A Holistic Theory of Non-Dual Union - The Eighth Karmapa’s Mahāmudrā Vision as Reaction, Re-Appropriation, and Resolution

A HOLISTIC THEORY OF NON-DUAL UNION: THE EIGHTH KARMAPA’S MAHĀMUDRĀ VISION AS REACTION, RE-APPROPRIATION, AND RESOLUTION

Joseph A. Faria Jr. Master of Arts Thesis Advisor: Karin Meyers Centre for Buddhist Studies, Kathmandu University, Nepal 2015

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………………....1 Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………3 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..4 An Intellectual Study of Mahāmudrā……………………………………………………...6 An Introduction to Mikyö Dorjé and His Recognizing the Blessings……………………11 Literary Review………………………………………………………………………….16 Chapter Outline…………………………………………………………………………..29 Chapter One: Situating the Eighth Karmapa and His Mahāmudrā: The Historical and Doctrinal Context of Mahāmudrā in Tibet……………………………………………………………………………..32 1.1. Gampopa and Early Kagyü Mahāmudrā: The Rhetoric of Absolute Transcendence…………………………………………..33 1.2. Sakya and Gelug Critiques of Mahāmudrā and Kagyü Thought: Demands for Doctrinal Coherence, Intellectual Rigor, and Adherence to Worldly Conventions………………………………………………………………………...38 1.3 The Context and Position of the Eighth Karmapa and Recognizing the Blessings….46 Chapter Two: Recognizing the Blessings of the Union of Ground, Path, and Fruition………………………...53 2.1. Articulating the Ground, Path, and Fruition………………………………………...53 2.2. Union as Reaction: Distinguishing Between Authentic and Inauthentic Union…….79 2.3. Resolution in Union: The Non-Duality of the Conventional and Ultimate in

Mahāmudrā………………………………………………………………………….84 Chapter Three: Concluding Remarks……….……………………………………………………………………98 3.1. A Comparative Analysis of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā Vision…………………….98 3.2. Conclusion: The Holistically Non-Dual Union of Mikyö Dorjé…………………..107 Appendices: Appendix 1: A Translation of Recognizing the Blessings of Mahāmudrā……………………...110 Appendix 2: A Translation of A Response on the Sugatagarbha and the Dharmakāya………..125 Appendix 3: A Chart of Mikyö Dorjé’s Two Truth Schema……………………………………129 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………131

Acknowledgments:

I would like to take this opportunity foremost to thank my parents Joseph A. Faria Sr. and Susan Cook, as well as my grandparents Donald and Margaret Doyle, who have given me so much support over the years, both financially and emotionally, without which the present work simply would not be possible. Of course I would also like to thank my entire family and all of my friends who have also been a great source of encouragement for me in my recent studies. I would especially like to thank my professors at the Centre of Buddhist Studies, in particular Karin Meyers my thesis supervisor, but also Philippe Turenne, Susan Zakin, and James Gentry who have all encouraged, guided, and counseled me on several occasions during my graduate studies here. I also owe thanks to the rest of the students and staff at Rangjung Yeshe Institute, many of whom have given me feedback on my translation work as well as for the ideas present in my thesis. Additionally, I feel the need to offer my gratitude to my wonderful Tibetan language teachers over the years who have helped me reach a competent level of Tibetan fluency which has allowed me to translate the texts associated with this work and understand the nuances of Tibetan terminology: in particular, Cinthia Font, Sonam Dikyi, Benjamin Collet-Cassart, Luke Hanley, Tenzin Phuntsok, Tenpa Tsering, as well as too many others to mention in this limited space. I would also like to thank my professors who instructed me in my undergraduate Philosophy courses at the University of Massachusetts in Lowell for their great encouragement regarding my pursuit of studies at the graduate level: in particular, Eric Nelson, John Kaag, and Robert Innis. I would like to especially thank everyone at the Khyentse Foundation and Tsadra Foundation whose scholarships have provided me with more than enough financial means to

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pursue my studies here in Nepal, and Tsadra Foundation in particular who have shown remarkable concern for their beneficiaries’ welfare and education. I also need to thank my spiritual teacher Yongey Mingyur Dorjé Rinpoche and the Tergar spiritual community which is under his guidance for their immense and incomparable spiritual influence in my life; it is largely because of them that I decided to come to Nepal to study Buddhist philosophy and Tibetan language in the first place. Furthermore, I would like to offer my sincere thanks to Khenpo Gyurmé of Tergar Oseling Monastery in Kathmandu, who gave me an oral commentary on the text Recognizing the Blessings of Mahāmudrā which has been translated for the present work. Many thanks go out to all of the many other spiritual friends in my life who have imparted upon me their great wisdom and compassion.

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Abstract:

This research investigates the Mahāmudrā interpretation of the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé (1507-1554), particularly regarding his text Recognizing the Blessings of Mahāmudrā (Phyag rgya chen po’i byin rlabs kyi ngos ’dzin). Drawing upon contemporary research, historical developments, and textual evidence, this work argues that the Eighth Karmapa’s Mahāmudrā thought can be understood as reaction, re-appropriation, and resolution. Though Mikyö Dorjé reacted to Sakya and Gelug critiques of Kagyü Mahāmudrā, and accepted that one could reappropriate Mahāmudrā by incorporating aspects of sūtra and tantra onto the path of Mahāmudrā, he ultimately sought to adhere to the subitist tendencies of early Kagyü masters by resolving all conventional tensions of the ground, path, and fruition via a holistically non-dual union (Skt. Yuganaddha; Tib. zung ’jug). This demonstrates that both doctrinal eclecticism and upholding the transcendence of Mahāmudrā were pillars of Mikyö Dorjé’s thought, and that his theory of union provided rhetorical and philosophical consistency and justification for these views.

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Introduction

This work investigates the Mahāmudrā theory and views of the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé (Mi bskyod rdo rje, b. 1507-1554), particularly regarding his text Recognizing the Blessings of Mahāmudrā (Phyag rgya chen po’i byin rlabs kyi ngos ’dzin). Drawing upon contemporary academic research on Mikyö Dorjé’s spiritual and philosophical views as well as topics in Mahāmudrā and its relevant issues in Tibet, historical developments pertaining to Kagyü Mahāmudrā and Mikyö Dorjé himself, and also a close examination of texts written by Mikyö Dorjé and other relevant scholars, this work argues that his Mahāmudrā thought can be understood as reaction, re-appropriation, and resolution. Reaction here is to be understood in terms of how Mikyö Dorjé resisted, challenged, and generally responded to critiques of the Kagyü tradition of Mahāmudrā from Sakya and Gelug scholars who demanded more adherence to scholastic and worldly conventions by Kagyü proponents of such a subitist form of Mahāmudrā. Reaction here is to be understood in the sense of reacting to a perceived challenge while attempting to preserve or defend one’s own tradition and values, suggesting that Gelug and Sakya critiques had a strong impact on how Mikyö Dorjé formulated his Mahāmudrā interpretation and that responding to these challenges was important for Mikyö Dorjé as he attempted to clarify the intent of and remain true to his own lineage. Re-appropriation is to be understood in terms of how Mikyö Dorjé, in a manner of speaking, acquiesced to some of these critiques by allowing for and often explicitly advocating for views and practices of sūtra and tantra within the context of Mahāmudrā, demonstrating Mahāmudrā’s provisional compatibility with more mainstream Buddhist doctrines and praxis in an effort to rebrand Mahāmudrā as not divorced from these other tenets and systems. In other

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words, Mikyö Dorjé believed that, contrary to the critiques of many scholars, it is appropriate and even useful in many contexts to connect some of their doctrines and incorporate practices of sūtra and tantra onto the path of Mahāmudrā. This represents a particular manner of integrating more gradualist aspects of Buddhist theory and praxis with the suddenist aspects of Mahāmudrā. Re-appropriation here is to be understood particularly in the sense of empowering a term or idea (in this case terms and ideas used to identify a spiritual tradition) once used disparagingly: eg. Kagyü Mahāmudrā being characterized by others as the nihilist teaching of Hwashang or as incompatible with sūtra and/or tantra. Moreover, such empowerment largely comes through demonstrating anew that Mahāmudrā allows for other practices and has commonalities with other doctrines. This suggests that, while Mikyö Dorjé ultimately agreed with and sought to adhere to the suddenist and transcendental rhetoric of early Kagyü masters regarding the realization of Mahāmudrā proper, he still accepted that, at least provisionally, sūtra and tantra could be allowed onto the path of Mahāmudrā. Resolution is to be understood in terms of how, even while incorporating convential and gradualistic rhetoric and practices, Mikyö Dorjé ultimately sought to adhere to the subitist tendencies of early Kagyü masters (specifically Gampopa) by resolving all conventional tensions of the ground, path, and fruition (and coincidentally, all tensions between Mahāmudrā and other forms of Buddhist practice and doctrine) via a holistically non-dual theory of union (Skt. Yuganaddha; Tib. zung ’jug). Thus, Mikyö Dorjé was attempting to resolve the conventional in terms of the transcendent, in essence uniting transcendental wisdom and conventional means as an ultimate non-duality. Resolution here is to be understood in the sense of progressing from dissonance to consonance, which suggests that Mikyö Dorjé viewed the conventional as inherently conflicting and that all resolution is to be found in the ultimate which transcends

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conditioned and limited phenomena. Additionally, this third aspect can also be seen as the resolution of the first two points of reaction and re-appropriation, i.e. a resolution of the tension between the ideal suddenist transcendence of the early Kagyü masters that Mikyö Dorjé was reacting on behalf of and the Sakya and Gelug demands for gradualist and conventional coherence for whom he was re-appropriating. That is to say that for Mikyö Dorjé all of this merely conventional conflict is best resolved in terms of the transcendent quietude of the ultimate. In this sense then, the rhetoric and concept of union is pivotal for Mikyö Dorjé and thus has major implications for understanding his Mahāmudrā thought. These points demonstrate that both doctrinal eclecticism and upholding the transcendence of Mahāmudrā were pillars of Mikyö Dorjé’s thought, and that his theory of union provided rhetorical and philosophical consistency and justification for these views. The latter point here also demonstrates the pivotal importance of the theory of union in understanding Mikyö Dorjé’s final view, and it suggests that all of Mikyö Dorjé’s views should be reconciled with and based in an appropriate understanding of holistic and non-dual union which is the ultimate goal of all of his other merely provisional and contextual hermeneutic methods.

An Intellectual Study of Mahāmudrā The present thesis work is on the topic of Mahāmudrā, specifically with regard to the thought of the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé based on a careful study of one of his more obscure texts entitled Recognizing the Blessings of Mahāmudrā (Phyag rgya chen po’i byin rlabs kyi ngos ’dzin) which is essentially an exegetical work on the ground, path, and fruition (gzhi lam ’bras) of the Mahāmudrā system. In the course of my review of the academic literature available on Mahāmudrā, I have noticed that there seems to be a large consensus of the particular 6

difficulty of studying Mahāmudrā and ascertaining what it is, what it expresses, what it affirms and/or denies and so forth. Dan Martin succinctly problematizes the study of Mahāmudrā thusly: If Mahāmudrā differs from other types of views it would be in part at least because the something it bases itself on does not seem to supply a very stable cornerstone for a monumental structure of thought…Those of us who use philological, anthropological, philosophical and phenomenological approaches can and should take heed of such alternative voices as those of the early Bka'brgyud-pa and allow them to have their say. This might prod us to ponder the possible insufficiency of our approaches, to face with a more realistic humility the range of possible knowables, and of possible ways to go about knowing them. 1 In this regard, it is clear that the study of Mahāmudrā is inherently problematic: for a system which unabashedly proclaims the limits and often even the risks of conceptual, analytic, philosophical, and conventional approaches, it appears that some serious consideration is called for when considering how to approach an intellectual or academic study of such an unconventional practice and set of doctrines. Even in Recognizing the Blessings of Mahāmudrā, almost at the very beginning, Mikyö Dorjé cautions the reader, “Such conventional terms, the black marks of my treatise, are comparable to an old dog gnawing on dry bones; there is no way for [such conventionalities] to enter into one’s experience…”2 Taking this into consideration, it is very clear from Mikyö Dorjé’s perspective that, at least in terms of ascertaining Mahāmudrā proper, a merely textual or philosophical approach is grossly insufficient. Yet, other than relying on the text and the ideas put forth by their exegetes, there seem to be few other viable options available for the scholar. At any rate it seems likely that proponents of Mahāmudrā would be just

Dan Martin, “A Twelfth-century Tibetan Classic of Mahāmudrā: The Path of Ultimate Profundity: The Great Seal Instructions of Zhang,” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 15 (1992): 252-253. 1

nga gzhung nag tshig gi tha snyad de/ khyi rgan gyis rus skam mur ba ’dra/ myong thog la pheb par mi gda’. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 1b1-2: 2

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as quick to disapprove of any of the scholastic approaches available in our modern repertoire, as bound up in conceptual and analytic processes as they are. Though it is clear that the intellectual study of Mahāmudrā is problematic, it is not that it is an impossible or pointless endeavor, for even those very same proponents of Mahāmudrā engage in projects of expression, analysis, formulation, and theorizing. It is precisely this supposed tension between Mahāmudrā proper—that which is inexpressible and inconceivable— on the one hand, and the exegesis of Mahāmudrā on the other—that which is expressed and conceived of—that drew me into this course of study. At the same time that a figure like Mikyö Dorjé decries theoretical and analytical approaches, declaring the transcendent nature of Mahāmudrā, he is still engaged in that very project himself, to the extent that he is formulating it and communicating that nature in a manner that is intelligible and relevant for his audience. It is a project that is accomplished by means of and simultaneously bound by language, concepts, and logic. Thus, it cannot be that such approaches are completely meaningless or inapplicable for proponents of Mahāmudrā, but rather to what extent and under what circumstances they can be justified or how they can and cannot be interpreted. Based on this, if it is a justifiably meaningful endeavor for the exegetes themselves, then arguably modern scholars should be able to produce something meaningful as well, in spite of all the perceived limits of our methodologies. Considering these issues involved in the study of Mahāmudrā, I seek to take a rather multifaceted approach that consists of historical, doctrinal, and textual analysis based on a sympathetic interpretive approach of Mikyö Dorjé’s thought. Embracing the broad perspective of Mahāmudrā, as elicited by Martin in the previous citation, this work acknowledges the impossibility of any methodology restricted to a single approach, which would seem to be at odds with Mahāmudrā’s transcendental spirit which tends to reject any limited means for

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realizing it. Given that it is within his treatises that we find the most explicit expression of his thought, this work largely focuses on what is expressed by Mikyö Dorjé textually. However, it also considers historical conditions and doctrinal issues, such as divergent interpretations of the two truths and debates over Hashang’s influence on Kagyü Mahāmudrā. These, I argue, have greatly affected Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā interpretation (or at least how he formulated and expressed it), analyses which in turn act to balance the overall approach of this thesis, drawing our attention to extra-textual phenomena. The interpretative approach of this work binds these different aspects of analyses together, forming them into a comprehensible and sensible whole, which even seems to be in accord with the overall spirit of Mikyö Dorjé’s theory and rhetoric of union. This allows us to appreciate much of the meaning and intention that is not made explicit by Mikyö Dorjé’s within his own works, but which this thesis argues is critical for understanding his thought. However, such an approach clearly risks projecting one’s own assumptions and interpretations where they do not apply, and because of this philological critiques of such qualitative research are indeed considered here. As was mentioned earlier, this work is to a significant extant based in an analysis of Mikyö Dorjé’s own words. Focusing on the written word of Mikyö Dorjé helps to prevent unwarranted interpretations by relating as much as possible any interpretation made in this work to statements actually made by Mikyö Dorjé himself. For example, in discussing the doctrinal and scholastic conflicts Mikyö Dorjé had with scholars in the Gelug and Sakya traditions, I point out direct statements made by Mikyö Dorjé himself in that regard, which lend credence to claims I make further on about more specific issues and debates between Mikyö Dorjé and these traditions implicit in Recognizing the Blessings.

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The interpretive approach here is also informed by an emphasis on sympathetic hermeneutics, attempting to understand the thought of Mikyö Dorjé on his own terms and how his ideas and theories were meaningful and true for him, rather than taking a skeptical stance towards his claims and theories in an attempt to discover an objective truth divorced from his thought. A major project of this work is to demonstrate the overall consistency of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought and to appreciate his scholastic and intellectual prowess. Such a project is far better served by clarifying and elaborating upon how he expressed, formulated, and justified his own views. Though it is ultimately impossible to realize the true intention (if there even is such a thing) of any figure based merely on inference and furthermore to encapsulate such meaning through limited conventions and expressions (a sentiment that is clearly in line with the spirit of Mahāmudrā), this does not negate the value and import of the project of attempting to represent or approximate Mikyö Dorjé’s thought, a project in accord with those of many Mahāmudrā exegetes who attempted to convey inexpressible reality in terms that were relevant and comprehensible for their contemporaries. Finally, it should be noted that this research has to some extent depended on interpretation from within the contemporary Tibetan Buddhist tradition, since I relied on the counsel of Khenpo Gyurmé of Tergar Öseling Monastery (Kathmandu, Nepal) to improve my translation of Recognzing the Blessings. His explanation of the text proved invaluable for helping me to understand the text itself, especially in those cases where I found it difficult to interpret certain passages on my own. Students of Tibetan language know that classical Tibetan literature can often be quite ambiguous and unclear in terms of grammatical structure, syntax, and terminology. This can be further problematized by the prominent use of condensed terms (bsdus tshig) for purposes of keeping to a strict meter or simply as a convention. This, of course, also

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leads to the omission of particles and terms that English speakers might consider vital to understanding what is being said in a particular phrase. Additionally, any particular term might have several different meanings, leading in certain cases to an ambiguity of what the precise meaning or intented understanding of the term is. In short, the use of an informed aid is often necessary in interpreting any Tibetan text in order to make adequate use of it. Though Khenpo Gyurmé’s interpretation provided the framework that allowed me to properly translate the text, my interpretation of Mikyö Dorjé’s thought for this thesis is based on my own research and analysis. In closing, I would like to apologize in advance for any possible mistakes in my interpretation of the text and Mikyö Dorjé’s thought, which are strictly my own. 3

An Introduction to Mikyö Dorjé and His Recognizing the Blessings

Mikyö Dorjé (1557-1554) was a prolific scholar and meditation master of the Karma Kagyü tradition. He was recognized as the eighth incarnation in the lineage of the Karmapas, though it should be noted that when he was around five years old his status as Karmapa was disputed by a rival candidate; the issue was eventually resolved in his favor.4 The Eighth Karmapa’s intellectual contribution to the Karma Kagyü school cannot be understated: he commented on four of the five main sūtra topics,5 tantric doctrines, Mahāmudrā, as well as topics

To clarify issues I had in translation and where in particular I relied on Khenpo Gyurmé’s interpretation, I have provided footnotes in the translation included in the appendix. 3

For more, see: Jim Rheingans, “Narratives of Reincarnation, Politics of Power, and the Emergence of a Scholar: The Very Early Years of Mikyö Dorjé” in Lives Lived, Lives Imagined: Biography in the Buddhist Traditions, ed. Linda Covill et al. (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2010), 241-297. 4

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Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Prajñāpāramitā, Vinaya, and Pramāṇa.

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such as poetry and linguistics, with his oeuvre filling more than thirty volumes.6 His main teacher was the first Sangye Nyenpa (Sangs rgyas mnyan pa, b. 1445/1457-1510/1525) whom Mikyö Dorjé praises emphatically throughout his works, providing a vivid demonstration of guru devotion. His other instructors of note include Dakpo Tashi Namgyal (Dwags po bkra shis rnam rgyal, b. 1512/1513- 1587) and Karma Trinlepa (Kar ma prin las pa, b. 1456-1539). Though Mikyö Dorjé is often renowned for his rather blunt and straightforward challenges to scholars of other traditions, particularly in his commentary on the Madhyamakāvatāra for example, his interest in other traditions has also been noted, especially as demonstrated in his life stories.7 More on Mikyö Dorjé’s life, political affiliations, and thought will be elaborated upon towards the end of the first chapter. Though a significant amount of modern scholarly work has been done on Mikyö Dorjé, most of this has focused on his Madhyamaka thought, especially his work on the Madhyamakāvatāra, The Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas (dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta), and to a lesser extent the debate over whether Mikyö Dorjé was a proponent of otheremptiness (gzhan stong) or self-emptiness (rang stong). Given the significance of Mahāmudrā to Mikyö Dorjé’s thought and to the Karma Kagyü tradition as a whole, it is surprising that, until very recently,8 little work has been done on his interpretation of Mahāmudrā. The present work seeks to contribute to this lacuna by providing a detailed analysis of Mikyö Dorjé’s little known yet ideologically significant Mahāmudrā treatise Recognizing the

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Rheingans, “Narratives of Reincarnation,” 241.

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Ibid., 242.

See for example: Jim Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa's Life and his Interpretation of the Great Seal.” (PhD thesis, Bath Spa University, 2008). 8

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Blessings of Mahāmudrā (Phyag rgya chen po’i byin rlabs kyi ngos ’dzin).9 This short yet dense text contains a wealth of information clarifying the Eighth Karmapa’s views on Mahāmudrā and tantric practice, specifically via the schema of ground, path, and fruition (gzhi lam ’bras). Unfortunately, significant as the ideas in this text are for understanding the Mahāmudrā thought of Mikyö Dorjé, it is a relatively obscure text and few details about it are known, such as the time and place of composition. Jim Rheingans has discussed this issue briefly and accepts this as an authentic text of Mikyö Dorjé: Not much is known about the historical circumstances and the audience of this work. The first pages of the text are missing and the second part starts with a prostration to Sangs rgyas mnyan pa (ibid. fol. 1b: Pha mnyan pa 'i chen po'i zhabs la ’dud). In the colophon, the name Mi bskyod rdo rje is not mentioned. This title, however, is mentioned in both title lists (Mi bskyod rdo rje spyad pa rabs, fol. 7b; dKar chag, fol. 7a). It is thus likely that the Eighth Karmapa composed this text.10

This is a sentiment with which I agree, and thus I believe that this text is an authentic composition by Mikyö Dorjé. Furthermore, I find strong similarities in this work with ideas found in Mikyö Dorjé’s other compositions, which will be evidenced further below in the present work, further suggesting the likelihood that the author is indeed Mikyö Dorjé himself. Although it is currently impossible to precisely locate this text chronologically in Mikyö Dorjé’s lifetime, it is at least doctrinally significant in helping to connect his Mahāmudrā views with other significant areas of his thought such as in sūtra and tantra. Thus, I would argue that it certainly merits the current analysis taken here, even given the ambiguity surrounding the text. Finally, there is one small clue as to the time period in which this text was written: within the text itself

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Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O3LS12537|O3LS125373LS13592$W8039 10

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life and His Interpretation of the Great Seal,” 213.

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Mikyö Dorjé refers to himself as, “this old man.”11 If we take this statement literally—and I see no reason why the Eighth Karmapa would refer to himself in this way were he actually in his youth at the time of composition—it would suggest that it was composed sometime during his final years. Considering his relatively short lifespan of forty-seven years (1507-1554), commonsense would suggest that this was then probably written in his forties—and, I would imagine, more likely in his late forties to match a more common sense estimation of when to consider someone as elderly—allowing us to conservatively estimate that that this text was perhaps written sometime between 1547 and 1554. This text in particular has been little studied, but it merits study due to its usefulness for understanding Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought, which itself has been little studied. Although Rheingans refers to this text in his doctoral thesis,12 other than mentioning its emphasis on tantric Mahāmudrā and how this seems to contradict other of Mikyö Dorjé’s statements on the relationship of Mahāmudrā and tantra, he mentions little about the text itself. Throughout his thesis, Rheingans focuses largely on the contextual nature of Mikyö Dorjé’s question and answer texts (dris lan) with his disciples on the subject of Mahāmudrā. By contrast, this work seeks to emphasize the rather consistent and scholastic nature of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought by focusing largely on the ideas found in Recognizing the Blessings; other of his exegetical texts will be analyzed when necessary in order to help clarify his philosophical and doctrinal positions on certain matters. I am aware of the inherent risks involved with generalizing a figure’s thought over an entire lifetime and throughout different contexts, given the likelihood that any thinker’s ideas will evolve over time and be adjusted according to context. However, this also does not rgas pa ‘di. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 1b4. 11

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Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 213-216.

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preclude the likelihood of significant similarities in thought over time and throughout different contexts, and since one of the major purposes of this project is specifically to point out these consistencies in Mikyö Dorjé’s thought, I feel this holistic hermeneutic is not only justified but largely necessary. This should help scholars appreciate how Mikyö Dorjé navigated and related to different areas of doctrine and philosophy based on certain guiding principles (such as his general cynicism towards conventional phenomena, his nature of mind theory, his interpretat ion of the two truths, and so forth) and a grander vision of the finality of Mahāmudrā and its union (zung ’jug) of all possible aspects of reality. In particular, I will make frequent reference to another short text entitled A Response on the Sugatagarbha and the Dharmakāya (Bde gshegs snying po dang chos sku'i dris lan).13 Though this text is quite brief (consisting of only two folios), it is significant in its explanatory power of certain key points related to the present work, especially with regard to how to understand Mikyö Dorjé’s two main categorizations of ultimate truth: a provisional ‘categorized ultimate’ (rnam grangs pa’i don dam) and an absolute or final ‘uncategorized ultimate’ (rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam).14 Furthermore, this text’s identification of the final (mthar) view as according with a particular theory of union (zung ’jug) and Mahāmudrā is in agreement with

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Mi bskyod rdo rje. Bde gshegs snying po dang chos sku'i dris lan. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 323 - 326. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O3LS12537|O3LS125373LS13570$W8039 It is interesting to note that therein Mikyö Dorjé identifies Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka thought as propounding the categorized ultimate, which suggests that the rang stong view espoused by Mikyö Dorjé in his dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta is not the final (mthar) view for Mikyö Dorjé, as certain scholars have suggested; See for example: David Seyfort Ruegg, “A Karma bKa’ brgyud Work on the Lineages and Tradition s of the Indo-Tibetan dbu ma (Madhyamaka)” in The Buddhist Philosophy of the Middle: Essays on Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka . (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2010), 355; Also: Cyrus Stearns, Buddha From Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 63. 14

Furthermore, though I am going with a more literal translation of these two terms, I acknowledge their ambiguity in English. I choose this particular manner of translation simply due to convention. However, it should be clear from the context of their usage that the “categorized ultimate” refers to a merely provisional pres entation of the ultimate that does not represent the truth itself, whereas the “uncategorized ultimate” refers to the final and authentic presentation of the ultimate.

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statements made within Recognizing the Blessings, suggesting the finality and consistency of such views, as I argue throughout this work.

Literary Review

There has been a considerable amount of academic research done on the life and thought of the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé, however, as indicated above, almost all of this has focused on or emphasized his Madhyamaka thought— 15 more on this below. While it certainly is the case that his work on Madhyamaka has been highly influential on the Kagyü lineage and the Tibetan tradition on the whole, the overwhelming focus on this aspect of his thought somewhat belies the significance and influence of his Mahāmudrā thought, with respect to both the tradition and the level of importance it held for Mikyö Dorjé himself. This is especially true when considering, for example, how one of the more important projects for Mikyö Dorje was to demonstrate the compatibility and common purport of Madhyamaka and Mahāmudrā.16 The focus on Mikyö Dorjé’s Madhyamaka thought may simply be indicative of the intrigue of its controversial nature due to his polemical exchanges with scholars of other traditions, in particular against the Gelug tradition in his famous commentary on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra, The Chariot of the

Other scholars have noted this phenomena as well, for example: “[Mikyö Dorjé] was a prolific writer: his oeuvre filled more than thirty volumes. Previous academic research on his doctrines has concen trated mainly on his wellknown Madhyamakavatra commentary and his rang stong Madhayamaka philosophical position. His gzhan stong works, such as his Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentary and the Gzhan stong legs par smra ba’i sgron me, have also been taken into account. But his Great Seal instructions have been relatively neglected”. Jim Rheingans, “Communicating the Innate: Observations on Teacher-Student Interaction in Tibetan Mahāmudrā Instructions” (paper presented at the second International Association of Bud dhist Universities conference at the Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Wang Noi, Ayutthaya, Thailand, Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice. May 31-June 2, 2012), 180. 15

16

See for example: Brunnhölzl, Karl. The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 2004), 47.

