Kristie Xyla R. Amaro
CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)
Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation
G.R. No. 133706 Supreme Court 3rd Division (Panganiban, J.)
Francisco Estolas vs. Adolfo Mabalot May 7, 2002
FACTS:
Adolfo Mabalot was awarded with an agricultural land by virtue of PD 27. Corresponding Certificate of Land Transfer was issued on November 11, 1973. In May 1978, he needed money for medical treatment and passed the land to Francisco Estolas in exchange of P5,800 and P200 worth of rice. According to Mabalot, the transfer was only a verbal mortgage but Estolas treated the same as sale. Department of Agrarian Reform then issued a Transfer Certificate Title in favor of Estolas. In 1988, Mabalot tried to redeem the land from petitioner but was unsuccessful. DAR Regional Office decided in favor of the petitioner contending that there was abandonment on the part of the respondent. DAR Central Office, however, reversed its regional office's decision. Estolas appealed but Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent, contending that the transfer of land to petitioner is void and there was no abandonment by respondent since failure on the redemption was due to a higher redemption price set by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the transfer of the agricultural land valid?
LAW:
Presidential Decree 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the government shall not be transferable except to the grantee's heirs by hereditary succession or back to the government by other legal means.
RULING:
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent. It affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and cited that there is no room for interpretation in the provision of PD 27 regarding transfer of agricultural land. It affirmed, as well, CA's decision on the non-abandonment of the subject land by the respondent.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The award of agricultural land by virtue of PD 27 is based on the premise that farmers must be given opportunities to achieve a dignified existence and to make them more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens. To protect that interest, the law provides that transfer of title shall only be made if such would constitute either transfer to the awardee's heirs or to the government. This would ensure that these small farmers will not be deceived or enticed to sell the property in consideration of urgent financial needs. Such provision of the law accorded the farmers or grantees the protection they need from abusive lenders or creditors.
G.R. No. 109568 Supreme Court 1st Division (Austria-Martinez, J.)
Roland Sigre vs. August 8, 2002
Court of Appeals & Lilia Gonzales
FACTS:
Lilia Gonzales, in her capacity as a co-administratrix of the estate of Matias Yusay, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, seeking to prohibit Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from accepting leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre and for LBP to turnover to Gonzales the rentals previously remitted by Sigre. Sigre was a tenant of Gonzales in an irrigated rice land in Iloilo. He remitted rental payments to Gonzales until the issuance of memorandum circular no. 6 series of 1978 by the Department of Agrarian Reform, which set the guidelines in the rental payments by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of PD No. 27. Pursuant to the issuance, Sigre stopped paying Gonzales and remitted the rentals to LBP instead. Gonzales questioned the validity of the circular and the constitutionality of PD 27. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Gonzales and ordered LBP to return the rentals to the respondent and Sigre to revert direct payment to Gonzales. Rolando Sigre, who substituted Ernesto, filed consolidated petitions for review alleging that erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Is the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 invalid? Is PD No. 27 unconstitutional?
LAW:
PD No. 27 decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till and providing the instruments and mechanism therefor.
PD No. 816 provides that rentals are to be paid to the landowner by agricultural lessee until after the valuation of the property shall have been determined.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rolando Sigre and granted his consolidated petitions. The Court ruled that DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not in conflict with PD 816, which states that tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and DAR. The circular only supplements such Presidential Decree by mandating that tenant-farmer pays rental to LBP after the value has been determined. Moreover, the Court reiterated that there is no question on the constitutionality of PD 27, providing for the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of soil and transferring to them the ownership of the land they till.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. DAR Memorandum Circular and PD 816 are not in conflict with each other, rather, they complement each other. With the promulgation of DAR circular, the petitioner is now obliged to remit rental payments to Land Bank of the Philippines since the value of the property has been ascertained. The respondent's contention is without merit as the constitutionality of PD 27 has long been settled.
G.R. No. 128557 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Bellosillo, J.)
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. December 29, 1999
Court of Appeals and Jose Pascual
FACTS:
An action for mandamus was filed by Jose Pascual after the refusal of Land Bank of the Philippines to pay private respondent pursuant to the final decision rendered by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). LBP was ordered to pay Php 1.9M plus interest as just compensation to Jose Pascual. The computation was based on the increased value of the Government Support Price, which was Php 300 per cavan of palay and Php 250 per cavan of corn. The petitioner refused to pay the respondent alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and that it acted beyond its authority. It also asserted that the writ of mandamus could not be issued, as there are other remedies available in the ordinary course of law.
