Andrew Strathern-Body Thoughts

Body Thoughts

Body Thoughts

Body Thughts

Andrew J. Strathern

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Coyright by the University of Michigan 1996 Al rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America < Printed on acidfree aer 2004

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No art of this publication ay be reproduced stored in a retrieval syste, or tansmitted in any form or by any means electronic mechanial or otherwise without the wrien ermission of the ublisher A CIP

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Library of Congress CataoginginPublication Data trathern Andrew. od thoughts I Andre J Stathen. . m. ncludes bibliograhical references (. ) and index. ISBN 47209580-3 (hardcover: alk. aer) .  SBN 047206580-7 (bk. : alk. aer 1 Body HumanSocial asects. 2. Mnd and body. 3· Ehnology Meanesia. 4 Ehnology. . Ttle. G298.77 1996 9616550 36.4dc20 CIP

Acknowledgments

In 198, when I came to the University of Pittsburgh, I decided to begin teaching medical anthropology. My interest in this branch of anthropology grew initially out of my experiences during fieldwork for many years in Papua New Guinea and soon broadened into general questions of mindbody relations. Subsequently, I added a course on the anthropology of the body, and from this in turn came, in 1992, the idea for the present book. For friendly help in geting he original short proposal accepted by the University of Michigan Press, I wish to thank in particular Joyce Harrison (now with the University of South Carolina Press) and Professors Roy Rappapot and Raymond Kelly of the University of Michigan. Preparation of the book itself has been in various ways facilitated by Thomas Mullane, Kata Chillag, David Hudgens, and Abby Margolis, who have (by courtesy of the Dean's Office, Faculty of Arts and Sciences) worked for me successively as graduate student assistants at the University of Pittsburgh. The final version of he manuscript has benefited also from discussions in my Anhropology of the Body class in the fall of 1994, in which Jill Thomas Grannan, Satsuki Kawano, Joan Leach, Abby Margolis, Lisa Murphy, Tamiko Noll, Jo Recht, and John Traphagan took part. For discussions on the Duna materials I acknowledge the inpu of Dr. Gabriele Strzenhofecker; and for views on the theme of chapter 7, I am indebted to Dr. Caryle Gl osser and also to participants at the 1 994 ASA conference, "Questions of Consciousness,  held in St. Andrews, Scotland. A version of this chapter is also published by Routledge in the ASA series of monographs edited by Anthony Cohen and Nigel Rapport, 1995 . I thank also Patty Zogran, as usual, for her indefatigable work in typing and checking manuscript drafs and Dr. Pamela Stewart for help with final proofreading and indexing. The completed manuscript itself also received a most perceptive review from the anonymous reader for the University of Michigan

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Acknowledgments

Press. Indeed, in contradistinction to my experience on many other occasions, I found myself in close agreement wth the readers suggestions and lists of the books shortcomings. I have tried briefly to respond to many of these comments but, regretfully, had to recognize that to meet all of them propery would mean prolonging the enterprise unduly I wish to acknowledge here, however, some of the gaps in my exposition: feminist theorizing on and the efflorescence of an interest in "the body the work of Foucault, particularly his History of Sexuality, and sexuality in general a proper appreciation and critique of Freud and Lacan, rather than my passing references here and a full discus sion of theories of magic from Hubert and Mauss through Malinowski, Leach, and Tambiah. Answering to the call of such topics properly would have meant, I fear, the addition of four more chapters, and this did not seem practicable (some are dealt with in Chris Shillings book The Body and Social Theory). I therefore have committed the book to publication, while recognizing fully that its topic is almost indefinitely capable of expansion and any closure in the treatment of it is purely pragmatic and provisional.

Contents

Introduction

1

Chapter 1 The Social Body: Mauss o Douglas

9

2 Habit or Habitus? Theories of Memory, the Body, and Change 3 Mind, Body, and Soul 4

The Becoming Body

5 The Threatened Body

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6 The Biomedical Body: Configurations of Science and Gender

139

 Trance and Healing

153

8 Embodimen

1 77

References

205

Index

21

Introduction

This bk takes its inspiratin frm an essay that uicly established itself as a classic in its field: "The Mindful Bdy by Margaret Lck and Nancy ScheperHughes (8) . My cncern is t push the implicatins f that essay int ethngraphic and tpical areas in which it can serve t reilluminate issues t d with cncepts f health and illness persnhd and agency and with prcesses f change in scicultural systems. Philsphical histrical anthrplgical and linguistic threads have t be wven tgether t make such a study. In Western intellectual discurse discussin f the prblems raised by Lck and ScheperHughes has ften cited the wrk and influence f the French philspher Ren Descartes via his pstulate f the abslute difference in kind between the sul (r "mind but see belw n this euatin) and the bdy. While this is an advantageus perspective frm the pint f view f Eurpean intellectual histry and therefre is als imprtant as a means f understanding hw schlars wrking within the varius Eurpean traditins have themselves apprached the cncepts f a range f wrld cultures, it is necessary t recgnize that in ther ways starting frm the Cartesian paradigm is arbitrary bth histrically and crssculturally Indeed the majr reasn fr beginning differently is precisely that it can enable us t reject the Cartesian view fr Eurpean cultures as well as fr many thers acrss the glbe. Such a purpse in fact underlay Lck and ScheperHughes's enterprise als. Their cncern was t retherize mindbdy relatins in such a way as t ighlight the cncept f the bdy itself. This strategic tack has been fllwed by many thers subseuently t the extent that the term embodimen has reached the status f a majr cncept in cultural analysis (e.g. Csrdas  ). Yet as bth the term embodimen and Lck and ScheperHughes's wn title indicate it is nt enugh t switch frm ne side f the Cartesian dichtmy (i.e. mind) t the ther (i.e.

