the details of his schematic: a sector with a neutral commander, a Russian area of responsibility, and the presence of a major NATO country. Russia, by retaining its national command, would have the right to refuse an order if it perceived carrying out any specific mission ran counter to its best interests. In such a case, the sector commander would authorize another national contingent to perform the task. Foglesong maintained, "It is possible they are going to fire me for proposing some of this stuff." "Why?" asked Sergeyev. "Well, the chairman wants NATO command only in all the sectors. As I said, there are parts you won't like and parts that Clark won't like." Foglesong's statement was not entirely empty rhetoric; Clark had expressed considerable irritation with the concessions that NATO had made to Russia in forging the peace agreement at the Petersberg. General Ivashov added, "Yes, I can see some concessions here. But why can't we have a sector where there is a Russian commander and a Finn as a deputy?" "I could never convince NATO of that," said General Foglesong. At that point, both Ministers Sergeyev and Ivanov were called out of the room to take a phone call. General Ivashov continued the debate: "The Finns are sending only 600 people. Russia will have several thousand, so it's not fair for us to work under them." General Kvashnin argued that it was unacceptable to have a sector commander who had far fewer troops giving Russia orders. Then Kvashnin too was called from the room. Talbott told the remaining Russians he needed to huddle with his delegation. The Ameri-


can side took a break around 9:30 at night, placed a number of telephone calls, and compared notes. The group learned that Sergeyev and Ivanov had gone to see President Yeltsin. In Pristina, Kosovo, a local television station announced that Russian troops would soon be arriving. Several thousand Serbs began to fill Pristina's main square, near the Grand Hotel, in anticipation.

The Last Inch of the Last Mile Around 10:30 in Moscow, Sergeyev and Ivanov returned from meeting with Yeltsin, and Ivanov explained, "We just had a long conversation with the president. He is very concerned. He wants a Russian sector with a Russian commander. He thinks that is equitable participation." While there are no fully reliable accounts of President Yeltsin's actions at the late-night meeting, it was clear that Yeltsin had expressed enough support for Operation Trojan Horse that the Russian military felt that it now had approval to take the Slatina airbase. Decision-making for one of the world's most powerful military machines was operating under the loosest possible civilian authority. The Russian foreign minister, likely fully aware of the operation's intention for the first time, asked Talbott to inform President Clinton that Russia would not insert its troops into Kosovo before NATO, but that if NATO deployed, Russia would follow closely behind and then continue negotiations on a final arrangement. An aide came in to tell Sergeyev that there was another call from Yeltsin, and the minister of defense left the room. The deputy secretary stressed that NATO had always been willing to take "no" for an answer and it was acceptable if the Russians did not wish to participate in Kosovo. However, he continued, if Russian forces deployed without securing an agreement it would be "a very serious problem" and provide "an unhappy surprise ending to a drama that everybody thought would have a happy ending." Talbott stressed that Clinton and Yeltsin had maintained solid relations throughout the war; they should be able to cooperate on the peace. Talbott rattled off several quick points concerning the Russian proposals. A Russian commander in charge of a sector would be at odds with unity of command. What Moscow called equitable and responsible was really a split in KFOR's overall authority. The United States had been clear: NATO at

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 259 the core had never meant two separate commands. Ivanov drew two circles on a piece of paper, arguing that KFOR could have two commands, but since they would be joint commands the unity of command would be preserved. Talbott countered, "In effect, you're talking partition." Talbott told the Russians that the proposal on the table was the best NATO could offer. He stressed that an area of responsibility was "the last inch of the last mile we can go to meet your president halfway. We haven't been playing games here." Both delegations were dog-tired and visibly irritated. The deputy secretary argued the situation would become dire if Russia launched a synchronized deployment that placed NATO and Moscow at loggerheads. "I heard earlier about the possibility of confrontation from the Russian side by a noncooperative deployment. I'm not going to use that word myself unless I am under instructions from the president to use it. But such is the seriousness with which we take the possibility of confrontation between our countries." He declared that any rash unilateral move would carry high costs. Talbott noted that it was odd that the Russians, who had raised the issue of a security vacuum so many times, would tell NATO to not be concerned about the prospect of two independent and uncoordinated forces sweeping into Kosovo. Sergeyev claimed Talbott had mischaracterized his position. He said Russia was offering to deploy as simultaneously as possible, not literally, and to use their time to work on a longer-term solution. Ivanov acknowledged the situation was complex and again maintained that Russia would not be the first to enter Kosovo. He insisted that the commitment came directly from President Yeltsin, but he did not back down from the plan for a synchronized deployment if an agreement could not be reached. Ivanov suggested they explore the details for an interim joint deployment, and Talbott illustrated the concept by putting one hand on top of the other and moving them both forward. If the Russians were to agree to such a strategy, the forces would enter the province side by side, not from different directions, and closely coordinate their activities. Kvashnin countered that such an effort could only take place in a command structure where General Jackson had a Russian deputy and proportional Russian representation on his planning staff. The Russian Army chief of staff argued that by fully integrating Russia into KFOR's senior decision-making, Russian peacekeepers would never be placed in a situation where they were uncomfortable with their mission.


Foglesong explained that a Russian deputy for General Jackson was unacceptable because it would blur NATO's political control of the operation. General Casey again suggested the Russian battalion join U.S. forces in their sector with responsibility for largely Serb areas. Ivanov quickly rejected the idea and Ivashov claimed the Serbs would simply leave Kosovo as the KLA returned. General Casey insisted the Serbs would not need to depart, because U.S. and Russian soldiers would be there to protect them. The Russians called for a break in the negotiations at twenty minutes after midnight on Saturday, June 12, and someone observed that it was now National Day, Russia's version of the Fourth of July. The talks resumed at 1:10 in the morning. Talbott sought clarification on Russian intentions, indicating KFOR would deploy the next day as planned and asking if Russian forces would subsequently enter Kosovo without an agreement. Sergeyev replied that Russia's deployment would indeed be synchronized, but that they were willing to "negotiate the boundaries" to ensure that troops did not bump into each other, noting, "Simultaneous entry doesn't have to mean entry in the same place. Why don't we enter from the north, you enter from the south, and we can agree where to meet. You set the boundary." "That is partition," argued Talbott. "Why?" "Look, we are making history here for better or worse. Are we serious about this or not?" a frustrated Talbott asked the defense minister. "We're serious." "If Russia is to move into one part and the U.S. and NATO into another, this crosses our most dangerous line. We can't have partition. Our goal is not to divide Kosovo but as soon as we set a line, as soon as a line is drawn, we have partition. All the Serbs will pour into the Russian sector." "No they won't," claimed Ivanov. "Let's just agree on the line," suggested Sergeyev. "No," countered Talbott. Talbott pointed out that Foreign Minister Ivanov had provided repeated guarantees to both Albright and Secretary-General Solana that Russia would not take such an action. Ivanov objected, "That's not quite right. When Madeleine called she said Russian forces were already in Kosovo. I said they were not in Kosovo; they were being deployed so that they would be ready to enter. We won't do

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 261 anything that surprises NATO. I didn't speak about what happens after NATO deploys." Sergeyev, trying to calm the situation, indicated that the two sides would work things out. Talbott was not placated—there were no signs anything had been resolved. The deputy secretary stressed the Russian flip-flop risked unleashing "a whole new dimension of the Kosovo crisis and a crisis of U.S.Russian relations." He suggested that President Clinton might have to call President Yeltsin despite the late hour. Back in Washington, the White House had decided to delay NATO's entry into Kosovo, hoping that the extra time would allow more time to resolve the situation with the Russians. According to General Clark, "I protested the idea of a delay, but there was nothing to be done. The decision had been made." In Moscow, Colonel Bourne passed General Foglesong a note: CNN was reporting the Russian troops were in Belgrade. Foglesong informed the group of the news, including the fact that Serbs in Kosovo were waving Russian flags and celebrating the anticipated arrival of Russian troops in the streets of Pristina. Russian Gen. Viktor Zavarzin, Moscow's former liaison to NATO, took command of the column of troops as they entered the Yugoslav capital. Zavarzin's orders from the ministry of defense in Moscow: Advance the convoy to the Kosovo border and await further instruction. Sergeyev lashed back at Foglesong in the best Soviet style: The movement of Russian peacekeeping forces to the border of Kosovo is completely in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution. The border has not been crossed. There are no Russian peacekeepers in Belgrade. There aren't any, and weren't any, in Belgrade. I thought only Russian television lies. We haven't violated anything. Our entry will be synchronized; I confirm what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. Everything they said was right. So somebody waves some flags. Making the scene even more surreal, Foreign Minister Ivanov asked Sergeyev whether the Russian military had made any decision to deploy. Sergeyev said that the military did not intend to act without agreeing on an approach, leading Talbott to ask with whom the Russian military would be reaching such an agreement. Sergeyev indicated that he was seeking agreement with NATO, but reiterated if NATO went in, so would Russia. Talbott


countered the situation had the makings of the worst crisis between Russia and the United States in years. The defense minister stressed the UN resolution neither mentioned NATO nor gave it the right to make all the decisions, and General Foglesong replied that the Yugoslavs had signed the military technical agreement and given NATO the authority to do its job. Talbott argued if the two sides did not reach an interim agreement, it was difficult to imagine how confrontation on the ground could be avoided. It was almost two in the morning. In Yugoslavia, General Zavarzin ordered his troops to cross from Serbia into Kosovo. Russia had gone in without an agreement, and almost immediately major disputes erupted within the Russian military. Startled Russian ministry of defense officials ordered Zavazrin to move his troops back into Serbia, but General Zavarzin insisted that he had orders from higher-ranking officials to seize the Slatina airbase. General Kvashnin had ordered the troops to continue moving forward—without consulting Defense Minister Sergeyev. Russia was again at odds with itself and the world. Far from being punished for his actions, General Zavarzin would be promoted later that same day. Back in Moscow, Minister Sergeyev was being blindsided, unaware his forces had entered Kosovo, and he continued to debate the merits of a joint deployment. Talbott insisted the situation was so precarious they needed to reach an understanding before they left the table, leading Sergeyev to insist that he was in complete understanding of the military situation. Ivanov decried that the group was losing precious time, he too unaware that Russian troops had already entered Kosovo. Talbott indicated he would telephone the president and National Security Advisor Berger and advise them both of his strong objections to Russian plans. He suggested the situation on the ground in Kosovo—Serbs waving Russian flags in Pristina, violent Kosovar Albanians waving KLA banners— was ready to explode. The deputy secretary asked for a "leap of faith" on the Russian's part: Hold back on a unilateral deployment, work out an agreement for an interim deployment, and NATO would minimize the time between KFOR's arrival and the introduction of Russian forces into the U.S. zone. Foglesong suggested NATO dispatch a plane from Europe with planners on board who would pick up several Russian military authorities and fly

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 263 them to Macedonia to begin planning for an initial joint deployment. Then the Russians could return to Moscow that evening, and Sergeyev could issue orders for Russian participation under a tentative agreement. Sergeyev agreed, and told Foglesong to go ahead and arrange for a plane. Sergeyev said he would notify his staff and that Russian commanders would do nothing without direct orders. Ivanov called a short pause in the talks, and General Ivashov turned to Toria Nuland, the only woman in the talks, and said, "Why are you torturing yourself with this? Let the men handle it." Nuland, one of the rising stars of the U.S. Foreign Service, was unfazed. Discussions broke until shortly after three in the morning. Upon resumption, Ivanov grimly announced, "It's not good news. We have reports that KFOR is deploying." "It's not true," replied Foglesong. "From Albania and Macedonia," added Sergeyev. "Unless General Shelton just misled me, it's not true. I will call again to the chairman and Wes Clark and check," insisted Foglesong. Sergeyev was adamant that he had "verified and cross checked" his own information. "It's your 'spetznatz, your special forces that are going in." Colonel Bourne was summoned to place calls to Generals Clark and Shelton to reconfirm that KFOR had not deployed. However, both NATO and Russian elements were in Kosovo by this point. While most press accounts at the time credited Russia with being the first to enter the province, a small vanguard of NATO Special Forces spotters had entered Kosovo under the cover of darkness—ahead of Trojan Horse. While the main body of KFOR had yet to deploy, the Russians were accurate in accusing NATO of having moved into Kosovo. As one participant in the talks observed, the Russians, "defined that as movement. Whether you say we were lying to each other, or the definitions were different, it hardly matters; they were determined to move when we moved. Since the information chain was all intelligence driven, that was enough of a trigger for the Russians." Indeed, General Ivashov would maintain that one of the main reasons that Yeltsin had not objected to moving troops in Kosovo was that his senior military advisors told him that U.S. Special Forces had already entered Kosovo. Generals Foglesong and Casey were summoned out of the room to take a telephone call. When they returned, Foglesong declared that the Joint Chiefs had confirmed that the NATO deployment was not underway. Foglesong


was ready to dispatch a NATO plane to take General Casey and Russian officers to Macedonia to negotiate a joint deployment. Both Ivanov and Sergeyev were then called out of the room, and when they returned, the minister of defense reiterated his support for sending a small team to Macedonia to work on the immediate deployment plan. He also indicated he would have to report to Yeltsin on the matter. Ivanov suggested Foglesong should have a plane in Moscow by ten in the morning and Sergeyev asked if he would be able to tell President Yeltsin that there was progress on the issues of KFOR's command structure and the matter of a Russian sector. Foglesong noted it was difficult situation, but that he would not be able to sell a Russian sector to either NATO or his own government. "This was something out of a novel," confided one of the U.S. negotiators: We are sitting in the Soviet-era defense ministry, with the Soviet-era general staff, led by the defense minister himself, Marshall Sergeyev, and the Army chief of staff, Kvashnin, and they were talking about the deployment. We kept getting reports the troops were on the move, but also assurances from the Russians that nothing would happen. Then at the very end, when we thought we were almost done for the evening, we got the call from Steinberg who was watching it all unfold on CNN. It was almost four in the morning. Talbott's Chief of Staff Phil Goldberg, entered the room, speaking on his cellular phone with Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg, and Goldberg passed Talbott a hastily scribbled note. Russian troops had arrived in Pristina, and CNN was broadcasting the news around the globe. The column of fifty Russian military vehicles was greeted by thousands of cheering Kosovar Serbs throwing flowers and firing guns into the air. Serb civilians and Yugoslav soldiers joyously joined the celebrations as the crowd chanted, "We and the Russians, we are 300 million." Talbott read Goldberg's note aloud. Sergeyev denied it. However, his denial was undercut by the fact that he immediately called for a pause in the talks as he, Ivanov, and Kvashnin hurried from the room. Talbott demanded an explanation from one of the Russian generals who served as an assistant to Minister Sergeyev. The general left the room seeking an answer. From down the hall, the U.S. delegation could hear shouting between Sergeyev

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 265 and Kvashnin. Sergeyev was furious that Kvashnin had given approval for the Russian troops to enter Kosovo without his knowledge. He wanted the Russian forces to hold at the border and deploy concurrently with the main body of KFOR. Kvashnin, and elements loyal to him, had countermanded those orders and commanded General Zavarzin to push into Pristina ahead of NATO. It was a remarkably dangerous moment. Just as NATO's two most senior officers, General Clark and General Jackson, were experiencing rising tensions over possibly intercepting the Russian troops headed for the airport, Russia's two most senior military officers, Minister Sergeyev and General Kvashnin, were screaming at each other about pushing toward the airport. Never had the two respective chains of command looked more fragile, and not since the Cold War had the potential for disastrous miscommunication between NATO and Russia run such a high risk of violence. The tensions between Sergeyev and Kvashnin were long running. Sergeyev had risen to minister of defense from his former position as head of Russia's strategic rocket forces, which controlled much of the nation's nuclear arsenal. In 1998, Sergeyev had launched an effort to establish a unified command over Russia's land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear weapons. The proposed head of the new nuclear forces command was to be Vladimir Yakolev, Sergeyev's successor as head of the rocket forces and a close ally. This expensive new command architecture would have come at a time when the conventional armed forces, to which Kvashnin was allied, were already underbudgeted. Kvashnin and his army colleagues viewed Sergeyev's move as a blatant power grab, particularly since it would cut them largely out of the chain of command over nuclear forces. Thus, the insubordinate push to Pristina was doubly blessed in Kvashnin's mind: it would embarrass both NATO and his chief rival within the Russian military while providing an opportunity to demonstrate the utility of conventional forces in high-stakes geopolitics. Several minutes later, Sergeyev's aide returned to the room and told U.S. negotiators that the minister had asked him to inform Talbott that no information was available on the situation. Talbott insisted a nonanswer was unacceptable. The international media was broadcasting live footage of Russian troops entering Pristina; it was highly unlikely that the minister of defense had no thoughts on the matter. The general left to relay the information. He was not seen again. The U.S. delegation retired to a side room. Talbott spoke to Albright on


the phone, and she reacted to the news by exclaiming, "God in heaven! Why can't someone get control of those people?" Talbott was unsure if the comment was a personal rebuke. Around five in the morning, Foreign Minister Ivanov, looking stunned, strode into the room, nervously snapping his fingers by his side. The foreign minister announced, "I regret to inform you that a column of Russian soldiers crossed the border accidentally into Kosovo and orders have been given for them to be out within two hours. The minister of defense and I agree on this." Ivanov then asked for a one-on-one meeting with Talbott. From what Talbott could see and hear, it appeared that the timing of the troop movement into Pristina had caught both Ivanov and Sergeyev—two of the most powerful figures in the Russian government—flat-footed. Speaking with Berger and Steinberg on a cell phone as he sat with Ivanov, the deputy secretary insisted Ivanov make a public statement acknowledging the deployment was an error and that the troops would be pulled back. After some discussion, they agreed to put Ivanov in contact with CNN so he could issue a statement. Tellingly, the senior Russian military leadership—Sergeyev, Kvashnin, and Ivashov—did not return to the negotiating table. Ivanov and Talbott emerged from their private meeting, and they began to draft the statement the Russian foreign minister would read to CNN. Ivanov had no staff of his own to help or advise him, and he cut a uniquely solitary figure. Toria Nuland gave him some assistance, and they arrived at a two-part formulation. First, Ivanov would announce that U.S. and Russian military teams would meet in Macedonia later in the day to discuss the issue of a joint deployment. Second, Ivanov would tell CNN, "In connection with the information regarding the appearance of Russian military personnel in Pristina, unfortunately this did take place. We're in the process of clarifying how this happened. The military will be given an order to leave Kosovo immediately." Working through the State Department Operations Center, the American team connected Ivanov with C N N in Atlanta, who verified the delegation's identity by calling back to Nuland's cell phone. After making the confirmation, they put Ivanov on the air live, with an interpreter on a different phone. It was an unlikely moment: the State Department Operations Center patching the Russian foreign minister through to CNN to make a live statement

DECEPTION AND CONFRONTATION * 267 disavowing the actions of his own military. Having read his statement, a very dispirited Ivanov escorted the U.S. delegation out of the defense ministry at 5:20 in the morning into the patchy first light of day—nine and a half hours of talks at the ministry of defense had collapsed in deception, disarray, and animosity.


