Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1

Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Title Association of Small Landowners v. DAR Secretary GR Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777 14 July 1989 Cruz, J.

Facts GR No. 79777: PD 27, EOs 228 & 229 – Nicolas Manaay and his wife own a 9-hectare riceland; while Agustin Hermano, Jr. owned 5. They both have four tenants each on their respective landholdings, who were declared full owners of the said lands by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27.

Issue/s W/N PD 27, PP 131, and EOs 228 and 229 were validly enacted.

The Manaays and Hermano question the constitutionality of PD 27 and EOs 228 and 229. GR No. 79310: PP 131, EO 229 – Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District in Negros, as well as Planters’ Committee, Inc. seek to prohibit the implementation of PP 131 and EO 229 for being violative of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection.

W/N the CARP fund provision in PP131 conforms to the requirements of a valid appropriation.

NO. PP 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of the said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

W/N PP 131 and EO 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits.

NO. This argument is no longer tenable because RA 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law. As such, landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under PD 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by RA

Subsequently, the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP), Manuel Barcelona, and Prudencio Serrano filed their own petitions, which also assailed the constitutionality of the abovementioned statutes. GR No. 79744: EOs 228 & 229 – Inocentes Pabico alleges that the then DAR Secretary placed his landholding under the coverage of OLT, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to

Ruling YES. The promulgation of PD 27 by Pres. Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained and there is no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of Pres. Aquino to promulgate PP 131 and EOs 228 & 229, the same was authorized by Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to RA 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.

Doctrine To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. Obiter: One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual’s rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Art III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

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tenants, who then refused to pay lease rentals to him. He then protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under OLT and asked for the recall and cancellation of the said CLTs, which was denied without hearing. Although he filed an MR, EOs 228 and 229 were issued, rendering his MR moot and academic because the said EOs directly effected the transfer of his land to his farmers-tenants. GR No. 78742: PD 316 – The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines invokes the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. Because PD 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the landowner shall have been determined, they petitioned the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.

6657 under the therein prescribed.

conditions

W/N the assailed statutes violate the equal protection clause.

NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.

W/N the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.

YES. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of a lawful subject. However, objection is raised to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in the provision, as the determination of just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, because the law provides that the determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the right to review with finality the said determination.

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Sigre v. CA GR Nos. 109568 and 113454 8 August 2002 Austria-Martinez, J.

Matias Yusay owned a parcel of irrigated rice land in Iloilo, in which Ernesto Sigre was a tenant. Sigre previously had been paying Yusay a lease rental of 16 cavans per crop, but stopped paying in 1991-92. Instead, he

W/N the content and manner of just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is violative of the Constitution.

NO. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at this time. The invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program.

W/N the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well-accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting the landowner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation.

NO. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmerbeneficiaries were deemed full owners of the land they acquired under PD 27, after proof of fullfledged membership in the farmers’ cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. YES. It was pursuant to PD 27 that MC 6 was issued by the DAR. The Circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmer’s lease rentals to the landowner were not credited in his favor against the

W/N PD 27 sanctions MC 6.

The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects

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remitted the payments to the LBP pursuant to DAR’s Memorandum Circular No. 6 (MC 6), which set the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmerbeneficiaries under the land transfer program of PD 27. Lilia Gonzales, co-administratrix of Yusay’s estate, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with the CA, seeking to prohibit the LBP from accepting Sigre’s leasehold rentals. According to Gonzales, she had no notice that DAR had already fixed the value of the land. Her petition also assails the validity of MC 6 and PD 27. The CA then declared MC 6 null and void, and directed the LBP to return to Gonzales the lease rentals paid by Sigre, and Sigre to pay the rentals directly to Gonzales.

determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price. Since the assailed Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of PD 27, it is therefore valid. W/N an irreconcilable conflict exists between PD 816 and MC 6, such that PD 816 must prevail over MC 6.

NO. PD 816 provides that the tenant-farmer shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, MC 6 mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to the LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been determined. Thus, there is no incompatibility between these two. On the contrary, the two supplement each other as they set the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the agricultural property.

W/N PD 27 is unconstitutional for setting limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation.

NO. Jurisprudence has upheld the constitutionality of the said decree. Moreover, the determination of just compensation under PD 27 is not final or conclusive, because unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation by DAR, the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation.

W/N RA 6657 superseded or repealed PD 27.

NO. According to EO 229, PD 27 as amended shall continue to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder.

and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by law.

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Office of the President v. CA and Heirs of Jose Reyes GR No. 131216 19 July 2001 Pardo, J.

