Charismatic Leadership (Fidel Castro)

Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro Richard R. Fagen The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, Part 1. (Jun., 1965), pp. 275-284. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-4078%28196506%2918%3A2%3C275%3ACAATLO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5 The Western Political Quarterly is currently published by University of Utah.

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CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY AND THE LEADERSHIP

OF FIDEL CASTRO

&CHARD

R. FAGEN

Stanford University 0 PART of Max Weber's sociology has been as thoroughly overworked in discourse about politics as has his concept of charisma. The appellation "charismatic" has been applied to leaders as different as Stalin, Nkrumah, Hitler, and Gandhi, and there has been a general tendency to equate the charismatic in politics with the demagogic, the irrational, the emotional, and the "popular." This luxuriance of meanings and attention is not, as one commentator has already pointed out, simply a result of intellectual faddism.l Rather, it represents in part a very genuine groping about for a conceptual framework which might be of service in the analysis of twentieth-century politics. However, if the concept of charisma is to serve in scientific political inquiry, it cannot refer in blanket fashion to leadership styles as disparate as those mentioned above. There is a need for explication and parsimony. This paper attempts to provide a first step toward that explication and to indicate, by example, how the concept might be used in empirical inquiry. WEBER'SFORMULATION AUTHORITY OF CHARISMATIC

N

As conceptualized by Weber, charisma (the gift of grace) referred to "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities." The concept was, of course, taken from the idiom of early Christianity, and in Weber's sociology charismatic authority was one of the three pure types of legitimate authority - the other two being rational-legal and traditi~nal.~ There are at least five elements of Weber's formulation of charismatic authority which must be taken into account in any political research using the concept. These elements, stated in propositional form, follow : 1. The charismatic leader is always the creation of his followers. That is, charismatic authority (in common with all other types of legitimate authority) is rooted in the belief system of the followers rather than in some transcendental characteristics of the leader.4 When no one is disposed or able to believe in the omnipo-

' Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Leadership and the Problem of

the Charismatic Power," Journal of Politics. 23 ( 1961 ,) , 3-24. Max ~ e b e r T, h e Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M . Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: Free Press, 1947), p. 358.

.

Weber's three-part typology of legitimate authority has been discussed so frequently that there seems to be no need to summarize it here. For a particularly compact and cogent explication of the typology see Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations, A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), pp. 30-36. The most recent critique of Weber's typology is Peter M. Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority," A P S R , 57 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 305-16. Blau's essay contains a useful listing of earlier critical appraisals of the typology. ''It is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma." Weber, op. cit., p. 359; see also p. 382. This aspect of the charismatic rela-

276

T H E WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

tence, omniscience, and moral perfection of the leader, he cannot be said to exercise charismatic authority no matter how strong, wise, or moral he perceives himself to be. 2. An "individual personality" or leader capable of generating a charismatic authority relationship in one context may fail completely to generate that relationship in some other context. There are no universal charismatics. This is clearly a corollary of the first proposition and suggests that the set of followers is always bounded by at least two factors. There are some who are never reached (physically) by the messages of the leader and thus remain at best what we shall call potential followers. And there are others who, although reached, do not for a variety of reasons respond in the prescribed manner. These individuals we shall call the nonfollowers. 3. The leader does not regard himself either as chosen by or as solely dependent on his followers, but rather as "elected" from above to fulfill a mi~sion.~ He perceives his followers as having obligations and duties toward him and he perceives himself as deriving his morality and legitimation from his special relationship with some more abstract force such as God or history. Furthermore, those who resist or ignore him - the non-followers - are regarded as "delinquent in duty." 4. The behavior of the charismatic leader in power is anti-bureaucratic "specifically outside the realm of everyday routine and the profane sphere." Daily affairs, whether economic, political or administrative, are treated with disdain by the leader. He surrounds himself with disciples chosen for their devotion rather than a staff selected by more formal means.