16

Dwags po bKa’ brgyud Siddhas (dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta). 17 Whatever the intention in focusing on one aspect of a particular thinker may be, it risks creating an unbalanced and onedimensional image of a figure and their thought, ignoring the multi-dimensional nature of the thinker and the various influences on their thought and works. One of the purposes of this thesis is to present the systematic and comprehensive nature of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought, in which he makes considerable effort to relate it to sūtra and tantra, as well as specific philosophical areas such as Madhyamaka. In this respect, a greater appreciation of the comprehensiveness of Mikyö Dorjé’s thought, and the integrated nature and nuanced explication of his Mahāmudrā interpretation will hopefully have been attained. A pivotal overview of Mikyö Dorjé’s Madhyamaka thought in contrast to Gelug thought is Paul Williams’ article “A Note On Some Aspects of Mi Bskod Rdo Rje's Critique of Dge Lugs Pa Madhyamaka” (1983) based on philosophical disputes brought up by the Eighth Karmapa in his commentary on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra, the dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta against the Tsongkhapa and the Gelug tradition. These issues chiefly pertained to interpretations of emptiness and ultimate truth from a Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka perspective. Williams notes the transcendent and other-worldly rhetoric of Mikyö Dorjé, which is contrasted with the preoccupation towards the mundane phenomenal of ‘this’ world that Tsongkhapa and his followers adhere to in their explication of emptiness. The Gelugpa interpretation of emptiness for Mikyö Dorjé is wholly inadequate for achieving liberation and eradicating suffering, thus highlighting the soteriological concerns underlying his critique. Williams also notes the pedagogical nature of language for Mikyö Dorjé, in that it represents a skill in means rather than

See for example: Paul Williams, “A Note On Some Aspects of Mi Bskyod Rdo Rje's Critique of Dge Lugs Pa Madhyamaka,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 11 (1983), 125-145. 17

17

a position claiming doctrinal correctness. Ultimately, Williams concludes that Mikyö Dorjé’s notion of emptiness and the absolute is seeking something that is independent of context and conditions—the opposite of Tsongkhapa and his followers—that is to say, an ultimate that is not made dependent upon phenomena, but one that is an unconditional ultimate. Due to the focus on a single text by Mikyö Dorjé and a single aspect of his thought, i.e. his Prāsaṅgika interpretation, this work presents a limited, albeit useful, understanding of Mikyö Dorjé’s thought. This work is also pivotal for its presentation of Mikyö Dorjé’s doctrinal philosophical disputes with the Gelug tradition, which are relevant for the current undertaking. Thus, I will expand upon these insights and incorporate them into the realm of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā and tantric thought as well. Finally, it should also be noted that Williams discusses possible political and power-based motivations of the Eighth Karmapa in this work,18 something that, given the lack of explicit evidence, I deem to be largely speculative and in any case is unhelpfu for examining the coherence and development of Mikyö Dorjé’s thought.19 Another article focusing on the Madhyamaka thought of Mikyö Dorjé is Michael Broido’s article entitled “Padma dKar-po on the Two Satyas” (1985), in which he mainly focuses on the thought of Pema Karpo, yet also discusses Mikyö Dorjé’s thought in the Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas at great length in this work. Broido emphasizes the great importance of Vajrayāna in Mikyö Dorjé’s formulation of the two truths and his Madhyamaka thought in general. He mentions that what differentiates Mikyö Dorjé from certain other scholars, is his

18

Williams, “Mi Bskyod Rdo Rje's Critique of Dge Lugs Pa Madhyamaka,” 138.

19

Other scholars have presented alternative means for interpreting and understanding the polemical motivations of Mikyö Dorjé, which do not necessitate a Marxist or Foucauldian skepticism of power and authority. Karl Brunnhölzl, for example, suggests not disregarding possible spiritual and soteriological reasons for debate between religious figures, such as attempting to establish the proper view, i.e. searching for the truth. Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky, 553.

18

formulation of the ground (gzhi) and the view (lta ba); for him, the view of sūtra and the view of tantra are different, only the view of the latter proclaims the spontaneous and non-discursive śūnyatā endowed with all qualities. Although Broido presents useful information on Pema Karpo and Tsongkhapa’s understanding of the term union (zung ’jug), which is highly relevant for the current work, his presentation on Mikyö Dorjé’s understanding of emptiness and the two truths is unclear and seems to be mistaken at times, in spite of the fact that he is attempting to correct some of Williams points on this matter. For example, he claims that śūnyatā for Mikyö Dorjé merely amounts to svabhāva-śūnyatā20 which is a more appropriate understanding for Tsongkhapa’s more objective conception of śūnyatā, but not so well suited for Mikyö Dorjé’s much more subjective interpretation of the key term.21 This is further problematized by the fact that further on Broido acknowledges that the Karmapa emphasizes a cognition which is free from mental elaboration (spros bral),22 a subjective interpretation of emptiness that distinguishes Mikyö Dorjé from Tsongkhapa. Broido also makes the rather bizarre claim that Mikyö Dorjé is much more inclined to accept a “world” (although he qualifies this by claiming it is a world that lacks ontological status) than Tsongkhapa is, but as Williams 23 has pointed out, Mikyö Dorjé was very critical of Tsongkhapa’s attempts to relativize ultimate truth and preserve the existence of phenomena- in-themselves, which are empty of mere true existence. As I will argue throughout

M.M. Broido, “Padma dKar-po on the Two Satyas,” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 8 (1985): 32. 20

is not to suggest that Mikyö Dorjé does not accept svabhāva-śūnyatā, but rather that the objective emphasis on an entity’s absence of nature is not the main emphasis nor the final import of his interpretation of śūnyatā as Broido seems to be suggesting. Rather, Mikyö Dorjé’s emphasis on śūnyatā meaning freedom from mental elaboration (spros bral) suggests the subjective orientation of his conception of emptiness in terms of emptiness being an absence of mental constructs. 21 This

22

Ibid., 34.

23

Williams, “Mi Bskyod Rdo Rje's Critique of Dge Lugs Pa Madhyamaka.”

19

this text, if we here understand “world” in the sense of such relevant Tibetan terms as srid pa or ’jig rten, which both carry the connotations of conditionality, compoundedness, and impermanence, these are ideas that Mikyö Dorjé was eager to dismiss ontolologically and associate with notions of falsehood and non-existence. Continuing the academic emphasis on Mikyö Dorjé’s Madhyamaka thought, David Seyfort Ruegg wrote an article entitled “A Karma bKa’ brgyud Work on the Lineages and Traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dbu ma (Madhyamaka)” (1988), based on the same commentary analyzed by Williams and Broido above (which further demonstrates the narrowness of contemporary research on Mikyö Dorjé’s thought). He focuses on the concept of lineage for Mikyö Dorjé’s understanding of Madhyamaka, as well as how he relates this to sūtra, tantra, Mahāmudrā, and issues of rang stong versus gzhan stong. Ruegg makes the claim that this commentary, composed circa 1545, was likely written in response to critiques made by Sera Je Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsan (Rje bstun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, b. 1469-1544), specifically towards Mikyö Dorjé’s gzhan stong views on Prajñāpāramitā and the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, which is significant in highlighting the tension between Mikyö Dorjé’s views and those of Gelugpa scholars. In this regard, Ruegg also makes a problematic claim that Mikyö Dorjé turned away from his earlier views on gzhan stong, in favor of a stricter rang stong position later in life (coinciding with his composition of the Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas).24 This claim I find problematic mainly for three reasons: 1) it is clear that Mikyö Dorjé held a deep affinity for the views of both the Third and Seventh Karmapas, both of whom held or were at least believed by their tradition to have held gzhan stong views, and he believed himself to be adhering to and

24

Ruegg, “A Karma bKa’ brgyud Work,” 355.

20

often defending their views;25 2) rang stong and gzhan stong are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories, and therefore adherence to one does not imply rejection of the other; and 3) Ruegg himself notes that in this commentary, Mikyö Dorjé is merely silent about gzhan stong, there is nothing implying an outright rejection of the doctrine. In my opinion, this silence more likely reflects the context of engaging in a debate with a Gelugpa scholar who does not accept such a gzhan stong position at all, and the discussion of Candrakīrti’s Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka thought, which is widely regarded as much less amenable for explicating a purely gzhan stong position. Thus it need not imply a refutation of the entire gzhan stong philosophical position by Mikyö Dorjé. This work is also significant in discussing Mikyö Dorjé’s view that Madhyamaka and Mahāmudrā can be seen as synonymous via Maitrīpa’s non-mentation (amanasikāra) doctrine. Relevant for the current research, Ruegg mentions issues that Mikyö Dorjé had with Sakya Pandita’s critiques of Kagyü Mahāmudrā, and he also points out that Mikyö Dorjé was critical of attempts to separate Mahāmudrā from Mantrayāna, as some scholars such as Gö Lotsawa Zhönu Pal had done with his explication of a sūtra-based Mahāmudrā. In his article, “The Canonization of Philosophy and the Tibetan Rhetoric of Siddhānta in Tibetan Buddhism” (1990), José Cabezón discusses Mikyö Dorjé’s gzhan stong position in the Beacon That Thoroughly Distinguishes the Tradition Propounding Other-Emtpiness Madhyamaka (dbu ma gzhan stong smra ba’i srol legs par phye ba'i sgron me) as an attempt to present a modified version of the Cittamātra system of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as the

25

For more details on this subject, see: Klaus -Dieter Mathes. A Direct Path to the Buddha Within: Gö Lotsawa's Mahāmudrā Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2008), 61-63; 415-416. Also: Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa's Life,” 130.

21

ultimate philosophical view point,26 which Cabezón claims is a novel way of presenting siddhānta doxography in the Tibetan tradition. He does this by presenting this form of Cittamātra as Mahāmadhyamaka, thus equating it with Madhyamaka which is widely accepted by Tibetan scholars as the highest philosophical tenet one can hold in the Tibetan Buddhist doxographical system.27 This is significant in demonstrating the nuanced nature of Mikyö Dorjé’s doxography, and that his distinctions of rang stong and gzhan stong, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, for example, are much more complicated and subtle than certain scholars have described,28 though Cabezón himself admits he is uncertain about this matter.29 Karl Brunnhölzl wrote a work that emphasizes the Madhyamaka thought of the Kagyü tradition in general entitled The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition (2004), which although not a strictly academic work, contains a significant amount of detail on the thought of Mikyö Dorjé, and is thus invaluable for the present research. In the second chapter specifically, Brunnhölzl equates the views of both Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka; for example, he states that “the explicit teaching of this Mahāmudrā is the Madhyamaka of emptiness free from discursiveness as taught in the sūtra system,” the latter of which he equates with Maitripa's notion of “mental non-engagement,”30 a position well-known to belong to Mikyö Dorjé. Brunnhölzl points out that Mikyö Dorjé himself states that implicitly Mahāmudrā teaches the

José Ignacio Cabezón, "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Tibetan Rhetoric of Siddhānta in Tibetan Buddhism." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota , ed. Paul J. Griffiths et al. (San Francisco: Buddhist Books International, 1990), 24. 26

27

Ibid., 25

28

See Williams above.

29

Ibid., 24

30 Brunnhölzl,

The Center of the Sunlit Sky, 55.

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“profound actuality of both sūtras and tantras.”31 Brunnhölzl also notes that Mikyö Dorjé makes a distinction between the buddhahood of the sūtras and that of the tantras. Specifically, Mikyö Dorjé comments that the luminous mind of the sūtras is different than that which is taught in the tantras. Although the same names are used for the ground, path, and fruitio n for both the sūtras and tantras—i.e. “the Heart of the Blissfully Gone Ones,” “mind,” and “luminosity” respectively—what it is that is actually being labeled is different; in short, although distinctions can be made in this regard with both sūtra and tantra, tantra is supreme in that it incorporates both.32 This work also contains a useful discussion of the differences between Mikyö Dorjé and Tsongkhapa’s views on Madhyamaka, such as their disparate interpretations of emptiness, the two truths, and how Mikyö Dorjé categorized Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka views. In another work, Gone Beyond Volume One: The Prajñā Pāramitā Sūtras, The Ornament of Clear Realization, and Its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyü Tradition, Brunnhölzl presents an important analysis of Mikyö Dorjé’s gzhan stong thought is presented based on his Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentary. It should again be noted that while this is not strictly speaking a scholarly work, the analysis here is directed towards scholars, as well some of the claims that Brunnhölzl is making. Here, he notes two distinct levels of discourse in Mikyö Dorjé’s gzhan stong presentation: 1) a via negativa approach when discussing the ultimate at the level of conventional philosophical parlance and 2) an affirmative approach when speaking about the level of non-conceptual meditative experience and realization.33 Brunnhölzl also points out Mikyö Dorjé’s significant statement that from the perspective of direct realization in meditative

31

Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky, 57.

32 Ibid.,

61-62.

Karl Brunnhölzl, Gone Beyond: The Prajñā Pāramitā Sūtras, The Ornament of Clear Realization, and Its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyü Tradition Vol. 1 (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 2010), 147. 33

23

equipoise, neither of the terms rang stong nor gzhan stong applies;34 and it is in light of statements like this that Brunnhölzl suggests that Mikyö Dorjé should not be so emphatically categorized as either rang stong or gzhan stong, but rather appreciated for how he treats these issues and concepts in their respective contexts.35 As mentioned before, I strongly agree with this sentiment, i.e. not pigeon-holing Mikyö Dorjé with regard to either rang stong nor gzhan stong. I also think that it is important to understand how Mikyö Dorjé incorporates these and other systems of thought into his Mahāmudrā presentation, though a thorough study of this lays outside the scope of the present work. Brunnhölzl also points out that in his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Mikyö Dorjé equates the terms prajñā pāramitā and Mahāmudrā.36 Representing a shift in focus away from Mikyö Dorjé’s Madhyamaka thought in modern academia, Klaus Dieter-Mathes wrote two works in particular that mention the Eighth Karmapa, the first being “Blending the Sūtras with the Tantras: The Influence of Maitrīpa and His Circle on the Formation of Sūtra Mahāmudrā in the Kagyü Schools” (2006) and A Direct Path to the Buddha Within: Gö Lotsawa's Mahāmudrā Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga (2008). In the former work, Mathes states that Mikyö Dorjé identified Maitrīpa as having realised that his doctrine of not becoming mentally engaged (which is tantamount to Mahāmudrā for Mikyö Dorjé) has the same meaning as the Madhyamaka taught by Saraha, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, which Mathes implies was in response to Sapan’s critiques of the origin and lineage of Kagyü Mahāmudrā.37

34

Brunnhölzl, Gone Beyond, 134

35

Ibid., 132

36

Ibid., 157

Klaus-Dieter Mathes, "Blending the Sūtras with the Tantras: The Influence of Maitrīpā and His Circle on the Formation of Sūtra Mahāmudrā In The Kagyü Schools." In Tibetan Buddhist Literature and Praxis: Studies in its Formative Period, 900–1400: (Proceedings from the Tenth Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan 37

24

In the latter work, Mathes demonstrates how Mikyö Dorjé followed the tathāgatagarbha thought of the Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorjé rather closely. Mathes notes that in his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra Mikyö Dorjé distinguishes tathāgatagarbha from ordinary consciousness by defining the former as kun gzhi ye shes and the latter as kun gzhi rnam shes, which Mathes equates with Mikyö Dorjé’s gzhan stong view of the mind in its pure and the impure aspects.38 Mathes later quotes Mikyö Dorjé in that same commentary as criticizing those who interpret the Third Karmapa as asserting that the tathāgatagarbha exists inseparably within the dharmadhātu of the mind of sentient beings, and rather claims that mind has an impure aspect—possessing consciousness (sems can) and not possessing the dharmadhātu, which is tantamount to the adventitious stains that deviate from the dharmadhātu due to false imagination—and a pure aspect that possesses the manner of being inseparable from the buddha qualities which is related to such Mahāmudrā terms as natural mind (tha mal gyi shes pa).39 Mathes also points out a distinction that Mikyö Dorjé makes with regard to the important Mahāmudrā concept of “thoughts appearing as the dharmakāya,” in that this merely reflects the realization that thoughts do not exist as anything other than their dharmatā, not that thoughts can actually appear as the real dharmakāya, with this term being a mere convention to describe the realization.40 It is a subtle point, but is clearly a distinction between the nature of thoughts as they actually are and how they appear to deluded beings, with only the former being conducive for realization. Taken in relation to the present work, this would mean that the ground (ie. the

Studies, Leiden/Boston, 2006), 206. 38

Mathes, A Direct Path to the Buddha Within, 61.

39

Ibid., 63.

40

Ibid., 65.

25

dharmatā) is understood as the nature of thoughts, which is equivalent to the fruition (i.e. the dharmakāya), and that the fruition can never manifest as the deluded appearances of thought as ordinary beings perceive them. Mathes also mentions how Mikyö Dorjé was critical of Zhönu Pal’s interpretation of Rangjung Dorjé’s thought, specifically with regard to his claim that buddha nature in sentient beings is merely the six sense fields (āyatanas) which resemble a Buddha. Moreover, he states that for Mikyö Dorjé the buddha element (dhātu) is nothing other than the dharmadhātu or dharmadhātu wisdom, and is in no way to be interpreted as a cause. Mikyö Dorjé furthermore defines his and the Third Karmapa’s understanding of tathāgatagarbha as being identical with the all-pervading kāyas.41 These points are significant in pointing out the lack of a cause and effect relationship between the ground (i.e the tathāgatagarbha/dharmadhātu) and the fruition (i.e. the trikāya), illustrating that Mikyö Dorjé should rather be seen as a subitist with regard to the ground and the fruition, a point to bear in mind when investigating his conception of union (zung ’jug). Perhaps most pertinent for the present undertaking is the recent work of Jim Rheingans who has written two works solely on the Mahāmudrā thought of the Eighth Karmapa, making a much needed advance in our understanding of Mikyö Dorjé’s non-Madhyamaka thought. The two works are “The Eighth Karmapa's Life and his Interpretation of the Great Seal” (2008) and “Communicating the Innate: Observations on Teacher-Student Interaction in Tibetan Mahāmudrā Instructions” (2012). Regarding the first work, Rheingans discusses at great length the Mahāmudrā thought of Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé, with a special emphasis on the context and audience of his teachings in order to demonstrate the pedagogical and pragmatic nature of his brand of Mahāmudrā. He makes three specific points regarding Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā

41

Mathes, A Direct Path to the Buddha Within, 415-416

26

interpretation: 1) that Mikyö Dorjé emphasizes the nature or essence of conceptualization as being equal to the dharmakāya and buddhahood; 2) that this teaching is taught differently based on context, either as letting go of artifice in a sūtra based approach or as employing the tantric path of means; and 3) that the common origin of these teachings is the instruction of the guru. Although Rheingans notes that Mikyö Dorjé attempted to secure the Kagyü tradition by grounding it more firmly in the Tibetan canon and the graded teachings of Atiśa (982-1054) in a scholastic context, in his Mahāmudrā instructions and question and answer (dri lan) sessions, there is a much more liberal use of the rhetoric of immediacy akin to earlier Kagyü figures such as Gampopa, Saraha, and the like. It should also be mentioned here that in this work, Rheingans briefly discusses Recognizing the Blessings of Mahāmudrā (Phyag rgya chen po’i byin rlabs kyi ngos ’dzin), the current text under analysis here—though his discussion consists of a brief summary in order to point out that Mikyö Dorjé interprets his Mahāmudrā differently based on context and recipient of the teaching.42 Though I do not necessarily wish to dispute Rheingans’ claim of the contextual and pedagogical nature of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā teachings, I do wish to emphasize the rather consistent and coherent nature of his Mahāmudrā thought. Furthermore, his work may have overstated the amount of influence that circumstance had on Mikyö Dorjé’s teachings, perhaps in an attempt to avoid the difficult project of clarifying the philosophical reasonings and doctrinal rationales that he favored, which a great scholar and polemicist like Mikyö Dorjé surely had to adhere to and uphold to a significant degree in order to develop a coherent philosophical view and hermeneutical system, which very much influenced his Mahāmudrā thought as this work will show. Especially within the context of the present work, Rheingans’ thesis is problematized, because it is clear here that Mikyö Dorjé is attempting

42

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa's Life,” 213-215.

27

to present Mahāmudrā as a coherent and rigorous system of thought that is broadly compatible with Madhyamaka, sūtra, and tantra. Thus, for the purposes of the present work it is necessary to recognize Mikyö Dorjé as a serious scholar whose main views can be applied in a consistent manner throughout different philosophical and doctrinal contexts. Rheingans’ second work is largely a continuation of the first with elaboration on some of the concepts therein. In particular, Rheingans discusses the role of the guru as being primary in Mahāmudrā, with considerations of doctrine being secondary. Since the Mahāmudrā thought of Mikyö Dorjé is difficult to locate, he claims, the guru should be viewed as the crucial origin, means, and unifying spiritual element for Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā.43 Rheingans also identifies key elements of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā which demonstrates commonalities with Gampopa and Indian Siddhas, such as an emphasis on the removal of any clinging to experiences resulting from empowerments or to emptiness, as well as the teaching of conceptualization as the dharmakāya.44 This is significant in that it helps to demonstrate that Mikyö Dorjé attempted to preserve the Mahāmudrā lineage of early Kagyü masters, even though he was re-appropriating his Mahāmudrā in response to critiques from Sakya and Gelug scholars. Again, though this article provides a crucial overview of the Mahāmudrā thought of Mikyö Dorjé insofar as it emphasizes the contextual and sometimes contradictory aspects of Mikyö Dorjé’s thought it neglects where he makes great efforts to present Mahāmudrā as a cohesive and coherent system of thought and practice.

43

Rheingans, “Communicating the Innate,” 201.

44

Ibid., 207

28

Though a considerable amount of research has been done on Mikyö Dorje, considering the extensiveness of his compositions and the variety of subjects he wrote about,45 as well as the fact that almost all of the research performed until very recently has focused on his Madhyamaka thought, there is still much to be explored and understood in order to fully appreciate the vast breadth of Mikyö Dorjé’s scholarship and influence on such fields as tantra, Yogācāra, abhidharma, poetry, linguistics, and of course Mahāmudrā. One of the goals of the present work is to present Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā in detail as thoughtful and coherent and to clarify where he saw it as necessary and/or appropriate to incorporate elements of various Buddhist systems— such as Madhyamaka, sūtra, and tantra—in order to further demonstrate the relevance and coherence of Kagyü Mahāmudrā in the face of growing criticisms from outside traditions.

Chapter Outline

This thesis will consist of three main chapters, which will largely employ the trifold interpretation of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought as reaction (i.e. to Sakya and Gelug critiques), re-appropriation (i.e. incorporating sūtra and tantra onto the path of Mahāmudrā), and resolution (i.e. of all conventional aspects in terms of their ultimate union). The first chapter will detail some of the historical and doctrinal developments of Mahāmudrā in Tibet focusing on the teachings of Gampopa, the critiques of Kagyü Mahāmudrā by Sakya and Gelug scholars, as well

45

Of course focusing solely on written works is also a somewhat narrow appro ach and neglects other possible aspects of his thought and spheres of influence, other research should be undertaken considering these as well. For example his influence on the arts is known to be significant, as he is considered to be a founder of the Karma Gadri style of Tibetan painting; however, such work falls outside the scope of the present research. For more, see: "The Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorjé," Treasury of Lives, accessed November 02, 2014. http://www.treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Eighth-Karmapa-Mikyo-Dorjé/6230.

29

as the context of the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé in particular. This will lay the foundation for better understanding the element of reaction to these critiques and controversies in Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought. The second chapter will consist of two parts that focus on Recognizing the Blessings: the first section will analyze significant ideas and issues that appear in Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of the ground, path, and fruition, and the second will analyze his theory of union. Both sections will illustrate how Mikyö Dorjé’s thought may be further understood as reaction towards critiques and re-appropriation of Mahāmudrā in terms of integrating its path with aspects of sūtra and tantra. However, the latter section will convey in particular how his Mahāmudrā is to be understood as resolution in terms of union: that all conventional aspects of the ground, path, and fruition are ultimately and inseperably non-dual. Finally, the third chapter will consist of a comparative analysis of different aspects of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā interpretation with those of other relevant Mahāmudrā exegetes, demonstrating how we can understand Mikyö Dorjé as a figure who was essentially negotiating between two poles: that of Gampopa’s transcendental or hierarchical Mahāmudrā vision and later Kagyü proponents’ more inclusive Mahāmudrā vision (particularly as found in Mahāmudrā presentations by advocates of the non-sectarian ris med movement). In closing, the conclusion will be presented that will summarize and integrate all of the crucial ideas in the present work, characterizing Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā theory as one of both perspectival and non-dual presentations that are both based on his nature of mind theory, which leads to the resolution of all conventional dissonance within the ultimate reality of holistic and non-dual union, thus establishing the significance of understanding Mikyö Dorjé as ultimately a proponent of union, i.e. a Yuganaddhavādin.

30

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Chapter One: Situating the Eighth Karmapa and His Mahāmudrā: The Historical and Doctrinal Context of Mahāmudrā in Tibet

The Tibetan Kagyü system of Mahāmudrā (Tib. phyag rgya chen po; lit. “The Great Seal”), a system of meditation which is said to produce a direct realization of the nature of the mind (sems nyid), as well as its accompanying theories and rhetoric of the transcendental nature46 of the absolute, often presents challenges to established spiritual and secular systems alike, denigrating whatever is perceived to belong to the mundane and the conceptual spheres of worldly existence. However, Mahāmudrā and its proponents were in turn challenged and explicitly criticized for such anti-establishment rhetoric as well as for the infamous antinomian behavior of certain yogins who adhered to its practice. These significant controversies and debates had indelible effects on the Kagyü tradition of Mahāmudrā and influenced one of the major Karma Kagyü figures, the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé (1507-1554) who can be seen as attempting to negotiate between these two poles: the transcendental aims of his Kagyü predecessors and the theoretical and doctrinal demands of rival scholars and traditions. Therefore, by clarifying and properly understanding the historical context of Kagyü Mahāmudrā and its controversies preceding the Eighth Karmapa, we can better appreciate Mikyö Dorjé himself as well as his role in developing Mahāmudrā thought, and specifically how he presents that thought in Recognizing the Blessings of Mahāmudrā (Phyag rgya chen po’i byin rlabs kyi ngos ’dzin). The current chapter will therefore focus on the development of Mahāmudrā starting

When I am using the term “transcendental” or “transcendence” I mean that which has the nature or quality of being beyond the limits of expression, conceptual mind, and dualistic experience. 46

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with Gampopa, as well as Sakya and Gelug critiques, followed by a discussion of Mikyö Dorjé himself and the significance of Recognizing the Blessings for understanding his Mahāmudrā thought in light of this context.

1.1. Gampopa and Early Kagyü Mahāmudrā: The Rhetoric of Absolute Transcendence

From the beginning of its appearance in Tibet, Mahāmudrā presented a challenge to the other established spiritual systems of Tibet, in particular those that adhered to more gradualist or scholastic approaches. The Mahāmudrā system of the early Kagyüpas was characterized in particular by its strong rejection of the inferential and gradualist means of realizing ultimate reality (such as the Madhyamaka reasonings found in sūtra) or more ritualistic approaches (such as the system of empowerments found in tantra). What such figures strongly advocated for was a non-conceptual means of directly realizing ultimate reality, i.e. the nature of mind, via the pointing out instruction (ngo sbrod kyi man ngag) of the guru. Particularly important for this tradition was Gampopa Sönam Rinchen (Sgam po pa bsod nams rin chen, b. 1079-1153), who many in the Kagyü tradition recognize as the founding father of their lineage, a fact which is exemplified by one of the names given to their tradition: “The Oral Lineage of Dakpo”47 (Dwags po bKa’ brgyud).48 Gampopa is recorded as having identified

47

The term Dwags po is a reference to the birthplace of Gampopa, whom is often identified by the honorific title: “Dwags po Rin po che”. 48

It should be noted here that Mikyö Dorjé strongly identifies his tradition with that of Gampopa, as is evinced, for example, by the title of his famous Madhyamakāvatāra commentary: The Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas (dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta). Also, within the current work, Recognizing the Blessings (phyag rgya chen po’i byin rlabs kyi ngos ’dzin), Mikyö Dorjé notably refers to followers of the Mahāmudrā he is addressing therein as “those who follow the tradition of Dakpo” (dwags skor ba). Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a1.

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three distinct Buddhist traditions: 1) the path of the perfections (pāramitā) which takes inference49 as its path; 2) the method of mantra, which takes the guru’s spiritual power as its path, based on the generation and completion stages; and 3) the innately and simultaneously arising (lhan cig tu skyes pa) luminosity of the mind of Mahāmudrā, which takes direct perception (mngon sum) as its path.50 Due to its direct and non-conceptual approach, Gampopa emphasizes this third manner of practice as supreme in its spiritual efficacy. David Jackson describes the ingenuity of Gampopa’s Mahāmudrā as follows:

In the later part of his life, [sGam-po-pa] gave increasing attention to transmitting directly the highest Great Seal insight, perhaps in part also as an outgrowth of his own deepened and intensified spiritual insight. What was somewhat revolutionary about the approach sGam-po-pa adopted was that he sought ways to transmit this insight outside of the traditional Mantrayāna method, which treated it as an ultimate and highly secret “fruit” instruction to be conveyed only after full, formal tantric initiation and in connection with special yogic practices.51

Likewise, the Tibetan scholar and historian Gö Lotsawa Zhönu Pal (’Gos lo tsa ba gzhon nu dpal, b. 1392-1481) described the teachings of Gampopa thusly:

Concerning that [teaching of the Great Seal], rJe-btsun Mid-la [sic] had not given the Path of Means (thabs lam) and Great Seal [instructions] separately from one another. But [sGam-po-pa] taught the instructions on the Path of Means to those who were suitable recipients of the Mantra teachings, and he gave instructions on the Great Seal to those who were suitable as recipients of the Perfection-Vehicle The reference to Gampopa and the identification of his system of Mahāmudrā as the subject here is also highly significant and peculiar given the tantric nature of Mikyö Dorjé’s text, which will be discussed further on in this work. Gampopa’s identification of the use of “inference” (rjes dpag) on the path of the perfections implies that it lacks the use of direct perception (mngon sum) into the nature of mind that Mahāmudrā employs, instead relying on reasoning (gtan tshigs) to establish the emptiness of outer and inner phenomena, thus investigating the cognitive image of the universal object (don spyi’i rnam pa yul) but not the actual object (don dngos). See: David Paul Jackson. Enlightenment by a Single Means: Tibetan Controversies on the “Self-sufficient White Remedy” (dkar Po Chig Thub) (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1994), 31-32. 49

50

Ibid., 26.