2

Bdy Thughts

bdy) while leaving unuestined the dichtmy itself. It is precisely the frm f this dichtmy that has een cntested and replaced implicitly r explicitly with cncepts that stress cr ssver r interpenetratin f putative mental and bdily characteristics, adding up t varius frms f ttality that express ideas similar t thse enc apsulated in earlier scilgical terms such as the idividual r the perso What, therefre, is gained by the use f a new terminlgy in which embodimet becmes central? It is simply tha by this means we are reminded frcibly f a basic and ramifying feature f the human cnditin. Terms such as idividual r perso tend t have an abstract ring r reference, benging t plitica and scial philsphies that have t d with rights, identities, and tendencies f will r selfdefinitin that are psychgically r legally based. Embodimet, by cntrast, reminds us f the cncrete, the hereandnw presence f peple t ne anther, and the full cmplement f senses and feelings thrugh which they cmmunicate with ne anther (see Seremetakis 4). In the spirit f hlism, which they have restimulated in scial thinking, Lck and ScheperHughes begin " rm an assumptin f the bdy as simultaneusly a physical and symblic artifact, as bth naturally and culurally prduced, and as securey anchred in a particular histrical mment (8, ). We have t cnsider here what is meant by "simultaneusly. Essentialy, they are arguing that the bdy is a discrete entity that nevertheless carries separate meanings and aspects. It therefre becmes f interest t knw nt nly what these separate aspects are but als, and perhps mre crucially, hw they are related t r influence ne anther. They themselves distinguish "three bd ies, by which they mean three semantic realms f representatin and practice that use the image f the physical bdy as their lcus f reference. The three bdies are the inividual bdy, r the experiencing bdy in he phenmenlgical sense; the scial bdy, in the sense used earlier by Mary Duglas, referring t he use f bdy imagery as a means  picturing scial relatins; and the "bdy pitic, referring t the regulatin f physical bdies by plitical and legal means (8, 8). It is clear that their list can be expanded  r further cmpressed in accrdance with heuristic needs. he scial by verlaps with the plitical in a symblic sense, since sciety always has cercive and therefre pliticlegal aspects, and the practical effects f influence are alays felt utimately by the experiencing bdy f the individual. Skin

Intrductin

3

ttts, fr mp, r ft r princd in  crtin wy ty my rprsnt sci vus; nd ty my b rstrictd t, r njind n,  crtin sci css r ctgry (s  3). Mrvr, t bdy is "mindfu t  tr f ts vs, nd tr cn b supprt, s w s intrfrnc, btwn thm. But wt is mnt by sying tht t bdy is mindful? T sttmnt pprs t b  prgism if w tink ng Crtsin ins. Crtinly, w cn intrprt it s suggsting tt t mind infuncs t bdy, but tis wud b t rinstitut t Crtsin dictmy. Rtr, wt is bing ssrtd r is tt t bsic cncpts f rity tt w v bn ccustmd t wrking wit, spciy in Wstrnsty bimdicin, must b rthught. Sinc Dscrts cnsidrd tht t su/mind hd n physic tnsin (res non extensa) yt pssssd t cpcity t tink (res cogitans) wi t bdy d pysic tnsin but n cpcity t tink, it is vidnt tht  st up  rm f t pysic, r mtril, tt cud b pprndd bjctivly s  "ting nd studid by t trnscndnt cpcitis f t su/ mind. T ttr, wvr, rmins mystrius in is usg, sinc it cnnt b dircty bsrvd. Ony t pysic, in tis sns, bcms bt r nd bsrvb nd tus bcms s t prpr prvnnc f scinc. Obsrvbl rity bcms pury mtri, nd hnc thr is  strss n t primt mtri cuss f tings, incuding cnditins f sicknss. Suc  md f tugt is muc dr tn Dscrts, f curs. Lck nd ScprHugs cit t Grk Hippcrtic trditin f mdicin nd t wrk f th pilspr Aristtl s bnging t t mtriist prsusin wit rgrd t sicknss nd t "su (psc) Dscrtss rrngmnt f cncpts, wvr, ws uit diffrnt frm Aristts. Wrs Aristt cncrtizd t su (in lin wit rir frms f Grk ppur tugt s Onins 54 Pd  2]) , Dscrts prsrvd t su fr tgy nd t bdy fr scinc (Lck nd SchprHughs 8, g), tus ntly kping  ft in bt cmps in ccrdnc wit is wn psitin s  Cthic. As bigy nd bimdicin dvpd, ty tndd, trfr, t v ut th mnt spct f smtic stts. A prblm ws thrby crtd fr t undrstnding f phnmn cssifid s "mnt inss. Suc pnmn cud nt b studid dircty if ty wr "mnt Yt ty wr ccmpnid by bd ily stts tt wr indubitby "tr. Th cnundrum f mnt ilnss is, in fct, simpy n rtifct f wt w my c th Crtsin