ISSUE:
Is the Land Bank of the Philippines bound to pay the Php 1.9M plus 6% interest per annum as just compensation to Jose Pascual?
LAW:
EO 228 provides that the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by PD 27 shall be based on the average gross production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related issuance of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross production shall be multiplied by 2.5, the product shall be multiplied by Php 35, the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Php 31, the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to the landowner.
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in granting the compensation of Php 1.9M but it deleted the 6% interest per annum, as it is no longer applicable. Administrative Order No. 13, which provides compensation to landowners for unearned interests is no longer applicable since the PARAD already increased the GSP from Php 35 to Php 300 per cavan of palay and from Php 31 to Php 250 per cavan of corn.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court to modify the decision of the Court of Appeals. I believe that imposing 6% interest per annum on top of the Php 1.9M value of the lands is unconscionable. It goes beyond the "just compensation" required by law to be given to landowners. By PARAD's decision to increase the basis of land valuation, the landowner has already been justly compensated. The need for imposing the interest is uncalled for.
G.R. No. 132048 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Quisumbing, J.)
Hon. Antonio Nuesa and Restituto Rivera vs. March 6, 2002
Court of Appeals, DARAB and Jose Verdillo
FACTS:
An award over two (2) parcels of agricultural land was granted by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in favor of Jose Verdillo. He then filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform to purchase the lots after twenty-one years. Restituto River, who was in possession of and cultivating the land for the time being, filed a letter of protest against Verdillo. He also filed an application to purchase the land. After investigation, Antonio Nuesa, the Regional Director of DAR, ordered the cancellation of the grant to Verdillo. A petition was consequently filed by Verdillo with the Provincial Adjudication Board for the annulment of the said decision.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the petition of Verdillo on the ground of improper remedy but the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator denied it and the DAR Appellate Adjudication affirmed the same. Hence, petitioners submit this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Does the Court of Appeals act in grave abuse of discretion when it sustained DARAB's decision?
LAW:
RA 6657 and other relevant laws and issuances provide that the Department of Agrarian Reform is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program.
RULING:
The Court ruled that DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded the lots in question. It emphasized the importance of observing jurisdictional limits set by enabling laws for the implementation of the agrarian reform program. DARAB's decision is unjustified, as it should not, in the first place, take cognizance of the case. Hence, Court of Appeals' decision was reversed and DAR Regional Director's order granting the land in favor of Restituto Rivera was reinstated.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court, not only on the basis of jurisdictional authority, but also based on the principle of equity. Restituto Rivera has been in possession of the land and he has also been cultivating the same. It is only equitable that he be awarded with the agricultural land. Jose Verdillo, who was originally granted with the award of land, did not act upon it until after the lapse of twenty-one years. He did not object nor initiated an action to stop Rivera from possessing and cultivating the land. Hence, it can be inferred that he was estopped from filing an action to recover the land by way of the grant. As Rivera cultivates the agricultural land for quite some time now, it is pursuant to the objectives of agrarian reform that he reaps the fruits of his labor.
G.R. No. 139285 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Velasco Jr., J.)
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. December 21, 2007
Secretary of Agrarian Reform & DAR Regional
Director (Region V)
FACTS:
The Archbishop of Caceres owned several parcels of land planted with rice, corn and coconut trees. He filed petitions for exemption from Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under PD 27 of these lands with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office in Naga City. Two petitions were however denied by the Regional Director of Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioner contended that such lands were donations and he held the property only in trust capacity. He argued that the donations had stipulations prohibiting him to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage the subject lands, from which he concluded that he was the "landowner" as contemplated by the PD 27 and RA 6657. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Are the subject lands exempt from Operation Land Transfer under PD 27?
LAW:
RA 6657 provides for an exclusive list of exemptions as follows:
"Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. –
Lands actually, directly, exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
Private lands actually, directly, exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, that said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian Reform Program. In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farmworkers shall no longer be necessary; however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply.
Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production center, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (As amended by RA 7881)"
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in holding that subject lands are not exempt from the Operation Land Transfer of PD 27 and RA 6657. Supreme Court held that the Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the Filipino faithful as the lands in question clearly do not fall under any of the exemptions enumerated by the law. The law is clear on the exemptions granted and there is no room for interpretation. According to the decision in this case, the Archbishop, as a religious leader, can just take solace in the fact that his lands are going to be awarded to those who need and can utilize them to the fullest.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court that the land in question should not be exempt from the OLT of PD 27. The ultimate goal of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is to accord land to the landless who can utilize such to its fullest. With the nobility of this law, it is only proper that exemptions be strictly construed. Only exclusions contemplated by law should be allowed to ensure that its purpose would not be defeated. Moreover, I find the contention of the Archbishop rather unbecoming of a religious leader. He, among anybody else, should have understood the reason behind the Operation Land Transfer of CARL. By filing the petitions for exemptions, it was as if he wanted to deprive the landless the lands that should be awarded to them.
