COURSE SYLLABUS FACULTY: ATTY. VICTORIA V. LOANZON COURSE: POLITICAL LAW REVIEW COURSE DESCRIPTION:
This review course will focus on the basic principles and concepts of constitutional law within the context of decisions of the Supreme S upreme Court. It will emphasize the supremacy of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land. A close examination of the three branches of Philippine political system will be reviewed and the principles that govern its operations like the separation of powers, principle of checks and b alances, judicial power of review. A separate review of the relationships between the national a nd local government units as well as the independent constitutional commissions and special governmental bodies will likewise be done. A segment of the course will be devoted to the constitutional foundations of the bill of rights, protection of these rights, and the essence of due process. The course will likewise cover administrative law, the law on public accountability and election law. There will be a separate discussion on Public International Law which will emphasize current issues that prevail in the world. This review course seeks to deepen the law students’ students’ critical thinking competence in conceptualizing and analyzing constitutional con stitutional issues while applying constitutional doctrines or rules to each issue. To engage law students in developing this vital competence compet ence for their preparation for the bar examinations and a career in the legal profession, this course will rely mainly on basic principles and relevant provisions of law and will relate such with leading jurisprudence. PREREQUISITES: Constitutional Law I (Political Law), Constitutional Law II (Bill of Rights, Citizenship and Inherent Powers of Government), Administrative Law Proper, Election Law (Right of Suffrage, Qualifications and Disqualifications for Elective Positions, Term of Office, Removal from from Office and other pertinent pertinent laws) Law of Public Accountability (Law on Public Officers: Qualifications, Disqualifications, De jure and De facto public officers, Security of Tenure, Merit and Fitness Principle, Removal from office to include impeachment, jurisdiction of Ombudsman, Civil Service Commission and Sandiganbayan), Public Corporations (Fundamentals of Local Governments) and Public International Law. COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES: By the end of the course, the student will be able to: 1. Define clearly one or more constitutional issues in a given case. 2. Apply the most appropriate constitutional doctrines or rules to a particular constitutional issue. 3. Engage in analytical process when examining constitutional issues.
I. The Philippine Constitution A. Constitution: Definition, Nature and Concept 1. Definition : The Constitution is the body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the power of sovereignty is habitually exercised. (Cooley) 2. Purposes : The Constitution provides for a framework of government, identifies basic structures of government and assigns their respective powers and duties, establish principles upon which the government is founded and its relationship to its constituents. 3. The Constitution as the Fundamental Law of the Land Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) Read (1803) Read from the internet, see the facts and main issue for resolution and the portion of the decision which laid down the rule why the Court may intervene to reconcile a law subordinate to the Constitution.
C onsti onsti tuti tuti onal supremac supremacyy is i s a doc doctr trii ne whi which ch provid provides that all acts acts of of C ongre ongr ess, i ssuances ssuances of the P r esid si dent and rules rules and and re r egulations of adm admi nistr ni strat atii ve agenci agencie es must conf confor orm m to to the the pr pr ovi sions sions of the the Const Constii tuti uti on. Constitutions classified: Written or unwritten; Rigid or flexible; Enacted or evolved The Philippine Constitution is written, rigid and enacted. 1|Page
N i colas colas v. Ro R omulo , 578 SCRA, Read the facts and cover only the portion of the decision on the adoption of the Mutual Defense Treaty under the 1935 Constitution: every treaty needs ratification of the Senate; any agreement in furtherance of a duly-ratified treaty does not need any action from the Senate. 4. The Constitution and the Three Branches of Government Read Articles VI, VII and VIII of the Constitution Demetria v. Alba , 148 SCRA 208 (1987), concentrate on pp. 209-210; pp. 214-218: The enactment of an appropriations act strictly belongs to the legislative branch; no funds under the G.A.A. may transferred from one item to the other without congressional action. The Court said “The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to transfer an y fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to an y program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned.” concerned.” 5. Operative Fact Doctrine Under the Operative Fact Doctrine, a law la w or an act may be b e declared unconstitutional but may produce legal effects. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or o r disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law o r executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity equit y and fair play. It applies only onl y to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application. According to Justice Brion in his Separate Opinion in Araullo v. Aquino, the doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is not always the consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked onl y in situations where the nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice; but but where no such result would ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional law is totally ineffective should apply. Justice Brion has clarified that the doctrine of ope rative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, autho rs, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unl ess there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities. Read any material available in the internet. T anad anada v. Tuve T uverr a , 136 SCRA 27(1985) focus on pp. 33-35; pp. 40-41: 40-41: Even under extraordinary circumstances, a law must be published; the Civil Code provision on effectivity of laws will apply unless the law provides for another date of effectivity. The clear object of the publication requirement is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim max im "ignorantia legis non
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excusat." It would be the height of o f injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." Ar aullo ullo v. A quino , G.R. No. 209287, 1 July 2014; Read the facts and Part 6 of the main decision only: while DAP is not “unconstitutional”, “u nconstitutional”, cross border transfer of funds is unconstitutional; read discussion on the impoundment of public funds under approved budget and the power to discontinue use of public funds. According to Phi li lip ppi ne Constitut Constitutii on Asso A ssociat ciatii on v. E nr nrii que uez z : "Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type." Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean the retention or deduction of appropriations. B. Parts of the 1987 Constitution 1. Constitution of Liberty: Bill of Rights 2. Constitution of Government: Government Organization and Functions 3. Constitution of Sovereignty: Method of Amendment
I nter nter pretat pretatii on of the the C onstitut nsti tutii on legi s – Wherever 1. V er ba legi Wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. 2. Ratio legis est anima – Where Where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers. 2. Ratio legis est anima – Where Where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers. C i vil L i ber ti es Unio Uni on v. E xecut xecutii ve Secr Secr etar tar y , G.R. No. 83896, Feb. 22, 1991: While it is permissible to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose pu rpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had onl y when other guides fail as . . . when the meaning is clear. I ntegr ntegr ated ted Ba B ar of the P hili hi lip ppi nes nes v. H on. Ro R onald naldo o Zam Zamor a , G.R. No. 141254, Aug. 15, 2000, Puno, C.J. separate opinion: The proceedings of the Convention are less conclusive in the proper construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute , for in the latter case, it is the intent of the legislature the courts seek, while in the former, courts seek to arrive at th e intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives. magi s valeat quam quam per per eat eat – 3. Ut magi – The The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole (Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003). C. The Amending Process: Two-step process: proposal and the ratification 1. How amendment is instituted a. Congress, Art. XVII, Sec. 1: By Congress Con gress as a constituent assembly upon a vote of ¾ of all its members b. Constitutional Convention, Art. XVII, Sec. 3: By 2/3 vote of all members of Congress call a constitutional convention or by a majority vote of all its members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such convention. c. The people through initiative, Art. XVII, Sec. 2: Upon petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every district must be represented by at least 3% of the voters therein. Kinds of Initiative under the Initiative and Referendum Act (RA 6735) ni tiatii ve on the C onsti nsti tuti tuti on – Refers a. I nitiat Refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. b. I niti Refers to a petition to enact a national legislation. ni tiat atii ve on statute statutess – Refers c. I nitiat Refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, ni tiatii ve on loca local legi legi slation slation – Refers municipal, city, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance [RA 6735, Sec. 3 (a)]. Sec. 3 (b) of RA 6735 provides for: a. I ndi Exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress ndi r ect I nitiati nitiati ve – Exercise or the local legislative body for action. b. D i r ect I nitiati The people themselves filed the petition with the COMELEC and not with nitiati ve – The Congress. 3|Page
Defensor-Santiago v. COME LE C G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997:Under R.A. 6735, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to amend. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can on ly do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." Secondly, the Act doe s not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that RA 6735 excludes initiative on the amendments of the Constitution. Also, while the law p rovides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If RA 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While RA 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Lambino v. COME LE C , G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006: Petitioners failed to convince the Court that the provisions which they sought to change in the Constitution are proper for a People’s Initiative process as the same are intended onl y for revision. The People’s Initiative is limited to amendment of the Constitution only. Referendum – Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for that purpose. Kinds of Referendum a. Referendum on Statutes - Refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, or part thereof, passed by Congress. b. Referendum on Local Law – Refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
2. How revision is instituted a. Congress, Art. XVII, Sec. 1: By Congress as a constituent assembly upon a vote of ¾ of all its members b. Constitutional Convention, Art. XVII, Sec. 3: By 2/3 vote of all members of Congress call a constitutional convention or by a majority vote of all its members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such convention. Tests to determine whether a proposed change is an amendment or a revision 1. Quantitative test – Asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. One examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. 2. Qualitative test – Asks whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision (Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006) 3. How is the Constitution ratified: In case of amendments proposed by Congress or a Convention, Art. XVII, Sec. 4, paragraph 1: Ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite conducted by COMELEC which shall be held not earlier than 60 days nor 90 days after the approval of the amendment or revision. In case of amendments proposed through initiative, Art. XVII, Sec. 4, paragraph 2: Ratification by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than 60 days no later than 90 days after certification by COMELEC of t he sufficiency of the petition. Requisites for a valid ratification 1. Ratification must have been held in a plebiscite conducted under the Omnibus Election Code; 2. Plebiscite must been supervised by COMELEC; and 3. Only registered voters participated in the plebiscite.
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Doctrine of Proper Submission Gonzales v. COME LE C , G.R. No. L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967: A plebiscite may be held on the same day as a regular election. The people must be sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, for them to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner. Submission of piece-meal amendments is unconstitutional. Tolentino v. COME LE C, G.R. No. L-34150, Oct. 16, 1971:All amendments must be submitted for ratification in one plebiscite only. The people have to be given a proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision 4. Frequency of amendment/ratification under People’s Initiative: onc e every 5 years (Sec. 2, Art. XVII) 5. Judicial review of the amending process, Art. VIII, Sec. 1, paragraph 1 Lambino v. COME LE C , 505 SCRA 160: The Court. may exercise judicial review over any matter relative to the process of amending or revising th e Constitution. Revision of the Constitution cannot be carried out through People’s Initiative. D. Self-Executing and Non- self -executing Provisions A self-executing provision is one which is complete by itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjo yed or protected; nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Manila Prince H otel v. GSI S, G.R . 122156, F eb. 3, 1997: The general rule is a constitutional provision is self-executory unless the provision provides otherwise.. A contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to p ass the needed implementing statute. Belgica v. Ochoa (G.R . Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251, November 13, 2013: Non-self – executing provisions are provisions which need co ngressional action to take effect. There is a need for Congress to define political dynasty. E. General Provisions
1. The Philippine Flag, Art. XVI, Sec. 1 It shall be red, white, and blue, with a sun and three stars, as consecrated and honored by the people and recognized by law. 2. The Country’s Name, National Anthem and Government S eal, Art. XVI, Sec. 2 Symbols of nationality 1. Philippine Flag – the flag may be changed by constitutional amendment; 2. Name for the country; 3. National anthem; and 4. National seal Note: It will require a constitutional amendment to change the Philippine Flag but the name of the country, the national anthem and the national seal will require only congressional acts but the change must be approved by the people in a referendum conducted by the COMELEC. Congress may, by law, adopt new symbols in numbers 2, 3 and 4. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national referendum. 3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines Concept of a citizen army , Art. XVI, Sec. 4 It shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the state (1987 Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 4). Regulation of the armed forces, Art. XVI, Sec. 5, Art. XVIII, Sec. 24 It shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage d irectly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote . Period of the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff General Rule: It shall not exceed three (3) years.