4

Bdy Thughts

cmprmise between the impulses tward religin and science. Once we recgnize that there is a mental cmpnent in all bdily states and cnversely a physical cmpent in all mental states the bundary between mental and ther illnesses disappears . Here then is a benefit t be derived frm the idea f the mindful bdy. As Genevieve Llyd (84) has argued there is als an implicit gender cmpnent in Eurpean philsphical thught regarding the mind and te bdy "Mind has smetimes been euaed wi te male sphere f reasn and culture and "bdy with the female sphere f emtins and nature the frmer clearly represented as superir t the latter (see als MacCrmack and Strathern 8; Schiebinger 3). Such a cnflatin f categries is unlikey t have resulted purely frm the thughts f philsphers themselves. Rather it is likely t have derived frm prevailing ppular r religius idelgies that fund their way int the thughts f philsphers either cnsciusly r uncnsciusy. Descartes himself makes n such explicit crrelatins but his extreme separatin f te sul frm the bdy made it pssible nt nly t islae the sphere f reasn and the intellect frm the sphere f practical embdied life but als t exaggerate the malefemale dichtmy that was grafted nt this dchtmy f mind and bdy. It is imprtant t nte at nce that this act f idelgical grafting is ne that is culturally specific and nt necessarily universal altugh it may have widespread analgies in ther cultures. The effect hwever f suc an idegical structure f thught can still be bserved n ppular EurAmerican culture in which fr example the expressin f emtins may be seen as apprpriate nly t femaes (and then n always) while males are represented as ratinal and are expected t maintain "a stiff upper lip (Lutz 88). Descartes accrding t Llyd drew sme f his inspiratin frm lat whse views als idealized pure and rarefied thught as the surce f true knwledge (epism) (Llyd 84 4). This kind f thery f knwledge als tends t unite reigin and science. Descartes fr example cnsidered that the intellect is the part that unites man t Gd althugh Gd is suppsed t have created bth mind (r sul) and bdy "in his wn image (see Hansn ). By anther twist emptying the bdy f all vestiges f the sul freed scientists t examine he bdy physically as a thing thus facilitatig he grwth f experimental bilgy. By the same tken hwever Descartes's dichtmy

Intrductin

5

might imply a ban n any attempt t "investigate the sul by empiri cal methds. Descartess wn enterprise was a cmplex ne, selectively cited in later times as a ustificatin fr furter enterprises f a thelgical, philsphical, r scientific kind. His wrk became in the anthrplgical sense a funding charter fr bimedical practice and thery At the same time it preserved a hierarchy f mind ver matter tat was essen tially tecentric. His idea tat the sul des nt have a physical exten sin saves the cncept f the sul frm any attempts t study it by physical means and thus makes it a secure bect fr cntemplatin by thught alne. Where he derived this ntin frm is perhaps hard t say, since in mst religius systems the sul is given sme physical existence, hwever ethereal. Similarly, his ambiguus cnflatin f sul with mind is ne that cannt be exactly paralle led in Germanic and Englishspeaking traditins f thught but belngs, instead, t the Frenc language and its apparent identificatin f me (frm Latin anima) wit esprit (frm Latin spiritus) (see, hwever, arkin 85, 4). Cmmentatrs wh ignre differences f meaning in this semantic arena between different Eurpean languages run the risk f blurring the issues invlved. A prblem fr Descartes, as fr all Cartesianists subseuently, is hw t accunt fr the intermingling f mind and bdy, given their abslute difference and separatin. In sme fashin Descartes gave the sul/mind an ethnlcatin within the head, since he cnsidered that the pint f interactin between sul and bdy was the pineal gland. This small gesture tward physicalizatin culd have led t a mre thrughging recgnitin r investigatin f these links as is nw cnducted under the rubric, fr example, f psychneurimmunlgy, but fr Descartes the gesture was sufficient. He des nt seem t have been interested in fllwing it up, peraps fr the gd reasn that t d s wuld have undermined his whle a priri psitin. In medical anthrplgy Descartes has becme negatively significant fr example, in Lck and ScheperHughess narrative, as the surce fr the mechanisticmaterialistic backgrund t bimedicine Whether this crrespnds histrically t his wn exact aims is anther mater. It is with te intervening trajectry f histry that medical anthrplgists have had t cntend and, i te curse f ding s, t recreate the anthrplgy f the bdy alng the lines argued fr by

