G.R. NO. 152375, DECEMBER 13, 2011. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, AND POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), RESPONDENTS. FACTS: A case was filed against the respondents for before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages in relation to the allegation that respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). This case docketed as Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a petition instituted by Victor Africa (Son of the late Jose Africa) which sought to nullify the orders of the PCGG directing him to account for the alleged sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights. The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130. In the former case, Victor Africa (Africa) was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party thereto. In the proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England. The purpose was for Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of ETPI’s Class A stock. As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion (1st Motion) to adopt the testimonies of the witnesses in Civil Case No. 0130, including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane which was denied by SB in its April 1998 Resolution because he was not available for cross-examination. The petitioners did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. In rectifying this, they filed a second motion with prayer for reopening of the case for the purpose of introducing additional evidence and requested the court to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition. This was however denied by the SB in its November 6, 2000 resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion was filed by the petitioners on November 16, 2001 seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition which the SB denied for the reason that the 1998 resolution has become final in view of the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the SB committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality and in refusing to re-open the case. 2. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the rules of court and under the principle of judicial notice. RULING: 1. The court ruled that the SB’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion due to the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. The SB’s ruling, although an erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one. The 1998 resolution is an interlocutory decision, thus petition for certiorari is still premature since the rules of court provides that certiorari should be availed in a situation where neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party except if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of. At the time of the 1st motion, the presentation of evidence has not yet concluded. The remedy after the denial of the 1st motion should have been for the petitioner to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission of the Bane deposition. But upon denial of the 2nd motion, petitioners should have already questioned it by way of certiorari since it effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion. However, the court ruled that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case provided that the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence. At the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted “through oversight.” 2. Despite the cases being closely related, admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs to comply with the rules of court on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing otherwise, the adverse party may oppose it as mere hearsay.
Cross-examination will test the truthfulness of the statements of the witness; it is an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. Depositions from the former trial may be introduced as evidence provided that the parties to the first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. In the present case, the petitioner failed to establish the identity of interest or privity between the opponents of the two cases. While Victor Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, the deposition is admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed Civil Case No. 0130. Further, the rule of judicial notice is not applicable in this case as it would create confusion between the two cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila FIRST DIVISION YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ, Complainant,
A.M. No. P-11-2972 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3430-P)
Present: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ,* J., Acting Chairperson, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, PEREZ,** and MENDOZA,*** JJ.
- versus -
SERGIO V. PASCUA, Sheriff III. Municipal Trial Court in Cities,Trece Martires City, Cavite. Respondent.
Promulgated:
September 28, 2011 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Before the Court is an administrative case for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law filed by Yolanda Leachon Corpuz (Yolanda) against Sergio V. Pascua (Pascua), Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Trece Martires City, Cavite.