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Exception to the Rule: It can be extended by the President during times of war or any other national emergency, provided that the existence of such is declared by the Congress (1987 Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 5). 4. The national police , Art. XVI, Sec. 6 Command responsibility is applicable to the chain of command within the PNP structure only but in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the command responsibility extends to the President because the President is the Commander-in-Chief. (Reason: Civilian authority is supreme over the military.) 5. The retirement and other benefits: War veterans, Art. XVI, Sec. 7; and 6. Government and private sector retirees, Art. XVI, Sec. 8 Congress shall adopt laws to improve the conditions of war veterans and government and private sector retirees. 7. Consumer protection, Art. XVI, Sec. 9 There must be a continuing effort to protect consumers to ensure proper standards in products. 8. Mass and advertising media, Art. XVI, Sec. 10 Ownership and management of mass media, Art. XVI, Sec. 11(1) 100% Filipino-owned Ownership of advertising companies, Art. XVI, Sec. 11(1), A rt. XVIII, Sec. 23: 70% Filipinoowned II. General Considerations A. National Territory The National Territory, Article I, Philippine Constitution Archipelagic Doctrine The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines (1987 Constitution, Art. I). Basis to Determine the Baselines of the Philippines under UNCLOS Under the Archipelagic Doctrine, the outermost points o f the Philippine archipelago are connected with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. The entire archipelago is regarded as one integrated unit instead of being fragmented into so many thousand islands (Cruz and Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 24). The main purpose of the archipelagic doctrine is to protect the territorial interests of an archipelago, its territorial integrity. Without it, there would be “pockets of high seas” between some of our islands and islets, thus foreign vessels would be able to pass through these “pockets of seas” and would have no jur isdiction over it. The Philippine Archipelago under Domestic Laws Treaty limits: Treaty of Paris, Art. III
Method of determining baselines under R.A. No. 3046, June 17, 1961 based on Treaty between Spain and U.S. concluded at Washington on November 7, 1900 and that between U.S. and Great Britain on January 2, 1930 R.A. No.5446, September 8, 1968 amended R.A. 3046 to correct typographical errors therein and to redefine the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippines; and R.A. No. 9522 otherwise known as the Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law, March 10, 2009, using the straight line approach and covered the Kalayaan Island Group under P.D. No. 1596 ( June 11, 1978) and Bajo de Masinloc also known as Scarborough Shaol as the Regime of Islands over which Philippines exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction consistent with Article 121 of the UNCLOS. Relevant provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, April 30, 1982: 1. Internal waters of the Philippines consist of waters around, between and connecting the islands of the Philippine Archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, including the waters in bays, rivers and lakes. No right of innocent passage for foreign vessels exists in the case of internal waters. (Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed., 1998, p. 407). 2. Territorial waters include the waters which extend to twelve nautical miles from the baseline. Arigo v. Swift: A foreign-owned vessel may pass through territorial waters when it is performing a governmental function. Under UNCLOS, however, warships enjoy a right of innocent passage when a portion of the territorial water of the coastal state is used for international navigation.
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Article 42(2) of UNCLOS provides that there shall be n o suspension of innocent passage through straits used for international navigation. The right of the co astal state to suspend the same requires that the coastal nation must publish the same and without any publication, it cannot insist to suspend the use of such body of water. A claim that suspension of innocent passage is necessary for national security may be cited by the coastal state. Upon the other hand, if a war ship delayed its right of innocent passage, the same may justified under Article 18(2) of UNCLOS if the delay was caused by rendering assistance to persons or ship in distress. 3. Contiguous zone is the zone contiguous to the territorial sea and extends up to twenty-four nautical miles from the territorial sea and over which the coastal state may exercise control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within the territory or territorial sea. (Article 33 of UNCLOS) 4. Continental Shelf is 150 nautical miles from the baseline. 5. Exclusive Economic Zone is the zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a state over which the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing its natural resources, whether living or nonliving, of the waters super adjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and subsoil and with regard to other activities for the economic exp loitation and exploration of the zone. (Articles 56 and 57, UNCLOS) Refer of Article I (National Territory) for Continental Shelf and Territorial Waters Flag state means a ship has the nationality of the flag of the state it flies, but there must be a genuine link between the state and the ship. (Article 91, UNCLOS) Flag of convenience refers to a state with which a vessel is registered for various reasons such as low or non-existent taxation or low-operating costs although the ship has no genuine link with that state. (Harris, ibid p.425) Freedom of navigation (FON) is a principle of customary international law which states that ships flying the flag of any sovereign state shall no t suffer interference from other states while in international waters. This right is now also codified as Article 87(1) a of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Right of Innocent Passage means navigation through the territorial sea of a State for the purpose of traversing the sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to internal waters, or making for the high seas from internal waters, as lon g as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. (Articles 18 [1] and [2], 19[1], UNCLOS)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) enshrines the concept of innocent passage through a coastal state’s territorial sea. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. A vessel in innocent passage may traverse the coastal state’s territorial sea continuously and expeditiously, not stopping or anchoring except in force majeure situations. Transit Passage is the right to exercise freedom of navigation and over flight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit through the straits used for international navigation, i.e., between two areas of the high seas or between two exclusive economic zones. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage. For aircrafts, this may refer to the freedom of over flight. The requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State. (Magalona, 2005; Article 38[2], UNCLOS) Distinction between Innocent Passage and Transit Passage Innocent passage is for travel within territorial waters while transit passage is for any zone. Innocent passage applies only to ships while transit passage applies to aircrafts as well. In transit passage , military vessels are also allowed which are not allowed in innocent passage .
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Nature of Space occupied by a Foreign Embassy
William C. Reagan v. CI R , G.R. No. L-26379, Dec. 27, 1969. While foreign embassies retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to Philippine authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American Armed Forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be considered as foreign territory. The ground occupied by an embassy is not in fact the territory of the foreign State to which the premises belong through possession or ownership. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of acts they committed is determined by the territorial sovereign. If an attaché commits an offense within the precincts of an embassy, his immunity from prosecution is not because he has not violated the local law, but rather for the reason that the individual is exempt from prosecution. If a person n ot so exempt, or whose immunity is waived, similarly commits a crime therein, the territorial sovereign, if it secures custody of the offender, may subject him to prosecution, even though its criminal code normally does not contemplate the punishment of one who `commits an offense outside of the national domain. It is not believed, therefore, that an ambassador himself possesses the right to exercise jurisdiction, contrary to the will of the State of his sojourn, even within his embassy with respect to acts there committed. Nor is there apparent at the present time any tendency on the part of States to acquiesce in his exercise of it. B. Sovereign/ State Immunity 1. Basis, Art. XVI, Sec. 3 Basis of the Doctrine of State Immunity: It is obvious that indiscriminate suits against the state will result in the impairment of its dignity, besides being a challen ge to its supposed infallibility. To Justice Holmes, however, the doctrine of non-suability is based not on “any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law o n which the right depends.” Another justification is the practical consideration that demands and inconveniences of litigation will divert the time and resources of the State from the more pressing matters, demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare (Cruz and Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 48). Department of A gr iculture v. NL RC , 227 SCRA: governmental function (an act of sovereignty) distinguished with proprietary function (a commercial act or an activity from which government derives income) Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000 : an officer of the Asian Development Bank may not invoke immunity if his personal acts are directed against a fellow employee and does not pertain to the discharge of his official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered b y any immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is covered b y immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter ’s right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be p resented at the proper time.
2. When a suit is against the state and when it is not
Ar igo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, Sept. 16, 2014:All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another, consonant with the public international law principle of par in parem non habet imperium. A contrary disposition would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Garcia v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-20213, January 31, 1966: The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit may be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. Consent; Manner by which consent is given. The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted and that actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officers could grant relief is a matter which the Court must consider.
Accreditation; reciprocity; treaty obligation GTZ v. CA, 585 SCRA 150: claim of immunity by a foreign entity
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Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities, it must be ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal that may ultimately be held liable, has given its consent to be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether the government agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical personality, like the Social Security System, the University of the Philippines, and the City of Manila. By contrast, the unincorporated agenc y is so called because it has no separate juridical personality but is merged in the general machinery of the government, like the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Mines and the Government Printing Office. If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provides that they can sue and be sued. State immunity from suit, one which focuses on the particular functions exercised by the party and determines whether these are proprietary or sovereign in nature. The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should appl y. At the same time, our Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking immunity remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision, is often conferred by the v ery same statute or general law creating the instrumentality or agency.
Ar igo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, Sept. 16, 2014: The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating P hilippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. However, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and applicable only to US personnel under VFA and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of the U. S. government covered by the VFA. Remedy of a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign government H oly See v. R osario , G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994:.Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign o r diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. See ruling in Barcelona Traction case under Public International Law which lay done the doctrine that in cases of claims of stockholders against a state, it is material to determine the place of incorporation of the stock corporation. Express Consent will not excuse the state from immunity General Law a. Act No. 3083 and CA 327 as amended by Sections 49-50, PD 1445 – Money claims arising from contracts which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties to be first filed with COA before a suit may be filed in court. The COA must act upon the claim within 60 days. Rejection of the claim authorizes the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari. b. Art. 2180, NCC – Tort committed by special agent; c. Art. 2189, NCC – LGUs liable for injuries or death caused by d efective condition of roads or public works under their control (City of Manila v. Teotico, et al., G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968); d. Sec. 22(2), RA 7160, LGC of 1991 – LGUs have power to sue and be sued; and e. Sec. 24 of LGC – LGUs and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury or damage to property. Special law may grant immunity PD 1620: immunity of the Director-General of the International Rice Research Institute 9|Page
Callado, v. I RRI , G.R. No. 106483, May 22, 1995: By virtue of PD 1620, the grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal, and an express waiver by its Director General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. The Court reiterated its earlier pronouncement in WHO v. Hon. Benjamin Aquino, et al ., to wit: “It is a recognized principle of international law an d under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized an d affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion b y the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adhe rence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.” Express consent on the part of the state when government institutes action in court Yujuico. Atienza , 472 SCRA 463: The institution of an expropriation case allows the court to have jurisdiction over a local government unit. In Republic v. Lim, this Court made the following pronouncement: “. . . while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of judgment in the expropriation proceedings , the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the dut y of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.” Money claims arising from contracts executed between the government and a private person Government take-over of a private during the period of Martial Law: Republic v. H on.H idalgo , 534 SCRA 619: Property owner was deprived of her property along Arlegui Street in Manila during the martial law period. Property owner filed a suit to cover her property or in the alternative, to recover lease rental during the period it was used by the government. The trial court awarded more than what the property owner prayed. The Court remanded to the trial court to fix the amount of the lease because this is a factual matter for determination of the trial court and not the Supreme Court. Torts committed by special agents under the Civil Code, Art. 2180 (Consent to be sued includes actions for tort) Teotico v. City of Manila , 22 SCRA 267 (1968): A local government unit may be held liable for quasi-delict under a special provision of the Civil Code. Incorporation of government owned or controlled corporations PNR v. K anlaon Construction, I nc ., G.R. No. 182967, Apr. 6, 2011: Liability under a contract can only attach if all requirements of law may been fully satisfied; a government corporation may not be held liable for payment of an obligation if the project covering such obligation is not included in the approved budget of the agency. Spouses J ayme v. Apostol G.R. No. 163609, Nov. 27, 2008: Liability cannot attach if the public official is acting as a special agent of government, performing a governmental function Implied consent When the Government enters into business contracts E PG Construction v. DPWH Sec. Vigilar , 354 SCRA 566: Government can be held liable for non-payment of just obligation under a contract.