Aurora Tinio-Reyes owned 24 hectares of land in Nueva Ecija, which she bequeathed to her 9 children upon her death, one of which was Jose.

W/N Jose’s land should be covered by the OLT under RA 6657 or PD 27.

When Jose tried to get a TCT over his lot, he was told that he first needed a clearance from the DAR attesting to the noninclusion of his land in the OLT. However, the PARO ruled that his land was covered under the OLT.

Corpuz v. Grospe GR No. 135297 8 June 2000 Panganiban, J.

The DAR then issued 12 TCTs in his favor after he appealed the PARO Decision. However, subsequently, the Secretary of the Office of the President affirmed the PARO as Aurora’s will was not registered prior to PD 27’s effectivity, and thus could not bind third persons. When Jose appealed, the CA reversed the Secretary’s Order. Gavino Corpuz was a farmerbeneficiary under the OLT Program of the DAR. Pursuant to PD 27, he was issued a certificate of land transfer over 2 parcels of agricultural land. Corpuz then mortgaged the land to the Grospes. In their mortgage contract, Corpuz allowed the spouses Grospe to use or

W/N the waiver of rights is contrary to agrarian law.

Whatever provisions of PD 27 that are not inconsistent with RA 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under PD 27 are retained even with the passage of RA 6657. NO. There is no doubt that the original landholding of Aurora, consisting of 24 hectares of Riceland tenanted by farmers was covered by PD 27. However, the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of PD 27, as the seizure only takes effect on the payment of just compensation; and the DAR had not even determined the just compensation for the taking of the landholding when it decreed that the land was under the coverage of RA 6657. Moreover, when Aurora died and her children inherited the land, they only acquired 2.5 hectares each, which is decidedly within the retention area of 7 hectares under PD 27, or 5 hectares under RA 6657.

YES. The sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquire vast tracts of land, thus

Seizure only takes effect on the payment of just compensation.

Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court approval as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. Obiter: The farmers’ cooperatives were established to provide a strong social and economic

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cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. Corpuz subsequently instituted a complaint which alleged that the Grospes had entered the disputed land by force and destroyed the palay that he had planted on it. However, according to the Grospes, Corpuz had already executed a “Waiver of Rights” over the landholding in favor of the spouses in consideration of P54k.

Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary GR No. 86889 4 December 1990 Paras, J.

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Ernesto Tabara ruled that Corpuz abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Nueva Ecija. Said Samahang Nayon even passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of said lots to the Grospes, who were the “most qualified farmers-beneficiaries.” The DARAB and the CA both affirmed the Decision. In 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines. It includes the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. In 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the IRR of Secs. 11, 13, and 39 of the said law. Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of certain

negating the government’s program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil. W/N Corpuz had abandoned his landholding.

NO. Corpuz’ surrender of possession did not amount to an abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of the Grospes to return possession of the landholding upon full payment of the loan. There was no clear, absolute, or irrevocable intent to abandon.

W/N Corpuz had voluntarily surrendered his landholding.

YES. Corpuz’ intention to surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions. His voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. NO. It was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the agrarian reform program of the government. The intention of the Committee was to limit the application of the word “agriculture”. Thus, Section II of RA 6657 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry, and swine raising” in the definition of “commercial farms” is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial

W/N the CARL should include the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits of agrarian reform.

Raising of livestock, poultry, and swine are excluded from the coverage of the CARL.

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sections of RA 6657, of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under RA 6657, and of the IRR of Section 11. It prays that the aforesaid statutes be declared unconstitutional.

activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. W/N the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of RA 6657 directing “corporate farms” to execute and implement “production-sharing plans” is unreasonable for being confiscatory and violative of due process, with respect to livestock and poultry raisers. Separate Opinion: Sarmiento, J. W/N the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Natalia Realty v. DAR GR No. 103302 12 August 1993 Bellosillo, J.

PP 1637 set aside several hectares of land in Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were

W/N the Natalia properties were validly converted from agricultural to residential land.

YES. As there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform, there is no need to call upon them to distribute from 3% of their gross sales and 10% of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation. NO. Substantial distinctions exist between land directed purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for livestock, poultry and swine raising that make real differences: 1. There are no tenants nor landlords in livestock and poultry businesses; 2. Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land; 3. Land is not a primary resource; 4. Livestock and poultry production are industrial activities; 5. Livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by tenancy law. YES. Natalia and EDIC complied with all the requirements of law, even securing prior approval from DAR. As a matter of fact, there was no need for Natalia and

Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. “Agricultural land” refers to “land devoted to agricultural

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designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite, where Natalia Realty’s properties were situated. Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC), the developer of the Natalia properties, was granted approval to develop the said properties into low-cost housing subdivisions. The Natalia properties then became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

Morta v. Occidental GR No. 123417 10 June 1999 Pardo, J.

