The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Document filed by respondents against petitioners before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6. In their Amended Complaint6 docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 6644, respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the sale of their share on the subject property was effected thru a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and is therefore null and void. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dated 31 March 2005 dismissing the complaint of the respondents for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the SPA were forged. Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 on 6 May 2005 seeking for the reversal of the earlier RTC Decision. For failure of the respondents, however, to comply with the requirement of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Ascribing grave abuse of discretion, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus12 with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO seeking to annul and set aside the RTC Order dated 16 May 2005. For lack of merit, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition petition filed by the respondents. On Motion Motion for Reconsideration by Respondents,15 however, however, the Court of Appeals reversed its earlier Resolution and allowed the relaxation of the procedural in a Resolution16 dated 28 June 2007. Hence, the appellate court vacated the 16 May 2005 Order of the RTC directed the court a quo to thresh out the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents on the merits. In a Resolution17 dated 19 August 2011, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners. The foregoing requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon.21 The logic for such requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose.22 The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant.23 In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party a chance to oppose should simply be disregarded.24 Principles of natural justice demand that a right of a party should not be affected without w ithout giving it an opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, the three-day requirement is not a hard and fast rule.31 Where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is compliance with the rule.32 The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering that the running of the period towards the finality of the judgment was not stopped, the RTC Decision dated 31 March 2005 became final and executory. Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable.
On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) was killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton).2 On October 15, 2014, a Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor.3 On October 22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the general headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. On December 15, 2014, the Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court in Olongapo City.5 The case was docketed as Case No. 865-14,
and was raffled to Branch 74. A warrant of arrest against Pemberton was issued on December 16, 2014.7 Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde on December 19, 2014, and h e was then arraigned. On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage.10 “The [M]otion was [scheduled] for hearing on December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m.”11 According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail.12 In any case, they claim to have also “furnished a copy of the [M]otion personally . . . at the hearing of the [M]otion.”13 On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners’ Urgent Motion for lack of merit. The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior.Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural due process.110 In Jehan Shipping Corporation: As an integral component of procedural due process, the threeday notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights.113 The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant.114 In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process. Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing.115 They attempt to elude the consequences of this belated notice by arguing that they also served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel.116 They also attempt to underscore the urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas season and the “series of legal holidays”117 where courts would be closed. Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for another incident,119 it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-Jabalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an accused.
“On March 25, 2002, respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia Ochoa, through respondent Araceli Azores, ostensibly acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City an action seeking the annulment of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale and damages. The action, docketed as Civil Case No. 68896 and entitled Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia A. Ochoa, etc. v. Josefa M. Guevarra, et al., was raffled to Branch 160, presided by the respondent RTC Judge. On May 22, 2002, the petitioners, as defendants in Civil Case No. 68896, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The petitioners’ motion to dismiss was formally opposed by the private respondents.
On December 16, 2002, the respondent RTC Judge denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and at the same time set Civil Case No. 68896 for pre-trial conference, directing the parties to submit their respective pretrial briefs. On March 31, 2003, the petitioners filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that the certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint was not executed by the p rincipal parties (plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the complaint fatally defective and thus dismissible. The private respondents opposed the second motion to dismiss. On February 12, 2004, the respondent RTC Judge issued her f irst assailed order, denying the second motion to dismiss. On May 25, 2004. the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration, but the respondent RTC Judge denied the motion through her second assailed order. Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the order of denial to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio since it was fatally defective. They pointed out that the Verification and Certification of NonForum Shopping attached to the complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia Ochoa but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the attorney-in-fact of Cesar Ochoa only. On August 11, 2005, the CA denied the petition for lack of merit. The CA, in its decision, agreed with the RTC that following the omnibus motion rule, the defects of the complaint pointed out by the petitioners were deemed waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to dismiss.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates the case nor finally disposes of it, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.4 Only in exceptional cases where the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the Court allows the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. By “grave abuse of discretion,” we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal-to perform the duty e njoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.5 In this case, the petitioners failed to convincingly substantiate its charge of arbitrariness on the part of Judge Fabros. Absent such showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or ill motive, the Court cannot but sustain the ruling of the CA. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion because under Section 8, “all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.” As inferred from the provision, only the following defenses under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application:
In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping only when they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite the fact that this ground was existent and available to them at the time of the filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omission, the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping was deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to dismiss.
On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo, accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials3 of the Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Sison, of highly a nomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer. The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million went without proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were expended without a State of Calamity having been declared b y the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison, 612 SCRA 702, G.R. No. 185954 February 16, 2010 On January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T. De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial officials of Samar, docketed as OMBC-A-05-0051-B. The latter were then required to file their counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the complaint. In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his innocence on the charges. He asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds are available. He did not, in any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the certification issued by the requesting parties. In addition, he averred that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding. Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached in the letter-complaint bore his signature and that he was neither factually connected nor directly implicated in the complaint. On August 22, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him from service. CA REVERSED, INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE On July 22, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed resolution of December 18, 2008
In its Decision, the CA did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene, because (1) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in the administrative case against petitioner; (2) the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed after the CA rendered its Decision; and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decision. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 7 The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention. Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. Based on the facts above, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Garcia to support its intervention in the appellate court for the following reasons: First , Sison was not exonerated from the administrative charges against him, and was, in fact, dismissed for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case, OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. Thus, it was Sison who appealed to the CA being, unquestionably, the party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal. Second , the issue here is the right of the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal of its decision, not its right to appeal. Andthird , Garcia should be read along with Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals15 and National AppellateBoardoftheNationalPoliceCommissionv.Mamauag(Mamauag),16 in which this Court qualified and clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency to actively participate in the appeal of decisions in administrative cases However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be the one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent.
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate. Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time . In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was promulgated on June 26, 2008.
RODOLFO JALANDONI DIED INTESTATE. On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court. On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia) —who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis. The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother —Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the legal spouse of the latter. For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in t he estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter. It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives. The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo. On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement proceedings.25 The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that t oken, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf. On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court.
A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.45 Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein. 46 Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a case—the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in exces s of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion. The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and t heir siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate. Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit
cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger .34 Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in the original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay the injurious writ.35 Such is the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed .36 Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.37 The complainants, who at various times served as elected members of the Board of NADECOR, did not bother to intervene in the CA petitions, hence, they are not entitled to the service of pleadings and motions therein. Complainant Fernandez was himself a defendant in SEC Case No. 11-164 in the RTC, but he chose not to join any of the four CA petitions.