Happy Renault-Nissan Marriage Student: Laura AMBARDARYAN EEIB College of Europe PROFESSORS: AIMÉ HEENE AND PHILIPPE DE BUCK ASSISTANT: DAVID RINALDI
CASE STUDY
Student: Laura AMBARDARYAN EEIB, College of Europe PROFESSORS: AIMÉ HEENE AND PHILIPPE DE BUCK ASSISTANT: DAVID RINALDI Word Count: 3970 words
Bruges, 2015
TABLE OF CONTENT Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 0 Nissan before the Alliance .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 0 Nissan facing financial difficulties ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 The last hope for Nissan ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Nissan and ELV Directive ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 2 Renault-Nissan Alliance ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 “Mr. Fix-it”...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Synergies .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Nissan after Nissan-Renault Alliance ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 Questions for discussion ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Annexes ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Annex 1: Nissan’s sales before the Alliance ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Annex 2: Nissan’s growth of sales before the Alliance ......................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Annex 3: Geographical Synergy ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Annex 4: Alliance sales on the world in 2003....................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Annex 5: One year after the creation of the Alliance Nissan becomes profitable. ............................................................................................................................... 5 References............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
INTRODUCTION
5,188,000 Vehicles representing 6.2% of Global Market Share in 2013. It employs 142,925 people and generates ¥605.7Billion of operating profit2.
In this case study I will try to investigate the success story of the Europeanization of Nissan through the creation of an international
In the 1990s, Nissan was the most global of all Japanese carmakers. It was
Alliance with European car manufacturer-Renault. The foundation of the
well established in Japan, North and South Americas but to a less extent in
Alliance was a step forward for both companies to address the issues that
Europe. The entry of Nissan in the European market was barred by several
each of players was facing in the late 1990s. The signature of a unique
economic and political constraints. More precisely, the trade between
Alliance between a Japanese and a French competitors is known as a
Japan and Europe was restricted by several policy measures such as “VER
corporate fairy tale as Nissan was almost bankrupt due to huge debt and
(Voluntary Export Restraints), national quotas, antidumping, local content
losses. One year after the creation of the Renault-Nissan Alliance, Nissan
rules often specifically targeting Japanese firms”3. So that is why the first
becomes again profitable. The new Alliance helped Nissan to influence
steps of Nissan in Europe started quite late with the acquisition of an equity
more effectively the decision making in the EU.
interest in Motor Iberica, S.A. in Barcelona, Spain 4 . In 1980s Nissan established Nissan Motor Iberica S.A., in Spain and started the production
NISSAN BEFORE THE ALLIANCE
of the Patrol.
Nissan Motor Company Ltd, usually known as Nissan, is a
However, few years after the establishment of Nissan in Europe, the
Japanese multinational automobile manufacturer which was created in
economic and political environment becomes much more favorable for
1933, in Yokohama. The company is one of the pioneers in car
Nissan. The creation of the Single Market opened several doors of
manufacturing which is specialized in manufacturing and selling
opportunity for Nissan to increase its investments in Europe, because most
mainstream cars and trucks.
of the restrictions such as national quotas, VERs, restrictive use of rules of
More than 80 years after its creation, Nissan has become the world’s 9th
origin, local content rules were eliminated within the commitment to
car manufacturer and enjoys the 111th rating within Global 2000 Leading Companies 1 . According to its annual report of 2014, Nissan produced
1 2
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/eimi45eilh/no-9-nissan-motor/ NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION Annual Report 2014
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of the EC. So in the mid1980s, the most of the disputes between Japan and EU were solved and
3
Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 22), Doctoral dissertation, University College London 4 http://www.newsroom.nissan-europe.com/EU/engb/Corporate/EuropeHistory.aspx
European market became more open to welcome Japanese car
top management at Nissan failed to take notice of changing trends in the
manufacturers, among which was Nissan.
customer tastes especially in the US, its biggest export market”5.
Following the opening of the European market for Japanese car manufacturers, the European market represented a huge opportunity for Nissan to expand its activity to a larger extent in Europe. In 1991, Nissan established Nissan Motor Ltd in the United Kingdom. The next year, it opened Nissan Design Europe in Germany.