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When it would be inequitable for the government to claim immunity Department of E ducation v. Oñate 524 SCRA 200: A government agency can be held liable if continued enjoyment of use of a “donated” property would impair the enjoyment of property rights of a private individual; read on the concept of unjust enrichment and the principle of inequity. 4. Scope of Consent
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan , 193 SCRA 282: A public officer cannot be held liable under a counterclaim in a pending case when he is performing a governmental function.
Rule on Garnishment of Public F unds under a Contract U.P. v. Hon. Di zon, 679 SCRA 54(2012): U.P. is a government instrumentality and its funds cannot be diverted for any other purpose except for those appropriated by Congress. The remedy of the party is to file its claim before the COA. Buisan v. COA , 816 SCRA 346 (2017): COA denied the money claims of the Petitioners in the total amount of P122,051,850.00 for the construction of the Liguasan Cut-off Channel (Project) in Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao. COA held that for the petitioners’ failure to
file their money claims within a reasonable time, they are deemed to have committed laches. Furthermore, the petitioners’ cause of action had already prescribed in view of Article 1146 of the Civil Code. The Doctrine of Non-Suability of State insulates the DPWH, a governmental entity, from claims of damages. It is a fundamental postulate of con stitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the State, as well as its government, is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. The rule, in an y case, is not absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The doctrine only conveys that “the state may not be sued without its consent;” it’s clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. As the State’s engineering and construction arm, the DPWH exercises governmental functions that effectively insulate it from any suit, much less from any monetary liability. C. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES General Rule: The state principles and policies enunciated in the Constitution are guidelines and are intended to be self-executing principles. Purpose: They serve as aids or guides to the legislature in the enactment of laws, for the executive in the implementation of laws and for the judiciary in its exercise of its power of judicial review. (Tondo Medical Center Employees Assn. v. Court of Appeals, 527 SCRA 746) The Health Sector Reform Agenda (“HSRA”) cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners’ bare allegations that it violates the general principles expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of due process and th e limitations of judicial power. 1. Principles 1.1. Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism (Art. II, Sec. 1 and Art. V) Macquiling v. COME LE C , G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013: to govern, one must have the necessary qualifications; effect of filing a void Certificate of Candidacy The use of foreign passport after renouncing on e’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it do es not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. An y act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack. The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for an y elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a fo reign citizen, to hold any public office. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public 11 | P a g e
office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. Ar nado vs. COME LE C and Captain, G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015, the Court ruled: "Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local position. Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local position. In Mercado v.Edu Manzano, it was clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said S ection 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance.'' Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full c ivil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They ma y now run for public office in the Philippines p rovided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such p ublic office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. 1.2. Adherence to International Law (Preamble, Art. II, Sec. 2, Sections 7-8) Philip Morr is, I nc. v. CA , G.R. No. 91332, July 16, 1993: The fact that the international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on accou nt of Section 21A of the Trademark Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market. Enforceability in the Philippines of Final Judgments of Foreign Courts Republic v. Mupas, G.R . No. 181892, Sept. 8, 2015: In the course of the RTC expropriation
proceedings, the RTC allowed Takenaka and Asahikosan to intervene in the case. Takenaka and Asahikosan based their intervention on the foreign judgments issued in the ir favor in the two collection cases that they filed against PIATCO {London awards). Takenaka and Asahikosan asked the RTC to: (a) hold in abeyance the release of just compensation to PIATCO until the London awards are recognized and enforced in the Philippines; and (b) order that the just compensation be deposited with the RTC for the benefit of PIATCO's creditors. The Supreme Court held that it can only recognize and/or enforce a foreign judgment or order after a conclusive and a final finding by Philippine courts that: 1. the foreign court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the case; 2. the parties were properly notified; and 3. there was no collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. BPI v.Guevara, G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015).It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain c onditions that vary in different countries. In the Philippines, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced simply by execution. Such judgment or order merely creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign cou rts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain conditions that vary in different countries. In the Philippines, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced simply by execution. Such judgment or order merely creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. An action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order in this jurisdiction is governed by Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court. Secretary of Justice v. J udge Lantion , 343 SCRA 377: The Court said that the individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-à-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court was called upon to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a treat y.
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In a situation where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]). Doctrine of Auto Limitation
Tanada v. Angara , G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997 :While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, ex pressly or impliedly as a member of the family of nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda -- international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture like: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations; and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. 1.3. Supremacy of Civilian Authority (Art. II, Sec. 3, Art. VII, Sec. 18, Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4), Art. XVI, Sec. 5(2)) Constitutional provisions which ensure civilian supremacy 1. By the installation of the President, the hi ghest civilian authority, as the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 18). 2. Through the requirement that members of the AFP swear to uphold and defend the Constitution, which is the fundamental law of a ci vil government (1987 Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 5, Par. 1). 1.4. Government as Protector of the People and People as Defender of the State (Art. II, Sec. 4 and Sec. 5) People v. Zosa , G.R. No. L-45892-93, July 13, 1938: One cannot avoid compulsory military service by invoking one’s religious convictions or b y saying that he has a sick father and several brothers and sisters to support. Accordingly, the duty of government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty to the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. 1.5. Separation of Church and State (Art. II, Sec. 6, Art. III, Sec. 5, Art. IX, C, 2 (5), and Art. VI, Sec. 5 (2)) Provisions of the Constitution that support the principle of separation of Church and State: 1. Art. III, Sec. 5: “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” 2. Art. VI, Sec. 5[2]: “The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the pa rty list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the allocated to part y-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, b y selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sections as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. 3. Art. IX-CI, Sec. 2[5]: “Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when 13 | P a g e
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be p rescribed by law.”
E xceptions: Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) and Sec. 29(2); Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3) and Sec. 4(2): 1. Art. VI, Sec. 28[3]: “Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.” 2. Art. VI, Sec. 29[2]: “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, bene fit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of an y priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, excep t when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.” 3. Art. XIV, Sec. 3[3]: “At the option expressed in writing by the p arents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or app roved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.” 4. Art. XIV, Sec. 4[2]: “Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equ ity participation in all educational institutions.” Theories on the separation of church and state: 1. Separation Standard - May take the form of either (a) strict separation or (b) the tame r version of strict neutrality, or what Justice Carpio refers to as the second theory of governmental neutrality. a. Strict Separationist – The establishment clause was meant to protect the State from the church, and the State’s hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two. b. Strict Neutrality Approach – It is not hostility towards religion, but a strict holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action. It does not permit; much less require accommodation of secular programs to religious belief. 2. Benevolent Neutrality Approach – The “wall of separation” is meant to protect the church from the State. It believes that with respect to gov ernmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006). 2. Policies 2.1. Independent foreign policy and a nuclear-free Philippines (Art. II, Sections 7-8 and Art. XVIII, Sections 4 and 25) Article II – Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sove reignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts an d pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. Article XVIII Section 4. All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified shall not be renewed or extended without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Section 25: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America conc erning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the P hilippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. Saguisag v. E xecutive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016: nature of agreements which cover presence of foreign military personnel 14 | P a g e
The President carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. Since every state has the capacity to interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states, it is but logical that every state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign states. EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation is found in Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive Department: "No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions, the full text of which reads as follows: “SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America c oncerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines exce pt under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” It is quite plain that the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution intended to add to the basic requirements of a treaty under Section 21 of Article VII. This means that both provisions must be read as additional limitations to the President's overarching executive function in matters of defense and foreign relations. The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. 2.2. A just and dynamic social order (Preamble, Art. II, Sec. 9) 2.3. The promotion of social justice (Art. II, Sec. 10, Art. XIII, Sections 1-2, Art. II, Sec. 26 and Art. VII, Sec. 13, par. 2) 2.4. Respect for human dignity and human rights (Art. II, Sec. 11, Art. III, Sections 17-19, and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(2)) 2.5. Fundamental equality of women and men (Art. II, Sec. 14; Art. XIII, Sec. 14) 2.6. Promotion of health (Art. II, Sections 15-16 and Art. XIII, Sections 11-13) Oposa v. F actoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993: The Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioners as represented by their parents. It said that while the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than an y of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing bu t parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The present generation must ensure that the future generations can enjoy the natural resources which now benefit the present generation (intergenerational responsibility) 2.7. The priority of education, science, technology, arts, culture and sports (Art. II, Sec. 17; and Art. XIV, Sec. 2) 2.8. Urban land reform and housing, (Art. XIII, Sections 9-10) 2.9. Reform in agriculture and other natural resources (Art. II, Sec.21; Art. XIII, Sec. 4-8) 2.10. Protection of Labor (Art. II, Sec. 18 and Art. XIII, Sec. 3) The right of employees from the private and public sectors to form unions, associations and societies not contrary to law (Art. III, Sec. 8; Art. IX, B, Sec. 2(5) 2.11. Independent people’s organizations (Art. II, Sec. 23; Art. XIII, Sections 15-16)
