Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation v City of Pasig GR 152230 The Municipality (now City) of Pasig needed an access road road from ER Santos St., a municipal municipal road near the Pasig Pasig Pulic Pulic Mar!et, Mar!et, to "rgy. Sto. Sto. Tomas "u!id, Pasig, where #$ to %$ houses were located. The road had to e at least three meters in width, as re&uired y the 'ire Code, so that re truc!s could pass through in case of conagration. *i!ewise, the residents in the area needed needed the road for water and electrical electrical outlets. outlets. The municipality municipality then decided to ac&uire + s&uare meters out of the ,%- s&uare meter property of respondents *oren/o Ching Cuanco, 0ictor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco 1ho (Ching Cuangcos) which is autting E. R. Santos Street. The Sangguniang "ayan of Pasig appro2ed an 3rdinance authori/ing the municipal to initiate e4propriation e4propriation proceedings to ac&uire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notied of the municipality5s intent to purchase the property for pulic use as an access road ut they re6ected the o7er. Municip Municipali ality ty led led a compla complaint int agains againstt the Ching Ching Cuangc Cuangcos os for the e4propriation of the property under Sec 1! of R" #1$0 8t #1$0 8t appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant *oren/o Ching Chuangco. City of Pasig deposited deposited with the RTC RTC +9 of the mar!et mar!et 2alue of the property property ased on the latest latest ta4 declaration declaration co2ering co2ering the property. 3n plainti75s plainti75s motion, RTC RTC issued issued a :rit of Possessi Possession. on. Plainti7 Plainti7 caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of the TCT under the name of ;esus is *ord Christian School 'oundation (;8*CS'8) which had purchased the property. City of Pasig Pasig constructe constructed d therein a cemented cemented road with a width of three meters< the road was called =amayan Street. Ching Cuancos claimed, in their answer that, as early as 'e 5-> they had already sold the property to ;8*CS'8 2ia deed of sale. ;8*CS'8 led a motion to inter2ene as defendantininter2ention which the RTC granted. 8t a2erred that the City of Pasig5s e4ercise e4ercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the enet of the poor and the landless. The City of Pasig o7ered in e2idence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. ;ose Reyes addressed to *oren/o Ching Cuanco to pro2e that the plainti7 made a denit denite e and and 2alid 2alid o7er o7er to ac&uir ac&uire e the propert property y to the coowners coowners.. ?owe2er, the RTC re6ected the same letter for eing a mere photocopy. RTC issued an order in fa2or of plainti7. The plainti7 and inter2enor are herey directed to sumit at least two (@) names of their recommended
R%C held that, held that, as gleaned from the declaration in 3rdinance Ao. @, there was sustantial compliance with the denite and 2alid o7er re&uirement of Section - of R.B. Ao. %#$, and that the e4propriated portion is the most con2enient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas "u!id. C" a&r'ed the order of the R%C CB R%C CB declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes, in2iting *oren/o Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him the road pro6ect and the price of the lot, was a sustantial compliance with the 2alid 2alid and and deni denite te o7er o7er re&uir re&uireme ement nt under under said said Sectio Section n -. 8n addition, addition, the CB noted that there there was also constructi2 constructi2e e notice notice to the defendants of the e4propriation proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the TCT. 'inally. CB upheld the pulic necessity for the su6ect property ased on the ndings of the trial court that the portion of the property sought to e e4propriated appears to e, not only the most con2enient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas "u!id, ut also an easy path f or 2ehicles entering the area, particularly re truc!s. Moreo2er, the CB too! into consideration the pro2ision of Brticle >> of the *DC5s 8RR, which regards the construction or e4tension of roads, streets, sidewal!s as pulic use, purpose or welfare. ;8*CS'8 led a MR. MR. CB denied the MR. 8SSEFsG . :as there there a 2alid 2alid e4prop e4propria riatio tion n on the part of the munici municipal pality ityH H Aone @. :FA the e4pro e4propriat priation ion of the su6ect su6ect proper property ty is su6ect su6ect to the . essential essential re&ui re&uisites sites for for an easemen easementt of right of of wayH A3 A3 ?E*=G . The right of eminent domain is usually understood to e an ultimate right of the sovereign (o)er to a((ro(riate any (ro(erty )ithin its territorial sovereignty for a (u*lic (ur(ose ?owe2er, this power still has its limits. The Constitution pro2ides that pri2ate property shall not e ta!en for pulic use without 6ust compensation. Blso, the due process and e&ual protection clauses are safeguards against aritrary e4ercise of go2ernmental power. The e4ercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly y the State or y its authori/ed agents, is necessarily in derogation of pri2at pri2ate e rights rights.. :hen :hen the so2er so2ereig eign n delega delegates tes the power power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will e gi2en against the agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is to e strictly construed in fa2or of the owner and against the condemnor. Coroll Corollari arily, ly, the respo responde ndent, nt, which which is the conde condemno mnor, r, has has the urden of pro2ing all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. 8t has the urden of proof to estalish that it has complied with all the re&uirements pro2ided y law for the 2alid e4ercise of the power of eminent domain. •
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Bn ordinance is enacted y the local legislati2e council authori/ing the local chief e4ecuti2e, in ehalf of the local go2ernment unit, to e4ercise the power of eminent domain or pursue e4propriation proceedings o2er a particular pri2ate property. @. The power of eminent domain is e4ercised for pulic use, purpose or welfare, or for the enet of the poor and the landless. >. There is payment of 6ust compensation, as re&uired under Section -, Brticle 888 of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. I. B 2alid and denite o7er has een pre2iously made to the owner of the property sought to e e4propriated, ut said o7er was not accepted. 8t is incument upon the condemnor to e4haust all reasonale e7orts to otain the land it desires y agreement. Bn o7er is a unilateral proposition which one party ma!es to the other for the celeration of a contract. The o7er must e complete, indicating with suJcient clearness the !ind of contract intended and denitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract.