51

Ibid., 10.

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(Pāramitāyāna) teachings, even though they had not received tantric initiation. He composed then a step-by-step manual of practical instruction called the Lhan cig skyes sbyor, which became popularly known also as “Dags-po’s Realization Teaching” (dags po’i rtogs chos). He taught that although the scriptures mention many essential qualities of teacher and students, a student need not have many qualities; it is enough if he just has devotion. He quickly produced realization of the Great Seal even in the minds of some unintelligent, poverty-stricken or evil persons.52 Statements such as these illuminate the main teaching emphasized by Gampopa and how his teachings were later interpreted: that Mahāmudrā was not exclusive to the path of Mantrayāna, thus demonstrating an attempt to open up the teachings of the Great Seal for a wider audience through bypassing the need for tantric rituals and initiations. Indeed, this manner of transmantric Mahāmudrā, as mentioned above, was also generally taught with a rhetoric of superiority over the teachings of both sūtra and mantra. At times, Gampopa even more explicitly criticized both Pāramitāyāna and Vajrayāna, stating: [The teachings of sūtra and tantra degenerate] to the level of the cognitive image of an object-universal, its object of knowledge. By becoming delayed in that, one doesn’t know how to impress it upon the mind and practice experientially. Because one does not know that, [the teaching] will not become the counteragent to the cognitive-emotional defilements and conceptual thinking. 53

Such a strong and clear statement conveys the heavily implied sense of superiority that Gampopa imbued his direct and non-conceptual Mahāmudrā approach with over both sūtra and tantra alike, which he furthermore distinguished as the path of the suddenist (cig car ba) which is of definitive meaning (nges don) as opposed to the inferior teachings of the gradualist (rim gyis pa) which are merely of provisional meaning (drang don).54 Gampopa is also said to have elsewhere

52

Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 11.

de shes bya don spyi’i rnam pa la shor/ de la ’gyangs pas rgyud tho g tu bkal nas nyams su len ma shes/ de ma shes pas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par rtog pa’i gnyen por mi ’gro bar ’dus pas dang po mi ston . Ibid., 34. 53

54

Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 34.

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stated that his Mahāmudrā instructions were greater even than the “Three Greats” (chen po gsum): the Great Madhyamaka (dbu ma chen po), the Great [Vajrayāna] Mahāmudrā (chag rgya chen po), and the Great Perfection (rdzogs pa chen po).55 It is clear, therefore, that Gampopa intended to demonstrate that his teachings were distinct from all other traditions and doctrines extant at that time in Tibet, which were relegated to the mundane level of inference, conceptuality, and ritual means. Finally, the anti-scholastic rhetoric of Gampopa should be noted,56 for example with the following statement in the text Responding to the Questions of Düsum Khyenpa (dus mkhyen shus len), “One needs to forget all the technical terms of the treatises (bstan bcos kyi tha snyad). Those whose learning is extensive are acute in words, but obtuse in meanings. Their talents turn into faults.”57 Such strong rhetoric of demarcation between his own teachings and those of others on the part of Gampopa is substantially different from Mikyö Dorjé’s more inclusive approach in the present work. A brief mention here should also be made of the controversial figure Lama Zhang (Bla ma zhang, b. 1122-93), since many later critics of Mahāmudrā may have had him specifically in mind due to his infamy for both his extreme rhetoric and forceful conduct. Following Gampopa’s anti-intellectual style, Zhang has for instance remarked, “While falling short of the mark does not mean an end to development, following what has not entered deep within will give rise to disease. Those contemplators who have mastered mind-made philosophies will be invaded by the

55

Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 35.

56

This is not to suggest that Gampopa was not a scholar in his own right, but rather that he was ultimately critical of a strict adherence to purely scholastic means divorced from authentic experience and direct non -conceptual realization. Martin, Dan, “A Twelfth-century Tibetan Classic of Mahāmudrā: The Path of Ultimate Profundity: The Great Seal Instructions of Zhang,” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 15 (1992): 245. 57

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chronic disease of partiality,”58 and, “[This truth] will not be fathomed by those tongue-users who are conceited about what is a mere object of [conceptual] understanding [accessible] through their critical investigations of mere [minor] experience and mere words, through the bustle [?] of mere purposeful effort. Having concealed [this truth] through their own evil thoughts, they acquire great demerit.”59 Here, we should note that while the strong sense of antischolasticism is the same as Gampopa’s, the rhetoric employed is much more damning. Zhang was also known for his antinomian and at times even violent conduct, which included armed conflict and the use of military force against his opponents.60 Though such conduct was not totally unprecedented given the history of the famously unconventional Mahāsiddhas and divine madmen (chos smyon pa), it was still quite remarkable for many Tibetans, apparently at one time even requiring an intervention by the First Karmapa Düsum Khyenpa (Dus gsum mkhyen pa, b. 1110-1193), who viewed himself as a peacemaker in the conflict.61 However, Zhang did provide a defense for his conduct via the rhetoric of transcendence so common to Mahāmudrā, as in the following example: I have abandoned the world. Many years have passed since the link with the world has been completely severed and I have entirely gone beyond into unborn space. Reckoning by these outer activities of mine, many others cannot comprehend [or accept my behavior]…Taken as objects within a worldly value system, these things are all seen to be nothing but apparently worldly activities such as metal casting, residence-bases, the closing off and controlling of roads, [enforcing] secular law, theft, and fighting. But if there fundamentally exists any connection with this world, it has died… 62

58

Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 247.

59

Ibid., 52.

60

Ibid., 61.

61

Ibid., 63.

62

Ibid., 62.

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While Lama Zhang was seen by many to have resorted to extreme and unconscionable behavior, his actions were not totally without precedent and are conceivably justifiable through the use of such transcendental rhetoric familiar to adherents of Mahāmudrā. It was occurrences such as these that prompted sharp critiques by powerful figures, and in turn required answers and justification by figures such as the Eighth Karmapa, as we shall see.

1.2. Sakya and Gelug Critiques of Mahāmudrā and Kagyü Thought: Demands for Doctrinal Coherence, Intellectual Rigor, and Adherence to Worldly Conventions

The unconventional rhetoric and conduct of the tradition of Kagyü Mahāmudrā prompted very strong and damning responses from powerful figures, not least among them Sakya Paṇḍita (Sa skya paṇ ḍi ta, b. 1182-1251).63 In particular, in his famous text Differentiating the Three Precepts (sdom gsum gyi rab tu dbye ba’i bstan bcos), Sakya Paṇḍita made very strong arguments against the Mahāmudrā that was being touted in the Kagyü traditions. Sakya Paṇḍita identified strongly with the sūtric and tantric teachings of India,64 and saw Kagyü Mahāmudrā as a dangerous departure from these lineages, instead arguing that it was something modern and novel (ta lta’i),65 i.e. a fabrication and departure from accepted tradition,66 and he identified it

For more on Sakya Paṇḍita’s influence in Tibetan religion and politics, see: Ronald M. Davidson, Tibetan Renaissance Tantric Buddhism in the Rebirth of Tibetan Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 63

64

Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 85.

65

Ibid., 84.

66

Ibid., 80.

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pejoratively with the infamous teachings of Hwashang Mohoyen,67 who is renowned for losing the famous debate with Kamalaśīla (740–795) at bSam yas Monastery due to advocating for a purely suddenist approach and the suppression of thoughts in meditative equipoise.68 Sakya Paṇḍita very strongly differentiated what he understood as his own tradition of Mahāmudrā from that of the Kagyüpas, stating for example that, “Our Great Seal is the Gnosis arisen from tantric consecration and the spontaneously arisen Gnosis that has arisen from the meditative absorption (samādhi) of the two stages…The Buddha taught no other understanding of the Great Seal besides that.”69 Such a claim clearly illustrates Sakya Paṇḍita’s desire to isolate Mahāmudrā within the realm of tantra, an approach in marked contrast to the Mahāmudrā of the Kagyüpas. In his work on this matter, David Jackson presents three main doctrines that Sakya Paṇḍita criticizes with respect to Kagyü Mahāmudrā: 1) That a single method or factor (i.e. the ‘Single White Remedy’ dkar po chig thub)70 could ever suffice soteriologically; 2) That the primordial wisdom (ye shes) of Mahāmudrā could arise through an exclusively non-conceptual

67

Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 78.

Ruegg explains that the expression “Hashang’s theory” is a typological designation in Tibet for “gnoseological nativism,” “philosophical ataraxia,” etc., See: David S. Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 1989), 130. 68

Furthermore, A later Sakya scholar, Gorampa Sonam Senge (Go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, b. 1429-1489) followed Sakya Paṇḍita’s lead and also described two traditions of Mahāmudrā: that of his own tradition (rang lugs) and a Chinese version (rgya nag lugs) held by others (gzhan lugs). This latter tradition was in error due to its mere facsimile of insight (lhag thong ltar snang) which fixates solely on emptiness (stong rkyang du lta ba). Gorampa also saw this Mahāmudrā as characterized by the suppression of thought which rests in a blank void (stong pa had de ‘jog pa’i rtog pa kha tshom pa nyid). This is significant in demonstrating how the Sakya tradition and those who perceived similarities between Kagyü Mahāmudrā and the system of Hwashang characterized that tradition of Mahāmudrā as one that has a false or extreme view of emptiness. For more see: Ibid., 105. 69

Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 90.

The so-called ‘Single White Remedy’ or dkar po chig thub, is a term associated with the Mahāmudrā teachings of Gampopa meant to convey the soteriological self-sufficiency of the realization of the true nature of mind. As mentioned, this term was heavily criticized by opponents such as Sakya Paṇḍita. For more, see: Ibid., 149. 70

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meditative method; and 3) That Mahāmudrā could ever be taught apart from the Mantrayāna.71 Jackson also rightfully pointed out that Sakya Paṇḍita had strong scholastic concerns as well, claiming that doctrines should only be accepted on the basis of scripture and reasoning (lung rigs): Acceptance, too, should be done through scripture and reasoning. With scripture, furthermore, take the definitive meaning as the decisive criterion. Don’t rely on provisional meaning! With reasoning, moreover, you should uphold objectively grounded reasoning. Fallacious reasoning is pointless. To accept and reject after examining the intention is the way of the learned. To hold as chief the teachings of the non-Buddhist Indian sectarians and the tradition of the “Old [Tibetans]” is the conduct of the ignorant.72

With the strongly anti-scholastic rhetoric having been employed by proponents of Kagyü Mahāmudrā, it is clear from statements like this that Sakya Paṇḍita took offense with such sentiments. Such critiques aimed at the Kagyü traditions were not taken lightly of course, and this was compounded by the fact that they came from Sakya Paṇḍita. As Ulrich Kragh explains, “it was a criticism coming from one of the most influential persons in Tibet at the time, whose power was felt both scholastically and secularly.”73 Indeed a decade after writing Differentiating the Three Precepts, Sakya Paṇḍita had received favor from the court of the Mongols, thus establishing the Sakya tradition as the most powerful in Tibet at that time. While it is not the intent of the current work to suggest or infer political or other worldly motivations for various figures involved in these controversies, it is important to acknowledge the presence of these more secular factors due to the demands and challenges they place on various figures and

71

Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 72.

72

Ibid., 118.

Ulrich T. Kragh, "Culture and Subculture - A Study of the Mahāmudrā Teachings of Sgam po pa." (Master's thesis, University of Copenhagen), 1998: 42. 73

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traditions for legitimation of their own tradition and philosophical or doctrinal positions. In short, Sakya Paṇḍita’s criticisms were clearly very significant for how Mahāmudrā was subsequently perceived and demanded some kind of a response from Kagyü apologists, lest their silence on the matter appear damaging for their own tradition of Mahāmudrā. As Roger Jackson once put it, all subsequent upholders of the Kagyü traditions have been “haunted by the ghost of Sa skya Paṇḍita.”74 Following these critiques made by Sakya Pandita were the philosophical challenges brought forth by Je Tsongkhapa (Rje tsong kha pa, b. 1357–1419) and his followers in the Gelug (a.k.a. Ganden) tradition. The Gelugpas in a sense extended the critiques of Sakya Pandita, arguing against the more suddenist and transcendental language of Kagyü Mahāmudrā75 (as well as Nyingma Dzogchen) proponents in favor of a strictly gradual approach and insisting upon the superiority of scholastic and analytical approaches to both theory and practice. Concerning the

74

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa's Life,” 246.

As David Jackson has pointed out, Gelugpa responses to the Kagyü Mahāmudrā system itself and its validity varied from outright rejection to more diplomatic approaches, with the latter approach largely due to the fact that the Gelugpa had their own tradition of Mahāmudrā, sometimes referred to as the “dGa’ ldan bKa’ brgyud’, demonstrating some affinity between the two traditions. However, even for those Gelugpas who accepted the Kagyü Mahāmudrā as a valid tradition, there were still doctrinal, philosophical, and practical issues. For instance, the Gelugpa scholars Jangkya Rölpay Dorjé (1717-1786) and his contemporary Thükwan Chökyi Nyima (1737-1802), both seemed much more concerned with refuting the non -mentation doctrine associated with Kagyü Mahāmudrā than questioning the validity of the tradition on the whole, as Sakya Paṇḍita had done. Although these two figures come after Mikyö Dorjé’s time, this still demonstrates the overall unease Gelugpa scholars felt towards the ideas, rhetoric, and practices found within Kagyü Mahāmudrā. See: Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 123-137. 75

Roger Jackson has also pointed out that the Gelug Mahāmudrā proponent the Fourth Paṇchen Lama Lobsang Chökyi Gyaltsen (1570–1662) essentially sides with the Kagyü tradition over Sakya Paṇḍita on the matter concerning the legitimacy of a sūtra based Mahāmudrā outside of tantric practice, which further illustrates that the Gelugpas in their entirety cannot be said to be against Kagyü Mahāmudrā proper—although it should also be noted that Lobsang Chökyi Gyaltsen seems to be exceptional in his attempts at demons trating commonalities between the Gelug Lam Rim tradition and the Kagyü Mahāmudrā, Roger Jackson further notes that later Gelugpa commentators on Lobsang Chökyi Gyaltsen’s Mahāmudrā works emphasized a strictly Gelug approach to Mahāmudrā, demonstrating their discomfort with displaying any commonalities with the Kagyü tradition. See: Roger Jackson, “The dGe ldan-bKa’ brgyud Tradition of Mahāmudrā: How Much dGa ldan? How Much bKa’ brgyud?” in G. Newland (ed.) Changing Minds: Contributions to the Study of Budd hism and Tibet in Honor of Jeffrey Hopkins. (Ithaca: Snow Lion. 2001), 155-191.

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influence of Tsongkhapa, Rheingans states, “Tsong kha pa had a considerable impact on Tibetan Buddhism, particularly on scholasticism and clerical education. With him, an era began characterized by widespread scholastic activity and intellectual efflorescence: the beginning of high scholasticism.”76 Furthermore, the Gelugpas were very critical of non-conceptual, suddenist, and transcendental rhetoric,77 theory, and any practice based therein, as evinced by Tsongkhapa’s disciple, Khedrub Je (Mkhas grub rje, b. 1385-1438) in the following statement:

Many who hold themselves to be meditators of the Snow mountains [of Tibet] talk, in exalted cryptic terms, of theory free from all affirmation, of meditative realisation free from all mentation, of [philosophical] practice free from all denial and assertion and of a fruit free from all wishes and qualms. And they imagine that understanding is born in the conscious stream when – because in a state where there is no mentation about anything at all there arises something like nonidentification of anything at all – one thinks that there exists nothing that is either identical or different. By so doing one has proclaimed great nihilism where there is nothing to be affirmed according to a doctrinal system of one’s own, as well as the thesis of the Hashang in which nothing can be the object of mentation. 78

Very strong anti-transcendental rhetoric such as this demonstrates that the Gelug critiques of non-conceptual and non-dualistic philosophical and meditative approaches were very condemning, and challenges made in this manner by the Gelug tradition produced many

76

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa's Life,” 50.

77

Sonam Thakchoe notes that the Gelugpa do have their own notion of transcendence which should be acknowledged here, one that is much more epistemologically oriented rather than metaphysically oriented as are other traditions. This is significant in that it still demonstrates the Gelugpas’ desire to preserve the status of the phenomenal and the conditional, something that other traditions and scholars—including here Mikyö Dorjé—being much more metaphysical in their notion of transcendence included in the category of what is to be transcended. For more, see: Sonam Thakchoe, The Two truths Debate: Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the Middle Wa y (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2007), 110-111. 78

Though according to Sam Van Schaik, this kind of rhetoric was aimed specifically at the Nyingma Dzogchen tradition as implied later on in the same text, Van Schaik also notes that this kind of rhetoric was targeted at the Kagyü tradition of Mahāmudrā as well. Regardless, the fundamental Gelugpa distaste for transcendental and non conceptual rhetoric is patently obvious here. See: Van Schaik, Sam, The Great Perfection and the Chinese Monk: Nyingmapa Defenses of Hashang Mahāyāna. Accessed November, 18, 2014. http://earlytibet.com/about/hashang mahayana/

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polemical and apologetic responses by notable figures such as Gorampa Sonam Sengey, Shakya Chogden (Shakya mchog ldan, b. 1428-1507), and Mikyö Dorjé himself.79 Again, the Gelugpa order had risen to prominence already during the life of the Eighth Karmapa, and so their criticisms were taken more seriously than they would be were that not the case. In order to better understand what sort of views these scholars were reacting against, a brief presentation of Gelugpa ideology is warranted. For our purposes here, it is perhaps best to focus on how Tsongkhapa and his followers interpret the important Madhyamaka doctrine of the two truths (bden pa gnyis)80 —the conventional truth81 (kun rdzob bden pa) and the ultimate truth (don dam bden pa)—since this topic is heavily discussed in Mikyö Dorjé’s Recognizing the Blessings, and is critical for understanding the disparate interpretations of the term “union” (zung ’jug) central to the present investigation. According to Sonam Thakchoe, Tsongkhapa is a philosophical pluralist when it comes to interpreting the two truths; this is because Tsongkhapa wants to interpret both of the

See for example: Donald Lopez, “Polemical Literature (dGag lan).” in Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre, ed. Jose Cabezon et al. (Snow Lion Publications, 1996). Also: Thakchoe, The Two truths Debate. 79

80

Although a deeper analysis of some of the unique philosophical and hermeneutical positions of Tsongkhapa and his followers is perhaps warranted, it is not possible in the limited space here. A brief overview o f the particularly relevant Gelugpa understanding of the two truths here should sufficiently provide a much needed basis for beginning to understand where, how, and why Mikyö Dorjé disagrees with Tsongkhapa and his followers. This understanding will be supplemented by Mikyö Dorjé’s own understanding of their views as well. 81

A note on translation here: in translating the term kun rdzob bden pa, I am interpreting it in a manner more conducive to Mikyö Dorjé’s understanding as a “conventional truth” rather th an as a “relative truth” which might be more demonstrative of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of it. This is so because, as he does in his dwag brgyud grub pa’i shing rta for example, Mikyö Dorjé strongly equates kun rdzob bden pa with ordinary beings (so skye), conceptual mind (blo), and falsity (rdzun pa). See: Ari Goldfield et.al, trans., The Moon of Wisdom: Chapter Six of Chandrakirti's Entering the Middle Way With Commentary from the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé’s Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2005). Thus, by purposefully using the translation “conventional truth” I hope to emphasize and reflect Mikyö Dorjé’s understanding of the term as something that is merely relegated to the mundane and conceptual world of ord inary beings and not given an equal or relative status to that of the ultimate.

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truths as truth proper, with neither one being conceived as more significant or truer than the other. In other words, both of the truths are mutually interdependent and exist only in relation to one another, thereby eliminating the need to proclaim the metaphysical superiority of one over the other. Furthermore, Tsongkhapa does not accept that the ultimate truth is metaphysically unconditioned, and therefore the two truths are identified respectively as empirically valid cognition with respect to conventional truth and ultimately valid cognition with respect to ultimate truth. Tsongkhapa also views the ultimate truth as conceptually knowable and effable (at least to a certain extent), thus making a valid conceptual cognition possible. Tsongkhapa also views transcendental knowledge of the ultimate as tantamount to realizing the interdependent nature of empirically given phenomena. According to Thakchoe, this all culminates in the belief for Tsongkhapa that an enlightened being attains the perfection of knowledge of both the conventional and ultimate truths, thus finalizing the correct view of the equality of both truths. As Thakchoe points out, such interpretations were in stark contradiction with the views of other traditions and scholars.82 What is important to take away from these ideas is that Tsongkhapa held a notion of the ultimate and the transcendent which are highly dependent upon and conditioned by the relative and the conventional. As Paul Williams notes throughout his article “Mi Bskyod Rdo Rje's Critique of Dge Lugs Pa Madhyamaka,” Mikyö Dorjé took offense at such a relativized ultimate truth, and thus his formulation of a two truth theory and their unity can be viewed as a reaction to the Gelugpa interpretation of this pivotal doctrine, a point which will be elaborated upon below. By reviewing the doctrinal and ideological critiques and challenges from monumental figures like Sakya Paṇḍita and Tsongkhapa, we can begin to form a clear picture of the central

82

Thakchoe, The Two Truths Debate, 2-3.

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demands being made on the Kagyüpas by their critics: 1) That their system of Mahāmudrā should clearly demonstrate how it is related to Buddhist doctrine, particularly that found in sūtra and tantra; 2) That it should be based on reasoning and more amenable to scholastic demands for rational and doctrinal coherence; and 3) That it should rein in its transcendental fervor and adhere more strictly to the conventions of the world—not merely in an ethical sense (although that was certainly part of it) but also in an epistemological and ontological sense by emphasizing the ontological validity of the conventional truth. As will be demonstrated below, Mikyö Dorjé was certainly very aware of these critiques, and a large portion of his thought can be understood as a reaction to these challenges by Sakya and Gelug scholars. Though there has been much academic discussion of how Mikyö Dorjé’s Madhyamaka thought—particularly in his text the Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas—was a tract against the Gelugpa tradition and their unique Madhyamaka interpretation,83 as mentioned above, very little research84 has examined how such challenges impacted Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought and how he responded to these. The current examination of Recognizing the Blessings will demonstrate this important aspect of Mikyö Dorjé’s thought more clearly. In the section to follow, we will examine the context and position of the Eighth Karmapa himself in light of these controversies and critiques. This will allow for a better understanding of how to interpret his Mahāmudrā thought, which will prepare us for a closer examination of Recognizing the Blessings itself.

83

See note 36, for example.

With the exception of some recent work by Jim Rheingans. See fo r example: Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 192-210. 84

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1.3 The Context and Position of the Eighth Karmapa and Recognizing the Blessings

The Eighth Karmapa was considered to be the supreme head of the Karma Kagyü tradition, and thus carried a tremendous amount of spiritual and scholastic influence within the Kagyü tradition itself. The first half of the fifteenth century was a time of nearly unprecedented scholarly activity within Tibet,85 and Mikyö Dorjé’s own oeuvre filled more than thirty volumes.86 Included among his own monumental scholarly projects was the composition of commentaries on the first four of the five major non-tantric subjects.87 In this regard, it is clear that the Eighth Karmapa was an accomplished scholar of his day, and that his influence also crossed over into the political realm. In the decades preceding Mikyö Dorjé's birth the religious and political situation was characterized by tension and conflict between the Phagmo Drupa clan of Ü and the Tsang-based Rinpungpa clan. Yet, from the 1480s the Karma Kagyü tradition under the influence of the Fourth Zhamarpa, Chödrak Yeshe (Chos grags ye shes, b. 1453-1524), and the Seventh Karmapa Chödrak Gyatso (Chos grags rgya mtsho, b. 1454-1507) enjoyed a time of unprecedented honor and support from the Rinpungpa, which reached its peak in the period between 1498 and 1517.88 This placed the Eighth Karmapa, born in 1507, in a position of considerable power, extending his influence to wherever the Karma Kagyü held large estates, yet this was challenged by the rising influence of the Gelugpa tradition who were supported by the

85

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 48.

86

Rheingans, “Communicating the Innate,” 180.

The first four are: Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Prajñāparāmitā, and Vinaya, with the fifth being Pramā ṇa. See: Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky, 19. 87

88

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 49.

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Phagmo Drupa of Ü.89 Though it is certain that the influence and power held by these figures and traditions mandated consideration and responses in order to maintain the legitimacy of the apologists’ own traditions, as I mentioned before it is not the purpose of the present work to infer political or secular motivations in these disputes. As will be demonstrated, there were also serious doctrinal, philosophical, and perhaps most importantly, soteriological concerns at play which were arguably the main concern of Mikyö Dorjé. In discussing these issues, it is of course improper to merely assume that Mikyö Dorjé was aware of such critiques, even when coming from such influential figures as they did. As it turns out, Mikyö Dorjé seemed to be very cognizant of the fact that Sakya Paṇḍita had criticized the Kagyü tradition of Mahāmudrā, as clearly demonstrated by statements such as the following, “It also turns out that basing themselves on the mere term [non-mentation], Sa skya pan chen…[has] developed a hostile attitude to the whole non-mentation cycle, which is the Reverend Maitrīpāda’s very pure Dharma…”90 This statement is especially significant for Mikyö Dorjé given the importance that he gave Maitrīpā in his Mahāmudrā thought, whose understanding of amanasikāra (non-mentation) he employed to demonstrate the connection between Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka.91 In fact, it is clear that Mikyö Dorjé was sensitive to

89

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 50.

The political conflicts also included the Sakyapas (though there power and influence were on the decline at that time), as David Higgins notes: “The sixteenth century was marked by power struggles between the Karma pas and dGe lugs pas for territory in Khams and gTsang. At this time the Karma pas, Sa skya pas and dGe lugs pas all vied for patronage and assistance at the Mongol court of Gengzhiz Khan and his successors. The ʼBrug pa sect of the bKaʼ brgyud was also drawn into the political turmoil.” See: David Higgins, “On the Development of the Nonmentation (amanasikāra) Doctrine in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29, (2006): 261. 90

Ruegg, “A Karma bKa’ brgyud Work,” 331-332.

91

Higgins, On the Development of the Non-Mentation, 286.

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critiques of the Kagyü from both the Sakyapas as well as the Gelugpas in their charges against Kagyü Mahāmudrā. For example, he states in his Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas: [M]asters of the Sa [skya] and Dge [lugs]…have asserted that this Mahāmudrā theory and practice of the Precious Bka’ brgyud only is the theory and meditative realization (lta sgom) of the Hva shang92 …This is, however, not correct. Indeed, it has been stated [by the Buddha] that among the four recourses…dharma rather than an individual…is to be had recourse to; but there has been a deviation from this principle because of hostility [on the part of some masters to the Mahāmudrā of the Precious Bka’ brgyud].”93

What a statement like this clearly illustrates is that Mikyö Dorje was aware of and actively challenged critiques against Kagyü Mahāmudrā. Based on this fact, it is then within reason to suggest that such challenges from the Sakya and Gelug traditions had affected Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā interpretation insofar as he was pressured to answer such critiques. As indicated above, it is widely known that Mikyö Dorjé was actively engaged in debate with various Gelug scholars, and in this regard Paul Williams states confidently:

There can be little doubt that Mi bskyod rdo rje was concerned to establish firmly the Abhidharma and Sūtrayāna teachings of the Karma bKa’ brgyud in active and crusading opposition to the systematic and sophisticated interpretations dGe lugs pa scholars were presenting, a crusading opposition seen most notably in the invitation to debate issued by the twenty-three year old Mi bskyod rdo rje to the sixty-one year old dGe lugs pa scholar, yig cha author for Se ra byes, Se ra rje

92

The polemics of Hwashang in Tibetan Buddhism is a well-documented phenomenon by modern scholars (See for example: Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism). It began with a famous debate between Kamalaśīla and Hwashang Mohoyen—with the former representing the gradualist Indian approach of the pāramitās and the latter representing the suddenist approach of Ch’an. Hwashang is said to have been defeated in debate and his approach was thereby banned in Tibet. Since then, for a scholar to label an opponent’s view as “Hwashang” in Tibet was essentially to suggest that it was nihilist in nature and ignored the la w of cause and effect as well as the practice of the pāramitās. Mikyö Dorjé was apparently so concerned with this label, that he wrote a text solely devoted to detailing what views and theories he thought qualified as subscribing to the view of Hwashang, e ntitled ‘A Presentation That Points a Finger Toward the Meaning Mixed With Hwashang ’ (Hwa shang dang ‘dres pa’i don mdzub tshugs su bstan pa). 93

Ruegg, “A Karma bKa’ brgyud Work,” 336.

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btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, on the completion of the Karma pa’s commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.94

Based on such a description, it is easy to see that Mikyö Dorjé was more than willing to engage his scholastic opponents in debate and to directly challenge their views. Keeping this in mind, the question then is whether such an enthusiasm to oppose the views of others is presented in how he explicated Mahāmudrā itself, which seems to be the case in Recognizing the Blessings. Williams addresses what kinds of philosophical and doctrinal issues to which Mikyö Dorjé took exception in Gelugpa thought, focusing on his critique of the Gelugpa interpretation of emptiness as found in his Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas. Williams notes that Mikyö Dorjé sees a divergence between philosophical investigation and the task of liberation, in that for the Karmapa the mundane, phenomenal world has absolutely no theoretical or philosophical foundation whatsoever, with liberation involving an otherness or going beyond.95 Mikyö Dorjé sees Tsongkhapa’s understanding of emptiness as an emptiness that is necessarily connected with the world and with phenomena, which therefore grants these things an exalted status and an established position at some level of philosophical or theoretical activity.96 For Mikyö Dorjé then, in arguing for an emptiness that is the mere emptiness of inherent existence of a given entity—an entity which must be afforded some existential status due to not being empty of itself—Tsongkhapa and his followers are preoccupied with the worldly and are ignoring the actual state of emptiness which, for Mikyö Dorjé, must be something transcendent to these

94

Williams, “Mi Bskyod Rdo Rje's Critique of Dge Lugs Pa Madhyamaka,” 125.