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2.12. The Family as a Basic Autonomous Social Institution (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV ,The Family; Art. II, Sec. 13) See Civil Code, Art. 52: Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. 2.13. A self-reliant and independent economic order (Art. II, Sec. 19, Sec. 20); Art. XII National Economy and Patrimony Manila Prince H otel v. GSI S, 267 SCRA 408: The Constitution provides for preferential treatment of Filipinos. This constitutional provision is supreme over the guidelines issued by the GSIS when it invited bids for its shares of stock in Manila Hotel. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the lan d. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not onl y to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. The term qualified Filipinos as used in the Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. H eirs v. Gamboa v. Sec. Teves , 652 SCRA 640: The grandfather rule will apply to determine control of Filipino citizens in a corporation classified as public utility provider. The Court emphasized that while a stock corporation ma y issue common shares, there are common voting shares and there non-voting common shares which are known also as preferred shares. Roy v. SE C Chairperson Herbosa, G.R. No. G.R. No. 207246 November 22, 2016: The term 'capital' in Section 11, Article XII of the 198 7 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case onl y to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares )." The Court adopted the foregoing definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution in furtherance of "the intent and letter of the Constitution that the 'State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos' [because a] broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all -important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public utility." I DE ALS, I nc. v. PSALM , G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012: PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136,otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA). The EP IRA provided a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the privatization o f the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to the desired competitive structure, and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities Petitioners contend that with the award of the contract to K-Water Coproration, a foreign corporation, PSALM clearly violated the constitutional provisions on the ap propriation and utilization of water as a natural resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipinoowned. Under the EPIRA, the generation of electric power, a business affected with public interest, was opened to private sector and any new generation company is required to secure a certificate of compliance from the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), as well as health, safety and environmental clearances from the concerned government agencies. Power generation shall not be considered a public utility operation, and hence no franchise is necessary. Foreign investors are likewise allowed entry into the electric power industry. However, th ere is no mention of water rights in the privatization of multi-purpose hydropower facilities. Section 47 (e) addressed the issue of water security, as follows: (e) In cases of transfer of possession, control, operation or privatization of multi -purpose hydro facilities, safeguards shall be prescribed to ensure that the national governme nt may direct water usage in cases of shortage to protect potable water, irrigation, and all other requirements imbued with public interest; x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)” The Court concluded that foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not prohibited under existing laws. 2.14. Communication and information in nation-building (Art. II, Sec. 24, Art. XVI, Sections 1011, Art. XVIII, Sec. 23) 2.15. Autonomy of local government (Art. II, Sec. 25, Art. X Local Government)
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2.16. Recognition of the rights of indigenous cultural communities (Art. II, Sec. 22, Art. VI, Sec. 5(2), Art. XII, Sec. 5, Art. XIII, Sec. 6, Art. XIV, Sec. 12) Protection of Ancestral Lands of Indigenous Communities (1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 5) Carino v. Insular Government , G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907, reversed by U.S. Supreme Court, 212 U.S. 449 (1909):The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Con stitution, extends those safeguards to all. Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act. Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued possession thereof. Application of Principles of Agrarian Reform and Stewardship to Indigenous Communities and Landless Farmers (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 6). Preservation and Development of the Culture, Traditions, and Institutions of Indigenous Communities (1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 17). Consolidated Petitions: Province of Cotabato v. G .R .P .: the right to self-determination It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous Peop les of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses. The MOA-AD refers to the Bangsamoro homeland , the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain. 2.17. Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 27, Art. XI, Sections 4, 5 15), Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. XI, Sec. 17, Art. VII, Sec. 12, Art. VII, Sec. 20, Art. XII, Sec. 21, Art. XII, Sec. 2, par. 5, Art. VI, Sections 12 and 20, Art. IX, D, Sec. 4, and Art. III, Sec. 7) The 1987 Constitution provides for a policy of transparency relating to matters of public interest: 1. Policy of full public disclosure of government transactions (1987 Constitution, Art. I I ,
Sec. 28). 2. Right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. I I I , Sec. 7). 3. Access to the records and books of account of the Congress (1987 Constitution, Art. VI ,
Sec. 20). 4. Submission of Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net worth (1987 Constitution, Art. XI ,
Sec. 17). 5. Access to information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the government (1987
Constitution, Art. XI I , Sec. 21). These provisions on public disclosures are intended to enhance the role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in check ing abuse in government (Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930, Feb. 13, 1989). 3. Social Justice, Human Rights and other Guaranteed Rights 3.1. Social Justice defined, Art. XIII, Sec. 1, Sec. 2 Calalang v. Williams , 70 Phil. 726 (1940) Read: Definition of social justice - Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of societ y, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or ex tra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." 17 | P a g e
3.2. Aspects of social justice a. Labor, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 b. Agrarian and natural resources reform, Art. XIII, Sections 4-8 Tano et. al. v. Socrates et. al., G. R. No. 110249: protection of marine resources Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow an y right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991 which allows the local government units to grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it: Provided , however , That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have preferential right to such fishery privileges. c. Urban land reform and housing, Art. XIII, Sections 9-10 City of Mandaluyong v. Aguilar , 350 SCRA487: choice of site for public housing Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands. d. Health, Art. XIII, Sections 11-13 e. Women, Art. XIII, Sec. 14: maternal function of women 3.3. People’s organizations, Art. XIII, Sec. 15 3.4. Education Development of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen (1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 14). Mandate on educational institutions [1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 3(4)]. Priority to research and development, invention, innovation of science and technology (1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 10). Incentives, tax deductions, and scholarships to enc ourage private participation in programs of basic and applied scientific research (1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 11). Encouragement of widest participation of private groups, local governments, and organizations in the generation and utilization of science and technology (1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 12). a. Right to quality education, Art. XIV, Sec. 1 Mi riam College v. CA 348 SCRA 215: use of indecent/ vulgar language as a ground for expulsion b. Educational mandate of the state, Art. XIV, Sec. 2, Sec. 5 University of San Agustin v. CA 270 SCRA 761: effect of failure to comply with academic standards c. The educational system, Art. XIV, Sec. 3, Sec. 4 Ateneo v. Capulong 222 SCRA 643: power of the school to discipline students involved in violent fraternity initiation rites 3.5. Language, Art. XIV, Sections 6-9 National Language: Filipino Official Language: Filipino and English 18 | P a g e
Auxiliary official languages: regional languages Voluntary and optional languages: Spanish and Arabic 3.6. Science and technology, Art. XIV, Sections 10-13 Development of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen (1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 14). Mandate on educational institutions [1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 3(4)]. Priority to research and development, invention, innovation of science and technology (1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 10). Incentives, tax deductions, and scholarships to enc ourage private participation in programs of basic and applied scientific research (1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 11). Encouragement of widest participation of private groups, local governments, and organizations in the generation and utilization of science and technology (1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 12). 3.7. Arts and Culture, Art. XIV, Sections 14-18
Knights of R izal v. DMCI H omes, I nc., 824 SCR A 327 (2017): The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings together principles in the field of h istorical conservation and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and laid down by experts over the years. Each country, however, remains “responsible for applying the plan within the framework of its own culture and traditions.” The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law. The Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but mere guidelines- a set of the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the years to be the most effective in preserving and restoring historical monuments, sites and buildings. 3.8. Sports, Art. XIV, Sec. 19 3.9. The Family, Art. XV Imbong et. al. v. Ochoa et. al. (Consolidated Petitions) G.R. No. 204819, April Constitutionality of RH Law; exercise of police power; right to privacy
8, 2013:
D. Doctrine of Separation of Powers
The doctrine of separation of powers is a principle of government under which three separate branches of government are empowered to carry out functions without interference or encroachment from another branch. Angara v. E lectoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936): under the principle of separation of powers, the Supreme Court will have to await the termination of the proceedings before the Electoral Tribunal for it to take cognizance of the case. Pimentel v. J oint Committee of Congress, G .R . No. 163783, J une 22, 2004: The Congress is a continuing body and must fulfill its constitutional mandate to cond uct the presidential canvass of votes even it if is in recess. The Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Belgica et. al. v. E xecutive Secretary et. al. G.R . No. 208566, Alcantara et. al. v. Drilon et. al. G.R . No. 208493, and Nepomuceno et. al. v. Pres. Aquino et. al., G.R . No.209251, Nov. 19, 2013: Congress is the sole entity authorized to ena ct the General Appropriations Act; the President may exercise veto powers over any provision of the GAA; Congress cannot delegate its power to appropriate; the Executive Branch implements the GAA and Congress cannot have any post enactment participation in the implementation of the GAA. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon , G.R. No. 136760, July 29, 2003: The RTC or any court may not do so because that would be violative of the principle of separation of powers. The principle essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. Ampatuan, Jr., v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013: Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public 19 | P a g e
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion “in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.” How principle is violated: interference to and assumption of another branch’s functions
Alba v. Demetri a, 148 SCRA 208, 209-210, 214-218 (1987): stri ct adherence to the constitutional process by which an appropriations act must be passed; the executive branch cannot interfere with the prerogative of the legislative branch Consolidated Petitions: Belgica et. al. v. E xecutive Secretary et. al. G.R . No. 208566, Alcantara et. al. v. Dr ilon et. al. G.R. No. 208493, and Nepomuceno et. al. v. Pres. Aquino et. al., G.R . No.209251, Nov. 19, 2013: legal standing of petitioners ; PDAF is unconstitutional; no cross-border transfer of funds; application of principles of separation of powers and chec ks and balances; no delegation of legislative powers; respect for au tonomy of local governments; political dynasty Republic v. Bayao et. al., G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013. The relocation of a government center is a prerogative of the executive branch unless the implementation is contrary to law, morals, public policy and the Court cannot intervene in the legitimate exercise of such power. Principle of Blending of Powers This principle refers to an instance when powers are n ot confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or shared by several departments. Illustrations of Application of the Principle of Blending of Powers a. Power of appointment which can be exercised by each department and be rightfully exercised by each department over its own administrative personnel; b. General Appropriations Law – President prepares the budget which serves as the basis of the bill adopted by Congress; c. Amnesty granted by the President requires the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Congress; and d. Power of the COMELEC to deputize law-enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the government for the purpose of ensuring free, o rderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections in accordance with the power granted to it by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative the conduct of elections [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(1)] (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003). In Alejandrino v. Quezon, et al. (46 Phil. 83), the Supreme Court held that it could not compel the Senate to reinstate a Senator who assaulted another Senator and was suspended for disorderly behavior, because it could not compel a separate and co-equal department to take an y particular action. In Osmeña v. Pendatun (109 Phil. 863), it was held that the Supreme Court could not interfere with the suspension of a Congressman for disorderly behavior, be cause the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The assault of a fellow Senator constitutes disorderly behavior. However, under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court may inquire whether or not the decision to expel a member of Congress is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Corpuz v. People, G.R . No. 180016, April 29, 2014: The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amen d, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of power. (Some Justices of the Supreme Court proposed to alter the penalties provided for under RPC on the basis of the ratio of P1.00 to P100.00, believing that it is not fair to apply the range of penalties, which was based on the value of money in 1932, to crimes committed at present.) E. The Principle of Checks and Balances This principle in constitutional law where there is a system-based regulation that allows one branch to limit actions of another branch in keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers.