6

By Tu

Lck an SceperHue. In a cllecin enile Giving he Body Is Due Alber A. Jnne a aken up e caue by reenerin e crrepndence beween ecarte an Prince liabe f Bemia (Jntne 12 16 ff.. Jnne furter equae e ul wi e "ef a mve a i penially cnfuin alu i may be neceary fr i arumen. Hi main purpe wever i  arue a liabe wa ri in er quein  ecare an a if e a anwere em prperly e wul ave remaine mre cnien wi i wn rainal epiemic value. Jnne aim i u  urn ecare upie wn. iabe ake ecare w e ul can ac n e by ince i lack e prperie by wic ne by ac n aner. Se furer pinte u a bily maer uc a emin  apparenly affec te ul abiliy  enae in clear reflecin. e bai f er quein i u er wn inrpecin. In reply ecare uee a e unin f bdy an ul accun fr e imainain and u e effec f rublin u n e ul ielf. Bu i preuppe exacly wa liabet wa queinin. Se wa in fac uein a emin r feelin ave an effect n e ul perap al alluin  earlier view abu e divie ul (Lly 184 1 8 . I wa preciely i view a ecare wn ceme wa eine  replace ye i anwer t liabe bjecin were n very cnvincin. Jnne e n  arue a e "fel by i a penmenlical bai fr e knwlede f neelf a a bein a exi an at i knwlede i ifferent frm ecarte cit principle. Prbably i i wy nne equae ul wi elf. In fac e if ere frm ecare "lanuae ame  i wn. ecare ul i nt e elf a repreened in penmenlical pilpy. I i mre like a prin r reflecin f e ivine inellec an iea a a n place in penmenly a uc. Given wever a Jnne wie eenially  ubver ecarte cncep wi i wn an t bae i mve n e iea f e fel by i arumen i bviuly impran fr u ere. Neain e tecnical arumen f Sarre an MerleauPny n i  pic (Jnne 1 2 2425 e urn  i wn inrpecin a liabe f Bemia al eem  ave ne believin a i ca be purifie frm i culural ine (26 a prpiin a an anrpli wul find unneceary a well a ubful ince e "inie a ne "lk int i al culturally cnructe. He ne a ecare lcae me feelin uc a jy and aner wiin e ul an n in e

Inrucin

7

by (a curiu fac in ielf iven ecare verall aim f preervin a realm f pure inellec . In ecare wn ceme en i i ar  ee w uc feelin wul relae  e by. Ye a Jnne pin u we experience emin in e by: "ne invariably fin me mificain f ne fel by a ame by in wic are lcae ne pain ne uner an ne feelin f warm (28 . In makin i bervain Jne i cerainly fllwin in e fep f bervainal pyili (e.. annn 132 an i arumen i preumably ri in erm f i wn experience al. He i prbably n le rn run wen e rejec cncluin frm an experimenal finin a e eminal enr f a cial ccain influence ubjec injece wi epineprine (a imulan in reprin eier aner r eupria (30. Jnne ppe i inerpreain f e experimen ince i wul ue a e experience f emin i cnexualie by even uie f e inrpecive elf an u a ere i a cial r culural imenin  e experience. Aain fr e anrpli uc a finin pe n rea; inee i i an eenial arin pin. Wa we call "emin are culurally laen cncep as well as eeply fel bily ae. Tere i ere a cnjuncin f e cial an e pernal wic i i par f ur ckinrae  uy (ee Baalia 15. Wi e inrucin f ee cial r culural elemen I will nw urn back frm pilpy  e ream f anrplical eriin abu e by bu e pilpical backrun mu alway be kep in min a relevan. Ti cnjuncin beween anrply an pilpy i marke well al by Marare Lck in er laer impran urvey aricle "uivain e By: Anrply an piemlie f Bily Pracice an Knwlee (13. Lck aricle prvie a biblirapic backrun  e paricular prjec n wic I embark ere. Se icue e iry f apprace  e cial an culural cnrucin f e by /bie in anrplical analye epecially in meical anrply (ee al Feaerne Hepwr an Turner 11. One pin e make wever i epecially relevan: a an anrply f e by mu inclue a ery f e emin an e fir ep war uc a ery i  recnie w arbirary e areian eparain beween "rean an "emin i. iin e wrk f e meical anrpli Gilber Lewi (180 an e culural anrpli Micelle Ral (184 e inicae a "emin ineviably invlve b meanin an feelin

8

By u

an "u emin cann imply be capure a eier cniie juemen r iceral reacin (Lck 13 13. Hence Ral erm embodied hough, wic a ien rie  my ile ere Bod Thoughts. Lck aricle can be rea in cnjuncin b wi i inrucin an wi my cncluin in caper 8. Ye i i inerein  a  e wellbae cnruciim f er apprac eience frm recen uie f e uman brain ielf wic inicae a e neural paway f e brain implicae eer wa we label a emin an rainal u in paricular ia e amyala Wrk by Anni amai (14 a been prminen ere an amai a explicily uneraken  arue a ecare wa wrn  aciae rean wi e brain an emin wi e by ince e by ielf elfper ceie in e brain i acually e bai f wa we experience a min (n neural ne ee al Klyn an Keni 12. I i inerein  realie a ee ae finin by neurpyili wul be fun unurpriin by many peple arun e wrl w knw nin abu neurpyily bu in we wn culural cncep emin an rean are clely linke (e Wikan 10 n Bali. Wi i pin in min I nw bein  rerace e ep f cn rucii eri f e by arin wi Marcel Mau an min  Mary ula