When the CARL came into effect, the DAR issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia immediately registered its objection to the said Notice and requested the DAR Secretary to cancel the same. However, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo (SAMBA) filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain them from developing areas under their cultivation. The RA issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction. Natalia and EDIC appealed to the DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the RA. Natalia then requested the DAR Secretary to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither the DAR Secretary nor the DAR Director concerned took action on the protest letters. Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla filed a suit against Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for allegedly gathering pili nuts,

EDIC to do so because the Natalia properties were within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Since PP 1637 created the townsite reservation for the purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in effect converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites were met. W/N the Natalia properties are covered by the CARL.

NO. The undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as “agricultural lands.” These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.

W/N the cases are properly cognizable by the DARAB.

NO. Since there is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, the issue is clearly outside DARAB’s jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB

activity, and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land.”

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a

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anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land and destroying their banana and pineapple plants. Occidental claimed that he was a tenant of the actual owner of the land, Josefina Baraclan, and that Morta and Padilla were not actually the owners of the land in question. The trial court ruled in favor of Morta and Padilla. Occidental, et al. appealed, contending that the case was cognizable by the DAR Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). Thus, the RTC reversed the lower court and ruled in favor of Occidental, stating that the case is a tenancy-related problem which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA affirmed the RTC.

regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot be considered tenancyrelated for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina is the owner, then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the requisites, the issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB. Dissent: Davide, CJ. It is a tenancy-related issue because whether it is Josefina or Morta who is the owner of the land is no moment. It does not affect Occidental’s tenancy. Tenancy attaches to the land. The cases filed by Morta and Padilla were a clever way to defeat the agrarian law. While the cases were ostensibly for damages, they were, at bottom, a fight on issues incident to or arising from an agrarian relationship.

dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1. That the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2. The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3. That there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4. That the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5. That there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6. That the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Limited jurisdiction of DAR: 1. Adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; 2. Resolution of agrarian conflicts and landtenure related problems; and 3. Approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring, or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial,

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Monsanto v. Zerna GR No. 142591 7 December 2001 Panganiban, J.

Leonarda Monsanto owned a parcel of land, wherein Jesus and Teresita Zerna were overseers. In 1995, the Zernas harvested coconuts from the plantation without Monsanto’s consent, and processed them into copra for the purpose of confirming their claim that they are tenants of the land. It was alleged that the total amount that they actually made was P6,262.50; they deposited P5,162.50 with the Barangay Secretary of the locality, keeping the balance of P1,100.00 for their labor. Monsanto instituted a criminal case of qualified theft against the Zernas, but the Zernas were acquitted for lack of criminal intent. The barangay captain of the locality was ordered to return to Monsanto the money that the Zernas deposited. Monsanto filed an MR for the return of the P1,100.00. The court then ruled that since the harvesting of the coconuts and processing of the same into copra were not with the consent of Monsanto, then they could not be entitled to compensation for their labor. On appeal, the CA ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order the Zernas to pay Monsanto the P1,100.00. Because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy relationship, the matter fell within the primary

W/N an agrarian dispute existed between the parties.

YES.

1. The subject of the

2.

3.

4.

W/N the RTC was stripped of its criminal jurisdiction when the CA annulled the Order regarding the remaining P1,100.00.

dispute between them was the taking of coconuts from the property owned by Monsanto; The Zernas were the overseers of the property at the time of the taking of the coconuts, as can be gleaned from their Kasabutan; Monsanto allowed the Zernas to plant coconut, coffee, jackfruit, and cacao as shown by the Kasabutan; A tenurial arrangement exists among herein parties as regards the harvesting of the agricultural products, as shown by the several remittances made by the Zernas to Monsanto, substantiated by receipts.

and other nonagricultural uses. The resolution of an agrarian dispute is a matter beyond the legal competence of regular courts. The DARAB exercises primary jurisdiction—both original and appellate—to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements—whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise—over lands devoted to agriculture, including (1) disputes concerning farm workers’ associations; or (2) representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangement. A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.

NO. There is no question that the RTC had criminal jurisdiction to try the Zernas for the crime of qualified theft. However, the resolution of the issue of who is entitled to the P1,100.00 falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB, as it is an agrarian dispute.