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Alba v. Demetri a supra: The President cannot effect any changes in the General Appropriation Act which having the same amended by congress. Consolidated Petitions: Belgica et. al. v. Executive Secretary, supra: cross-border transfer of funds is not allowed; Congress cannot delegate the power to legislate to the executive branch particularly use of powers intended for the power sector; the President cannot allow his veto powers to be subverted by Congress Consolidated petitions of Araullo v. Aquino, supra: DAP is unconstitutional; strict observance of how savings under the General Appropriations Act can be aligned; power is limited by the Constitution to the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions (Sec. 25(5), Art. VI) Doctrine of Necessary Implication The Doctrine of necessary implication provides that the exercise of the power may be justified in the absence of an express conferment because the grant of express power carried with it all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it. F. Delegation of Powers General Rule: Potestas delegata non delegari potest ( what has been delegated cannot be delegated) Exception : The legislative branch can promulgate laws which allows the creation of administrative agencies to carry out q uasi-legislative transactions conforming to the following tests: 1. Completeness test to ensure that subordinate legislation is germane to th e purpose of the law. 2. Sufficient Standard test which deal with the parameters in implementing the law.
H ow law-making power is delegated: suppletory rule-making (fi lling i n details to ensure enforcement of the law) and contingent rule-making (ascertaining the facts to bring the law into operation) Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013: There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials with respect to the authority to issue BPO. The BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad , merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (b) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." Application of the Principle : PHCAP v. Sec. Duque III, 535 SCRA 265 on adoption of Implementing Rules and Regulations considering a domestic law and an international instrument to which Philippines is a party. Belgica et. al. v. Ochoa et. al. G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013; the utilization of the “pork barrel fund” (PDAF) by members of Congress coursed through the Executive Branch; Congress cannot delegate to the Executive Branch the power of appropriation. Abakada v. Sec. Purisima, 562 SCRA, 251: Delegation of power to the Secretary of Finance in the implementation of the accretion law for BOC and BIR employees People v. Maceren , 169 Phil., 447-448 (1977): Delegation of power; definition and scope of the law and penalties to be imposed Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary et al., G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012. The power of the President to reorganize is a prerogative under his continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. No.292. Banda et al. v. Ermita , G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010. The power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
Resident Mammals of Tanon Strait, Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-L iza E isma-Osorio, i n their capacity as legal guardians and as responsible stewards of G od's creations v. Secretary Angelo Reyes et al(G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015):Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular cou rse of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” 21 | P a g e
Permissible Delegation of Powers Delegation of powers to the President: 1. Emergency powers to the President (Sec. 23(2), Article VI) 2. Fixing of tariff rates (Sec.28(2), Article VI) 3. Power of subordinate legislation by Congress with the creation of administrative agencies under the Executive Branch. G. Forms of Government “Government” in general defined Forms: Democracy, Monarchy, Aristocracy, Dictatorship “Government of the Philippines” defined See Revised Administrative Code, Sec. 2 See Article VII and Article X Classifications of government 1. As to the centralization of control a. Unitary government – One in which the control of national and local, internal and external, affairs is exercised by the central or national government; b. Federal government – One in which the powers of the government are divided between two sets of organs, one for national affairs and the other for local affairs, each organ being supreme within its own sphere; consists of autonomous local government units m erged into a single State, with the national government exercising a limited d egree of power over the domestic affairs but generally full discretion of the external affairs of the State. 2. As to the existence or absence of title and/or control a. De jure – Has a rightful title but no power or control, one that is established of a legitimate sovereign. b. De facto – Actually exercises power or control but without legal title (Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986). THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
III. Legislative Department A. Who may exercise law-making powers? 1. Congress 2. Local Legislative Bodies under the principle of delegation of powers 3. Electorate (people’s initiative on statutes, initiative and referendum) 4. Emergency powers exercised by the President under Martial Law Rule or in a Revolutionary Government B. Composition of Congress, Qualifications of Members, and Term of Office 1. Election of Members : Regular election (Art. VI, Sec. 8) and Special Election (Art. VI, Sec.9) Elections for Senators and representatives are held in the manner and on the dates fixed by law. Regular elections of Senators and representatives of HOR is held every second Monday of May. (Sec.8, Art. VI) Commencement of Term of Office: The Constitution provides that the terms of office of the Senators and the representatives shall begin at n oon of 30 June next following their election. (Sections 4 and 7, Article VI) Vacancies, how filled: In case of a vacancy in the Senate or the House of Representatives, a special election may be called in the manner prescribed by law, but the senator or representative elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Sec.9, Art.VI) 2. Membership of the Senate : 24 Senators chosen by the qualified voters all over the Philippines and overseas Filipinos duly registered with Philippine embassies and con sulates abroad. Senate (Art. VI, Sections 2-4) 2.1. Qualifications: To be eligible for the Senate, a person: Must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines; Must be at least 35 years old on the day of election; Must be able to read and write; Must be a registered voter; and Must be a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of election. (Sec. 3, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal , 803 SCRA 435 (2016): A losing candidate may question the qualifications of an incumbent Senator.
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2.2. Term of Office : A Senator serves for a term of six (6) years and one cannot serve for mo re than two (2) consecutive terms. (Sec.4, Art. VI) Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board , 570 SCRA 411, 416-419, 422-425 (2008): no other substantive requirement may be prescribed for elective positions 3. Membership of the House of Representatives : Congressional district representatives and party list members. (Sec.5 (1), (2) and (3), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) 3.1. Qualifications: To be eligible for the House of Representatives, a person: Must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines; Must be at least 25 years old on the day of election; Must be able to read and write; Except for a party list member, must be a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected; and must be a resident of said district for not less than one year immediately preceding the day of election. (Sec. 6, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) , G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013: A member of Congress must be Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC a natural-born Filipino; there should be no infirmity in the oath taking ceremonies 3.2 Apportionment : Each congressional district must have at least a population of 250,000 inhabitants. The total number of party list members must not exceed 20% of the total number of members of the HOR. 3.3. Term of Office : Members of the HOR serve for a term of three (3) years and one cannot serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. (Sec. 7, Art. VI) Sema v. COME LE C , 558 SCRA 700-726, 731-744 (2008): membership; ARMM Legislative Assembly cannot create political subdivisions reserved to Congress under the Constitution Aquino and Robredo v. COME LE C, 617 SCRA 623, 630-652 (2010): a congressional district must meet the 250,000 inhabitant- threshold Aldaba v. COME LE C , 611 SCRA 137 (2010): population should not be based on projection and certification must be issued by head of the Philippine Statistics Authority, formerly, National Statistics Office (NSO) 3.4. Party list system : allocation of seats and sectoral representation Purpose why marginalized sector needs to be represented ( Lokin v. COMELEC, 621 SCRA 685) Ladlad v. COMELEC, System of accreditation; procedural aspect; criteria to be considered ( G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010) Basic parameters of representation: 1. The maximum representation of party list members is 20% of all members. 2. Each winning party list organization must meet at least the 2% threshold number of votes of all registered voters. 3. Each party list organization can only have a maximum of three seats. (BANAT v. COMELEC) Atong Paglaum v. COME LE C , 694 SCRA 477 (2013): sectoral representation need not be limited to the poor or marginalized group; extent of national membership; performance in party list election process Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC , G.R.No. 190582, April 8, 2010: While accreditation of party list is the prerogative of COMELEC, the Court, when called upon in proper cases, may scrutinize the basis why a party was not accredited. PGBI v. COMELEC, G .R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010. The COMELEC has the power to delist a party list on two grounds under Section6 (8) of R.A. 7941. Magdalo v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012. The registration of political parties does not involve administrative liability as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration of a party. C. Legislative Privileges and Disqualifications/Inhibitions Salaries (Art. VI, Sec. 10 and Art. XVIII, Sec. 17 ) General Rule: Incumbent members of Congress cannot benefit from salary increases approved during their term of office. PH I CONSA v. Mathay : 18 SCRA 300-312 (1966): The Court permanently enjoined COA from authorizing or passing in audit the payment o f the increased salaries authorized by Republic A ct No. 4134 to the Speaker and members of the HOR. It held that the law is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved will have expired and it also violates the Constitution.