Chapter

1

The Social Body: Mauss to Douglas

In w blly cnruce wrk e Brii cial anrpli Mary ula rew eer many ren implici in e wriin f Frenc aur frm mile urkeim an i nepew Marcel Mau nwar (ee Furnier 994 226 in rer  evelp er wn ynei f iea rearin e by plli ab cial caerie an e urce f riual ymblim (ula 970 [966] 984 ula a been a rue urkeimian in er baic rienain wiin anrply. Se ake eriuly e prpiin a caerie f u are cially erive an a eir explanain i  be u in eluciain e cial cniin frm wic ey prin. If we accep i prpiin realy cnee a i a been i fllw a caeriain a urrun an efine e by mu ave a cial riin.  arue i i e revere f e familiar prpiin a e by a meime been aken in an ranic anay a e imae r mel f ciey (ence prae uc a "e by pliic Alernaively wiu ainin caual pririie we can uy w imae f e by are mappe n ciey an vice vera. urkeim wa imelf larely cncerne wi eabliin an empirical uy f cial fac (reain em a "in [] an wi aruin f e cial riin f wieprea penmena uc a reliin (urkeim [92] 968 Mau wa mre cncerne an urkeim wi e quein f e by an e preerve al a irical r evluinary viewpin wiin i wriin w f i laer wrk are paricularly inifican in relain  e by: i eay n "e nin f pern (938 an n "e ecnique f e by (93 Mau imelf e n appear  ave yneie ee w eparae kece f e pic invlve alu ra (990 uin e  f embimen a ubequenly aempe an exer

0

Boy houghts

cise along such line he essay on the ody is a straightforward emonstration of the effect o social rules and conditioning on the physical oies of iniviuals a theme that resonates mos clearly with the useuent work of Michel Foucault (e g  Foucault  979 It fits also with the etaile observations of other anthropologist for example Malinowskis remark that sexual practice among the robrianders of Papua ew Guinea had their own specific form and the same argument ha fe into the work of Pierre Bourieu and Paul onnerton on memory and social condiioning (ee chap 2 his piece y Mauss therefore is clearly cononant wit aspects of contemporary thinking aout the ody Its referent i the phyical ody itself as molded y society and culture he esay on the person which ha een more favored by commentators in the past has a more indirect ut still important relationship to the topic of the ody a a site for the expresion of social personhood or individuality he isue of individuality is one that must e ealt with separately Maus takes an evolutionary stanpoint arguing that notions of individuality emerged only in the course of uropean history out of earlier concept of personnage (role or character as well as the primordial concept of the sel (le moi")  wich he acknowl edged to e universal (Mauss 98 3; trans W  Halls in arrithers et al 98 For the most part Maus in fac concentrates on the iea of personnage in a range of preindustrial socieie linking this with the practice of asigning limited et of names to people elonging to dif ferent clans hese names are een y him as defining roles whoe overall purpose is to act out "the prefigure totality of the life of the clan (  The individual appear only as te bearer an transmitter of one of these roles and of the ritual powers associated with them an achieved trough spirit possession Personnage becomes transmute in Roman law into ersona, a legal entity to whic however certain ritual masks (ie persona in the original sene migt elong The legal reference of the term can e seen in the fact hat laves id not possess it: servus non haet personam ( 7 Mauss goes on to argue that further alteration came aout with hristianity in which the legal concept of "persona was ranformed theoretically into a universal idea of the "human person It is this hristian iea it appears that i sometimes used y suseuent writers o make a contras between "Western thought and that of trial soci etie (see Burridge 979 Finally Maus notes that the idea of the

he Social Body



huan person as a psychological eng wthin socety is a stll later elaoration In one of the arupt transitions that characterie his wideranging work he switches nto dscussion of the work of philosophers and creits Spinoa Hue Kant an finally Fichte with eveloping a concept of the self (mi) his concept could function as the asis of consciousness reason an ethcs an hence ecame the source of political philosophies such as were proulgate y hoas Paine and fed nto the eclaration of Inependence of the frst thirteen states of the United States of erica Glancingly Mauss refers this development also to theoriing regarding the soul ut gves only fleetng notice in this context to escartes awarding nstead his accolade to Spinoa for pursuing the ethical diension of discussion regarding the soul Here as elsewhere Mauss sees to ove too swiftly over rough groun He introduces an ea of the self as priorial only to aanon it and reeerge at the end of his iscussion with the same iea now given an apparently new eaning nd he rngs in the matter of the soul an ts iortality only in the final part of his inuiry instead of asking whether t too has relevance for the definiton of the self in all of the societies he surveys evertheless in road ters his essage is clear: eas of the self an the person are socially constructe an vary historically a process he tends to treat as progressive or evolutionary in soe sense ick llen in his comentary on Mausss essay points out that we nee not overstress this evolutionary thread in Mausss thought (llen 985 2729 ut that Mausss concern whether evolutionary in any unilneal sense or otherwise was with concepts as they operate in the "legal and oral spheres (drit et mrale) (29 an also as parts of social totalities for which Mauss was ulding up a odel llen also notes that this oel ay have een in a sense a irage since ts full euivalent in ethnographic fact ay not e foun (4  For our purposes here it is more iportant to seek out the analytical connections etween Mausss discussions of the person and of odily techniues he linking concept in fact is foun in the latter essay in which he writes (as translate y Ben Brewster [Mauss  979  0 ] on the term haitus, after discoursing on different patterns of swiing arching and running: Hence I have had this notion of the social nature of the haitus for any years Please note that I use the Latin wordit should e