10

CHAPTER

A Creeping Coup?

National Day Back in Washington, a series of emergency meetings were held at the White House. NATO, having seen the Russians go into Pristina, quickly reversed its decision to delay entering Kosovo. General Shelton called General Clark indicating Sandy Berger "has reviewed the situation and changed his mind. Go ahead and enter." KFOR had its green light. The national security team was deeply troubled by Talbott's reports. Shouting matches between Russian military officials and the painful confusion within the Russian government had sparked fears that Yeltsin's government was slipping off the rails—and taking civilian control of the Russian military along with it. Russia and NATO were lurching toward confrontation in Kosovo. After much discussion, the team decided there was little choice but to take Ivanov at his word that the Russian troops would be pulled back, while stepping up pressure within the region to deny Russia air access for reinforcements. Joe Lockhart, the White House Press Secretary, was dispatched to tell reporters, "As Foreign Minister Ivanov has said, it was an unfortunate mistake, and the Russian troops will be withdrawn immediately." As Ivanov declared to C N N that the Russian operation was a mistake, Defense Minister Sergeyev and General Kvashnin engaged in an intense de269


bate as to whether Russian troops should complete the next phase of Trojan Horse: moving from Pristina to seize the Slatina airbase. Eventually they determined the Russian troops should indeed take Slatina, and within hours the troops occupied the airfield. General Zavarzin, who was with the troops, was given strict orders not to engage in any negotiations with any KFOR troops that arrived at the airfield; further talks were to be left to the Ministry of Defense. On June 12, two hours after Talbott and the others departed the ministry of defense in Moscow (5:20 local time in Macedonia), NATO began its main deployment with British paratroopers in Chinook helicopters leading armored units into Kosovo. As column after column of tanks and trucks rolled across the border, advance units leapfrogged ahead by air to Pristina. It would be almost ten hours after KFOR's initial entry that U.S. ground troops pushed into Kosovo. Just as the Russians had been greeted by cheering Serbs, raucous Kosovar Albanians welcomed NATO. British forces met no resistance as they pushed overland toward Pristina, although they were slowed by the fear of mines. As KFOR started pushing into the province, only some 4,000 of the total 40,000 Yugoslav forces had withdrawn from Kosovo, consequently, Yugoslav, KLA, NATO, and Russian forces were commingled in a strange military stew. In some locations, Serb troops even traveled side by side with KFOR, hoping NATO's presence would deter KLA reprisals. NATO was still debating how best to respond to the Russian provocation. One White House official commented, "One of the concerns that we had was that there were some indications that the Serb forces might stay behind to support the Russians. So we thought, 'Will the Serb forces use this as a basis to stop pulling out? NATO is only partially deployed. Then what? Have we bought into a partition? What will be the KLA's reaction?'" That morning there were also indications of a second group of Russians preparing to leave Bosnia to move to the airfield at Pristina. In Moscow, a U.S. Air Force plane met General Casey and several Russian officers at ten in the morning, but due to some problems in securing overflight clearances the plane did not depart for Macedonia until about one in the afternoon. The group was charged with beginning to sort out the interim peacekeeping arrangements between Moscow and KFOR, but Defense Minister Sergeyev was not about to have more junior officers negotiate Moscow's endgame. Talbott and the team got little in the way of sleep, and by ten in the morn-

A CREEPING COUP? it 271 ing, most of delegation had straggled into the deputy secretary's hotel suite bleary and rueful. Ambassador Collins joined them a short time later. The ambassador had seen a number of senior Russian officials at National Day ceremonies that morning, and he agreed that Trojan Horse had caught Ivanov totally off guard. Ivanov was so angry at his treatment that he had tendered his resignation, which had not been accepted. Collins had also run into Prime Minister Stepashin and National Security Advisor Putin at the event, and both had denied prior knowledge of the operation—although given their ties to the intelligence community, their denials were taken with a grain of salt. Throughout the day, speculation continued to intensify about Yeltsin's role in Trojan Horse. Sergei Prikhodko, a member of the Kremlin foreign policy staff, told C N N that Yeltsin had authorized the troop movement while leaving the timing up to the military. While the Kremlin was eager to put its cachet on the Slatina operation, the Russian media was rife with rumors that the Russian military had acted independently. Foreign Minister Ivanov told the press that rumors the Russian military had dispatched troops without Yeltsin's authorization were "baseless speculation," but acknowledged that his own ministry had largely been kept in the dark about the operation: "To a certain extent it was a surprise. . . . But at the same time, it should not be astonishing because in the end the foreign minister does not need to follow such tactical questions, troop moves, on a minute-to-minute basis." Russian public reaction to the operation was enthusiastic. The defiant gesture generated a rush of nationalism, demonstrated that Yeltsin was not soft toward the West, and sparked a measure of pride that Russia could still catch mighty NATO unprepared. Vladimir Zhrinovsky said that he saw Yeltsin at the National Day ceremonies and "the president was very happy." However, there were also skeptical undertones, with a number of Russian observers pointing out that little would change in Kosovo as a result of Trojan Horse. The Russian defense ministry publicly announced that 1,000 paratroopers were on alert, and Interfax quoted Russian diplomatic and military sources as saying that an additional contingent of soldiers would be airlifted to Pristina through Ukrainian and Bulgarian airspace. NATO diplomats put on a fullcourt press to ensure that Moscow was unable to secure the clearances it so desired. In Bulgaria, the Russian embassy attempted to pass a diplomatic note to the government requesting an air corridor, but officials refused to


take receipt of the note, saying that it was improperly formatted. The Bulgarians also indicated clearance would require parliamentary approval and confirmation that the deployment was undertaken within part of a broader command and control agreement with NATO. Bulgaria, like Hungary, was sealed off. Within NATO, military officials were still debating the hardest question: Should NATO or the frontline states fire on Russian planes violating airspace? At 2:30, Talbott met with Ivanov at the foreign ministry. Ivanov was chagrined and angered by the events of the night before, calling it "the worst day of his life." Talbott pointed out that it had not been a particularly enjoyable episode for him either, leading the Russian foreign minister to suggest that NATO's anger over the Slatina operation amounted to only a fraction of the injuries suffered by Russia during the bombing campaign. In a subdued conversation, Talbott suggested that since Ivanov and Secretary Albright had worked effectively in forging the UN resolution, it might be appropriate for them to work out the details of Russian participation in KFOR in the days that would follow. Reflecting instructions from Washington, Talbott proposed the discussions between the foreign ministers be carried out in conjunction with talks between Secretary of Defense Cohen and Minister of Defense Sergeyev. They also discussed the timing of a number of high-level calls. Vice President Gore would speak with Prime Minister Stepashin around 5:30 Moscow time, and eventually President Clinton would speak with President Yeltsin. After hearing Talbott's account of events at the ministry of defense, the Clinton administration was eager for some assurances that the civilian leadership was intact. After telling Washington they did not know who was in charge in Moscow, U.S. officials wanted, as one negotiator acknowledged, to "make sure Yeltsin was awake, dried out, whatever—that was the reason for wanting to place the call." Vice President Gore spoke with Prime Minister Stepashin later in the day, saying he was calling because of the urgent situation and because Clinton and Yeltsin were now scheduled to speak to each other the next day. Gore said that events had the potential to undermine all of the joint achievements of Russia and the United States and noted that, after repeated assurances from Ivanov to the contrary, Russian forces had deployed unilaterally. Despite Ivanov's statement to CNN, the troops had not been withdrawn, Russia was continuing its attempts to reinforce its troops, and C N N was

A CREEPING COUP? * 273

reporting that President Yeltsin had approved the deployment. The vice president insisted that unless all the matters were clarified, Russia and NATO might directly clash. He urged the Russians to accept the two-track approach repeatedly forwarded by Talbott and Foglesong the night before. While a joint short-term deployment would not be a permanent solution, it would demonstrate that the two nations were working together. He also sought a vow from Stepashin that Russia would not deploy additional troops without NATO agreement. Stepashin offered something of a nonapology apology, expressing regret that the UN resolution had not spelled out all the details for military cooperation. The Russian maintained that working out an agreement on a Russian sector would be the most important factor in securing a deal and he urged that the situation not be overdramatized. Gore did not find Stepashin's reassurances comforting but welcomed Stepashin's suggestion that Yeltsin was not the force behind the deployment. Gore noted that before confidence and trust could be rebuilt Russia had to deal with the consequences of its actions. He urged Moscow to make a public statement clarifying the many conflicting signals. It was an unusual situation. U.S. officials were encouraging the Russian government to declare that that their own military had acted without presidential authority. It was a quandary. If Yeltsin ordered the move, the United States had to accept that Yeltsin himself was becoming more dangerous and unpredictable within an already deeply dysfunctional government; If Yeltsin didn't order the move, civilian authority over a large, nuclear-capable military was in question. Stepashin argued that the decision to deploy Russian troops had been made through ministry of defense channels, and the government would provide adequate explanation. Gore was persistent and stressed that with the flurry of contradictory statements out of Moscow, the world was left speculating as to who was in control of Russia's vast military, gravely harming Russia's international standing. Stepashin, in a flash of honesty, admitted that much of the misunderstanding was caused by the deep strains inflicted during the effort to reach a peace agreement. He pleaded for time to sort things out. Gore acknowledged he sounded "like a broken record," but again stressed the world needed to know Russia's system of command and control was intact. The frustrating conversation and deep ambiguity in Moscow had


done nothing to reduce Washington's fears that Yeltsin's government was coming apart at the seams. A little after five in the evening, Moscow time, the U.S. delegation met again with Russian National Security Advisor Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin. Talbott began by noting the Russian deployment "had shaken the confidence of the U.S. government regarding Russia's word on matters of importance," and he quickly ticked off the many contradictory Russian statements and actions during the previous forty-eight hours. Talbott claimed that since the Russian deployment had not been coordinated with NATO, and the military technical agreement gave General Jackson wide authority over all troop movements in Kosovo, the Alliance would be reasonable in insisting the Russian troops pull out of Kosovo before eventually being redeployed as part of KFOR, particularly since Foreign Minister Ivanov had publicly announced that the Russian troops would be withdrawn after they had had "mistakenly" crossed into Kosovo. The deputy secretary conceded the United States would consider recommending to NATO that Russian troops be redeployed elsewhere in Kosovo if an agreeable plan could be worked out among military officials, and he pushed Putin to have the Russian government provide assurances— confirmed by facts on the ground and in the air—that there would be no additional Russian troop deployments without a deal. Talbott stressed that while NATO was willing to reach an agreement with the Russians, some areas were nonnegotiable. A Russian sector with a Russian commander was a nonstarter. Putin did little to reveal his hand. He acknowledged the question of command arrangements was an important one and that it was vital to have the Russian forces not appear to be directly under NATO. Putin noted that negotiations were complicated by Russia's "pre-election struggle," adding that there were "hawks and doves" in both countries with their own agendas. Putin felt that there were people within his government who did not agree with the deployment and he branded it a "mistake." However, he quickly added that Russia's mistake "did not lead to the loss of human life," and that, although the hawks had damaged relations between Moscow and Washington, it was "far less than what NATO had done to President Yeltsin's prestige" with the air campaign. Putin displayed little emotion as he implied that a politically wounded Yeltsin government had little choice but to make the rush to Slatina.


Putin indicated that once Russia and NATO agreed to an interim solution, there needed to be a clear plan for proceeding with a long-term deal. He warned that the final arrangement should not allow Russians to accuse Yeltsin of being a NATO puppet and that his nation would need a decision on what troops would be in what areas. Talbott concluded the meeting by expressing his hope that both sides would be able to work out a mutually acceptable solution before the G-8 Summit and begin to repair bilateral relations. However, in a comment that set off more alarms within the U.S. delegation, Putin referred to a "possible" visit by President Yeltsin to the G-8 Summit. This came in addition to earlier suggestions by the Russians that Stepashin would fill in for Yeltsin for the first two days of the G-8 gathering. Talbott had begun to fear that the people around Yeltsin—Ivanov, Putin, and Stepashin—had concluded that the Russian government was in the throes of a genuine constitutional crisis as a result of Operation Trojan Horse. There was a dangerous possibility that the civilian leadership would have no choice but to pull the plug on the Yeltsin presidency because of his inability to rein in the power ministries.

Slatina Showdown Tensions ran high as the balance of power within Kosovo quickly started to shift. The scene at the Slatina airbase was uneasy. By late afternoon, 100 British paratroopers had managed to make it to the airbase. However, Russian and Yugoslav forces barred the British from bringing reinforcements overland into the airport. A convoy of British army vehicles and 400 soldiers sat lined up on an access road to the airport as KFOR officers tried to negotiate their entry in exactly the kind of scene General Clark had envisioned when advocating the airbase's preemptive seizure. The potential for the exchange of fire, particularly between disgruntled Yugoslav troops and NATO or KLA guerillas and the Russians, was significant. Even an isolated incident at that moment would have been calamitous. The public views expressed by U.S. and NATO officials were strikingly disparate from their actual views toward the ongoing Russian operation. At NATO headquarters, General Clark told reporters that afternoon that the Russian brigade "was sent racing along to apparently move to an airfield to


do some mission—we can't imagine what—in an uncoordinated fashion. So right now, I wouldn't want to pass judgment on it at this stage except to say that it seems to be an isolated element that is out there by itself." Clark added, "I think there is a lot of explaining that will have to be done on all of these issues over time," but "those are political issues. We are not in the political business in NATO." For his part, Secretary of Defense Cohen downplayed the incident. "I think it's a situation where they were anxious to participate, and they moved into the region, Pristina. It's not a militarily significant force. . . . Whether it's a mistake on the part of the lower level commanders or the higher levels, we can't say at this point." U.S. officials were very careful not to publicly suggest that the Russian military was out of control. Behind the scenes, NATO's military concerns continued to escalate with renewed fears that the Russians would fly in reinforcements. NATO could surround the Russian troops at the airport, but there were also worries that Russian troops could move overland from Bosnia or be airlifted to Serbia and still move into the north and partition the province. Sandy Berger commented, "We decided to block the airport, and tried to do it. I don't know that we would have gotten in a military clash with the Russians had they crossed the border. That was probably not an option." General Ralston called General Clark and suggested, "You might want to block the runways." Clark agreed, and Ralston suggested, "Why don't you use the Apache helicopters," since only limited numbers of British troops had reached the airfield. After making clear that he had Washington's authorization for such a move, Clark passed on orders to his subordinates to "use the Apaches to block the Pristina runways during the hours of darkness so the IL-76 transports can't land. This isn't 'business as usual.' NATO has been deceived or misled by about everyone in the Russian government at this point—we can't believe their promises. We don't want to be forced to decide whether or not to shoot down Russian aircraft if they violate Hungarian or Romanian airspace." Clark also wanted NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia to block the bridges with Serbia to prevent additional Russians from SFOR moving into Kosovo, but the NATO commanders in Bosnia were reluctant to take such a step. In the evening, General Jackson arrived at the airport via helicopter, after having to repeatedly postpone a news conference that had been scheduled for earlier in the day. With Russian armored personnel carriers speeding


across the tarmac and nearly drowning out his words, Jackson halfheartedly insisted, "It's a very good time to be here." The general welcomed the Russian contingent and announced that he would meet with General Zavarzin in an effort to resolve the situation. The pace of the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo was gathering momentum, with more than 10,000 Serb personnel having left the province. However, Russian forces and NATO troops at the Slatina airfield remained in an uneasy face-off, with the Russians using armored personnel carriers to block the approach road to the airport. During the afternoon, a Russian general and a British captain, Edward Melott, engaged in three hours of largely fruitless discussion in an attempt to resolve the issue of the airport's control. Eventually the British pulled back to the far end of the airport. Across Kosovo, NATO troops moved in, Serb military and civilians moved out, and the KLA and Kosovar Albanians exerted a newfound freedom of movement as sporadic gunfire punctuated the day. The changing of the guard was underway and thick traffic jams snarled intersections and roadways north. Nightfall brought a steady downpour as Russian, Yugoslav, KLA, and NATO forces hunkered down to keep dry. As a steady rain fell, Clark was convinced that NATO and Russia were "headed toward some sort of political-military confrontation." Adding to his distress, General Jackson—citing both the weather and a variety of operational concerns—was resisting his call to deploy the Apaches to block the airport's runways. General Jackson, concerned by General Clark's confrontational attitude, appealed to his superiors in the national command at the British ministry of defense in London. These appeals, in turn, set off a flurry of anxious back-and-forth calls between London and Washington. The British shared Jackson's concerns and cited the assurances that had been given by Ivanov that the Russians would not reinforce their troops without an agreement. At the Slatina airfield, a house not far from the runway was set on fire despite the downpour, and Serbs soldiers torched a number of houses in largely ethnic Albanian neighborhoods in Pristina. NATO peacekeepers did not intervene as periodic gunfire barked out in the darkness. The wrangling between London and Washington continued. On Sunday, June 13, General Clark made a predawn flight to Macedonia. Before departing, NATO Secretary-General Solana confirmed that he had a green light to deploy the Apaches to block the Slatina runways. When Clark arrived at General Jack-