5. Charismatic authority is unstable, tending to be transformed (routinized) through time.8 This "natural entropy of the hero's charisma" occurs in part because his image of infallibility cannot be maintained in the face of inevitable failures, and in part because the demands of ruling cannot be met through time without more rationalized involvement in the mundane affairs of state.1° tionship was stressed in an important article by James C. Davies, "Charisma in the 1952 Campaign," A P S R , 48 (1954), 1083-1 102. Using data from the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, Davies identified and analyzed 32 respondents (out of 1,799), who perceived Eisenhower as a charismatic leader. Davies' insights and approach do not seem to have been followed up by scholars interested in the rapidly changing political environments where the concept would be of more research value. ' Weber, o p . cit., pp. 359-61. "bid., p. 360. ' Ibid.,. p- . 361. See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. and trans.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Galaxy, 1958), pp. 248-50. The phrase is from Immanuel Wallerstein, "Evolving Patterns of African Society," in Immanuel Wallerstein et al., T h e Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Washington, D.C. : George Washington U., 1959), p. 6. lo Notice that our five propositions say nothing about the social and political conditions conducive to the establishment of charismatic authority. This reflects a gap in Weber's thought structure which has been succinctly pointed out by Blau: "In short, Weber's theory encompasses only the historical processes that lead from charismatic movements to increasing rationalization and does not include an analysis of the historical conditions and social processes that give rise to charismatic eruptions in the social structure. H e has no theory of revolution." Blau, op. cit., p. 309. Davies, o p , cit., discusses the genesis of the "charismatic phenomenon," but only in the context of politics in the large modern state.

CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY

277

These five propositions serve to direct us toward a set of empirical questions which should prove useful when confronted with a suspected instance of charismatic authority in the real world. The first proposition focuses our attention on the attitudes and perceptions of the followers as crucial determinants of the existence or non-existence of the charismatic relationship. The second proposition suggests that deeper understanding of the relationship will result if we can map these perceptions and attitudes against the distribution of social and personality characteristics in the society. The third directs us to an examination of the leader's perceived relationship both to his mission and to his followers. The fourth and fifth propositions are predictive; the former states that the leader in power will behave in certain ways, and the latter states that the charismatic relationship will inevitably be transformed. This is clearly a mixed bag of propositions, and any thorough investigation of one or more cases would of necessity have to concentrate on some elements to the partial or complete exclusion of others.ll Nevertheless in the following examination of the Cuban case whatever data were at hand - no matter how unsatisfactory are presented in order to offer at least a brief exploration and discussion of each proposition. This exploratory posture is assumed because it best serves the twin purposes of suggesting investigatory strategies appropriate to the propositions and of organizing what little we actually know about the leadership of Fidel Castro.

1. T h e charismatic leader is the creation of his followers There is no lack of reports which mention that in the early stages of the Cuban Revolution Castro was regarded by large segments of the population as the heavensent savior of the nation.12 The religious overtones of this relationship have been emphasized by many commentators, and one prominent Presbyterian minister in I'

Except for the first proposition which cannot be ignored because it is at the core of the definition under which we are operating. Among the book-length studies in English which stress the charismatic elements of Castro's relationship with his followers I would mention the following ten: Teresa Casuso, Cuba and Castro (New York: Random House, 1961) ; Jules Dubois, Fidel Castro (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1959) ; Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960) ; Herbert L. Matthews, T h e Cuban Story (New York: Brasiller, 1961) ; Warren Miller, 90 Miles from Home (New York: Crest, 1961) ; C. Wright Mills, Listen Yankee (New York: Ballentine, 1960) ; R. Hart Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959) ; Nicolas Rivero, Castro's Cuba, A n American Dilemma (Washington, D.C.: Luce, 1962) ; JeanPaul Sartre, Sartre on Cuba (New York: Ballentine, 1961) ; William Appleman Williams, T h e United States, Cuba, and Castro (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962). These books, which otherwise represent a wide range of interpretations of the Revolution, are in consensus on the charismatic basis of the leader-follower relationship -at least in the first year or two of Castro's rule. For two brief scholarly analyses which make the same point see Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "The Revolution Next Door: Cuba," Annals, 334 ( 1961 ), 113-22, and George I . Blanksten, "Fidel Castro and Latin America," in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), T h e Revolution in World Politics (New York: Wiley, 1962). The two most scholarly sources on the Revolution and its antecedents are Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett, Cuba, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962), and Dudley Seers ( e d . ) , Cuba, T h e Economic and Social Revolution (Chapel Hill: U . of N. Carolina Press, 1964). A critical and well-documented treatment of many aspects of the Revolution can be found in International Commission of Jurists, Cuba and the Rule of Law (Geneva: The Commission, 1962).