2

Boy Thoughts unerstoo in France The wor translates infinitely bet ter than habitude habit or custom the "exis [shoul be hexis], the "acuire ability and "faculty of ristotle who was a psycholo gist It oes not esignate those metaphysical habitudes, that mysterious "memory

Mauss attributes variations in habitus in this sense to the "work of coective and iiviual practical eason ather tha to "merey the soul and its repetitive faculties ibi That is he sees habitus as his toricaly variable rather than universalin other wors as the embo iment of cultural ifference encoe in eucation It is in a way remark abe that he introuces the concept in this way without reference to concepts of person / self since one of the obvious ways in which these latter are constructe is precisey in terms of boily habitus. Ieas of this kind were not peculiar to Mauss or to French traitions of thought either since they are to be ound also in the writings of the German ethnologist Richar Thurnwal in his book Banaro Society, first publishe in 96  The institutions of the social organiation dominate the inivi ual o such a egree that his actions become almost automatic a are generally no more consiere than is his gait or the fingers of a good piano player This automatiation of our thinking an the prearrangement of our personal behavior by formalities saves energies an facilitates the conscious process in the reciprocal relations Thurnwal 96 390 This uotation aso gives us one clue why Mauss himself i not link habitus with personne. Habitus calls to min the unconscious an personne the conscious aspects of ourselves an Mauss was intereste in tracing the history of ieas about consciousness among other things in his essay on the person For a full theoretical perspective however we nee to juxtapose habitus with more consciously eveope elements o personality especially since Mauss insists that habitus is learne not natural as in he traitional way of waking called onioni, taught by Maori mothers to their aughters Mauss 979 02 In this example the teaching an learning are at first fully conscious It is only afterward that the learne pattern becomes an unconscious part of boily routines

The Socal Body

3

The rest of Mausss discussio s largely take up with further example of leared form of habitus. There is however an elegant overall formulation that sums up hs tartng poit ad has ecome a startig point for others such as Mary ougla ( 970: The ody is mas frst ad most atural trument Or more accurately ot to speak of nstrumets mas first a most atural techical oject and at the same time techcal means is hs ody (Mauss 979 04 auss extends this fudametal oservatio ito the sphere of theoiig aout magic Here he wrte that "technical acton phycal actio magcoreligous acto are cofused for the actor (979 03 Whether we say that there s "cofuson here or simply "fusio is moot ut  ay case t s the emoded actioorieted apect of magcal technues that  highlghted Words and movemets act out desired eds In oe example from a old accout of a ustralia origial huntng rtual a hunter carries a piece of magcal rock crystal in hi mouth ad chants a formula a he clms a tree  order to dislodge a possum that he s hutg s Maus pots out the magcal actio i also a part of a practical ad cocurret odily movemet ad cotrutes in fact to the effcacy of that movemet Thi emoded charactertic of magc s therefore cetral to our uderstadig of magc a a total practice auss oervatons o odly techiues therefore fa out  a umer of directons relevat to the athropology of the ody overall ad I return to some of them i the ext chapter Here I move o to the wok of Mary ouglas whch s predcated oth o fudametal urkheimia propostos that alo permeate Mauss work and specifically o the idea of the ody as a atural ymol similar to au pcture of it a mas "irt and most natural instrumet  It i  her econd work o the theme o f the ody Natural Symbols (970 that ouglas most explicitly follows Mauss pointers aleit with her ow twts I other seses however Purity and Danger is oth intellectually and chroologically pror ad should e dicussed frt The ody a a natural symol i fact appears early on  Purity and Danger (heceforth PD) ut in a astract tellectualst way that  remiscet also of LvStrauss: "The ody is a model which ca stand for any kd of ouded system (ouglas [ 966] 984 5 The

Body houghts urkheimian movement of her thought is shown immediately after this uotation when she writes that we cannot possily intepret rituals concerning excreta reast milk saliva and the rest unless we are prepared to see in the ody a symol of society and to see the powers and dangers credited to social structure reproduced in small on the human ody (iid Part of her reason for asserting this viewpoint is to oppose psychological reductionism as Mauss also did especially the version of psychology that compares the cultural practices of socalled primitive peoples with those of deviant individuals in uropean societies A example of theoriing of this kind that she correctly ridicules is the idea that among primitive peoples the ego is weakly developed and infantile wishes are still expressed in adulthood so that "archaic man retains the magic ody of infancy (  7; uoting Noman 0. Brown ouglas replaces this form of reductionism with her own ukheimian rand of sociological determinism when she argues that it is in the form of social practices and the symolism of oundaries associated with these that the explanation of particular ideas aout the ody are to e found She uses this standpoint in a good cause when criticiing psychological interpretations that depend on the euation "primitive man = child.  For example she argues that odily symols may e used in an adult and serious way to confont prolems of separation and loss in social life as in funeral rituals in which people as mourners first take onto their odies forms of ruish or dirt and then cleanse themselves (ouglas [ 966]  984  2  7677 on the yakyusa people Bodily exuviae may also e used as vehicles of political power as when fluids from the corpse of a ueen among the Lovedu people of the rakenserg mountains in South frica are used y the successor ueen to control the weather y magical means ( 20 hese are valid examples although it is possile to argue along Freudian lines that all these practices while owing their specific content to cultural traditions may take their genesis from intrapsychic processes ouglass own purpose with these examples is to home in on one of her cental prolems: "Why should odily margins e thought to e specially invested with power and danger? Her answer is that since the cultural concern (in the sense o f sets of symolic meanings with such margins is variale the causes of sym