The facts of the case are as follows: Upon the complaint of Alicia Panganiban (Panganiban), Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were instituted against Juanito Corpuz (Juanito) before the MTCC. In an Order[1] dated June 16, 2009, the MTCC approved the Compromise Agreement[2] dated May 25, 2009 executed between Panganiban and Juanito (in which Juanito promised to pay Panganiban the sum of P330,000.00) and dismissed provisionally Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082. On January 25, 2010, the MTCC allegedly rendered a judgment based on the Compromise Agreement, but there was no copy of said judgment in the records of this case. When Juanito failed to comply with his obligations under the Compromise Agreement, Panganiban filed Motions for Execution dated January 4, 2010 and February 25, 2010 of the MTCC judgment. On March 17, 2010, the MTCC acted favorably on Panganibans Motions and issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Sheriff of the MTCC of Trece Martires City, with the following decree: NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to proceed to accused Juanito Corpuz who resides at No. 118 Lallana, Trece Martires City, for him to pay private complainant the amount of Php330,000.00 less the amount of Php50,000.00 allegedly paid for the first installment. In (sic) the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, you shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt for execution, giving the latter, the option to immediately choose which property may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, you shall first levy on the personal properties of any and then on the real properties, if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the. You shall only (sic) so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, and make a report to this Court every thirty (30) days on the proceeding taken, until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires.[3]
On June 2, 2010, Yolanda, Juanitos wife, and her daughter were in her office at the Cavite Provincial Engineering Office of Trece Martires City. At around three oclock in the afternoon, Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolandas office and demanded
that Yolanda surrender the Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate No. 471, which was registered in Yolandas name, threatening to damage the said vehicle if Yolanda would refuse to do so. Sheriff Pascua tried to forcibly open the vehicle. Yolanda called her brother to ask for help.Yolandas brother arrived after one hour. Yolanda, with her daughter and brother, went out of the office to face Sheriff Pascua. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and to avoid further indignities, Yolanda surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua, but she did not sign any document which Sheriff Pascua asked her to sign. Offended, humiliated, and embarrassed, Yolanda was compelled to file the present administrative complaint[4] against Sheriff Pascua. In addition to the aforementioned incident on June 2, 2010, Yolanda alleged in her complaint that Sheriff Pascua kept possession of the vehicle and even used the same on several occasions for his personal use.Yolanda attached to her complaint pictures to prove that Sheriff Pascua, instead of parking the vehicle within the court premises, in accordance with the concept of custodia legis, parked the vehicle in the garage of his own house. Yolanda also claimed that her vehicle was illegally confiscated or levied upon by Sheriff Pascua because the Writ of Execution, which Sheriff Pascua was implementing, was issued against Juanito, Yolandas husband. Yolanda further pointed out that Sheriff Pascua has not yet posted the notice of sale of personal property, as required by Rule 39, Section 15 of the Rules of Court. In his Comment,[5] Sheriff Pascua denied that he threatened and used force in levying upon the vehicle in question, and avowed that he was the one maligned when he served the Writ of Execution at Yolandas residence on April 21, 2010 and at Yolandas office on June 2, 2010. Yolanda delivered unsavory remarks in an unconscionable manner, maligning Sheriff Pascua in the presence of other people, during both occasions. When Sheriff Pascua first served the Writ of Execution, Yolanda uttered to him, Ipaglalaban ko ng patayan kapag kumuha kayo ng gamit dito, matagal ko ng pag-aari ang mga ito.[6] Sheriff Pascua averred that after the levy, he politely informed Yolanda that he would temporarily keep the vehicle at his place as there was no safe parking within the court premises. The lower floors of the building where the courts are located are being used as classrooms of the Cavite State University, and the vacant lot thereat serves as parking area for judges, prosecutors, and doctors and staff of