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, 56 SCRA 823 (1974): The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ligot v, M athay Auditor-General's decision that petitioner as a Congressman whose term of office expired on December 30, 1969 and qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a minimum of twenty years of government service is entitled only to benefits effective during his term and cannot benefit from the new law mandating the increase of salaries and benefits approved by Congress during his incumbency. Freedom from Arrest (Art. VI, Sec. 11, Rev. Penal Code, Art. 145): Freedom from Arrest in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment while Congress is in session. Speech and Debate Clause (Art. VI, Sec. 11) Pobre v. Miriam Defensor-Santiago , A.C.No. 7399, August 25, 2009: a member of Congress may invoke parliamentary immunity in a speech delivered during session. Disqualifications/Inhibitions Incompatible and Forbidden Offices (Art. VI, Sec. 13 and Sec. 14) Puyat v. de Guzman , 113 SCRA 32 (1982): an incumbent member of Congress cannot engage in the practice of another profession. Other Prohibitions (Art. VI, Sec. 3) Duty to Disclose (Art. XI, Sec. 17, Art. VI, Sec. 12, Sec. 20) D. Quorum and Rules of Proceedings 1. Quorum (Art. VI, Sec. 16(2)) Plenary Sessions: Quorum and Attendance: A quorum is required to conduct business. Congress may adjourn from day to day when there is no quorum. It may compel attendance in such a manner it may provide. It may also impose any punishment it may consider proper on members who refuse to attend the sessions and whose absence prevents the House from having a quorum. (Sec. 16 (2), Article VI) Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949): Physical presence during session is required 2. Rules of proceedings (Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) and Sec. 21) 3. Journal and Record (Art. VI, Sec.16 (4)) Both the Senate and HOR are required to keep a journal of their respective proceedings. The Journal is a complete official record of what transpired in the chambers, including the remarks and speeches made by members, the bills presented and deliberated upon, the votes cast and the decision of every matter included in the Agenda for each session day. Congressional Journals (Sec.16 (4), paragraph 2 Article VI) The following matters are required to be included in the Journal: 1. Votes cast in favor of and those against every motion, bill or other question, when the entry in the journal is requested by 1/5 of the members present. (Art. VI, Sec.16 (4)) 2. Yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, Sec. 26[2]) 3. Veto message of the President (Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]) 4. Yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President (Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]) The Enrolled Bill Theory Mabanag v. Lopez Veto , 78 Phil., 1-3, 12- 19, 29-31(1947): Under the enrolled bill theory, law passed upon by the legislative branch is conclusive to the court. The law is question pertains to the amendment of the Constitution. The Court said the amendment process is " political" in its entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point. Ar royo v. De Venecia , 343 Phil., 54-60, 71-74 (1997) internal rules must be observed in floor deliberations. (amendment of the NIRC on “sin” taxes on cigars, cigarettes, wine and other alcoholic drinks Probative Value of the Journal U.S. v. Pons , 34 Phil., 729-735 (1916): The courts may not go behind the legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (illegal importation of opium)
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Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory Morales v. Subido , 27 SCRA 131 (1969): An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. (qualification and eligibility to become Chief of Police of Manila) Astorga v. Vi llegas , 56 SCRA 714 (1974): The Court held that that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. 4. Sessions a. Regular sessions (Art. VI, Sec. 15 and Sec. 16(5)) b. Special sessions (Art. VI, Sec. 15 upon call of the President, Art. VII, Sections 10-11 to fill vacancies in the Presidency and Vice Presidency Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 2, Commander-in-Chief powers David v. Arroyo, G. R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006: emergency powers of the President can be exercised pursuant to Sec.23 (2), Art. VI and Sec. 19, Art. VII , 421 SCRA 656: calling out powers of the President under Sec. Sanlakas v. E xecutive Secretary 18, Art. VII Kulayan v. Tan , 675 SCRA 482(2012): A provincial governor cannot exercise the calling out powers which the Constitution has reserved to the President. Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, 4 July 2017): The Supreme Court may be called upon to review the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of th e writ of habeas corpus. E. Voting Requirements 1. General Rule: When the House has a quorum, a majority vote of the quorum is generally sufficient for the approval of matters. 2. Exceptions : There are, however, certain matters which prescribe that entire membership is required like two thirds vote in – The passage of a bill vetoed by the President. (Sec.27 (1), Art. VI) The declaration of war. (Sec. 23(1), Art. VI To call a constitutional convention. (Sec.3, Art. XVII) The expulsion or suspension of a member. (Sec. 16(3), Article VI)
3. Votes in impeachment proceedings A majority vote of the members of the Committee on Justice of HOR is necessary for consideration of its report in a plenary session. (Sec. 3(2), Art. X I) A vote of at least 1/3 of all members of the HOR is necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment or override its contrary resolution. A verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by 1/3 of all members of the HOR shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment. Two thirds vote of all members of the Senate is necessary to convict the impeached public officer. Gutierrez v. H OR , Feb. 15, 2011: consideration of two complaints as basis of the Articles of Impeachment F rancisco v. HOR , 415 SCRA 44: initiation of a complaint for impeachment Chief J ustice Corona v. Senate of the Philippines et al ., G.R. No.200242, July 17, 2012: The power of judicial review includes the power of review justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Republic v . Sereno (May 2018; M.R . J une 2018): the Chief Justice may not only be removed through impeachment; quo warranto proceedings may be instituted if there is factual basis that the Chief Justice was not qualified at the time of appointment F. Discipline of Members (Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)) Discipline of Members (Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)). The Committee on Ethics conducts the investigation of a member and will submit in plenary its recommendation. A member of Congress may be suspended or expelled by two – thirds vote of all its members. Each house may determine the rules of proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. 25 | P a g e
2. Commission on Appointments (Art. VI, Sections 18-19) Membership of the Commission on Appointments: It is composed of 25 members with the Senate President at its ex oficio Chairman and 12 senators and 12 members of the House of Representatives. Members coming of the Senate and the House of Representatives are chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. Jurisdiction : Article VII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution reads:"The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the h eads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, o r officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also ap point all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for b y law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. Sarmiento v. Mi son , 156 SCRA 549 (1987): Appointment of Bureau of Customs Commissioner does not need confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Tatad v. Commission on Appointments , G.R. No. 183171, August 11 , 2008: With the resignation of the nominee, there is no longer an actually justiciable controversy. Paguia v. Office of the President (G.R. No 176278, June 25, 2010): a lawyer undergoing suspension may not file a petition which applies his knowledge of the law to challenge the nomination of former Chief Justice Davide to bec ome the Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations. H. Powers of Congress 1. Legislative Powers: General Plenary Powers ; Limitations on legislative powers (Refer to Sections 22, 25, 29, 28 of Art. VI, and Sec. 22, Art. VII, Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV for express and implied SUBSTANTIVE restrictions and Sections 26(1), (b) of Art. VI and Art. 2 of the Civil Code for procedural restrictions) Power of Inquiry; Investigation (Sec. 21, Art.VI) Question Hour (Sec. 22, Art.VI) (Gudani v. Senga 498 SCRA 67: Commander-in –Chief powers of the President) Approval of presidential amnesties/consent to appointees of the President(Commission on Appointments) Declaration of state of war and delegation of emergency powers (Section 23, Article VI) Legislative veto or approval of extension of suspension of privilege of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. (Section 18, Article VII) Senate’s concurrence in treaties. (Section 21, Art.VII) Enactment of laws related to utilization of natural resources.(Section 2, Article XII) Amendment of the Constitution. (Sec. 2, Article XVII) Limitations on Legislative Powers: Substantive limitations a. Express substantive limitations (Art. III under the Bill of Rights, Art. VI, Sections 25 and 28, Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3), Art. VI, Sections 29, 30 and 31)) b. Implied substantive limitations Prohibition against delegation of legislative powers Prohibition against passage of irrepealable laws E xemptions to Non-delegation Doctrine - Delegation to the President: Art VI, Sec. 23(2) and Sec.28 (2) Delegation to the people (Art. VI, Sec. 32): referendum and initiative Procedural limitations (Art. VI, Sec. 32) a. Legislative VETO or approval of extension of suspension of privilege of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law (Art. VII, Sec. 18) b. Approval of Presidential Amnesties (Art. VII, Sec. 19) c. Concur in Treaties (Art. VII, Sec. 21) d. Declaration of war and delegation of emergency powers (Art. VI, Sec. 23) e. Power with regard to utilization of natural resources (Art. XII, Sec. 2) 26 | P a g e
f. Amendment of the Constitution (Art. XVII, Section 12) Cases: Demetria v. Alba, G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987: no cross border transfer of funds; all appropriations bill must emanate from the House of Representatives and the executive branch has no power to transfer one budget for another purpose for which it was originally intended. Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R.No. 208493, November 19, 2013: limitations on the power to enact appropriation bills YMCA v. Collector of Internal Revenue , 33 Phil. 217(1916): taxpayer has burden of proof to claim tax exemption Quezon City v. ABS-CBN , G.R. No. 166408, Oct. 6, 2008: LGUs have power to collect local franchise tax Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 484 (2000): only Congress has the power to grant franchise Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27(1985): effectivity of laws Power of impeachment (Refer to Sections 2 and 3(1) to (6), Article XI for jurisdiction, grounds and procedure) Gutierrez v. House of Representatives , G. R. No. Feb. 15, 2011. Congress may look into separate complaints against an impeachable officer and consider the inclusion of matters raised therein in the adoption of the Articles of Impeachment. The Court further said that: “ Impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office . It is, by nature, a sui generis politico-legal process that signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt.” (Contrast this with Francisco v. HOR) Chief Justice Corona v. Senate of the Philippines et al., G.R. No.200242, July 17, 2012. The power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. IV. The Executive Department A. Qualifications, Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications 1. Qualifications, election, term and oath, (Art. VII, Sections 2, 4 and 5) 2. Privileges and salary (Art. VII, Sec. 6) 3. Prohibitions (Art. VII, Sec. 13) Compare prohibition against other officials ( Art. VI, Sec. 13, Art. IX, A, Sec. 2 and Art. IX, B, Sec. 7 ) Exceptions to rule prohibiting executive officials from holding another office; Vice President as member of the cabinet (Art. V III, Sec. 3, par.2) Secretary of Justice as member of Judicial and Bar Council (Art. VIII, Sec. 8 (1)) Presidential Immunity : The immunity of the President from suit during his incumbency is rooted in the separation of powers doctrine. The President enjoys the presumption that he is faithful to his Oath. B. Powers 1. Executive and Administrative Powers in General (Art. VII, Sections 1 and 17) The Constitution provides that “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the President.” (Sec. 1, Article VII) Under the principle of separation of powers, the e xecutive, legislative and judicial departments of the government are coordinate co-equal with one another. Being the head of the state, the President, by general conception, is the highest official of the land. 2. Power of appointment a) In general : The President shall appoint all officers of the go vernment whom he may be authorized by law to appoint and such officers of government whose appo intments are not otherwise provided by law. (Art. VII, Sec. 16) b) With consent of Commission on Appointments (please commit to memory): Heads of departments (Art. VII, Sec. 16) Ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls (Art. VII, Sec. 16) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel and naval captain (Art. VII, Sec.16) Chairman and members of Constitutional Commissions (Art. IX, B, Sec. 1(2), C, Sec. 1(2), and D, Sec. 1(2)) 27 | P a g e
Members of the Judicial and Bar Council (Art. VIII, Sec.8(2))
c) Upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar Council Members of the Supreme Court and all lower courts,(Art. VIII, Sec. 9) Ombudsman (Tanodbayan) and Deputies (Art. XI, Sec. 9) Limitations on appointing power of the President (Art. VII, Sections 13 and 15) Interim or recess appointments, (Art.VI, Sec. 19 and Art. VII, Sec. 16, par. 2) Limitation on appointing power of Acting President (Art. VII, Sections 14-15) c) Midnight appointments: The outgoing President refrain from filling vacancies to give the new President opportunity to consider names in the ligh t of his new policies especially so when he ran on a platform approved by the electorate.( Art. VII, Sec.15) De Castro v. J BC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010: This case questioned the power of the President to appoint the Chief Justice during the prohibitive period. The S.C. held that the appointment of the members of the judiciary is not covered by the prohibition on midnight appointments. Judge Aguinaldo v. Pres. Aquino I I I , GR No. 224302, Nov 29, 2016: Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as nominees for the 16th Saridiganbayan Associate Justice, did not have a clear right to said position, and therefore not proper parties to a quo warranto proceeding. Being included in the list of nominees had given them only the possibility, but not the certainty, of being appointed to the position, given the discretionary power of the President in making judicial appointments. It is for this same reason that respondents Jorge-Wagan, et al., nominees for the 21stSandiganbayan Associate Justice, may not be impleaded as respo ndents or unwilling plaintiffs in a quo warranto proceeding. Neither can the IBP initiate a quo warrant proceeding to oust respondents Musngi and Econg from their currents posts as Sandiganb ayan Associate Justices for the IBP does not qualify under Rule 66, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court as an individual claiming to be entitled to the positions in question. The issue is of paramount importance for it affects the validity of appo intments to collegiate courts and, ultimately, the administration of justice, for if there are questions as to the right of the appointee to his position as judge/justice, then do ubts shall likewise shadow all his acts as such. This will indubitably undermine the faith of the pu blic in the judicial system. Since at hand is a constitutional issue of first impression, which will likely arise again when there are simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, it is imperative for the Court to already resolve the same for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, and the general public as well. It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacanc y in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Ju stice. d) Power of Removal : For appointees who serve at the pleasure of the President, they may also be removed if there is loss of trust and confidence in them. Other public servants may be removed for cause provided for by law.