son's headquarters, the two quickly launched into a heated and very personal confrontation. According to Jackson's autobiographical account, Jackson refused to block the runways and directly questioned Clark's authority, saying, "Sir, I'm not taking any more orders from Washington." "Mike, these aren't Washington's orders, they're coming from me." "By whose authority?" "By my authority as SACEUR." "You don't have that authority." "I do have that authority. I have the secretary-general behind me on this." "Sir, I'm not starting World War III for you." Clark insisted that the situation did not need to lead to a confrontation with the Russians, leading Jackson to complain, "I'm a three-star general; you can't give me orders like this." "Mike, I'm a four-star general, and I can tell you these things." The two men decided that the issue could only be resolved by going to their own political superiors, and a call was quickly placed to the British chief of defense, Charles Guthrie. After a brief discussion, Guthrie told a shocked Clark, "Well, I must say that I agree with Mike, as does Hugh Shelton." The intensive behind-the-scenes lobbying by the British against Clark's directive had turned Washington. The disagreement on how to proceed on the airport operation was largely adjudicated in a series of telephone discussions between Sandy Berger and his British counterpart John Sawyers. President Clinton was not on the phone, even though Blair had asked to speak with him directly, but was closely consulted. Initially, the U.S. national security team was inclined to back Clark. "Ultimately, although we thought British were desperately wrong," one White House official acknowledged, "the president felt, and we communicated to Number 10, that we were not going to take them on." Another White House official argued that the breakdown between Clark and Jackson was indicative of "a really serious problem in terms of how NATO manages its command and control." However, U.S. annoyance with the British behavior was tempered by Washington's frequent exploitation of the fact that the SACEUR operates in the U.S. chain of command as well in the NATO chain of command. Many of the tensions in operations stemmed from occurrences when the Allies felt that Clark was getting instructions from Washington that were not going through the NATO ambassadors. In


short, as a national security official acknowledged of blocking the runways, "The decision was not made in a careful, thoughtful, rational way." Secretary of Defense Cohen commented on the debate. "Initially, we got a call from General Clark, who indicated that they [the Russians] had departed and were on their way to the airfield. The question surfaced: what do we do about it?" Cohen observed, "It was unclear exactly what their motivation was—whether others would follow, whether this was just a spearhead of a larger Russian force coming in, and what action, if any, would we take if that followed." He maintained, "We considered blocking the runway so they couldn't be reinforced. The commander on the ground objected to that. So, it became something of a dispute over what action should be taken. The conclusion was that, with no logistical supply, they [the Russian contingent] couldn't be sustained." Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg maintained that it was "a little hard to be self-righteous with what the British did with Jackson. There were huge risks either way, and the British concerns were not trivial. I think these types of disputes are inevitable within the Alliance, but the biggest lesson is how dangerous they can be." Clark himself insisted, "It was not disobedience of orders, however, nor technically was it insubordination. It was just a striking example of what was to become an increasingly open 'secret' of NATO operations. NATO commands were like puppets, with two or six or sometimes dozens of strings being pulled from behind the scenes by nations themselves, regardless of the formalistic commitment of forces." In the end, the British forces would block further ground access to the airport, but did not seize the runway. As NATO's military and civilian brass waged the bitter behind-the-scenes fight over blocking the runway, General Casey and the delegation of Russian officers who had flown to Macedonia to negotiate the interim status of the Russian forces in Kosovo returned to Moscow at five in the morning on June 13. They had established the general parameters of an agreement on shortterm cooperation, but the Russians had made clear that they could not move forward until a long-term deal was also finalized. Around ten in the morning in Moscow, Talbott, Foglesong, Ivanov, General Ivashov, and their respective delegations gathered at the Russian foreign ministry. The foreign ministry was again virtually deserted, and Ivanov appeared wearing a sports jacket and no tie since "it was a day off." In a one-on-one session with Talbott, Ivanov agreed that there needed to be an official explanation of Russia's position, and he acknowledged that the


long night at the ministry of defense had been a difficult experience that he did not want to repeat: "I was operating on my own." He insisted that much of the weekend's confusion stemmed from misunderstandings between Russia and NATO and misunderstandings within the Russian government—not deliberate attempts to mislead the United States: "It had not been a betrayal." He pointed out that the Russian contingent had deployed into Kosovo only three and a half hours ahead of KFOR and he suggested, "I would have preferred that NATO go in first, and then we'd gone in, without agreement." The foreign minister also had a transcript of the previous day's Gore— Stepashin telephone call, and several passages were highlighted. Ivanov was upset that senior American officials felt that he had misled them, and he argued that lies "should be a thing of the past" in Russian diplomacy. The three-hour series of meetings was cordial, and the atmosphere greatly improved. A number of agreements were struck. First, the foreign minister agreed that Russia would not reinforce the troops at the Slatina airfield until a long-term deal on participating in KFOR was reached; in the interim, those forces would cooperate with KFOR along the lines of the Bosnia model. Ivanov consented to join Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, and Marshall Sergeyev to negotiate the final details of the military agreement in Helsinki several days later, with the foreign minister stressing that it would "help to get out of Moscow." Of equal importance, Ivanov broadly suggested that a command and control model similar to the one being used in Bosnia might ultimately be acceptable as a long-term arrangement. As the session concluded and Talbott was saying goodbye to the foreign minister, Ivanov insisted, "This whole episode will help us in the long run— and by helping 'us' I mean both our side internally and what we're trying to do together." Ivanov seemed to suggest that the defense ministry's bellicose behavior would force Russia's civilian leadership to exert firmer control.

The Brink Despite Ivanov's assurances, the situation at Slatina remained confrontational. French fuel trucks were turned away from entering the base, and several managed to get stuck in a muddy field as they reversed course. Russians


soldiers continued to sporadically block access to different sections of the airfield. Across Kosovo, NATO exerted tentative control as more than 5,000 of its troops entered the province and Serb military and police forces continued to withdraw. A confusing and dangerous sea of armed forces washed across the province. NATO tanks rolled past Yugoslav military checkpoints. Withdrawing Serb soldiers flashed victory signs at KFOR troops. Serb civilians greeted KFOR with obscene gestures, and KLA fighters raised double-eagle flags on municipal buildings. British tanks in the heart of Pristina trained their guns on a Yugoslav tank dug into the west of the city, only to have the Yugoslav tank return the favor. Yugoslav soldiers waiting for busses to take them to Serbia mingled with British forces in downtown Pristina. Kosovar Albanians flooded the streets to shower affection upon NATO peacekeepers in scenes that looked reminiscent of World War II. NATO officials continued to publicly downplay Trojan Horse, with General Clark insisting, "No plans have been disrupted whatsoever by this bizarre event." Secretary Albright told Meet the Press that there was no need to become "overexcited." However, there was some finger-pointing behind the scenes within the Alliance. English military officials were widely telling reporters—off the record—that the delay in getting U.S. troops through Greece ensured that the Russians were the first to Slatina. In light of General Jackson's reluctance to have paratroopers preemptively seize the airfield, the anonymous comments by British officers angered U.S. officials. Around 12:30 Moscow time, the plane carrying the now-spent American delegation again lifted off, bound for Washington. Phil Goldberg playfully drew up a "No U-turn" sign for the pilots. As the plane departed Moscow, President Clinton finally spoke with President Yeltsin, and the crisis between NATO and Russia wildly careened once again. Yeltsin was barely in control. Rambling, repetitive, and almost incoherent, the Russian president seemed to be operating without staff or guidance. He did not have a grasp on the unfolding events, and he insisted over and over again that he and Clinton meet on a "boat, a submarine, or some island so not a single person will disturb us. . . . No one else can do it," Yeltsin mumbled. When Clinton asked about the situation at the airport, Yeltsin insisted that the generals on the ground should work something out. A senior administration official remarked, "I don't remember much of what Clinton said, he was rolling his eyes and quite worried." Then, in a moment of dark com-


edy, Yeltsin insisted that Clinton spell out Russian General Zavarzin's name, and several others, so he could write them down in an agonizingly slow process. The conversation stretched for ninety minutes, with almost nothing accomplished. The two men could only agree that they should speak again the next day. There was nothing during the call to suggest that Yeltsin concurred with Ivanov on using the Bosnia model as a stop-gap arrangement. Yeltsin had never sounded worse. "It was the most bizarre Yeltsin—Clinton call in six and a half years—and that's saying a lot," observed Talbott. As Berger, Albright, Steinberg, and Talbott conferred after the call, Berger was deeply distressed. He was worried that the hard-liners such as General Kvashnin and Minister of Defense Sergeyev were exploiting Yeltsin's confusion and inebriation. Given the previous several days, and the Russian president's growing incapacitation, Kvashnin and Sergeyev could easily manufacture reasons to intensify the showdown. It would not take much to spark an exchange of gunfire. President Clinton and his advisors saw the call as further evidence that civilian control of the Russian military was crumbling. Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg remarked, "President Clinton was worried, and the Yeltsin telephone call dramatically increased the tensions. Any of the possible interpretations associated with the telephone call—either because of Yeltsin's intent or his inability to effectively manage the situation—led you to worry that the situation could get out of hand." Some of the U.S. national security team argued for using Yeltsin's confusion to their own advantage, by claiming that Yeltsin's lack of dissent actually constituted agreement. It would not be the first time that Moscow had been logrolled. The group also agreed that Ambassador Collins should speak with Foreign Minister Ivanov to clarify the situation, which he did. However, the foreign minister was ominously tight-lipped and noncommittal. Ivanov suggested only that much would depend on a second Yeltsin-Clinton call the next day. Fears continued to mount that Yeltsin and his government were on the verge of collapse. The national security team explored ways to limit the Russian influence without sparking a military confrontation. "We looked for a solution that would not force the Russians to be totally humiliated but that would also diffuse our greatest fear: that the airfield would be a staging area for the strategy to partition Kosovo," suggested Jim Steinberg. He added, "We were trying to find an operational model—and General Ralston was extremely


helpful in this—in setting out the activities that took place at an airfield that allowed you to have NATO control of air operations without forcing a direct confrontation." Berger and his team felt that, regardless of the Russian intentions, they had to create the most banal result by allowing the Russians to stay at the airport without letting them have control over landing rights. Berger and Albright even flirted with sending Talbott back to Moscow yet again, but to the relief of all those on the plane, it was determined not to execute the second U-turn in three days. Adding to the angst, Russian troops continued to block further British access to the airport. Toward early evening, events quickly grew more dire. General Clark received an alarmed call from one of his intelligence officers: "Sir, we've got indications of Russian air transports moving again. They could be headed this way." NATO Secretary-General Solana called Washington on a secure line to pass on the volatile information: General Clark was indicating that 300 Russian paratroopers were headed to the airport and their planes were already in the air. Russia was going to push through its reinforcements without air clearance from neighboring states. Worse still, General Jackson was resisting orders from General Clark to secure the airstrip using tanks. A showdown seemed inevitable. Sandy Berger quickly convened a secure telephone call with Albright, Cohen, Clark, Jim Steinberg, Vice President Gore's national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, and Talbott, in a discussion that one of the participants would describe later as "bone-chilling." The mood on the conference call was tense and aggressive, as the group considered proposals from those as extreme as storming the airport and overpowering the Russian contingent to shooting down the Russian transport planes if they illegally entered Romanian or Hungarian airspace. Fuerth joined Clark in advocating a forceful response to the Russian planes that were thought to be airborne. A senior U.S. diplomat claimed, "Leon was hard over. But Leon is like that with the Russians. He would intellectually favor cooperation until you are morally affronted, and then he would hit them with a lead pipe. It also made political sense: If the Russians were going to be provocative, you had to be tough." Some of those involved in the debate thought the threat was exaggerated, given Russian capabilities, and felt that by the time the Russians could get troops on the ground and get themselves organized, NATO could have surrounded the forces. But as one official commented, "Given the great 'Red


menace' was actually deploying for the first time in all these soldiers' lives, you can understand why it got out of hand." Fuerth himself noted, "We were concerned because we did not know exactly what was going on in Moscow. To have the Russian foreign minister clearly and admittedly out of the decision-making loop that had brought this about was extremely disconcerting and we didn't know whether Yeltsin was fully in control of the situation. There was obviously the possibility of an armed confrontation between the Russians sitting on that air force base and the advancing NATO troops." However, Fuerth insisted that if the Russians had reinforced the troops at Slatina, "We probably would have groped along trying to find a way out of the face-off. I don't think we would have done anything like shoot down a Russian air transport. They would have landed and the Russian position would have been reinforced. . . . There was no decisive other option." Pentagon officials were worried that a creeping coup was underway in Moscow, and, given the disarray at the highest levels of the Russian government, there was a consensus on the telephone call that NATO needed to aggressively counter any deeper thrust by Russian forces. Messages were sent directly to Ivanov of the stark dangers of "confrontation" over the planes being prepared to reinforce the Russian contingent, and it must have been clear to the Russian foreign minister that the United States was now considering a direct military response. The long-term relationship between Moscow and Washington would be the first casualty of such an exchange. However, before the Clinton national security team was forced to make a final decision on how it would respond to the Russian flights, an equally remarkable piece of news came through: The intelligence reports appeared to be mistaken; there were no Russian planes in the air. The fog of war left the shaken and chagrined national security team with a disturbing realization that bad information had almost driven them to disaster. The combination of miscommunication, suspicion, fatigue, questionable intelligence, and soldiers in close proximity had pushed Russia and NATO to war footing. All the simmering resentments, insecurities, and frustration of the seventy-eightday bombing campaign came within a hair's breadth of spilling over into tragedy. While the crisis of the day had been averted, Washington was still sincerely troubled by Yeltsin's condition and the chaos in the ranks of the Russian government. "I think it just shows you this is serious shit. It is very dangerous when

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you get armies and air forces moving around where there is an undertone of mistrust and resentment," a senior administration official observed. "Just because the Cold War is over it doesn't mean the U.S. and Russia can't stumble into a shooting situation. No scenario brings you to World War III and nuclear weapons and general war in Europe. But there were certainly scenarios where you could have had Russians killing Americans or vice versa—for the first time ever—ever." All the more remarkable that this was taking place within a peacekeeping operation where Washington and Moscow were supposedly on the same side. As a senior NATO official maintained: The Slatina airport operation was more of a symbolic muscle-flexing thing to improve the Russian negotiating position that ended up weakening their position. But to actually put in a thirty-six-hundred-man force as a fait accompli would have completely altered the whole terms of the deal and been a major betrayal on the part of the Russians—after we had given them a respectable role. It would have undermined the effectiveness of KFOR and created the basis for a partition instead of implementing the mission as intended. Exactly what measures would have been necessary I don't know. . . . There were a lot of potential hard choices. In Kosovo, evening settled in uneasily. In Prizren, two Serbs opened fire from their car on a group of German peacekeepers. As bystanders ducked for cover, the German soldiers returned a volley of fire. The vehicle's driver was shot and killed, the passenger seriously wounded. CNN carried graphic footage of the incident, and the images of the bullet-torn automobile drifting to a ghostly stop. On June 14, Secretary Albright spoke with Ivanov, pointing out that their respective presidents would be speaking a short time later. She also complained that General Zavarzin had not been cooperating at the airport along the terms the foreign minister had spelled out. Zavarzin had declared that he was not ready to accept a Bosnia model for the deployment and said that the troops already in Kosovo needed to be reinforced. Albright feared that the general was acting on his own. Ivanov had not spoken directly with the general, but he insisted that Zavarzin was acting on the basis of orders that President Yeltsin had given him the day before, just before he had spoken with Clinton. Yeltsin had told Za-


varzin to continue discussions with General Jackson along the same lines as Ivanov had communicated to the secretary, and Stepashin had relayed this to Vice President Gore. Both agreed the situation needed to be resolved quickly, but Ivanov maintained that he was overstretched. He thought purely military matters could be better handled between Sergeyev and Cohen. Ivanov underscored that on certain fundamental issues, the bottom line simply had to be determined by President Yeltsin—a disturbing prospect given his previous day's performance. President Clinton and President Yeltsin spoke not long after that. Although Yeltsin still sounded rough, frequently coughing and wheezing, he was far more in control and worked his way steadily through a set of prepared points. The scare of the day before seemed to have—literally and figuratively—sobered everyone up. Yeltsin confirmed that the Russian contingent at Slatina would serve under the Bosnia rules and that there would be no reinforcements absent an overall agreement. The two presidents agreed that Generals Jackson and Zavarzin should continue to work out arrangements on the ground. The Russian president also acceded to a Sergeyev-CohenIvanov-Albright meeting in Helsinki. After the telephone call, relieved Clinton administration officials felt that the Yeltsin government was largely back on track. However, the Russians made one final stab at securing overflight clearance for reinforcements through Romania, but the Romanian ministry of defense rejected the application, noting that Moscow would have to both consult with NATO and receive formal parliamentary approval. Privately, the Romanians indicated that they would not grant use of the airspace unless requested to do so by the United States or the United Nations. The Romanian minister of defense reportedly told Russian officials that, if Moscow dispatched planes through Romanian airspace without clearance, "We would be obliged to send an aircraft up to intercept your aircraft. And there are only two buttons on our aircraft. If the pilot pushes the wrong one, we'll shoot down your transport plane with all of those people on board. Of course, that would be a crime and he would be prosecuted under our law. He would be convicted and he would be sent to jail for seven years. But he would also be a national hero." The Russians, recognizing that further attempts to secure overflight approval from the frontline states would prove futile, as would be efforts to land troops in Bosnia, stood down their airborne paratroopers. The Russian


inability to push reinforcements into the theater evaporated the potential for a full-scale confrontation between NATO and Russia. The Russian elements at the airfield were effectively isolated. The Yugoslav military continued its total withdrawal, and NATO established its position across the province. For good or bad, the international community had taken stewardship of Kosovo. The war was over.