he Social Boy olis are to e foun in society ie processes an social relations realize in practice: we shoul procee "from the known dangers of sociey to the known selection of oily themes and try to recognize what appositeness is there (ouglas [966] 984 2 It i s worthwhile to notice here exactly what the focus is It is on margins rather than total sets of ieas aout the oy an the person We are thus exploring only a section of our overall topic ut one that enales ouglas to pursue he sociological reasoning Secon the thinking is purely sociocentric focuse on the stanarize "social ody hese two points are wellknown an have een uch canvasse hir however perhaps the most interesting an productive part of ouglass assertions lies in her recommenation that we look for concordances etween social angers an their oily symols Concordance appositeness: these are ideas that suggest matters of logical fit But if we wish to deepen the approach we can also roaen the notion of appositeness as I will do later Let us first consier ouglass own arguments an exaples expresse with her own crisp lan irst she evelops a typology of social pollution:  "anger pressing on external ounaries; 2 "anger fro transgressing the internal lines of the syste; 3 "danger in the argins of the lines; an 4 "anger from internal contraiction ouglas [966] 984 22 he "danger involve i all of these contexts is that of social reakown or social change o view it from another perspective With this efinition it is clearly assumed that oily syolism is use ultimaely to aintain the status uo he argument is theefore functionalist although again we coul uite easily twist it to point out tha the sae fors of syolism can e use for the purposes of resistance reellion or even revolution he examples ouglas chooses illustrate her concern with social rigiity versus fluidity Her first example is the Coorg society of south Inia Coorgs ha a grea fear of impurities entering their oies an this was relate to their case syste in which higher cases guare agains impurity fro lower castes; yet there was a division of laor in which lower castes performe menial an polluting tasks on ehalf of higher ones he social orer was seen as like a oy in which "the head [ie the higher castes] oes the thinking and praying and the ost espise parts [the lower castes] carry away the waste matter ouglas [ 966] 984 23 he Coorgs preoccupation with ounaries elongs to ouglass category 2 ut also she suggests to category 

6

Body hought

ice hey were a iolaed miority group withi a wider ociety She implie that they were axiou to preerve heir eparatio (whether i wa ojectively threateed or ot a were the aciet Iraelite a eleaguered people "The threateed oudarie of their [the Iraelite] ody politic would e well mirrored i their care for the itegrity uity ad purity of the phyical od (24 Paradoxically he herelf ote that thi care did ot exted i the Idia cae to taoo o where ad how people actually defecated (24 It i appare tha the ethographic maerial he cite raie more uetio tha they awer other example that he throw i that of the Yurok of orther California (Klamath River produce he ame effec otig that thee people had may taoo regardig the mixig of flui epecially ea and river water he ugget hat uch taoo  e ee again the ackdrop of he "fluid formlee of their highly competitive ocial life (27 I i o clear here why i he Coorg cae taoo agait iappropriate mixig hould reflec rigidity while i the Yurok cae apparetly imilar rule hould have ee precipiaed (y a cotrary dialectic? out of fluidity ad formlee ougla i uite aware that may of her example may ot e fully worked out Her aim i o exemplify a theory ad a method ad to um up her cocluio i a pithy maer a a he ed of chapter 7: "ritual work upo the ody politic through the ymolic medium of the phyical ody  (ougla [ 966] 984 28 Here he ugget that riual ue he phyical ody i order to effect ocial operatio to make taemet aout political tructure It i a valuale geeraliatio ad oe that urely reonate with for example, the work of Victor ureru wherea urer wa also cocered with the pychophyiological level ougla ha her eye ucompromiigly fixed o "ociety a uch  more pheomeological approach would attempt to rig thee two level of ociet ad the idividual more cloely ogeher Like Mau ougla i itereted i the moral dimeio of act ad he raie the uetio of how idea aou odily pollutio may e relaed to oral Here he i o olid ethographic groud She goe o he corpu of writig y vaPritchard o the uer (oe of her favorie ource ad poit out hat while the uer have rule ad idea hat expre the dager of ince a adultery i geeral their attiude to ay particular cae i o very diapprovig Their polluio idea erve to upport the rule while deflecig immediate diap