278


Cuba published an article in which he wrote: "It is my conviction which I state now with full responsibility for what I am saying, that Fidel Castro is an instrument in the hands of God for the establishment of His reign among men." l3 Only one study, however, is actually based on the type of systematic data needed for a more thorough analysis of the charismatic elements in the relationship of Cubans to Castro during the first few years of the Revolution. This is a sample survey conducted by Lloyd Free in Cuba in April and May of 1960.14 Under the direction of Free, a Cuban research organization interviewed a cross section of 500 residents of Havana and another cross section of 500 residents of other urban and semi-urban centers. The 40 per cent of the Cuban population living in rural areas was not represented in Free's survey. Free classified 86 per cent of his respondents as supporters of the regime. Of all supporters, one-half (or 43 per cent of all respondents) were sub-classified as fervent supporters. In "more-or-less typical quotations from the interviewsJ' Free suggests the articulated content of fervent support: " 'Fidel has the same ideas as Jesus Christ, our protector and guide.' 'I would kiss the beard of Fidel Castro.' '[My greatest fear is :] That some mean person might kill Fidel. If this happens, I think I would die.' " l5 Now these are clearly responses with charismatic overtones. But it would be an unwarranted inference simply to assume that all of the fervent supporters are also charismatic followers. Rather, in the absence of an analysis specifically designed to identify the sub-set of charismatics we can only speculate on how closely it might coincide with the set of all fervent supporters. In any event, two points stand out: First, in the early stages of the revolution Castro was perceived as a charismatic leader by some "sizable" fraction of the Cuban population. Second, in the absence of survey research designed especially for the purpose, it is impossible to determine with exactitude just how sizable this fraction was, or how it might have changed in size and composition through time.la

2. T h e distribution of charismatic followers illuminates important characteristics of the relationship One striking aspect of the Cuban Revolution is the thoroughness and frequency with which the voice and visage of Fidel Castro have blanketed the island. Through Rafael Cepeda, "Fidel Castro y el Reino de Dios," Bohemia (July 17, 1960), p. 110 (my translation). An American observer noted: "In many Cuban homes a picture of Fidel has an honored place; in some of them it is a photograph of a bearded youth who seems to be wearing a kind of halo; the resemblance to portraits of Christ is notable." Irving P. Pflaum, "By Voice and Violence," Part I, American Universities Field Staff Reports, Series V , No. 3 (August 1960), p. 16. See also MacGaffey and Barnett, op. cit., pp. 284-85. I4 Lloyd A. Free, Attitudes of the Cuban People Toward the Castro Regime (Princeton: Institute for International Social Research, 1960). " Ibid., p. 6. Free makes the point that such expressions of devotion were not dictated by the political exigencies of the open-ended interview situation. If a respondent simply wanted to give a "safe" answer, it would have been quite sufficient simply to express admiration for Castro and the regime. '' Of course the problems of conducting survey research in areas undergoing rapid political and social change are immense. Free mentions that the Cuban organization which originally promised to undertake the field work backed out at the last moment when informed by a government leader that it would be "suicidal." The organization which finally undertook t h r~esearch did so only because it felt its days in Cuba were already numbered. Ibid., p. 1. IS


279

the extensive television system and the mass rallies - which have on occasion drawn as many as one million of Cuba's seven million inhabitants into the plaza of Havana -the messages of the maximum leader have been brought to almost 100 per cent of the population.17 In our terminology this suggests that there is only an insignificant number of potential followers (persons not reached by the leader's messages) in Cuba. We can therefore direct our entire attention to the non-followers, those who have been reached but do not respond in a charismatic manner. Once again we must return to Free's data as the best available for an analysis of the distribution of charismatic followers in Cuba. As before, we cannot identify the sub-set of charismatics from the set of all fervent supporters, but the patterning of fervent support by education, social class, and place of residence is revealing. The tendency for fervent support to be associated with low education, low social class, and semi-urban residence is clear.18 If rural respondents had been included in the sample, we would expect the associations to emerge even more strongly. Finally, Free found that the distribution of fervent supporters was sharply skewed toward the lower end of the age continuum - 43 per cent of all fervent supporters were between 20 and 29 years of age.18 TABLE 1 SUPPORT F OR CASTRO I N 1959 BY EDUCATION, SOCIAL CLASS,A N D PLACEOF RESIDENCE* (in percentages)