11

CHAPTER

The Aftermath

Serbs Outf NATO In, Refugees Allowed to Go Home By June 15, 1999, drama had largely given way to farce at the Slatina airfield. Russia was left without a supply line to provide even basics such as food and water to its troops at the airport. General Zavarzin's men were reduced to negotiating for basic rations with the same NATO peacekeepers they had worked so hard to upstage. Eventually, British soldiers hauled much-needed water to the Russian troops to hold them over until a truck convoy carrying food and fuel could arrive overland from Bosnia. Secretary of Defense Cohen and Defense Minister Sergeyev arrived in Helsinki on June 16 to finalize arrangements for Russia's participation in KFOR, beginning talks in what President Ahtisaari called a "clammy atmosphere." The importance of having prevented the Russians from reinforcing their positions was immediately apparent. As one of the U.S. negotiators in Helsinki put it, "I don't think the Russians knew what they were doing. In general, we had checkmated them. If we hadn't, we would have had a really big mess. We were lucky, and they were lucky, that it really was symbolic." On June 17, Minister Ivanov and Secretary Albright joined Sergeyev and Cohen. Right up until the last half hour of talks, the Russians kept insisting that they would put a force of 10,000 troops on the ground in Kosovo be289


cause that would put them on par with the major powers, leading one U.S. negotiator to privately insist the Russians were bluffing: "They don't have it, and can't sustain it." Late in the evening of June 18, after more than thirty hours of contentious negotiations conducted over three days, Sergeyev and Ivanov made a trip to the Russian embassy to seek final approval from President Yeltsin in Moscow. After getting a green light, the United States and Russia finally reached agreement on the role of Russian forces in KFOR. President Ahtisaari announced the breakthrough: "Ladies and gentlemen of the press, I welcome you all to this occasion and I do apologize for this very late hour but, like so often, it's always worthwhile to wait for the good things to come." Sergeyev and Cohen signed their agreement shortly before eleven in the evening. Neither General Ivashov nor General Foglesong—both key players in the talks—attended the signing ceremony. The bottom line: Russian would not be given its own sector. Indeed, Russia's presence—3,600 troops—would be scattered across four sectors, patrolling southern areas of Kosovo commanded by American, French, and German troops and continuing to serve alongside the British at the airport. NATO would be in charge of all flight plans and issues relating to airspace. Marshall Sergeyev insisted Russia would retain "complete political and military control" over its forces, although the troops would serve under the respective national commands of the NATO countries in charge of each sector. By distributing forces across more than one sector, the Russians were able to claim they were represented across all of Kosovo. Russia's potential force of 3,600 men would be spread thin among 45,000 NATO peacekeepers. After the many long nights and endless negotiations, Russia had no sector of its own. The peacekeeping arrangements left NATO with political control of KFOR and had Russian troops answering to NATO national commanders. The final peacekeeping configuration, while slightly more complicated, was a lot like the one in place in Bosnia. Once again, token numbers of Russian troops were cooperating in a NATO-led operation with only a paper-thin guise of military independence. On June 20, 1999, Chancellor Schroeder welcomed a slightly shaky President Boris Yeltsin to the G-8 Summit in Germany with a bear hug, and the Russian president told reporters, "The most important thing is to mend ties after a fight." As Yeltsin sat down with Blair, Chirac, Clinton, and the other G-8 leaders, he declared, "I am among my friends now." Russia's ties with

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the West, including much-needed financial assistance, had been preserved despite the travails of Kosovo. Although Yeltsin was plainly in the twilight of his career and suffering from a rapidly deteriorating physical state, Western leaders eager to put Kosovo behind them glossed over concerns about his health and leadership. "He can't run a marathon but he is in good form," optimistically observed Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien. At one o'clock at the Renaissance Hotel in Cologne, Yeltsin and Clinton sat down together. It was the seventeenth, and next to last, face-to-face meeting between the two men in their official capacity. Before the session, Yeltsin launched into a violent and sustained coughing fit that required the attention of his personal physician. Secretary Albright, National Security Adviser Berger, Deputy Secretary Talbott, Foreign Minister Ivanov, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, and several others joined the two presidents. Both Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that Kosovo had pushed the relationship dangerously close to a breaking point, and they were pleased that they could discuss a range of other issues that had been put to the side because of Kosovo, such as arms control agreements and international financial assistance. After the meeting, Berger happily declared the two countries to be "back in business." In an interview with CNN, President Clinton was asked if Kosovo had established a "Clinton Doctrine," leading him to reply: I think there's an important principle here that I hope will be now upheld in the future—and not just by the United States, not just by NATO, but also by the leading countries of the world, through the United Nations. And that is that while there may be a great deal of ethnic and religious conflict in the world—some of it might break out in wars—that whether within or beyond the borders of a country, if the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. Clinton saw three conditions for such intervention by the United States: if there was a moral imperative, such as stopping ethnic cleansing; if the setting was of strategic importance; and lastly, if the intervention could be carried out without too steep a price. The logic of Clinton's theory was so broad and conditional as to leave most foreign policy experts simply shrugging their shoulders. In Kosovo, ethnic Albanian refugees poured back into the province at an

292 it COLLISION COURSE

astounding rate. By June 17, as many as 1,000 refugees an hour were returning to the province. Some 600,000 Kosovar Albanians refugees returned to their homes in the first month after NATO forces arrived. By late November 1999, all but 30,000 of the more than 800,000 refugees had returned. These statistics are remarkable in there own right, but even more so when one considers the record elsewhere in the region. Out of the more than 1,000,000 refugees created by the war in Bosnia, only 55,000 returned in the first three years after that conflict. In sharp contrast, Kosovo's Serb population declined dramatically after the war, with at least 75,000 of Kosovo's 180,000 to 200,000 Serbs fleeing the province fairly quickly. By June 18, 1999, traffic jams of departing Serb civilians stretched for forty miles in some parts of Kosovo. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's plan to fundamentally alter Kosovo's ethnic landscape had dramatically backfired. In early August 1999, NATO's Supreme Commander Gen. Wesley Clark was informed by telephone that he would be relieved of his post several months early, in a move that left him "stunned." The Pentagon defended the move as a bureaucratic necessity, saying that Clark's successor, Gen. Joe Ralston, had to be given the post before he was forced to retire due to military regulations. Few accepted the Pentagon explanation at face value, and General Clark had won the war only to lose his job. Clark's bitter relations with Secretary Cohen and General Shelton were clearly at the root of the problem. Indeed, Shelton would later comment, "I will tell you the reason he came out of Europe early had to do with integrity and character issues, things that are very near and dear to my heart." Shelton clearly felt that Clark's frequent back channels to the White House, which were often encouraged by the National Security Council staff, overstepped the bounds. While many pointed to Clark's aggressive style as the primary cause of his downfall, it was these same traits that may well have allowed NATO to prevail in Kosovo. In February 2000, Russian President Putin restored his country's ties with NATO, leading Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to observe of the Kosovo war, "What happened, happened. Let us leave it for history." Milosevic's many failures finally came home to roost in late September of 2000. In a presidential election many observers thought would simply reaffirm his hold on power, challenger Vojislav Kostunica scored an upset victory. Milosevic had lost his sway over Serbia's nationalists, and Kostunica—a staunch nationalist in his own right—was able to patch together a broad

THE AFTERMATH * 293 mandate of voters simply fed up with the Yugoslav president's disastrous policies. After Milosevic resisted the election results, massive street protests and a general strike erupted. As hundreds of thousands of protestors flooded the streets of Belgrade calling for his ouster, he appeared on state television on October 6, 2000, to concede defeat to Kostunica. Milosevic was subsequently arrested for a variety of offenses in March of 2001. In late June of 2001, Milosevic was delivered to The Hague to stand trial for war crimes. As Ambassador Richard Holbrooke observed, "Losing Kosovo absolutely cost Milosevic his hold on power. That is the great consequence of Kosovo so far."

Reluctant Warriors In the final analysis, President Clinton and NATO's other leaders pulled together more than they pulled apart. Collectively, they realized that a military defeat or a half-baked political compromise would carry steep costs for the transatlantic political, economic, and strategic agenda. Failure would have cast doubt on the future of NATO as an organization and deeply compromised its ability to expand the community of democracies and open markets eastward. Worse still, Slobodan Milosevic would not only have persevered, he would have triumphed. NATO would have proved unable to check behavior and values anathema to the norms of the international community. Instability in the Balkans would have further accelerated. Collapse in Kosovo would have also been a devastating political fiasco in Washington and Europe. Kosovo marked a reluctant watershed for Europe's ability to project force and defend shared values. Despite the frequent missteps of the Kosovo campaign, the worth of such a triumph should not be underestimated. In a world where the United Nations has repeatedly proven incapable of effectively supervising military operations or addressing civil conflict, regional security organizations must develop the capacity to keep order in their own backyards. NATO demonstrated that while the task is not easy, it is also not impossible. Milosevic's eventual demise was a prize worth fighting for. While one may rightly question the wisdom of NATO's strategy, the Alliance was able to meet its goals: Kosovo was left within Yugoslavia, but under international administration. Milosevic was defeated, but Kosovar Albanians were denied


immediate independence. Such a delicate arrangement demanded broad political consensus, and NATO waged the proportional conflict needed to secure such carefully delimited goals. Sandy Berger contended, "It is possible to fight a war with nineteen nations. It is impossible without intense American leadership at every level. I never have bought the indispensable nation thing, it has always bothered me because it sounds a little too much triumphalist, but when it comes to something like this America has to lead." In Kosovo, President Clinton was faced with unpalatable choices but, given the nature of the political and institutional restraints he faced, charted a reasonable, albeit politically timid, course. The president was emerging from an impeachment battle that had almost brought down the government. He could have ignored the conflict, and subjected his administration to withering criticism that it was impotent in the face of wholesale human suffering. Clinton also could have pushed the issue of ground troops far earlier, knowing such an approach lacked congressional support, would risk substantial casualties, and had the potential to rupture NATO. Clinton split the difference, authorizing an air war designed first to minimize his political vulnerability and second to achieve its goals. His behavior was entirely logical from a political and institutional perspective, and it speaks volumes about the inherent limits of intervening in civil wars with democratic coalitions. It took a series of bad judgments for Clinton to end up in such a mess, but the president's considerable political instincts, persuasive abilities, and tactical skills all allowed him to emerge from the crisis in surprisingly good shape. Sandy Berger commented, "I don't think anybody expected we could go through Kosovo without one hostile casualty. But there is a proportionality that comes into play when you have something like Kosovo that is not a direct threat to America's vital interests, but which I believe was certainly a threat to our national interests. Losing thousands of Americans would have been very difficult." General Clark offered a similar view: "If we were engaged in wartime operations to turn back aggression against our allies, then casualties would be more or less accepted." However, Clark also maintained, " 'voluntary' operations that incurred casualties might not be sustainable. Period." Both NATO and Milosevic could easily have climbed down from their confrontation in its earliest stages, and NATO was not bent on destroying Yugoslavia simply to prove that it could so. However, by driving hundreds

THE AFTERMATH * 295 of thousands of refugees out of Kosovo, Milosevic ensured that it was impossible to sweep Kosovo under the rug. Absent this behavior, NATO would not have acted in a decisive fashion. In choosing to use limited means to achieve limited goals, President Clinton threaded the needle between inaction and moving forward with a ground war at the campaign's outset. Vice President Gore's national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, acknowledged the administration's thinking was more directly conditioned by Somalia than Vietnam, but that, "The officers who were doing the planning here had been young officers in Vietnam and they carried through their years of lessons learned in that conflict. Those lessons didn't necessarily mean, 'Never get involved in a ground war,' but they meant only 'get involved under certain circumstances.' " Launching democratic military action involving multiple partners against an imploding state such as Yugoslavia stacks complexity on complexity. For example, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a clear assault of the vital national interests of numerous states. The political goal of the first Gulf War coalition was relatively straightforward: get Iraq out of Kuwait. In Kosovo, the threat to the national interests of NATO member states was less clear-cut and the political goal was painstakingly nuanced: establish Kosovo as an international protectorate under NATO military control with a UN mandate while maintaining Yugoslavia's territorial integrity in the short term, but not eliminating the possibility of independence in the long term. In Kosovo, the international community showed that it was willing to stand on principle, at least in some cases, in opposing crimes against humanity. It also demonstrated that its patience with leaders such as Milosevic while large, is not infinite. This should cause other despots around the world to hesitate before they move to brutally repress their own citizens while dismissing these actions as internal matters. Kosovo was a trying experience for the Alliance because of the difficulty of forging a shared vision in dealing with the complex situation. It would be foolish to suggest that some new era of humanitarian intervention has been ushered in because NATO's vast military machine was able to overwhelm Yugoslav forces in Kosovo. NATO, having committed to military action, soon realized that it had dramatically raised the stakes. Instead of the fate of Kosovo, the Alliance was soon fighting for its survival as an institution. It is unfortunate that most European and American leaders did not recognize the ultimate threat to regional integration and security posed by the situation in


the Balkans far earlier—particularly in the early 1990s as Yugoslavia began to disintegrate. Both U.S. and European institutions must ultimately trace much of the blame for Kosovo back to earlier policy missteps. By failing repeatedly to check aggression in Bosnia, Croatia, and elsewhere, the international community set the table for its later troubles. Kosovo was not some separate or unique phenomena; it was part of the gloomy fabric of repeated calamities that have befallen the Balkans since the end of the Cold War. If the European members of NATO had been more confident in their vision of an inclusive Europe earlier in the decade, they likely would have been quicker to understand the fundamental threat that emanated from virulently nationalist leaderships in Belgrade and Zagreb. It was only the West's long track record of timidity, compromise, and half-baked threats that emboldened the different factions within Yugoslavia—particularly Milosevic's—to feel they could act with impunity. To focus on European failures in dealing with the issue of Yugoslavia in its early stages by no means recuses the United States from its share of blame. Both the senior Bush and Clinton administrations were guilty of hoping that the difficulties in the region would simply go away. It was only after repeated bumbling, and horrific public accounts of civilian casualties that the United States and NATO were finally compelled to take decisive military action against Serb forces first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. Three wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia—all driven by Milosevic— passed without any attacks by western Europe into Serbia proper. Only belatedly, in a fourth war in Kosovo, did the West see fit to make Milosevic and his supporters directly feel the pain of their actions. Transatlantic policy toward the Balkans was so poorly conceived and executed throughout the 1990s that by 1999 further convulsions in the region—whatever their form—were inevitable. A case can be made that if NATO had brought the true cost of war home to the people of Serbia earlier and more forcefully, Milosevic would have taken a far different course in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no accident that Milosevic only lasted in office fifteen months after NATO's strikes into Serbia. Milosevic understood that the West preferred negotiation to combat. He knew how to manipulate the media and to gain every possible advantage from collateral damage—both real and staged. He had capitalized on all these factors repeatedly. He knew NATO was not good at hard choices. Milosevic's biggest failure was in not realizing that the weaknesses he ex-

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ploited were skin deep. The United States and NATO would use their vast military power in defending vital interests, and institutional pride is ultimately one of those interests. Milosevic had danced on the lip of the volcano for so long that he forgot that there was a reason that powerful nations like China and Russia genuinely fear NATO. Western nations have incredible economic, military, and strategic tools at their disposal, and when used properly, few nations can withstand their brunt. In the long view of history, NATO will be given credit for ensuring that all of Milosevic's victories were Pyrrhic. Under Milosevic's watch, Yugoslavia shrank geographically, its standards of living sharply declined, and the nation's status was steadily reduced to that of a pariah. Instead of the grand dream of a "greater Serbia" stretching across the republics of Yugoslavia, more and more Serbian refugees from Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo were herded into a "Lesser Serbia." Milosevic can rest assured his lasting legacy will be that of national ruin. NATO sowed dangerous seeds in the way it resolved Kosovo, leaving some important issues unresolved, including Kosovo's final status and how best to stem ethnic Albanian militant movements in the region. By kicking the can of Kosovo's political status down the road, NATO ensured the matter will be dealt with at a time when they will be less engaged with the issue and the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians even more engaged, leaving the Alliance with little in the way of leverage. In the days following the war, General Clark noted to author Michael Ignatieff, "There is no peace settlement. The ultimate division of political power has not been settled." Ambassador Holbrooke insisted that one critical policy he disagreed with was "the decision to put Kosovo under the United Nations, to which I am still totally opposed. I think it was a tremendous mistake. We should have followed the Bosnia model where the high representative is responsible to an ad hoc group, which means he is responsible basically to us, and the British and French and the Europeans." Holbrooke argued, "The worst consequence of putting Kosovo's administration under the United Nations is still ahead of us: which is the final negotiations over Kosovo's final status, in which the United Nations will run those negotiations and they will be much harder to conduct than if they were done in the ad hoc, U.S.-led fashion that the Dayton talks were." Another senior administration official dismissed Holbrooke's complaints as a "formalistic quibble," and both Berger and Albright argued to Holbrooke at the time that there was little support among the allies for an alternative to the UN model.


President Ahtisaari continued to defend his position that a limited number of Yugoslav "stay-behinds" should have been allowed in the peace agreement with Milosevic. "If there was an understanding that less than 1,000 Serbs would be allowed to stay, they should have been allowed to stay. The mere fact that they had to go out and then return was not practical." Ahtisaari argued that it became impossible for any of these Serbs to return and that an alternative approach might have eased the transformation process, "Now, I don't think we have any choice but to give Kosovo independence. It leaves a bit of a bad aftertaste that so many Serbs had to leave. Whether we can have a multiethnic society is unclear. It is dangerous to have monoethnic societies such as the way Kosovo is developing."