G.R. No. 154654 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Velasco Jr., J.)
Josephine Taguinod & Vic Aguila vs. September 14, 2007
Court of Appeals, Antonino Samaniego, et al.
FACTS:
Salud Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots based on homestead patents. Said lots were transferred to Vic Aguila, who was then a minor, and to Josephine Taguinod. Both lots were held under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27 with 12 tenants or farmer-beneficiaries identified. Salud Aguila, on behalf of Vic Aguila, filed an application for retention over the said land. And when Vic Aguila reached the age of majority, he filed a letter-protest for exclusion or exemption from OLT. Taguinod filed the same letter-protest seeking for exclusion and exemption from OLT. The DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) recommended the approval of applications of Salud and Taguinod to the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) for retention of the lots in question. PARO did grant the application, which led the beneficiaries to file a counter-protest.
The issue was then elevated to the Regional Director of DAR, who ruled that the application for retention be granted to the petitioners of not more than seven (7) hectares of land. Lots in excess of 7 hectares must be placed under the control of the Operation Land Transfer. Petitioners filed motions for reconsideration.
Taguinod filed an appeal with the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, contending that she was the rightful owner of the disputed land after redeeming the property from Salud Aguila, her adoptive mother, when such land was subjected to a mortgage. The Secretary affirmed the decision of the DAR Regional Director and denied the petitioner's appeal. The Secretary also found that Salud Aguila was disqualified to retain 7 hectares of land.
With this decision, the petitioners interposed appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the President ruled in favor of the petitioners. It anchored its ruling on the fact that the land in question was derived from a homestead patent. As such, these lands are exempt from the coverage of PD 27.
The respondents, then, filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of the Office of the President and reinstated the decision of the Secretary of DAR. CA agreed with the Office of the President that the rights of the homesteaders are superior to those of tenants invoking agrarian reform laws. However, petitioners failed to establish the identities of the original homestead patentees and that they are direct compulsory heirs of the original patentees.
ISSUE:
Are the lots previously covered by homestead patents outside the ambit of PD 27?
LAW:
RA 6657, Sec. 6 provides that original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. According to SC, it is a settled rule that homestead grantees' rights are superior to those of tenants invoking rights under the agrarian reform law. However, in this case, the petitioners failed to prove the identities of the original homestead grantees and establish that they were indeed direct compulsory heirs of the grantees to avail of the exemption. As exclusions from the coverage of PD 27 must be strictly construed, failure on the part of the petitioners to prove that they are covered by the exemptions provided for by law extinguishes their rights to avail of the same. Premised on the said grounds, the petitioners are disqualified to avail of the right of retention over the land as they are not small landowners and the lands in dispute are subject to the Operation Land Transfer of PD 27.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Since petitioners failed to prove that they hold superior rights over the subject land, they are not entitled to the exemptions accorded by the law. Granting them with the right of retention over the said land would defeat the very purpose of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Promotion of social justice is the paramount consideration of the program; hence, it is a deviation from this core purpose if retention will be granted to the petitioners who still own several parcels of land aside from the lots in question. It is more in accordance with law that qualified farmer-beneficiaries will be granted parcels of land, which they can till and fully utilize to improve their living.
G.R. No. 164195 Supreme Court 3rd Division (Chico-Nazario., J.)
Apo Fruits Corp & Hijo Plantation vs. December 19, 2007
Court of Appeals & Land Bank of the Phils.
FACTS:
Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Incorporated were owners of 5 parcels of land in Davao. These companies voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the Department of Agriculture pursuant to RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The parties were not able to come into agreement as to the price of the lands in question. Thus, the petitioners brought the matter to before the DAR Adjudication Board to determine just compensation. Pending the determination of the just compensation, the government deposited P26M and P45M to Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc., respectively. DAR also registered said lands in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and distributed the same to farmers under CARP.
Three years passed but DARAB failed to render decision on the valuation of land and determination of just compensation. Hence, petitioners filed a complaint for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Davao, which rendered decision in favor of AFC and HPI. RTC ruled that the purchase price of the land should be higher than what was initially offered by DAR, considering the permanent improvements on AFC's and HPI's lands.