( N = 1,000)

Fervent Supporters ( 4 3 per cent)

Moderate Supporters and Non-supporters (57 per cent)

Education: Elementary or no schooling .......................... 49

Secondary schooling ...................................... 35

University training ........................................ 29

Social class: Lowest socioeconomic class .......................... 48

Lower-middle class ........................................ 39

Upper-middle and upper class ...................... 34

Place o f Residence: Outside of Havana ........................................ 49

In Havana ...................................................... 34

* Adapted from Lloyd A. Free, Attitudes of the Cuban People T o w a r d the Castro Regime (Princeton: Institute for International Social Research, 1960), p. 7. l 7 I have developed and documented this theme of the modernity and pervasiveness of the Cuban communication system in two other papers. See Richard R. Fagen, "Calculation and Emotion in Foreign Policy: The Cuban Case," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 ( 1962), 214-21, and "Television and the Cuban Revolution" (Stanford: Dept. of Political Science, 1960), mimeo. For a useful evaluation of Castro's television talents see T a d Szulc, "Cuban Television's One-Man Show," in CBS (ed.), T h e Eighth Art (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 197-206. " O u r inability to isolate the charismatics from the fervent supporters is not too crucial here for it seems safe to assume that, if anything, the charismatics would exhibit these tendencies to a greater degree than the fervent supporters do. lo Free, op. cit., p. 8 .

280


Confirmation of this pattern of support for Castro also emerges from data on a systematic sample of Cuban refugees in Miami - a group which is presently unanimous in its expressed hatred of FideLz0 When asked how they originally had felt about Castro when he came to power in 1959, 42 out of 191 refugees replied that they thought "he was the savior of Cuba." Since the refugee community represents a highly skewed sample of Cubans, a sample comprised substantially of members of the middle and upper classes, Table 2 is of special interest. Thus, even in this refugee sample the association of strong support with lower education, semi-urban and rural residence, and lower age is found. TABLE 2 FOR CASTRO IN 1959 BY EDUCATION, PLACEOF RESIDENCE, AND AGE* REFUGEE SUPPORT ( i n percentages)

"Castro was Savior of Cuba" ( N = 4 2 ) Education: High school or less ........................................ At least some college ....................................

25 12

All other responses (N=149)

75 88

Place of Residence: Outside of Havana ........................................ 27 Havana ..................................................... 19 Age: 40 or younger ............................................... 26 18 41 or older ...............................................

* All respondents currently in exile in Miami. But should we expect these particular socio-demographic patterns of fervent support (and the less frequently encountered - though similar - patterns of charismatic support) to be found in all cases of charismatic leadership? That is, whenever a charismatic political relationship is identified will the followers tend to come from among the rural, the younger, the less educated, and the lower classes? There is no simple answer to this question, but at least three points should be noted: First, as emphasized previously, the communication system of Cuba has brought all members of the society into contact with Fidel, giving them at least the opportunity to become charismatic followers. In less developed and less homogeneous societies, it would be precisely the lower classes, the rural, and the poorly educated who would tend to be cut off from the national channels and therefore from the messages through which the leader might establish his claim to legitimacy. Second, both the ideological focus and the actual accomplishments of the Cuban Revolution This derives from an unpublished study by the author and Professor Richard Brody of Stanford University. As part of the study, a self-administered questionnaire was given to a pre-selected sample of male Cuban heads of household living in Miami (in March 1963). The data in Table 2 are taken from the completed questionnaires. Complete demographic data on the refugees are reported in Richard R. Fagen and Richard C . Brody, "Cubans in Exile : A Demographic Analysis," Social Problems, 11 ( 1964), 389-401.