Alliances and Military Strategy at Odds The downsides of NATO's consensus military approach in Kosovo have been widely publicized, as critics have heaped scorn on NATO's incremental and risk-averse approach to the war. The long buildup to the conflict, the mismanaged Rambouillet negotiations, initially ruling out the use of ground troops, hopes for a short bombing campaign, and painful arguments over targeting all allowed the Yugoslavs to drag out the fighting. NATO's decision to keep its pilots at relatively high altitudes increased the risk of collateral damage while reducing the ability to inflict meaningful military damage. No aspect of NATO's campaign has received greater critical scrutiny than the targeting for air attacks. Some even called the strategy a "Goldilocks" air campaign—not too hard, not too soft. These discussions are interesting for what they say about military tactics, but also offer powerful illumination that coalition warfare has pushed defense officials into uneasy waters. Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Short was an especially vocal detractor of the Alliance's tactics in the wake of the war, saying he would have "gone for the head of the snake on the first night" of the campaign to "turn the lights out" in Belgrade. Short argued, "If you hit the man hard—slapped him upside the head—he'd pay attention." General Short's comments reflect the frustration of many officers who felt that military doctrine took a back seat to political considerations during Kosovo. However, too often the influence of civilians on the NATO military campaign has been stereotyped as incompetent, unnecessary brakes on a mil-

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itary machine that could have quickly brought NATO victory. As General Clark complained, "This was the only air campaign in history in which lovers strolled down riverbanks in the gathering twilight and ate at outdoor cafes and watched the fireworks." Likewise, General Short wanted to strike the "rock and roll bridge" where the Serbs were dancing in the early part of the war. There is also a case to be made that the diffuse influence of the coalition's respective members actually helped NATO achieve its goals. Let us say that General Short had been allowed to pursue bombing as he saw fit, launching massive attacks on downtown Belgrade the first night of the conflict. This was the very onset of the war, before Yugoslav forces had fully initiated the massive expulsion of Kosovar Albanians from their homes. What if some of those NATO bombs had gone astray in a crowded urban area and hit a school, a hospital, or an apartment complex causing largescale fatalities? Would NATO still have been able to justify its war to the world? Would U.S. public opinion have supported such dramatic action without the hundreds of thousands of refugees huddled in Albania and Macedonia? Would NATO's members have been able to defend involvement in a war that brought wholesale destruction to a European city simply on the basis of failed talks at Rambouillet? The answer is no. A bridge full of dead civilians on the first night of the war, instead of forcing Milosevic to capitulate, might have propelled him to almost instantaneous victory. Inefficient alliances are certainly flawed, but they may also be the best tools to secure complex political aims. NATO was able to amplify its military attacks on Yugoslavia because the Alliance had successfully created the perception that it was responding in a measured and proportional way to events on the ground. Negotiations in France turned into light bombing because Milosevic refused to take Rambouillet seriously. Light bombing turned into heavy bombing because Milosevic showed his face as an unrepentant purveyor of ethnic terror by driving more than a half million Kosovars out of the country. Heavy bombing turned into planning for a ground war because NATO demonstrated that it had exhaustively pursued a diplomatic solution. Incrementally, but unyieldingly, increasing pressure on Belgrade while minimizing civilian casualties was seen as the behavior of a security alliance committed to broader democratic and humanist values. During the war, author Michael Ignatieff observed, "NATO is much condemned for waging


war by committee, but it is precisely because nineteen member states must be persuaded before military action can be undertaken, that such action has not become indiscriminate or disproportionate." The embrace of these values has allowed NATO to become an effective political, as well as military, instrument. NATO may well have achieved its military goals more quickly by launching something closer to total war, but it might have destroyed the Alliance's broader political and social agenda. The Alliance did stray far too close to disaster and dissolution. NATO risked disaster because it was poorly positioned at the onset of the campaign—both military and politically—to effectively see a proportional response through to its ultimate conclusion. It was clearly a mistake to take the option of ground troops off the table at the beginning of the war. NATO should have made clear that it was willing to escalate force in direct response to Milosevic's obstinacy, and should have done so from the beginning. NATO was ill-situated to efficiently carry out such a finely graded approach at a time when continued resistance by Milosevic was a distinct reality. Nowhere was the tension among the Allies more acute than in the discussions of the ground option. While NATO's increasing seriousness about a ground war was an important factor in tipping the military and diplomatic balance in its favor, it was a hugely controversial issue. When Secretary Cohen was asked if a consensus would have emerged for the use of ground troops if there had been stronger leadership from the United States, he was dismissive, "I think it's easy to sit on the sidelines and say, if only we had led, they would have followed. But none of those people were part of those conversations. We found strong opposition." General Clark takes a diametrically opposite view, arguing that the Alliance would have responded to more robust leadership. The reality lies somewhere in between. Jim Steinberg pointed out that the issue of ground troops during the Kosovo war needs to be considered within a broader framework. "You don't have a strong consensus for a deployment of American troops under almost any set of circumstances these days—and I don't care who the president is. . . . Look at Desert Storm and how hard it was for President Bush to get support for the use of ground troops there." The deeper politics of American international engagement and the use of ground troops continue to make the United States a reluctant superpower. Indeed, the terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the massive loss of American life

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was the only case in decades where there has been overwhelming bipartisan support for deploying U.S. armed forces with very little debate. Ambassador Holbrooke contended that the matter of ground troops in Kosovo was overplayed. "One way or the other, Milosevic was going to end the bombing. We were never going to have to invade. That was one of the great myths of 1999: that we should have invaded. Why should we have invaded? We went through this and did not lose a single person, got everything we wanted, and the only problem was that we did not ask for enough. Milosevic had to get the bombing stopped; it was destroying his country." Yet, planning for the ground option was instrumental in pressuring Russia to agree to NATO's terms. Signs that the Alliance was improving roads in Albania and had approved a plan to forward deploying into Hungary were decisive. For the Russians, it was the lesser of two evils: settle with Washington or have NATO march through the middle of Europe to Belgrade. NATO's war also highlighted the continuing need to improve command and control arrangements within the Alliance. General Charles Krulak observed, "When we go to war and we go to war as a coalition, there's got to be an ability of the commander to make the call and not have to go through a committee in order to get his decisions blessed." This was a formula that the Alliance increasingly adopted during the war and, in many ways, NATO was fortunate that it could have its operational ability tested in a conflict that did not involve fundamental threats to the survival of member states. In the Department of Defense's after-action report, the Pentagon acknowledged, "The United States must work with our NATO allies to develop an over-arching command and control policy and an agreement for the policy's implementation." This is a remarkable admission for a military alliance that has been in business for over half a century. The dispute between General Jackson and General Clark regarding the Slatina operation are of particular relevance in this regard. While both Clark and Jackson's positions had merit, it is disturbing from an organizational perspective that at a moment of high crisis, flag officers debated strategy back up the chain of command. As Clark emphasized, "What it says for the future is you'd better damn well have thought through the policies before you run through the operations." The whole episode also underscored the prerogative of nations within the NATO command structure. Jackson could go to London and appeal a direct order from a commander and get political backing to refuse to execute an order. "That is not necessarily a bad thing," U.S. Am-


bassador to NATO Sandy Vershbow argued. "NATO is an alliance based on consensus and the voluntary consent of members. If NATO was run like the Warsaw Pact, it probably would not still be around either." However, the Slatina episode demonstrated a very serious issue that NATO will have to address over time.

12

CHAPTER

Conclusion: Hard Lessons

Diplomacy in the Whirlwind The extensive diplomacy chronicled in these pages was an essential element of NATO's political and military approach to waging the war in Kosovo. Diplomacy served as a critical element in maintaining coalition unity and bolstering international support for NATO's actions, yet some of the most important talks during this crisis were those which took place within the Alliance. While Secretary Albright has received deserved criticism for her role in the Rambouillet negotiations and her generally tepid management of the Department of State, far less attention has been paid to the role of her diplomacy once the conflict began. In retrospect, the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy deserve high marks for their intensive collaboration. The foreign ministers and their subordinates were in constant contact, and their efforts amounted to a standing committee for guiding NATO's war. From issues surrounding targeting to the potential ground war, each nation had distinct and deeply held convictions. The labors of the foreign ministers never erased these differences but certainly helped contain and soften them. Due largely to their close coordination, the ministers presented both the Russians and the Yugoslavs with a united front. This common face— backed by the threat of escalating force—ultimately led both the Russians 303


and Yugoslavs to accept NATO's terms. NATO's internal negotiations were messy and exhausting, but produced the desired result. However, the Alliance should also not delude itself: This unity was dangerously shallow. "Part of the story, of course, is that the much-vaunted resolve of the Alliance was incredibly fragile," conceded a senior administration official. "I just don't know how long we could have kept it up." The work of Albright, British Foreign Secretary Cook, and German Foreign Minister Fischer was essential in getting other NATO nations to allow military commanders such as Clark and Short greater latitude in carrying out attacks on a broader array of targets, while the French effectively framed the dangers of collateral damage. By giving both Clark and Secretary-General Solana increasing measures of authority, NATO was able to minimize the number of diplomatic disputes among its ambassadors in Brussels and make the military operation increasingly effective. By the end of the war, both Albright and Cook were reasonably well positioned to secure reluctant support—or at least nonopposition—for a ground war. The foreign ministers also worked assiduously to draw other nations in the region to the Alliance's cause. Allied diplomacy was vital in keeping Albania and Macedonia on board with NATO's plan despite the high cost they faced. Allied diplomatic efforts were also vital in securing the support of other frontline states such as Bulgaria and Romania, and the continual effort to expand the number of nations backing NATO's efforts was key in isolating Yugoslavia. The trilateral diplomacy between the United States, Russia, and Finland was a curious creation. The United States signed on to the trilateral process to contain Russian anger, to demonstrate to its allies that it was pursuing a diplomatic solution, and to buy time for more bombing. Certainly from a military perspective, every day that the United States and others engaged the Finns and Russians in talks was another twenty-four hours that NATO was able to bomb Yugoslavia; a more modern version of Chairman Mao's "fight, fight, talk, talk" axiom. Public opinion in NATO member nations clearly supported diplomatic efforts to end the crisis, and the scores of hours dedicated to the talks demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that NATO was not driven by remorseless military conquest. Active diplomatic efforts were vital in preserving NATO's image as the defender of stability and democracy in Europe. Over time (and much to the surprise of some of the participants), the trilateral talks actually worked. Diplomacy became more than a veneer. The

CONCLUSION: HARD LESSONS * 305

intensive negotiations produced a result that met the Alliance's bottom lines, stopped the bombing, and allowed virtually all of the Kosovar refugees to return home. Given NATO's dominant military and economic position, such an outcome should be expected, although few thought it would be secured through the trilateral channel. Much of the credit for the success of the talks belongs to the intrepid efforts of the respective negotiators— Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Talbott—who fought hard to keep talks alive when prospects were bleak. The involvement of the Finns was something of a coup, from both institutional and personal perspectives. Finnish participation allowed the EU to be represented in the talks without effectively giving that body a veto over proposals. Ahtisaari's role was key in holding together the loose European consensus supporting the diplomacy, and in an almost endless stream of conversations, the Finnish president kept his EU colleagues apprised of developments in both Moscow and Washington. Finnish involvement also helped comfort the Russians and eased the appearance that Kosovo was a Cold War re-creation, pitting East against West. Simply having a third party in the room during talks between Russia and the United States helped create a less polarizing dynamic. By engaging with Russia and Chernomyrdin, NATO gained a steady line of communication with Belgrade and helped to ensure that the UN Security Council could eventually endorse the diplomatic solution to the crisis. While the bureaucracy in Moscow was sharply divided on Kosovo policy—often painfully so—President Yeltsin was able to push through a settlement that achieved his goal of ending the bombing without rupturing Russia's ties to the West. Most seem to agree that Russian concerns can better be addressed directly between Washington and Moscow than through NATO channels. No one deserves more individual credit than Chernomyrdin for forging the peace agreement. To this day, Chernomyrdin continues to take considerable grief from many Russians. For example, Dr. Alexi Arbatov chided Chernomyrdin's "modest intellect and illiterate manner of speaking," claiming that while the envoy "had quite a sober intuitive view of Moscow's general interest" he could not "tell Bosnia from Croatia." Abartov claimed that Talbott outmaneuvered Chernomyrdin and that "in such a diplomatic competition there were no doubts about who would be the winner." Others are kinder. President Yeltsin argued that during the negotiations, Chernomyrdin displayed his best qualities: "the qualities of an old political


fighter—patience, flexibility, and a firm will for intelligent compromise." The fact that the trilateral diplomacy hurt Chernomyrdin politically makes him the real hero of the events, in that he was willing to make a genuine sacrifice for a greater good. He faced down the foreign ministry and defense ministry and was willing personally, financially, and politically to stick his neck out, which not many people are willing to do. Talbott also deserves recognition for his unique role both in the trilateral diplomacy and the stewardship of U.S. policy toward Russia as a whole. Ultimately, it will be the long view of history that judges the performance of the Clinton administration in assisting Russia's economic and political transformation, but the deputy secretary deserves solid marks for his performance during Kosovo. He maintained firm hold of NATO's bottom lines throughout the negotiations and kept a process alive that most gave little chance of success. While there is much to laud about the trilateral diplomatic effort, it is a process that raises some concerns. The arrangement was ad hoc, pulled together in a moment of inspiration at the vice president's residence over breakfast. There is no guarantee that the Alliance will be able to put together as effective a process, or host of personalities, for the next crisis. The careful balance of interests between NATO, the United States, the European Union, and the Russians has no formal institutional construct. There is no assurance that the United States would, or necessarily should, again be given primacy as first among diplomatic equals. One of the reasons that the trilateral process succeeded was that large institutions such as NATO and the EU were willing to vest significant authority in small negotiating teams able to work flexibly and effectively. Collectively, Ahtisaari and Talbott represented some twenty-three nations in the talks. If more of these nations had demanded a seat at the table, the negotiations would in all likelihood have been far less effective in maintaining NATO's redlines. This is a lesson that large institutions all too often ignore, as was the case at Rambouillet. The nascent U.S.-Yugoslav effort to develop a secret back channel for negotiations demonstrated that the desire to open up communications seemed to flow almost equally from both Washington and Belgrade, although such a process appears to have been equally controversial in both capitals. The eagerness of both sides to engage directly with the "enemy" is understandable, and in many ways it seemed a logical endgame to the conflict. Neither Belgrade nor Washington placed much confidence in the trilat-


eral process, and, given that the peace talks at Dayton had ended the war in Bosnia, a face-to-face encounter had precedent. There was a hint of desperation in Washington's eagerness to explore directly engaging Belgrade, although administration officials have downplayed their interest in bilateral talks in interviews after the war. Jim Swigert of Talbott's team argued, "Had it been something that had come to us definitively through a channel that we trusted that Milosevic was looking for a way out and wanted to talk—and had come from Milosevic— that was something we would have taken more seriously. I don't think anything fell into that category." If bilateral negotiations with the Yugoslavs had led to the acceptance of NATO's terms, there would have been a sigh of relief within the Alliance. However, U.S. bilateral diplomacy with Milosevic was already suspect. The final Holbrooke missions on the eve of the bombing failed, and the allies were starting to resent Washington's self-appointed role as interlocutor with Milosevic at a time when everyone's credibility was on the line. While Washington might have hewed a hard line in talks with Milosevic and secured terms as tough as those forged at the Petersberg and the border talks, it also might have been willing to soften demands, and, as one senior diplomat observed, "If we were dealing with Milosevic directly, there would have been no deal that was good enough."

Wither Russia? Engaging Russia on Kosovo was a difficult blessing. Russia reluctantly sided with the West in a fashion that created almost as many problems as it alleviated. Russia helped to effectively isolate Belgrade and pushed Milosevic to accept NATO's terms. Moscow also repeatedly broke its word, suffered a long series of bureaucratic meltdowns, and launched a dangerous unilateral military operation that could have placed it in a direct military confrontation with NATO. Russia managed to look as bad as possible in the process of producing a sound result. The Russian government was in obvious and painful turmoil throughout the conflict. President Yeltsin's health was tenuous to the point of calling into question his control over the government, and in the midst of vital negotiations, rivalry and obfuscation erupted between the respective Russian ministries. Russian rhetoric throughout the episode was bellicose and extreme. Even


moderate voices, such as Chernomyrdin, repeatedly warned that Kosovo could result in a sea of blood or a third world war—hardly the behavior of a modern, moderate European nation. The Russian movement of forces to the Slatina airbase showed a Russian government perilously close to free fall, willing to risk the potential exchange of fire with NATO forces in an effort to improve its negotiating position. Further, the notion that the Russian polity could almost rupture under the stress of Kosovo policy does not augur well for its behavior in times of major internal crisis. Kosovo also underscored the frailty of Russian civilian control over the military and intelligence services. On a broad level, Russia's choices during the Kosovo conflict demonstrate that Moscow is still grappling to shed a dominantly Cold War mindset as it expands its ties to the West. Too often, and particularly within its power ministries, Russia continues to view regional security developments as a zero-sum game: If it is good for the West, it is bad for Russia; if it is bad for the West, it is good for Russia. The fact that Russia would risk so much of its limited political capital in an effort to preserve Slobodan Milosevic's power showed breath takingly limited vision. Grand strategic considerations aside, almost all the officials involved with the U.S.-Russian diplomacy on Kosovo identified the rather dilapidated state of the Russian bureaucracy as a key impediment. As Jim O'Brien commented, "The Russians always assumed that we were about to pull some trick on them—they were incredibly suspicious—and always felt rushed because they didn't have time to absorb what we were pursuing. They were consistently fearful that they were going to be put on a side that they didn't want to be put on." "I feel that we overestimated Russia's strategic competence," a senior U.S. diplomat contended. "It was like playing chess with somebody who doesn't know the rules. They knew what it should look like—they weren't batting the pieces off the board—but they didn't know where they were headed, and they didn't have a bureaucracy capable of effectively going through the motions." NATO kept confronting the Russians with fast-moving and complicated issues that required Moscow to have a clear sense of their own objectives and the machinery to achieve those objectives. Russia had neither. Yet, for all the flaws in Russia's approach to the Balkans, and despite its many strategic gaffes, Russian involvement in Kosovo was surprisingly positive. Throughout the conflict, the United States and Russia remained in constant contact. Secretary Albright, National Security Advisor Berger, Deputy


Secretary Talbott, and Ambassador Collins spoke daily with a cast of characters that included Foreign Minister Ivanov, Prime Ministers Primakov and Stepashin, Special Envoy Chernomyrdin, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, and Ambassador Ushakov. Conversations at lower bureaucratic levels were also constant. For all the vitriol in the public rhetoric, the Kosovo crisis provided daily evidence of a level and breadth of fundamental engagement between Russia and the United States that would have been unthinkable fifteen years before. These intensive discussions took place before the trilateral effort was in place, and were often independent of that process. As much as the two sides exasperated each other, both parties realized that they needed to work with the other to resolve an issue of profound importance. In looking at both U.S. and Russian behavior during the air campaign, the mind's eye is naturally drawn to moments of high crisis such as Slatina. In reality, the steady traffic of engagement during the war may be of the greatest historical significance. Russian forces ultimately participated as peacekeepers on the ground within established guidelines acceptable to NATO. Russian diplomatic efforts were instrumental in reaching an accord with Belgrade that was unambiguous and achieved the international community's goals. Russian support of the trilateral agreement effectively isolated Yugoslavia, and its diplomatic efforts helped NATO avoid having to launch a ground war. Chernomyrdin argued that Russia was brought into the diplomatic process precisely because the United States and NATO "were looking for a way out. They realized it would not be over in two or three months." Both the Russian military and intelligence services, restrained by civilian leadership, largely avoided the repeated opportunities to wage a proxy war in the Balkans by providing Milosevic's forces with substantial military hardware or intelligence. Nothing illustrated Moscow's awkward stance toward the West better than Russian public opinion. In USIA polling after the war, more than 80 percent of Russians believed that the United States sought world domination, with roughly the same number of respondents agreeing that the United States was trying to make Russia a "second-rate power." NATO expansion, military action in the Balkans, and continued economic difficulties all combined to give Russians a very jaundiced view of their place in the world. However, despite this growing mistrust, almost seven in ten Russians said they believed it was in Russia's best interests to work closely with the United States and other Western powers.