NISSAN FACING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES
What were the reasons for these hard times for Nissan? Firstly, following the asset boom of 1991, a gap was created gap between the investment yield and guaranteed return on Nissan paid to policyholders. Due to asset deflation and extremely low interest rates, actually Nissan was paying 4.7% to policyholders, while the return on investments was less than 3.1%6. Moreover, almost the half of Nissan Life’s assets represented contracts of individual pension funds promising very high revenue of almost 5.5%. This was 7% of Japanese insurer’s portfolios. So the fact of
In the late 1990s, the global player Nissan entered the transition
taking excessive risk made Nissan exposed to the risk of unexpected fall
period. Several important global development such as globalization,
of yield. Nissan continued promising high return and in this way worsened
increasing competition on the global scale, raise of environmental issues,
the solvency problem. So by 1997, Nissan had the burden of ¥25.1 of debt.
Asia’s economic turmoil, Japanese recession and prolonged stagnation in
During one of his speeches in Automotive News World Congress in
the consumer spending hampered the further advancement of Nissan,
Detroit, Nissan’s CEO Carlos Ghosn’s noted about the unfavorable
which entered into a period of recession. According to its annual report,
evolution of Nissan’ debt “Nissan was buckling under $20 billion of
the consolidated sales in fiscal 1999 declined by 1.0% to 2,542 thousand
automotive debt. For most of the ‘90s, Nissan lost share and revenue in all
units, and net sales increased only by 0.2% to ¥6,580 billion. Even in Japan
markets. It was delivering a 1% operating profit margin. Our competitors
Nissan’s market share decreased from 34% in 1974 to below 19% in the
were averaging 4%. Return on invested capital averaged 1%. Our
late 1990s. Many analysts were of the opinion that in the early 1990s, “the
competitors averaged 10%”7.
Nissan’s turnaround story The spectacular failure of Nissan Mutual Life Reported by Rayman Yan https://riskviews.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/the-spectacular-failure-of-nissan-mutuallife.pdf
7
5 6
http://nissannews.com/en-US/nissan/usa/releases/bb933d39-b8c4-46ae-a23a1db992a1ddee?mode=print
These circumstances had led to a delay of dividend payments for
The analysis of the growth rate of sales (See: Annex 2) shows that the
the fiscal year 1999. The company was doing a lot of effort to reduce the
overall sales of Nissan cars fell significantly. Only European market could
interest-bearing debt 8 . Under Nissan’s Global Business Reform Plan
have been considered as the last hope of Nissan because even if the growth
“Nissan set itself the target, in its “global business reform plan” in 1998
of sales in Middle East and Africa were increasing sharply, but that
May, of cutting short-term debt from ¥2.5 trillion to ¥1 trillion by March
represented only a small fraction of the overall sells of Nissan respectively
2001”9.
5% and 1% of total sales in 1999. After North America’s sales, the Nissan’s
However, due to extraordinary losses related mainly to the Global Business
the second biggest market was the European one- 22% of total sales in
Reform Plan, the net income represented a ¥27.7 billion loss. To some
1999.
analysts the revival plan of Nissan looked much more like a “survival” plan. The company was bearing second consecutive annual loss in 1999. Due to the dark age of debt problem10, Nissan was near-bankruptcy. Carlos Ghosn in November 2002 stated “Nissan was in a difficult situation not only for the short term but for the future”. So to sum up, the overall performance of Nissan on all over the world was less encouraging.
