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2017 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Executive Committee Over-all Chairperson Chairperson for Academics
TYRONE LEWIS D. ONG ULAHMARIA JESUSA NAZARENE L. URUBIO
Chairperson for Hotel Operations
ANNA PATRICIA M. DERECHO
Vice-Chair for Operations
ROMEO VALENTINO S. GO
Vice-Chair for"Secretaria~
ARTLYN GEM G. SENORAN
Vice-Chair for Finance Vice-Chair for Audit Vice-Chair for Electronic Data Processing Vice-Chair for Logistics Vice-Chair for Membership
CLARISA G. BELO CARLO VIEL C. SAPLAN MA. CELI NE P. ENRIQUEZ RONALDO DEMETRIO L. SIOCO JOANNA KRYSTLE MUNGCAL
Content and Lay-out Editors JOSE MANUEL PENAFLOR ELAINNE ENCILA HERA MARIE YDULZURA JEANNE PAULINE DE LA PENA
REX MARK CABANSAG CHRISTIAN JASON DALUDADO KEVIN CHRIS SESE ANGELO RAY ADINA ABDUL-MAJID MAROHOMBSAR M A. JENN IFER PARAGAS JOSEF NINO ACERO
San Beda College of Law Administr~tipn ATIY. VIRGILIO B. JARA College Dean
Centralized Bar Operations A4visers ATTY. MARCIANO G. DELSON Vice Dean and Adviser . ATTY. RISEL G. CASTILLO-TALEON Prefect for Student Affairs and Co-Adviser
Centralized Bar Operations Core Group
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Kates Jastln E. Aguilar, Mark Ericson M. Magdamo, Zaire Xandra M. Reyes, Hanz Darryl p. Tiu, Angelo Ray A. Adina, Rex Mark M. Cabansag, Christian Jason 0 . Oaludado, Abdul·Majid P. Marohombsar, Ma. Jennifer R. Paragas, Kevin Chris M. Sese, Lorelei Joselle H. Bu.cu, Mara Clara M. Estrella, Gu'enave,re J. Hao, Ishihara, Rio Anne A. Marvle L Pagcaliwangan, lose Emmanuel I. Cabel, Hannah A. Caceres, Colleen F. Dilla, lrl~ lane A. Tan, John Caleb C. Anda!, Marlz Regala, Divina G. Velasco, Cheska Arla Agrupis, Mark Darryl P. Buemio, Vincent Paul C. David, Corinne Marie D. Espidol. Marie Camille Allen C. Flores, Niece Cecilio D. llojilla, Dynamagne Parinas, Clarisse Nicole V. Soliman, Elainne I. Encila, Jose Manuel P. Penaflor, Hera Marie T. Ydulzura, Martin Alec Bautista, Ivan Kevin G. Lin, Fatima J. Rodriguez. Ulpiano Z. Sarmiento. Jessica Sharla Bustamante, Jhelsea Louise Oimaano, Sophia Victoria E. Mina, Graham' Edison G. Ragsac. Mary Cyriell C. Sumanqui, Daniel P. Ang. Daniel Philip V. Barnachea, Eric Winson F. Cea, Criselda Marie G. E~guerra, Jose Christian C. Samson Ill, Kent Arvin C. Aquino, Suzanne A. Roces, Benise D. Madamba, Lorenzo Thaddeus Ruel 0. Galandines, Janelle Caryn A. Dela Cruz. Jeanne Pauline E. De La Pena
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CIVIL LAW Subject Chair MILCIELO CLAIRE S. VILLAMAYOR
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Assistant Subject Chair PATRICK DAVE F. EBID Subject Committe.e Electronic Data Processing RONIFELLE L. BARRIOS
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Subject Heads JULIENNE THERESE V. SALVACION PERSONS'AND FAMILY RELATIONS - LYLE M. REGENCIA PROPERTY HAZEL DHANE A. BAUTISTA WILLS AND SUCCESSION CHRISTINE P. MONDERIN & OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS JAMES PHILIPPE MAC AGATHA JOSEPHINE V. MATABUENA SALES AND LEASE LERYHC ANDREI T. JIMENEZ PARTNERSHIP, AGE'NCY AND TRUSTS CZARINA MAYBELLYNE V. PACIS CREDIT TRANSACTIONS RONIFELLE L. ·BARRIOS .LANDS TITLES AND DEEDS . CLARISSA KRISTEN V. SECERIO .TORTS AND DAMAGES KRIA CELESTINA MANGLAPUS CONFLICTS OF LAW Subject Committee Members MILLICENT S. J. MATIENZO, MARY SARAH D.C. GOBOLE, KENNER VICTORS. GALANG GABRIEL ALESSANDRO N. PRUDENTE, DIANE KRISTEL E. FALCOTELO, TRACIE KATHLYNNE B. B.ACARRO, JAMES BRYAN J. TAN, RENNETIEJOY G. ALFARO ANN MARY MICHELLE B. RUALO, KASHMERE TAME P. DURAN, MA. CARMELA L. DfETA, SR! MICHi CORDELLE V. DOMANTAY, ALDEN JEROME C. DAVID ANNA MICHAELA I. MARQUEZ, GUIA KARLA SALDIVIA, RONALD DERICK TORRES EDIONE B. QUINONES, KAREN CLARISSE P. PALMA, PAULINE ROSE T. DULDULAO KEIRVIN ANTHONY B. VIADO Advisers DEAN ED VINCENTS. ALBANO ATTY. NfCASIO C. CABANEIRO ATTY. JOSEPH "FERDINAND M. DECHAVEZ ATTY. EFREN VINCENT M. DIZON ATTY. CHARLITO MARTIN R. MENDOZA ATTY. BRUCE V. RIVERA ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES M. SENGA ,