95

Williams, “Mi Bskyod Rdo Rje's Critique of Dge Lugs Pa Madhyamaka,” 129.

96

Ibid., 130.

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phenomena.97 He even goes so far as to define the Gelugpa version of emptiness as a limited categorical emptiness (nyi tshe ba’i rnam grangs pa’i stong nyid), one that is equal to the nonBuddhist (phyi rol pa’i) view of the Realists (dngos po smra ba) ,98 and in being so “it is not an authentic emptiness which is suitable as a support for the path of liberation,”99 a most serious critique in the world of inter-Buddhist scholasticism. Williams aptly notes that for Mikyö Dorjé, such a view of emptiness is limited because it depends upon the situation or context to which it refers.100 This leads Williams to the conclusion that Mikyö Dorjé is after an ultimate truth that is not dependent upon context, one that is not relegated to the level of conventional truth; in other words, not a conventional or relative ultimate, but rather an ultimate ultimate that is independent of contexts, conditions, and conventions.101 What these points demonstrate is the clear unease that Mikyö Dorjé felt with the Gelugpas’ views, not only philosophically but also, perhaps more significantly, soteriologically. Recall, for example, that Mikyö Dorjé does not even consider the Gelugpa view of emptiness as Buddhist and deems it to be inadequate for the path of liberation. Furthermore, it shows in this case how he differentiated his own views from those of Tsongkhapa and his followers, in that— 97

Williams, “Mi Bskyod Rdo Rje's Critique of Dge Lugs Pa Madhyamaka,” 132.

98

Ibid., 133.

99

Ibid., thar pa’i lam gyi rten du rung ba’i stong nyid yang dag pa ma yin te . See note 30.

Williams says that Mikyö Dorjé justifies his application of the term “limited” (nyi tshe ba) to the Gelug view of emptiness thusly, “The first [quote Mikyö Dorjé uses to justify his use of the term nyi tshe ba] is from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, and refers to the itaretaraśūnyatā, the emptiness which occurs where things are mutually absent, ‘This isn’t present here’. This śūnyatā Mahāmati is exhorted to abandon. Obviously such an emptiness is mutual exclusiveness in a particular context, limited to the situation referred to by its two terms. This needn ’t necessarily be spatial limitation (cf. absence of thoughts, the absence of bad in good, etc.), it is simply that a situation is limited in that an alternative (possible or impossible) is not at that time occurring in that locus. It could presumably be a permanent, universal absence—give that there are no unicorns anywhere at all, and never have been, then it would, I assume, be an example of itaretaraśūnyatā to refer to the permanent, eternal absence of unicorns at any point in space. But, and this is the point Mi bskyod rdo rje is seeking to exploit, the absence is limited in that it depends upon the situations referred to.” Ibid., 134-135. 100

101

Ibid., 138.

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like the Kagyü masters of yore—he clearly felt the need to strongly assert an ultimate truth that is utterly transcendent, beyond the phenomenal world and its conditions—an important point that will be clarified further in the following discussion of Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of the two truths and union (zung ’jug) in Recognizing the Blessings. As indicated in the introduction, there are three ways in which I will present Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought explicated within Recognizing the Blessings, namely as: a) a reaction to Sakya and Gelug critiques of Kagyü Mahāmudrā in defense of the subitist tradition of Gampopa; b) a re-appropration of Mahāmudrā so that it is provisionally able to accomodate doctrines and practices of sūtra and tantra; and c) a resolution of all conventional and conditioned phenomena (specifically here regarding the ground, path, and fruition) in terms of their ultimate non-dual union. A close examination of Recognizing the Blessings in the following chapter will demonstrate the presence and significance of these three aspects, and in particular his theory of union and its significance for understanding his Mahāmudrā thought.

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Chapter Two: Recognizing the Blessings of the Union of Ground, Path, and Fruition

In Recognizing the Blessings, a short yet very dense text, Mikyö Dorjé seems to make a great effort to relate the Kagyü system of Mahāmudrā to as many aspects of sūtra and tantra as possible, as well as to the thought of the Indian Mahāsiddhas, and even Madhyamaka and Yogācāra philosophical frameworks (though this last part is less explicit). This demonstrates the remarkably inclusive approach Mikyö Dorjé takes in formulating his Mahāmudrā thought, especially considering the brevity of the current text in question. Yet, at the same time it is clear that Mikyö Dorjé still wants to place Mahāmudrā as the system above all other systems, using a transcendental rhetoric quite similar to his Kagyü predecessors such as Gampopa. With this in mind, the present chapter will analyze how Mikyö Dorje describes the ground, path, and fruition (gzhi lam ’bras), the pivotal role of his conception of union (zung ’jug) based on the two truths (bden pa gnyis), and how this supports understanding Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought as reaction (to Sakya and Gelug critiques), re-appropriation (of path Mahāmudrā to accommodate sūtra and tantra), and resolution (of the conventional to the ultimate via union).

2.1. Articulating the Ground, Path, and Fruition

Recognizing the Blessings is categorized as a text of “advice,” “training,” or “instruction,” (bslab bya), which suggests that it was intended to guide practitioners on the practice of Mahāmudrā; indeed, it should be noted that the section on the path takes up about half

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of the entire text, which is six folios total. Yet, much of the text also reads like a philosophical treatise, in that Mikyö Dorjé attempts to clarify many technical points of doctrine and terminology. The intended audience appears specifically to be Kagyü practitioners of Mahāmudrā, yet, as will be demonstrated, the text seems implicitly to be in conversation with those outside of this tradition as well, particularly those who doubt the authenticity and efficacy of his system of Mahāmudrā and its concomitant views. With this last point, I am not suggesting that we read this text as explicitly answering objections (dgag len), which is its own genre of text in the Tibetan tradition, a genre in which Mikyö Dorjé himself engaged enthusiastically,102 yet I do wish to emphasize the significant degree to which certain controversies and debates affected Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought and how he responds to these in the present work. Furthermore, it is clear from reading the text itself that Recognizing the Blessings is structured by the common Buddhist theoretical model of the ground, path, and fruition (gzhi lam ’bras). Explicitly, the text is about blessings (byin rlabs), but Mikyö Dorjé makes it clear that such blessings are to be found via this three-fold rubric. In the introductory section, Mikyö Dorjé exhorts his audience to understand the importance of pursuing blessings when practicing Gampopa’s system of Mahāmudrā. Immediately following that, he suggests that this necessitates the phases (’gros)103 of the ground, path, and fruition as well as their union. This model is an interesting choice in that the very structure of it demonstrates the tension between subitist and gradualist models of enlightenment in Buddhist thought. The ground and fruition, for Mikyö Dorjé in particular, represent the immediacy (in terms of the ground) and transcendence (in terms of the fruition) of enlightenment that is to be realized (the view of the subitist) rather than 102

See for example: Lopez, “Polemical Literature (dGag lan).”

103

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2b2.

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fabricated or engineered (the view of the gradualist). It is only the path that specifically entails and caters to the contexts and conditions of ordinary beings (so so skye bo), which from their perspective appears gradual and is a process of removing impurities and obscurations—a necessary evil of sorts, to realize the unconditioned ultimate which was always present in the ground104 and appears to re-emerge in the fruition.105 Herbert Guenther, in discussing this concept with regard to Buddhist tantra in general, describes this mutual reinforcement between the ground and fruition as “circular causation,” the idea that “the goal is in no way different from the foundation or starting-point, and the path, therefore, also is not some separate entity leading from one extreme to another…[a] conception which is often expressed in the words that ‘The effect is to be sealed by the cause, but also the latter by the former.’”106 This sentiment captures the spirit of Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of union as well, in that the triad of ground, path, and

It should be noted that Mikyö Dorjé’s views about buddha nature should not be defined strictly in terms of immediacy, as for example many strict gzhan stong pas might be categorized. As Klaus Dieter-Mathes rightfully notes in A Direct Path to the Buddha Within, even though Mikyö Dorjé accepted the doctrine of sugatagarbha, he did not accept that all of the enlightened qualities of a buddha are possessed by sentient beings (55). In commenting upon the thought of the Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorjé, whose views he strongly claims to adhere to, Mikyö Dorje states that sentient beings are actually equivalent to the impure adventitious stains and deviate from the dharmadhātu, which is the pure natural mind, which is also clear considering his strict distinction between the ordinary consciousness of the ālayavijñāna (kun gzhi rnam shes) and the primordial wisdom-ālaya (kun gzhi ye shes). However, the strong perspectival approach that Mikyö Dorjé follows in the present text in line with Saraha’s views—from one perspective the ground is saṃsāra (sentient beings lacking realization) and from another it is nirvāṇa (āryas with realization)—as well as Mikyö Dorjé’s insistence that buddha nature is not in any sense a cause (415-416). This suggests that he rejected a strict gradualist model which would favor a causal understanding of the sugatagarbha and also that he still adhered to a form of immediacy based on perspective rather than the existence of essential qualities. See: Dieter-Mathes, A Direct Path to the Buddha Within. 104

In his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Mikyö Dorje cautions against adhering to a cause-and-result view of something impure becoming pure, “A presentation of the ālaya-consciousness as the cause and mirrorlike wisdom as its result is not something that is obtained through reasoning. Rather, with respect to the mode of being of causes and results in terms of [such] causes and results in the abdhidharma that actually fulfills these functions (that is, what produces and what is produced), the ālaya-consciousness and mirrorlike wisdom are not adequate as a cause and result that fully qualify as such. Also, since the very nature of the ālaya consciousness is [nothing but] the adventitious stains, it is presented as impure. No matter how it may be refined by something else, it will not turn into something pure. It is not possible within the sphere of knowable objects that something impure turns into something pure, or that something pure turns into something impure”. Karl Brunnhölzl, Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2009), 56. 105

106

Herbert Guenther, The Life and Teachings of Naropa. Translated from Tibetan with Philosopical Commentary based on the Oral Transmissions, 189.

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fruition are not merely mutually reinforcing yet actually distinct phases that a linear model of causation might suggest. Rather, these phases of ground, path, and fruition are all primordially inseperable as Guenther’s circular model of causation suggests. Mikyö Dorjé addresses the intimate relationship and seemingly contradictory nature of these three concepts (i.e. that something always present could be produced as a later result through the conditions of the path) in an intriguing statement early on in the text: “If one authentically refines [the ground] by means of the path, since the fruition is Vajradhāra, the extraordinary being who has the power to appear as though re-emerging, it expresses the ground, the pervasive lord Vajrasattva.”107 Based on this statement it seems that Mikyö Dorjé was quite aware of the difficulties in negotiating these conceptual tensions involved in upholding the ground, path, and fruition schema. Here he notes that the immediacy of the ground—which he describes as unalterable (gzhan du mi ’gyur ba), timeless (thog ma dang tha ma med pa), and unblemished by ordinary consciousness (rnam par shes pa’i rgyun dang ma ’dres pa)108 —is something that nevertheless needs to be worked with in terms of the path that attains the transcendent result.109

de lam gyis yang dag par sbyang na‘bras bu rdo rje ’chang slar ’byung du rung ba ltar snang ba’i nus pa khyed par can gyi bdag nyid yin pas gzhi khyab bdag rdo rje sems dpa’ shes bya’o . Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2b1-2. 107

108

Ibid., 2b1.

109

How Mikyö Dorjé resolves this issue of needing to practice the path in spite of the immanence of the ground may be clarified by how Rheingans discusses the Eighth Karmapa’s views of the manner of purity and/or impurity of the minds of sentient beings, bodhisattvas, and buddhas respectively in his text Bla ma’i khams pa’ dris lan mi gcig sems gynis: “Referring to the Third Karmapa's Zab mo nang gi don, Mi bskyod rdo rje relies on a teaching well known from the Ratnagotravibhāga : the pure aspect, the Buddha nature inherent in beings, shows itself in the three phases: impure (for ordinary beings), pure and impure (for bodhisattvas), and completely pure (for Buddhas). How does the impure aspect of mind comes about? The mind is in essence (ngo bo) empty, its nature (rang bzhin) clear, and its expression (rnam pa) is unhindered - but this is not known by itself (rang gis rang ma rig). Therefore the mind at first (sems dang po) is timeless awareness (ye shes), and at the same time obscured by ignorance, which is called 'consciousness' (rnam shes). Conventionally (tha snyad du), the former is an existing phenomenon, the natural, self arisen inherent, undeluded Buddha nature.” Thus, for Mikyö Dorjé the path is merely a process of coming to see what has always been there, rather than developing or producing something that was not there before. 56

It may seem odd that Mikyö Dorjé here associates the fruition with the primordial buddha, Vajradhāra, but he only associates the dharmakāya with enlightened beings.110 Since Vajradhāra is the dharmakāya buddha (with Vajrasattva being the sambhogakāya buddha, representing the bliss and clarity of the ground), it makes sense that he would emphasize Vajradhāra’s context as being that of the fruition. Yet, it is also clear from the above statement that Vajradhāra as the fruition is not actually made to reappear subsequent to the stages of the path, but rather that is simply how the manifestation of the fruition appears from the unenlightened perspective. This latter notion also further demonstrates the primordial, or one could say “timeless,” nature of Vajradhāra that is never actually absent throughout any of the phases of ground, path, or fruition. Unfortunately, Mikyö Dorjé does not clarify the statement any further; however, his theory of union (zung ’jug) may help shed light on this matter. Later in the text he says, “all the phases of the ground, path, and fruition of those aspects are inseparable and in union.”111 The implications of which will be discussed in-depth below. Given the importance of the ground, path, and fruition within this text, it seems important to at least briefly address how Mikyö Dorjé defines and describes each of these phases and how this relates to his Mahāmudrā thought overall. This will further allow us to see how he deals with The path then is a process of shifting perspectives from ignorance to gnosis. See: Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 220. For example, he states in his Response on Buddha Nature and the Dharmakāya, “as the buddha nature of the cause is not the dharmakāya, the dharmakāya itself is the perfection of the two accumulations, it is what brings about the final purification of the two obscurations, it is free from the obscurations of the five aggregates, the twelve sense sources, and the eighteen elements, and being together with the three kāyas which are the transformation of the eight consciousnesses, the five wisdoms, and enlightened activity, these features are referred to as ‘the dharmakāya.’” rgyu bde gshegs snying po ni chos kyi sku ma yin la chos kyi sku ni tshogs gnyis rdzogs/ sgrib gnyis sbyangs pa mthar thug tu byas pa/ phung po lnga skyes mched bcu gnyis khams bco brgyad kyi sgrib pa bral ba/ rnam shes tshogs brgyad gnas gyur gri sku gsum ye shes lnga phrin las dang bcas pa de yi tshogs don zhig la chos sku zhes sgra sbyar ba yin. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Bde gshegs snying po dang chos sku'i dris lan. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 323 - 326. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 1b1-3. 110

gzhi lam ’bras bu’i gnas skabs thams cad dbyer med zung ’jug yin. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 4a1-2. 111

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subitist and gradualist tendencies in this work, and to demonstrate how the text may be profitably read as reaction, re-appropriation, and resolution. Demonstrating the importance of union in his Mahāmudrā thought and ground, path, and fruition theory, Mikyö Dorjé sets out by defining each phase succinctly as some manner of union. The ground, he says, is the union of clarity and emptiness (gsal stong zung ’jug), the path is the union of the two accumulations (tshogs gnyis zung ‘jug) i.e. the accumulations of merit (bsod nams) and wisdom (ye shes), and the fruition is the union of the two kāyas (sku gnyis zung ’jug)112 i.e. the rūpakāya and the dharmakāya—with each one of these pairs corresponding to the conventional and ultimate truths respectively. Based on this concise manner of describing the ground, path, and fruition, Mikyö Dorjé then elaborates each phase in more detail. When discussing the phase of the ground, Mikyö Dorjé makes it clear that he is discussing the “intention of the Anuttarayoga tantras,”113 revealing that there is indeed a strong tantric element to this Mahāmudrā text, one which was already implied by the text’s emphasis on blessings mentioned earlier.114 In fact, tantric view and practice heavily influences Mikyö Dorjé’s explication of Mahāmudrā here, which is interesting due to his remark that this text is specifically intended for those who follow Gampopa’s system of Mahāmudrā.115 As readers will recall, in the first chapter it was noted that Gampopa made a rather sharp distinction between 112

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a2. rnal ‘byor bla med kyi rgyud kyi dgongs pa. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a3. 113

114

Rheingans has already aptly noted that the use of the term blessings in this work indicates a strong connection to Vajrayāna practice. See: Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 215. Though the Tibetan edition reads phyin instead of phyir for this last term, phyir which means “for the sake of” or “for the purpose of” makes more sense in this context than phyin which is normally understood as the past tense of the verb ’gro ba (to go), and thus is likely a misspelling. sgos dwags skor ba’i phyag rgya pa yin phyir. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a1. 115

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Vajrayāna and his system of Mahāmudrā, yet here Mikyö Dorjé seems to want to have his cake and eat it too, in that he explicitly incorporates Vajrayāna elements into his explication of Mahāmudrā while also claiming it is in line with Gampopa’s Mahāmudrā system, which itself would imply Mahāmudrā’s supremacy over Vajrayāna systems. Given that Mikyö Dorjé was a great scholar of the Kagyü tradition as well as his own explicit self-identification with the tradition of Dagpo Rinpoche, it is fair to say that he was probably well aware of Gampopa’s strict distinction between Mahāmudrā and Vajrayāna thought. Indeed, as Rheingans has pointed out, the incorporation of tantra in this text even seems to contradict Mikyö Dorjé’s own thought elsewhere.116 Yet, it is my view that Mikyö Dorjé is not here trying to show that Vajrayāna along with its system of empowerments is an absolute necessity for Mahāmudrā, as Sakya Paṇḍita claimed, but rather that Vajrayāna and its practices can be merely incorporated onto the path of Mahāmudrā (re-appropriation), which would still allow him to maintain the supremacy of Mahāmudrā’s realization over other systems (reaction). This idea will be expanded upon below in this chapter. To continue with our discussion of the ground, Mikyö Dorjé describes it in basic terms such as possessing the qualities of clarity, emptiness, and bliss (gsal stong bde ba’i khyad chos dang ldan), as being the nature (rang bzhin) that exists primordially (thog ma nas yod pa), and that it represents simultaneously the intrinsic purity of (ngo bo nyid kyis dag) and freedom from (bral) conditioned or worldly existence (srid pa).117 Essentially, Mikyö Dorjé is describing the

Rheingans analyzes a text by Mikyö Dorjé, the gLing drung pa la ’dor ba’i dris lan (Answer to a Question Asked by gLing drung pa La ’dor ba), in which Mikyö Dorjé clearly expresses his view that the Mahāmudrā of Gampopa is superior to the system of the four empowerments and all tantras except for the Kālacakra. This will be discussed in more detail further on in this chapter. See: Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 200-203. 116

117

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a3-5.

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sugatagarbha (bde gshegs snying po),118 although it is curious that he does not use this term at all in the section on the ground nor anywhere else in this text. In other texts, such as his Beacon That Properly Elucidates the Tradition of the Other-Empty Madhyamaka Proponents (dbu ma gzhan stong smra ba’i srol legs par phye ba’i sgron me), he applies the term quite generously, further raising questions as to why Mikyö Dorjé does not use it here. This issue may also be related to why Mikyö Dorjé chose to say so little about the ground in this text, the discussion of which takes up hardly a single folio. Instead he chooses to emphasize the path and to a lesser extent the fruition (although of course, he reminds his audience again and again that these aspects are all inseparable). It seems that Mikyö Dorjé is here much more concerned with emphasizing the distinction between ordinary beings (those on the path) and the noble beings (those who have attained realization), describing their disparate manners of perceiving reality. The ground, meanwhile, is the fundamental state of reality that bridges the gap between these two states of ignorance and enlightenment. It seems that within the context of the path that Mikyö Dorjé takes this perspectival approach to be much more useful for his audience. This perspectival approach becomes much more apparent in the context of the path: as Buswell and Gimello have noted about Buddhist path theory in general,119 discussions of the For example, Brunnhölzl also emphasizes the doctrine of sugatagarbha in Mikyö Dorjé’s formulation of the ground which is equated with luminosity or clarity: “According to Mikyö Dorjé, the basis that is intended by this statement [‘As for the mind, it is no-mind. The nature of the mind is luminosity’] is the luminous mind as it is explained in the tantras. The purpose of saying that the actual nature of the mind (the six or eight consciousnesses) is luminosity is to understand that one attains the buddhahood of the sūtra approach through the path of the sūtras. Thus, the above quotation refers to the nondual wisdom mind that ‘is without the mind that consists of apprehender and apprehended.’ The luminous mind of the tantras resides in all sentient beings in an unmanifest way. However, when it is about to become manifest, gradually all eight consciousnesses, including their nature, completely vanish, until finally the luminous mind as described in the tantras dawns. Thus, in the Kagyü lineage, in talking about buddhahood in the sūtras and tantras, the same names are used for the ground based on which buddhahood is accomplished, the path that accomplishes it, and the fruition that is accomplished. These names are ‘the Heart of the Blissfully Gone Ones,’ ‘mind,’ and ‘luminosity,’ each one in terms of ground, path, and fruition.” See: Brunnhölzl, The Center of Sunlit Sky, 61-62. 118

Robert E. Buswell and Robert M. Gimello, Paths to Liberation: The Mā rga and Its Transformations in Buddhist Thought (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994), 10-11. 119

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path tend to mediate between the ideal and transcendental example of enlightened beings on the one hand and the experiences of ordinary unenlightened spiritual practitioners on the other. In the section on the path in Recognizing the Blessings, we see a marked bifurcation between these two modes of experience,120 particularly in terms of consciousness (sems) and primordial wisdom (ye shes), saṃsāra (’khor ba) and nirvāṇa (myang ngan ’das), and what constitutes the experience of ordinary beings (skye bo tha mal pa) and the āryas (’phags pa) and/or the siddhas (grub thob).121 Such a strong distinction between these two modes is very important for Mikyö Dorjé, as is made evident by his critiques of Gelug views on emptiness and the two truths discussed in the first chapter. In light of this, it is no wonder that Mikyö Dorjé strongly emphasizes the path here to illustrate this distinction. That being said, it is critical to also note that such a distinction is merely perspectival or empirical in its implications and so for Mikyö Dorjé the experience of an ordinary being does not have any ontological implications for reality. For the Gelugpas on the other hand, the empirical validity of conventional truth means that the existential status of conventionally valid phenomena is in some sense equal to the existential status of the level of ultimate reality. By contrast, Mikyö Dorjé does not claim that these two perspectives actually exist in their own respective spheres, which would result in proclaiming a duality and would contradict his project of a holistic and non-dual reality. Rather, though both perspectives are operative on some empirical level, one perspective is ontologically false and the other is correct. This allows him to uphold his theory of union while still emphasizing the significance of maintaining this perspectival bifurcation on the path.

This is not to say however, that Mikyö Dorjé’s discussion of the path only involves this perspectival approach, just that it is emphasized here where it is not at all found in discussions of the ground and the fruition. 120

121

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 4b4-6.

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Another important point to note here is that almost all of the scriptural citations occur in this section of the text on the path; of the few quotations found in the last two sections of the fruition and the concluding remarks, the only Indian sources,122 i.e. Nāgārjuna and Maitreya, occur within the discussion of the fruition. The manner in which Mikyö Dorjé employs these citations seems to be quite significant, in that it demonstrates his view that Mahāmudrā is able to accomodate both tantra and sūtra. Within the path section, he variably employs quotes from the Samādhirāja Sūtra, works by Maitreya, tantric sources, Āryadeva, Mahāmudrā siddhas such as Saraha, Candrakīrti, the Sūtra Requested by Sagaramati, Nāgārjuna, and Asaṅga (with this last figure demonstrating as well an affinity with Yogācāra thought). Considering how cautious and reserved Gampopa was in relating Mahāmudrā to sūtra and tantra—instead professing its superiority over both of those systems—it is interesting to see how freely Mikyö Dorjé here makes these inter-doctrinal connections under the rubric of Mahāmudrā. Not only that, but he explicitly makes it clear that what he is discussing is tantric in nature—for example, he begins the section on the path by describing it as “the path Mahāmudrā of the tantras of the exceptional methods.”123 However, he emphasizes that what he is describing is not necessarily exclusive to the Vajrayāna path: for example, before launching into a series of sūtric quotes he prefaces them by clarifying that what he is discussing regarding the purification of dualistic appearances is “Not only [found] in the secret mantra…”124 This incorporation of both tantra and sūtra into his

122

I differentiate the Indian sources found in the section on the fruition from the Tibetan sources referenced in the conclusion due to the general sense of authority the Indian sources carried in Tibetan exegesis. Reference to Tibetan sources tended to be less compelling, especially in general discussions on sūtra and tantra. Therefore, it is significant that Mikyö Dorjé employs the authority of Indian sources almost exclusively in the context of the path, thus demonstrating that he felt it necessary to supply that section with more authority and a strong basis in sūtra and tantra. 123

khyad can thabs kyi rgyud lam phyag chen. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2b2-3. 124

gsang sngags su ma zad. Ibid., 5a2.

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vision of Mahāmudrā is a clear demonstration of Mikyö Dorjé’s attempts at re-appropriation, showing that he wished to demonstrate that sūtra and tantra are indeed applicable on the path of Mahāmudrā. Regarding the compatibility between these three systems, it seems especially clear from the text that Mikyö Dorjé feels that both Mahāmudrā and the Anuttarayoga tantras possess the qualities of clarity, bliss, and emptiness. 125 While he emphasizes these similarities, he also cautions that in relation to the Mahāmudrā of the tantras of the exceptional methods, “it would be insufficient on the path of Mahāmudrā merely to [engage in] the samādhis of bliss, clarity, emptiness, and non-conceptuality which are dependent upon consciousness. ”126 Since he feels the need to qualify this form of tantric Mahāmudrā in such a manner, perhaps this suggests that Mikyö Dorjé deems tantric practices, even in the context of Mahāmudrā, to still engage and involve mundane consciousness and thus not fully possess the transcendental qualities of Mahāmudrā proper. This point is supported by statements made by Mikyö Dorjé elsewhere regarding the inferior methods of tantra, which will be discussed below, as well as other ways that we may understand Mikyö Dorjé’s presentation of “tantric Mahāmudrā.” He mentions that sūtra includes meditations on the non-elaborated and empty nature of appearances,127 with the caveat that this alone does not complete the special qualities that Mahāmudrā possesses.128 Thus, it is clear that Mikyö Dorjé is making connections in this manner between these three systems,

khyed par rnal ’byor bla med kyi rgyud kyi dgongs pa ni/ rgyu’i rgyud gsal stong bde ba’i khyed chos dang ldan . Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a3. 125

thabs khyad can thabs kyi rgyud lam phyag chen ni/ sems kyi steng gi gsal ba’i ting ’dzin ni/ bde ba’i ting ’dzin/ mi rtog pa’i ting ’dzin tsam gyis ni lam phyag rgya chen po’i go mi chod . Ibid., 2b2-3. 126

127

snang ba’i rang bzhin spros bral stong par sgom pa. Ibid., 2b5.

128

phyag chen gyi khyad chos ma tshang. Ibid., 2b6.

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re-appropriating Mahāmudrā so that it may involve aspects of sūtra and tantra, though this incorporation does not seem to represent final Mahāmudrā for him. Likewise, Mikyö Dorjé emphasizes Mahāmudrā’s supremacy at different points throughout this discussion. For instance, he cautions that an inferior manner of combining śamatha and vipaśyanā—which he implies would be too focused on the aspects of clarity of mind and non-distraction, ignoring the empty aspect of mind—would lead to “the emergence of many elaborate outer vehicles of dialectics.”129 This heavily implies not only the systems of the Hīnayāna but also of the Mahāyāna which would fall under the influence of their own conceptual proliferations as a result of their own incomplete manner of meditation. Elsewhere, he more explicitly states that: It is not appropriate to merely meditate on the non-elaborated and empty nature of appearances since it does not even arise as more profound or vaster than any of those on the path of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, nor even those of the Pāramitā, and therefore the special qualities of Mahāmudrā would be incomplete.130 Therefore, even while Mikyö Dorjé claims that his presentation of Mahāmudrā here shares views and doctrines in common with sūtra, such as possessing the teachings on the non-elaborated and empty nature of appearances, the practice and attainments of those solely belonging to the Sūtrayāna still do not compare with the transcendent realization of the nature of mind in the context of Mahāmudrā. Specifically, there are special qualities such as transcendental bliss and clarity present in Mahāmudrā that just cannot be found in sūtra.

phyi mtshan nyid kyi thek par zhib rgyas can mang po ’byung. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 3a5-6. 129

snang bar rang bzhin spros bral stong par sgom pa tsam gyis kyang mi chog ste/ nyen thos kyi lam ’ga’ zhig dang pha rol tu phyin pa las kyang/ de lta bu’i zab cing rgya che ba du ma ’byung bas phyag chen gyi khyed chos ma tshang. Ibid., 2b5-6. 130

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However, the relationship expressed here between tantra and Mahāmudrā does not so explicitly convey Mahāmudrā proper’s superiority. As has been mentioned, the Mahāmudrā here is heavily tantric and Mikyö Dorjé makes explicit statements in this regard, despite the fact that he makes strong statements elsewhere that seem to contradict this view. Such contradictory statements can be found, for example, in the gLing drung pa la ’dor ba’i dris lan (Answer to a Question Asked by gLing drung pa La ’dor ba), where Mikyö Dorjé is questioned about whether or not the Mahāmudrā of Gampopa is the same or different than the fourth empowerment of the Anuttarayoga adhered to by the Sakya tradition. He goes on to explain that there are two general categorizations of tantra: mundane (’jig rten pa) and transcendental (’jig rten las ’das pa),131 with only the Kālacakratantra being included in the latter category as superior (mchog).132 Interestingly, Mikyö Dorjé then makes two somewhat contradictory statements regarding Gampopa’s system in this regard. First, he seems to suggest that ultimately such distinctions do not apply in the context of Kagyü Mahāmudrā, stating, “The Great Seal of the bKa' brgyud Dwags po Lha rje cannot be harmonised with the question as either the same or different from the supramundane and mundane fourth empowerment from the tantric scriptures.”133 Later, however, he reveals rather bluntly his disapproval of ritualistic means for the attainment of Mahāmudrā realization: Apart from [settling the mind in the unfabricated nature], there is [no way] that one will realise the accomplishment of the Great Seal through tiresome [activities] such as to go and ask for empowerment, to ring the bell, to recite [mantra] while meditating on a Buddha aspect, and to collect yam-wood and make fire offerings; or to carry out an [extensive] meditation ritual after having collected offering

131

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 198.