“Sales in Europe were approximately 10% above the previous year’s level” stated Yoshikazu Hanawa, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Nisssan. The Overall performance of Nissan was bad but there was light at the end of tunnel for Nissan because “Nissan’s European operations, which broke even in fiscal 1998, achieved a further improvement in fiscal 1999, resulting in a net income of approximately ¥7 billion.”11
THE LAST HOPE FOR NISSAN Despite this recession of the Nissan in almost all markets where it
NISSAN AND ELV DIRECTIVE The growing role of Nissan’s (4.1% market share in August 1995)
was operating, only in the European market Nissan was performing. The volume of sales was quite promising. (See: Annex1)
in the European market has contributed to the fact that Nissan grew into a full player in the European market. Thereby Nissan had incentives to
8
A NewAlliance for the Millennium ANNUAL REPORT 1999 Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1999 9 The Economist: Renault and Nissan Renissant?-Mar 18th 1999 (TOKYO)
10
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1999-04-04/the-debt-thats-dragging-nissandownhill-intl-edition 11 A New Alliance for the Millennium (1999)- Yoshikazu Hanawa Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
influence the decision making process and exploit policy’s possible
influential pan-European association to represent car manufacturers’
channels. In the Europeans market, the main problems related to the
interests. ACEA had a lot advantages. However becoming a member of
Nissans activity were environmental policy issues, safety measures in the
ACEA was nearly impossible because from the beginning it was composed
EU which were gaining more and more importance in 1990s with more
of only European car manufacturers. Even the biggest Japanese car
focus on car manufactures due to the growing importance of recycling the
manufacturer Toyota applied several times for the membership but it was
waste of end-of-life vehicles. So the proposal of the ELV (2000/53)
not accepted12.
directive was addressed to car manufacturers to insure the production of the cars that would be more recyclable upon its end-of-life. The proposal had 3 main targets being recycling, reuse and saving energy.
Nissan was a member of JAMA (Japan Automobile Manufacturer Association) which was the only channel to represent its interests as a Japanese car manufacturers at EU level. However, JAMA was not
However, gaining insider status for Nissan in policy making was
necessarily effective because issues concerning lobbying in the EU needed
not easy because of several reasons. Nissan as many of Japanese car
to be decided in Tokyo office which made fast decision making process
manufacturers had to adapt their lobbying strategy to the new environment.
impossible13. Moreover, in the 1990s mainly regarding the ELV directive
Firstly, Nissan had no member state to champion its interests and concerns related to the future regulations. Whereas the individual European firms were able to use both national and European channels of influencing the decision making process. Secondly, the dominant player in lobbying was ACEA (European Automobile Manufacturers Association) which was at that time the most
12
Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 139), Doctoral dissertation, University College London 13 Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 141), Doctoral dissertation, University College London
JAMA was a following ACEA without having some influence on negotiations. The Commission awaited on ACEA being sure to get reliable information from ACEA considering Japanese car manufacturers as a secondary source of information14. It will be further illustrated how Nissan addressed the issue of lobbying in the section of Nissan after the Alliance.
14
Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 149), Doctoral dissertation, University College London
RENAULT-NISSAN ALLIANCE In Europe, since the 1990s, French car manufacturer Renault was attempting to widen its geographical coverage by finding a partner to internationalize its production. Even though Renault was strongly present in the European market, which was becoming more and more maturated, it exported only a small fraction of its production outside the Europe. For this reason, in February 1990 Renault attempted a merger with Volvo which ultimately failed, because of several reasons. De jure, the alliance was called merger but de facto it was a takeover of Volvo by Renault, because the players were too different and the conditions were not equal. Formally both companies would have kept their independence but in reality this alliance would have been more favorable for Renault because the latter
After this unsuccessful merger with Volvo, Renault continued its attempts
would have hold the “Golden Share” of 65% of the new Renault-Volvo
to find a strategic partner and the next possible partner was Nissan, which
Alliance having more say on distribution of shares.
was the most international of Japanese car manufacturers by creating the
The “Golden share” would imply that the French government during a
fourth largest car manufactures on the world. But Nissan was struggling
stock exchange introduction keeps at least one share, which would give the
from financial problems. At the same time, due to debt problems, Nissan
French government the right to approve or disapprove if other shareholders
was negotiated with 2 other possible partners which were Daimler
would exceed the limit of 10 to 20 % of capital and votes in the alliance
(Germany) and Ford (US). After several years of negotiations, despite all
between Volvo and Renault 15 ."From a shareholder's point of view, I
kind of universal skepticism (on early 1999, BusinessWeek wrote, "But for
couldn't think of a worse arrangement," said Forsgardh (Forsgardh's group
a recently turned-around Renault, the Nissan link is a dangerous liaison)
represents individuals who together hold only 10% of Volvo stock)16.
