A SURVEY OF DISBARMENT AND REINSTATEMENT REINSTATEMENT CASES IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE A paper submitted by Kremil Kremil S. David and Michelle Borromeo Borromeo in partial fulfillment of the requirements in Problem Areas in Legal Ethics under Atty. Rodel V. Capule, M.D. for the school year 2011-2012, second semester - Arellano University School of Law PREFATORY REMARKS Why do we call i t ―Bar‖ anyway?
The Florida Bar Website Website[1] has this story to tell as to the origin of the word Bar and how it came to be referred to as the members in the legal profession. According to the website, the history of the term ―bar‖ as representing a legal organization dates from the early 1300s. The word originated when King Edward II established a system of courts throughout his kingdom to settle disputes among the people. Judges moved from village to village to hear and settle disagreements in the surrounding communities.
The people of this early era derived most of their entertainment and education in public gathering places. Hearing the plights and disputes of fellow villagers was a great diversion for them. As the courts grew in number, more people began attending these sessions as a social gathering. Consequently, the court sessions had to be held i n fields or commons to accommodate the crowds. It soon became necessary to set up boundaries to separate the spectators from the proceedings. This was accomplished by surrounding the court with a square of logs. Only t hose persons who were part of the court or party to the argument were allowed within the square of l ogs or ―bars.‖ Thus, the terminology, ―admission to the bar,‖ became synonymous with practicing law. The term ―bar‖ since has come to mean an organized group practicing law in a given locality. In the Philippines, admission to t he legal profession is a function solely vested in the Supreme Court. Paragraph 5, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to – [p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar … (Emphasis supplied.) In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this att ribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly constitutes the most solid of ti tles. tles.[2] Bar examinations therefore are supervised and administered by the Supreme Court to determine whether an applicant for admission has the re quisite legal learning or intellectual qualification to become a member of the Bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least l east twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Philippines.[3] The power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. it.[4]
The power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it i s a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature or the Supreme Court by virtue virtue of its rulemaking power may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating creating it, and t hat such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds. grounds .[5] DISBARMENT – ITS NATURE, CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVE
Disbarment is the act of the court to in withdrawing from an attorney the privilege to practice law. The name of the lawyer is stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. And he does not have the right to put in his name even the prefix ―Atty.‖. Neither can he sign pleadings even if he does not personally appear in court. court.[6] Disbarment terminates the individual‘s status as a lawyer. As distinguished from Suspension, only the Supreme Court can disbar a lawyer, while the Court of Appeals and the Regional Regi onal Trial Courts are empowered to warn, admonish, reprimand and suspend an attorney who appears before them for the practice of law. law .[7] Suspension is the act of the court prohibiting an attorney from practicing law for a definite definite certain period. It amounts to a qualified disbarment disbarment because the attorney [8] is deprived temporarily of the right to practice his profession. profession . Since the membership to the Bar is being merely a privilege, such membership may be suspended or removed from the lawyer by the granting authority for reasons provided in the Rules , l aw and jurisprudence. jurisprudence.[9] In distinguishing the power to punish for contempt from t he power to disbar, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Regalado opined that – … the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the other. A contempt proceeding for misbehaviour in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court‘s officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice. justice.[10]
There is some pronouncement of the Supreme Court which states that disbarment proceeding is a class by itself, a sui generis. In the case of Gatchalian Gatchalian Promotions vs. Atty. Primo R. Naldoz a[11], the Supreme Court had the occasion to state that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. Almacen[12]once again ruled that The Court in Gatchalian Promotions, citing its previous decision In Re Almacen –
[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio . Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. Although, considered as a sui generis, the power to discipline lawyers – for that matter, the power to disbar – is judicial in nature and can be exercised only by the court. The authority of the Supreme Court to discipline lawyers is anchored on the constitutional provision which mandates the highest tribunal to regulate the practice of l aw and the admission of individuals to engage in the legal profession. However, this judicial power must at all times be exercised with caution. Since admission to the legal profession is inherently a difficult and an arduous attempt, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the power of the Court to discipline lawyers should not be exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner. Neither should it be exercised at the pleasure of the court or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. It is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate its disciplinary power by a sound and ju st judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be scrupulously guarded and maintained by the court as the rights and dignity of the court itself .[13] Being a sui generis proceeding, the procedures in disbarment cases tend to deviate from regular court proceeding. In some respect, disbarment proceedings are a matter of public interest and no private interest is involved. Being so, a real party in interest is not required. Explaining the rule, the Court in Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos[14] tersely put thus – This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney‘s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Nonetheless, the burden of proof still rests upon the l awyer to prove his innocence. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.[15]. Disbarment proceeding is akin to an administrative proceeding. The quantum of evidence required is clearly preponderant evidence. As cited in Gatchalian Promotions, Administrative cases against lawyers are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burdens of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, ―clearly preponderant evidence‖ is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent‘s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court‘s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favourable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. Furthermore, in a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr., the Supreme Court, through Justice Castro held that the object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.[16]
In various cases, other objects of disbarment proceedings have been provided by the Court. Disbarment has been designed to compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his clients, and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.[17] The case of Geeslin vs. Navarro[18] further elucidates the purpose of disbarment proceedings in this wise – In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court; he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. DISBARMENT PROCEDURE UNDER THE RULES
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides for t he procedure for disbarment and suspension of lawyers. The only officers authorized to investigate cases of disbarment are the following – 1
The Supreme Court;
2 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines through its Commission on Bar Discipline or authorized investigators; and 3
Office of the Solicitor General.
