21. Loreli Lim Po vs. Department of Justice and Jasper t. Tan

21. LORELI LIM PO

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and JASPER T. TAN

FACTS:

Tan was a stockholder of CHVI. Antonio Chiu was the President of the said company. Tan claimed that Po was the personal accountant of the Chiu. However, Po argued that she is merely a consultant of the company. Tan lamented that pertinent information relative rel ative to CHVI’s operations were withheld from him. His repeated requests for copies of financial statements and allowance to inspect corporate books proved futile. He filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor against Chiu and Po for violation of the Corporate Cor porate Code. The prosecutor found probable cause. Chiu and Po’s motion to reconsider were denied by the prosecutor. The findings of the prosecutor was subjected by Po and Chiu to a petition for review with the DOJ. Initially, the DOJ reversed the prosecu tor’s finding. However, in the end, it affirmed the findings of the prosecutor. Po and Chiu, each filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Po’s petition was dismissed on a technical ground. Chiu’s petition was denied for lack of merit. Po filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Chiu filed for certiorari under Rule 65. The SC consolidated the case. Contention of Po and Chiu:  

The DOJ gravely abused its discretion in affirming the

prosecutor’s finding. The Court cannot interfere with an executive function of the prosecutor in determining the existence of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. Contention of Tan:

Whether or not the court may interfere with the determination of probable cause which is an executive function

ISSUE:

HELD: No.

As we ruled in  Metrobank vs. Tobias III, 664 SCRA 165 (2012), in a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor is bound to determine merely the existence of probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the accused has committed the same. The rules do not require that a prosecutor has moral certainty of the guilt of a person for the latter to be indicted for an offense after the conduct of preliminary investigation. Further, we have repeatedly ruled that the determination of probable cause, for purposes of preliminary investigation, is an executive function. Such determination should be free from the court’s interference save only in exceptional cases where the DOJ gravely abuses its discretion in the issuance of its orders or resolutions.