Department of Agrarian Reform appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed RTC's decision.
ISSUE:
Was the price set forth by the Department of Agrarian Reform within the ambit of just compensation as contemplated by the law?
LAW:
RA 6657, Sec. 57 provides that the Special Agrarian Courts (SAC) shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.
Sec. 17 of the same Act provides that in determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that just compensation was not accorded to the petitioners, AFC and HPI. DARAB's failure to determine just compensation for a span of three years was prejudicial to the landowners. DAR was not able to justify why a lower purchase price was offered for the said lots. The Court ruled that to allow the taking of landowners' properties and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive. According to the decision, just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount of be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Although the welfare of the less privileged farmers is the main consideration of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, payment of just compensation to landowners should not be taken for granted. While the government reserves its right to uphold the law and protect small farmers, it should not also oppress the landowners and deprive them of just compensation in exchange of their properties. With the facts presented in the case, it can be concluded that the landowners have given the government, especially DAR, ample time to determine just compensation. But the latter's failure to determine and award such compensation prejudiced their rights as property owners. It is only just and proper to award P1.38B to the petitioners.
G.R. No. 122363 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Bellosillo, J.)
Victor Valencia vs. Court of Appeals April 29, 2003
FACTS:
Victor Valencia, a government retiree, owned two parcels of land, which he leased out to Glicerio Henson for ten (10) years. Henson constituted Crescenciano Frias and Marciano Frias to work on the property during his lease. Valencia then leased the same land to Fr. Andres Flores for five years after the expiration of the first lease contract. Fr. Flores also designated several people as workers, including Crescenciano and Marciano. The petitioner acquired said parcels of land through a homestead grant by the government.
After the expiration of the contract between Valencia and Flores, the petitioner demanded the workers to vacate the said land. However, the workers refused and continued cultivating the land. They applied for Certificates of Land Transfer under the Operation Land Transfer Program of PD 27, instead. The Department of Agrarian Reform granted the applications and CLTs were issued to the respondents.
Valencia then filed actions for recovery of possession over the subject land on the ground that the tenants and the government unjustly withheld these lands from him. He also contested the existence of the tenancy relationship between him and the tenant-beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
Were the subject lands wrongfully taken from the petitioner?
LAW:
RA 3844, Sec. 6 states that a Civil Law Lessee is not automatically authorized to employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The subject lands were unlawfully taken from Valencia when the Department of Agriculture issued Certificates of Land Transfer to the respondents (tenants). First, the lands in question were acquired by the petitioner through a homestead grant, which is excluded from the coverage of PD 27. Second, the tenant-beneficiaries were not really tenants of the landowner. The lessee, Fr. Flores, was the one who hired the workers to cultivate the land. Such designation of workers was beyond the scope of authority of a Civil Law Lessee and was made without the consent of the landowner. The security of tenure guaranteed by the laws may only be invoked by tenants de jure, and not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. The Court also emphasized that while it is true that in case of reasonable doubt, the it has to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion, it is never justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor or reject the rich simply because they are rich. Justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the mandate of the law.
OPINION:
I agree with the opinion of the Supreme Court. I strongly agree with Justice Bellosillo that decisions of the Court should not favor the poor just because they are poor. Although the agrarian reform program is especially implemented to promote social justice and provide opportunity for the farmers to own the lands they till and decently provide a living for their families, the Court has to maintain its independence and must decide always according to the mandate of the law. In this case, the landowner was unlawfully deprived of his property. The parcels of land were taken away from him pursuant to PD 27. However, according to the same law, the subject property is exempt from the Operation Land Transfer Program as it was acquired through a homestead title. Moreover, the tenant-beneficiaries did not qualify as right beneficiaries of the program because they are not lawful tenants of the landowner. They were designated to cultivate the land without the tacit consent of Valencia. With all these facts, I believe that while it is not beneficial to the respondents, the decision was fair enough to enable the real owner to recover possession of his property.
G.R. No. 78742 Supreme Court En Banc (Cruz, J.)
Association of Small Landowners in the Phils. July 14, 1989
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
The case at bar is a consolidation of four cases harping on the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, Executive Order Nos. 228 and 229, and Republic Act No. 6657. The petitioners in this case question the unreasonable taking of their land without just compensation. The lands were taken from the petitioners before the payment of just compensation. The landowners also raised the issue that the mode of payment of compensation for the lands subjected to the agrarian reform program was unfair and prejudicial to them.