28 1

have come to center on the rural and less privileged sectors of the society.21 I t is natural to assume that those who perceive themselves as the prime beneficiaries of Castro's leadership should also tend to relate most frequently to him in a charismatic manner. However, just as all nations do not have Cuba's well-developed communication system, so all charismatic political movements do not necessarily benefit the rural, the poorly educated, and the lower classes. Finally, the social groupings most likely to relate charismaticly to Castro may well contain a disproportionate number of persons who as individuals are predisposed to make a charismatic response. Davies, for instance, hypothesizes four characteristics of the "charismatic aspect of personality structure," 2 2 and Doob has suggested that the less educated and less westernized members of a society perceive and behave toward authority figures quite differently than do their more educated and westernized c o ~ n t r y m e n It . ~is ~ perhaps at this level of "personality in social structure" that the Cuban experience will prove to be most similar to other instances of political charisma.

3. T h e leader regards himself as elected from above to fulfill a mission Only a close analysis of Castro's published and unpublished thought could supply the richness of detail which a full investigation of his self-image would require. In the absence of such an analysis, we can only note a few recurring and interrelated themes. First, Castro perceives the Revolution as part of a greater historical movement against tyranny and oppression. Castro developed this theme long before he became a professed Marxist-Leninist. More recently, of course, capitalism and imperialism have replaced (domestic) tyranny and oppression as the prime obstacles to a revolutionary cleansing of the world's political landscape. Second, the Cuban leadership and Castro in particular are seen as blessed and protected by the larger historical movement of which the Revolution is a part. Castro's famous speech ending, "condemn me, it doesn't matter. History will absolve me," is a classic, early articulation of this idea.24 Finally, because the leader is seen as acting in concert with larger historical forces not always visible to more ordinary men, he alone retains the right to determine "correct" behavior in the service of the Revolution.

" By actual accomplishments of

the Cuban Revolution we refer to such social gains as the educational, health and welfare, and housing facilities which have been built since 1959. For examples of the manner in which the Revolutionary Government uses the themes of egalitarianism and social welfare, see Richard R. Fagen, Cuba: The Political Content of Adult Education (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1964). Davies, op. cit. '"eonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Exploration (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1960). '4 This speech was delivered by Castro at his trial for leading an attack on the Moncada Army Barracks in 1953. I t is available in English under the title, History Will Absolve M e (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961). The attack and the trial are well treated in Dubois, op. cit. The theme of historical blessedness and protection received popular reinforcement from the circumstances surrounding Castro's return to Cuba from Mexico in 1956 with 82 men and the avowed purpose of overthrowing Batista. Only Castro and 11 others escaped to the Sierra Maestra where they launched the guerrilla action which culminated in the downfall of Batista two years later. All the elements of high drama and miraculous escape were attached to the story of the guerrilla band during these two years. At one time, Castro was reported dead, and subsequently a price of $100,000 was set on his head.

282


I t is important to realize that these overtones of intellectual Marxism and political authoritarianism preceded by many months the introduction of Marxist economic determinism and Soviet bloc alliances into the vocabulary and practice of Cuban politics. Castro's growing impatience during 1959 with his political opposition was only one early manifestation of this particular self-perception. More recently, as is suggested by his attack on Anibal Escalante and the "old-line" Havana Communists, he has exhibited much the same determination to maintain his position as chief interpreter of the correct meaning and interrelatedness of events.26 However, now it is (some) Communists in addition to (all) anti-Communists who are being rudely schooled in what it means to be a follower in Castro's Cuba.26