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UNDERTAKING
This publication is the intellectual property of the San Beda College of Law Centralized Bar Operations. Any unauthorized reproduction, use, sale or purchase hereof is a violation of intellectual property laws. The user hereby recognizes the right of the San Beda College of Law Centralized Bar Operations to prosecute any ancl all actions in accordance with the law to protect its intellectual property rights from infringement. As such, the user undertakes to neither unlawfully reproduce nor cause the unlawful .reproduction of this material without the prior consent of the San Bed a College of Law Centralized Bar Operations.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Effectivity of Laws 1. Section 1 of P.O. No. 755 states: "Section 1. Declaration of National Policy. - It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the Implementation of the 'Agr.eement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bar:ik for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers' executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority, the, terms of which 'Agreement' are hereby incorporated by reference; xx x" A copy of the Agreement was not attached to the Presidential Decree.
2.
A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the ·giving of herself in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality,· no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry .but because .of fraud ,and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to rnorals, good customs, or public policy (Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97366, February 19, 1993).
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Marriage 3.
Lea Cruz is a new Hotel and Restaurant Management graduate. Despite her efforts, she still has not been hired. Disheartened, Lea put "FUNemployed : Forever Unemployed" as her Facebook status. As fate would have it, her Tita Cherry, who is currently residing in Chicago, USA, saw it and Immediately messaged her that there Is an available position as a receptionist in the hotel she manages. However, Lea does not have a US Visa nor is she flt to apply for one, as she does not have any means to support herself.. Faced by this predicament, Tlta Cherry once again comes to the rescue. It · so happens that her nephew's cousin, Clark Kurtz, is having a vacation in the Philippines. She suggested that she marry Clark so that she will acquire American citizenship and get an easy pass going abroad. Clark agreed provided Lea pays him 150,000 pesos, which she got from her parent s. They got married in Manila and Lea was able to go to the US. Lea and Clark did not see each other thereafter.
4. Discuss the rules on Code. Philippine law does not prov1m&l'l'Ol of the Family Code - whiert-~Ol:~r:.6lJ~ foreigner - allows a Filipino~!azt~J'
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-~ .. ~D cnm.. LAW Void Marriage
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7. Michael met Nancy as a young lieutenant and after a whirlwind courtship, they were married. In the early part of his military career, Michael was assigned to different places all over the country. They did not live together until the 12th year of their marriage. One .day, while Michael was away on official business, one of his friends caught Nancy having sex with the corporal assigned as ' Michael's driver. The aide Immediately reported the matter to Michael who rushed home to confront his wife. Nancy admitted the affair and Michael sent her away in anger. Michael would later come to know from his aides , his household staff, and former neighbors who informed him that Nancy has had intimate relations with various men thro.ughout their marriage whenever Michael was away on assignment.