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Sanchez v. Marin GR No. 171346 19 October 2007 Chico-Nazario, J.

and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. It then annulled the RTC order requiring the return of the P1,100.00. David Felix owned a fishpond. Jaime Sanchez was instituted as a tenant on the said fishpond, with a 50/50 sharing agreement. After a few years, Felix sold and transferred ownership of the subject fishpond to the Marins. As new owners of the fishpond, they entered into a civil law agreement with their mother, Zemaida, which was renewable yearly.

W/N a fishpond is an agricultural land.

NO. By virtue of Sec. 2, RA 7881, the operation of fishponds is no longer considered an agricultural activity, and a parcel of land devoted to fishpond operation is no longer an agricultural land.

W/N a tenurial arrangement exists between Sanchez and Zenaida Marin.

YES. Although the fishpond is not covered by the CARL, it bears emphasis that Sanchez’ status as a tenant in the subject fishpond and his right to security of tenure were already previously settled. Having been declared as a tenant with the right to security of tenure as provided by the law enforced at the time of the filing of the complaint, Sanchez has acquired a vested right over the subject fishpond. Therefore, even if fishponds were later excluded/exempted from CARL coverage, and despite the fact that no CLOA has been issued to Sanchez, the same cannot defeat the aforesaid vested right already granted and acquired by Sanchez long before the passage of RA 7881.

W/N the DARAB jurisdiction over the case.

YES. The present case was instituted as early as 1991 when the law applicable was still RA 6657, and fishponds and prawn farms were not yet exempted/excluded from the CARL coverage. At that time, there was an agrarian dispute between the parties. Prior to the

Zenaida then made an arrangement with Sanchez wherein Sanchez would receive a regular salary and a 20% share in the net profit of the fishpond. When her lease agreement with her children expired, Zenaida ordered Sanchez to vacate the premises. Sanchez refused, asserting that he was a tenant of the fishpond and not a mere contractual worker; hence, he had the right to its peaceful possession and security of tenure. He then asked the court to declare him as a tenant of the subject fishpond, which subsequently did. As Sanchez was already declared as an agricultural tenant of the fishpond, he filed a petition to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the fixing of leasehold rentals for his use of the fishpond. However, Zenaida countered this

has

Fishponds are no longer considered agricultural lands.

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application by filing a case with the PARAD to eject Sanchez for failure to pay the rent and for failure to render an accounting. The PARAD consolidated the 2 cases and ruled in favor of Sanchez.

Nuesa v. CA GR No. 132048 6 March 2002 Quisumbing, J.

Zenaida appealed to the DARAB, which affirmed the PARAD decision. The CA reversed the ruling, stating that the DARAB lacked jurisdiction over the case. It stated that Sec. 2 of RA 7881, which amended Sec. 10 of RA 6657, excluded private lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL, so that the operation of a fishpond is no longer considered an agricultural activity. Since the cases are not agrarian disputes, then the DARAB could not have validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. When Verdillo was issued an “Order of Award” by the DAR Secretary over 2 parcels of land, it had a condition that Verdillo should personally cultivate the land, and pay at least the first installment, within a period of 6 months. 21 years later, Verdillo filed an application with the DAR for the purchase of the said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in the Order of Award. Restituto Rivera protested this application, claiming that it was he who had

enactment of RA 7881 in 1995, the case was already pending appeal before the DARAB. Hence, the aforesaid amendments cannot be made to apply to divest the DARAB of its jurisdiction of the case. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it until the full termination of the case.

W/N the DARAB jurisdiction over the case.

has

NO. Verdillo and Rivera had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within the ambit of an “agrarian dispute.” Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of Verdillo’s petition in the first place.

W/N the DARAB acted in grave abuse of discretion.

YES. The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the DAR Secretary falls under the

While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, care should be taken that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. The DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform

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been in possession of the land and had been cultivating the same. He also filed his own application for the said parcels in opposition to that of Verdillo.

administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the case on the merits without giving Rivera the opportunity to present his case.

After the DAR’s investigation of the conflicting claims, it found that Verdillo violated the terms of the Order of Award, and cancelled the said Order. Hence, Verdillo filed with the Provincial Adjudication Board a petition for the annulment of the said order. Instead of filing an Answer to the Petition, Rivera filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator chose to resolve the case on the merits, and ruled in favor of Verdillo. The DARAB and the CA affirmed this decision.

Almuete v. Andres GR No. 122276 20 November 2001 Ynares-Santiago, J.

Since the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) awarded a parcel of land to Rodrigo Almuete in 1957, he and his family exercised exclusive

W/N the case is an agrarian dispute and, as such, falls under the DARAB’s jurisdiction.