132

Ibid., 200.

133

Ibid., 200-201.

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[substances].134 As should be fairly evident, these two statements seem to be somewhat at odds, claiming that even though ultimately there can be said to be no distinction between tantric methods and Gampopa’s Mahāmudrā, practically speaking there is a great difference. This demonstrates the reaction aspect of the Karmapa’s thought—i.e. upholding the transcendence of Gampopa’s Mahāmudrā over other systems—and the resolution aspect—i.e. such questions of distinction are ultimately irrelevant for what is beyond all such divisions and demarcations. What is lacking in this text is something that we find quite strongly in Recognizing the Blessings, namely the re-appropriation of Mahāmudrā in demonstrating how the tantras can be incorporated onto the path of Mahāmudrā. We can take a look at one particularly explicit statement in this regard, where Mikyö Dorjé states, “Since the meditation of Mahāmudrā is the path of the Anuttarayoga one must take up the practice which is replete with all of the qualities of the direct path of the Vajrayāna.”135 It seems pretty clear here that Mikyö Dorjé is making a strong connection between the higher tantras and Gampopa’s Mahāmudrā system. Yet, as noted in the previous paragraph and implied throughout Recognizing the Blessings, he still ultimately wishes to maintain Mahāmudrā’s supremacy over both inferential (sūtra) and ritualistic (tantra) means in accord with Gampopa’s categorization of sūtra and tantra. For example, in Recognizing the Blessings he implicitly refers to sūtra as the belonging to the “elaborate outer vehicles of dialectics” (phyi mtshan nyid kyi thek par shib rgyas can),136 which is reminiscent of Gampopa’s

134

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 203.

phya rgya chen po sgom ni/ rnal ’byor bla na med pa’i lam yin pas/ rdo rje theg pa’i nye lam gyi khyad chos rnams tshang bar nyams su len dgos pa yin. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 3a6. 135

136

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 3a5-6.

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understanding of sūtra as the “dialectical path of the pāramitās,” (mtshan nyid lam pha rol tu phyin pa) “which takes inference for its path” (rjes dpag lam du byed pa).137 Likewise, as just cited previously from Answer to a Question Asked by gLing drung pa La ’dor ba, with regard to tantra Mikyö Dorjé refers to practices such as “receiving empowerments” (dbang bskur zhur ‘gro ba) and “meditative rituals” (sgrub mchod) as being inferior to Mahāmudrā,138 reminiscent of Gampopa’s classification of mantra as the path of blessing (byin brlabs lam).139 Thus, we find both reactionary trends of maintaining Mahāmudrā’s superiority in line with Gampopa’s hierarchical classifications and attempts at re-appropriation to incorporate aspects of sūtra and tantra onto the path of Mahāmudrā. There seems to be a few inferences we can make to help resolve these conflicting statements and ideas. First, in the above quotation Mikyö Dorjé generally describes Mahāmudrā as the “path of the Anuttarayoga,” which would include for him both the mundane and transcendental tantras previously mentioned in the Answer to a Question Asked by Ling Drung pa La ’dor ba, and as this description is in the context of the path it would be progressively divided up into stages from lower to higher. This allows for the path to include and encompass all the tantras within their appropriate context leading up to Mahāmudrā realization. In other words, it is not necessary to see this statement as contradictory in the sense of suggesting that Mahāmudrā does not in fact surpass inferior forms of tantra. This is, for example, similar to a view held by Mikyö Dorjé’s contemporary, Pema Karpo (1527-1592), who claimed that even though Mahāmudrā is superior to the path of tantric means, it must be preceded by

137

Jackson, Enlightenment By a Single Means, 26.

138

Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 203.

139

Jackson, Enlightenment By a Single Means, 26.

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empowerment.140 An additional clarifying statement is found with Dakpo Tashi Namgyal (1511, 1512, or 1513–1587)—a contemporary and in fact a tutor of Mikyö Dorjé—who suggested in his famous Mahāmudrā work, Moonlight of Proper Explanation Clarifying the Stages of Meditation of Ultimate Mahāmudrā (Nges don phyag rgya chen po’i sgom rim gsal bar byed pa’i legs bshad zla ba’i ’od zer), that the Sakyapas, in criticizing Kagyü Mahāmudrā, were actually mistaken in upholding that a transient bliss which arises only from empowerment, which is contradictory to the immutable great bliss described in the Kālacakra (which is equivalent to Mahāmudrā) must be accomplished “by gaining perfect experience on the path with regard to that which lies hidden in the existential foundation.”141 Likewise, in his discussion of the ground Mikyö Dorjé states that, “Such bliss is not like the occurrence of a blissful feeling dependent on an awareness contacting an attractive object. However, the nature that is primordially present which is established and abides together (grub bde gcig pa) with the mind of clarity is [non-dual] like a sugar cane and [its] sweetness.”142 Thus, we find that Mikyö Dorjé describes this great bliss in the same terms as Dakpo Tashi Namgyal does when equating it with what is detailed in the Kālacakra: as unproduced, independent, non-dualistic, and tantamount to the ground of Mahāmudrā. Furthermore, by describing what this bliss is not, Mikyö Dorjé here also appears to be implicitly responding to an opposing view, likely the Sakyapas, as suggested by Tashi Namgyal’s remarks. This further suggests such a statement is in reaction to such alternative 140

Mathes, Blending of Sūtras with the Tantras, 204.

Lobsang P. Lhalungpa, trans., Mahāmudrā The Moonlight: Quintessence of Mind and Med itation, by Dakpo Tashi Namgyal, (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2006), 107-109. 141

de’i bde ba yang yul yid ’ong phrad pa’i rig pa la brten nas tshor ba bde ba ’byung ba lta bu ma yin gyi/ rang bzhin ’od gsal gyi sems dang grub bde gcig par thog ma nas yod p a ste bu ram gyi shing dang mngar ba lta bu ste. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a4-5. 142

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views of the Sakya scholars. We even find, shortly thereafter, Mikyö Dorjé describing this ground as the Mahāmudrā of union which is “spoken of in a hidden manner of symbolic means,”143 reminiscent of Dakpo Tashi Namgyal’s elusion to what lies “hidden” in the ground. All of this suggests that indeed, Mikyö Dorjé is eluding to final Mahāmudrā—which is also discussed in the Kālacakra as opposed to inferior tantras—when he is speaking in ultimate terms within Recognizing the Blessings. Referring to “final Mahāmudrā” here is for the purpose of differentiating it from the merely provisional sense of Mahāmudrā, that which is re-appropriated to accomodate tantric and sūtric practices and doctrines also endorsed by Mikyö Dorjé and Dakpo Tashi Namgyal. Further below Mikyö Dorjé’s sense of what is final (mthar thug) and what is provisional (gnas skabs) will become clearer in discussing his views expressed within A Response on the Sugatagarbha and the Dharmakāya. To continue discussing Mikyö Dorjé’s incorporation of tantra into Mahāmudrā, the remark mentioned above from Recognizing the Blessings equating Mahāmudrā with Vajrayāna is embedded within the discussion of the path, making it more perspectival. While Mahāmudrā is in fact beyond all other systems, it is still applicable for those engaged in tantric practice, meaning that one may still choose to incorporate tantric means onto the path of Mahāmudrā. Furthermore, the path is the specific context in which the Mahāmudrā master and exegete relates to those on the path, i.e. ordinary beings, and so it is an occasion for connecting to their experience using skillful means which might not directly reflect the definitive meaning. In this regard it is notable that Mikyö Dorjé makes no explicit mention of the tantras when he discusses the fruition, an occasion for relating the actual realization of ultimate Mahāmudrā.

143

brda thabs kyi sbas pa'i tshul. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a6.

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To further support the idea of a merely provisional tantric Mahāmudrā, in A Response on Buddha Nature and the Dharmakāya, Mikyö Dorjé clarifies that there are two ways of discussing the ultimate: the categorized (rnam grangs pa’i don dam pa) and the uncategorized (rnam grangs min pa’i don dam) ultimate. Therein, his understanding of what applies to the categorized ultimate employs heavily perspectival language similar to that found in his discussion of the path in Recognizing the Blessings, specifically drawing upon the strict distinction between saṃsāra and falsity on the one hand and nirvāṇa and truth on the other.144 Yet, in Recognizing the Blessings we also find several statements that accord with Mikyö Dorjé’s understanding of the final (mthar) uncategorized ultimate—which is essentially the unconditional and non-dual union of bliss and emptiness145 —suggesting that both forms of the ultimate are applicable when emphasizing different aspects or stages of Mahāmudrā theory and practice. With this understanding, it seems plausible that the lower forms of tantra are still appropriate for

“Well then, as for the empty nature of mind, when it arises as the various interdependent occurrences of delusion—the fetters of the two obscurations —there is saṃsāra; when the empty nature of mind arises as the various interdependent occurrences of accumulation and purification —the non-deluded liberation from the two obscurations there is non-abiding nirvāṇa. Well then, as nirvāṇa is true and saṃsāra is untrue, delusive, and false it therefore means that [saṃsāra] does not infiltrate objective reality (yul gyi gnas tshul). Since nirvāṇa is undeceiving and non-deluded it is presented as the ultimate truth. Likewise, this presentation of the falsity of saṃsāra and the truth of the ultimate, too, is not in the context of the uncategorized ultimate. However, it is within the context of asserting the ultimate meaning of what is categorized.” ’o na sems rang bzhin stong pa nyid la sgrib gnyis kyi ’ching ba ’khrul pa’i rten ’brel sna tshogs su shar ba’i tshe na ’khor ba/ sems rang bzhin stong pa nyid sgrib gnyis las grol ba’i ’khrul med kyi bsags sbyang gi rten ’bral sna tshogs su shar ba’i tshe na mi gnas pa’i myang ’das yin la/ ’o na myang ’das bden la ’khor ba mi bden pa’i ‘khor ba ’khrul pa dang brdzun pa yin pas yul gyi gnas tshul du ma zhugs pa’i don gyis yin no/ myang ’das ni mi bslu ba dang ma ’khrul pas don dam bden par ’jog la/ de ltar ’khor ba rdzun pa dang don dam lden par ’jog pa ’di yang rnam grangs min pa’i don dam pa’i skabs su ma yin gyi/ rnam grangs pa’i don dam khas skabs su yin te. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Bde gshegs snying po dang chos sku'i dris lan. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 323 - 326. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a2-5. 144

145

In particular, consider the following statement as found in the context of the fruition and notice its emphasis on non-duality, which differs from other statements in Recognzing the Blessings that emphasize the perspectival understanding of reality: “The primordial wisdom which is free from all conceptual elaborations of dualistic phenomena—saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, self and other, acceptance and rejection, and so forth—is the dharmakāya, the aspect devoid of any nature which is inseparable from the dharmadhātu, and is what fulfills one's own benefit.” ’khor ’das bdag gzhan blang dor la sogs gnyis chos kyi spros pa thams cad dang dral ba’i ye shes/ chos kyi dbyings dang dbyer med pa rang bzhin med pa’i yan lag chos kyi sku rang don rdzogs pa ’o. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 6a2-3. 70

presenting the categorized ultimate in terms of path Mahāmudrā, but not in the context of presenting the uncategorized ultimate of the actual realization of Mahāmudrā. In a similar vein, in his commentary on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra, Mikyö Dorjé emphasizes the merely conventional nature of the ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), and he then asserts in that same spirit that: In the same way that the Buddha taught using the words “I” and “mine,” he also taught that all things from form through omniscience exist, even though they really have no inherent nature at all. He taught provisionally in this way in order to help the world understand the profound nature of reality. This understanding should be applied to his explanations of the four truths, the two truths, the three natures, and so forth—to all the teachings that the Buddha gave. 146 This statement clearly expresses a pedagogical and provisional understanding of all the Buddha’s teachings, which would strongly suggest that Mikyö Dorjé presumes that this also applies to the teachings of Mahāmudrā (what is categorized and provisional) but not to the actual realization of Mahāmudrā (what is uncategorized and final). Understanding this can help us to make sense of how Mikyö Dorjé could justify different applications and expressions of Mahāmudrā at the conventional level while still refusing to imbue Mahāmudrā with such conventionalities at the ultimate level. To clarify how we can understand such an integration of Mahāmudrā, sūtra, and tantra, Dakpo Tashi Namgyal wrote in the Moonlight of Proper Explanation Clarifying the Stages of Meditation of Ultimate Mahāmudrā: Concerning the manner of identifying the essence of the path, some of the mystical songs and the transmission of symbolic Mahāmudrā recognize this system as belonging to the tantric tradition as opposed to the sūtra tradition, and specifically to the third subdivision of tantra—the path of directly perceiving reality. The other two are the path of spiritual blessing and the path of giving inner solace. It is said that…one is required to receive either a short or an elaborate 146

Goldfield et al., The Moon of Wisdom, 121.

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initiation as a means of germinating [the hidden seeds of illumination]. It is further said that—since the paths preceding esoteric mantra are regarded as being stepping stones—one should meditate on any of the aspects of these paths and not ignore them. According to the tradition of the secret mystic practice, since there are three levels of spiritual trainees—inferior, average, and superior—the path has been divided into three, viz.: the definitive vehicle of wisdom-gone beyond, the vehicle of innermost mystical formula, and the vehicle of unsurpassed essence. Mahāmudrā is regarded as belonging to the third. It has been said that Mahāmudrā does not conform directly to the first, it is not in conflict with the second, and while in accord with the third, it even surpasses all three. It is said that one…should receive a short or elaborate blessing and initiation and should also meditate on a meditate deity [yidam] at an appropriate stage… At certain times Mahāmudrā was also designated as the path of spiritual blessing. That is to say that an awakened guru is required to guide his predestined disciple…toward liberation through Mahāmudrā, the only path of instantaneous illumination that doesn’t depend on the path of the sūtras and tantras. In recent times, meditators of Mahāmudrā sought to make adjustments according to both the sūtras and tantras. They have incorporated [in the Mahāmudrā tradition] many practices that require preparations, such as the mystical empowerment that sows the seeds of a spiritual blossom, devotion to preliminary exercises, and methods of enhancing experiences. It is for that reason that it is not contradictory to regard Mahāmudrā as identical with the common and profound path of the sūtras and tantras, due to the fact that many superior and inferior minds are going to benefit from it.147 Here, we should understand that for Dakpo Tashi Namgyal, the realization of Mahāmudrā is still something that transcends all other systems, as is evident by his remark that Mahāmudrā “surpasses all three,” i.e. which includes systems of sūtra and tantra, yet the practice or path of Mahāmudrā allows for these other systems to be utilized, thus making them in a provisional sense “identical.” This statement also makes clear that during the time of Mikyö Dorjé, even though there was a shift observed in how Mahāmudrā was being related to sūtra and tantra, this was not viewed by its proponents as necessarily in contradiction with the transcendental spirit of Mahāmudrā. Using citations, Tashi Namgyal even therein notes the strict separation that

147

Lhalungpa, Mahāmudrā The Moonlight, 109-112.

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Gampopa used to distinguish Mahāmudrā from sūtra and tantra, yet still finds no fault with the “incorporation” of these systems on the path of Mahāmudrā—or as I have been terming it, the reappropriation of Mahāmudrā. In particular, Tashi Namgyal states that even though Mahāmudrā transcends all other systems, it is in harmony with (or at least does not contradict) the Pāramitāyāna and the Mantrayāna. We may also notice here that the rhetoric of the path—i.e. perspectivalism—is used to justify the re-appropriation of path Mahāmudrā. In other words, since there are practitioners of lower and higher faculties, and since it may be of benefit for their particular mindsets and capacities, the incorporation of sūtra and tantra on the path of Mahāmudrā is indeed acceptable. Also, a nineteenth century proponent of Kagyü Mahāmudrā, Karma Tashi Chöphel (Kar ma bkra shis chos ’phel),148 in trying to reconcile three categories of Mahāmudrā (sūtra, mantra, and essence) asserted that Mahāmudrā itself (associated with essence Mahāmudrā), being a direct path for those of highest capacity, is dependent upon neither sūtra nor tantra. However, he still maintained that it could be combined with either sūtra or tantra in order to be applicable for many.149

148

I have been unable to locate a precise date of birth for this figure.

149

Rheingans. Communicating the Innate. (2012). 179.

Although Rheingans also notes this similarity between Mikyö Dorjé, Tashi Namgyal, and Karma Tashi Chöphel, he emphasizes the contradictory nature of their approaches and that this suggests the pragmatic nature of Mikyö Dorjé’s teachings with the guru being the basis of applying Mahāmudrā based on the context of the disciple. However, I would like to stress that I am here emphasizing that it is not seen as contradictory by these figures themselves (as suggested by the direct statements in that regard by Dakp o Tashi Namgyal cited above) but rather reflects an understanding of the path as involving the bifurcation of distinct perspectives (t hose of ordinary beings and āryas). With Mikyö Dorjé in particular, conventional phenomena are inherently false and contradictory and need to be resolved in the quietude of the ultimate. This being so, the conventional needs of particular beings can be ca tered to in a conventional manner as necessary (re-appropriation), yet it is also crucial to recognize the limited nature of any such conventional approaches (reaction) since ultimately everything must be resolved in accordance with the transcendental wisdom of the āryas (resolution).

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Since other proponents of Kagyü Mahāmudrā (contemporary and later) such as Dakpo Tashi Namgyal and Karma Tashi Chöphel explicitly expressed views similar to what Mikyö Dorjé seems to be demonstrating within Recognizing the Blessings—in brief that is, that Mahāmudrā can be both transcendent and accommodating—it is not necessary to see this as in contradiction with his views that Mahāmudrā surpasses sūtra and tantra (with the exception of the Kālacakra tantra, of course). To put it another way, its ultimate transcendence over other systems does not preclude the possibility and/or utility of its conventional re-appropriation in terms of the path, incorporating other systems and practices onto the path of Mahāmudrā. Furthermore, in this regard Mikyö Dorjé’s rhetoric of the union of seemingly dualistic phenomena within this text makes it clear that one can understand conventional phenomena that appear to be in contradiction with one another to be in essence Mahāmudrā, which would allow for discrepancies in doctrinal context to be ultimately resolved.

Rheingans’ approach—emphasizing the pedagogical nature and “doctrinal flexibility” (243) of Mikyö Dorjé’s approach—seems to belie the consistency of the Eighth Karmapa’s thought in general and his Mahāmudrā interpretation in particular, which I argue will seem more consistent here when understanding his perspectival rhetoric based in these two modes of apprehension. Indeed, even Mikyö Dorjé’s rhetoric of union here seems to imply that he sees no contradiction in the various ways he is describing Mahāmudrā—that is to say that all of these apparently disparate aspects are ultimately inseparable. Specifically, Rheingans comments that “these contradictions suggest that at this stage of research it is hard to pin down the 'final' in terpretation or hierarchy of the Eighth Karmapa's Great Seal. As it seems intrinsic to the study of Great Seal texts that it often evades classification, one must ask oneself, whether such a research avenue does full justice to the material” (242). Yet, fo r example, in his Response on Buddha Nature and the Dharmakāya , Mikyö Dorjé explicitly defines his final view (mthar ni) which is consistent with statements made in Recognizing the Blessings, he defines the absolute in terms of being a “single truth” (bden pa chig pa), “not something to be obtained” (rnyed pa ma yin), the “non-dual bliss and emptiness” (bde stong gnyis med) of the “final mantric treatise(s)” (sngags gzhung mthar thug) and “Mahāmudrā” (phyag chen), with all of this being the uncategorized ultimate (rnam grangs min pa’i don dam) in contradistinction with the categorized ultimate (rnam grangs pa’i don dam) which “does not transcend conditionality” (’dus byas las ma ’das pa); (See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004., 2b1-3). This strongly suggests that we can find much more consistency in Mikyö Dorjé’s thought than Rheingans claims. In sum, though Rheingans makes important points regarding Mahāmudrā hermeneutics and sensitivity to practical context and pragmatic concerns, which are certainly factors to be considered, we should understand that the contextual nature of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā is based in a consistent emphasis on the futile and limited nature of worldly conditions which ultimately must be resolved anyhow. Such an understanding provides a larger framework to understand the Eighth Karmapa’s thought that is in fact more consistent than Rheingans seems to suggest. See: Rheingans, “The Eighth Karmapa’s Life,” 228-229; 242-243.

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To be sure, there is much more to be said about Mikyö Dorjé’s discussion of the path, but due to the limited nature of this thesis, that is not possible here. However, some of the ideas brought up therein will be discussed further on in this chapter in the context of Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of union. In particular, there is much to be said about Mikyö Dorjé’s understanding of śamatha and vipaśyanā, the formulation of the generation and completion stages, and the incorporation of the four abhiṣekas into Mahāmudrā practice. Mikyö Dorjé’s discussion of the fruition is based mainly on his conception of the three kāyas (sku gsum) which are solely the realm of the āryas and is the place where he discusses their qualities. The dharmakāya (chos kyi sku) is specifically equated with primordial wisdom (ye shes) and is inseparable from the dharmadhātu (chos kyi dbyings dang dbyer med pa).150 It is here in the context of the dharmakāya that Mikyö Dorjé exclusively employs the non-dualistic language of the uncategorized ultimate, stating that it is “free from all conceptual elaborations of dualistic phenomena—saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, self and other, acceptance and rejection, and so forth,”151 and that it is “devoid of any nature” (rang bzhin med pa).152 Interestingly, however, Mikyö Dorjé seems to emphasize the sambhogakāya (generally the second of the three kāyas) insofar as he lists it first. This could be due to the fact that at the outset of the text Mikyö Dorjé identified the fruition as the union of the two kāyas, a concept perhaps best represented by the sambhogakāya which is in a sense the intermediary between the dharmakāya and the nirmāṇakāya. This seems correct in that the rhetoric of union is rather strong here: Mikyö Dorjé identifies the sambhogakāya as “the union of bliss and emptiness” (bde

150

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 6a3. 151

’khor ’das bdag gzhan blang dor la sogs gnyis chos kyi spros pa thams cad dang bral. Ibid., 6a2-3.

152

Ibid., 6a3.

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stong zung ’jug), “the unified equality of primordial wisdom” (ye shes mnyam par sbyor ba), as including “the aspect of coalescing” (kha sbyor gyi yan lag) and as “not wavering from [the state of] great unchanging bliss” (’gyur med bde chen po las mi gyo ba).153 Additionally, the sambhogakāya represents the union of appearance and non-elaboration for Mikyö Dorjé, as he makes clear in the previous section on the path when he says, “even though the sambhogakāya of the buddhas is the svābhāvikakāya free from mental elaboration, it still continues to appear.”154 This statement is particularly interesting in that it seems to be an admonition for ordinary Mahāmudrā practitioners to not overemphasize the rhetoric of nonduality and non-conceptuality, reminding them that there is still the ever-important aspect of compassion—i.e. appearing to beings for their benefit. Indeed, this is preceded by a rather strong statement appearing to condemn practitioners who “blather on about there being no such distinctions as good or bad” (bzang ngan dang khyad par med pa’i cal col), which Mikyö Dorjé seems to take as a denigration towards “the nature of all appearances” (snang ba tham cad ngo bo la).155 To be sure, Mikyö Dorjé accepts that the nature of such appearances actually is nondual (recall his description of the dharmakāya in ultimate terms); again, however, this particular admonition is in terms of the path and is directed at ordinary beings who lack the realization of the ultimate and endanger their spiritual progress by denigrating appearances. In emphasizing the sambhogakāya here, Mikyö Dorjé is using the clearest example of the union of appearance and emptiness in order to quell any nihilistic or unethical interpretation of Mahāmudrā—likely a direct response to figures like Lama Zhang (specifically, those who might emulate his brand of

153

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 6a1-2. 154

sangs rgyas kyi longs sku yang ngo bo nyid sku spros bral gyi snang bar byas gda’o. Ibid., 5b2.

155

Ibid., 5a6-5b1.

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antinomian behavior justifying it in light of Mahāmudrā rhetoric), but also a response to figures like Sakya Paṇḍita who openly criticized those figures—in other words, Mikyö Dorjé clarifies that such behavior is not the ideal for and is not representative of Kagyü Mahamudra. In any case, this is clearly an example of reaction: Mikyö Dorjé wants to emphasize that Mahāmudrā does not advocate engaging in reckless behavior for those who are merely ordinary beings, contrary to how it might be portrayed by certain charlatans posing as advanced practitioners. This is made especially clear in his concluding remarks, when he says for example, “while one has not gained resolve in the presence of the supreme nirmāṇakāya and one's mind-stream has not been liberated, it is a grave mistake to pretend to be a destroyer of delusion and then engage in the yogic discipline of dogs and pigs.”156 Finally, Mikyö Dorjé addresses the nirmāṇakāya, which he primarily discusses in terms of its relationship to ordinary beings—i.e. as “being replete with compassion, the great [enlightened] compassion which is expressed equally towards all sentient beings,” and as including “the aspect of the perpetual engagement in enlightened activity in order to tame beings in whatever way necessary until saṃsāra is emptied.”157 These two points also implicitly provide a basis for Mikyö Dorjé’s eclectic Mahāmudrā approach—enlightened beings teach a variety of methods and doctrines out of compassion for beings with varying inclinations and dispositions. Taken together with what we discussed earlier regarding the statement found in the his Madhyamakāvatāra commentary on the provisional nature of the Buddha’s teachings (as opposed to the Buddha’s final realization), we find both an emphasis on the pedagogical nature

mchog gi sprul sku’i drung du gdar sha mi gcod par rang rgyud ma grol bzhin du ’khrul zhig ltar bcos nas khyi phag gi brtul zhugs byed pa ’di nyes dmigs shin tu che. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 6b1. 156

sems can thams cad la mnyam par ’jug pa’i thugs rje chen po snying rje gang ba’i yan lag/ ’khor ba ma stong kyi bar du gang la gang ’dul phrin las kyi ’jug pa rgyun mi ’chad pa’i yan lag . Ibid., 6a3-4. 157

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of the teachings, which is necessary in order to relate to needs of the disciple, as well as a taking for granted of the conditional nature of anything semiotic in nature—including even the most sacred of the Buddha’s teachings. Particularly, this latter point is supportive of Mikyö Dorjé’s overall view of the limited nature of conditional existence—as noted in the first chapter when discussing his qualms with the Gelugpa’s implication that the ultimate truth is relative to and on par with the conventional truth. Understanding this ontological cynicism towards the conventional helps us to understand why Mikyö Dorjé occasionally allows for seemingly disparate and contradictory views and practices to be incorporated along the path to enlightenment: it is not purely out of pedagogical or pragmatic concern (which is indeed part of it), but also due to recognizing that such methods and teachings are intrinsically conditional and limited no matter how they are presented, with the lot of them ultimately needing to be abandoned in order to realize the transcendence of the absolute. Any discussion or formulation of the path therefore necessitates involvement with limited causes and conditions, contradictory though they may seem at times. In fact, by recognizing the contradictory nature of such teachings Mikyö Dorjé enhances his cynical position towards the limited conditions of the world, allowing him to finally emphasize the transcendent nature of the absolute. How Mikyö Dorjé finds meaning and utility in contradiction is in stark contrast to the approach of Gelugpa scholars who sought to strictly adhere to logical consistency throughout all their various presentations. Once again, this has been a brief overview of Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of the fruition, and there is a lot more that could (and should) be said. What we have found thus far is that Mikyö Dorjé appears to be discussing two forms of Mahāmudrā throughout his explication of the ground, path, and fruition: a categorized Mahāmudrā—so to speak—involving bifurcation between ordinary and enlightened perspectives that is mainly applied to the path, and an

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uncategorized Mahāmudrā that is completely non-dual and emphasized particularly within the contexts of the ground and the fruition. What brings these two categories of Mahāmudrā together is Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of union, which is what will be discussed in the following section.