Any person aggrieved by the misconduct of a lawyer may file the corresponding administrative case with the proper forum. A complaint for disbarment may be filed directly in the Supreme Court, the IBP National Office or in any of its chapters. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service. In proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor-General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case t he investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.[19]
Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to t he Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations for the final action of t he Supreme Court.[20] Six copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to t he IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator.[21] If the complaint is filed in the IBP, the Board of Governors shall appoint from among IBP members an Investigator or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3) investigators to investigate the complaint. All Investigators shall take an oath of office in the form prescribed by the Board of Governors. A copy of the Investigator‘s appointment and oath shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship within the fourth degree of consanguinity of affinity to any of the parties of their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his having acted as counsel to his acting as such Investigator. Where the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party may appeal to the IBP Board of Governors, which by majority vote of the members present, there being a quorum, may order his disqualification. Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after due hearing, by the vote of at least six (6) members of the IBP Board of Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors in all cases of disqualification or removal shall be final.[22] If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. Quite clearly, the above provisions plainly show two (2) modes of init iatory actions that the Investigator is empowered to take upon the complaint – either dismiss the same without delay or proceed with the investigation. Perforce: A
The Investigator shall proceed with the investigation of the case:
1
if the complaint appears to be meritorious; or
2 upon joinder of the issues (upon submission of the answer by respondent within fifteen [15] days from the date of service), when the answer shows that the complaint is indeed meritorious; or 3
if respondent fails to answer.
B
On the other hand, the investigator may recommend the dismissal of the same:
1
if the complaint lacks merit; or
2 if the answer shows, to the satisfaction of the Investigator, that the complaint is not meritorious. Verily, it is within the sound discretion of the Investigator to determine whether or not the complaint is meritorious and if an in vestigation must indeed ensue[23]. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to t he satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the case motu propio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of the complainant.[24] No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors,
determines that there is no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent.[25] The answer shall be verified. The original and five (5) legible copies of t he answer shall be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the complainant or his counsel. The IBP Board of Governors shall appoint a suitable member of the Integrated Bar as counsel to assist the complainant of the respondent during the investigation in case of need for such assistance.[26] Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the i nvestigation shall proceed ex parte. The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application. Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penal ty.[27] Not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the Investigator shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with the stenographic notes and the transcript thereof, and all the evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of the report need not await the transcription of the stenographic notes, it being sufficient that the report reproduce substantially from the Investigator‘s personal notes any relevant and pertinent testimonies.[28] Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by t he Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator‘s Report.[29] If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth it s findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.[30] If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is l ess than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other i nterested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board‘s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.[31] Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.[32] After receipt of respondent‘s answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu propio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138,
Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.[33] GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT OF LAWYERS
Section 27 of Rule 128 provides for the specific grounds for disbarment of a lawyer. Accordingly, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for – 1
any deceit;
2
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office;
3
grossly immoral conduct;
4
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice;
6
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or
7 do.