The Social Body poval away fom misceants Thus adultey can e dangeous to the offended husand ecause of the pollution it causes: hence he must e compensated and a sacifice made by the adultee The adultee himself is not at isk of ecoming sick it should e noted Polution ideas uphold the ules ut if compensation is made no futhe moal disappoval comes into play ouglas makes a futhe osevation of a functionalist kind hee and tuns it into a geneal hypothesis Some ules ae suppoted y mystical sanctions othes ae not  Nue son should espect his fathe yet even if he fails to do so he does not incu the mystical dange he would fo neglecting to hono his paentsinlaw  fathe has economic sanctions he can ing to ea on his son wheeas inlaws cannot execise contol in this way; hence ouglas agues it is the weaker elationship that is uttessed y ideas of pollution He geneal hypothesis is that pollution eliefs come into play in aeas of social stuctue in which cleacut secula o mateial constaints do not opeate They thus act in he view as supplementay mechanisms of social contol Numeous ethnogaphic examples can e cited that fit with this hypothesis including belies "that a woman will miscay if she has committed adultey while pegnant (ouglas [ 966] 984 34 fo instance o an example fom Papua New Guinea not given by ouglas the Pangia peoples idea that a woman who has committed adultey will have difficulty in giving ith unless and until she confesses to he aduteies (in one case known to me the woman confessed to sixteen sepaate acts with diffeent men efoe he child was safely on Ideas of this kind can also have amifying esults Fo example the Bema people consideed that pollution can e conveyed though fie which is also a medium of cooking; hence women wee at geat pains to enew thei souces of fie peiodically fom neighbos who wee consideed itually pue ( 38  f we eexamine these and othe examples ouglas gives not so much fom a functionalist (o antifunctionalist standpoint but athe in pusuit of the mindful body it is clea that he themes fit well with such a focus The link etween "pollution (a physical concept in a sense and "moals shows exactly the conjunction of bodyand mind we would expect to find ctions that ae the poduct of will and intention have epecussions on the odies of those involved and the incidence of these epecussions tells us how the moal univese is stuctued ually howeve it eveals the ethnotheoies of the people

8

Body hought

theelve aout flow of utance and power etween peron Why i it for exaple that for the uer an adulterou an i not at rik fro the ytical influence of the woan huand while the huand hielf is hought o e at rik? Clearly in uer theory the flow of power (lierally of confuion run fro adulterer to huand that i fro polluter to polluted via the exual organ of the woan It i the one who i wronged who ecoe ick not the wrongdoer( hi i an idea that chie with oe concept of the Hagen people in Papua ew Guinea regarding anger and ickne nger arie in a wronged peron and through the action of ghot on the peron nman ("ind  it can caue ickne which can hen e cured only through revealing the caue of the anger and extracting copenation fro the icreant h difference etween the uer and the Hagen exaple here i that in the uer cae effect are held to flow autoatically while in Hagen the victi of wrongdoing ut know he caue and experience reentent againt it In oth cae however ioral act caue ickne and thu he ody y definition ecoe indful In addition in Melaneian context and perhap frican one too oe ethnotheory of utance ee to e iplicated a a kind of "cheitry In the cae of adultery for exaple it i the "een out of place that pollute the woan ody and econdarily her huand (through inappropriate ixing [ee Hritierug 979 994] thu cauing ickne If we return now to ougla own work we find that in her econd ook on the ody Natural Symbls, he ha yteatied her theorie of ocial tructure ut never aandon her urkheiian principle In chapter 5 he argue that "the ocial ody contrain the way the phyical ody i perceived (ougla  970 68  hu odily control i an expreion of ocial control (a Mau argued uing the idea of habitus). In the original edition of her ook he took the ody itelf a a "natural ai for ocial yoli ut in a later edition he adit that the phyical ody i already ocially contructed and that it phyiological contrain "could never give rie to the variety of yolic tructure aed on it  (23)  In order to yteatie her arguent ougla introduce i thi ook her theory of grid and group In ocietie in which "grid (the preence of unounded role network i treed the inner elf coe o e a focu wherea in thoe treing "group (ounded collectivity of one kind or another outward neceitie are ore iportant than

he Social Body

9

otation In y coentary here I a not concerned wth the oerall grid/ group theory other than to note that there should e correlations etween grid/ group patterns and ethnotheories of the ody In this context two of ouglass discussions are of particular interest In one she considers trance and possession n another the presence or asence of ideas of enstrual pollution With regard to trance she argues that trance states will e "feared as dangerous when the social diension is hghly structured ut welcoe and een delerately induced when this s not the case (ouglas 970 74 If we see the ody as a odel of society and trance with possession as a reach of the odys  oundares it does ake sense to argue that such a reach ay e considered ore threatening in societies in which rigid control (i e defense of group oundaries is iportant ouglass own exaple howeer shows the liitation of this line of reasoning She notes that for the uer people trance is held to e dangerous whereas for their neighors the Western inka it is a lessing Presualy this should e a ark of greater rigidity in uer social structure Yet for the uer also if a an is possessed permanently y a spirit he ecoes a prophet who thereafter occupies an anoral "wild role transcending the ordinary diisions etween political groups In colonial ties (when ansPritchard worked with the uer in what was then the nglogyptian Sudan such prophets soeties ecae foci of political resistance to the British  similar potentialty lies in the role of the Flesh spearasters aong the inka and the leopardskin priests aong the uer theseles who also appeal to the diinity Flesh as the source of their power he appeal here does see to e to the indiidual ody of certain en as repositories of power that can transgress political diisions usually operatie in society he iage of the diinity Flesh ecoes a eans of conceptualiing historical change In this way we learn ore fro the uer /nka exaple than can e done y treating it as a flat case of synchronic structural comparison he arguent regarding enstrual pollution also egins as a static coparison Here ouglas takes two sallscale huntergatherer societies of frica the Muti and the Hada s with ost such societies social groupings in oth cases are fluid In theory therefore neither should show a concern for oundaries expressed in ters of pollution he Muti confor: they hae no polluton deas he Hada en howeer show a fear of enstrual lood ouglas correlates ths not with social group ut with gender oundaries here is a arked dii