NO. The action filed by Almuete before the trial court was for recovery of possession and reconveyance of title. The issue to be resolved was who between Almuete and Andres has a better

matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAN has primary original and appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and their IRRs. An “agrarian dispute” is defined to include “any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under RA 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. Elements

of

a

tenancy

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possession over it, cultivating it and planting narra, fruit trees, rice, corn, and legumes thereon. However, in 1979, an Agrarian Reform Technologist represented that Almuete could not be found and that he had waived all his rights as a NARRA settler. It was also stated in the report that the actual owner of the land was Marcelo Andres, who was then allowed to file his homestead application. After the issuance of an original certificate of title in favor of Andres pursuant to his homestead patent, he and 10 other armed persons entered the subject property and took possession of approximately half of it.

right to the subject property considering that both of them are awardees of the same property. It was thus a controversy relating to ownership of the farmland, which is beyond the ambit of the phrase “agrarian dispute.” No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between the parties, let alone that which would so characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. Consequently, the RTC was competent to try and decide the case. Its decision was, thus, valid and can no longer be disturbed, after having attained finality. Nothing more can be done with the decision except to enforce it.

relationship: 1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2. The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3. There is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4. The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5. There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; 6. The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

Almuete quickly brought the matter the DAR’s attention, and learned of the cancellation of his award and its subsequent titling in favor of Andres. Almuete then filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession against Andres, which was granted by the court. Andres then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction over the nature as well as the subject matter of the case. He argued that since the subject property was agricultural land covered by a homestead patent, exclusive jurisdiction was with the DARAB, and not with the

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Chico v. CA GR No. 122704 5 January 1998 Vitug, J.

regular courts. The CA ruled in Andres’ favor, and declared the ruling of the RTC as null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Pedro Chico claims to be the lawful owner of a parcel of land, which the Mananghayas were occupying. He averred that he needed the lots for his personal use but because the Mananghayas refused to vacate, he was constrained to initiate the case.

W/N the dispute between the parties is agrarian in nature.

NO. The records of the case fail to show any juridical tie binding between the parties or their predecessors-in-interest, let alone that which would so characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. Worse, the land subject matter of the controversy was not shown to be an agricultural land; to the contrary, the land appears to be located within a residential area. Compounding the matter, no receipt, or any other evidence, was presented by the Mananghayas to prove their claim that the harvest was shared between the parties.

In order for a tenancy relation to take serious hold over the dispute, it would e essential to first establish all its indispensable elements. It is not enough that these requisites are alleged; these requisites must be shown in order to divest the regular court of its jurisdiction in proceedings lawfully began before it.

W/N the parties have a tenurial arrangement.

NO. Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or lessee, it is clear that there is no tenancy

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the

The Mananghayas assert that the true owners of the property in question, Don Rafael and Doña Salud Chico, were succeeded upon their death by their son Delfin Chico. They also claim that they had long been in lawful possession of the subject parcel of land as tenants of the deceased spouses and their son to whom rentals had been paid.

Isidro v. CA GR No. L-105586 15 December 1993

The RTC ruled in favor of Pedro and ordered the Mananghayas to surrender its possession. The Mananghayas then initiated a petition for certiorari with the CA to annul the RTC decision for being void. They contend that their tenancy relationship with the original owners was an agrarian dispute cognizable exclusively by the DARAB. The CA set aside the RTC decision on the ground that the dispute between the parties was an agrarian reform matter. Natividad Gutierrez owns a parcel of land, over which her sister Aniceta was an overseer.

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Padilla, J.

Aniceta allowed Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land, so that he would have enough income to meet his family’s needs, with the condition that he vacate the property upon demand. Remigio occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond. When Natividad demanded Remigio to return the land, the latter refused to vacate, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. Thus, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Natividad. However, it was dismissed by the trial court, stating that the land is agricultural and is thus an agrarian dispute under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations. The RTC affirmed the decision.

Sintos v. CA GR No. 96489 14 July 1995 Quiason, J.

The CA then reversed the lower courts, and ruled that there was no tenurial arrangement between the parties, and that Remigio only possessed the property by mere tolerance. From 1963 to 1983, Teofilo Magarin, Aguido Ebasco, Guillermo and Manuel Casinillo, Sergio Corpus, Severino Magarin, Rufina Mendoza, Victoria Orilan, and Fausta Salidaga had been cultivating portions of a parcel of land owned by Nicolas Sintos. They agreed to pay him one-fourth of

or agricultural/leasehold relationship existing between the parties. There was no contract or agreement entered into by Remigio with Natividad nor with the overseer of the property, for Remigio to cultivate the land for a price certain or to share his harvests. Remigio failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the use of the land. W/N the case falls under the DARAB’s jurisdiction.