for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
These grounds are not exclusive. A lawyer may be disbarred even if the grounds are not any of those provided in Section 27. Thus the acquisition of an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, either through purchase or assignment, constitutes not only breach of professional ethics, but is a patent violation of Article 1491[34] of the Civil Code. In one case, Tranquilino Rovero was convicted of smuggling. The Solicitor General filed the complaint for disbarment, based on such conviction. The respondent admits the existence of t he decision of the Collector of Customs, and his conviction by the Court of Appeals, but sets up the defense that they are not sufficient to disqualify him from the practice of law, especially because the acts of which he was found guilty, while at most merely discreditable, had been committed by him as an individual and not in pursuance or in the exercise of his legal profession. Still, the Court disbarred him, stating that Respondent‘s conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals certainly involves an act done contrary at least to honesty or good morals. The ground invoked by the Solicitor General is aggravated by the fact that the respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private person, but the Government.[35] In another, case a retired RTC judge penned a decision after his retirement from the bench. He made the decision appear to have been written prior to his retirement, such that the plaintiff succeeded in executing the judgment even if rendered seven months after the retirement of the judge. The Supreme Court ordered the disbarment of the retired judge.[36] DISBARMENT IN CONNECTION TO ADMISSION TO THE BAR
Philippine jurisprudence contains several bar examination anomalies committed by those aspirants to become members of the legal profession. At any rate, the discovery of these bar scandals caused the disbarment of concerned lawyers and examinees. The first bar examination scandal took place i n 1928. Unable to obtain a passing grade for t he second time, Felipe del Rosario filed a petition i n the Supreme Court for a revision of his test booklet, claiming a mistake for the correction of his grades. The Supreme Court acted in good faith and granted the petition. Del Rosario was admitted to the bar. But the city fiscal of Manila conducted an investigation and found out that there was connivance between Del Rosario and Juan Villaflor, an employee of the
Supreme Court, in the manipulation of grades. They were charged with falsification of public document. Villalfor was convicted. But for lack of evidence, Del Rosario was acquitted. But such acquittal did not serve to prevent the disbarment proceeding instituted against Del Rosario. Justice George Malcolm, speaking in behalf of the Court stated that – [t]he acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney‘s certificate. While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar. (Citing therein In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266.)[37] Del Rosario was thereafter ordered to surrender his certificate of admission to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court. The second bar examination scandal took place in 1932. In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Estela Romualde z [38] , Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were charged with the crime of falsification of public and official documents. Romualdez was appointment as secretary to Justice Norberto Romualdez. By reason of said duty she had under her care the compositions and other papers and documents having reference to the examinations for the admission of candidates to the bar held in the months of August and September 1926. Luis Mabunay, who was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar Examinations, extracted the compositions, which were written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination. Romualdez and Luis Mabunay erased t he grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased the grade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote 73%. They succeeded in making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtained the general average required by the rules of the Supreme Court, and in securing the latter‘s admission to the practice of law. The Court found out that Estela Romualdez caused the al teration of the grades, without authorization from the correctors. The Court found her guilty of falsification of public document. Mabunay was found guilty as an accomplice. The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit of her co accused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and a fter the Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his co accused that he had failed. Mabunay was not allowed admission to the Bar. Another scandal in the bar examination which l ed to the disbarment of Atty. Danilo de Guzman has to do with the leakage in the 2003 Bar examination. inB.M. No. 1222, In Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, dated February 4, 2004, the Supreme Court ordered the nullification of the results in the Mercantile Law after a leakage of t he questions in the said subject happened. Upon investigation by a committee appointed by the Court, it was found that there was indeed l eakage of test questions in Mercantile Law. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, was appointed examiner for the bar examination in Mercantile Law. Using his personal computer in the law office, he prepared for three consecutive days, three sets of test questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law. As he did not know how to prepare
the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl Palma, to format the questions. And, as he did not know how to print the questionnaire, he likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a printout. All of this was done inside his office with only him and his secretary there. His secretary printed only one copy. He then placed t he printed copy of the test questions, consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called up Justice Vitug, the Chairman of the Bar Examination, to inform him that he was bringing the questions to the lat ter‘s office that afternoon. However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had been instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice Vitug‘s confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the sealed envelope containing the test questions. Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type on it . He does not know how to open and close his own computer which has a password for that purpose. In fact, he did not know, as he still does, the password. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and closed his computer for him. His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which is locked when he is not in the office. He comes to the office every other day only. He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he alone had access to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage broke out, that his computer was in fact interconnected with the computers of his nine (9) assistant attorneys. As a matter of fact, the employees – Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly – of the Court‘s Management Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request of Atty. Balgos, were directed by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in his office, reported that there were 16, not 9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network (LAN) and one (1) stand-al one computer connected to the internet. Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and questioned his office staff. He interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of them professed to know nothing about the bar leakage. Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of t he Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos‘ computer and faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the source of the leakage of his test questions in mercantile law. DECEIT AS A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code states t hat there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. This concept of deceit under Criminal Law is applicable in disbarment proceedings. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his l egal injury. The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud[39]. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that a lawyer shall not engage in willful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In a case[40], lawyer Isaias A. Celestino was disbarred for wanton falsehood when he notarized an affidavit knowing that the affiant had been dead. This deceitful conduct warranted the disbarment of Atty. Celestino. The Supreme Court, acting upon the disbarment proceeding filed against Celestino found out that – [t]he ex-parte petition wherein he sought another ow ner‘s duplicate of original certificate of title No. 62507 and presented himself as counsel for Julian Agdoma, his grandfather, whom he knew had been dead since 23 July 1945, and the affidavit which he (the respondent) represented to have been subscribed and sworn to by Julian Agdoma before him (the respondent) as notary public, thus making it appear that his late grandfather was alive, and which he used to support the ex-parte petition, are clear evidence that the respondent Isaias A. Celestino had committed a wanton falsehood in court. And this wanton disregard for truth and honesty is aggravated by his forging or simulating a deed of sale of the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 62507 executed in his favour by his deceased grandfather Julian Agdoma when he (the respondent) knew that his grandfather had been dead ten years before and therefore could not have executed the deed of sale.