Russia's political leadership, largely in the form of President Yeltsin, successfully avoided letting deep public resentment of NATO's actions rupture the nation's ties to the West. Yeltsin understood that Western support for Russian reform was essential to keeping his country on track. He had not fought a decade worth of internal struggles to see his legacy destroyed in a dispute over the political machinations of Slobodan Milosevic. A Russia on war footing with NATO would be a Russia where Communists and ultranationalists quickly replaced reform. Russian media, over time, began to reflect a greater variety of opinions about the conflict and about the Russian troop push to Pristina—an important sign of a functioning civil society. Even the rush to Pristina, one of the most dangerous elements of Russia's involvement in Kosovo, was carried out without an actual conflict breaking out between Russian and NATO forces. Yeltsin, as always, had been emotional, unpredictable, and focused on bringing a democratic Russia closer to the West. General Jackson observed that the Russian decision to endorse the trilateral agreement was "the single event that appeared to me to have the greatest significance in ending the war." Similarly, Sandy Berger noted, "I think the war ended metaphorically when Ahtisaari finished his presentation, Milosevic turned to Chernomyrdin and asked if that was the best he could get, and Chernomyrdin said yes. At that point, Milosevic had no external safe harbor, no external support." According to author Tim Judah, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic later noted that the loss of Russian support was "I must admit, very relevant." Without a superpower to cling to, Yugoslavia was alone. Despite serious mistakes at Rambouillet, and in the management of Balkans policy as a whole, engagement with Russia during the Kosovo war was carried out in a fashion that advanced the Alliance's overall goals without needlessly alienating Moscow. The numerous headaches of collaboration with an often-dysfunctional Russia pale in comparison to the cost of failing to bring Russia into the family of modern states. Partnership and periodic confrontation between the United States and Russia will continue to be united in an uneasy marriage for some time.

The Trojan War President Ahtisaari of Finland has consistently maintained since the conflict that the Russian effort to seize the Slatina airfield was designed to effectively

CONCLUSION: HARD LESSONS * 311 partition Kosovo as part of a secret agreement with Milosevic. H e insisted that no other explanation fully encompasses the confusing events of those frenetic days. "I am convinced that it had been agreed between the Russian armed forces as well as intelligence services and the Yugoslav leadership that Russia would take control of the northern part of Kosovo and form a sector of its own." Ahtisaari felt the secret plan explains why Milosevic approved the peace offer he brought to Belgrade, and why the Russians worked to stall the military-technical talks to buy more time. Ahtisaari added, " T h e Russians would have flown in 10,000 or so and they would have established their own sector. I think it is proven. A n d Milosevic knew that. And that is why the Russians left the mater of deployment open." Perhaps Ahtisaari is only guilty of understatement when he suggested, "It would have been a rather unpleasant situation." Ahtisaari insisted: In the back of his [Milosevic's] mind must have been this Russian plan, otherwise I cannot see why he would accept. I do not believe this talk of the ground offensive convinced him. Because he knew perfectly well what the mood in NATO was. You might have gotten the United States and Great Britain to do this, but nobody else. . . . You would never have gotten the French or the Germans. So I come back again. Why did it go so smoothly? I had warned Strobe, that if I were Milosevic, I would demand a second round. He may want to replace us both—myself and Strobe—and get Albright or Gore or someone else to come. Ahtisaari felt that if Milosevic was aware of the Russian plan, "he must have been terribly disappointed with the Russians when that did not actually happen. If they had been able to fly the thousands of forces—and I don't k n o w how many people they had in reserve, but it was thousands, a major consignment of troops—that would have created a fait accom pli on the ground." Others doubt Ahtisaari's theory. As one senior U.S. diplomat argued: If it was a partition deal, it was a pretty poorly thought out partition scheme. The idea that a small force of Russians would move from Bosnia down to the airport in Pristina and then draw a new line through Kosovo and send in reinforcements to hold that line that would be backing off entirely agreements that they had painstakingly worked out with the United States, that had been


enshrined in a G-8 agreement and then introduced into the Security Council, doesn't make sense to me. A senior Balkans expert commented, "It was a macho move to show they were still capable of surprises, and to raise the morale of the Serbs as well. The relative cooperation we have seen since then suggests that it wasn't a broader plot. Milosevic may well have had this in the back of his mind, to set up a partition line concentrated in the northern areas, but I think he was scrambling and didn't have such a well thought out plan." Jim Steinberg reflects the view of most of those involved when he observed that "the evidence is profoundly contradictory" regarding both Russian and Yugoslav intentions. Certainly, Milosevic made every effort to facilitate the Russian move into Kosovo, and the Russian and Yugoslav intelligence and military services closely coordinated their efforts. If Milosevic accepted the NATO demands on the basis of the hope that the Russians would secure northern Kosovo, it was a miscalculation that ultimately ended his career. However, it is difficult to believe that Milosevic had enough faith in the Russian military—the same military that had provided so little in the way of assistance to him in the past—to place great confidence in their ability to prevail in a direct contest of will with NATO. Perhaps Milosevic saw an opportunity to create what he viewed as useful mayhem. A possible military clash between NATO and Russia, a small portion of Kosovo under Russian control, firelights between Russian forces and the KLA—all were possibilities that would provide Milosevic with openings he could potentially exploit. It is also not clear that Russia would have been willing to endure the considerable international fallout it would have experienced if it actually tried to split Kosovo in two. The evidence on the Russian side seems to indicate strongly that Moscow's primary goal in bringing in the troops was to improve its negotiating position with NATO regarding command and control arrangements for KFOR. Senior NATO officials acknowledge that Russia would have gotten even less favorable command and control arrangements without a presence on the ground in Kosovo. The Russians were correct in believing that NATO wanted to deploy its troops first and then discuss KFOR's structure with Russia second. However, in strengthening their negotiating position, the Russian military and intelligence services appeared hazardously out of control, and the lack of coordination and professionalism between the ministries was striking.


The incident also underscored that the defense and intelligence services still view civilian authority as something of a nicety. A Western diplomat maintained, "It was a scary development to see how Ivashov behaved. If this was an indication of the freedom of movement of Russian generals, they could do anything." By most accounts, the Russian military was not openly insubordinate; they were simply playing within the loose framework of rules in place in Moscow. The trouble is that Trojan Horse exposed exactly how loose civilian control is over the power ministries. As a U.S. diplomat argued, "The good news, for those worried about a virtual military coup in Russia and the break down of constitutional order, was that Yeltsin did indeed, sort of, in his fashion, approve the move. The bad news was that he approved the move—thus putting on display his unpredictability, and the dangerousness of his half in/ half out state, his irascibility, and his anger at the U.S. and the West." Acting on a general directive from Yeltsin, the military demonstrated its willingness to engage in some very poorly thought out brinkmanship. The independence-minded ways of the power ministries has been a fact of life since the Soviet Union collapsed. The shallowness of Russia's strategic thinking during Trojan Horse—when it was willing to trade the wide range of its growing cooperation with the West to assuage the resentments of Soviet-era generals—is astounding. As a senior Clinton administration official argued, it was as if the "anger and humiliation of watching NATO bomb Yugoslavia had a kind of delayed reaction." The Russian leadership—and Russian common sense—had managed to keep the worst of the Russian reaction in check throughout the bombing, "only to stumble into the single biggest crisis in U.S.-Russian relations of the post—Cold War period, and arguably the first military confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis." Of equal importance is the United States and NATO response to the Russian actions. As previously noted, the splits between Generals Clark and Jackson highlight a serious problem within NATO regarding its own command and control. Further, officials still debate over which of these two men had the sounder approach for responding to Trojan Horse. Sandy Berger reflected on the debate over how best to deal with the Russian maneuver. "Suddenly, we find out that this unit has gone from Bosnia into Pristina. . . . The only issues that night were over what was the best way, tactically, to deal with the Russians." Berger concluded, "A military confrontation with the


Russians was not wise. I think ultimately that was the right decision." A senior NATO official largely agreed, "It was a tactical setback, but in military terms there were risks of actual exchanges of fire with Russian forces that would not have been a good way to start the operation. Probably in hindsight, the British were right: We simply did not effectively have the means to capture the airport before the Russians did." In contrast, one senior NATO official argued, "Now it doesn't matter, but in the sense that the Russians could have learned that those heavyhanded tactics don't pay, and that they result in humiliation, it probably would have been worth it. But nobody wanted the aggravation." General Clark was justified in seeking to take swift and decisive action to prevent Russian forces from seizing the Slatina airfield and creating new facts on the ground. Russian behavior had been disruptive and erratic, and the presence of thousands of Russian troops on the ground in Kosovo absent an agreement with NATO would have spelled disaster. That said, Jackson's less-confrontational approach to dealing with the Russians has a powerful argument on its side: It worked. A military clash was avoided and the Russian troops at the airport were effectively isolated. Jim Steinberg added his view, "Things worked out, but to this day I am not satisfied I know the answer to whether the Russians fully knew what their objectives were or if they just launched the operation. I am inclined to a fairly malign view of their intentions, particularly with the extreme effort to reinforce their positions. It was a terrific piece of diplomacy, and the single best endorsement for NATO expansion, that we got the Hungarians and Romanians to block the airspace." Russia's behavior during the Slatina episode only served to push its neighbors closer to the arms of NATO and the West—yet another strategic blunder on Moscow's part. Instead of strengthening their regional position, Russia often seems to be acting like the chair of a NATO membership drive. There is no better illustration of Europe's ongoing transformation than the saga of Russian attempts to secure overflight clearances from the states bordering Kosovo. As the prime ministers and foreign ministers of Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary wrestled with the question of granting permission for overflights, they each made a conscious decision that risking Russia's ire was far preferable to burning their bridges to the West. The desirability of prospective membership in the European Union, NATO, and other institutions burned bright in their minds. These nations also shared a


common belief that Russian adventurism in Kosovo might make Russian adventurism in their own territory more likely. Perhaps the most important lesson of the Slatina episode is that Russia simply had not yet earned the trust of the international community. The pull toward adventurism and obstructionism are still too strong in the defense and intelligence services for Western military officials to view Moscow as a genuine partner. The rush to Slatina provides the perfect illustration of why Russia did not deserve to have its own peacekeeping sector.

What Putin Learned It is no surprise that the complexion of Russia's leadership changed dramatically when President Yeltsin stood down on January 1, 2000, and appointed Vladimir Putin as his successor. Vowing economic reforms and a tough stand toward Chechnya, Putin swept to a comfortable election margin in March 2000. However, concerns lingered that Putin would tilt Russia to an increasingly authoritarian bent given his earlier career as a KGB officer, and early efforts by Putin to crack down on the Russian press heightened these fears. President George W. Bush took office in the United States in January 2001 after campaigning on getting tough with Moscow and a steady drumbeat of "Who lost Russia?" questions. It appeared that the U.S.-Russian relationship might remain in a long down cycle. The entire Kosovo war raised the larger question of whether Russia's tilt to a "strong" leader such as President Putin was an inevitable by-product of NATO expansion and the Alliance's use of force in the Balkans. Some commentators claimed that Putin's rise was a natural reflection of Russia's anger and frustration with NATO's bombing of Kosovo and a belief that Russians needed an iron hand to deal with the West and with internal problems like Chechnya. However, the consensus seems to be that the entire experience of the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall was so painful for Russia that a backlash was almost inevitable. Strobe Talbott observed, "I think the world underestimates how many concessions we got out of the Russians for seven years. We underestimate the price to be paid for that in terms of toughness we encountered after Yeltsin, and Kosovo was a big part of that—much more so than NATO enlargement. NATO enlargement would have gone much, much more smoothly if the enlarged NATO had


then not promptly gone to war." Similarly, a senior U.S. diplomat confided, "We knew since 1991 that this would come, a period of nostalgia and longing for a strong hand." While a swing to the right may have been the inevitable by-product of the hard realities of Russian reform, Kosovo did mark a rise in influence of the military and intelligence services that continues until today, and will continue to be a problem in the future. As one White House official noted during the conflict, Russia's long historical experience had molded a national character that seemed incapable of understanding "winning without cruelty." In that respect, the Russians must have been truly puzzled by the actions of the United States. Despite a dominant military position, the United States continually reached out to weaker adversaries and partners. Unable to understand the Kosovo intervention in humanitarian terms, Moscow had to see it as part of a larger plot to undermine Russia. Throughout the marathon negotiations to end the war, the Americans endured Russia's unpredictability, raised voices, and long negotiating sessions patiently, in measured tones, while giving very little ground. Perhaps this was a new form of U.S. cruelty—rationality used as a blunt instrument of political will. Maybe the real power of the United States was measured in the dispassionate tones of vast economic power and military might held largely in check. The terror attacks on Washington and New York of September 11, 2001, abruptly changed the calculus of U.S.-Russian relations. For many, September 11 seemed to signal a fundamental shift in U.S.-Russian relations, with much being made of the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to telephone President George W. Bush to express both his concern and support in the wake of the attacks. Certainly, the notion that Russia would acquiesce to what will likely be a long-term U.S. military presence in the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan borders on the revolutionary and would have been difficult to imagine without the events of September 11. Yet, it is probably wiser to look at Putin's foreign policy as far more evolutionary than revolutionary and his views were deeply shaped by the Kosovo experience that took place as his rise through the ranks of power was approaching its most meteoric. By siding with the United States after September 11, President Putin was able to do in one fell swoop something that had evaded Russia since the Soviet Union had crumbled: He was able to define Russia as fundamentally Western in civilizational terms. After September 11, Putin was astute enough


to understand that all the concerns about Chechnya, corruption, stalled reforms, and still-lingering Soviet mind-sets could be largely supplanted by one bold stroke of fundamental partnership. Instead of constantly being vilified as "Milosevic's defense attorney," Russia could be seen as an ally against Osama bin Laden. This was also a canny reading of American President George W. Bush, a man whose approach to foreign policy has relied more on personalities and broad strokes rather than nuance. It is not hard to understand the appeal of cooperation for Putin. First, it would make it more likely that he could realize his fundamental goal of achieving closer economic integration with the West, which he has always seen as essential to restoring Russia's status as a great power. Second, Putin reflexively understood that partnership would help galvanize the international community to deal with the "green wave" of Islamic extremism that Russian policymakers had long cited as a central strategic threat, while blunting criticism of Russia's often-brutal actions in Chechnya. After seeing U.S. military power on display in Kosovo, what could be better for Russia than having the United States do the dirty work of driving the Taliban out of Afghanistan? It is also telling that the initial reaction of the power ministries following September 11 was all too predictable, sounding much like Kosovo redux, with recently installed Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov saying, "I can see no grounds, even hypothetical, for a possible NATO deployment in Central Asian states." Russia was once again acting just like the strong-headed, shortsighted, and reluctant partner with which Washington had become so frustrated. Once again, Russia was treating Central Asia like a client state, just as it had done with Yugoslavia for much of the 1990s. But Putin marshaled his considerable popularity, and a level of parliamentary support that Yeltsin had never enjoyed, to overrule his generals and seemingly give the West carte blanche in going after terrorists. The events of Kosovo help explain this shift. It is easy to understand why the Kosovo war made Putin less anxious about "NATO aggression." The constant wrangling between NATO members about actions in the former Yugoslavia and the extreme reluctance to pursue military attacks against Milosevic—even when he was on his worst behavior—made evident that NATO was anything but a reckless belligerent eager to strike against Russia. NATO was happy to survive the Kosovo experience, and there was little enthusiasm to use it as a template for new military interventions. Intervening against Russia to protect Chechnya is a nightmare


that sends a shudder down the spines of most NATO ministers. Equally telling, Putin has also likely realized—as the Slatina operation demonstrated— that his often-reactionary military forces are capable of doing great harm if left unchecked. Similarly, Putin also cooled his rhetoric in opposition to NATO expansion, understanding that the larger the alliance becomes, the more bureaucratic its behavior. Further, intense Russian lobbying against NATO expansion only made those countries in Russia's "near abroad" more apprehensive and eager to join the mainstream European defense and economic community. Indeed, Putin has chosen to pursue greater integration with NATO structures, including the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002, reasoning that a place at the table is probably the best means to slow NATO from acting against Russia's interests. Putin had always been angry that President Yeltsin repeatedly lost face for Russia on the international stage. Yeltsin would always take strong initial stands—against NATO expansion and against the use of force, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo—and then back down. Putin prefers to begin from an initial appearance of agreement, or at least a willingness to negotiate, and then try to defend his bottom line to the best of his ability. He would appear to believe that the best way to play a weak hand well is to minimize the bluster. Putin believes that Russian greatness must be borne on the back of a strong Russian economy, and his carefully calculated foreign policy in the wake of September 11 should not lead Western observers to believe that he has experienced some dramatic change of heart. Events since September 11 have revealed a decidedly authoritarian bent in Putin. Rather than building the institutions of a modern democracy, the Russian leader has preferred to centralize power in the Kremlin. He has cracked down on the media, manipulated elections that he would have won easily without such machinations, and undercut the wealthy oligarchs who potentially threatened his position. Yet, for all his appeals to strength, Russia under Putin remains a very messy place, and the specter of Chechnya continues to cast a long shadow. In October 2002, Chechen rebels took more than 700 hostages at a Moscow theater. The rebels and 120 of the hostages were killed when Russian security forces stormed the building. This was another stark reminder that no matter how much Putin and his military chiefs claimed to have brought the conflict in Chechnya under control, Moscow's blunt and often indis-