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9. What are the jurl~r~cl,!'.9t!a1 g .i i !": ·chp~1cal incapacity? Are these guidelines absolute? ~/ 111 • In Republic v. CA anc!\N1Q . Ii . , G. ~ 1fl, 199 , t · C laid down the guidelines, otherwise known as the fi)id' -t>octr iti a. jpplyi d 36 of the FC: Ill or In 1. Incapacity must be _ 2. .Boot cause of the psy Inca a. Medically or clinically b. Alleged in the complainL";~..-. i. Sufficiently proven by ~~~~=!:;Qr;:~~~~ ii. Clearly explained in the decision 3. Marital Obligations refer to Arts. 68-'Z , . , 221 lilfl"4.f5 of the Family Code; 4 . Plaintiff has j!urden of proof; "\..) 5. Incapacity proven to be 5.xistin·g at the time of the celebration of marriage; 6. Trial court must order the f.rosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear for the state; 7. !nterpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines while not controlling should be given great respect; and 8. Illness is §rave enough to bring about disability to assume essential marital obligations. . . No, these guidelines are not absolute. As held in Te v. Yu-Te (G.R. No. 161793, February 13,2009), the Supreme Court stressed that the detennination is to be made on a c;ase to case basis. Each must be judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge .must take. pains in
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examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid st1bstituting its own judgment for .that of the trial court." ·10. Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and had five children. Plaintiff filed a case for foe nullity of the marriage due to Psychological Incapacity alleging that her husband failed to provide mate1ial support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA. The plaintiff now contends that personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a .requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Is the contention tenable? Yes. According to the Supreme Court ip Marcos v. Marcos, (G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000), the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. The totality of the evidence presented may determine such incapacity. The mandated guidelines in the case of Republic v. P/lo/ina incorporated the three basic requirements earlier _ by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characte1ized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) inc!Jrability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be de
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11. What are the grou~~..annul a valid marriage?, A marriage may b~:_aqp.u,fled bf sed on)lny of tll\a.ifi. ollowihg ~xclusive g~· . under Article 45 of the 1'.~ Family Code, that mi.tst ljXist atu heAmte.bfJhe "1M.rla"~' "(AY,FFJS')" 1. Absence of_ pareti1~~ 1 {c se~1 ( 1;v ear t~~bel@W:N2:1 , years of ct9~); '-..l 2. Y11sound m!nd; ~ . . ~ ~ 3. Consent obtaine~ Fraud in the following insfan'ces: · a. Non-disclosure o- 91previous coqviction by {IJ,'101 judgmept fl cri · '.[p~ng moral turpitude; · b. Concealment~~~e of pregn~nc.y by,,a.man 0thetJIJa~hustfa1J.$.-7 c. Conceal ment~ se~qally ransmissibl_e oiSJ{£lSe>.N:l~rdless of itrh ture; g addiction, ha~i~al ~1~dl'i s ' 0 o exua r sbianism; d. Concealment o r1fl • , 4. Consent obtained;t>N;o~e. int1.f1id~tion i:>riG~ 5. !~potency that con)iau,.~s jlnd apg~a.r,~ o)~d Clll Ii!! 6. Serious § exually tr~ ml~ible dise~se ~tia peq ~!t0 cura e.
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12. What are the rounds fo;)e al s.e aration (.'.'.'\ The following are the exclus1v~ - r. u ~ or legal separ t•o ,u d l'ticle 55 of the Family Co,de: (PAA· . ID-LAMBS) . . .,,.--. --~~~ 1. Repeated f.hys1cal violence or gress y abu§_lve.:eof\l'duc · 2. ,Attempt to corrupt or induce to engage"'(ii·prostihltitr>~'· 3. Attempt on life; V ""-.) 4. Final judgment involving more than 6 years of Imprisonment; 5. Qrug addiction or habitual alcoholism; 6. .besbianism or homosexuality; 7. Unjustified Abandonment for· more than 1 year; 8. Compulsion by physical violence or Moral pressure to change religious or political affiliation; 9. g_igamy; and . 10. §exual infidelity or perversion.