4. T h e behavior of the leader in power is anti-bureaucratic Once again we find striking agreement among the various interpreters of the Revolution that Castro is (or at least was) highly disdainful of and uninterested in the routine processes of public administration. Friends and foes of the Revolution differ on whether this disinterest is "good'' or "bad," "creative" or "uncreative," but few deny its existence. This characteristic of Castro is thrown into ironic relief by the immensity and pervasiveness of the bureaucratic structures which have been created to direct the reorganization of Cuban society. For instance, the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), once headed by Castro and often called the heart of the Revolution, directly or indirectly controls 80 per cent of the farm land on the island.27 But Castro's behavior, both while chairman of INRA and after, hardly fits Weber's model of rational-legal leadership. On the contrary, his leadership was highly personalized and un-hierarchical, and his choice of second-level administrators was based primarily on ascription (is he a trusted follower from the Sierra?) rather than achievement criteria. Nowhere is the personalized and un-hierarchical nature of Castro's leadership better drawn than in an episode reported by Jean-Paul Sartre. In a chapter called "A Day in the Country with Fidel," Sartre tells how on a stopover at a rural tourist center Castro became upset because his soft drink was warm.28 According to Sartre, Castro's ire was not aroused by his personal inconvenience but rather by his generalized irritation with a bureaucratic structure which was created to serve "the people" but which frequently succeeded only in frustrating them. After "rummaging passionately around in a refrigerator that was out of order. . ." and being unable to fix it himself, "He closed with this growled sentence : 'Tell your people in charge that The crucial document here is Castro's television speech of March 26, 1962. This is available in English under the title Fidel Castro Denounces Bureaucracy and Sectarianism (New: York: Pioneer, 1962). See also the discussion in Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1962), Appendix Three. * I am simplifying a very complex and poorly understood relationship (between Castro and the old-line Communists) for purposes of emphasis. However, I think that the essential point remains valid; i.e., Castro has fought very hard to maintain his position as the prime interpreter of the larger historical importance and meaning of events in Cuba? and thus he sees himself as a leader who is not obligated to accept the interpretations of others with regard to what his or their political roles should be. '' International Commission of Jurists, op. cit., p. 61. 15 Sartre, op. cit., see pp. 122-3.

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if they don't take care of their problems, they will have problems with me.' " And this, Sartre maintains, was typical of the manner in which the "maximum leader" invested his energies in the administration of Cuba.

5. Charismatic authority is unstable, tending to be routinized through time Now we come to a set of questions which we have in part glossed over by pretending that the legitimacy of Castro's rule has been relatively stable since 1959. This is not the case, for there have been changes along a t least two dimensions. First, there has been some shrinkage of the set of followers, both the charismatic and the non-charismatic. Most simply, Castro's rule is not now as legitimate for as many Cubans as it once was. However, we lack the data needed to document and quantify the extent and distribution of this partial disintegration of legitimacy. Second - and this bears most directly on Weber's concerns - there has been at least a partial shift as predicted from authority relationships based on charisma to relationships based on rules, law, and a nascent "revolutionary tradition." This shift cannot be adequately described in brief compass, but central to the partial routinization of charisma in Cuba has been a movement away from Castro as the prime popular symbol of the Revolution and a concomitant movement toward a heterogeneity of symbols which includes other leaders, a whole spectrum of martyrs, revolutionary organizations, and achievements. This movement away from Castro as the organizing symbol of the Revolution incarnate is illustrated in Table 3, which compares the frequency with which Castro's picture appeared in two successive sets of INRA, the TABLE 3

PICTURES O F CASTRO IN 22 AVAILABLE ISSUESOF I N R A

First I I Issues Vol. I (1960)

No. of Pictures

Second 1l Issues

No. of Pictures

Vol. 11 (1961)

Total =3 1 Mean* =2.82

* For difference between the means, t = 3.85, d.f. = 20, p=.001.

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official monthly magazine of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform.2g Although these data do not constitute a test of Weber's hypothesis, they do suggest that his statement that "in its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in the process of originating. I t cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both" may be susceptible to more rigorous investigation than it has hitherto received. Certainly our understanding of politics and political change in the emerging nations of the world would be much enhanced by systematic research designed to explore the validity of this and other segments of Weber's model of charismatic authority. This paper has attempted to explicate that model in a way which might prove useful for research. A brief look at the leadership of Fidel Castro leads to cautious optimism regarding the usefulness of Weber's ideas for the investigation of charismatic politics. But much work is still needed before we can claim with any confidence to understand the processes by which politicians like Castro bind to themselves and their causes the men and women who as charismatic followers constitute the primary resource of such regimes.

ZNRA is a large-format popular magazine of 108 pages. I t contains both pictures and text much in the manner of LIFE. Although INRA concentrates rather heavily in the areas of current events and recent history, it does publish essays, reviews, fiction, and poetry. The original intent was to compare Volume I (1960) with Volume I1 (1961), but two issues of Volume I could not be located so the 22 remaining issues were split into two equal sets of 11 each. Weber, op. cit., p. 364.

Charismatic Leadership (Fidel Castro)

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