the City Health Office. Sheriff Pascua believed that it was not safe to park the vehicle within the City Hall premises because of his personal experience, when the battery of his owner-type jeep, parked in the vicinity, was stolen. Sheriff Pascua already stated in the Sheriffs Return dated June 4, 2010 that he was keeping temporary custody of Yolandas vehicle. He asserted that he never used the vehicle as he owns an owner-type jeep, which he uses for serving writs and other court processes, as well as for his familys needs. He likewise contradicted Yolandas claim that no public auction has been scheduled. In fact, Yolanda already received on July 9, 2010the Notice to Parties of Sheriffs Public Auction Sale and Notice of Sale of Execution of Personal Property. Lastly, Sheriff Pascua argued that he only took Yolandas vehicle after verification from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) that it was registered in Yolandas name.Yolanda is the wife of Juanito, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082, and the vehicle is their conjugal property, which could be levied upon in satisfaction of a Writ of Execution against Juanito. Yolanda filed a Reply[7] dated September 17, 2010, belying the averments in Sheriff Pascuas Comment. Yolanda insisted that Sheriff Pascua committed an error in levying upon the vehicle solely registered in her name to satisfy a Writ of Execution issued against her husband and an impropriety in parking the vehicle at his (Sheriff Pascuas) home garage. In his Rejoinder[8] dated October 5, 2010, Sheriff Pascua maintained that he acted in accordance with law. It was not his duty as sheriff to show proof that the personal property he was levying upon to execute the civil aspect of the judgment was conjugal; rather, the burden fell upon Yolanda to prove that the said property was paraphernal.Sheriff Pascua further reiterated that he never used Yolandas vehicle for his needs. The pictures submitted by Yolanda only showed that the vehicle was parked at his home garage. No picture or evidence was presented to prove that he used the vehicle. Sheriff Pascua lastly averred that he had no intention of delaying the public auction of the vehicle and was merely following the proper procedure for the reasonable appraisal of the same. He had already filed a Notice of Attachment/Levy upon Personal Property with the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City, requested certified true copies or photocopies of the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration of the vehicle to be used for the auction sale, and gave notice of the auction sale to Yolanda six days prior to the scheduled sale. He also gave Yolanda the opportunity to file a Third-Party Claim or proof that
the vehicle was her paraphernal property, but Yolanda failed to file anything until the day of the auction sale. On November 17, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its report,[9] with the following recommendation: RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted Honorable Court our recommendation that:
for
consideration
of
1.
The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2.
Sergio V. Pascua, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires City, Cavite, be REPRIMANDED for impropriety in taking the vehicle and parking the same at his garage; and
3.
Sergio V. Pascua, be SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day for Simple Neglect of Duty, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.[10]
the
In a Resolution[11] dated February 9, 2011, we required the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Sheriff Pascua[12] and Yolanda[13] submitted their Manifestations dated April 11, 2011 and April 12, 2011, respectively, stating that they were submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Resultantly, the case was already submitted for resolution. After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that Sheriff Pascua, in levying upon Yolandas vehicle even though the judgment and writ he was implementing were against Juanito, then parking the same vehicle at his home garage, is guilty of simple misconduct. A sheriff performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-bound to know the basic rules in the implementation of a writ of execution and be vigilant in the exercise of that authority.[14]
Sheriffs have the ministerial duty to implement writs of execution promptly. Their unreasonable failure or neglect to perform such function constitutes inefficiency and gross neglect of duty. When writs are placed in the hands of sheriffs, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable speed and promptness to execute such writs in accordance with their mandate.[15] At the same time, sheriffs are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs.Sheriffs, as officers of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in their behavior.[16] In the instant case, Sheriff Pascua failed to live up to the standards of conduct for his position. Despite the undisputed facts that the MTCC Judgment and Writ of Execution in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 were against Juanito only, and the Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate No. 471 was registered in Yolandas name solely, Sheriff Pascua proceeded to levy upon the vehicle, invoking the presumption that it was conjugal property. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. [17] An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.[18] A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The sheriff may be liable for enforcing execution on property belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no justification, for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ.[19] Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal property of Juanito and Yolanda.
Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. [20] There is no such proof in the records of the present case. Sheriff Pascuas assertions of diligence do not exculpate him from administrative liability. After inquiry from the LTO, he already discovered that the vehicle was registered in Yolandas name only. This fact should have already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more information, such as when Juanito and Yolanda were married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle, which, in turn, would have determined whether or not Sheriff Pascua could already presume that the said vehicle is conjugal property. Moreover, when Sheriff Pascua proceeded in levying upon Yolandas vehicle, he digressed far from the procedure laid down in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for the enforcement of judgments, pertinent portions of which read: SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate payment on demand. The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. x x x. xxxx (b) Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
As the aforequoted provision clearly state, the levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor may be had by the executing sheriff only if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the full amount stated in the writ of execution. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check, or other mode acceptable to the judgment obligee, the judgment obligor is given the option to immediately choose which of his property or part thereof, not otherwise exempt from execution, may be levied upon sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option immediately, or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. Therefore, the sheriff cannot and should not be the one to determine which property to levy if the judgment obligor cannot immediately pay because it is the judgment obligor who is given the option to choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment.[21] In this case, Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules. Without giving Juanito the opportunity to either pay his obligation under the MTCC judgment in cash, certified bank check, or any other mode of payment acceptable to Panganiban; or to choose which of his property may be levied upon to satisfy the same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately levied upon the vehicle that belonged to Juanitos wife, Yolanda. To make matters worse, Sheriff Pascua parked the vehicle at his home garage, believing that the parking area within the court premises was unsafe based on his personal experience. In previous administrative cases, sheriffs had already proffered the same excuse, i.e., lack of court storage facilities for the property attached or levied upon, so as to justify their delivery of the said property to the party-creditors. In Caja v. Nanquil,[22] we rejected the excuse, thus:
Respondent sheriff argues that he never delivered said personal properties to the judgment creditor but merely kept the same in a secured place owned by the latter. He brought them there because the Sheriffs Office and the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City had no warehouse or place to keep levied personal properties. In support thereto, he presented John Aquino, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, who testified that they have no designated warehouse or building where sheriffs can keep levied personal properties. In so far as large motor vehicles, the practice as to where to keep them is left at the discretion of the sheriff. Respondent sheriffs argument that he kept the levied personal properties at the judgment creditors place because the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City does not have any warehouse or place to keep the same does not hold water. A levying officer must keep the levied properties securely in his custody. The levied property must be in the substantial presence and possession of the levying officer who cannot act as special deputy of any party litigant. They should not have been delivered to any of the parties or their representative. The courts lack of storage facility to house the attached properties is no justification. Respondent sheriff could have deposited the same in a bonded warehouse or could have sought prior authorization from the court that issued the writ of execution. [23] (Underscoring supplied.)
Sheriff Pascuas explanation for parking Yolandas vehicle at his home garage is just as unacceptable. Granted that it was unsafe to park the vehicle within the court premises, Sheriff Pascua should have kept the said vehicle in a bonded warehouse or sought prior authorization from the MTCC to park the same at another place. Although there is no evidence that Sheriff Pascua had also used the vehicle, the Court understands how easy it is for other people to suspect the same because the vehicle was parked at his home garage. Sheriff Pascuas actuations smacked of unprofessionalism, blurring the line between his official functions and his personal life. Time and again, the Court has held that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs play a significant role in the administration of justice. They are primarily responsible for the execution of a final judgment which is "the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law."[24] Thus, sheriffs must at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. As officers of the court, they are expected to uphold the norm of public accountability and to avoid any kind of behavior that would diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people
in the judiciary.[25] Measured disappointingly fell short.
against
these
standards,
Sheriff
Pascua
The OCA recommends that Sheriff Pascua be held administratively liable for impropriety and simple neglect of duty. The Court though determines that Sheriff Pascuas improper actions more appropriately constitute simple misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of an established rule of action. More particularly, misconduct is the unlawful behavior of a public officer. It means the "intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official." [26] In order for misconduct to constitute an administrative offense, it should be related to or connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.[27] Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987) and Section 52(B)(2), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple misconduct is a less grave offense with a penalty ranging from suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. WHEREFORE, respondent Sheriff Sergio V. Pascua is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and is SUSPENDED for TWO (2) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. Yulo, Aliling & Macamay for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.: This is a petition for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 576-A with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. The allegations of the petition are that on January 19, 1960, Republic Act No. 3001 was passed granting petitioner the permit or franchise to construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Petitioner was able to construct, maintain and operate ten (10) radio broadcasting stations all over the country. Through said broadcasting stations, petitioner was able to provide adequate public service which enabled the government to reach the population on important public issues, and assist the government in programs relating to public information and education. Its radio stations have never been used for the broadcasting of obscene or indecent language or speech, or for the dissemination of misleading information or willful misrepresentation, or to the detriment of the public health, or to incite, encourage or assist in subversion or treasonable acts. Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001, petitioner's franchise or permit "shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of the Philippines when the public interest so requires . ..." On November 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A entitled "Decree Regulating The Ownership And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations And For Other Purposes" was issued and duly published in the December 2, 1974 supplemental issue of the Official Gazette. 1 Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said Decree provide as follows: Sec. 3. No person or corporation may own, operate, or manage more than one radio or television station in one municipality or city; nor more than five AM and FM radio stations; nor more than five television channels in the entire country, and no radio or television station shall be utilized by any single-interest group to disseminate information or otherwise influence the public or the government to serve or support the ends of such group. Sec. 4. Any person or corporation which owns more than the number of radio or television stations authorized in the preceding section shall divest itself of the excess stations or channels. Any excess station shall be sold through the Board of Communications.