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13. Distinguish Legal Separation from Declaration of Nullity, Annulment, and Absolute Divorce
\ Legitimate
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1 Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta's share in ·the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any special portion of Marta's share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree . Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta's share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his ' undivided share; hence. Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
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interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rita as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta's share (Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. v. Ester Servacio, G.R. No. 157357, September 7, 2007). 16. Distinguish Art. 147 from Art. 148 of the Family Code.
Both must be capacitated to marry each other, AND there is NO MARRIAGE or m~rriage is VOID:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under Art. 147.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, share of party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited: 1. In favor of their common children.2. In case of default or waiver by any or all common children or their descendants each vacant share shall belong to respective . surviving descendants 3. In their a~sence, to the innocent party.
1. If one of the parties is validly married to another,
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his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the ACP or CPG . existing in such valid marriage. 2. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his/her share shall be forfeited in the same {Tlanner provided for in Art. 147. 3. The above rules apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
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CIV!ltAW Paternity and Filiation 17. Pia had a relationship with a married man who had legitimate·children. A son was born out of that illicit relationship in 1981. Although the putative father did not recognize the child in his certificate of birth, he nevertheless provided the child with all the support he needed and spent time regularly with the child and his mother. When the man died in 2000, the child was already 18 years old so he flied a petltlon to be recognized as an illegltlmate child of the putative father.and sought to be given a share in his putative father's estate. The legitimate family opposed, saying that under the Family Code his action cannot prosper because he did not bring the action for recognition during the lifetime of his putative father. ·
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19. May the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child be determined in the case for -the partition of the estate of a decedent-father? No, It cannot. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child cannot be contested as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. However, this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy - or illegitimacy - of a child is at issue (Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No.197099, September .. 28, 2015) . The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may .still be easily available (Tison v. ·CA, G.R. No. 121 027, July 31 ,1997).
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20. Distinguish the rights of a legitimate child from an illegitimate child.
General,ly required to use mother's surname.
Right to bear father's surname.
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Exception: If child's filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil regi ster, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father (R.A. No. 9255, Sec. 1) .
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Adoption 22. Ben and Jerry, both male and single, lived together as common law spouses and agreed to raise a son of Ben's living brother as their child without legally adopting him. Ben worked while Jerry took care of their home and the boy. In their 20 years of cohabitation they were able to acquire real estate assets registered In their names as co-owners. Unfortunately, Ben died of cardiac arrest, leaving no will. Ben was survived by his biological siblings, Jeny, and the boy. a) b)
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1 25. What are the grounds for the rescission of adoption? Upon the p~tition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over 18 years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following · · grounds committed by the adopter(s): a. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; b. Attempt on the life of. the adoptee; . c. sexual assault or violence; and d. abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations. Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code(RA 8552, Sec. 19).
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26. What are the effects of rescission of adoption? The effects are the following: . 1. The parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s}, if known, or the legal custody of the Department'shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated; 2. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished; 3. The court shall order th~ Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original birth certificate; and 4. Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected (R.A. No.
8552, Sec. 20).
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27. Distinguish the Rules on Domestic Adoption and Inter-Country Adoption in the Philipplne.s
Filipino Citizen (a) Legal age; (b) Of good mor (c) Not convicte turpitude; (d) Emotionally a
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CIVIL LAW his/her Filipino spouse; or (iii) ·one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse. [Sec. 7(b)]
Only a legally free child may be the subject of intercountry adoption. [Sec 8]
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Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department, in accordance with the Chila
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28. Spouses Maria and ReVh:!ll the couple stayed 1 custody of Maria's m Reynaldo died; Mari 1
29 .. Can a mother lose her rtght to the custody of her illegitimate son just because she .signed an agreement that she is turning over the child to his father and waiv~d she waived her rights? No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provide illegitimate children shall be under ·the parental authority of their mother. The right to take the custody of a.son shall be exercised by the one who enjoys parental authority over him. Such right may not be renounced, waived or transferred to another person, except in the cases authorized by law. Hence, in t~e absence of exceptions under .the Family Code, the mother is still the parent vested with parental authority of the illegitimate child therefore, she has the right over the child's custody. ·
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Use of Surname
30. Grace and Antonio lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. They had two sons. The children were not expressly recognized by Antonio as his own in the birth records in the Civil Registry. The eventually separated and Antonio to file a Petition to have parental authority and custody and the correction/change of surname of his sons. Can the father compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children? . No. It is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is~ in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Hence, illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known. They cannot be compelled to use the surname of their father (Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014).