xxx The respondent avoided attending the hearings conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan. Even in this Court, his whereabouts are totally unknown. His knowledge that a disbarment proceeding had been file pending against him imposes upon him the duty to make himself or his presence available to this Court for a trial. That he could not be located at his known address without making his whereabouts known implies that he had chosen to waive every right and opportunity to put up his defense. The respondent Isaias A. Celestino is barred from the practice of t he legal profession. In another case[41], a previously disbarred lawyer once again faced another disbarment case wand was charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients against the doctors of St. Luke‘s Medical Hospital. On November 12, 1987, he was first disbarred for his immoral complicity or ―unholy alliance‖ with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese business firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter‘s court. Facts of the case revealed that Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at St. Luke‘s Hospital on December 20, 1990. She was examined and diagnosed to have mild pre-eclampsia. Five days later, on Christmas day, December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family. However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December 27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child. Blaming the doctors of St. Luke‘s for his wife‘s demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, filed a complaint. During the trial the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke‘s, as requested by Attorney Grecia, lawyer for the complainant. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles. On July 16, 1991, between 8:30- 9:00 o‘ clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for another hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the medical records of Mrs. Aves. While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two pages of the medical records. The respondent‘s act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately returned the folder to Mrs. Robles (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious act) and left the office. Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages ―72″ and ―73″ missing. She ordered Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the building, calling a man (presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia‘s car). When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from his coat pocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what she had seen t o Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of them — Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico — went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way back to chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St. Luke‘s counsel, Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them t o come to her office.
In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had passed on to him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico declared that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages ―72″ and ―73″ of the medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them as the same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man.
After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized this, so she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered Sandico to submit a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police. A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia‘s driver who was known only as ―SID.‖ He located Grecia‘s hou se in Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to enter the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin of ―SID‖ and asked for the latter. The housemaid informed him that ―SID‖ was sent home to his province by Grecia.
He talked with Grecia himself but t he latter denied that he had a driver named ―SID.‖ PO3 Alabastro also talked with one of Grecia‘s neighbors across the street. The neighbor confirmed that Grecia‘s driver was a fellow named ―SID‖. The Court found Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty of disbarment. Said the Court in its decision – On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves‘ medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that: Canon 1. . . . Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is ―like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice‖. An incorrigible practitioner of ―dirty tricks,‖ like Grecia would be ill -suited to discharge the role of ―an instrument to advance the ends of justice.‖
xxx By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the Bar. Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanour or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favourable opinion of the public. MALPRACTICE AS A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT
Malpractice refers to any dereliction of duty or any act of malfeasance. The term is occasionally applied to lawyers, and then means generally any evil practice in a professional capacity, but rather with reference to the court and it s practice and process than to the client.[42]
In the recent case of Atty. Carmen Alcantara vs. Atty. Eduardo de Ver a[43], respondent De Vera was a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office. Pursuant to a favourable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favour of Rosario P. Mercado. Respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorney‘s fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent. On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client‘s funds and recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law. Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits against the Mercado family. The respondent also instituted cases against the family corporation, the corporation‘s accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of t he case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year. The Supreme Court ruled out that the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation of his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who issued the said Resolution, t he Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former client received a favourable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total of twelve different cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court. In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of previously dismissed cases. In justifying the penalty of disbarment, the Court explained that – …. there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness.
xxx [T}he barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law. The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade member of the complainants‘ family, the defendants named in the cases and the foul language used in the pleadings and motionsall indicate that the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity i n the custody of a client‘s funds. GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AS A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT
Grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment is not easy to define. There is no hard a nd fast rule to determine whether an act i s grossly immoral to warrant the disbarment for erring lawyers. The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.[44]To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree [45]. The Supreme Court has somehow come up with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., ―that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.‖ In the case of Atty. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Atty. Leo Palma[46] the Court ruled Atty. Palma‘s acts to be grossly immoral when he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; lured an innocent young woman into marrying him; and misrepresented himself as a ―bachelor‖ so he could contract marriage in a foreign land. The elucidation of the Court‘s decision in this case is worth to be quoted – The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondent‘s closeness to the complainant‘s family as well as the latter‘s complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainant‘s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter‘s back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainant‘s resources by securing a plane ticket from complainant‘s office in order to marry the latter‘s daughter in Hong Kong. He did this without complainant‘s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that ―everything is legal.‖ Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of propriety and decency. Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity. How could respondent perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away. Respondent‘s culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was ju st a 22-year old college student of Assumption Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. Naturally, she was an easy prey. Anent respondent‘s argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to t he present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then the judgment of annulment of respondent‘s marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof — clear preponderance of evidence — in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.