The divestiture provided herein shall be made not later than December 31, 1981. Thereafter, a person or corporation shall make such divestiture within one year from the discovery of the offense. Sec. 5. Failure to divest as provided in the foregoing section shall, in addition to the penalties provided in Section 6, subject the person or corporation guilty of such failure to cancellation of the franchise of every excess station and to confiscation of the station and its facilities without compensation. Sec. 6. All franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates or other forms of authority to operate radio or television broadcasting systems shall terminate on December 31, 1981. Thereafter, irrespective of any franchise, grant, license, permit, certificate or other forms of authority to operate granted by any office, agency or person, no radio or television station shall be authorized to operate without the authority of the Board of Communications and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications or their successors who have the right and authority to assign to qualified parties frequencies, channels or other means of Identifying broadcast systems; Provided, however, that any conflict over, or disagreement with, a decision of the aforementioned authorities may be appealed finally to the Office of the President within fifteen days from the date the decision is received by the party in interest. Pursuant to Section 6 of the said Decree, all franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates, or other forms of authority to operate radio or television broadcasting systems/stations, including the franchise or permit of petitioner under Republic Act No. 3001, have been deemed terminated or revoked effective December 31, 1981. Thus, petitioner is left with only 3 radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City. Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it great and irreparable damage, because — (a) it divested petitioner of its franchise without due process of law and forced it to divest itself of some of its radio stations; (b) it deprived petitioner of its right to further construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in other cities or municipalities of the country; 2 (c) it deprived petitioner of its right to avail of loan facilities or renew its existing loan availments from any bank or financial institution in order to expand and continue the operation of its radio broadcasting business; and (d) petitioner suffered loss of income. Hence, this petition to declare Presidential Decree No. 576-A as unconstitutional and null and void ab initio. The grounds of the petition are as follows: I THE ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 576-A SUMMARILY TERMINATING THE PETITIONER'S FRANCHISE OR PERMIT ON DECEMBER 31, 1981 CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OR DEPRIVATION OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS (FRANCHISE OR PERMIT) OF PETITIONER WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND/OR PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION;
II. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE FORCED THE PETITIONER TO DlVEST ITSELF OF SOME OF ITS RADIO STATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF ITS CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION AND IMPAIRMENT OF PETITIONER'S OR THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT OR FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION AND/OR OF THE PRESS; III. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE FORCED THE PETITIONER TO DIVEST ITSELF OF SOME OF ITS RADIO STATIONS AND THE ARBITRARY TERMINATION OF ITS CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE PETITIONER; AND IV. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE RESTRICTING PETITIONER OR ANY OTHER PERSON OR ENTITY TO OPERATE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF RADIO OR TELEVISION STATIONS IN ONE CITY OR MUNICIPALITY, OR IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY FOR THAT MATTER, AND FURTHER TERMINATING THE CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE OF PETITIONER CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT OF TRADE; 3 Without giving due course to the petition, the respondents were required to submit their comment thereto within ten (10) days from notice. After the comment of the respondents was submitted, the petitioner was required to file a reply thereto. As said reply was filed the Court required respondents to submit their rejoinder. The rejoinder of respondents had been duly submitted so the case is now due for resolution. After a careful deliberation on the petition, the Court finds the same to be devoid of merit. The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of Presidential Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must be treated as one seeking declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should be brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court. A petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.4 Thus, the present petition should be dismissed on this score. Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is, likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated or shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. All that petitioner seeks is the nullification of Presidential Decree No. 