W/N the tenants have a right to disturbance compensation.

NO. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The law provides for conditions or requisites before the possessor of the land can qualify as an agricultural lessee or tenant, and the land being agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. In the absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful detainer is properly within the jurisdiction of the MTC. YES. There existed a landlord and tenant relationship between the parties. He allowed them to cultivate the land and, in return, received a share of the harvest. Being tenants, they are entitled to disturbance compensation.

land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. Unless a person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws. An agricultural lessee is a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter’s consent for the purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. An agricultural lessor, on the other hand, is a natural or juridical person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certain. Where persons cultivated the land and did not receive salaries but a share in the produce or the cash equivalent thereof, the relationship created between them and the landowner is one of tenancy and not employment.

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their harvest as their shares. Subsequently, Nicolas amended the sharing agreement by requiring them to give him 10 sacks of 50 kilos per sack, per hectare, per harvest. Thereafter, the said tenants paid him on the basis of the new sharing scheme. When the subject parcel of land was identified by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform as covered under Operation Land Transfer, Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to the tenants. Nicolas then asked for the exclusion of his landholding from the land reform program, contending that the portions occupied by his tenants were part of his land development project, the Sintos Subdivision. After investigation, the MAR recommended the cancellation of the CLTs in favor of the tenants and instead recommended the award to them of disturbance compensation. Although no agreement was reached by the parties with respect to the amount of disturbance compensation, the tenants were ejected from their landholding when Nicolas started dumping sand and gravel on the portions they were cultivating. They then filed a case against Nicolas for the payment of disturbance compensation. The trial court ruled in favor of the tenants, and ordered Nicolas

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Philbancor v. CA GR No. 129572 26 June 2000 Pardo, J.

to pay them disturbance compensation. The CA affirmed the trial court. Nicolas appealed, contending that the respondents do not have a right to the compensation because they were not his tenants. Vicente Hizon, Jr. is the owner of agricultural lands which were tenanted by Alfredo Pare, Pablo Galang, and Amado Vie. Hizon mortgaged the subject property to Philbancor without his tenants’ knowledge, and when he failed to pay his obligations, Philbancor was able to acquire the property at a public auction.

W/N the tenants could still exercise their right of redemption, five years after the registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds.

NO. Section 12 of RA 3844 provides that the right of redemption may be exercised within 2 years from the registration of the sale. The redemption period had already expired when the tenants filed the complaint for redemption. Nevertheless, the tenants may continue in possession and enjoyment of the land in question as legitimate tenants because the right of tenancy attaches to the landholding by operation of law. The leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding.

The right of tenancy attaches to the landholding by operation of law. The leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding.

W/N the ruling in the land registration case in favor of the spouses Abalos becomes res judicata with respect to the security of tenure rights of the heirs of Roman Soriano.

NO. What is in issue in the land registration case was ownership. The security of tenure case before the DARAB involved the issue of possession. It is important to note that although

Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.

The tenants allegedly only found out about the mortgage seven years after the public auction, when they were notified by Philbancor to vacate the lots. Thus, they filed a complaint for maintenance of possession with redemption and tenancy right of pre-emption against Philbancor and Hizon with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB).

Heirs of Roman Soriano v. CA GR No. 128177 15 August 2001 Ynares-Santiago, J.

The PARAB ruled in favor of the tenants and ordered Philbancor to execute the necessary Deed of Redemption in favor of the tenants. The DARAB and the CA affirmed the decision. A parcel of land originally owned by Adriano Soriano passed on to his heirs who leased the same to the spouses de Vera for 15 years beginning 1967 (until 1982). Roman, one

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Adriano’s children, was to act as caretaker of the property during the period of the lease. However, in 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted him from the property and appointed Isidro and Vidal Versoza as his substitutes. Because of this, Roman filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation against the de Vera spouses. On appeal to the CA, he won. Prior to the execution of the CA’s decision in 1972, the de Vera spouses and Roman entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the spouses allowed Roman to sub-lease the property as an agricultural tenant until the termination of the lease in 1982. The said agreement was approved by the agrarian court. After executing an extrajudicial settlement among themselves, Adriano’s heirs divided the property into 2 lots. The first was assigned to Lourdes, Candido, and the heirs of Dionisia; the other was assigned to Francisca, Librada, Elocadio, and Roman. In 1971, the first lot was sold by its owners to the spouses Abalos, while the ¾ of the second lot was sold to the same spouses by Elocadio, Francisca, and Librada.

the spouses Abalos have been declared titled owners of the subject land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. W/N the winning party in a land registration case can effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB.