The interdict upon lawyers, as i nscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they ―shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.‖ This is founded on the lawyers‘ primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states: ―CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.‖
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers — the disciples of law — who are most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:
―Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.‖
Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrin ed in the Attorney‘s Oath which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is al lowed to practice. The case of Atty. Noli Eala[47], commentator of the Philippine Basketball Association, discusses gross immorality as basis for disbarment. Eala, admittedly maintained relationship with Mary Anne Moje, who was married to the complainant. Out of that illicit relationship, Moje gave birth to a child which Eala acknowledged. In the disbarment case filed against Eala, he insisted that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, grossly immoral under scandalous circumstances. The Court was not convinced and went to discuss that – [t]he immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase ―grossly immoral conduct,‖ not ―under scandalous circumstances.‖ Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere. Whether a lawyer‘s sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as ‗grossly immoral conduct‘ depends on the surrounding circumstances.‖ The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
xxx Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in ―unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,‖ and Rule 7.03 ofCanon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any ―conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.‖ xxx That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took placebefore the marriage was declared null and void. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer. xxx It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant‘s motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint. However, not all sexual relations can be considered as act of immorality. In the case of Ui vs. Bonifaci o[48], Atty. Iris Bonifacio who entered into a relationship with Carlos Ui, a married man and bore two children with him was not disbarred. Her defense that she honestly believed that the man
was single was sided by the Court. This is so, because upon di scovery of the true civil status of t he man, she parted ways with him. The Supreme Court, thru Justice De Leon pronounced – In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos U i, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him. Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui‘s personal background prior to her intimate involvement wit h him. Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent‘s suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent‘s allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be ―grossly immoral,‖ that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. We have held that ―a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.‖ Respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. (emphasis supplied.)
It may be safely assume that a number of disbarred lawyers on the ground of grossly immoral conduct have committed sexual or marital infidelity. Nonetheless, there have been cases where the Supreme Court ruled that a certain act, not sexually related is a grossly immoral act, which may warrant disbarment. In Sebastian vs. Calis[49], the act of the lawyer in facilitating the travel of a person to the United States using spurious travel documents was considered a grossly immoral conduct. The respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, i mmoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon I, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. The Supreme Court explained – Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonourable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer‘s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candour. This is the essence of the
lawyer‘s oath. The lawyer‘s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he made her travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondent‘s acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration of justice. Running away with P2, 500.00 paid as settlement for a victim killed in a vehicular accident has also been characterized as a grossly immoral conduct. In a case[50], complainant Victoriano Resureccion, on May 13, 1970, was involved in a vehicular accident in EDSA resulting in the death of a boy. By reason of the said incident, Resureccion was accused of homicide thru reckles s imprudence before the City Fiscal‘s Office at Quezon City. In the preliminary investigation, the father of the victim Mr. Armando Basto Sr. was represented by Atty. Ramon Umali. The case for homicide thru reckless imprudence was amicably settled on August 8, 1970 and lawyer, Atty. Ciriaco Sayson received from the Resureccion the amount of P2, 500.00. Atty. Sayson assured Resureccion that the sum would be delivered to Mr. Armando Basto, Sr. However, he had not delivered the said amount of P2,500.00 and the case was not dismissed for which reason Resureccion was compelled to pay anew the heirs of the victim the amount P2,500.00. Atty. Sayson was charged of and was convicted with estafa. But the Supreme Court, acting on the belated disbarment case against him observed that – Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.However, in the present case, the Court notes that even if respondent‘s culpability for estafa has been indubitably established, there is no indication that he has served sentence, returned to complainant what was due him or showed any remorse for what he did. The 27 year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused by his fai lure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought against him. Respondent Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE AS A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT
To be disbarred under this ground, two requisites must concur: (1) there must be conviction of a crime and (2) the crime must involve moral turpitude. One of the requirements before one can be admitted to the practice of law is that applicant must possess good moral character. This requirement is a continuing one as the Court has always stressed that lawyers must at all times be of good moral character, otherwise the privilege to practice law may be withdrawn. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves. Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintai n their good standing in this exclusive and honoured fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if i t
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanour.[51] Anathema to good moral character is moral turpitude. Traditionally defined, moral turpitude is an act which involves baseness, vileness, or depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. In an old case, the crime of abduction with consent was treated to be a crime involving moral turpitude. However, the Court, during this time, showed compassion to the young lawyer as he was simply suspended from practice for one year to take effect after serving his sentence. The decision is hereby reproduced in verbatim thus – The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa. Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional . On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1 The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that ―A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . .‖ The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude. ―Moral turpitude,‖ it has been said, ―includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.‖ (Bouvier‘s Law Dictionary, cit ed by numerous courts.) Al though no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. ( In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)
When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly.On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined. It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered. Although not a disbarment proceeding, the case of International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC [52] laid down a more specific guide i n determining whether a criminal offense involves moral turpitude. In this case, Micosa, an employee of the IRRI was convicted of homicide. Consequently, he was terminated from employment for violation of Institute Personnel Manual, in as much as the provision in the Manual states t hat an employee maybe dismissed on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Supreme Court held that IRRI simply assumed t hat conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. In sustaining the argument of Micosa, the Supreme Court held that – Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing citing In Re Basa and Tak Ng v. Republic as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is
unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as i nvolving moral turpitude. IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as the killing of a man is conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It added that Micosa stabbed the victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack. IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record show that Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa‘s face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa‘s face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa‘s intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self- defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa‘s character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.While . . . generally but not always, crimesmala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached. VIOLATION OF OATH AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT
Every lawyer is bound to obey the Oath which reads – I, _________________________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.‖ By way of enumeration, the following duties as embodied in the Oath when so vi olated are grounds for disbarment or suspension – 1
Duty to recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines;
2 Duty to support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; 3
Duty to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
4 Duty to refrain from wittingly or willingly promoting or suing any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; 5
Duty to delay no man for money or malice,
6 Duty to conduct oneself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. The Attorney‘s Oath has been expressed in general terms. The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct supplement these solemn provisions of the Oath. Such that, any of the grounds for disbarment mentioned in Section 27 of Rule 138 are complementary to the Oath.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates Rules that are relevant to this ground, to wit – CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man‘s cause. Rule 1.04 – A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. The duty to refrain from wittingly or willi ngly promoting or suing any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same is embodied in Canon 28 of the Professional Ethics. It provides that – [i]t is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or t o employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred. WILFUL DISOBEDIENCE TO LAWFUL ORDER OF A SUPERIOR COURT AS A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT This ground for disbarment is also embodied in t he Attorney‘s Oath. Lawyer‘s disobedience of or resistance to the order of the court may also constitute contempt of court.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases, but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and the person making them should be protected[53].
In one case[54], while the Supreme Court was convinced that Atty. Lope E. Adriano committed willful disobedience of lawful orders of the Court, the High Tribunal sim ply imposed upon the lawyer the penalty of suspension for one year. Adriano has received no less than three resolutions of this Court requiring compliance of its orders. To be recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this Court directed him, in ten days from notice, to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his failure to file appellant‘s brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Nothing was done by counsel for over a year. To impress upon counsel the gravity of his repeat ed failure to obey this Court‘s orders, on October 3, 1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten days. He was in that order also required filing his brief in fifteen days. He was warned that more drastic disciplinary action would be taken upon his failure to do either. Still he remained unmoved. Then, this Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968 commanding him to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office. The Court made it certain that this order would reach him. He personally acknowledged receipt thereof. He has not paid the fine. He has done nothing. CORRUPT OR WILFUL APPEARANCE AS AN ATTORNEY FOR A PARTY TO A CASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO DO SO
An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys willfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by l eave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official t ransactions.[55] In a case, Erwin Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 1989. He also, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City E ngineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for ―Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages‖ and in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DILG Regional Director. An administrative complaint was filed against him. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Memorandum Circular, stating in part in its decision that – With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner‘s motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him. Petitioner‘s contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court‘s power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law al lows it.
Of course, this prohibition against lawyer is a special one, as it is embodied in a special law. The rationale laid down by the Court is stated in this wise – Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members ―may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours.‖ If there are some prohibitions that apply
particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service. A disbarred lawyer cannot continue to represent himself as a counsel.[56] More so a suspended lawyer is also prohibited to practice during his suspension [57]. REINSTATEMENT
The Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to reinstate a disbarred lawyer. The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been successful, and, the refore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust[58]. The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is ―of good moral character‖ in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications [59]. The disbarred lawyer in the 2003 Bar examination scandal Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008. He prays that this Honorable Court ―in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioner‘s plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar. As culled from the records of the Court, he prayed before the Court by narrating the following – Petitioner narrated that he had laboured to become a lawyer to fulfill his father‘s childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay. Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees. Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws. Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance. In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños. Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner‘s flourishing career was cut short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment. Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions. Accompanying his petition are fourteen numerous testimonials and letters of indorsement from various sectors and officers of the judiciary. The Supreme Court was convinced that petitioner has indeed reformed and thus ordered his reinstatement in this manner – The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment. Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. xxx Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.3 However, the record shows that the long period of respondent‘s disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again t o the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent‘s disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the People‘s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003. Petitioner‘s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning: ―Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.‖ WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW , reckoned from February 4, 2004.