Nissan and Renault created an Alliance based on cross-shareholding, on
15
16
Affärsvärlden 27 of October Nr 43/93
Why Volvo Kissed Renault Goodbye- Bloomberg, December 19, 1993
March 27, 1999 which is known as “corporate fairy tale” because it was
The Structure of the Alliance was as follows:
the first cooperation in the history between a Japanese and French car manufacturers which had no cross-regional links before, no common language to communicate. Within the Alliance both players engaged to keep their brand identities independent from each other. After the signature of the Alliance Renault acquired 36.8% of Nissan’s equity for a total of “¥643 billion including the acquisition of these shares and Nissan’s financial subsidiaries in Europe” 17 . Afterwards, Renault’s participation increases to 44.4%. The acquisition Nissan’s shares was the only way to inject money to solve cash problem of Nissan and reduce its debt. In its turn, Nissan acquired 15% of Renault’s shares.
“MR. FIX-IT” Carlos Ghosn is the main character of this Alliance. Being currently both the Chairman & CEO of Renault and Chairman & CEO of Japanbased Nissan he is the founding father of the Renault-Nissan Alliance. He
17
A New Alliance for the Millennium (1999) Annual report Nissan
is known as one of the “automobile industry's great turnaround artist”.
companies”20 in many contexts. Geographically, Nissan was operating in
Being the main character of Nissan-Renault Alliance he is known as "le
addition to Japan in almost all markets- Mexico, Asia, the Middle East, and
cost killer" but also with a more telling nickname:"Mr. Fix-It." 18 . His
South Africa, United States. At the same time, Renault started operating in
leadership, cross cultural awareness was crucial for the success of the
Mercosur, Turkey, and Central and Eastern European markets. (See:
Alliance. Mr. Ghosn have been awarded with several awards such as ‘Most
Annex 3 geographical complementarity).
Respected CEOs’ by CEO Quarterly Magazine (2010) and ‘Asia Business Leader of the Year’ by CNBC (2011). In 2019, Carlos Ghosn was elected as the president of ACEA for 2010 and was re-elected in December 5, 201519.
The principle of geographical expansion of the Alliance is that the player who is well established in a region assists to firmly establishment of the partner in the new region. In Annex 4 we see that already in 2003, both companies covered a more expanded coverage compared to even estimate geographical synergies before the Alliance (Annex 3). Renault’s objectives Nissan’s objectives Quality improvement Cost reduction Internationalization
Combat the debt problem Europeanize Common objectives Create synergies
As to products, Renault was mainly specialized in the production of
SYNERGIES The ideal complementarity of two firms as once noted G. Douin was an “almost miraculous complementary relationship between two
18
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Carlos_Ghosn.aspx http://www.acea.be/press-releases/article/carlos-ghosn-re-elected-president-of-aceafor-2015 19
medium-sized cars such as Mégane which represented its main business while Nissan was focused on the production of bigger cars to a greater extent.
20
Behind the Scenes of the Renault-Nissan Alliance by Georges DOUIN- 5th April, 2002
The excellence of Nissan engineers was another essential asset that was offered by Nissan, while Renault brought to the table its favorable financial
Consolidated net automotive debt reduced to less than ¥700 billion by fiscal year 2002”22.
stability, innovation and R&D. “The complementary relationship was also
In 2001, one year ahead the planned schedule, Nissan met all 3 of these
noticeable in terms of organization and know-how”21.
commitments. In the Annual report of 2001, Nissan reported that “….net
The Alliance was favorable for both companies in term of approaches, for
profitability was achieved in the first year with net after-tax profits of
example Renault put emphasis on cost management, on the style of
¥331.1 billion. This then grew in fiscal year 2001 to ¥372.3 billion—the
products and innovation while Nissan used much resources for R&D,
highest yearly profit in the company’s history”23. Nissan reduced its debt
advanced technologies, factory productivity and quality control. These
from ¥2.1trillion in 1998 to 953 billion in 2000. Nissan’s stock moved up
differences were opportunities for both companies to learn from each other
by of $15.97 per share on NASDAQ in 2001.
expertise by creating a common platform, participate to value-creation and harvest apart of created value.
The NRP was beneficial for Nissan not only to resolve its problems, but also to strengthen its brand identity by launching the 22 new vehicles.