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under Republic Act No. 3001.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." 5 The function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give advisory opinions. 6 The power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. 7 Petitioner alleges that it used to maintain and operate at least ten (10) radio broadcasting stations but pursuant to Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 576-A it divested itself of the "excess stations" thus leaving it with three (3) radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City. Petitioner did not allege that it challenged the constitutionality of the decree at any time since it took effect on December 31, 1981. It does not appear that petitioner's compliance was made under protest. In view of its acquiescence with Presidential Decree No. 576-A, the petitioner is now estopped from challenging the same under the principle of estoppel that "one who sleeps on his rights shall not be heard to complain." The allegation of petitioner that its petition should be treated as a petition for prohibition does not place petitioner in any better position. The petition cannot be considered as one for prohibition as it does not seek to prohibit further proceedings being conducted by any tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. 8 In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to prohibit any proceeding being conducted by public respondent which adversely affects its interest. Petitioner does not claim that it has a pending application for a broadcast license which is about to be denied under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Apparently, what petitioner seeks to prohibit is the possible denial of an application it may make to operate radio or television stations on the basis of the restrictions imposed by Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the petition is premature. Petitioner prays for reinstatement of its rights under its original franchise. Reinstatement is an affirmative remedy and cannot be secured through a writ of prohibition which is essentially a preventive and not a corrective remedy. It cannot correct an act that is a fait accompli. 9 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.
CITY OF MANILA VS. ALEGAR Petition for certiorari for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner: - City of Manila passed Ordinance 8012, authorizing the City Mayor to acquire private lots of Alegar Corporation, Terocel Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda for socialized housing project. - City offered P1,500 per sqm, which the respondents rejected. - City filed a complaint for expropriation before RTC Manila. Respondents: - Alegar and Terocel claimed that the suit was premature because the City made no renegotiation when they rejected the initial offer. - RTC issued writ of possession in City’s favor, and asked the City to pay P1,500,000 deposit to the respondents. - Both parties agreed to go to trial and the respondents submitted their memorandum EXCEPT the City. - RTC dismissed the complaint for expropriation because the City violated: o Sec. 9, RA. 7279 = There is a rank to be followed in acquiring properties for socialized housing projects. Acquisition of private property is the last in rank. City failed to provide evidence that there are no other available location except for the said private property. o Sec. 10, RA 7279 = prefers the acquisition of private property by “negotiated sale” over the filing of an expropriation suit. City did not negotiate. - City moved for reconsideration but before RTC could act upon it, the City appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Issue: Whether or not City of Manila’s complaint for expropriation deserves approval. Supreme Court: No. City claims that they do not need to comply with Sec. 9 of RA. 7279 because the lots were
already more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries because they were long-time occupants of the land. However, they failed to adduce evidence on this. They also failed to show evidence that there are no other available location except for the private properties. City also violated Sec. 10 of RA. 7279 when it did not conduct the proper mode of land acquisition when it did not renegotiate the price rejected by the respondents. The project does not fall under the category of “public use” because it only benefits a few people. City failed to present evidence to counter this claim. There was also no denial of due process upon the City because a hearing was conducted and they did not submit a memorandum. Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 27, 2009 in CAG. R. CV 90530 subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: 1. Petitioner City of Manila is ordered to indemnify respondents Alegar Corporation, Terocel Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda in the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
2. Respondents Alegar Corporation, Terocel Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda are in turn ordered to return the advance deposit of P1,500,000.00 that they withdrew incident to the expropriation case; and 3. This decision is without prejudice to the right of the City of Manila to refile their action for expropriation after complying with what the law requires. SO ORDERED.