ISSUE:
Are the executive orders 228 and 229 in violation of the constitutional provision that no property shall be taken without due process or just compensation?
LAW:
RA 6657, Section 16 provides for the procedure on the acquisition of private lands. Included in this section is the payment of just compensation. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall send notice to the landowners for the acquisition of land and offer to pay corresponding value of the land. If the landowner accepts the offer of DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall pay the owner the purchase price of the land within 30 days after the delivery of the deed of transfer in favor of the government. Otherwise, the DAR shall conduct an administrative summary proceeding to determine the value of the land. Upon payment of the purchase price to the landowner, or in case the offer was rejected, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The lands will then be distributed to the beneficiaries. Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. It found no basis to render the executive orders unconstitutional. As regard the just compensation in question, the court ruled that the case does not deal with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. Neither does it involve exercise of ordinary expropriation. The expropriation involved pertains to vast areas of land amounting to a hundreds of billion pesos. Hence, just compensation in cases like this need not be paid fully in money.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The agrarian reform program involves a massive transfer of landownership from private individuals and corporations to the government, and as such, a large sum of money is needed to pay for just compensation. Hence, it is not to be expected that all land subject to the implementation of the agrarian reform program will be paid at once and in full before they shall be taken away by the State. It will be detrimental to the economy and would affect other government projects if all landowners will be paid with just compensation at the same time for the full amount. While the government is mandated to pay for just compensation whenever it takes away private property, it should also ensure that such taking would not affect other projects of the government intended for other stakeholders.
G.R. No. 119398 Supreme Court 3rd Division (Panganiban, J.)
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. vs. July 2, 1999
Court of Appeals, PCSO & Fernando Carrascoso, Jr.
FACTS:
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. was an owner of several racehorses. He entered in the sweepstakes races on March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. He sent letters of demand to private respondents for the collection of prizes and other fees due him. The respondents however responded consistently that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was withholding the demanded prizes. When petitioner filed an action for collection before the Regional Trial Court, the PCGG advised private respondents that it is no longer objecting to the remittance of the prize winnings. Petitioner, however, refused to accept payment of prizes.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered PCSO and Carrascoso to pay the prize winnings with interest. The Court of Appeals however reversed the decision of the trial court on holding that the respondents are in bad faith. CA is of the opinion that the respondents were just carrying out the instructions of the PCGG.
ISSUE:
Was the withholding of the petitioner's winnings in violation of his property rights without due process of law? Did the respondents act in bad faith when it withheld the remittance of winnings?
LAW:
Civil Code Article 32 provides that it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.
Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The respondents did not act in bad faith when they withheld the prize winnings of the petitioner upon the instructions of the PCGG. Hence, the moral and exemplary damages should not be awarded. However, the Court agreed with the petitioner and the trial court that the petitioner's constitutional right has been violated. Although the PCSO and private respondent only acted upon the instructions of the PCGG, they could have also sought legal basis for the order issued by the latter. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. Hence, Cojuangco was unlawfully deprived of his property. Nominal damage, amounting to Php 50,000 was then awarded to the petitioner.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court in holding the respondents liable for nominal damages and for the payment of the prize winnings. Despite the existence of an order issued by the PCGG, the respondents are still liable for damages for failure to exercise prudence in inquiring into the legality and applicability of the withholding order. Even if the petitioner has properties subject to examination of the PCGG, the property in question is not part of the sequestration proceedings.
G.R. No. 118712 Supreme Court 3rd Division (Francisco, J.)
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. July 5, 1996
Court of Appeals, Pedro Yap, et. Al.
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed after the petition for review on certiorari was denied. The petitioners contend that contrary to the Court's conclusion, the opening of the trust accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of the RA 6657. The respondents, on the other hand, argue that there is no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of their properties.
In this case, the private respondents' parcels of land were subjected to the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The landowners did not accept the offer made by the Department of Agrarian Reform, hence, they demanded for reassessment of land valuation. Pending the determination of the final valuation, the petitioners opened trust accounts as a mode of deposit pursuant to Section 16 of RA 6657.
ISSUE:
Was the opening of trust account for the rejecting landowners compliant to the mandate of RA 6657?
LAW:
Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides that "Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response form the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines…"
RULING:
The Court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision of RA 6657 as to the procedure for acquisition of private lands is clear and unambiguous. Hence, including the opening of trust accounts within the ambit of Section 16 (e) is tantamount to expanded construction. The Court also ruled that to allow the taking of the landowners' properties and in the meantime leave them empty-handed by withholding the payment of compensation while the government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the owners when it has already been rendered useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. It is prejudicial and oppressive for the landowners to be deprived of just compensation especially when their properties have already been taken away from them. The Constitution guarantees that when a private property is to be taken from an individual or corporation, just compensation must be given. In this case, the Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines were not compliant with the mandate of the law regarding payment of just compensation to the landowners.
