Government v. Monte De Piedad Digest
Facts:
1. Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands Islands for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake. 2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution institution under the control of the church, church, the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4 installments. As a result, result, various petitions were filed, including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and for it to pay with interest. 3. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various various jewelry loans.
Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action
YES.
The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae of the people. These principles are based upon public policy. The Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its sovereign functions or powers and was merely mer ely seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States. Finally, if said loan was was for ecclesiastical pious work, work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities.
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts: 1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to t o be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took
charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child
Melchora Cabañas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms
of the insurance policy?
YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
V
GUILLERMO CASIPIT
GR No. 8829 May 31, 1994 FACTS: Guillermo Casipit found guilty of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the offended party (Myra Reynaldo) P30,000 for moral damages.
Myra Reynaldo is a 14 year-old, innocent barrio lass The medical findings of Dr. Ochave showed no external signs of physical injuries but noted first degree fresh healing lasceration at the perineum and of hymen at 6 o’clock position, and negative for
spermatozoa.
ISSUE Appellant assails the trial court for giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses while discarding his and finding him guilty instead, on the basis that: The doctor who examined Reynaldo found no external injuries on her body as claimed for raping by means of force and intimidation She is attracted to him for she go with him on a movie date and that they are sweet hearts. She slept with him in the hut until morning which is an unnatural behavior of one who had been raped
HELD The absence of external signs or physical injuries doesn’t negate the commission of rape, it’s proof is not
necessary as it is not an element of the crime. This does not mean that no force or intimidation was used on the victim. The force or intimidation required in rape is relative, it is viewd on the victims perception and not by any hard and fast rule. Aside from force, the appellant used intimidation by threatening the
victim with a knife. The fact that Myra went with the appellant to a movie is no indication that she agreed to have sex with him, it is not improvable that the victim put a trust on him for she is a close relative according to the appellant’s grandfather, she is only 14 yr -old barrio lass with no ill-reputation of flirtatious nature to incite or provoke the appellant to have sex with him. If it is true that they are sweethearts she would have concealed it as this would disgrace her honor and the reputation and her family or keep silent about it. The fact that Myra lost no time in reporting the violation of her honor and submit herself to medical examination bolster her credibility and reflects the truthfulness and spontaneity of her account of the incident, Her unwavering and firm denunciation of appellant negates a consent. Conidering the victims physical condition and the place where the crime was perpetrated which was an isolated hut in an open field, it is not difficult for the accused to subdue the victim and coerce her into submission.
The court lend credence to the testimonies of the victims of tender years regarding their version of what transpired since the State, as parens patriae is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who because of their minority, are not yet capable to fully protect themselves. Appellant is declared guilty of rape, sentencing him of reclusion perpetua and modification in favor of indemnifying Myra Reynaldo increased to P50,000.
Gonzales vs. Marcos GONZALES vs. MARCOS 65 SCRA 624 GR No. L-31685 July 31, 1975 "With the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest owing from the public, a taxpayer may not have the right to question the legality of an issuance creating a trust for the benefit of the people but purely funded by charity." FACTS: The petitioner questioned the validity of EO No. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines, having as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as donations received, financial commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming in the future. It was likewise alleged that the Board of Trustees did accept donations from the private sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of New York a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the National Investment & Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million received from President Johnson of the United States in the concept of war damage funds, all intended for the construction of the Cultural Center building estimated to cost P48 million. The petition was denied by the trial court arguing that with not a single centavo raised by taxation, and the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that could in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the general public. ISSUE: Has a taxpayer the capacity to question the validity of the issuance in this case? HELD: No. It was therein pointed out as "one more valid reason" why such an outcome was unavoidable that "the funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations [and] contributions [not] by taxation." Accordingly, there was that absence of the "requisite pecuniary or monetary interest." The stand of the lower court finds support in judicial precedents. This is not to retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by People v. Vera, where the doctrine of standing was first fully discussed. It is only to make clear that petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning, has not satisfied the elemental requisite for a taxpayer's suit. Moreover, even on the assumption that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not necessarily follow that such kind of an action to assail the validity of a legislative or executive act has to be passed upon. This Court, as held in the recent case of Tan v. Macapagal, "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained." The lower court thus did not err in so viewing the situation.
Nov 1, 2010
Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh 75 PHIL 131
FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law.
ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US Forces.
HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good. All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign. Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and continue the proceedings.
G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto March 2, 2001 FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President. In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit" Singson , a close friend the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose
Velarde" – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada
on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters. On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office. At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post". Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president", but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign. 2.) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits. HELD: The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political. For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment . It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he
issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner,
as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure( the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term ( time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988] Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following:
American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now. Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration.