In cases where the Court has deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, the remorse of the disbarred lawyer and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar have been taken into account. There is no concrete guideline as to how long must it take for a disbarred lawyer to be reinstated. In a case, it took twenty-eight year for Atty. Tranquilino Rovero to be reinstated. He was found guilty for violation of Administrative Code for smuggling. The Court pointed out the twilight years of t he petitioner being at age 71 year old, and in his favor considered the following 1
Since his disbarment in 1952, Rovero has honourably dealt with his citizens.
2 He had demonstrated his moral rehabilitation and reformation as to be fit, once more, to engage in the practice of law. 3 He was appointed the secretary of the Provincial Board of Aklan where that province was organized. He had also been the duly accredited delegate of the Aklan Chapter of the Philippine National Red Cross to its Aklan Chapter of the Philippine National Red Cross to its Second Biennial National Convention held in Manila on August 23 to 26, 1957. 4 He was president of the Quezon City Central Lions Club which he helped organize, and for a time, he was president of the Board of Trustees of the Northwestern Visayan Colleges in Kalibo, Aklan. 5 He has also held high positions of trust in commercial establishments. He had been elected the president of the Filipino Industrial Corporation; the vice-president of the Meteor Company, Inc., and the president of the Rural Bank of Hermosa (Bataan), a position which he holds up to the present. 6 Testimonials have been presented regarding the high esteem accorded him in the community to which he belongs. 7 His good conduct is certified to by the president of the Aklan Bar Association and the parish priest of Christ the King Church who stated that Mr. Rovero ―is a devoted parishioner who always gets voluntarily involved in the various charitable activities of the parish,‖ and ―is cooperative and responsible and gets along fine with his fellow parishioners.‖ 8 His conduct has also merited the approval of the late Pres. Ramon Magsaysay who granted him an absolute and unconditional pardon for his crime. Still in another reinstatement case[60], the Court laid down this criterion in determining the fitness of the applicant to be reinstated. Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court, The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant‘s participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court t hat he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant‘s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time t hat has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. But not all who seek reinstatement may be granted by the Supreme Court. In t he case of Tan vs. Sabandal [61], the Court denied the petition for reinstatement after it has received numerous petitions preventing the reinstatement. Although there are testimonials attesting to his good moral character; these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials cannot, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.
In another case, Atty. Goldwin Valdez was not reinstated into the bar. Torben Overgaard (Overgaard) engaged the services of Atty. Valdez as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him. Despite the receipt of the full amount of legal fees of P900, 000.00 as stipulated in a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant‘s request for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected the complainant‘s demands for the return of the money paid t o him. Atty. Valdez was disbarred. He filed a motion for reconsideration, stating among others that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has no jurisdiction to investigate him; hence its recommendation is null. He contended that he was not properly notified of the disbarment complaint. The Court however, in rejecting this contention ruled out – The respondent‘s feeble excuse that he was no longer holding office at his Makati office address at the time the Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was sent to him is unacceptable. Ordinary prudence would have guarded against his alleged failure to receive the notices. All notices to the respondent were sent to his Makati office address, which was the address made known to the public and to the complainant. This is even the address printed on the letterhead of the Retainer Agreement between the complainant and the respondent. And although the respondent claims that he had to ―make himself ‗scarce‘due to threats to his life and safety, this does not mean that he avoids the responsibility of taking account of his mail. The respondent owes it to himself and to his clients to adopt a system whereby he would be able to receive mail sent to his law office during his absence. Assuming that circumstances would justify the respondent‘s abrupt abandonment of his Makati office, it absolutely does not give him the license to abandon his clients as well. The Court, in reinstating the lawyer, may require additional conditions. In the case of Quingwa vs. Puno[62], the Supreme Court required respondent to formally acknowledge his child who is in t he care of the mother. The Court, in its resolution ordered – Respondent Armando Puno, of Zamboanga City, in Administrative Case No. 389, petitions for the lifting of the disbarment decree issued against him by this Court in its decision of 28 February 1967,pleading that since then he has striven to lead and has led a model and exemplary life, despite the hardships undergone by him and his family. His exemplary conduct since his disbarment is attested by public officials and civic organizations of Zamboanga City, specially the local chapters of the Jaycees and the Boy Scouts, the Family Workshop of the Philippines, the Zamboanga City Amateur Athletic Federation and the Amateur Basketball Association, in which he has served as officer thereof. All of them have certified to this petitioner‘s proper and irreproachable behaviour during the past four years. Considering that the complainant has expressed no objection to his reinstatement in the practice of the law, provided said respondent supports his child by the aforesaid complainant, to which condition respondent Armando Puno has expressly agreed: and considering that this Court is now convinced that said respondent has evidenced his moral reform and willingness to atone for the misconduct that led to his exclusion from the bar, and will endeavor in the future to lead an upright and irreproachable life, assiduously avoiding occasion to bring the profession into disrepute. As prayed for, respondent Armando Puno is ordered reinstated in the practice of the law as a member of the Philippine Bar, subject to the conditions that (1) he shall formally acknowledge his child, Armando Puno, Jr., now in the care of the mother, complainant Flora Quingwa, and (2) the said petitioner will provide a minimum amount of P125.00 per month for the support of said child starting from 31 January 1971. Let the name of said respondent be restored to the roll of attorneys upon his taking anew the corresponding oath of office before this Court, and upon his submittal of the formal acknowledgment of his child. So ordered. And in another case[63], the respondent Atty. Rusiana was required to enroll in and pass the regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school. to take anew the lawyer‘s oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to the court the requisite fees. SOME OTHER RELEVANT CASES