for the ptiall.Q~pf(!Jj! "'-~ ·:An s~~ In his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court~ Lucena City. R?le,n af1@gep ~~ h ~-W'.tifqri tti~t l\_e wa born in the City of Lucena on August 4, 1'9l>2'l .ktis name wa.s r,.f@~ta!file and 111 sex reglst,re;J)'~s "male". He further alle~~t'he is a m!lte""transsexual, that .is, "anatomically male but~tJel ~thinks and acts as a female" aiTd tnat he ha~ always 'de~ttfJl " d ~ms:e f'Wifn girls since child e t eeling trapped ·in a man's bo d~ '" ppnsulted severa oc • rs ll-tfi'e u~~\ · y,- he mtea States. He u.., d ent psychological examin!ltion, ho~o~~ treatm n Jl! it:@l€9n@tft'iol ·\\itt,fuPtNo transfonn himself to a "woman" culmin~tte.cJ.r~n Janua!:Y,: 27, 2001 when he., unde~ent se~\ceass gnment surgery in Bangkok, Thailancf~Me;!~en sought to have h1& n9rhe JJI. hi birt~ cert't!..,~hanged from "Rolen Cruz" to "Mely Cruz. ' a11d his sex "male"~ to "femal~. Can Roh(n cbapge his name? On the other hand, can R6~ change his..se.l bn the gro~d. of sex reassign~nt?"' . No, Rolen cannot c~q~~'is n mEJ\ Ri,U~11'\ AcP~ .wh.lch•g-qvernsJpqhange of first name .and . enumerates the grc;iune~pnereof f~uc l cnage ~9.fl ngt §a.f\9tloo1a ch~sf:1'first narT)e on the. ground .. of sex reassignmen~s~rnbing~ petiti er's first•tN~ife!' ii,: CJ~clare~91~e may only create grave complications in the Cl~ l~~ist and t public~~~ :erqre~·pers\i.~ ~ legally change his given name, he must pres~ aper o reasqpabl~ ca . • ~~11ng (ea~,plll;justifying such change. In addition, he must sho .t at'tie wt,11 be pr~jt,rdiaed~:!!Ml~e of his tru~..{no~efficial name. Lastly, while a t!C
31. Rolen filed a petition
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~~I\. ' PROPERTY ~ c~.,.J-stics o£. . 32. What are the characteristics of..p.i:.o~of.B;~lic~o,rii_olll> ·The characteristics Of property of pu61ioil"Oi]l.n.J.9n· e fullowing: 1.) it is outside the commerce of man
except insofar as they may be the object,,ef)epair or 1 ~o.'(ement or other similar things (Roman Catholic Bishop v. Municipality of Buruanga, 486\~CRA 229); 2.)-..it is Inalienable, however, when it is no longer needed for public use or service, it may be declared as patrimonial property; 3.) It cannot be acquired by prescription (Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, 13 Phil. 152); 4.) It cannot be burdened with easements (Art. 613); 5.) It is not subject to attachment or execution (Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 495 SCRA 591; and 6.) It cannot be registered under the Property Registration Decree (PD No.
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33. What is the classification of a building constructed from strong materials? Buildings are always Immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property. (Punsalan; Jr, v. Lacsamana, G.R. NO.L-55729, Mar.26, 1963) ·
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34. Give an instance when a movable property becomes immovable property. .Machinery which is movable by nature becomes immovable under Art. 415, when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner (Davao Sawmil Co. v. Casrillo, 61 Phil709) Ownership
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Quieting of Title
38. What are the req.uisites for an action to quiet title to prosper? For an action to quiet titl e to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action ; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy." (Manaquil v. Moico, G.R. No. 180076, November 21, 2012) Co-Ownership
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CIVIL LAW perpetrated by anotf'ier, the 1a·w imposes the loss upon the party who, by his, misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the Civil Code specifically Article 559." (Consuelo S. de Garcia, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et a/s., L20264, January 30, 1971; 37 SCRA, p. 129).