criminate use of force in Chechnya had neither broken the back of the insurgents nor created any substantial momentum for peace talks. In September 2004, Russia and the world were appalled as Chechens seized a large school in Beslan, Russia, and wired the building with explosives. After the Chechens shot a number of hostages, Russian security forces and armed locals assaulted the school and ultimately more than 300 were left dead, more than half of them children. Russians and the international community alike were amazed by Chechen terror tactics that targeted innocent school children. Putin's response was also of concern. In the wake of Beslan, he announced plans to appoint, rather than elect, regional governors, and unmercifully harassed Russian journalists trying to offer a reasoned account of the events in Beslan. In an address to the nation, Putin declared, "We showed ourselves to be weak, and the weak get beaten," while simultaneously implying that the West was somehow responsible for the depredations of Beslan. At the core, Putin seems incapable of understanding that Russia's incredibly cruel treatment of Chechnya's Muslims and his own authoritarian tendencies had directly nurtured the Chechen extremism. After Beslan, Putin seemed genuinely angry and confused when Western leaders were reluctant to simply add Chechnya as another front on the global war on terror. The United States and its allies would be wise to learn from Russia the limits of brute force in ripping out the roots of extremism and terror. Military force ultimately will prove hollow unless accompanied by sound political and diplomatic initiatives. The Kosovo experience probably helped convince Putin that pursuing a policy of selective foreign policy engagement was more practical, given the constant demands of Russia's domestic situation. Russia is simply no longer in a position to be considered as a major player in every foreign policy event, despite its seat on the Security Council, and is better served by picking its fights more selectively. Ultimately, Russia's long foot-dragging on Kosovo bought Moscow very little: NATO went ahead with its military operation, the rush to the Slatina airfield ended weakly, Milosevic was delivered to The Hague for trial, the effectiveness of Russia's UN Security Council veto was diluted, and most of the states in southeastern Europe were left convinced that Moscow remained dangerously provocative. From Putin's perspective, there was very little to be gained by reflexively opposing the United States and NATO. In some ways, Russian foreign policy is evolving much more like that of


western Europe. Moscow, like most of Europe, is apprehensive about U.S. unilateralism and the disproportionate influence enjoyed by Washington in a largely unipolar world. Russia, like Europe, is willing to creatively use its foreign policy mechanisms to slow or block the United States—while carefully avoiding the appearance of pure obstructionism. Often this means framing arguments within the context of debates about international law although, as Chechnya makes clear, Russia's regard for the sanctity of international law remains distinctly selective. Similarly, Russian public opinion toward the United States looks more and more like that in the rest of Europe, where opposition to U.S. policies is intense but sentiments toward American society, freedoms, and openness remain enduringly positive.

Kosovo Today While the transatlantic community was clearly overjoyed with Milosevic's demise and his delivery to The Hague, its stewardship of Kosovo has been an uneasy one. The slow, slogging, and often frustrating business of reconstruction and enforcing the peace among former combatants has not been easy. The often-articulated dream of a peaceful and multiethnic Kosovo has largely remained a chimera. Large numbers of Serbs have fled the province, and those who remain are clustered together in small enclaves. The level of violence by ethnic Albanians against Serbs has slowed from high levels immediately after the war, but Serbs remain very much a persecuted minority within Kosovo. The issue of Kosovo's ultimate status remains awkwardly unresolved, and the international community has shown little stomach for addressing the issue. Restive Kosovar Albanians, still eager to ultimately secure independence, have pushed the international community to give the institutions of self-government greater authority. In contrast, the Kosovar Serb community wants no part of living within an independent Kosovo. The issue of Kosovo has become a frequent topic of nationalist political appeals in both Pristina and Belgrade. Once again, the notion of partitioning the province has gained some currency, although such a process could well trigger as much upheaval as it resolves. Some progress has been made. Elections for provincial bodies have been held, reconstruction has moved forward, and a police force has been de-


ployed. Yet, unemployment among the province's overwhelmingly young population is still dauntingly high, and little international investment has been attracted to Kosovo. Squabbles between Belgrade, Pristina, and the international community over everything from who should issue license plates to the design of postage stamps have demonstrated that a tremendous reservoir of ill-will still sits between the ethnic Albanian and Serb communities. KFOR has faced provocations both from extremist Kosovar Albanian and Kosovar Serbs since it was deployed, and the United Nations remains the effective administrator of daily life in Kosovo. Western officials continue to insist that the institutions of Kosovo simply need more time to mature and meet international standards before the question of status can be resolved. Actors on the ground are less inclined to embrace such a wait-and-see approach. Ethnic Albanian rebels have continued to foment unrest not only in Kosovo, but in neighboring Macedonia and Albania as well. As long as independence remains an open question, politicians, criminals, and ideologues in the region will be able to exploit the issue to advance their own agendas. The hard work of democratic reform in both Serbia and Kosovo will be quite difficult when the most fundamental question of Kosovo's status is up in the air. The dangers of Kosovo's economic and political limbo became painfully apparent in March 2004. After two Kosovar Albanian teens drowned, the local media claimed that Serbs had a hand in the deaths. The province erupted in violence, and Kosovar Albanian mobs rampaged in cities and small towns. When the dust had settled, nineteen people were left dead, hundreds injured, and thousands of homes and at least thirty Serbian Orthodox churches damaged. With the UN struggling to effectively administer Kosovo, the dangers of more widespread violence were self-evident. The March 2004 riots, while remarkably disruptive, focused international attention on the need to resolve Kosovo's final status. Talks on final status were tentatively scheduled to move forward in mid-2005, but Europe and the United States have both approached the process with great reluctance. Nationalist politicians in Serbia have continued to advocate radically decentralizing Kosovo, although these proposals are widely viewed as an effort to partition northern Kosovo and make it part of Serbia proper. All leading Kosovar Albanian politicians are adamant in their demands for full independence, and Serbs and Albanians within Kosovo now have remarkably little interaction in their daily lives. Less then one percent of Serbs in Kosovo par-


ticipated in the province's parliamentary elections in October 2004, and Kosovo's Serbs and Albanians are increasingly disgruntled with the province's state of suspended animation. Ethnic tolerance and coexistence continue to be far from the order of the day. Having waged a war over Kosovo, NATO and the international community remain profoundly uncertain what to do with Kosovo now that the fate of the province is in their hands. If they have learned any lesson from the bitter experiences of the 1990s, it should be that such problems cannot simply be set aside for another day. After the terrible tragedies that claimed so much innocent life, there is now an opportunity for the Balkans to take a peaceful and prosperous place within modern Europe. But for this goal to become a reality, hard choices still need to be made, and they need to be made sooner rather than later.

Bibliography

This account draws from numerous sources in addition to my personal recollections and interviews with those involved, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street journal, The Guardian, USA Today, The Economist, CNN, BBC, TIME Magazine, Newsweek, Public Broadcasting Service, National Public Radio, Tanjung, the Washington Times, Reuters, Associated Press, and United Press International. Two first-rate documentaries, and the accompanying transcripts of their interviews, were also of particular use: Moral Combat: NATO at War by the BBC; and, "War in Europe," a PBS Frontline production. While literature on Kosovo continues to grow by the day, a number of books were also of tremendous utility in piecing together this narrative, including memoirs by Finnish President Ahtisaari, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Gen. Wes Clark, Secretary Albright, Russian Prime Minister Primakov, and Deputy Secretary Talbott. Historical accounts of the war by Tim Judah, Ivo Daalder, and Michael O'Hanlon and the Kosovo Commission are also recommended. Ahtisaari, Martti. Mission to Belgrade. Helsinki, Finland: WSOY Press, 2000. Albright, Madeleine (with Bill Woodward). Madam Secretary. New York: Mirimax Books, 2003. Arbatov, Dr. Alexi. The Kosovo Crisis: The End of the Post-Cold War Era. Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, March 2000. Ash, Timothy Garten. "Kosovo: Was It Worth It?" The New York Review of Books (September 21, 2000). Boyer, Peter J. "General Clark's Battles." The New Yorker (November 17, 2003). Buckley, William, ed. Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000. 323

324 * BIBLIOGRAPHY Byman, David L., and Matthew C. Waxman. "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate." International Security (Spring 2000). Chomsky, Noam. The New Military Humanism: lessons from Kosovo. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999. Clark, Wesley K. Waging Modern War. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Cordesman, Anthony. The lessons and Non-lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999. Daalder, Ivo. Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O'Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. Danner, Mark. "Bosnia: The Great Betrayal." The New York Review of Books (March 26, 1998). . "America and the Bosnia Genocide." The New York Review of Books (December 4, 1997). Deutch, John, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft. "Saving NATO's Foundation." Foreign Affairs (November/December 1999). Donnelley, Thomas. "Lessons Unlearned: A Comparison of Three American Wars." The National Interest (Summer 2000). Fromkin, David. Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields. New York: Free Press, 1999. Galen, Ted, ed. NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War. Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2000. Hagen, William W. "The Balkans' Lethal Nationalisms." Foreign Affairs (July/ August 1999). Halberstam, David. War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals. New York: Simon and Schuster. 2002. Hedges, Chris. "Kosovo's Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs ( May/June 1999). Hirsh, Michael. "The Fall Guy: Washington's Self-Defeating Assault on the U.N." Foreign Affairs (November/December 1999). Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. New York: Random House, 1998. . "The Road to Sarajevo." The New Yorker (October 21 & 28, 1996). Homser, Stephen. Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Press, 2001. Ignatieff, Michael. Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. New York: Henry Holt, 2000. . "The New American Way of War." The New York Review of Books (July 20, 2000).

BIBLIOGRAPHY * 325 . "Balkan Physics." The New Yorker (May 10, 1999). . "Homage to Bosnia." The New York Review of Books (April 21, 1994). Independent International Commission on Kosovo. Kosovo Report. Conflict, International Response, lessons learned. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Judah, Tim. Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. . "Will There Be a War in Kosovo?" The New York Review of Books (May 14, 1998). Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History. New York: Vintage Books, 1993. Kennan, George F. Introduction to The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan, by International Commission to Inquiry into Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment, 1993. Krauthammer, Charles. "The Short, Unhappy Life of Humanitarian War." The National Interest {VAX 1999). Levitin, Oleg. "Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle." Survival (Spring 2000). Little, Alan, and Tom Giles. Moral Combat: NATO at War. [Documentary.] London: BBC 2, 2000. Luttwak, Edward N. "Give War a Chance." Foreign Affairs (July/August 1999). Maas, Peter. love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996. Malcolm, Noel. Kosovo: A Short History. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Mandelbaum, Michael. "A Perfect Failure." Foreign Affairs (September/October 1999). Mertus, Julie. Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999. Motes, Mary. Kosova-Kosovo: A Prelude to War 1966-1999. Homestead, FL: Redland Press, 1998. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "Redefining the National Interest." Foreign Affairs (July/August 1999). Posen, Barry R. "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy." International Security (Spring 2000). Rieff, David. "A New Age of Liberal Imperialism?" World Policy Journal (Summer 1999). . Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. Rodman, Peter S. "The Fallout from Kosovo." Foreign Affairs (July/August 1999). Rohde, David. "Kosovo Seething." Foreign Affairs (May/June 2000).

326 * BIBLIOGRAPHY Ross, Stewart, and R.G. Grant. The War in Kosovo. Austin, TX: Raintree SteckVaugn, 2000. Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. The Death of Yugoslavia. [Documentary.] London: Penguin, BBC, 1995. Solana, Javier. "NATO's Success in Kosovo." Foreign Affairs (November/December 1999). Steinberg, James. "A Perfect Polemic: Blind to Reality on Kosovo." Foreign Affairs (November/December 1999). Talbott, Strobe. The Russia Hand. New York: Random House, 2002. Taylor, Scott. Inat: Images of Serbia and the Kosovo Conflict. Ottawa: Esprit de Corps, 2000. U.S. Department of Defense. Kosovo: Operation Allied Force, After-Action Report to Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. Vojin, Joksimovich, and Anita Basil-Jenkins, eds. Kosovo Crisis: A Study in Foreign Policy Mismanagement. Los Angeles, CA: Graphics Management Press, 1999. Young, Rick, and Michael Kirk. "War in Europe." [Documentary.] Washington, D.C.: PBS Frontline!Channel 4, 2000.

Index

Ahtisaari, Martti, xiii, 8 6 - 9 1 , 102, 108, 121, 126, 130, 139, 147-49, 152, 154, 156, 162, 182-88, 191-94, 210, 213, 215, 2 2 0 - 2 1 , 224, 289, 298, 305, 306, 310-11; Chernomyrdin discussions, 104-5, 158; Talbott discussions, 68, 88-90, 104, 13233, 149-50, 163, 195-97, 203-4; trilateral discussions, 111-12, 122— 23, 133-37, 140-41, 143-46, 165-79 Akashi, Yasushi, 95 Albright, Madeleine, xix, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31,33,39,40,41-42,50-51, 58, 63, 64, 68, 86, 89, 91, 97, 98, 107, 108-9, 110, 113-14, 117-18, 126, 133, 136-37, 139, 145-46, 150, 159, 162, 163-64, 170-71, 177, 197, 209, 213, 215, 217, 221, 242, 243, 244-46, 260, 265-66, 272, 280, 281, 282-83, 297, 304, 308, 311; "Albright's war," 26-27, 54; Cook discussions, 137-38, 153, 154, 195, 204, 227; Ivanov discussions, 12-14, 16-18, 19-20, 41-42, 44, 53-54, 78, 82, 157-58, 202-3, 224-25, 244-47, 285-86, 289-90; "quint" discussions, 11, 137, 153— 55, 1 5 9 - 6 0 , 2 0 4 - 5 , 2 1 2 Annan, Kofi, 14, 39-40, 68, 76-78, 83,

84, 86, 89, 94, 116, 132, 137, 230; Talbott discussions, 76-78, 106-7 Arbatov, Alexi, 305 Arbour, Louise, 130, 132, 146 Avdeyev, Aleksandr, 32-35, 129, 202, 218,23 4-35,250 Axworthy, Lloyd, 195 Bacon, Ken, 94, 189, 204, 209, 223 Barmyantsev, Yevgeny, 211, 213, 218-19 Bass, John, xiii Berger, Samuel "Sandy," 2 - 3 , 7, 10, 19, 27-28, 29, 30, 37-39, 50, 54-55, 58, 60, 61, 64, 65, 79, 84-86, 94, 107, 110-11, 115-19, 126, 129, 136-37, 150, 162, 163, 170, 1 8 1 82, 189-91, 194, 197, 215, 243-44, 247, 262, 266, 269, 276, 278, 2 8 2 83, 291, 294, 297, 308, 310, 313-14 Bitterlich, Joachim, 95, 199 Blagojevich, Rod, 78-79 Blair, Tony, 9, 21, 29, 47, 48, 53, 55, 59, 62, 93, 129, 212, 290; Clinton discussions, 57-59 Boiling, Landrum, 78-79, 98-98, 127, 138-39 bombing pause, 18-20, 22, 27-29, 33, 39, 59, 66-67, 70, 73, 78, 83, 90, 102, 105, 109, 144, 158, 167, 175,

327

328 * INDEX 186, 195, 201, 202, 204, 209-14, 216, 222-23, 225, 227. See also NATO, demands Bourne, Guy, 179, 204, 235, 261, 263 Bugarcic, Bojan, 11-12, 127, 133, 139, 163-64, 184 Burns, Nick, 209 Casey, George, 100, 140, 144, 204, 233, 234, 237, 239, 249, 260, 2 6 3 64, 270, 279 Central Intelligence Agency, xi-xii, 8, 94 Chance, Ken, 237 Chechnya, xx, 15, 36, 71, 253, 256, 315,317 Chernomyrdin, Viktor, xii, 42-44, 51, 52, 54, 59, 60, 64-66, 69, 76, 78, 82, 88, 90, 91, 94-95, 98-99, 102, 103, 106, 107, 108, 124, 132, 138, 139, 147, 150, 154, 156, 157, 15960, 162, 165-79, 195, 217, 240, 305-6, 308, 309, 310; Ahtisaari discussions, 104-5, 158; Milosevic meetings, 59, 79-80, 112, 151-53, 182-87, 191-94; Talbott discussions, 70-74, 89, 101-2, 125-26, 229-30; trilateral discussions, 1 1 1 12, 122-23, 133-37, 140-41, 143-46; Washington trip, 83-87 Chinese embassy bombing, 93-95, 96, 98 Chirac, Jacques, 21, 62, 82, 95, 98, 105-6, 153, 155, 158,201,204, 214, 290 Chollet, Derek, xiii Chretien, Jean, 212, 291 Chubais, Anatoly, 32 civilian casualties, 42, 106-7, 126, 299 Clark, Wesley, 4, 5-6, 9, 18, 21-22, 29, 41,52,55,57,60,62,93,95-96, 110-11, 114, 115-16, 119, 129, 131, 142, 143, 148, 153, 156, 179,