One interesting case that caused the dismissal from service of a judge, in effect disbarring him from the legal profession is the case of Judge Florentino Floro, Jr[64]. He was ordered by the Supreme Court relieved of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City a nd considered him separated from the service due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office. The common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations against Jud ge Floro is his mental incapacity. The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995. Relying on the psychiatric evaluation, the Court was convinced that there are evidences of developing psychotic process on the part of Floro. The Supreme Court explained t hus – There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence. Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in ―psychic visions,‖ of foreseeing the future because of his power in ―psychic phenomenon.‖ He believes in ―duwendes‖ and of a covenant with his ―dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel.‖ He believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the ―angel of death‖ who can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only t o black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floro‘s uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial system. Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floro‘s reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Fran cisco, Jr. sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecution‘s principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a ―fairytale‖ or a ―fantastic story.‖ He then went to state that ―psychic phenomena‖ was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness. In a recent case, the lady senator, Miriam Defensor Santiago also faced disbarment proceeding[65] in connection to her privilege speech delivered in the floors of the Senate. The complainant, Atty. Antero Pobre, in his complaint stated that the following statements of Senator Santiago reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. The Court, in dismissing the petition sided with Senator Santiago in her defense that the speech delivered are covered by her legislative immunity. Her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or
in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. But the Supreme Court nonetheless expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted ―to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,‖ and calling the Court a ―Supreme Court of idiots.‖ Said the Court – A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armour for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them. Case law teaches us that a public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for t he office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.[66]Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. In a case, a lett ercomplaint against Justice Marcelo Fernan was filed before the Office of t he Tanodbayan. Acting upon the letter, Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez indorsed the complaint to Justice Fernan for his comment. The Court resolved that the Tanodbayan or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file i mpeachment proceedings. The Court opined in this wise – There is another reason why t he complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member‘s in cumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id .), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] i n relation to Article XI [2],Id . and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id .), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. xxx It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehaviour. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule , Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their
lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ―The first thing we do, let‘s kill all the lawyers.‖ The lines were spoken by one of the characters in William Shakespeare‘s play, Henry VI. On first impression, those who are not acquainted with Shakespearean literature would think of the statement as a pejorative attack in the legal profession. But on the contrary, this stat ement is a homage paid by Shakespeare in ennobling the l egal profession.
The accolade is spoken by Dick the Butcher, a follower of anarchist Jack Cade, whom Shakespeare depicts as ―the head of an army of rabble and a demagogue pandering to the ignorant,‖ who sought to overthrow the government. Shakespeare‘s acknowledgment that the first thing any potential tyrant must do to eliminate freedom is to ―kill all the lawyers‖ is, indeed, a classic and well-deserved compliment to our distinguished profession.[67] Unlike any other profession, law has always been regarded as a noble calling imbued with great responsibility. The ethical and moral standards that a lawyer must possess and maintain all through out his legal career is a clear evidence of the nobility i nculcated in the profession. The disbarment and reinstatement cases shown in this work can only provide for a bird‘s eye view of the intricate and exacting world of lawyers. However, one thing remains true – in pursuit of a just and orderly society, what we need are not smart and assiduous lawyers. More importantly, ethical lawyers who maintain their moral qualifications as members of the bar are what we really need. John Davis, an American lawyer and politician has a fitting description for the lawyers. Describing the legal profession he observes – True, we build no bridges. We raise no towers. We construct no engines. We paint no pictures – unless as amateurs for our own principal amusement. There is little of all that we do which the eye of man can see. But we smooth out difficulties; we relieve stress; we correct mistakes; we take up other men‘s burdens and by our efforts we make possible the peaceful life of men in a peaceful state.