42. X steals the ring of B. X pledges the same to R Pawnshop. B does not readily discover the theft committed by X. And so when X fails to redeem the ring, R Pawnshop sells the same at public auction where Y is the highest bidder and buyer in good faith of the ring. Upon learning of this, 8 sues Y to recover the ring. Decide. B cannot recover the ring from Y unless B ind~mnifies Y for what the latter pays for the ring. This is so because Y acquires the ring at public auction, a situation excepted from the rule in Article 559 of the Civil Code that the owner who is unlawfully deprived of his personal property may recover the same without paying any indemnity. Usufruct
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·CiVILLAW The owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. It is. settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement in the context of Article 622 of the Civil Code, which provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of title. But the phrase with existing "Right of Way" in the TCT is not one of the modes of acquisition of the eas~ment by virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to "the juridical act which gives birth to the easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the testator." What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries tj1erein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. An encumbrance "subject to 3 meters wide right of way" was annotated on TCT No. 107915, which covers Lot No. 5808-F2"'B of Aurora. As the owner of the servient estate, Aurora retained owoership of the road right of way even assuming that said encumbrance was for the benefit of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A of the Mary. The latter could not claim to own even a portion of the road right of way because Article 630 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[t]he owner of the se~ient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and ma~~"tpe sam~';lo s~ · · snner as not to affect the exercise of the easement." ~~t?. the right of Wft_Y r[ghtfull~"belo9EiiJ19: ~ 1.l'iel\l as tt<1€ owners of the burdened property, Aurora remal'l.~l ~ptitled to avai o~..attdtilit~ ~rsoip under the Civil ~ode · (Sps. Bernabe Mercader, J -~~J.orna Mercader' vs. Sps. Jesus Bardilas and Letieia.,..Bardilas, ~/~(.No. 163 157, June
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Bersa~) ~ ~'!~ E;~D " . ~ 'f2~ 46. How do you chaF~l/ze v~luQJ.w~-9~£!!1~{£n ~c_le 6~.§pHJ\s CivilP,Pde?"" 27, 2016,
They are not contract14al).n nat~ they constitute the act of the owner. If h~~~~d?any condition, like the payment of the indajtrn[~l8 ny Rerson willing to pay it may make use 'Of the e~se!Jj~nt. If the contention be made that a contra'bCiUecessary, it nfay be stated-that a contract exi ,,.rro5 the time all those who desire to make use'Qf f(e).eas~m~nl ifJ dispos~a.. . ~ pay •th~ re~uired i~E\ . (North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Hidalgo>~1lIPnl 664) lr ~ · · ·
.47. Is the .
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actionable nuisance{~r..!1 ;. r·-~---, Yes, because in suc~J. the .pt:cup?r;)1~ of ·~~ ' oljs~m,su'ffer \ti~ nOfle, vibrations, smoke, etc. coming from the station~U~iAg its "operat{ofl, thµ_~e~ lfng'n r9"ihe cornfqif,11ealth, and even the lives of · the persons concerned ir.i.c~joffire (Bsn~;on \!Si. ~ ~~Jn, 2 Ph1l..,°"81'6V
48. When is noise an actio ab e)luisan a? ·,' -; if°.i A noise rnpy constitute ~etio~E: a no hjyfi affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary peo~le...~'rrJflvicinlty_to a~ unreasonabk\~}t~!:tojury to a particular person in a peculiar position or. of spe~~ f_lr;isitive ~h~istig~ ~~..-r~nder the noise an actionable nuisance. In the ?onditions 'Of..;j) ~~t')liv_ing, n~ise ll~~r~para_ble f:om · the con~uct of ma~y necessary occupations. Its preseoo ~.;g;_nu1sanc~~t~Rtl~nse in which that word 1s used, but in the absence of statute, noise becomes4Ctiojla!ll,e QJJ.ly~'nen:.lt.passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of ttieJieeds oflh1f 1istener. What those limits, are not fixed by any definite measure of quantity or quality. They depend upon..lhe circumstances of the particular case. They .may be affected, but are not controlled, by zoning ordinance. The delimitation of designated areas to use for manufacturing, industry or general business is not a license to emit every noise·profitable attending the conduct of any one of them.( Velasco vs. Mera/co, L-18390, August 6, 1971 ). · 49. May the City Engineer of the City of Manila summarily remove houses constructed without · governmental authority on public streets and waterways? Yes, he is so authorized under the Charter of the City of Manila which shall prevail over the Civil <:;ode, such Charter being a special law (Sitchon vs: Aquino, G.R. No. L-8191, February 27, 2956; Quinto vs. Lacson L-137700, May 30, 1960).
