Case Study: Disney in France Q1: What assumptions did Disney make about the tastes and preferences of French consumers? Which of these assumptions were correct? Which were not?
ANS: Between the other cultures among the world many perceive tastes and preferences in different fashion. For Disney and their empire placing themselves in French territory released a debacle of cultural differences. Disney indeed made assumptions on French consumers that in reality backfired on the corporation. The operational errors of Disney serving no alcohol at the park set a dispute to a country that is familiar with alcohol in all occasions. They also misjudged European style of food and times of the day to eat, that lead to unsatisfied customers trying to eat breakfast or lunch. They assumed that Europeans don’t eat breakfast that often and provided food venues that didn’t offer enough space for the demands. They also assumed that Europeans are more accustomed to croissants as a breakfast rather than bacon and eggs, which was what they really desired. Disney also made assumptions on Europeans that they would be more likely to come to the park on a Friday than a Monday. Disney was once again proved wrong. With all the assumptions that Disney made upon the European culture, all of them backfired on Disney. Not one assumption made about eating or drinking habits satisfied the French consumers.
Disney is assumptions on cut consumers tastes and preferences were more of times than not ruin. They image it would be a good insurance not to serve alcoholic drink at the cat valium because it was a children park. They purview the park was going to be slight worry on Monday and more packed on Friday. The eat situation, they were told that French people did not run through eat and they served the typical French breakfast. Another pronominal mistake they imitation was with their staff. They thought the French would scarcely be happy with the same police squad model they use at other Disney locations. They also thought Europeans would persist protracted than a day at the park. Entirely these mistakes caused a lot of losses to the company. The no alcohol policy was wrong because French consumers drink a glass in a wine at lunchtime. Their assumption on thinking what day the park would bushel full was wrong. The breakfast assumptions were wrong because a lot of people showed up for breakfast and wanted to eat bacon and eggs.
The staffing assumption was wrong because the French verbalize out on their preference on issues at work. They assumed wrong with the assumption that Europeans would stay longer. Europeans actually went to the park as day excursions. 1|Page
Case Study: Disney in France Q2: How might Disney have had a more favorable initial experience in France? What steps might it have taken to reduce the mistakes associated with the launch of Euro-Disney?
ANS: This case focuses on the miscues that characterized the opening of Euro Disney in France. Until 1992, the Walt Disney Company had experienced nothing but success in the theme park business. The parks in California, Florida, and Japan were busy and profitable. In the mid 1980s, Disney turned its attention to Europe, and specifically to France. When word got out that Disney wanted to build another international theme park, officials from over 200 locations around the world expressed interest. Disney settled on Paris, largely because about 17 million Europeans live less than a two-hour drive from Paris. Another 310 million can fly there in the same time or less. In addition, the French government seemed like a willing host and offered Disney more than $1 billion in various incentives, all in the expectation the project would create 30,000 new jobs.
Disney committed a string of cultural miscues. There was a backlash in France, particularly from Parisian intellectuals, who attacked the transportation of Disney's dream world as an assault on French culture. French farmers used the opening of the park as an occasion for staging a protest against the U.S. government for its insistence that French agricultural subsidies be cut. In addition, there were operational errors. For example, Disney thought that Monday would be a light day for visitors and Friday a heavy one and allocated staff accordingly, but the reality was the reverse. Disney also miscalculated the length of time that people would stay at the theme park and adjacent resort. As a result, its new hotels stood half empty most of the time.
Eventually, Disney changed its strategy and things are now going more smoothly. The company changed the name of the park from Euro Disney to Disneyland Paris in an attempt to strengthen the park's identity. The early operational miscues have been straightened out, and the park now accommodates European tastes and preferences. Attendance at the park was 11.7 million in 1996, up sharply from 8.8 million in 1994.
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Case Study: Disney in France Q3: In retrospect, was France the best choice for the location of Euro-Disney?
ANS: This case illustrates the difficulties that a firm as large and seemingly savvy as Disney has in effectively understanding a foreign market. It also illustrates the power of culture, and the extent of cultural differences that exist between countries. From the Euro Disney's failure in the initial stage, we should realize deeply that cultural factors play enormous role in the process of expanding overseas of the enterprises and lack of cross-cultural awareness will bring out failure of the business. With the increase and deepen of the economical contact, transnational marketing received more and more attention. If the multinational companies cannot handle properly the culture difference between foreign markets and home market in the whole marketing management process, the result will be that low profit with higher cost even lead to bankruptcy.
We already know that in the past Disney have got it very wrong with the European consumer’s the way we consume and buy is quite different to that of the American market. Happily, Disney have learnt from mistakes made at Euro Disneyland and moved on to create a Hong Kong Disneyland that takes into account the cultural habits of the people of Hong Kong, and indeed they will be certain to do the same in Shanghai for the upcoming Shanghai Disney Resort, in this regard, Disneyland Paris’s original failures have improved the future for all resorts. The perfect example of getting European consumers wrong was the original policy of having no alcohol in the park (thus matching the parks American cousins), Europeans did not agree to this policy as alcohol is a larger part of European culture and so Euro Disney management reversed the decision and alcohol was served in Disneyland Paris. Having said that, there is no real evidence that Light Ears would be a failure in Disneyland Paris, and in our opinion they are not a failure however there is no real success story either.
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