Gonzales I I I v. Offi ce of the Pr esident (G.R.Nos. 196231, 196232, September 4, 2019): Only the Ombudsman can discipline the Over-all Ombudsman, the other Deputies and the Special Prosecutor. Almario v. E xecutive Secretary , 701 SCRA 269 (2013): Where the law provides for criteria for selection, the President must comply with the standards as prescribed. 3. Power of Control and Supervision a) Concept of Qualified Political Agency b) Executive Departments and Offices >Control of executive department (Art. VII, Sec. 17)
Ople v. Torres , 293 SCRA 141(1998): In the exercise of power of control, the President may substitute his own judgment over a decision of his subordinate; he may amend, affirm, alter or revoke any issuance of his subordinates. c) General supervision of local government and autonomous regions but not CONTROL (Art. X, Sec. 4 and Sec.16)
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, 290 SCRA 279(1998): The President’s power over local Joson v. E xecutive Secretary governments is only supervision and not control. Thus, the primary concern is to ensure that local government officials comply with the law when implementing the same. 4. Powers as Commander-in-Chief ( Art. VII, Sec.18, Art. III, Sec. 15, Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par.2) Emergency powers (Art. VI, Sec. 23(2)) Ampatuan et al. v. H on. Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President, without need of congressional authority to exercise the same. 5. Pardoning Power (Art. VII, Sec. 19, Art. IX, C, Sec. 5) a) Nature and Limitations: Rooted in the “divine rights of the King” General Rule: The Constitution grants the President this right to individuals convicted by final judgment who have demonstrated they have fulfilled their debt to society.
Exceptions: Grant of amnesty requires congressional consent. Offenses involving violation of election laws require the recommendation of the COMELEC. Tiu v. Natividad Dizon, G.R. No. 211269, June 15, 2016 (Perlas, Bernabe, J.): It must be emphasized that pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individu al for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential. The necessity for the individual pardon papers is best explained by the nature of a conditional pardon, which is "a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon." b) Forms of Executive Clemency: Reprieves, Commutations and Pardons; Remit fines and forfeitures; Amnesty with consent of Congress Pardon distinguished from probation People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937 ): Under the law on probation, the convicted party does not serve his sentence in jail while in pardon, the convicted party serves his sentence and upon good grounds, he may be granted pardon.
Pardon distinguished from parole Tesoro v. Director of Prisons, 68 Phil. 154 (1939): Parole is granted to a convicted person upon showing of good behavior but the party is required to report regularly to the Parole Board to ensure that fulfills the conditions of his parole. Pardon distinguished from amnesty Tolentino v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948): Pardon is left to the personal discretion of the President while amnesty requires the imprimatur of Congress. Pardon is normally extended to an individual while amnesty is extended to group of individuals who have committed crimes against the state. Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 (1949): The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, cannot be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is pardoned through amnesty truly deserves to be forgiven.
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Philippine jurisprudence has been influenced by rulings of the U.S. Supreme regarded by the Amnesty
Proclamation which has the force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, Effect of Pardon Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34 (1940): If it is absolute pardon, one is restored to his full civil and political rights. Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441 (1941): In the pardon is conditional, the party cannot avail of the privilege of habeas corpus as he will be incarcerated at once if he violates the condition of his pardon. Effect of Absolute Pardon on Qualification to seek Public Office Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC: Presidential pardon unless qualified restores a person to his full civil and political rights. Revocation of Pardon In Re: Wilfredo S. Torres, 2 SCRA 109: Since pardon is a an act of grace, the same may be revoked if the party shows that he does not deserve the same because he has not reformed himself. Note: The President cannot grant pardon to an impeached officer neither can the grant pardon to a person convicted of an election offense without the recommendation of the COMELEC. 6. Diplomatic Power Treaty making power (Art. VII, Sec. 21) Stages involved in the Adoption of a Treaty 1. Negotiations 2. Execution 3. Ratification in accordance with domestic law 4. Exchange of ratified instruments 5. Deposit of instruments Treaty distinguished from executive agreements Arthur Lim et al v. Executive Secretary GR No. 131445, April 11, 2002: A party who does not any legal standing cannot question the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement. Please note that the Court has, in a prior case, made a distinction between an Executive Agreement and a Treaty. A treaty requires the ratification of the Senate while an Executive Agreement does not. The VFA is considered supplemental to the Mutual Defense Treaty executed by the Philippine government and the U.S. government and ratified by both the U.S. Senate and the Philippine Senate prior to the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Deportation of undesirable aliens Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans (Art. VII, Sec. 20, Art. XII, Sec. 21, R. A. No. 4860) 7. Powers relative to Appropriation Measures Address Congress (Art. VII, Sec.23): State of the Nation Address Preparation and submission of the budget (Art. VII) Refer to S.C. Rulings on: Demetria v. Alba, supra; Belgica v. Ochoa, supra; Araullo v. Ochoa
Stages in the Adoption of the General Appropriations Act –
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1. 2. 3. 4.
Budget Preparation Budget Legislation Budget Implementation Budget Accountability Budget Savings vs. Unutilized Funds
8. Delegated Powers Emergency power (Art. VI, Sec. 23 (2)) Fixing of tariff rates (Art. VI, Sec.28 (2)) 9. Veto Powers Veto power (Art. VII, Sec. 27) Line veto; veto due to constitutional grounds Effect of inaction for 30 days over a bill submitted for approval 10. Residual Powers: "Whatever is not judicial, whatever is not legislative, is residual power exercised by the President." Residual powers of the president include things that are considered to be outside of the office's usual realm. Th is includes things like having criminal immunity while in office.
B. The Vice President 1. Qualifications, election, term and oath (Art. VII, Sections 3, 4, and 5) 2. Privileges and salary (Art. VII, Sec. 6) 3. Prohibitions (Art. VII, Sec 13, Sec. 3, par. 2) C. Succession (Art. VII, Sec.9) 1. In case of vacancy at the beginning of term (Art. VII, Sec. 7 and Sec. 10) 2. In case of vacancy during term (Art. VII, Sec. 8 and Sec. 10) 3. In case of temporary disability (Art. VII, Sections 11 -12) D. Removal (Art. XI, Sections 2-3) Read provisions on the process of impeachment: HOR “impeaches”; Senate “convicts” VI. THE JUDICIARY A. Concepts 1 . Judicial Power (Sec. 1, Art. VIII): Duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Nature: The power to hear and settle disputes concerning rights and duties between private persons or between private persons and the government. When exercised : Only when an actual controversy is presented to the court for resolution/disposition. How exercised : When the law is clear, it is the court’s duty to APPLY the law. When the law is vague, the court must interpret the law and apply it according to its meaning. Philippine jurisprudence has been influenced b y rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court. 31 | P a g e
The Philippine Supreme Court has extensively relied on the 1803 U.S. case of Marbury v. Madison to justify the power of judicial review. 2. Judicial Review 2.1. Theory and Justification of Judicial Review: Judicial review is the doctrine where the judiciary may review acts of the executive and legislative branches. This power is rooted under the principle of checks and balances and separation of powers doctrine. A court with judicial review power may invalidate laws and decisions that are contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.
Consolidated Petitions (B elgica and others) supra: The Supreme Court is not supreme over the two other branches of the government when it scrutinized the utilization of funds under the GAA. I t merely exercised its constitutional duty to check on the abuse of exercise of powers by the executive branch and the legislative branch.
2.3. Functions of Judicial Review: Checking, Legitimating and Symbolic Functions of Judicial Review: Checking – looks into possible abuses of each branch of government; review of decisions of lower courts; Legitimizing – looks into constitutionality of laws and its application; and Symbolic – looks into issues although they have become moot and academic. REMEMBER THE EXPANDED POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE S.C. Under normal circumstances, S.C. will not disturb the findings of facts of administrative tribunals and the trial courts. However, S.C. may review findings of facts the lower courts under recognized exceptions: when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; where there is abuse of discretion; when judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, when the findings of facts are conflicting; when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to those of the trial court; when findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and when the findings of fact of the C.A. are premised on supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by evidence on record. a) Operative Fact Doctrine Araullo v. Aquino, supra: A law or an act may be declared unconstitutional but such law or act may produce legal effects prior to the pronouncement of nullity. Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality Under Civil Code, Art. 7, Statute is void when declared unconstitutional Statute is not always void but may produce legal effects. Ar aullo v. Ochoa, supra: the transfer of funds under the Development Acceleration Program of the Aquino was unconstitutional but the projects funded out of DAP need not be undone. General Rule: All courts can exercise judicial review.
Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, Mayor B inay et.al: The Court of Appeals is a court of general jurisdiction. As such, it may review the acts of the Ombudsman when called upon to render judgment on a particular act of the Ombudsman. b) Moot Questions General Rule: A matter is moot if further legal proceedings with regard to it can have no effect, or events have placed it beyond the reach of the law. Normally, courts will defer to acting on a matter that has become moot and academic. Exception: Where matters of transcendental importance arise, the Cou rt render a resolution to give guideposts to the bench and bar if a similar matter should arise in the future.
Resident Mari ne Mammals of Tanon Straits v. Secretary Angelo Reyes: Despite the fact that the issue had become moot and academic when the oil exploration activity was already stopped, the Court saw it fit to resolve the issue raised by the Petitioners. Concept of expanded power of judicial review: resolve matters of
transcendental importance/ address matters which have been rendered moot and academic
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c) Political Question Doctrine The political question doctrine could be read narrowly or more broadly. Read narrowly, the political question doctrine should be invoked only when the issue presented to the Court is one that "has been textually committed to another branch of government ." That is, if the framers of the Constitution made clear their intention that the judiciary not resolves a particular question of constitutional interpretation, that determination must be respected. More broadly, the political question doctrine might be invoked when there is a lack of judicially manageable standards to decide the case on the merits , when judicial intervention might show insufficient respect for other branches of government , or when a judicial decision might threaten the integrity of the judicial branch. (Baker v. Carr, 1962) Marcos et al. v. Manglapus et al. G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989: When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. B. Judicial Independence The Constitution has instituted safeguards to ensure the independence of the judiciary. The judiciary enjoys financial autonomy. The tenure and salaries of the members of the judiciary are guaranteed. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Sec. 10, Art. VIII) Members of the judiciary enjoy the tenure o f their office during good behavior, until they reach the age of 70 years or become incapacitated to discharge the du ties of their office or by voluntary resignation. C. Judicial Restraint Judicial restraint is the philosophy of judicial interpretation wherein members of the bench normally defer to written legislation whenever possible, if it is not in conflict with the Constitution. D. Appointments to the Judiciary The Judicial and Bar Council (Art. VIII, Sec. 8); Memorize composition but it will be more an appropriate topic in judicial ethics. Membership of the Judicial and Bar Council (Chavez v. JBC): - the Chief Justice as ex oficio Chairman; - the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members; - a representative of the Integrated Bar; - a professor of law; - retired Member of the Supreme Court; and - a representative of the private sector. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings The Constitution provides for the creation of the Jud icial and Bar Council (“JBC”) which shall have the principal function of recommending to the President the appointees to the Judiciary. The JBC shall submit to the President a list of at least three nominees for every vacanc y from which he may select a person of his choice. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appo intments within 90 days from the submission of the list while any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. (Castro v. The JBC) It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. Chavez v. JBC: Congress cannot have two representatives in the JBC. The Constitution provides only for one representative. De Castro v. JBC: The President must appoint a member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the date the vacancy occurred. Such appointment cannot be restricted by the midnight appointment rule.