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MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP Donation 50. Can a person donate a property which is not owned by him? A donation would not be legally feasible if the donor has neither ownership nor real right that he can transmit to the donee. A donation, under Art. 712, ' NCC in relation to Art 725, NCC is also a mode of acquiring and transmitting ownership and other real rights by an act of liberality whereby a person . disposes gratuitously that ownership or real right in favor of another who accepts it. It would be an inefficaciQus process if the donor would have nothing to convey at the time it is made (Hemecf.es vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999; R & B Insurance Corp. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 108472, October 8, 1999). ..
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(b) Lands of the public domain subsequentl y classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of ac;:quisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
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private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in obse·rvance of the law (Article 111 3, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character -shall not be the object of prescription (Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No . .179987, September 3, 2013)
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54. What is the nature o"f prescription? Whai are the kinds and_ period of acquisitive prescription of rights? Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable propef1y. It is concerned with the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
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4 years i. Action for revocation or reduction qf donation based on supervening birth, appearance or adoption of a child (Art 763 NCC) ii. Action for revocation of donation based on non-fulfillment of .condition (Art. 764 NCC) iii. Action for recovery of movable (replevin) if possessor is in good faith (Art 1132 par 1 NCC)
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59. A entered into a contract with B where the former will deliver 50 sacks of Maharllka rice to the latter. When the time to deliver arose, A instead delivered 30 sacks of Maharllka rice and 20 sacks of Sinandomeng rice. B filed an action to annul the contract on the ground of vitiated consent through fraud. Will B's action prosper? No, the concept of fraud to annul a contract must be fraud in the perfection of a contract or dolo causantt7 (Art. 1344); mere fraud in the fulfillment of a contracted obligation (do/o incidente) does not annul a contract. Dolo incidente does not annul a contract because the party did not use fraud to induce the other to enter into the contract as in do/o causante, thus, vitiating his consent rendering the contract voidable. In dolo incidente, the party employs fraud only in the performance of the obligation which is the subject of a validly entered contract; it does not involve the perfection of the contract, rather, only its consummation. In this problem, A did not use fraud to induce B into entering into the contract. A's fraud is present only
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during the performance of the obligation to deliver the rice. Thus, B's action is not to annul the contract but to recover damages for nonfulfillment of the obligation. (Arts. 1170, 1171)
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60. A borrowed P1,000,000.00 from B. In case of non-payment by A after demand, what are B's remedies? There are 3 general remedies which are available to the creditor for the protection and enforcement of his right against th~ debtor. They are: first, to exhaust the property in possession of the debtor; second, to be · subrogated to all of the rights and actions of the debtor save those which are inherent in his person (accion subrogatoria); and third, to impugn all of the acts which the debtor may have done to defraud him (accion pauliana). The second and third, however, are subsidiary to the first (Art. 1177). KINDS OF OBLIGATIONS Pure and Conditional Obligations
64. Suppose in the previous question a period has. been fixed by the court. Can the court give a new period in which to comply with the condition? NO, the period fixed by a court supplements that. of the contract. Courts may extend only a period allowed by a judicial decree for the fulfillment of an obligation, but not a period fixed by a judgment which becomes part of a contract. The latter is not designated simply for the execution of a judicial decree and, in consequence merely procedural in its nature; it is a period fixed in a final judgment and i~ res judi.cata, and as such forms an integral part of the imperfect contract which gave rise to its designation by the court, and thenceforward part of a perfect and binding contract (Barretto v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 4372, [March 27, 1908]). 1 {
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Alternative Obligations 65. JA obtained a loan from MM and mortgag·ed his house and lot as security with the provision that in case of failure to pay the debt, all his rights to the house and lot at an appraised valuation will be transferred to MM. JA paid no part of their Indebtedness. Is the agreement to convey the house and lot at an appraised valuation in the event of failure to pay the debt in money at its maturity valid? · Yes, the agreement to convey the house and lot at an appraised valuation in the event of failure to pay the. debt in money at its maturity is perfectl~1 valid. It is simply an undertaking that if the debt is not paid in money, it will be paid in another way. Tha stipulation is not pacto comisorio. It is not an attempt to permit the creditor to declare a forfeiture of the :;ei;urity upon the failure of the debtor to pay the debt at maturity. It is simply provided that if the debt is n·Jt paid in money, it shall be paid in another specific way by the transfer of property at a valuation (Agondllo v. Javier, G.R. No. 1261 1, [August 7, 1918)).