NO. Roman’s status as tenant is yet to be declared by DARAB. The prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by once claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter’s occupancy was unlawful. This is because if Roman’s claim of possession as a tenant of the said property is proven, it will entitle him and his heirs to protection against dispossession.

The exercise of ownership yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant (as provided for in The Tenancy Act). Obiter: Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in two ways: possession in the concept of owner and possession of a holder. A judgment for ownership does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.

In 1976, the spouses Abalos filed with the RTC of Pangasinan an application for registration of title over the lots they bought from the heirs of Adriano (the first one and the ¾ pro-indiviso share of the second lot sold to them). The application was

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granted by the RTC, and affirmed both by the CA and SC. In 1983, Roman, along with Elocadio and Librada, filed a case against the Abalos spouses for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership, and damages. It was denied by the trial court. In 1984, or 11 years after the approval of the post-decisional agreement between Roman and the spouses de Vera, the Abalos spouses filed with the agrarian court a motion for execution of the said post-decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property. The motion prayed that the spouses Abalos be placed in possession of the subject property, jointly with Roman Soriano, and to levy so much of Roman’s property to answer for the use and occupation of Roman of 6/7 share of the property. When Roman died in 1985, he was substituted by his heirs. It appears that in 1988, the land registration court’s decision was partially executed by partitioning the second lot into two—one part in favor of Roman and the other in favor of the spouses Abalos. Roman’s heirs appealed to the CA, which affirmed the partition but reversed the order of the land registration court directing the issuance of a writ of possession because of the pendency of the case instituted by Roman against the Abalos spouses.

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Hernandez v. IAC GR No. 74323 21 September 1990 Medialdea, J.

In 1993, the SC ultimately dismissed Roman’s case of annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership, and damages against the Abalos spouses; as well as the motion for execution instituted by the Abalos spouses. Roman’s heirs then filed with the DARAB a complaint against the Abalos spouses for “Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary Injunction.” The Abalos spouses, on the other hand, in view of the SC’s disposition of the case, moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution and/or writ of possession to place them in possession of the first and ¾ of the second lot. The trial court held this case in abeyance until after DARAB resolves the complaint filed by Roman’s heirs. The Abalos spouses’ MR was denied by the trial court, and on appeal, the CA reversed the RTC, ordering the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Abalos spouses. The spouses Tolentino owned a parcel of coconut land. They had persons living on the said land, who cleaned and cleared certain portions of the plantation for the purpose of improving the harvest, were identified as “bantay” or watchers over the property and entitled to 1/6 share in the harvest. Their houses were built in a cluster inside the property.

W/N the watchers could be considered as agricultural tenants.

YES. The watchers have been in continuous, uninterrupted physical possession of their respective areas in the landholding, which they have cleaned and cleared for the purpose of improving the harvests; they have lived in the landholding and constructed their houses thereon; they were paid in an amount equivalent to 1/6 of the harvest during the ownership of the Tolentino spouses, and

Where a person cultivates the land and does not receive salaries but a share in the produce or the cash equivalent of his share in lump, the relationship is one of tenancy and not employment. An important criterion in determining whether the relationship is one of share tenancy is cultivation. The definition of cultivation is

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Subsequently, SALES, Inc. was able to acquire the land. Its possession was relinquished to Wenceslao Hernandez under a civil law lease. The watchers’ pay was reduced to 1/7 of the harvest. However, from 1980 to 1983, they were not paid their shares.

then later, 1/7 during the period of Wenceslao’s lease. Their status as tenants based on the foregoing cannot be gainsaid. Where they cultivated the land and did not receive salaries but a share in the produce or the cash equivalent of his share in lump, the relationship is one of tenancy and not employment. The fact that they have huts erected on the landholdings shows they are tenants.

SALES, Inc. averred that the watchers had been ejected from the land even before it acquired the same; thus, they did not have a right to a share of the harvests, since they were not tenants. It also claimed that under the lease agreement, Hernandez was forbidden to take any tenants, and that these watchers were only subsequently hired as wage laborers to do the picking, gathering, and hauling of cocounuts. The court ruled in favor of the watchers, and declared them as tenants of SALES, Inc. and Wenceslao Hernandez. The latter were also ordered to pay the former their unpaid shares in the harvest. The CA affirmed.

