Union Bank vs People of the Philippines PRINCIPLE: The proper venue for the criminal action against perjury is the place where the certificate was notarized FACTS: Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed on March 15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.
In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving invo lving the same issue in another tribunal or agency". The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas To mas was filed in Makati. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid and that the facts do not constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the Pasay City Court where the Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the case against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the M otion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate was notarized there and the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied. When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of the MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on th e ground of grave abuse of o f discretion. They also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented". The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality where the perjury was committed, or wh ere any of its essential ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme Court to address the seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC Makati is the proper venue to try and decide the case
RULING: MeTC Makati is the proper venue for the criminal action.
The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Art. 183 of the RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following so, the jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who makes an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.' The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC. The Co urt ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Art. 183
of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sown statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, the determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
David vs Marquez PRINCIPLE: The filing of criminal actions arising from illegal recruitment is before the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. Same goes to Estafa arising from such illegal recruitment activities. FACTS: Respondent Glenda Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc, Manila and that sometime in March 2005, petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and represented that she could recruit her to work abroad. It was further alleged that petitioner demanded payment of placement fees and other expenses from the respondent for the processing of the latter's application, to which the respondent heeded. Respondent's application was, however, denied and worse, the money that she put out therefore was never returned. In her CounterAffidavit and Counter Charge, petitioner averred that it was physically impossible for her to hav e committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the alleged time of recruitment as evidenced by the entries in her passport. Petitioner further averred that she was never engaged in the recruitment business. The petitioner alleged that the amount deposited in her account was not for her but was just coursed through her to be given to her friend in Canada who was the one processing respondent's application, as evidenced by a certification to that effect issued by the said friend. Further, petitioner argued before the Prosecutor that assuming arguendo that the allegations of recruitment were true, the case should be filed in Kidapawan City and not in Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of illegal recruitment and estafa
RULING: Yes. The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. The express provision of the law is clear that the filing of criminal actions arising from illegal recruitment before the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense is allowed. Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising from such illegal recruitment activities, the outright dismissal thereof due to lack of jurisdiction was not proper, considering that as per the allegations in the Information, the same was within the jurisdiction of Manila. During the• preliminary investigation of the cases, respondent even presented evidence that some of the essential elements of the crime were committed within Manila,
such as the payment of processing and/or placement fees, considering that these were deposited in certain banks located in Manila.
Lee Pue Liong vs Chua Pue Chin Lee PRINCIPLE: Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. FACTS: Lee Pue Liong aka Paul Lee (petitioner), is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group. CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On June 15, 1999, Paul Lee on behalf of CHI caused the filing of a petition for the Issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) which covers a property owned by CHI. Paul Lee submitted an Affidavit of Loss stating that said TCT was inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999 but it had not been found and is already beyond recovery. Said title had not been the subject of mortgage or used as collateral for payment of any obligation with any person. RTC granted the petition and a new TCT has been issued. Chua Lee, joined by her brother Nixon Lee filed a petition asking for the RTC order that granted a new TCT to be set aside claiming that Paul Lee knew fully well that Chua Lee was in possession of the said TCT as she was the corporate treasurer at the time. Chua Lee posits that Paul Lee merely needs to have another TCT as he was planning to mortgage the same with Planters Development Bank. RTC recalled and set aside its order. On May 9, 2000, Chua Lee filed a complaint-affidavit stating among others, that Paul Lee made a wilful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, affidavit and testimony as he perfectly knew that she was in possession of the TCT. But through a Supplemental Affidavit, Chua Lee clarified that she was accusing Pau Lee of PERJURY. The Investigating Prosecutor recommended dismissal of the case. However, upon review, First Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the recommendation of dismissal. Thus, the City Prosecutor filed Information for perjury At the trial, Atty. Augusto Macam appeared as counsel for Chua Lee and as private prosecutor with the consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. Paul Lee argued that under Article 183 of the RPC, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution of the case. MeTC denied the motion stating that "an offended party may intervene in the proceedin g, personally or by attorney, in cases of offenses which cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. The only exception to this rule is when the offended party waives his right.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offended party may intervene in the criminal action
RULING: Yes. Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
SC: Petition has no merit.
SECTION 1, RULE 111 RULES OF COURT (read) SECTION 16, RULE 110 RULES OF COURT (read)
-EVen assuming that not civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case, whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. -Thus, whee the privatte prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accuses. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