186, 190, 193, 195, 197, 198-200, 214, 227, 230, 238, 241-42, 247, 250-51, 263, 265, 269, 276-79, 281, 283, 294, 299, 300, 301, 304, 313-14; media briefings, 5, 42, 74; relationship with Pentagon, 47-49, 5 3 , 6 1 , 117-18, 182,201,292 Clinton, William, 11, 21, 26-27, 28, 36, 39, 47, 48, 50, 59-60, 61-62, 9 1 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 109-10, 117, 118-19, 142, 150, 157, 177, 181-82, 191, 197, 201, 202, 204, 212, 215, 233, 240, 258, 261, 290, 293-94; Blair discussions, 54-55; impeachment, 4, 8-9; letters to Yeltsin, 40, 212; remarks,6-7, 160-61, 200-201, 230, 235-36; Schroeder discussion, 92-93; Stepashin discussion, 161-62; Yeltsin discussions, 4 - 5 , 51-52, 64-67, 216-17, 222-23, 230-31,281-82,286,291 CNN, 137, 173-74, 194, 246, 249, 264,266,271,272,285,291 Cohen, William, 7, 37-38, 48-50, 5 2 53, 61, 68, 74, 108, 110, 114, 117, 141-43, 171, 182, 189, 254, 272, 276, 279, 280, 286, 289-90, 300 Collins, James, 16, 32, 40, 43-44, 108, 124, 128, 1 5 1 , 2 0 1 - 2 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 4 , 246, 254, 270, 282, 309 Contact Group, xvii—xviii, 14 Cook, Robin, 11, 31, 32-35, 137-38, 143, 150, 153-55, 159-60, 204-5, 209, 212, 220, 227, 304 D'Alema, Massimo, 212 Dini, Lamberto, 11, 19, 150, 153-55, 159-60,204-5,209,212 Dobbins, James, 29-30, 50, 163 Draskovic, Vuk, 188-89 Edelman, Eric, 90, 201 envoys, proliferation of, 39-40, 79, 89, 110

INDEX • 329 European perspectives, 9, 21, 41, 52, 62,69, 113-14, 118,305,320 European Union, 87, 89, 90, 132, 140, 148-49, 155, 167, 177, 192, 19597, 201

Hill, Chris, 4 6 - 4 6 , 54 Holbrooke, Richard, xx, 1-3, 5-6, 1 1 12, 38-39, 54-55, 108-9, 116, 127, 128, 136, 138, 143, 155-56, 1 6 3 64,293,297,301,307

Fischer, Joschka, xix-xx, 11, 19, 23, 113, 137, 148, 150, 153-55, 1 5 8 60, 1 9 5 , 2 0 4 - 5 , 2 0 9 , 2 1 2 Foglesong, Robert "Doc," 99-101, 123, 128, 141, 144, 146, 155, 164, 16566, 168, 173, 175, 176, 179, 195, 198, 199, 203, 204, 208, 222, 224, 228, 233, 235, 238, 241, 245, 247, 249, 252-54, 257, 261, 262-64, 273, 279, 290 Fuerth, Leon, 3, 8, 48, 50, 59, 67-68, 84-96, 1 1 5 , 2 8 3 - 8 4 , 2 9 5

Ignatieff, Michael, 297, 299-300 international law, 81-82, 131, 209 Ivanov, Igor, 14, 17-18, 31, 33, 36, 37, 40, 44, 53-54, 73, 76-77, 92, 94, 98, 104, 127, 144-46, 150, 152, 161, 1 8 3 , 2 1 0 , 2 1 4 , 2 1 5 - 1 7 , 2 1 8 , 220-21, 222, 240, 244-46, 254-67, 269, 271, 275, 282, 292, 309; Albright discussions, 12-14, 16-18, 19-20, 41-42, 44, 78, 82, 157-58, 202-3, 224-25, 244-47, 285-86, 289-90, 291; Talbott discussions, 69-70, 102-3, 124-25, 130-32, 238, 248-50, 252-54, 272, 279-80 Ivanov, Sergei, 317 Ivanovsky, Boris, 43-44, 84, 101, 123,

Gelbard, Bob, 98, 127, 283-84, 295 Goldberg, Phil, xiii, 68, 135-36, 196, 254, 264, 281 Gore, Albert, 1-3, 31, 39, 42, 50, 59, 65, 67-68, 69, 71-72, 73, 78, 82, 84-86, 98, 105, 115, 157, 158, 161, 162, 177, 182, 217, 246, 272-73, 280,286,311 Grossman, Mark, 248 ground troops, 7-9, 20, 29-30, 32, 3 7 39,47-51,52-53,55,58,62,73, 79-80, 83, 88, 93, 95, 96, 102, 108, 110-11, 113-19, 127, 129, 138, 141-43, 146, 148, 152, 156, 172, 181-82, 187, 189-91, 200, 201, 295, 300-301, 304 Group of Eight (G-8), 20, 22, 31, 35, 82, 150, 152, 153, 154-55, 158, 160, 167, 177, 312; meetings, 9 1 93, 98, 202, 203, 204-5, 209, 213, 214, 215-17, 220-21; summit, 113, 128, 148, 169, 233, 275, 290-91 Guthrie, Charles, 278

125, 179 Ivashov, Leonid, 99-101, 103, 123, 134, 165-66, 176-77, 179, 182-83, 228-29, 233, 234, 235, 238-40, 241,245,254-65,279,296 Jackson, Jesse, Jr., 78-79, 81, 96 Jackson, Mike, 207, 208, 212, 213-14, 226-27, 231-32, 233, 242, 247, 250-51, 254, 259-60, 265, 276-79, 281,283,286,301,310,313-14 Jovanovic, Zivadin, 153, 183-84, 185, 193 Karic, Bogljub, 97-98, 127 Kaskeala, Juhani, 123, 165, 179, 185, 198,208,224,238,310 KFOR, 12, 88, 114, 129, 149, 170, 175, 178, 184, 192, 195, 199,200, 203, 205, 208-9, 209-14, 215-17, 218, 221-23, 224-25, 226-27, 229,

330 * INDEX 231-32, 234-35, 238, 243, 245, 246-47, 249-50, 252-67, 269-87, 289-90, 312-14, 321. See also NATO Kosovo: history, xv-xviii; partition, 28, 33, 218, 220-21, 235, 243-44, 251, 260, 282, 285, 310-12; status, 33, 38, 59, 69-70, 71, 72, 77, 91-92, 97, 102, 105, 111, 135, 153, 162, 178, 185, 189, 214, 222, 231, 232, 293-94, 295, 297-98, 319-20 Kosovo Liberation Army, xvi, 20, 26, 5 1 , 6 3 , 6 6 , 7 2 , 123, 135, 144, 185, 207, 210, 222, 230, 262, 270, 275, 277, 281, 312; arming the, xi-xii; 2 8 , 3 8 , 114, 116, 190 Kostunica, Vojislav, 292-93 Kovacevic, Blagoje, 207-8, 210 Krulak, Charles, 301 Kvashnin, Anatoly, 218, 254-65, 2 6 9 70, 282 Lockhart, Joe, 269 Lukashenko, Alexander, 79 Mamedov, Georgy, 16, 35-36, 4 0 - 4 1 , 74-75, 98-99, 126-27, 128, 151, 224, 254, 291, 309 Marjanovic, Mirko, 183-84 Marjanovic, Svetozar, 210, 211, 226 Markovic, Mirjana "Mira," 97, 188 Matic, Goran, 134 Mayorsky, Boris, 34-35, 69, 254 McCain, John, 57, 119 Merovci, Adnan, 4 4 - 4 6 Milosevic, Boris, 44, 46 Milosevic, Slobodan, xi, xv, xvi—xviii, xix, 12, 23, 26, 27, 34, 35-36, 38, 40, 41, 50-51, 54-55, 59, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 7 5 - 8 1 , 83, 85-86, 88, 92, 94, 97-98, 101, 104-5, 106, 108, 109, 113, 125, 134, 135, 138-39, 145, 154, 155,

157, 159, 162, 163, 164, 172-73, 176, 180, 194, 198, 202, 210, 2 1 2 13, 215, 217, 224, 225, 242, 246, 292, 294-95, 299, 301, 306-7, 308, 310, 311-12, 319; Albright's view of, 13; Holbrooke discussion, 1-3; media statements, 8 0 - 8 1 , 231; meetings with envoys, 17-18, 19, 59, 60, 78-80, 152-53, 183-87, 191-93; strategy, 28-29, 45-46, 95, 116, 122, 141, 188-89, 220; war crimes, 129, 130-33, 136-38, 146, 156, 292-93,296-97,318 Milutinovic, Milan, 45, 112, 146, 1 5 1 52, 156, 183-84, 185 NATO, xv, 5 9 - 6 1 , 75-76, 77, 80, 83, 100-11, 129, 139, 160, 182, 194, 197-200, 2 4 4 - 4 5 , 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 2 4 9 - 5 0 , 252-67, 291, 293-302, 317-19, 322; air strategy; 4, 5, 10, 21-22, 28, 37-39, 50, 52, 60, 62, 81-82, 94, 95-96, 115-16, 152-53, 171, 173, 175; at the core of peacekeeping, 28, 64, 69-70, 72, 73, 76, 77, 100, 104-5, 106, 109, 111, 112, 121, 122, 124-25, 131-32, 135, 144, 153; demands, 20, 22-23, 27-28, 29,33,40,41,50,63,65,72,85, 91-92, 100, 116, 132-33, 140, 149, 162, 167-69, 171, 173-74, 175-76, 177-79, 184-87, 191, 220-22, 235-36, 263-67; defense ministers meeting, 141-43 (See also Yugoslavia troop withdrawals and stay-behinds in Kosovo); expansion, xviii-xix; 37, 66, 314-15, 318; military-technical talks, 199, 203, 204, 207-9, 2 1 0 14, 219, 221, 223-24, 225-28; strategic concept, 63; summit, 4 6 - 4 7 , 57-64; unity and divisions, 9 - 1 1 , 4 6 - 4 7 , 61, 64, 93, 113 (See also

INDEX * 331 KFOR); updated planning assessment, 47, 55, 60 Nuland, Toria, xiii, 179, 254, 263, 266 O'Brien, Jim, 11, 22-23, 127, 308 Obuchi, Kenzo, 84 Ojdanic, Dragoljub, 146, 184, 192-93, 198-99, 208 Olsen, Lyndon, 138-39 Operation Allied Force, 1-2, 5 Operation Desert Fox, 2, 256 Operation Horseshoe, 6, 10 Operation Trojan horse, 217-20, 228, 231, 237-38, 239-40, 241-42, 243-44, 245-67, 269-87, 310-15. See also Slatina airfield overflight, 239, 243, 248, 251-52, 2 7 1 72, 276, 283, 286-87, 314-15 Papandreou, George, 195, 209 Pardew, James, 163-64 Petersberg talks, 165-79, 196, 217-17 Pickering, Tom, 29-30, 35-36, 147 Prikhodko, Sergei, 271 Primakov, Yevgeny, 1-3, 15, 17-18, 19, 31, 36, 43, 44, 70, 76-77, 103, 104, 309 Putin, Vladimir, 106, 2 4 0 - 4 1 , 271, 274-75,292,315-19 Ralston, Joe, 49, 243, 247, 276, 282 Rambouillet talks, xvii-xviii, 22-23, 80, 109, 134, 185, 192, 299 refugees, 6, 10, 12, 21, 27, 30, 39, 44, 5 1 , 5 9 , 6 3 , 6 6 , 7 8 , 116, 139, 141, 177, 190, 224, 226-27, 230, 242, 291-92, 295, 299, 306, 310 Robertson, George, 142 Rubin, Jamie, 137 Rugova, Ibrahim, 28, 4 4 - 4 5 Russia: Duma, 4, 16, 31-32, 36, 42, 46, 89, 103, 107, 229-30; envoys in Belgrade, 17-19, 59, 79-80, 112, 1 5 1 -

53, 182-87, 191-94; foreign policy perspectives, xx-xxi, 14-16, 35-36, 43, 73-74, 76, 92, 105-6, 128, 163, 169, 307-10, 315-19; peacekeeping role, 131, 144, 151, 170, 175, 178, 184, 186, 200, 203, 210, 222, 223, 225, 227, 228-35, 238-39, 2 4 0 - 4 1 , 244-67, 269-87, 290-91, 309, 312-14 (See also NATO); potential military support for Yugoslavia, 14, 16, 20, 31-32, 34, 37, 67, 80; public opinion, 16,67, 118,271, 309 Sainovic, Nikola, 45-46, 54, 146 Sawyers, John, 278 Schroeder, Gerhard, 9, 17, 19, 92-93, 101, 140, 143, 145, 148-49, 153, 155, 158, 160, 169-70, 171, 196 Seleznyov, Gennadi, 36 September 11, 3 0 0 - 0 1 , 316-17, 318 Sergeyev, Igor, 14, 17-18, 91, 177, 183, 218, 229, 232, 245, 249, 254-65, 269-70, 272, 280, 282, 286, 289-90 Sergeyev, Valentin, 174 Seselj, Vojislav, 160, 188-89, 192 Shelton, Hugh, 37-38, 49, 52-53, 74, 110, 116, 1 1 8 , 2 1 4 , 2 5 1 , 2 5 3 , 2 6 3 , 269, 278, 292 Short, Michael, 298-99, 304 Simitis, Costas, 11, 62 Slatina airfield, 218, 235, 241-42, 2 4 7 48, 251, 254, 262, 270, 2 7 4 - 8 1 , 282-84, 301-2, 309, 310-15 Smith, Rupert, 251 Solana, Javier, 4, 10, 11, 43, 47, 49-50, 5 3 , 5 5 , 5 9 - 6 0 , 7 3 , 129, 131, 17071, 198, 199, 227, 241, 260, 277, 283, 304 Stalin's dacha, 121-22, 133-37, 140, 143-46 Steinberg, James, 8, 19, 38, 50-51, 92, 110-11, 118, 136, 139, 163, 170,

332 • INDEX 227, 243, 246-47, 264, 266, 279, 282-83, 300, 312, 314 Steiner, Michael, 93, 196-97 Stepashin, Sergei, 103, 124, 137, 160, 161-62, 177, 185, 232-34, 240, 271, 272-73, 275, 280, 286, 309 Stevanovic, Obrad, 207-08 Stojiljkovic, Vlajko, 146, 184 Swigert, James, 123, 128, 138-39, 140, 164, 165, 189, 307 Talbott, Strobe, xi, 27, 29, 45-46, 5 0 51, 52, 59, 64, 67-68, 74-76, 83, 84-86, 88, 91, 98-99, 103, 105, 108-8, 110-11, 113, 121, 126-27, 128-29, 147-49, 155-56, 161-62, 164, 198-200, 209, 215, 223, 2 2 7 28, 232-35, 2 4 0 - 4 1 , 243-44, 2 4 6 47, 254-67, 270, 273, 274-75, 282-83, 291, 305, 306, 308, 311, 315-16; Ahtisaari discussions, 68, 88-90, 104, 132-33, 149-50, 163, 195-97, 202, 203-4; Annan discussions, 76-78, 106-7; Avdeyev meeting, 32—35; background of, 32, 65-66; Chernomyrdin discussions, 70-74, 89, 101-2, 125-26, 194, 202, 229-30; Ivanov discussions, 69-70, 102-3, 124-5, 130-32, 238, 248-50, 252-54, 272, 279-80; trilateral discussions, 111-2, 122-23, 133-37, 140-41, 143-46, 165-79 Thessaloniki port, 204, 209, 223, 227 Trubnikov, Vyacheslav, 17-18, 218 United Nations, 41, 59, 92, 137, 177, 184, 185, 188, 189, 192, 293, 295, 297; Chapter VII authority, 39, 75, 107-8, 110-11, 135, 178; mediation, 39-40, 68, 77-78, 86, 132; role in peacekeeping, 60, 65, 77, 80, 100, 106, 112, 116, 123, 175, 229; Security Council and resolutions, xvi; xxi, 14, 1 5 , 2 9 , 3 5 , 3 9 , 4 0 , 7 5 , 83,

91,93, 138, 153-55, 157, 158, 167, 186, 191, 202, 203, 204, 209-14, 215-17, 220-22, 224-25, 230, 231, 232, 245, 255, 261-62, 272, 305, 312 United States: back-channel U.S.-Yugoslav talks, 38, 44-46, 54, 127-28, 138-39, 163-64, 306-7; Congress, 7 - 8 , 4 9 , 5 0 , 5 7 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 119, 142; POWs, 12, 78-79, 81; public opinion; 10, 26-27, 139, 182 Ushakov, Yuri, 83, 84, 147, 309 Vedrine, Hubert, 11, 19, 98, 153-55, 159-60,204-5,212,217 Vershbow, Alexander "Sandy," 4 6 - 4 7 , 197, 248, 310-2 Vujovic, Nebojsa, 113, 138-39, 214 war crimes tribunal, 7 0 - 7 1 , 125, 129, 130-33, 136-38, 139, 140, 146, 151-52, 156, 185, 189 Yeltsin, Boris, 14, 17, 32, 36, 4 2 - 4 3 , 59, 76-77, 82, 85, 88, 91, 99, 102, 105-6, 113, 118, 121, 134, 137, 157, 183, 185, 202, 215, 219, 229, 233, 240, 245, 248, 256, 258, 261, 263, 264, 271, 272, 273, 274-75, 284, 290, 305-6, 310, 313, 315, 318; Clinton discussions, 4 - 5 , 5 1 52, 64-67, 216-17, 222-23, 2 3 0 31,281-82, 286, 291; health, 4, 125-26, 161, 291, 307; impeachment, 4, 16, 36, 103, 107; letters to Clinton, 2 - 3 , 20 Yepifanov, Roman, 220 Yugoslavia, 296-97; parliament, 187— 88, 192, 193; public opinion, 11516, 227; troop withdrawals and staybehinds in Kosovo, 63, 69, 71, 72, 8 0 - 8 1 , 9 5 , 9 7 , 100, 101, 105, 111, 112, 122-23, 128, 131, 133, 135, 144, 149-50, 153, 168, 171, 173,

INDEX • 333 174, 208, 226, 298.

176, 177-78, 184-86, 204, 209-14, 217, 221, 223, 225, 230, 242-43, 270, 277, 281, See also NATO, demands

Zavarzin, Viktor, 14, 134, 165, 218, 261, 270, 277, 285-86, 289 Zhrinovsky, Vladimir, 35, 271 Zyuganov, Gennady, 43, 202

About the Author

Throughout the Kosovo crisis, John Norris served as communications director for Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Norris is currently a special advisor to the president of the International Crisis Group. In addition, Norris has done field relief work in a wide variety of countries, including Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Bosnia. He lives in Washington, D.C.

Collision Course_NATO_ Russia_Kosovo.pdf

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