NISSAN AFTER NISSAN-RENAULT ALLIANCE 7 months after the creation of Nissan-Renault Alliance, Nissan with the
Nissan created not merely an enhanced identity of the company being in the center of the growth of the company, sustainable profitability and brand image.
supervision Carlos Ghosn introduced a 3-year plan of structural reforms
The creation of the Renault-Nissan Alliance contributed to operating
named the Nissan Revival Plan. When the NRP was first announced,
profits in the European market and further Europeanization of Nissan24. In
Nissan’s executive committee announced 3 commitments with promise to
2001, Renault-Nissan set up the first single Legal Entities (SLEs) in
resign if any of these 3 were not met. The commitment were as follows:
Switzerland and in Netherlands. In 2002, Nissan set a new headquarter
“A
A minimum operating income to sales margin of 4.5 percent by
return to net profitability in fiscal year 2000,
Nissan Europe SAS in Paris. In 2003, Nissan opens European design center
fiscal year 2002, 21
Behind the Scenes of the Renault-Nissan Alliance by Georges DOUIN- 5th April, 2002 The Nissan Revival Plan- Success Ahead of Schedule, Nissan Annual Report 2001 23 The Nissan Revival Plan- Success Ahead of Schedule, Nissan Annual Report 2001 22
24
Nissan has significantly increased its market share in Europe from 2.9% in 1989 to 9.5% in 2013.
in London. Already in 2003, Renault-Nissan had established 4 SLEs.
before the entry into force of the Directive. This would have meant for
Nissan NV200 awarded International Van of the Year 2010 in Europe25.
Nissan another huge burden of additional cost which was already suffering from financial problems.
Renault-Nissan partnership was beneficial not only for creating
Prohibited materials
synergies but also to vital for Nissan in lobbying context. Nissan was not able to become a member of the most-influential association representing car manufacturers’ interests (ACEA). However, at the same time Renault was a member of ACEA, which meant that Renault had access to internal information and transmitted to its partner as well. Even Nissan’s “lobbying division shares the facilities with Renault’s office in Brussels”26. That’s how the 39 amendments on “ELV directive” proposed by ACEA represented Nissan’s interests as well through its new partner. Below are presented the aspects of the proposal of the ELV directive that were
Another concern for Nissan of the proposal of the ELV Directive was that component of the cars that contain “lead, mercury, cadmium and hexavalent compounds of chromium had to be removed in the process of subsequent recycling from all vehicles sold as from 2003”27. This created conflicts of the targets of the Directive as the use of some materials such as steel and aluminum alloys is much more useful to reduce energy consumption. Spare parts
unfavorable for Nissan. Producer responsibility
Another inconsistency was related to spare and replacement details that comprise the materials listed above. The problem was that if Nissan would have to change the materials of the cars produced before the entry
One of the aspects which was of strategic importance for Nissan was that of the producer responsibility. More precisely, Nissan raised disagreement with the proposal that the complete cost of the take-back of the end-of-life vehicles would also be applied to the cars manufactured
25
History of Nissan in Europe, Nissan Newsroom, Europe https://newsroom.nissan-europe.com/ 26 Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 140), Doctoral dissertation, University College London
of force of the Directive, it would not be able to produce the same detail or part with banned materials. This means that new parts produced would no longer be compatible with the design of a car. So upon the demand of the consumers willing to replace a specific detail or part of the car that have 27
Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007, Doctoral dissertation, University College London
been produced before 2002, Nissan would no longer be able to replace that
of 2003. This was the first time any carmaker had used existing
part if it has even one of the prohibited materials mentioned in the
incineration facilities at its own plant to process ASR”29.
Directive. Consequently, this would mean that the whole vehicle must be replaced which would ultimately increase the damage to the environment more. So the Alliance with Renault was not only profitable for Nissan in term of creating synergies and overcoming financial difficulties but also in term of representing its interest concerning ELV directive through a member of ACEA.
Also, Renault’s membership to ACEA was another tool for Nissan to indirectly cope with its main competitor Toyota. The latter applied several times to become a member of the ACEA but its application was rejected because the voting was by unanimity. The huge resistance was mainly from the part of Renault30.