4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause. (2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. (3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest. The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary
Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired. Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people. Presidential Commission on Good Government v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan February 23, 2000 Piercing Veil of Corporate Fiction to recover Ill-Gotten Wealth
Facts: World Universal Trading & Investment Co., S.A. *WUTIC( was a sociedad a nonima registered in Panama but not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, now known as Philippine National Construction Corporation (CDCP/PNCC) is duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. PCGG ordered the sequestration and provisional takeovers against assets and records of Rodolfo Cuenca, Universal Holdings, Cuenca Investment, PNCC and San Mariano Milling Corporation. In 1987 PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Cuenca for illegally acquiring assets in the Cuenca owned corporations of CDCP/PNCC, Asia International Hardwood Limited (AHL), a Hongkong based company and Construction Development Corporation International Limited, Hongkong, a wholly owned subsidiary or alter ego of CDCP/PNCC. In 1991, claiming to be an assignee of AHL, WUTIC filed with the RTC against CDCP/PNCC to enforce a foreign judgement which W UTIC had obtained in Hongkong against CDCPI, which is wholly owned by CDCP/PNCC. After trial, the RTC found in favor of WUTIC, it considered CDCP/PNCC and CDCPI as “one corporate entity” and liable to pay WUTIC. CDCP/PNCC appealed, the CA affirmed the decision of tkhe RTC and the Supreme Court denied it on petition for review. Upon motion of WUTIC, the RTC issued a writ of execution and Sheriff Harina issued notices of garnishment against the accounts, shares of stocks and income of CDCP/PNCC with various banks and corporations. In October 197, PCGG Commissioner Mendoza attended the PNCC board meeting and discovered the writ and notices of garnishment. After realizing that WUTIC/AHL’s claim could be Cuenca’s in disguise, PCGG enjoined ONCC and/or any person acting in its behalf from taking any action which would dissipate or affect the assets of CDCP/PNCC. PCGG filed for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan to annul the RTC decision, writ and garnishment. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition ruling that it had not jurisdiction to annul the judgement of the RTC. It claimed to have only appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the RTC in criminal cases involving offenses relating to public office. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for certiorari despite the possibility that WUTIC is a dummy corporation or an alter ego of Rodolfo Cuenca.
Held: The 3 corporations involved in this petition, PNCC/CDCP, AHL and CDCPI, Hongkong are under sequestration are defendants in the sequestration case pending before the Sandiganbayan. AHL had claims against CDCPI and assigned the same to WUTIC. Eventually WUTIC obtained a favorable judgement in a Hongkong court. Due to the closure of CDCPI in Hongkong, WUTIC filed a case with RTC against PNCC/CDCP to enforce a foreign judgement obtained against CDCPI. Both corporations are Cuenca-owned and under sequestration. Hence there is valid ground for PCGG to evaluate the validity of WUTIC’s claim as a legitimate assignee or merely a dummy corporation set up to circumvent the sequestration case. As per the Court, it should be noted that despite the initial sequestration orders and the case filed with the Sandiganbayan against stockholdings of Rodolfo Cuenca and th so-called Cuenca-owned corporations, AHL, ONCC/CDCP and CDCPI, the PCGG was not made a party in the civil case in Hongkong and the case to enforce the foreign judgement filled with the trial court. Considering the interconnections between the participating corporations in the said transactions and the existence of the sequestration case, the PCGG should have been informed of the above cases to question and verify the veracity of the claim. The Court stated that it is aware of various schemes employed to circumvent sequestration orders, dissipate sequestered assets and thwart PCGG’s efforts to recover ill -gotten wealth. That there is a possibility that WUTIC is a dummy corporation formed by Rodolfo Cuenca, or his alter ego, the reach the sequestered assets, there is a need to vigorously guard these assets and preserve them pending resolution of the sequestration case before the Sandiganbayan.
Underhill v. Hernandez 168 US 250 (1897) “Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, nhand the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.” Format for determining whether suit can be brought against a foreign state: 1)
Apply the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
Is the defendant a foreign state? Do any of the FSIA exceptions apply in the case at bar? 2)
Apply the Act of State Doctrine:
Ask: Does the outcome of the case turn on whether the court gives validity to the public act of a foreign state?
If the outcome of a case turns on the validity of the public act of a foreign state in its own territory, the court has to presume the act of state to be valid
The Act of State Doctrine is like a Choice of Law principle: It is like a choice of law principle because the court is exercising jurisdiction over the foreign state but it is applying the law of the foreign state rather than domestic law. - S ee more at: http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2012/04/underhill-v-hernandez-case-
brief-168-us.html#sthash.QtSGfaIh.dpuf
People of the Philippines vs Gozo ON NOVEMBER 9, 2011
Political Law – Sovereignty Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country. ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base? HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as
part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base
Reagan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue
ON NOVEMBER 9, 2011
Political Law – Sovereignty Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force. In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson Jr for $6600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at P17912.34 and that his income tax would be P2797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation. ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax? HELD: The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable
Monday, December 17, 2012
Macariola vs. Asuncion Case Digest
Macariola v. Asuncion A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 114 SCRA 77
FACTS: Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc., Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals “with acts unbecoming of a judge.” Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce. ISSUE: Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?
HELD: Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent’s order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Laurel vsmisa Facts: the Supreme Court, in a resolution, acted on the petition for the writ ofhabeas corpus filed by petitioner anastacio laurel based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason definedand penalized by article 114 of the revised penal code for the reason that 1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens therto was then suspended;and 2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine republic.Issues:Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspendedand that there was a change of sovereignty over the Phil Islands.Held:No, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of theinhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate governmentor sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby theoccupier.Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Govt, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the US as well as against the sovereignty of the Phil Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of govt from commonwealthto republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the commonwealth, bec it is an offense against the samegovt and the same sovereign people.