G.R. No. L-61293 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Regalado, J.)
Domingo Maddumba & Anita Maddumba February 15, 1990
vs. GSIS
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus, compelling respondent GSIS to accept payment of LBP bonds at their face value for a pre-existing obligation.
Government Service Insurance System conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed properties. Domingo and Anita Maddumba participated in the bidding and gave a manager's check and cash as proposal bond. Upon receipt of notice of award, the petitioner offered to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at face value. Such bonds were issued to him as payment for his Riceland acquired by the government pursuant to PD 27. GSIS, however, rejected the offer. Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down payment and all future installments. When the second installment became due, the petitioner sent a letter to GSIS Board of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly amortizations with his LBP bonds. He invoked the provision of Section 85 of RA 3844, as amended by PD No. 251. GSIS however, denied the petitioner's request. GSIS would only accept the LBP bonds if they be discounted because acceptance at face value would impair the actuarial solvency of GSIS. Hence, petitioner filed an action for mandamus.
ISSUE:
Can GSIS be compelled to accept payment of LBP bonds?
LAW:
Sec. 85 of RA 3844 provides that "The bonds issued by the Bank may be used by the holder thereof and shall be accepted for any of the following: xxx Payment for the purchase of shares of stocks or assets of government-owned and controlled corporations. Upon offer by the bondholders, the corporation owned and controlled by the Government shall, through its Board of Directors, negotiate with such bondholder with respect to the price and other terms and conditions of the sale. In case there are various bondholders making the offer, the one willing to purchase under terms and conditions most favorable to the corporation shall be preferred. If no price is acceptable to the corporation, the same shall be determined by the Committee of Appraisers composed of three members, one to be appointed by the corporation, another by the bondholder making the highest or only offer, and the third by the members so chosen. The expense of appraisal shall be borne equally by the corporation and the successful purchaser. Should the government offer for sale to public any or all shares of stocks or assets of any of the government-owned or controlled corporations, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank shall be preferred, provided that the various bids be equal in every respect in the medium of payment."
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus in favor the petitioners. GSIS is ordered to accept payment of LBP bonds at face value. It not disputed that under Sec. 85 of RA 3844, GSIS is compelled to accept LBP bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets, and in fact, the bidder who offers to pay in LBP bonds is entitled to preference. Moreover, such provision cushions the impact of dispossession. Acceptance of LBP bonds, instead of money, entails a bigger sacrifice on the part of the landowners when they departed with their property pursuant to the implementation of the agrarian reform program. Thus, discounting the LBP bonds for acceptance as payment, thereby reducing their effective value, imposes additional burden on the landowner's part.
OPINION:
I agree with the opinion of the Supreme Court. GSIS, as a government owned and controlled corporation, must accept the payment of LBP bonds as payment for the purchase price of the asset sold. The bonds were issued by the government and it would seem peculiar if the GSIS rejects these bonds, being an instrumentality of the government, as well. To dishonor such bonds would impair the integrity of the debt instruments issued by the government. Discounting of the bonds gave the landowner double burden: first, when his property was taken away from him and compelled to receive LBP bonds as payment of just compensation and second, when such bonds would be accepted and used in a diminished value.
G.R. No. 86889 Supreme Court En Banc (Paras, J.)
Luz Farms vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform December 4, 1990
FACTS:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business. Along with others in the same business, Luz Farms stand to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of RA 6657 and its implementing guidelines. The petition prayed for the declaration of the aforesaid laws and guidelines unconstitutional. Luz Farms contend that the term "agriculture" as used by the law, did not mean to include livestock, poultry and swine.
ISSUE:
Are the aforementioned provisions of CARL unconstitutional?
LAW:
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
RULING:
The Supreme Court declared section 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of RA 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage NULL and VOID. During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it can be concluded that the framers of the law did not intend to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The Constitution only includes "agriculture" as subject of the agrarian reform program. The intention of the legislators in drafting the law was to provide farmers and regular farmworkers to own the lands they till and receive just share of its fruits. To include livestock, poultry and swine within the ambit of the agrarian reform program, is giving expanded interpretation of the law, which is in itself, clear and unambiguous. The decision of the Court to render the provision null and void is in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. No one must be deprived of his property without due process of law.