CONCLUSION It has contributed somehow that now Nissan has become the leader
To conclude, due to an International Alliance with one of the
of the application of the requirements of the ELV directive. Thanks to its
leaders of the European market-Renault, Nissan took advantage to
good performance in recycling ASR(The Automobile Shredder Residue),
Europeanize its activity, avoid bankruptcy, resolve its financial problems
Nissan was selected as team leader of ART (The Automobile Shredder
and come back to profitability. With the leadership of Carlos Ghosn,
Residue Recycling Promotion Team). This is because it has made a
Nissan successfully implemented NRP and was back on the track. Very
significant progress in recycling ASR28. “Nissan rebuilt part of their waste
different but at the same time complementing partners created a number of
incineration facilities at the Oppama plant, tested and achieved solutions
synergies
to technical problems and started energy recovery of ASR towards the end
implemented a common and a more efficient research and development
in
geographical,
technological
context,
successfully
platform by exchanging know-hows, expertise, staff, and represented their
28
The European ELV Directive (2000/53/EC) requires Member States to achieve a reuse and recovery rate of 95% for all ELVs by average weight by 2015. Since ASR typically represents 14-20% of the ELV weight - depending on the amount of prior manual dismantling - it is widely acknowledged that developing post-shredder technologies (PST) for treating ASR is crucial to reaching the 95% target. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/project/Projects/index.cfm?fuseaction=search.dspP age&n_proj_id=4006&docType=pdf
A Study to Examine the Costs and Benefits of the ELV Directive – Final Report, Annexes Source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/pdf/study/annex4.pdf 29
30
Interview with Ivan Hodac, ACEA Secretary-General 19/02/2015
interests to policymakers. At the same time, both companies preserved
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
their brand identity. Following this successful partnership, Renault-Nissan
1. What are the differences between Renault-Volvo Alliance and Renault-
became the 4th biggest car manufacturer on the world.
Nissan Alliance? 2. What were the alternative solutions for Nissan and Renault if the Alliance would have not been created? 3. How Nissan has become much more powerful than Renault after the Alliance? 4. How long can such an Alliance last? 5. Up to what extent can Renault continue to represent the interests of Nissan to the European level, through ACEA?
ANNEXES ANNEX 1: NISSAN’S SALES BEFORE THE ALLIANCE Units
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
Domestic
872507
981512
1140010
1,146,131
1063469
Overseas total
1669219
1586366
1570033
1524901
1636305
North America
656789
678488
809133
814541
833224
Europe
549547
494092
451809
464,714
460222
Middle East
139432
99311
70831
37508
38781
Asia
38706
86291
75731
66787
66059
Africa
22211
19853
10514
10350
11458
Latin America and
204539
162347
116141
99525
193137
Oceania
56544
45064
35240
31005
32094
Others
1451
920
634
471
1330
Total
2541726
2567878
2710043
2671032
2699774
Caribbean
Source: Annual Report, Nissan 1999
ANNEX 2: NISSAN’S GROWTH OF SALES BEFORE THE ALLIANCE Growth
1999
1998
1997
1996
Domestic
-11.11%
-13.90%
-0.53%
7.77%
Overseas total
5.22%
1.04%
2.96%
-6.81%
North America
-3.20%
-16.15%
-0.66%
-2.24%
Europe
11.22%
9.36%
-2.78%
0.98%
Middle East
40.40%
40.21%
88.84%
-3.28%
Asia
-55.14%
13.94%
13.39%
1.10%
Africa
11.88%
88.82%
1.58%
-9.67%
25.99%
39.78%
16.70%
-48.47%
Oceania
25.47%
27.88%
13.66%
-3.39%
Others
57.72%
45.11%
34.61%
-64.59%
Total
-1.02%
-5.25%
1.46%
-1.06%
Latin
America
and Caribbean
Source: Own calculation
ANNEX 3: GEOGRAPHICAL SYNERGY
Source: Annual Report Nissan 1999
ANNEX 4: ALLIANCE SALES ON THE WORLD IN 2003
ANNEX 5: ONE YEAR AFTER THE CREATION OF THE ALLIANCE NISSAN BECOMES PROFITABLE.
Source: Annual Report Nissan 2001
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Nissan’s turnaround story
Nissan Annual Report 2011
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/project/Projects/index.
Nissan Annual Report 2014
NISSAN
RENISSANT?-MAR 18TH 1999 (TOKYO)
19/02/2015
AND
debt-thats-dragging-nissan-downhill-intl-edition