2.2. Union as Reaction: Distinguishing Between Authentic and Inauthentic Union

In the previous section, I alluded to Mikyö Dorjé’s union as being a form of reappropriation, in that the use of the term ‘union’ provides at least a rhetorical basis for him to incorporate sūtra and tantra into his Mahāmudrā system. In this section, we will emphasize how this same conception of union is also reaction and resolution. Before discussing how Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of union is a form of resolution, however, it is important to see how it is first a form of reaction, which will also allow us to clarify precisely what he means by the term. Tucked away in the form of an interlinear note (mchan bu) is one of the most intriguing and perhaps significant lines found within Recognizing the Blessings. In discussing the fruition as the attainment of the unified state of no-more learning (mi slob pa’i zung ’jug) of Vajradhāra and the consummation of the two-fold benefit (don gnyis mthar phyin pa),158 Mikyö Dorjé mentions two disparate manners of interpreting the term “yuganaddha” as follows: “there are those who say the so-called ‘yuganaddha’ is not meant to be a non-duality, however in terms of being coupled together they are the same, i.e. the pair is to be understood as unitary.”159 What this tells us is that Mikyö Dorjé identifies two distinct interpretive trends for this critical term 158

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 5b6. 159

zung du gcig pa’am gnyis gcig gi go don yin gyi gnyis med pa’i don min ces smra ba rnams zer . Ibid., 5b6.

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yuganaddha: one which is dualistic and one which is non-dualistic,160 with the latter being deemed the correct interpretation. Since Mikyö Dorjé is being indirect here, the difficulty lies in identifying who he considers to be adhering to an incorrect interpretive trend. Michael Broido discusses the term yuganaddha at great length in his article “Padma DKar-po on Integration as Ground, Path, and Fruition, ” in which he also discusses Padma Karpo’s critique of Tsongkhapa’s unique vision of yuganaddha, “For Tsong-kha-pa the notion [of yuganaddha] is one of combination, the constituents being as it were primary and their combination, as a product of those constituents, secondary….For Tsong-kha-pa (as Padma Dkarpo sees him) what is primary are the components, say the two satya or the krama, and it is only when these are known separately…that they can then be combined in yuganaddha.”161 This understanding of yuganaddha is similar to the dualistic interpretation of the term that Mikyö Dorjé refers to in Recognizing the Blessings. In his terms, an incorrect interpretation of yuganaddha emphasizes union as a duality, as a separable combination of two parts in dependence upon one another, and this understanding seems to match how Padma Karpo characterizes Tsongkhapa’s conception of the important term. David Seyfort Ruegg also identifies Tsongkhapa as adhering to a similar paired notion of yuganaddha in the context of śamatha and vipaśyanā meditation specifically, “[Tsongkhapa] observes that śamatha and vipaśyanā are realized separately, and are made to alternate (spel mar

This can be gathered from the phrase gnyis med pa’i don min, “[yuganaddha] is not meant to be a nonduaity,”representing the dualistic position, and the phrase zung du gcig pa’am gnyis gcig gi go don, “in terms of being coupled together they are the same, i.e. the pair is to be understood as unitary,” which represents the nondualistic position. This latter phrasing may seem oxymoronic, as it literally states that “two are one,” but it essentially points to the inseperability of any aspects that are present together, i.e. the sameness or non-duality of these seemingly disparate aspects. 160

M. M. Broido, “Padma dKar-po on Integration as Ground, Path, and Goal,” Journal of the Tibet Society, 5 (1985): 25. 161

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byed pa) with each other, there being no rule at this [beginning] stage that Inspection and Fixation should be realized [together] in a single mental continuum (rgyun gcig)…But in a later stage there follows the yoking together [(zung du ’brel ba: yuganaddha)],162 or syzygy, of śamatha and vipaśyanā, when they merge and operate together ([mnyam du ’jug pa]).”163 Furthermore, Ruegg explains that from Tsongkhapa’s point of view, “This Fixation-Bhāvanā that initially alternates and then finally coincides with analytical Inspection, in the form of a regular sequence and then of a syzygy of śamatha and vipaśyanā, is not, therefore, to be confused ‘Darkness-Bhāvanā’ (mun sgom) and with non-construction known as tsom ’jog gi mi rtog pa…These last two expressions are used to describe that one-sided form of totally nonanalytical, and practically cataleptic, non-mentation [amanasikāra] and non-construction so often attributed in the Tibetan treatises to [Hwashang]…”164 What this demonstrates is Tsongkhapa did indeed emphasize a form of yuganaddha based in rather dualistic terms with an insistence on analytical means for its attainment, which is contrasted with the system of Hashang, of which the Kagyü Mahāmudrā tradition is accused of adhering to in some form or another, particularly by the Gelugpa. What this suggests is that, similar to (and likely connected to) the controversy over the term amanasikāra, the hermeneutics of the term yuganaddha had also become a cause for debate between the various traditions—in this case between the Gelugpa and the Kagyüpa. It turns out, in fact, that Tsongkhapa wrote an extensive commentary on the Guhyasamāja

To be sure, the term employed by Tsongkhapa here “zung du ’brel ba” is not the same as that is used by Mikyö Dorjé, “zung du ’jug pa”, however both are used to translate the Sanskrit term yuganaddha, and reflect the disparate interpretations of the term. 162

163

Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism, 115.

164

Ibid., 115.

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Tantra (which is heavily emphasized by Mikyö Dorjé in Recognizing the Blessings as well), which heavily involves the concept of yuganaddha. It turns out as well, that Mikyö Dorjé was at least aware of, if not familiar with, this commentary.165 Furthermore, both Tsongkhapa and Mikyö Dorjé quote a verse from the Pañcakrama, a text attributed to Nāgārjuna on the five stages of the Guhyasamāja,166 which suggests contention over the proper interpretation of this verse. In Tsongkhapa’s Guhyasamāja commentary, A Lamp to Illuminate the Five Stages (gsang ’dus rim lnga gsal sgron), Tsongkhapa defines the term yuganaddha thusly, “The Sanskrit for union is yuganadva. Yuga means ‘pair’ and adva means ‘not two.’ This means that the individual parts of the pair are not two in the manner of alternating but are together simultaneously, and this, as explained above, is ‘union.’”167 To be sure, Tsongkhapa appears to be advocating for a weak form of non-duality in his description of union, and indeed following this statement he clarifies, “Nāgārjuna’s Five Stages speaks of many types of union where conceptualization of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa and other pairs of dual phenomena are eliminated and become a union of nonduality not separated by those conceptualizations…the nondual exalted wisdom of having eliminated all holding-as-real conceptualizations, together with their seeds, focused on persons and phenomena is this type of union.”168 To be fair to Tsongkhapa, he is clearly advocating for a non-dual understanding of yuganaddha. However, his understanding of non-duality in this sense must be qualified, and in contrasting his views from those of Gorampa

165

Ruegg, “A Karma bKa’ brgyud Work,” 345-346.

166

Of further interest, this verse is also quoted by Padma Karpo In his discussion of the term yuganaddha, Broido suggests the doctrinal significance of this particular text in justifying one’s interpretation of the term itself. See: Broido, “Padma dKar-po on the Two Satyas,” 30. Gavin Kilty, trans., A Lamp to Illuminate the Five Stages: Teachings on Guhyasamā ja Tantra , by Tsongkhapa, ed. Thupten Jinpa, (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2013), 497. 167

168

Kilty, A Lamp to Illuminate the Five Stages, 497-498.

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Sönam Senge, Sonam Thakchoe reminds us that Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of non-duality is unique insofar as is only an epistemic non-duality, and has no ontological implications: Tsongkhapa regards the nondual realization of ultimate truth as an epistemic event. In his understanding nondual realization is possible, yet the apprehending consciousness—transcendent wisdom—retains its ontological distinctness as subject, and the cognitive sphere—ultimate reality—likewise retains its ontological distinctness as object. Gorampa contends that nondual realizatio n forms a single metaphysical reality—a total integration of subject and object. Only such a complete integration, according to him, resolves the problem of duality. Thus Tsongkhapa and Gorampa agree that, from the standpoint of nondual wisdom, the meditator experiences a total dissolution of even the subtle duality between subject and object, but they disagree on the implications of this nondual experience. Tsongkhapa does not hold the achievement of nondual wisdom as equivalent to the cessation of cognitive activity, whereas for Gorampa it means exactly that…Tsongkhapa holds that even the highest level of wisdom preserves duality and diversity. He asserts that Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka draws our attention to empirical dualities—among them the duality of morality and immorality—and takes them as the indispensable basis for any genuine search for liberating wisdom.169 Thus, for Tsongkhapa, the non-duality of yuganaddha is a purely epistemological state of union, with no implications for the ontological status of phenomena (other than their lack of inherent existence), and in fact the duality and diversity of phenomena is preserved. Bearing this in mind, we see that Mikyö Dorjé’s critiques still apply: for although Tsongkhapa advocates for a kind of epistemic non-duality in his yuganaddha, it lacks the metaphysical non-duality that Mikyö Dorjé emphasizes as qualifying for an authentic kind of non-duality and union. Recall from the first chapter how Mikyö Dorjé defined the Gelugpa version of emptiness as a limited categorical 169

For Gorampa, non-dual realization implies the complete dissolution of the knowing subject and apparently outer objects, which are in fact merely the mind’s constructs (in accord with a Yogācāra interpretation of non-duality). Thus, all of reality, whether conventional or ultimate, becomes a single entity in terms of ultimate reality and ultimate wisdom, and the individuality of cognizing consciousness and objects of cognition cease. Thakchoe also notes the similarity here between this theory of nondual wisdom and Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of it. For Tsongkhapa, however, meditation on non-duality merely involves the meditator engaging with their own psycho physical aggregates and not engaging with the external world, thus resulting in a dissolution of subject and object in terms of I and mine, thinker and thought, mind and body, etc. For Tsongkhapa, this is important in that it still allows the ārya to engage with dualistic phenomena and engage with dualistic conventions in the post-meditative state. Emphasis added. Thakchoe, The Two Truths Debate, 115-119.

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emptiness (nyi tshe ba’i rnam grangs pa’i stong nyid): in their attempt to preserve the ontological status of conditioned phenomena themselves, the Gelugpas relativize the ultimate truth and relegate it to the status of conventional and worldly phenomena, limited to particular conditions and contexts, thus not qualifying as the unconditional and transcendent ultimate that Mikyö Dorjé advocates for. With this in mind, it is clear how Mikyö Dorjé’s interpretation of the term yuganaddha is a form of reaction: for Mikyö Dorjé, Tsongkhapa and his followers adhere to a dualistic notion of union and thus denigrate the pure non-duality of union in its ultimate and metaphysical sense. Thus, Mikyö Dorjé feels it necessary to distinguish his own view from that of the Gelugpas in order to clarify his intention. Having contrasted Mikyö Dorjé’s understanding of union from that of Tsongkhapa and his followers, i.e. clarifying how it is a reaction against such views, we may now begin to analyze how it is a form of resolution.

2.3. Resolution in Union: The Non-Duality of the Conventional and Ultimate in Mahāmudrā

Throughout this thesis, I have alluded to the fact that within Recognizing the Blessings, the idea of “union” or yuganaddha is pivotal for Mikyö Dorjé’s articulation of Mahāmudrā. I have alluded to the fact that his conception of union is heavily reliant on his interpretation of the two truths doctrine, and in turn his understanding of emptiness (i.e. of ultimate reality). Furthermore, I have alluded to the fact that Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought is also based on two different ways of understanding the absolute: as a categorized ultimate—which is highly perspectival—and as an uncategorized ultimate—which is strictly non-dual and transcends all such distinctions. Therefore, within this section we will draw out all of these connections and

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clarify how Mikyö Dorjé sees Mahāmudrā as a union that resolves all of the tension of conceptual categories and transcends the limits of conditional and mundane phenomena. As mentioned before, much of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought in Recognizing the Blessings is reliant upon a theory of perspectivalism: the ground, path, and fruition can be bifurcated into two distinct perspectives or experiences, that of ordinary beings and that of the āryas. One particularly significant passage in Recognizing the Blessings, which occurs in the context of the path after expressing the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa (a significant fact in itself, which will be discussed further on), reads: As for the meaning that is found within the tantras and songs of the siddhas, such as the many texts [mentioned here] before, they refer to the appearances of the impure minds of ordinary beings that arise as external objects. Thus, that which produces obscurations which prevent one from clearly seeing both subject and object as in essence the dharmakāya (chos kyi sku’i ngo bor) are the adventitious stains. That being so, from the point of view of the insight of the āryas who perceive the truth of the dharmatā directly and the siddhas who obtain the supreme siddhis of Mahāmudrā, [such things] are an emanation of primordial wisdom.170 Again, we see here a clear distinction between these two modes of experience, which is pivotal for Mikyö Dorjé. This bifurcation between these two modes illustrates his cynicism towards the conditional, dualistic, and conceptual phenomena of ordinary beings—which are described negatively with such terms as impure (ma dag pa), ordinary (tha mal pa), and are tantamount to the adventitious stains (glo bur gyi dri ma yin)—which is to be contrasted with the exalted

rgyud dang grub thob kyi glu du mar ’di ’dra’i lung mang po ’byung ba’i don ni ske bo tha mal pa’i sems ma dag pa’i snang ba phi rol yul tu shar ba yin pas yul dang yul can gnyis ka chos kyi sku’i ngo bor gsal bar mthong ba la sgrib byed glo bur gyi dri ma yin la/ chos nyid bden pa dngos su gzigs pa’i ’phags pa dang phyag rga chen po mchog gi dngos grub brnyes pa’i grub thob rnams kyi gzigs ngo na ye shes kyi rnam ’phrul dang thabs khyad par can gyis zin pa’i lam zab mos nyon mongs pa’i rang bzhin shes nas gnad du bsnun pas rgya mtsho la rlabs zhi bar ltar nyon mongs pa gnas su dag cing/ yul dang yul can gyi snang ba thams ca d la bde stong phyag rgya chen pos rgyas thebs pa’i snang ba zhig dgos te. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 4b5-5a2. 170

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transcendence of the enlightened beings who solely experience what is true (bden pa)—i.e. the dharmatā (chos nyid), which is the manifestation of primordial wisdom (ye shes rnam ’phrul).171 Such a bifurcation is also more poetically expressed in the introduction when Mikyö Dorjé cynically laments such worldly trappings as his own disciples, offerings made to him, and even his own seemingly reprehensible condition, and then praises encountering the Buddha and the path to enlightenment itself. Thus, by clearly delineating the line between mundane and exalted states of experience Mikyö Dorjé emphasizes renunciation (nge ’byung) and disillusionment (skyo shas) towards worldly phenomena, a critical aspect of Buddhist soteriology. For Mikyö Dorjé, this bifurcation is strongly related to the two truths, with the perspective of ordinary beings relegated to conventional truth and the exalted position of enlightened beings placed into the category of ultimate truth. This is how it is stated in Mikyö Dorjé’s commentary on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra: Genuine truth is described as being simply the authentic object of the noble ones’ original wisdom that sees what is authentic and true; there is no identity actually established there for conceptual mind to find. Relative truth is the false object seen from the perspective of the conceptual mind whose eye of wisdom is completely covered by the cataract of ignorance, as is the case with ordinary beings. It is therefore posited as being this conceptual mind. The object perceived does not exist in the way that this mind perceives it to be. 172 Notice here the similarity to the statement from Recognizing the Blessings that was just discussed—specifically, ultimate truth is defined as being non-conceptual, authentic, true, and

171

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 4b5-6. don dam ni ’phags pa yang dag pa gzigs pa’i ye shes de ngor yul yang dag par ’jog go zhes brjod par zad kyi/ rang gi bdag nyid du grub pa zhig blos rnyed byar yod pa ma yin no/ kun rdzob ni so skye ma rig pa’i ling tog gis blo mig ma lus khebs pa rnams kyi blo ngor yul brdzun pa mthong bay is blor ’jog go/ blo des mthong ba’i ’dzin stangs dang mthun par yul de ltar grub pa ni ma yin no . Goldfield et al., The Moon of Wisdom, 75 172

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the object of primordial wisdom; whereas the conventional truth is false, conceptual, and ignorant. Given such a strong bifurcation, it seems odd to stress that the two truths are in union, as Mikyö Dorjé frequently does throughout Recognizing the Blessings. If the conventional truth— the realm of ordinary beings—and the ultimate truth—the realm of enlightened beings—are as distinct as Mikyö Dorjé makes them out to be, it seems antithetical to proclaim their union. In his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Mikyö Dorjé makes it clear that there are two perspectives with regard to this issue. In regard to the first case:

The nature of phenomena (ultimate reality) and the bearers of this nature (seeming reality) are not one because they have mutually exclusive features in that the ultimate nature of phenomena exists in an undeceiving manner, while the seeming bearers of this nature are deceiving instances of nonvalid cognition, that is, they lack a nature. This excludes that the ultimate and the seeming are one.173 This passage again demonstrates the strong demarcation between these two modes that Mikyö Dorjé emphasizes in his Mahāmudrā thought, and, to be blunt, this seems to precisely contradict his idea of the union of the two truths. However, Mikyö Dorjé also stresses that, just as they are not one, the two truths are not actually distinct either: The nature of phenomena (ultimate reality) and the bearers of this nature (seeming reality) are not separate either for the following reasons. (a) The ultimately existing nature of phenomena cannot be determined through being any superior “existence” that is other than being characterized through the seeming being nonexistent. Therefore, from the perspective that any “seeming” which is other than the mere nonexistence of the seeming bearers of the nature of phenomena is not established, the two realities are not separate. Or they are not separate because (b) a seeming that is other than the existence of the ultimate nature of phenomena is not established and thus there is no seeming that is different in nature from the nature of phenomena alone being really existent. 174 173

Brunnhölzl, Gone Beyond, 154.

174

Brunnhölzl, Gone Beyond, 154.

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Thus, it is due the fact that characterizations of existence and non-existence are inextricably linked as well as the fact that conventional reality is non-existent, and thus there is nothing to be distinguished from ultimate truth anyhow. Thus, it seems that from this perspectival interpretation of the two truths, there is at least some manner to understand the non-duality of the two truths, largely based on the non-existence of conventional reality. Regardless, to divide the two truths this way still seems antithetical to the entire project of union because of its dualistic framework, in that it makes such a stark distinction between the two truths. Though it certainly seems that way, it is important to remember that this bifurcation is based merely on perspective and nothing more. Furthermore, these perspectives are both manifestations of the nature of mind, as Mikyö Dorjé clarifies in his text, A Response on the Sugatagarbha and the Dharmakāya: Well then, as for the empty nature of mind, when it arises as the various interdependent occurrences of delusion—the fetters of the two obscurations— there is saṃsāra; when the empty nature of mind arises as the various interdependent occurrences of accumulation and purification—the non-deluded liberation from the two obscurations—there is non-abiding nirvāṇa. Well then, as nirvāṇa is true and saṃsāra is untrue, delusive, and false it therefore means that [saṃsāra] does not infiltrate objective reality (yul gyi gnas tshul). Since nirvāṇa is undeceiving and non-deluded it is presented as the ultimate truth.175 This statement clarifies that neither saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa is separate from the empty nature of mind, which—following Saraha’s Mahāmudrā doctrine of the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as Mikyö Dorjé does—provides a basis for understanding the union of these dualistic pairs based on the realization of the nature of mind. In fact, in Recognizing the Blessings, Mikyö Dorjé

’o na sems rang bzhin stong pa nyid la sgrib gnyis kyi ’ching ba ’khrul pa’i rten ’brel sna tshogs su shar ba’i tshe na ’khor ba/ sems rang bzhin stong pa nyid sgrib gnyis las grol ba’i ’khrul med kyi bsags sbyang gi rten ’bral sna tshogs su shar ba’i tshe na mi gnas pa’i myang ’das yin la/ ’o na myang ’das bden la ’khor ba mi bden pa’i ’khor ba ’khrul pa dang brdzun pa yin pas yul gyi gnas tshul du ma zhugs pa’i don gyis yin no/ myang ’das ni mi bsul ba dang ma ’khrul pas don dam bden par ’jog la. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Bde gshegs snying po dang chos sku'i dris lan. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 323 - 326. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a2-4. 175

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quotes Saraha twice on this topic: “When it is realized, it is everything; Searching for something other than this, it is not found,”176 and, “Whatever is saṃsāra is nirvāṇa.”177 Given that these quotes precede his discussion of the two perspectives of ordinary and enlightened beings, it seems that he emphasizes understanding that these disparate modes of experience, such as saṃsāra or nirvāṇa, conventional or ultimaty reality, are simply manifestations of the nature of mind which is itself empty. In A Response on the Sugatagarbha and the Dharmakāya, Mikyö Dorjé elaborates that any such dualistic discussion separating the two truths is not the final word on the matter: Likewise, this presentation of the falsity of saṃsāra and the truth of the ultimate, too, is not in the context of the uncategorized ultimate. However, it is within the context of asserting the ultimate meaning of what is categorized. As for the context of presenting it as the conventional truth in the tradition of ‘Glorious Moon’ [Candrakīrti], it is not possible for both to be the final sense, and so it is presented provisionally as the truth of the ultimate itself and within that context it is the subject being characterized (mtshan gzhi), which is exclusively the truth of nirvāṇa. Though this is how it is stated, even [this so-called] final nirvāṇa is not the genuine absolute.178 Here we see that Mikyö Dorjé recognizes that emphasizing the falsity of the conventional and the truth of the ultimate is merely provisional. He clarifies that it is the same kind of presentation of the two truths that we find from Candrakīrti, which matches the definition that we cited earlier from Mikyö Dorjé’s commentary on the Madhyamakāvatāra. Such a description emphasizing

rtogs par gyur na thams cad de yin te/ ’di las gzhan du btsal du rnyed ma yin. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 4b4. 176

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’khor ba gang yin de nyid mya ngan ’das. Ibid., 4b4.

de ltar ’khor ba rdzun pa dang don dam bden par ’jog pa ’di yang rnam grangs min pa’i don dam pa ’i skabs su ma yin gyi/ rnam grangs pa’i don dam khas len pa’i skabs su yin te/ dpal ldan zla ba’i rang lugs la kun rdzob bden par ’jog pa’i skabs ni gnas skabs mthar thug gnyis kar mi srid la/ gnas skabs su ni don dam nyid bden par ’jog cing de’i tshe de’i mthsan gzhi ni/ mya ngan ’das pa bden gcig bu’ shes gsungs kyang mthar thug myang ’das kyang don dam mtshan nyid pa min te. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Bde gshegs snying po dang chos sku'i dris lan. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 323 - 326. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a4-2b1. 178

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distinction is merely an expression of the categorized ultimate (rnam grangs pa’i don dam), i.e. framing the ultimate in definite terms that can be understood intellectually, which as he plainly states is not itself the genuine absolute. Mikyö Dorjé goes on to explain why this is not the final view: Since that does not transcend compounded phenomena, what is final (mthar) is a single truth and is not something to be attained (rnyed pa ma yin). The nonduality of bliss and emptiness taught in the final mantra treatise(s) and Mahāmudrā as well is what is meant by the inseparable, the union of bliss and emptiness as a single flavor, as the emptiness of the enlightened mind of the ultimate sense that is free from elaboration and the bliss of the enlightened mind of the conventional sense, which is the wisdom mind of love without reference, leading up to the noble minds of the Mantrayāna. 179 It is because the bifurcated model of the two truths expresses compounded phenomena, rather than transcending them, that it is not the final view; in other words, it does not reflect the perspective of absolute union. At the same time, we must also remember that even the bifurcated model, representing disparate yet empty modes of experience, is comprised of merely interdependent occurences of the empty nature of mind, and as such does not in actuality imply any separation from final absolute reality. Here it becomes clear that when Mikyö Dorjé emphasizes union in Recognizing the Blessings, he is basing it on an understanding of the uncategorized ultimate (rnam grangs min pa’i don dam), and this uncategorized ultimate transcends compounded phenomena, is not something to be attained (since it is unfabricated), and is holistically non-dual. This also clarifies that, while not explicitly mentioned, Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of

de ni ’dus phyas las ma ’das pa’i phyir des na mthar ni bden pa gcig pa’ang rnyed pa ma yin/ sngags gzhung mthar thug gi bde stong gnyis med phyag chen du bshad pa’i bde stong gnyis med de’ang rdo rje theg pa’i ’phags rgyud yan chad kyi thugs rgyud dmigs med kyi brtse ba kun rdzob byang sems kyi bde ba dang spros bral don dam byang sems stong nyid du ro gcig pa la bde stong zung ’jug bya ba dbyer med kyi don to . Mi bskyod rdo rje. Bde gshegs snying po dang chos sku'i dris lan. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 323 - 326. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2b1-3. 179

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absolute union allows for the hermeneutical interpretation of an authentic conventional truth (yang dag kun rdzob bden pa) which is non-dualistic in contrast with the incorrect conventional truth (log pa’i kun rdzob bden pa) which is dualistic. Recalling how he defines the conventional truth in The Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas, we can see how he would likely define the incorrect conventional: Relative truth is the false object seen from the perspective of the conceptual mind whose eye of wisdom is completely covered by the cataract of ignorance, as is the case with ordinary beings. It is therefore posited as being this conceptual mind. The object perceived does not exist in the way that this mind perceives it to be. 180 This is the way that conventional reality appears to ignorant beings with their dualistic mind, and such beings would grasp at the duality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, for example. However, as we just saw, Mikyö Dorjé describes the conventional differently in A Response on the Sugatagarbha and the Dharmakāya as “the bliss of the enlightened mind of the conventional sense, which is the wisdom mind of love without reference.”181 This conventional belongs to the realm of final (mthar) enlightened realization which is free from any grasping at duality, and is thus an authentic conventional. As Mikyö Dorjé mentions in the quote above, this authentic conventional mode is inseparable from the ultimate truth of unelaborated emptiness, and is the bliss of the enlightened mind which is love without reference. We find this sentiment similarly expressed in Recognizing the Blessings as well, for example, when Mikyö Dorjé discusses the conventional and ultimate aspects of tantric deity practice and states that, “Since all the phases of the ground, path, and fruition of those aspects are inseparable and in union, the emptiness of the manner of embrace is 180

Goldfield et al., The Moon of Wisdom, 75.

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thugs rgyud dmigs med kyi brtse ba kun rdzob byang sems kyi bde ba . Mi bskyod rdo rje. Bde gshegs snying po dang chos sku'i dris lan. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 323 - 326. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2b1-3.

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sealed with bliss, and the bliss being empty of nature is understood as the quintessence of a single flavor.”182 Based on the similarity between these statements, it is clear that Mikyö Dorjé is advocating for a similar understanding of absolute union in both cases. 183 All things considered, it seems that we can condense the ideas presented in Recognizing the Blessings in the following manner: 1) Ordinary beings are necessarily involved in conditions, conceptions, and duality which are false while enlightened beings transcend all of these and represent the ultimate truth, which is truth proper. Conveying these two perspectives provisionally expresses the incorrect relative and the categorized ultimate. 2) Both of these are equal in being mere perspectives or manifestations of the nature of mind: while not realized it is saṃsāra and when realized it is nirvāṇa. All distinctions do not exist as such and are fabrications of mind. 3) The uncategorized ultimate which is absolute (as well as the authentic conventional of enlightened love and bliss inseperable from it) is the union of all conventional and ultimate aspects, which is holistically non-dual, unconditioned, and is the final meaning of Mahāmudrā.184 From this, we can understand how Mikyö Dorjé’s theory of union is a form of resolution: anything categorized, conditional, or dualistic is inherently problematic and limited. Yet, at the same time these kinds of phenomena—being mere perspective, interdependent manifestations

de rnam gzhi lam ’bras bu’i gnas skabs thams cad dbyer med zung ’jug yin pas ’khyud pa’i tshul gyis stong pa’ang bde bas rgyas ’debs bde ba’ang rang bzhin stong pa ro gcig pa’i bdag nyid du shes pa dang. Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 4a1-2. 182

Refer to Appendix 3 for a chart of Mikyö Dorjé’s descriptions and qualifications of the two truths in their various categories. 183

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This formula is reminiscent of a statement made by Mipham Rinpoche which explains how such a process would work sequentially in terms of advancement along the path. Thus, it may help explain th e pragmatic role and soteriological purpose of such disparate models on reality. As stated by Dorji Wangchuk, “[Mipham Rinpoche] explains, a beginner is required to generate ‘a sense of fear in the face of the suffering…associated with [saṃsāric] existence’ (srid pa’i sdug bsngal la ’jigs pa’i yid) and ‘a sense of delight in [nirvāṇic] tranquility’ (zhi ba la dga’ ba’i yid), but once one becomes a highly advanced bodhisattva who realises the ‘homogeneity (or: equality) of [saṃsāric] existence and [nirvāṇic] tranquility’ (srid zhi mnyam pa nyid), one should abandon both ‘fear and thirst for, [respectively,] saṃsāra and nirvāṇa’ (’khor ’das la ’jigs sred)”. See: Dorji Wangchuk, “Was Mi-pham a Dialectical Monist?” Indo-Iranian Journal 55 (2012): 33-34.