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Republic v. Sereno (Original Decision rendered May 8, 2018 and Decision on Motion for Reconsideration rendered on June 19, 2018): A member of the Supreme Court may also be removed through Quo Warranto proceedings if it established that the member of the Court did not meet the prescribed qualifications at the time of her appointment. E. Hierarchy of Courts (more on Remedial Law) Supreme Court 1. Composition (Art. VIII, Sec. 4): there is only one Supreme Court, all other courts are created by law; Congress also defines the jurisdiction of courts created by law but it is only the Supreme Court that prescribes the Rules of Procedure and matters related to admission and practice of law and the discipline of the members of the bench and the bar. 2. Appointment and qualifications (Art. VIII, Sec. 7, Sec.8 (5), Sec.9) F. Supreme Court 1. En banc and Division Cases (Sec. 4, Art. VIII) (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, o r seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided that no doctrine or principle of law lay down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. 2. Procedural Rule-Making Art. VIII, Sec. 5. “(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.” 3. Administrative Powers (more on Judicial Ethics) Supervision of lower courts (Art. VIII, Sec.6) Discipline of Judges (Art. VIII, Sec. 11) G. The Supreme Court as Presidential Electoral Tribunal, (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 4) Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No.191618, November 23, 2010. PET is an institution independent but not separate from the judicial department. Legarda v. De Castro 542 SCRA, 125: The justices of the Supreme Court are triers of facts when they participate in the conduct of an election contest involving candidates for president and vice president. This allows the party in the election contest to raise any other issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because in this case, the Court now exercises its power of judicial review. Issues that may be resolved by the PET in an election contest: 34 | P a g e
1. election 2. returns 3. qualifications H. Judicial Privilege Protection from any statement made during judicial proceedings that is given to each attorney, judge, juror, litigant party, or witness who are a part of said legal proceedings. (Black’s Dictionary) VII. The Constitutional Commissions A. Common Provisions READ the common qualifications, disqualifications and tenure of office B. Civil Service Commission with Law on Public Officers 1. Composition and qualification of Commissions (Art. IX, B, Sec. 1(1), Art. VII, Sec. 13, par. 2) 2. Appointment and term of office of Commission (Art. IX, B, Sec. 1(2)) 3. Appointment of personnel of CSC (Art. IX, A, Sec. 4) 4. Salary (Art.IX, A, Sec. 3 and Art. XVIII, Sec. 17 ) 5. Disqualification (Art. IX, A, Sec. 2) 6. Removal by Impeachment (Art. XI, Sec. 2) Functions of the CSC (Art. IX, B, Sec.3, Art. IX, A, Sections 7 and 8) Scope of the civil service (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2(1)) Terms and conditions of employment in the civil s ervice (1) Oath of allegiance to the Constitution (Art. IX, B, sec. 4 and Art. XI, Sec. 18 ) (2) Merit system (a) Appointment of lame ducks (Art. IX, B, Sec. 6) (b) Appointment or designed of elective and appointive officials (Art. IX, B, Sec. 7. Art. VII, Sec. 13 and Art. VI, Sec. 13) (3) Standardization of pay and ban on double compensation (Art. IX, B, Sec. 5, Sec. 8) (a) Ban on partisan political activities (Art. IX, B, Sec.2(4)) (b) Removal or suspension only for cause (Art. IX, B, Sec. (3)) (c) Summary removal (d) Right of self-organization (Art, III, Sec. 8, Art. IX, Sec.2(5) 7. Review of decision of the CSC (Art. IX, A, Sec. 7) 8. Fiscal independence (Art. IX, A, Sec. 5) 2. Types of public officers: appointive (except for confidential appointees, must comply with CSC standard qualifications); and elective (derives position by direct mandate of the people. 3. QUALITIES (RILE) must serve with utmost RESPONSIBILITY, INTEGRITY, LOYALTY and EFFICIENCY; act with patriotism and justice and lead modest life. General Rule: A public servant may only be removed for cause. Every appointment is based on merit and fitness. Other pertinent rules governing public officers: 4. Midnight Appointments: A President or Acting President is prohibited from making appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term. (Art. VII, Sec. 15, Constitution) Exception: Temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. 5. Three fold liability of a public officer: civil liability, criminal liability and administrative liability 6. Preventive suspension is not a penalty but is mean to safeguard the integrity of the administrative investigation. There is no compensation given during this period of suspension. 7. Effects on resolution of cases on public officers: When a public officer is suspended pending appeal, he is entitled to compensation for the period of suspension if he is found innocent. If a public officer is illegally removed, he may be reinstated. If there was bad faith or malice, the superior who caused such illegal removal will be held personally accountable for the back salaries of subject employee. The award of backwages is limited to a maximum period of five years. (David v. Gania, 2003)
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8. Official immunity is not absolute; serves to protect the public officer in the discharge of his responsibilities; serves as a protective aegis for public officials from tort liability for damages on account of his responsibilities. 9. De jure and de facto officers, distinguished: elements of i n determining is one is a de facto
officer: 1. There must be a de jure office\ 2. Color of right or general acquiescence by the public 3. Actual physical possession of the office in good faith 10. Quo Warranto – normally brought in cases involving public officers, both elective and appointive, as to which party has a right or title to the office. 11. Sandiganbayan (Art. XI, Sec. 4) People v. L uis Morales, G.R. No. 166355, May 30, 2011. A private corporation is beyond the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. 12. Ombudsman 1. Composition (Art. XI, Sec. 5) 2. Qualification (Art. XI, Sec. 8) 3. Appointment and term (Art. XI, Sections 8 and 11) 4. Rank and Salary (Art. XI, Sec. 10) 5. Disqualifications (Art.XI, Sec. 8, Art. IX, A, Sec. 2) 6. Jurisdiction (Art. XI, Sec. 12) (102) Office of the Ombudsman v. CSC 451 SCRA 570 7. Powers and functions (Art. XI, Sec. 13) 8. Fiscal autonomy (Art. XI, Sec. 14) 9. Appointment of personnel (Art. XI, Sec. 6)
E milio A. Gonzales I I I v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, J r., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014: The Court said that the Ombudsman is vested with broad investigative and disciplinary powers. These powers include the scrutiny of all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. Under
Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to b e the “protector of the people” against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses, and excesses of the bureaucracy. As the Ombudsman is expected to be an ”activist watchman”, the Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by R.A. No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution. Office of the Special Prosecutor (Art. XI, Sec. 7) Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014. In recognition of the importance of the office of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, Congress made the Office of the S pecial Prosecutor as an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman. It also granted the Ombudsman control and supervision over that office. This power of control and supervision includes vesting the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor as he or she may deem fit. Even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a differential treatment between the Ombudsman’s Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other. What s i true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents o f the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
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Composition and qualification of Commissioners (Art. IX C, Sec.1 (1), Art. VII, Sec. 13, par. 2) Appointment and term of office of Commissioners (Art. IX, C, Sec. 1 (2)) Appointment of personnel (Art. IX, A, Sec. 4) Powers and Functions of the COMELEC (Art. IX, C, Sec.2) Enforce election laws (Art. IX, C, Sec.2 (1), Se c. 10) Decide administrative question pertaining to elections, except the right to vote (Art. IX, sec. 2(3)) File Petition for inclusion or exclusion of voters (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2(6)) Prosecute election law violators (Art. IX, C. Sec. 2(6)) Recommend pardon, parole or suspension of sentence of election, except the right to vote (Art. IX, C, Sec. 5) Deputize law enforcement agents and recommend their removal (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2(4), Sec. 2(8)) REGISTRATION of political parties, organizations, and coalitions and ACCREDITATION of citizens’ arms (Art. XI, C, Sec. 2(5)) Registration under the party-list system ( Art.IX, C, Sections 6, 7 and 8 and Art.VI, Sec. 5(2), Art. XVIII, Sec. 7) Regulation of Public utilities and media of information (Art. IX, C, S ec. 4, Sec. 9) Decide election contests and cases (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2(2) Sec. 3) Rule-making (Art. IX, A, Sec. 6) Other functions (Art. IX, A, Sec. 8) Act as National Board of Canvassers for Senators Review of COMELEC decisions, orders, and resolutions (Art. IX, A, Sec.7 ) Fiscal autonomy (Art. IX, A, Sec. 5) BANAT V. COMELEC, 592 SCRA 294: The Constitution provides that Congress shall not have more than 250 members unless Congress provides otherwise and out of the total number of incumbent members not more than 20% shall come from the party list. Of the party list members, each party list shall be entitled to a maximum of three seats. Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, G. R. No, 190852, April 8, 2010: Accreditation is done solely by COMELEC. The Court said that under the country’s system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad , and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The Court said that the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. Thus it held: “To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equallyqualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.” 37 | P a g e
Note: In a later decision penned by Chief Justice Sereno, the Court qualified who may accredited as a party list in the sense the same is no longer limited to the marginalized sector; and a party list which does not meet the 10% vote will lose its accreditation. Macquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013, supra D. Commission on Audit with public accountability in so far as public funds are concerned Composition and qualifications (Art. IX, D, Sec. 1(1), Art. VII, Sec. 13, par. 2) Appointment and term of Commissioners (Art. IX, D, Sec. 1(2)) Appointment of COA personnel (Art. IX, A, Sec. 4) Power and functions (Art. IX, D, Sec. 2, Sec. 3, Art. VI, Sec. 20) DBP v. COA, 373 SCRA 356: A government entity may engage the services of a private auditing firm if the said government entity’s funds consist of loan proceeds from an international funding agency like the World Bank. Such loan agreement shall be governed by the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties and that may include the audit of funds by an external auditor other the COA. (You may relate this also to the provision on adoption of generally accepted principles in International Law). Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010. COA is the guardian of public funds. COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COA’s vital constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective. E. Prohibited Offices and Interests Disqualifications (Art. IX, A, Sec. 2): not to hold an y other office or employment, no practice of profession; nor active management or control of business in conflict with functions of his office, no direct or indirect financial interest in any contract or franchise granted by government. F. Jurisdiction of Each Commission 1. Civil Service Commission: Sec. 3, Art. IX B 2. Commission on Elections: Sec. 3, Art. IX C 3. Commission on Audit: Sec. 2, Art. IX D E. Review of Final Orders, Resolutions and Decisions: (Art. IX, A, Sec. 7) F. Removal by Impeachment (Art. XI, Sec. 2)
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