8n the asence of competent e2idence that, indeed, the municipality made a denite and 2alid o7er to all the coowners of the property, the declaration in an ordinance that the property owners were already notied of the intent to purchase the same for pulic use as a municipal road is not a compliance with Section - of R.B. Ao. %#$ •
B property that is intended for the construction of a place of religious worship and a school for its memers may still e e4propriated. •
The purpose of the re&uirement of a 2alid and denite o7er to e rst made to the owner is to encourage settlements and 2oluntary ac&uisition of property needed for pulic purposes in order to a2oid the e4pense and delay of a court action. B single ona de o7er that is re6ected y the owner will suJce. B letter o7ered only to pro2e the municipality5s desire or intent to ac&uire a property for a rightofway does not pro2e that the *D made a denite and 2alid o7er to ac&uire the property for pulic use as an access road efore ling the complaint for e4propriation •
8n this case, respondent failed to pro2e that efore it led its complaint, it made a written denite and 2alid o7er to ac&uire the property for pulic use as an access road. The only e2idence adduced y the municipality is the photocopy of the letter purportedly earing the signature of Engr. ;ose Reyes, to only one of the coowners, *oren/o Ching Cuanco. 8n that letter, the respondent o7ered the letter only to pro2e its desire or intent to ac&uire the property for a rightofway. The document was not o7ered to pro2e that the respondent made a denite and 2alid o7er to ac&uire the property. Respondent also failed to adduce e2idence that copies of the letter were sent and recei2ed y all the coowners of the property (*oren/o Cuanco, 0ictor Cuanco and Ernesto 1ho)
There is no legal and factual asis to the CB5s ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of the owner5s certicate of title is a sustantial compliance with the re&uisite o7er.
8n here, the whereas clause in the ordinance that Kthe property owners were already notied y the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for pulic use as a municipal roadL is not deemed a sustantial compliance with the law.
Petitioner contends that the property can no longer e e4propriated y the respondent ecause it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its memers. ?owe2er, in Manosca v CA, the term pulic use is one of constant growth. Bs society ad2ances, its demands upon the indi2idual increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the indi2idual may e de2oted. . . . for “whatever is benecially employed for the community is a public use.”
@. :here property is e4propriated for the purpose of constructing a road, the e4propriator is not mandated to comply with the essential re&uisites for an easement of rightofway under the Aew Ci2il Code case law has it that in the asence of legislati2e restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to e ta!en unless such determination is capricious and wantonly in6urious. •
?ence, e4propriation is 6ustied as long as it is for pulic good N there is genuine necessity of pulic character. The Do2ernment can5t capriciously choose what pri2ate property should e ta!en.
The testimony of witnesses that although there were other ways through which one can enter the 2icinity, no 2ehicle, howe2er, especially re truc!s, could enter the area e4cept through the property sought to e e4propriated is more than suJcient to estalish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the areaa*solute necessity is not re+uired- only reasona*le and (ractical necessity )ill su&ce •
"ut in this case, respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner5s property and not elsewhere. :e note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the +s&uare meter lot is the shortest and most
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The respondent5s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner5s lot has een sur2eyed as the est possile ingress and egress. ?owe2er, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of e2idence to pro2e its claims.
Bn ocular inspection is part of the trial as e2idence is therey recei2ed and the parties are entitled to e present at any stage of the trialwhere the property owner was not notied of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual nding of the court ased on the said inspection has no proati2e weight.
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8n this case, nowhere in the record shows that an ocular inspection was conducted during trial. 8f, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the property during trial, the petitioner wasn5t notied. ?ence, petitioner was depri2ed of its right to due process.
Petition is granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. RC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of City of City of Pasig without pre!udice to reling thereof.