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that arise based on the empty nature of mind—are never separate from the absolute state of Mahāmudrā which is not at all bound by such conditions or duality. Emphasizing this thoroughly non-dual and inseparable form of union thereby allows Mikyö Dorjé to resolve all manner of contradictions and dichotomous conditions, which are adventitious and limited, in the quietude of the transcendent ultimate. Therefore, by advocating for this form of union as resolution, Mikyö Dorjé is still able to provisionally engage in the project of re-appropration which allows for sūtra and tantra to be incorporated into Mahāmudrā, while emphasizing adherence to ultimate transcendence against such conventional phenomena as reaction against those who reify duality. Dorji Wangchuk finds a similar use of the theory of union in the nineteenth century Tibetan scholar Mipham Rinpoche’s thought, describing it as a form of “dialectical monism”: If we understand the resolving of tension between any two opposed or juxtaposed poles by seeking one common substrate, or else a level (or dimension) that transcends both, to be “dialectical monism,” then Mipham can justifiably be regarded as a dialectical monist. This observation is indeed crucial, not just for understanding Mi-pham’s thought but also in understanding the fundamental doctrines of the rNying-ma school as perceived by him. Any potential semantic ambiguities of dialectical monism, at least in Mi-pham’s case, may be precluded if we bear in mind that we are dealing here with how Mi-pham exploits and employs the concept of “unity” (zung ’jug: yuganaddha) to resolve Buddhist philosophical or doctrinal tension, be it real or virtual. In fact, Mi-pham’s greatest contribution to the rNying-ma school seems to be his setting the entire spectrum of Buddhist doctrines into a yuganaddha framework, thereby furnishing his school with the essential tools and techniques for explaining and accepting not only major Indian Buddhist (primarily Mahāyāna) philosophies but also their various (and occasionally even diametrically opposed) Tibetan interpretations. It thus seems in my eyes to be fully justified to designate Mi-pham a “Yuganaddhavādin” (zung ’jug tu smra ba). Mi-pham maintains that his rNyingma school upholds the religio-philosophical system (grub pa’i mtha’: siddhānta) of yuganaddha, and it alone, at all levels, namely, the ground (gzhi), path (lam), and result (’bras bu), which clearly suggests that he perceived or defined his rNying-ma school as a “Yuganaddhavādin” school.185

185

Wangchuk, “Was Mipham a Dialectical Monist?” 31-32.

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Whereas I do not find Mikyö Dorjé explicitly defining himself or his tradition as Yuganaddhavādin in the same way that Mipham Rinpoche does, it is very clear based on the textual evidence that he considers union (of the two truths, bliss and emptiness, etc.,) to be his final view, which is tantamount to the realization of Mahāmudrā. It also seems clear that the rhetoric of union allowed Mikyö Dorjé to resolve contradictions as well as bring together disparate elements of Buddhist theory and doctrine. While his conception of union itself seems at times to be slightly different from Mipham Rinpoche’s—Mikyö Dorjé frequently refers to it as the union of bliss and emptiness (bde stong zung ’jug) which seems to imply a stronger relation to tantra and specifically the Kālacakra186 than Mipham Rinpoche’s emphasis on the union of appearance and emptiness (snang stong zung ’jug)187 —it seems appropriate to understand Mikyö Dorjé as a Yuganaddhavādin in the sense that Wangchuk is describing here, i.e. one who uses the concept of yuganaddha to resolve doctrinal tension and maintains this concept at all levels of the ground, path, and fruition. Again, Mikyö Dorjé is advocating for the inseparability of the two truths (bliss and emptiness specifically), and the entire ground, path, and fruition via their inseperable union. I would, of course, stress the importance of understanding the supremacy of

As Roger Jackson notes, “in the Kālacakra, Mahāmudrā is the inexpressible, unchanging bliss transcending other mudras, as well as the empty-formed buddha-aspect in which one awakens…” See: Roger Jackson, “Mahāmudrā: Natural Mind in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism,” Religion Compass 5 (2011): 289. 186

It is interesting that Mikyö Dorjé does not ever use the term “union of appearance and emptiness” explicitly in Recognizing the Blessings. He chooses instead to proclaim the union of “bliss and emptiness ,” and once refers to the ground as the “union of clarity and emptiness” (gzhi gsal stong zung ’jug)—and thereafter often implies that the term clarity is interchangeable with the term bliss by using them in tandem. He on ly uses the term appearance (snang ba) once in discussing the conventional and ultimate aspects of tantric practice, equating appearance with method (thabs), clarity (gsal ba), and bliss (bde ba)—this implies that he ultimately sees appearance as aspects of clarity and bliss, i.e. in union with emptiness. However, he generally seems to associate the term appearance (snang ba) with the experience of ordinary beings, distinguishing this from the emanation (rnam ’phrul) of primordial wisdom (ye shes) which is solely the domain of the āryas (’phags pa). This kind of distinction suggests to me that Mikyö Dorjé—unlike Mipham Rinpoche—was generally uneasy with the idea of equating the dualistic appearances of ordinary beings with the ultimate appearances of enlightened ones, though he at times concedes that ultimately such distinctions do not apply. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2a2; 3b6-4a1; 4b5-6. 187

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Mahāmudrā in conveying and/or realizing union in Mikyö Dorjé’s conception of union, just as it is important to understand Dzogchen as the pinnacle of Mipham’s union theory. For Mikyö Dorjé then, union acts as the common basis for which all manner of controversies and contradictions can be dealt with and ultimately resolved in Mahāmudrā. Since union is reality, and nothing is separate from this reality of union, everything is embraced in union. In closing, one pressing question seems unresolved at this point: If everything is truly and inescapably in non-dual union, how is it possible to make any distinctions at all, even merely on a temporal or conventional level, using such categories as ground, path, and fruition, or even sūtra and tantra? This is, after all, a substantial reason why Gelug scholars wished to assert the validity of conventionl truth itself, so that all of the relative categories of the path leading towards enlightenment would remain valid and coherent as well. In his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Mikyö Dorjé raises a possible objection regarding the indivisibility of the dharmadhātu (synonymous with ultimate reality), which for such interlocutors would preclude the possibility of ever making such divisions as the three yānas and the like, which Mikyö Dorjé clearly advocates for in his exegesis. To this, the he replies with a clever analogy of the space in a jar: For example, even though a jar (the foundation) is a single one, by virtue of the divisions of the phenomena that are contained in it and founded on it (such as honey or ground sugar), the divisions of this foundation are expressed as it sometimes being “a honey jar” and sometimes “a sugar jar.” Likewise, though the disposition to be realized is a single one, by way of being founded on it, different superior and inferior ways of realizing it occur. Therefore, it is divided in these ways.188 Therefore, for Mikyö Dorjé, since the foundation (union) is unitary, whatever is based upon it is

188

Brunnhölzl, Gone Beyond, 291-292.

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also necessarily unitary in nature, though it is if course possible to base apparently different things upon it. This helps clarify how Mahāmudrā may accomodate seemingly disparate circumstances: all of the various paths, categories, and vehicles (though they may be understood as superior and inferior) are founded upon ultimate union. It also clarifies how these disparate categories are ultimately resolvable in union. Such things as perspectives of ignorance and enlightened wisdom, and categories of false dualistic appearances of the incorrect conventional and the authentic conventional experience of love and bliss, for example, are merely provisional contents within the expanse of everlasting union. For critics of Mikyö Dorjé’s brand of nonduality such as the Gelugpa, the existential status of such categories and perspectives needs to be in some sense preserved in order for them to apply and remain coherent at all. Yet, for Mikyö Dorjé, it is the totality of non-dual union which both accommodates all of these various conventional expressions and allows them to be ultimately resolved. The finality and totality of union accommodates for and binds together all of these various expressions, experiences, and perspectives, which do not exist at all apart from that all-pervasive union. To denigrate this holistic non-dual union or exaggerate the status of conventional dualistic phenomena would leave dualistic and conceptual tensions unresolved for Mikyö Dorjé, perpetuating the delusions of ordinary experience and preclude final liberation. Holistic and non-dual union is thus the starting point, the final destination, and everything in between for Mikyö Dorjé: it is both the ultimate basis and the final resolution for all.

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Chapter 3 Concluding Remarks

3.1. A Comparitive Analysis of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā Vision

In discussing Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā interpretation, much has been said here in terms of how to understand it in relation to Sakya and Gelug critiques of the Kagyü tradition, as well as in relation to Gampopa’s characterization of the hierarchy of Mahāmudrā, sūtra, and tantra. With this in mind, at least a brief overview of how Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā compares and contrasts with other scholars and masters of Kagyü Mahāmudrā seems in order. This will allow for a more refined contextualization of the Eighth Karmapa’s Mahāmudrā thought, allowing us to appreciate the distinct and unique aspects of his interpretation. Padma Karpo (1527-1592) was a contemporary of Mikyö Dorjé, and as then head of the Tibetan Drukpa Kagyü tradition his thought was quite influential and remains so to this day. One interesting area of comparison here for the two figures is that Padma Karpo identifies two manners of discussing Mahāmudrā: Mahāmudrā in its deluded form (’khrul lugs phyag chen) and Mahāmudrā as it is (gnas lugs phyag chen).189 The former essentially represents the dualistic mind and the latter the realization of the nature of mind, i.e. of non-dual reality. This is also significant in that these categories are strongly related to Padma Karpo’s conception of yuganaddha. This formulation seems to be compatible with Mikyö Dorjé’s own understanding of Mahāmudrā, however at this point I am not aware of Mikyö Dorjé employing these terms specifically. Whatever the case may be, this description seems to match his understanding of an

189

Broido, “Padma dKarpo on the Two Satyas,” 27.

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ultimate that is categorized (rnam grangs pa) and that which is not (rnam grangs min). In this case, Mikyö Dorjé’s preference for the ‘categorized’ distinction may represent his penchant for polemics—as the reader will recall he referred to the Gelugpa’s view of emptiness as a limited categorical emptiness (nyi tshe ba’i rnam grangs pa’i stong nyid).190 Broido is quick to point out, however, that for Padma Karpo these two forms of Mahāmudrā are inextricably united, with neither one being “good” nor “bad.”191 As I have tried to clarify, Mikyö Dorjé ultimately agrees with this idea. However, at least provisionally he seems much more cynical than Padma Karpo about the conventional truth that is categorized or incorrect, which he has condemned as ‘falsity’ and ‘non-existence.’ This explicit cynicism towards the conventional seems to demonstrate the soteriological significance of renunciation of such dualistic and conventional phenomena for Mikyö Dorjé and its pivotal importance for those on the path, as I have mentioned before. In other words, renunciation of such phenomena is not possible as long as one ascribes to them any kind of validity (as the Gelugpas do, you may recall). This is just another form of grasping embedded in conceptuality and mental elaborations. Thus, Mikyö Dorjé’s cynicism towards the conventional aids in liberating one from grasping at truth where there is none. Yet even the conventional truth in that sense is not ultimately divorced from the all-encompassing embrace of union; if it were, then it would be antithetical to Mikyö Dorjé’s ultimate project of such union. Recall that even these phenomena are interdependent manifestations of the empty nature of mind for Mikyö Dorjé. In his Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas, he elaborates on the conventional truth: Bewilderment is that which causes sentient beings to be ignorant about the abiding nature of reality. Alternatively, it is that which imagines the abiding nature of reality to be something other than what it actually is and in this way obscures 190

Williams, “Mi Bskyod Rdo Rje's Critique of Dge Lugs Pa Madhyamaka,” 133.

191

Broido, “Padma dKarpo on the Two Satyas,” 28.

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the view of its true nature. Such a phenomena is called relative...[For noble ones] the relative is of a nature that resembles fabricated things rather than being something true, because they do not wrongly assume it to be true. Relative truth deceives immature beings, but the noble ones know it to be illusory, merely relative, and of the essence of dependent arising.192 Here we can understand that the conventional is true in two ways for Mikyö Dorjé: that it is true merely for ordinary beings who perceive phenomena in a deluded manner, i.e. it is a commonly accepted “truth” which is in actuality false (in accord with his perspectival theory), and that its essence is true as emptiness or dependent arising (in accord with his vision of union), which describes how it is “true” epistemologically and ontologically, respectively. In defining it as such, Mikyö Dorjé is keeping with the classical sense of the term for the conventional or relative, kun rdzob, as something that conceals the true nature (which can be contrasted to how the Gelugpa scholars understand the conventional as a truth of equal ontological and epistemological status to the ultimate).193 Another important figure for our purposes here is Gö Lotsawa, particularly since Mikyö Dorjé was at times critical of his ideas.194 As Ruegg has noted,195 Gö Lotsawa

gti mug ni sems can rnams gnas lugs la rmongs par byed pa’am/ gnas lugs las gzhan du sgro btags nas gnas lugs kyi rang bzhin mthong ba la sgrib par byed pa’i phyir/ chos de lta bu la ni kun rdzob ces byar ’jog ste rgyu mthsan bshad zin to/ gti mug gi rang bzhin kun rdzob des dngos po gang rang bzh in med bzhin yod par shen nas don la ma zhugs kyang bcos mar btags pa’i rten ’brel gyi dbang gis bden par snang ba de ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa zhes thub pa des gsungs so/ kun rdzob kyi bden pa de yang nyen thos dang rang sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dp a’ nyon mongs pa can gyi ma rig pa spangs pa ‘dus byed gzugs brnyan la sogs pa’i yod pa nyid dang ’dra bar gzigs pa rnams la ni bcos mar gyur pa’i dngos po ta bur gyur pa ni rang bzhin yin gyi/ bden pa ma yin te bden par rlom pa med pa’i phyir/ byis pa rnams la ni slu bar byed pa yin la/ ’phags pa rnams la ni sgyu ma ltar rten ’byung nyid kyi kun rdzob tsam du ’gyur ro. Goldfield et al., The Moon of Wisdom, 85. 192

Thakchoe explains, for example, “[Tsongkhapa] accords equal significance to both the epistemolo gical and ontological issues involved in the relationship between the two truths. To say that they share a single ontological identity with different conceptual identities does not mean, therefore, that the distinctions at issue are purely epistemological. This is consistent with his position that the two truths have equal status and do not constitute an ontological or epistemological hierarchy.” Thakchoe, The Two Truths Debate, 21. 193

194

See for example: Mathes, Direct Path to the Buddha Within, 51.

195

Ruegg, “A Karma bKa’ brgyud Work,” 348.

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made a strict distinction between Mantrayāna and Mahāmudrā by formulating a sutrabased Mahāmudrā, resulting in a “radical separation” of Mantrayāna and Mahāmudrā with which Mikyö Dorjé seemed uncomfortable. Considering the heavily tantric tone of Recognizing the Blessings, I would say that Mikyö Dorjé’s favoring of a tantric Mahāmudrā (which still may accommodate the sūtras) has been made evident, with the caveat that according to this research Mikyö Dorjé did view Mahāmudrā as something that ultimately transcends even the tantras, with the exception of the Kālacakra. For Gö Lotsawa at least, his preference for sūtric Mahāmudrā perhaps demonstrates his affinity for the sugatagarbha theory found in the Ratnagotravibhāga, which Gampopa designated as a basic text for understanding Mahāmudrā .196 Mathes also explains that Gö Lotsawa reads the gradual path of the four Mahāmudrā yogas into the Ratnagotravibhāga.197 Mikyö Dorjé’s preference for tantra seems to be based in his view that only the tantras express the spontaneous and non-elaborated emptiness that is endowed with all qualities, whereas sūtra only teaches the non-elaborated aspect198 —a view which is similarly expressed in Recognizing the Blessings. Mikyö Dorjé also strongly criticized Gö Lotsawa’s sugatagarbha theory as treating buddha nature as a real cause (specifically as being merely the six sense fields or āyatanas of sentient beings) and not as identical with the all-pervading buddha kāyas.199 In sum, it seems that Gö Lotsawa emphasized a gradualist understanding of Mahāmudrā via his particular sugatagarbha interpretation

196

See: Mathes, Direct Path to Buddha Within, 34.

197

Ibid., 45.

198

Broido, “Padma dKarpo on the Two Satyas,” 17.

199

Mathes, Direct Path to Buddha Within, 415-416.

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based on the sūtras, which Mikyö Dorjé took exception with since it would seem to contradict his theory of the union of cause and result (i.e. the ground and fruition) based on the tantras (specifically the Kālacakra). As for the other Karmapas, Mathes has already done a fair amount of analysis on the strong relationship between the thought of the Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorjé (1284-1339) and Mikyö Dorjé,200 which I do not feel I have anything significant to add at this point. In brief, Mathes demonstrates how Mikyö Dorjé followed the tathāgatagarbha thought of Rangjung Dorjé rather closely. Mathes quotes Mikyö Dorjé in his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra as criticizing those who interpret the Third Karmapa as asserting that the tathāgatagarbha exists inseparably within the dharmadhātu of the mind of sentient beings, and rather claims that mind has an impure aspect, i.e. that which possesses consciousness (sems can) and does not possess the dharmadhātu, which is tantamount to the adventitious stains that deviate from the dharmadhātu due to false imagination. For Mikyö Dorjé and his interpretation of Rangjung Dorjé, mind also has a pure aspect that possesses the manner of being inseparable from the buddha qualities which is related to such Mahāmudrā terms as natural mind (tha mal gyi shes pa).201 Accordng to Mathes, this clear-cut distinction between the pure and impure minds, centering on a distinction between an ordinary ālaya consciousness (kun gzhi rnam shes) and an exalted ālaya (kun gzhi),202 represents an essential part of Mikyö Dorjé’s other-emptiness interpretation. Thus, according to Mathes’ research, it seems that Mikyö Dorjé held Rangjung Dorjé’s theories in particularly high regard, and used his Yogācāra and Mahāmudrā

200

Mathes, Direct Path to Buddha Within, 51-74.

201

Ibid., 63.

202

Mikyö Dorjé terms the latter as a primordial wisdom-ālaya (kun gzhi ye shes). Ibid., 61.

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interpretations to complement his own thought. It is of particular interest to make a comparison of Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought to that of his successor the Ninth Karmapa Wangchuk Dorjé (1556–1603). It seems that Wangchuk Dorjé was more systematic than Mikyö Dorjé regarding Mahāmudrā, and indeed it was the Ninth Karmapa who formulated the popular four-fold pointing out instruction in his Ocean of the Definitive Meaning (nges don rgya mtsho), which are in short: 1) Recognize appearances to be mind (snang ba sems sun go ’phrod); 2) Recognize mind to be empty (sems stong par ngo ’phrod); 3) Recognize emptiness to be spontaneously present (stong pa lhun grub tu ngo ’phrod); 4) Recognize spontaneous presence to be self-liberating (lhun grub rang grol du ngo ’phrod).203 While I am not aware of Mikyö Dorjé employing these phrases specifically, particularly in such a methodical manner, we can find some analogues in his writings. For example, when he discusses śamatha and vipaśyanā in Recognizing the Blessings, we find some very similar ideas at play: As for vipaśyanā, understanding that there are no phenomena apart from the mind, since the mind’s aspects of clarity and awareness is this present mind that distinguishes between the three times [yet] is empty of a cause, fruition, and essence, it is the wisdom of fully discerning phenomena: a bare (rjen lhag gi) awareness that is unconditioned, inconceivable, and cannot be expressed as anything whatsoever.204 To be sure, as I just mentioned, the terminology that Wangchuk Dorjé employed is not explicitly mentioned here either. However, we can see some striking similarities. The first two of the

Anne Burchardi, “The Logic of Liberation: Epistemology as a Path to the Realization of Mahāmudrā,” Himalayan Discoveries 1 (2013): 40. 203

lhag mthong ni sems las ma gtogs pa’i chos med par shes nas/ sems gsal rig gi cha de la dus gsum du bcad pa’i da ltar gyi sems ’di la rgyu ’bras ngo bo gsum gyis stong zhing/ ’dus ma byas pa cing yang ma dmigs shing gang du’ang brjod du med par rjen lhag gi shes pa’i chos rab tu rnam ’byed kyi shes rab yin la . Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 3a3-5. 204

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pointing out instructions are clearly there, as in the statement to the effect that no phenomena is separate from mind and that this mind is empty of cause, fruition, and essence. The last two of the pointing out instructions are not so clearly illustrated here, however there are similar ideas here. For instance, the idea of being ‘spontaneously present’—or more literally ‘spontaneously accomplished’—can be compared to Mikyö Dorjé’s emphasis that this empty clarity and awareness is none other than “this present mind” (da ltar gyi sems ’di), which while not technically the same is similar in its subitist emphasis on immanence. The fourth instruction is the least obvious within the text, though the idea here of bare awareness being unconditioned does imply through the rhetoric of immanence that enlightenment is not fabricated, and hence not “other-liberated”—and there is also a later instruction that subject and object are in essence the dharmakāya (chos kyi sku’i ngo bor)205 —both of these ideas at least implicitly accord with the spirit of the final pointing-out instruction of Wangchuk Dorjé. This demonstrates, implicitly though not explicitly, that Wangchuk Dorjé’s formulation of the four instructions has an ideological precedent in his immediate predecessor. It is of course possible that these ideas are more explicitly expressed elsewhere, though that is not clear at this time due to the limited amount of research available on Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought. In the previous chapter, I mentioned the nineteenth-century Mahāmudrā scholar Karma Tashi Chöphel who adopted a tri-fold categorization of Mahāmudrā (phyag chen rnam pa gsum) into sūtra (mdo’i phyag chen), mantra (sngags kyi phyag chen), and essence (snying po’i phyag chan). This system was also popularized by Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Thayé (1813-1899) in his text The Treasury of Universal Knowledge (shes bya kun khyab mdzod). Mantra Mahāmudrā is

205

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 4b5.

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the generally accepted category of Mahāmudrā, and is transmitted via the Vajrayāna path of means, involving tantric empowerment. Essence Mahāmudrā is the sudden realization of the nature of mind via the empowerment of vajra-wisdom given by a realized guru to a qualified disciple. Sūtra Mahāmudrā is based in the Sūtrayāna (sometimes even said to be hidden in the sūtras), yet is also said to accord with mantra. It is different from standard Sūtrayāna in that it is able to produce a direct realization of emptiness even for beginners who have not obtained the first bhūmi. Many modern scholars have noted that such a classification of Mahāmudrā was not extant at the time of Gampopa, though Gampopa did employ a similar formula—as was mentioned previously in the first chapter—of a path of inference (rje dpag lam, i.e. sūtra), a path of blessing (byin rlabs kyi lam, i.e. mantra), and a path of direct perception (mngon sum lam, i.e. Mahāmudrā proper).206 The difference between these sets of categories lies in the fact that Gampopa wanted to distinguish Mahāmudrā proper as a direct path apart from the general sūtra and tantra approaches, while figures like Karma Tashi Chöphel and Jamgön Kongtrul wished to distinguish between three different ways to apply Mahāmudrā which are appropriate in their particular contexts. As we have seen, Mikyö Dorjé’s approach seems to meet somewhere in the middle of these: 1) he generally sees Mahāmudrā as superior to the Pāramitāyāna (even while according with it); 2) Tantric Mahāmudrā is generally favored, though, only on a provisional basis (with the exception of the Kālacakra); and 3) Ultimately, Mahāmudrā proper (which is presented in the Kālacakra as well) transcends both the inferential means of sūtra and the ritualistic means of tantra. This last point in particular accords with Gampopa’s vision.

For more on both Jamgön Kongtrul and Gampopa’s categorizations of Mahāmudrā, see: Mathes, “Blending o f Sūtras and Tantras,” 201-203. 206

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In light of research available to date, Mikyö Dorjé’s approach to Mahāmudrā appears to be less explicitly systematized than later approaches, which involve clear categorizations of Mahāmudrā (such as Wangchuk Dorjé’s set of four pointing out instructions or Karma Tashi Chöphel’s trifold classification of Mahāmudrā). Nevertheless, it does have a significant hierarchical element (such as his emphasis on the inferiority of the sūtra approach as well as tantras inferior to the Kālacakra), which is largely lacking in later formulations. Mikyö Dorjé’s hierarchical approach here accords with Gampopa’s as well. The lack of hierarchical emphasis in these later formulations may be due to the spirit of the non-sectarian (ris med) movement in Tibet that arose shortly after Mikyö Dorjé’s time, though this is just speculation. Thus, we may see Mikyö Dorjé as negotiating between the two poles of Gampopa’s transcendental Mahāmudrā vision and the kind of inclusive vision emphasized by later figures. Taken together with his contemporaries’ attempts at formulating or interpreting Mahāmudrā in rather novel ways, we can understand Mikyö Dorjé’s time as a period of adaptation for Mahāmudrā—with different proponents of Mahāmudrā adopting different formulas, hermeneutics, and categorizations. Compared to figures like Gampopa, Lama Zhang, and Chödrag Gyatso, in particular, Mikyö Dorjé’s approach is distinctive for its largely scholastic and theoretical approach (though it should be noted that this approach is at all times with praxis and soteriology in mind) that is based in his vision of union—distinguishing him from Gö Lotsawa, for example—and is employed to justify both hierarchical categories of systems, tenets, and views as well as how to explain their integration and fundamental commonalities. Though figures like Padma Karpo also heavily emphasized union in their Mahāmudrā thought, Mikyö Dorjé’s vision was unique in its strong cynicism towards conditional existence and conventional approaches to the ultimate. Again, this demonstrates his Mahāmudrā thought as reaction to such

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elements, which nevertheless may be re-appropriated, though ultimately culminating in the admonition that all conventional tension needs to be pacified via their resolution.

3.2. Conclusion: The Holistically Non-Dual Union of Mikyö Dorjé

Throughout this work, I have alluded to Mikyö Dorjé’s thought as reaction, reappropriation, and resolution. This interpretation is largely based on the Mahāmudrā thought contained within his text Recognizing the Blessings, but also of course relies on relevant statements and theories found elsewhere in his other works, as well as on the historical context of pertinent doctrinal disputes. The element of reaction is demonstrated in Mikyö Dorjé’s transcendental approach; it is his general cynicism towards merely conventional means limited by worldly conditions and leads him to defend the subitist Mahāmudrā tradition of Gampopa against critiques made by Sakya and Gelug scholars calling for more scholastic and doctrinal consistency, as well as disputes about how to approach the interpretation of conventional and ultimate truths. The element of re-appropriation is demonstrated in Mikyö Dorjé’s inclusive and eclectic approach; it is his acknowledgement of the provisional usefulness of incorporating other doctrines and practices onto the path of Mahāmudrā, and thus it is also an empowerment of Mahāmudrā by answering critics who claimed that Kagyü Mahāmudrā is detrimentally divorced from sūtra and tantra. This represents a rather distinct approach towards Mahāmudrā, demonstrating how one may accommodate aspects of sūtra and tantra within the system of Mahāmudrā. Finally, the element of resolution represents Mikyö Dorjé’s ultimate view, and his desire to resolve all tensions and distinctions (here in particular, those of the ground, path, and fruition)

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within the quietude of the unconditioned and non-dual reality of union. His union theory is both holistic—it includes everything, both conventional and ultimate truths—and it is non-dual—it is not a mere integration or connection of two (or more) elements, but the essential singularity of all aspects, it is the substrate of all phenomena consisting of their unconditional inseparability throughout all seemingly distinct and disparate phases and contexts. This holistically non-dual union is based in Mikyö Dorjé’s nature of mind theory, which recognizes all perspectives on the path as aspects of the empty nature of mind, and it is only by realizing the holistic and non-dual union of all such aspects that one may attain final liberation. The perspectival and non-dual modes are defined by Mikyö Dorjé as categorized and uncategorized, respectively, with the former being provisionally useful on the path and the latter being ultimate reality as it is. This demonstrates the pivotal importance of the theory of union in understanding Mikyö Dorjé’s final view, and it suggests that all of Mikyö Dorjé’s views should be based on an appropriate understanding of holistic and non-dual union which is the ultimate goal of all of his other approaches—and in that sense, Mikyö Dorjé is a proponent of unity, a “Yuganaddhavādin”, as it were. Mikyö Dorjé recognized the futile and contradictory nature of conventional approaches, yet maintained their provisional utility along the path because such approaches ultimately lead to his vision of unity which is the resolution of any and all tensions. Understanding this may aid scholars of Mikyö Dorjé to reconcile the various (and at times, seemingly contradictory) approaches that he employed, which would hopefully result in an appreciation of his grander vision and the general consistency of his thought.

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Appendix 1: A Translation of Recognizing the Blessings of Mahāmudrā207

Homage You who are not deluded, with your vast knowledge of the two scriptural traditions, you are the one who bestows the jewel of the profound meaning; I bow to the feet of the great father [Sangye] Nyenpa, the indisputable buddha Vajradhāra.

Introduction to the Blessings of Mahāmudrā

Such conventional terms—the black marks of my treatise—are comparable to an old dog gnawing on dry bones.208 As there is no way for [such conventionalities] to enter into one’s experience, those who understand this should focus on supplication. This heap of malignant attendants and disciples of mine209 are like a hundred wicked sons assaulting their own mother.

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Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O3LS12537|O3LS125373LS13592$W8039 A brief mention should be made here for the help that I received from Khenpo Gyurmé of Tergar Öseling Monastery in Kathmandu, Nepal. Khenpo read through the entire text with me, providing a line by line explanation of this text and answering any questions that I had as well. I would like to note, however, that I already had a rough translation of the text by the time that I had met him, and his explanations were used only to supplement my own original translation when there was something that I had not understood well o r noticed that I had misinterpreted based on Khenpo’s commentary. Thus, my translation is not based entirely on what Khenpo explained to me, but only as I deemed necessary to improve the accuracy of my interpretation. For more details on this, please see my discussion of this in the introduction. 208

According to Khenpo Gyurmé, this metaphor plays on the image of an old dog that gnaws on dry, meatless bones—even though the dog may enjoy the flavor and the activity, there is not much benefit for the dog, as th ere is no meat there to provide sustenance. In fact, as the old dog probably does not have healthy teeth, or any teeth at all, such activity could actually harm it. Likewise, one might enjoy reading the scriptures, but if there is no experience of what is being explained then there is not much benefit and it could even be harmful or counterproductive for the individual. 209

The text uses the agentive/instrumental case here with ngas but is probably an error (especially since there is no verb that goes along with it), which should instead here be possessive, as in nga’i. There are other instances of this basic error in the text, and this will be my only mention of it. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 1b2.