Valencia v. CA GR No. 122363 29 April 2003 Bellosillo, J.

When Victor Valencia acquired two parcels of land, he entered into civil law leases with Glicerio Henson and Fr. Andres Flores. Henson instituted Crescenciano and Marciano Frias to work on the property; while Fr. Flores appointed the Friases, plus some others, as farmhands. However, in Fr. Flores’ lease

Can a contract of civil law lease prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement?

YES. Sec. 6 of RA 3844 does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. A different interpretation would be most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease

not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. It may be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be considered the cultivator of the land. RA 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. RA 6389 subsequently declared that share tenancy was contrary to public policy. Although share tenancy was statutorily abolished, leasehold tenancy for coconut and sugar lands has not yet been implemented. The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its application and the consequences of its implementation. Nonetheless, this did not end the rights of share tenants in these types of lands. The eventual goal of legislation of having strong and independent farmers working on lands which they own remains. The right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. Inherent in the right of landholders to install a tenant is their authority to do so; otherwise, without such authority, civil law lessees as landholders cannot install a tenant on the landholding.

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contract, there was a stipulation that he was prohibited from installing a leasehold tenant thereon. No such prohibition existed in Henson’s contract. When Fr. Flores’ lease period expired, Valencia ordered his farmhands to vacate the lot. The farmhands refused to do so, and actually even secured CLTs over the land in their names. Catalino Mantac, one of the farmhands, subsequently entered into a leasehold contract undertaking to have a profit-sharing agreement with Valencia. After 12 years, DAR investigated the matter and found that the right of the farmhands to the land ceased upon the termination of the lease contracts, except as regards to Mantac, with whom Valencia entered into a tenancy agreement. As such, it was recommended that the CLTs given to the other farmhands be cancelled. However, the Regional Office disregarded the investigation report and ruled that the farmhands had a right to continue on the land until otherwise ordered by the court. On appeal to the Office of the President, then Exec. Sec. Teofisto Guingona upheld the ruling of the DAR, with the modification that the area acquired by Valencia as homestead be excluded from the coverage of PD 27. Valencia then appealed to the

agreement in good faith only to realize later on that he can no longer regain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee. On the other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In the case before us, not only is there no stipulation to the contrary; the lessee is expressly prohibited from subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant thereon since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership.

Tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character. Deforciants cannot install lawful tenants who are entitled to security of tenure. A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) There is consent; (4) The purpose is agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation; and (6) There is sharing of harvests between the parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.

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CA contending that the Exec. Sec. erred in recognizing the farmhands as tenants, and disallowing him and his 7 compulsory heirs from exercising their right of retention under RA 6657. However, the CA dismissed the case.

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. The act of subletting to third persons extinguishes the agricultural leasehold relations, as this constitutes an abandonment of the landholding due to absence of personal cultivation. Obiter: Social justice is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is never justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the mandate of law.

Caballes v. DAR GR No. 78214 5 December 1988 Sarmiento, J.

Andrea Millenes allowed Bienvenido Abajon to construct a house on a portion of her landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00. Millenes likewise allowed Abajon to plant

W/N Abajon is an agricultural tenant.

NO. To invest Abajon with the status of a tenant is preposterous. He only occupied a miniscule portion (60m2) of a 500m2 lot, which cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as an

Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. – Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship: (7) The parties are the landowner and the tenant; (8) The subject is

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a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a 50-50 basis. When Millenes sold her land to the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the spouses told Abajon that they intended to build a poultry close to his house and persuaded him to transfer his dwelling to another portion of the landholding. Abajon refused to leave, even after confrontation before the Barangay Captain of the locality. Subsequently, Yolanda filed a criminal case against Abajon for malicious mischief for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from their property without her knowledge. All the planting on the property however, had been done by Abajon. The trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties. The Ministry ruled that a tenancy relationship existed between the parties, and, as such, the case is not proper for hearing.

economic family-sized farm. Planting camote, bananas, and corn on such a size of land cannot produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family’s basic needs. Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of RA 3844. Moreover, there exists no tenancy relationship between the parties because Abajon’s status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that Abajon was never a tenant of Millenes.

agricultural land; (9) There is consent; (10) The purpose is agricultural production; (11) There is personal cultivation; and (12) There is sharing of harvests. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing laws. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. Obiter: If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from heaven?

On appeal, the DAR (the new MAR) reversed the findings and declared that the case was proper for trial as the land involved was residential. The new minister of the DAR, however, set aside the said order and declared that the criminal case was not proper for trial, as there was an existing tenancy relationship between the

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parties.

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Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1

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