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Since there is no way [for me] to ripen [their] mind-streams, those who understand this should focus on aspiration. This food offered to me is like consuming boiling molten bronze, the food and drink of hell-beings and hungry ghosts. Since I have no ability to return such favors (yon sbyong ba), those who understand this should give without attachment. I, a heretical old man, am like a shaman who sacrifices animals (gshen pa) for a sinful king. Since I have not been able to liberate my mind-stream in accordance with the dharma, those who understand this should focus solely on devotion. This undeluded (smyon med) meeting of mine with the buddha210 is like passing over to the dense Akaniṣṭha pure land. Since there is no deviation (gol sa) on this path, those who understand this should focus on joy and delight. Please look upon your son Mikyö Dorje! If one were to rely on a complete façade of the dharma, would its purpose be fulfilled? For those who adhere to the Mahāmudrā tradition,211 especially those who follow the tradition of Dagpo [i.e. Gampopa]—which is above all a tradition of practice—must they earnestly strive to receive blessings? If one does not have a sense of such blessings, if one does not know what “blessings” refer to, then there is no way to incorporate [Mahāmudrā] into one’s own experience.

The Ground of Mahāmudrā

As I understand it, the phases (‘gros) that seem to be necessary are those of the ground— the union of clarity and emptiness—the path—the union of the two accumulations—and the

210

Here the term sangs rgyas is likely referring to his own root guru, sangs rgyas mnyan pa, playing on both the fact that he considers him to be enlightened and that his name contains the term sangs rgyas. See: Ibid., 1b6. 211

The line reads: phyag rgya pa yin phyin but this last term phyin, normally understood as the past tense of the verb ‘gro ba (to go), is likely a misspelling in this edition of the term phyir, which can be translated as “for the sake of,” or “for the purpose of,” and makes more sense in this context. See: Ibid., 2a1.

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fruition—the union of the two kāyas. As for the intention of the exceptional Anuttarayoga tantras, it is necessary to be introduced to the causal principle 212 which possesses the qualities of clarity, bliss, and emptiness. Thus, the meaning of all the tantras without exception are exemplified by the two syllables: 'E Vaṃ.'213 Such bliss is not like the occurrence of a blissful feeling dependent on an awareness contacting an attractive object. However, the nature that is primordially present which is established and abides together (grub bde gcig pa) with the mind of clarity is [non-dual] like a sugar cane and [its] sweetness.214 From the perspective of this bliss, the great being who is without beginning or end is said to be Vajrasattva of great joy; from the perspective of emptiness, it is said that conditioned existence (srid pa) is intrinsically pure which results in it being free of conditioned existence by its very essence. [What is referred to here] is what abides primordially as method and wisdom; being represented by the vajra and bell it is a demonstration of the coupling of the great vajra and bell that is graced by the vajra blessing. The Mahāmudrā of union (zung 'jug phyag rgya chen po) is spoken of in that way; it is spoken of in a hidden manner of symbolic means (brda thabs kyi sbas pa'i tshul). Likewise, ground Mahāmudrā—the causal principle—is bliss, clarity, emptiness, and perpetuality (rgyun mi ‘chad pa). [This] nature (ris)215 is unalterable, it is without beginning or

212 rgyu'i rgyud: “The

reality of mind that abides unchangeable like space within the minds of sentient beings and Buddhas. According to sūtras this refers to the Tathāgata essence...According to the highest yoga tantra this principle is known as the union of E-Vaṃ” Tsepak Rinzin, Tibetan-English Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 2008), 57. 213

The syllables E and Vaṃ refer to thabs (skillful means) and shes rab (wisdom) respectively.

214

As Khenpo Gyurmé explained, this example refers to the fact that sugar cane and sweetness exist in dependence on one another, never existing apart. That is, if one were to disappear the other would be gone as well. The text reads ris (usually translated as “bias”, “form”, “class”, or “division”) but it seems possible that this could also be a misspelling for the term rigs (usually translated as “class”, “potential”, “division”, or “lineage”), which is a common synonym for buddha nature. Even so, these two terms would seem to be similar in meaning here, meant to denote something that is of its own kind or species. Khenpo Gyurmé did not seem to find issue with t he term ris, however, and equated it with the term bde gshegs snying po (sugatagarbha) and so I am loosely translating it here as “nature,” to both reflect its connotation to buddha-nature theory and the idea of something of its own kind, with its 215

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end, and it is not corrupted by the mental stream of ordinary consciousness, i.e. the mind, the mental factors, and so forth. If one authentically refines that by means of the path, since the fruition is Vajradhāra, the extraordinary being who has the power to appear as though reemerging, it expresses the ground, the pervasive lord Vajrasattva.

The Path of Mahāmudrā

As for the path Mahāmudrā of the tantras of the exceptional methods—the methods which actualize [the ground]—it would be insufficient on the path of Mahāmudrā merely to [engage in] the samādhis of bliss, clarity, emptiness, and non-conceptuality which are dependent upon consciousness. Even with regard to the mere enjoyment of such things, there is the potential for remaining in the middling kalpas (bskal pa'i bar gnas). In the Samādhirāja Sūtra it says: Though one may cultivate a worldly samādhi, It will not eradicate the perception of a self. Due to the afflictions, conceptual signs arise in full force. It would be like cultivating the samādhi of Utraka. [Such a samādhi] is explained in the commentaries of the tantras as a deviation into a formless samādhi, [as in the case] of those who arrogantly assume that absolute nothingness is emptiness. It is not appropriate to merely meditate on the non-elaborated and empty nature of appearances since it does not even arise as more profound or vaster than any of those on the path of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, nor even those of the Pāramitās, and therefore the special qualities of Mahāmudrā would be incomplete. Even in terms of the mere unification of śamatha

own special qualities. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 2b1.

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and vipaśyanā it would not suffice. As the sublime regent Maitreya has said: Due to resting the mind in terms of a mind based in genuine abiding, And due to fully discerning phenomena, One has śamatha and vipaśyanā. Since one rests in the single taste of mind within the clarity and awareness which are the defining qualities of the mind, as if blending water and milk, it is the śamatha which pacifies all of the afflictions. Here, the śamatha which apprehends (dmigs pa) external [objects] features the apprehension of purity and impurity. By visualizing the form of the deity, meditating on your own body as the form of the deity, and meditating on [forms of] skeletons, and then allowing the imprints (rjes yel)216 of the variable mental states (sems byung gzhan rnams)217 to fade away, one generates thoroughly purified mental states. As for vipaśyanā, understanding that there is no phenomena apart from the mind, since the mind’s aspects of clarity and awareness is this present mind that distinguishes between the three times [yet] is empty of a cause, fruition, and essence, it is the wisdom of fully discerning phenomena: a bare (rjen lhag gi) awareness that is unconditioned, inconceivable, and cannot be expressed as anything whatsoever. That being the case, it would be ineffective to merely perceive the clarity of mind while not being distracted by something else. One may unite śamatha and vipaśyanā in such a manner, yet it would result in the emergence of many elaborate outer vehicles of dialectics (phyi mtshan nyid kyi thek pa).218 Since the meditation of Mahāmudrā is the path of the Anuttarayoga (rnal ‘byor bla na med pa’i lam), one must take up the practice which The text reads rje yal, but this may be an error and so on Khenpo Gyurmé’s advice I have changed it to rjes yal which seems more appropriate, the rjes here being similar to the terms zhabs rjes or rkang rjes (i.e. footprints) according to Khenpo. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 3a3. 216

This probably refers to the sems byung gzhan ‘gyur bzhi, which are as follows: regret (‘gyod pa), sleep (gnyid), coarse conceptual understanding (rtog pa), and refined conceptual understanding (dpyod pa). See: Ibid., 3a3. 217

218

I.e. Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna. See: Ibid., 3a5-6.

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is replete with all of the qualities of the direct path of the Vajrayāna. Moreover, at the beginning one should bring about the maturation of one’s mind-stream by properly obtaining abhiṣeka [from] a qualified spiritual master. Following that, concerning the path of the vase abhiṣeka, the physical body and external objects mainly appear as obstructive matter which is [in fact] nothing other than mind; this ordinary subject and object duality which apprehends in that manner is purified through the illusion- like path of the generation stage. The meaning is [contained within] the saying: All things—anything and everything that appears—are the sovereign one, one’s own superior deity [i.e. one’s yidam]. Observe that all phenomena are of a completely pure nature, the primordial wisdom of buddhahood. Moreover, it must be done by sealing it with emptiness. Thus, as it is said in the Mother Tantras: Day is lord Vajradhāra; Night, likewise, is the yogini.219 Also, as it is said in the Father Tantras according to the Summary of Conduct 220 : Whatever arises is the conventional truth. Whatever has the name of cessation is the ultimate truth. 221 Through the spiritual master's kindness the two stages222 Are obtained which later results in buddhahood. As the Brahmin Saraha said in the Sādhanā of the Buddha's Skullcup223 :

According to Khenpo Gyurmé, Vajradhāra represents the aspect of the form or appearance of the deity (lha yi sku’i rnam pa) and the Yogini represents wisdom (shes rab) and emptiness (stong pa nyid), which must be realized together. 219

220

Skt. Caryamelapakapradipa. Tib. sbyod bsdus. An esoteric Buddhist text attributed to one of the founding Madhyamaka scholars Āryadeva. 221

Here, according to Khenpo Gyurmé, the conventional aspect is the conceptual aspect (rnam rtog) which relates to the form of the deity (lha yi sku), and the ultimate aspect is the aspect of its non-established nature (rang bzhin ma grub pa) and emptiness (stong pa nyid). 222

The two stages refers to the generation stage (bskyed rim) and completion stage (rdzogs rim).

The text reads bram ze sa ra has mdzad pa’i sangs rgyas thos pa’i sgrub thabs but on Khenpo Gyurmé’s advice I have changed thos pa to thod pa. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 3b4-5. 223

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Imagine the flavor224 of the quintessence of the dharmadhātu in the center of a hundred petaled lotus blossom. Heruka shines like the moon and radiates like a jewel. The bliss of the various wisdom consorts consists of the embrace with Heruka, the spiritual family of total bliss. Thus, while not wavering from the state of the empty dharmadhātu, the form of the male consort, the method taught conventionally as day and arising consists of the aspects of appearance, clarity, and bliss. The form of the female consort, the wisdom taught conventionally as the womb, night-time, and cessation, consists of the aspects of emptiness, non-conceptuality, and the uncompounded. Since all the phases of the ground, path, and fruition of those aspects are inseparable and in union, the emptiness of the manner of embrace is sealed with bliss, and the bliss being empty of nature is understood as the quintessence of a single flavor. In brief, one must meditate by properly joining the complete purity of the styles of the colors of their forms with their symbolic implements. Whatever the case may be (ci yin), meditating on the male or female deities individually when they are in fact inseparable (cha med) would never manifest as the path to buddhahood. Based on the path of the second and third abhiṣeka, the impurities of the defiled elements of the body gradually dissipate, and following that the arising of the primordial wisdom of the four joys (dga' ba bzhi)225 is sealed as the sense objects, sense faculties, and everything that appears and exists. Thereby, the beginner meditates in the manner of conviction and [divine] pride, incorporating them onto the path.

I translate ro here as “flavor” (as opposed to one of its other possible meanings such as “residue” or “elixir”), which is likely a reference to the third yoga of Mahāmudrā, ro gchig “the single flavor”. Though it is not immediately clear from the context of this quote that this interpretation is correct, the fact that shortly thereafter Mikyö Dorje refers to the single flavor doctrine supports this understanding of the term. See: Ibid., 3b5. 224

The four joys are: joy (dga' ba), supreme joy (chog dga'), unique joy (khyad dga'), and spontaneous joy (lhan skyes kyi dga' ba). 225

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With familiarity, one sustains the primordial wisdom which arises from what has been sealed as being united by the path226 of the four abhiṣekas, and therefore one attains the siddhis of supreme Mahāmudrā. Thus, as one becomes skilled in the higher tantras and the oral instructions, by your own accord you will not have any doubt regarding the profound definitive meaning. Thus, one must diligently rely on those who have the ability to guide disciples on the authentic path. As it says in the Brilliant Lamp227 : Even the imaginatively constructed 228 deity yoga [i.e. generation stage practice] transcends all concepts. It is the individual self-knowing awareness.229 It is the domain of the buddhas. Abiding within the womb of the precious aggregates, it is free from all positions of existence and non-existence. It is not within the reach of those who adhere to words or philosophical speculation. It is to be realized based exclusively on the instruction of the sacred spiritual master. Therefore, as those who engage in ignorant meditations do not enter onto the path of liberation, the completion stage that is based on such a profound generation stage is the complete path of practice in terms of its union of bliss and emptiness. Following that, as the supreme lord of siddhas [Maitrīpa?]230 has said: Like a crane gliding in space, One is liberated within the expanse of the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The text reads dbang bzhi pa’i las, but Khenpo Gyurmé read it as dbang bzhi pa’i lam, which makes sense given that this is the section on the path, and more specifically the path of the vase abhiṣeka. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 4a5. 226

Skt. Pradipoddyotana-namatika. Tib. sgron gsal. A text attributed to Candrakīrti, an extensive commentary on the Guhyasamāja Tantra. 227

228

The text reads yong su brtags pa but should almost certainly read yongs su brtags pa. See: Ibid., 4a6.

229

The text reads so so rang rigs gis rig pa but is most likely a spelling error meant to read so so rang rig gis rig pa. See: Ibid., 4b1. Grub thob mchog gi lha. I am unsure whether or not this statement is actually attributable to Maitrīpa. I have not been able to verify as of yet who “the supreme lord of siddhas” could refer to here. Khenpo Gyurmé was only able to tell me that he remembered this quote as belonging to one of the Indian Mahāsiddhas. Given the loftiness of this name and the importance of Maitrīpa to Mikyö Dorjé’s Mahāmudrā thought, however, it seems to me that Maitrīpa is an appropriate guess. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 4b3. 230

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It is that which is free from all hope and fear. As the Great Brahmin [Saraha] has said: When it is realized, it is everything; Searching for something other than this, it is not found. And: Whatever is saṃsāra is nirvāṇa.

As for the meaning that is found within the tantras and songs of the siddhas, such as the many texts [mentioned here] before, they refer to the appearances of the impure minds of ordinary beings that arise as external objects. Thus, that which produces obscurations [which prevent one from] clearly seeing both subject and object as in essence the dharmakāya (chos kyi sku’i ngo bor) are the adventitious stains. That being so, from the point of view of the insight of the āryas who perceive the truth of the dharmatā directly and the siddhas who obtain the supreme siddhis of Mahāmudrā, [such things] are an emanation of primordial wisdom. Thus, realizing the nature of the afflictions by means of the profound path which is embraced by exceptional means, those who adhere to the essential point naturally purify the afflictions, as if pacifying waves in an ocean. This being so, some experience of sealing all appearances of subject and object through the Mahāmudrā of bliss and emptiness is necessary. Not only [is this spoken of] in the secret mantra; as it is said in the Sūtra Requested by Sagaramati: For example, there is no substance (gzugs su snang ba) which is not considered to be medicinal by the king of doctors. Likewise, there is no phenomena which is not considered to be enlightenment for the bodhisattvas that engage in the Prajñāpāramitā.

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And in the Ornament of Sūtras: The childish obscure the true nature, Thus, [for them] falsity is all that appears. Since [the true nature] is illuminated by231 the bodhisattvas, [For them] the true nature is all that appears. As the protector Nāgārjuna has said: Other than the precious and genuine mind, There is no other deity to be accomplished (lha gzhan sgrub bya). Since the mind is pure it is the supreme deity. Ārya Asaṅga has said: Even if the yogin has not put an end to the cognitive act of bifurcation (tha dad sems) which concerns the great conceptual marks of the outside world, based on the immaculacy of seeing things which are pure, and that what the buddhas perceive is pure, the buddha-realms as well are completely pure. It should be understood in accordance with these sayings. Therefore, with respect to the essential nature of all appearances—[regardless of whether or not they] are pure or impure, full or devoid of [one’s own] mental elaborations—I humbly request that one not act like a vomiting dog, 232 speaking [in such a way that] one mixes up the fish and the turnips,233 applying the example of the hat to the foot, 234 blathering on about there

The text here reads byang chub sems dpa’ de gsal nas, but it seems much more likely to me that the genitive particle here should be an agentive, which would instead read as byang chub sems dpas de gsal nas. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 5a4. 231

232

It is fairly clear from the context that this metaphor refers to certain individuals who indiscriminately spew forth any kind of nonsense, as if they were vomiting like a dog. 233 nya

dang nyung ma bsres pa literally means blending or mixing up the fish and the turnips. According to Khenpo Gyurmé this phrase implies that someone is heedlessly or indiscriminately mixing things together (for example, mixing meat into a vegetarian dish), and that for this context it implies that those who are discussing Mahāmudrā should be much more careful in how they are defining or expressing it. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 5b1. 234

zhwa dpe lham bkab In other words, according to Khenpo Gyurmé, this phrase means that if one were to hear an example of something about a hat, one would try to apply it to the foot, which would be a misinterpretation of the metaphor being given. See: Ibid., 5b1.

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being no such distinctions as good or bad. According to Ārya Candrakīrti himself: The embodiment of peace [i.e. the dharmakāya] is clear like a wish-fulfilling tree, It is non-conceptual like a wish-fulfilling jewel. Remaining for as long as existence it endures to liberate beings, It appears while being free from conceptual elaborations. [In other words,] even though the sambhogakāya of the buddhas is the svābhāvikakāya free from mental elaboration, it still continues to appear.

The Fruition of Mahāmudrā

Concerning the principle of the fruition of Mahāmudrā, through gaining familiarity in the path of bliss and emptiness which is based in the maṇḍala cakra, the [physical] body (lus) is lucid like the colors of a rainbow and being unobstructed like the moon reflected in the water it pervades all. The bliss and emptiness of the mind endowed with the three dharmas of the vajra (rdo rje'i chos gsum)—which are as indestructible as a shadow—transforms into a single taste as changeless, indivisible great bliss. Thus, the enlightenment that combines the conventional truth of the generation stage with the ultimate truth of the completion stage is known as the supreme siddhi. As Ārya Nāgārjuna has said: By understanding the individual aspects Of the conventional and ultimate truths, And truly merging them correctly That is said to be union.235 Thus, following the attainment of the unified stage of the path of training (slob pa'i zung 'jug) one perfects the stages gradually, and then on the thirteenth bhumi of the vajra holder, endowed with the unified stage of no more learning, the three kāyas, and the seven factors [of

235

From the Pañcakrama (Tib. Rim pa lnga pa).

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enlightenment]236 one obtains the consummation of the two-fold benefit [of self and other]; there are those who say the so-called “yuganaddha” is not meant to be a non-duality, however in terms of being coupled together they are the same, i.e. the pair is to be understood as unitary.237 Regarding that, there are three [aspects of the sambhogakāya]: 1) The aspect of enjoyment, with regard to the wealth of accomplishing the activities and appearances of undefiled great bliss, the purity of the buddhafields; 2) The aspect of coalescing (kha sbyor) by means of the union of bliss and emptiness, as well as the unified equality of primordial wisdom; and, 3) By not wavering from [the state of] great unchanging bliss, there is the aspect of great truth. Due to these three aspects the sambhogakāya properly performs the benefit of those disciples to be tamed. The primordial wisdom which is free from all conceptual elaborations of dualistic phenomena—saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, self and other, acceptance and rejection, and so forth—is the dharmakāya, the aspect devoid of any nature which is inseparable from the dharmadhātu, and is what fulfills one's own benefit. The three aspects of the nirmāṇakāya are: 1) The aspect of being replete with compassion, the great [enlightened] compassion which is expressed equally (mnyam par 'jug pa) towards all sentient beings; 2) The aspect of the perpetual engagement in enlightened activity in order to tame beings in whatever way necessary until saṃsāra is emptied; and,

236

1)The seven factors of enlightenment (byang chub kyi yan lag bdun pa):1) Pure recollection (dren pa yang dag); 2) Thorough discernment of phenomena (chos rab tu rnam ’phyed); 3) Pure diligence (brston ’grus yang dag); 4) Pure joy (dga’ ba yang dag); 5) Pure ecstasy (shin tu sbyangs pa yang dag); 6) Samādhi (ting nge ’dzin); 7) Equanimity (btang snyoms). This is an interlinear note (mchan bu) in the text that reads: Zung du gcig pa’am gnyis gcig gi go don yin gyi gnyis med pa’i don min ces smra ba rnams zer. See: Mi bskyod rdo rje. Phyag rgya chen po'i byin rlabs kyi ngos 'dzin. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 765 - 776. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. 5b6. 237

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3) Unlike the cessation of the ceasing kind of nirvāṇa that belongs to the Hīnayāna— likened to a butter lamp that has exhausted its wick and oil—there is the aspect of the ceaseless nature of the five primordial wisdoms. In this and future lives it performs the benefit of a majority of the classes [of beings], the impure ones to be tamed. As the sublime regent Maitreya has said: The nirmāṇakāya of the Capable One [i.e. the Buddha] is unceasing. Likewise, it is asserted to be unceasing From now until however long saṃsāra may last. Thus, as it may be how you yourself understand it, do not think that somewhere beyond some [other] supreme nirmāṇakāya exists besides the Vajra-ācārya who establishes us in ripening and liberation.

Concluding Remarks

Therefore, while one has not gained resolve in the presence of the supreme nirmāṇakāya and one's mind-stream has not been liberated, it is a grave mistake to pretend to be a destroyer of delusion and then engage in the yogic discipline of dogs and pigs. For those who practice Mahāmudrā, it is important to investigate just a bit of such sayings as these: Not realizing suchness as it is, Those who distort something so marvelous Will, after their death, Wander the infernal realms for as long as space remains! And as the bodhisattva Ngülchu Chödzong has said: Learn to subdue all thoughts arising from the three poisons in post-meditation. For those in whom the dharmakāya of all thoughts and appearances does not dawn, This training is indispensable and it should be recalled whenever necessary. Do not give free rein to deluded thoughts, mani-reciters!

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As Wöntön Rinchen Gangpa has said: Do not feel scorn for any spiritual system. To rush after the higher teachings would be Like a small boy mounting a wild horse. What is most important is what is appropriate for one’s own mind. Just a little bit of investigation into phrases such as these is quite important. This being so, this is what recognizing the blessings of Mahāmudrā appears to be. Thus, having here assimilated the virtue of striving with a mind for spiritual practice, please grant your blessings so that I and all others may attain the state of the great Sangye Nyenpa. Shu Bhaṃ Satu Sarva Dzaga Taṃ!

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Appendix 2: A Translation of A Response on the Sugatagarbha and the Dharmakāya238

In answer to your question, there is a context for which the fruition-sugatagarbha, and the dharmatā-kāya (chos nyid kyi sku) are of the same nature. However, as the sugatagarbha [in the context] of the cause is not the dharmakāya, the dharmakāya itself is the perfection of the two accumulations, it is what brings about the final purification of the two obscurations, and it is free from the obscurations of the five aggregates, the twelve sense sources, and the eighteen elements. Consisting of enlightened activity, along with the five wisdoms and the three kāyas— which are the transmutation of the eight consciousnesses—these are the features that are referred to as “the dharmakāya.” Thus, the fruition is sugatahood, which possesses both the ultimate aspect of the svābhāvikakāya and the conventional aspect of the rūpakāya. Regarding that, the first topic—the svābhāvikakāya [in the context] of the cause—does not abide as the essence of the afflictions of the natural and primordial purity of the minds of all sentient beings. As for its name, it is called the sugatagarbha in the context of the tantras of the naturally present affinity (rang bzhin du gnas pa’i rgyud), in the treatises of mantra it is given names such as “original buddhahood” (dang po’i sangs rgyes) and “Hevajra of the ground” (gzhi kye rdo rje). As for the second topic—the cause of the rūpakāya—the existence of the eleven virtues of love, faith, and so forth dependent upon the minds of all sentient beings are the habitual tendencies of studying which are aroused based on other conditions, namely the appearance of the buddha in the world. 238

Mi bskyod rdo rje. Bde gshegs snying po dang chos sku'i dris lan. In gsung 'bum of Mi bskyod rdo rje. TBRC W8039. 3: 323 - 326. Lhasa: S.N., 2004. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O3LS12537|O3LS125373LS13570$W8039

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The awakening of virtuous habitual tendencies is the affinity of flourishing (rgyas ‘gyur gyi rigs). As this, too, is the sugatagarbha in the context of the tantras, there are some terms [employed therein] such as the distinctions of the six sense sources and the creation of the habitual tendencies of studying. Well then, as for the empty nature of mind, when it arises as the various interdependent occurrences of delusion—the fetters of the two obscurations—there is saṃsāra; when the empty nature of mind arises as the various interdependent occurrences of accumulation and purification—the non-deluded liberation from the two obscurations—there is non-abiding nirvāṇa. Well then, as nirvāṇa is true and saṃsāra is untrue, delusive, and false it therefore means that [saṃsāra] does not infiltrate objective reality (yul gyi gnas tshul). Since nirvāṇa is undeceiving and non-deluded it is presented as the ultimate truth. Likewise, this presentation of the falsity of saṃsāra and the truth of the ultimate is also not in the context of the uncategorized ultimate. However, it is within the context of asserting the ultimate meaning of what is categorized. As for the context of presenting it as the conventional truth in the tradition of ‘Glorious Moon’ [Candrakīrti], it is not possible for both to be the final sense, and so it is presented provisionally as the truth of the ultimate itself and within that context it is the subject being characterized (mtshan gzhi), which is exclusively the truth of nirvāṇa. Though this is how it is stated, even [this so-called] final nirvāṇa is not the genuine absolute. Since that does not transcend compounded phenomena, what is final (mthar) is a single truth and is not something to be attained (rnyed pa ma yin). The non-duality of bliss and emptiness taught in the final mantra treatise(s) and Mahāmudrā as well is what is meant by the inseparable, the union of bliss and emptiness as a single flavor, as the emptiness of the

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enlightened mind of the ultimate sense that is free from elaboration and the bliss of the enlightened mind of the conventional sense, which is the wisdom mind of love without reference that includes the noble minds of the Mantrayāna.

This was answered for Yung Chadrel.

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Appendix 3: Mikyö Dorjé’s Two Truth Schema (In Recognizing the Blessings, A Response on the Sugatagarbha and the Dharmakāya, and the Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyü Siddhas)

Ordinary Beings (so so skye bo/skye bo tha mal pa)

Incorrect Conventional (log pa’i kun rdzob bden pa)

Authentic Conventional (yang dag kun rdzob)

Categorized Ultimate (rnam grangs pa’i don dam)

Uncategorized Ultimate (rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam)

  

False object (yul brdzun pa) Dualistic mind (blo) Appearances of the impure mind (sems ma dag pa’i snang ba) Adventitious stains (glo bur gyi dri ma) Ignorance (ma rig pa) Deceptive for immature beings (byis pa rnams la ni slu bar byed pa) The two obscurations (sgrib gnyis) Delusion (’khrul pa) Saṃsāra (’khor ba)

Not perceived nor known by ordinary beings

Not perceived nor known by ordinary beings

Not perceived nor known by ordinary beings

Perceived as a fabricated entity (bcos mar gyur pa’i dngos po) Known to be untrue (bden pa ma yin) Appears as an illusion, a state of interdependence, and simply as concealing [what is true] (’phags pa rnams la ni sgyu ma ltar rten ’byung nyid kyi kun rdzob tsam ’gyur)







     

Noble Beings (’phags pa) & Siddhas (grub thob)

Metaphysical Basis In Reality

  

Interdependent manifestation (rten ’brel sna tshogs su shar ba) of the empty nature of mind (sems rang bzhin stong pa nyid)





The rūpakāya (gzugs kyi sku) Bliss of the enlightened mind (byang sems kyi bde ba) Love without reference (dmigs med kyi brtse ba)

Inseparable from the ultimate

Authentic object (yul yang dag pa)  Authentic perception of primordial wisdom (yang dag pa gzigs pa’i ye shes)  Based on accumulation and purification (bsags sbyang)  True (bden pa)  Nirvāṇa (myang ’das)  Objective reality (yul gyi gnas tshul)  Does not transcend compounded phenomena (’dus phyas las ma ’das)  Provisional presentation of the ultimate (gnas skabs su) Interdependent manifestation (rten ’brel sna tshogs su shar ba) of the empty nature of mind (sems rang bzhin stong pa nyid)

The svābhāvikakāya (ngo bo nyid sku)  Union of bliss and emptiness (bde stong zung ’jug)  Free from elaboration (spros bral)  Single truth (bden pa gcig pa)  Not to be attained (rnyed pa ma yin)  Non-dual (gnyis med)  Mahāmudrā (phyag chen)  Accords with the final mantra texts (sngags gzhung mthar thug gi)  Final presentation of the ultimate (mthar) Primordial wisdom free from all conceptual elaborations of dualistic phenomena (gnyis chos kyi spros pa thams cad dang bral ba’i ye shes) i.e. the dharmakāya, the aspect devoid of any nature inseparable from the dharmadhātu (chos kyi dbyings dang byer med pa rang bzhin med pa’i yan lag chos kyi kus)

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