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70. Under a contract, the obligation of A, B, and C was solidary. However, a judgment was rendered against them for the total amount without stating the nature or extent of their liability. Ma'y j udg'm ent be executed on the properly.of C alone to satisfy the entire obligation? No, when it is not provided in a judgment that the defendants are liable to pay jointly and severally a certain sum of money, none of them may be compelled to satisfy in full said judgment Each of the defendants is liable only for his proportionate part of the judgment (De Leon, 2010, p. 214; Oriental Commercial vs. Cebato, 60 Phil. 723 (1934]). ·
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71. The inhabitants of Barrio XYZ raised a sum of 16,000 to erect a chapel for their patron saint, San Vicente· Ferrer and placed the sum in the hands. of four trustees. The trustees entered into a· contract with the father of A in order to circumvent the prohibition on government employees engaging in outside worl•. P12,000 was paid at the time the contract was executed leaving P4,000 to b~ paid at the completion of the chapel. As a penalty, it was agreed that if either party should fail to comply with any of its conditions or stipulations, such party should pay the other by way of indemnity the sum of P4,000. The chapel failed to meet the specifications of the four trustees. May the trustees refuse to pay the remaining P4,000 to set off the penalty agreed upon? NO. The chapel is used for the purpo9e for which it was intended, thus, the trustees are not entitled to confiscate the sum of P4,QOO which is yet unpaid upon the purchase price and at the same time to claim the stipulated damages, The result is that the penalty as provided in the penal clause of the contract must be set off against that portion of the contract price which has been retained in the hands of the trustees, with the result that neither party can recover anything of the other (Navarro v. Mallari, G.R. No. 20586, [October 13, 1923]). 72. The municipality of WesterdS ept:ered~.J to cant[act\with 1igh~ing company to install 200 incandesce' t a~ps into the '.vll~ ~ # lhe mu .ipaliW,~tor. PSOO par lamp with the payment to be made in instfil~fnts. it was j ipulated tlia , as a pena ty ·n Ca.§e qf noncom~l.fanfo on the part of the municipafity,;. tlii::j company coutp,de~and t~cession;o the company of ~fl the, materials used i? the. installatl ·n:.Jljaj..d by the tr1.f·ruc1pality~f:.vd.e~ter~s. Thereafterl th i..ffiu nicipality had a financial problem..resultm~~t9e la,c~Qf.ff.,HM.rj,s and ~olati~ ot1 t~e agreement. Is the company obliged to proveross'O;; damatie ii'r"brdertb-dtrnand"itte erlfbrcement of rn!pe.rial clause? When a penal cl a~f..has been agr,e"e·d 11>011r t9~ce0tract, rather th~ri'a .security and sanction as punishment for the' i[if(aCtlon thereof, it[it:. a lawfUI means'>fd r repailj.ng 10\sss#lnd damages, and upon evidence of the viol;:ltLo< Qf the {'ronditiOJ_t stipulafed the it:U..ured Rarty is ~Q.UQ...QJiQed to prove losses and damages suffered, ~~.toe! exte;~t ql 'frif jame i'1 ,0f,Qer to deman(;! ~e eQ.foil"p~ent of the penal clause _agreed upon, which '~~njxcer;1tiqfi\to ~~e dd,mnwn a~ ,gan"2tral loss al)C!,JoJ(e.mnity clause (Palacios .v. Municipality of _Cavit~l}-flo. ~59S, [Nove'tnberr~,~~8],<1 2 f?W1Lf 40~1i8~
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lea~~\l\,;fth a~dva~e payme~ o~~6,.00Q. ~vas
73. A building was "It /{Wed in the contract that if the tenant defaults\ in the PctY:lfie'ilt~ot h" m"1nthly- rent, the ~traGt will be automatically cancelled, and "at 'tp"e. ~e ti~~~ a ' .19'. ~n~sftation i grah~~V_:.tt'tb,!e lessor of the lessee's advance payment as CJ-aw~es." ~~ itfie 'iSti»,ul~~~~ - li~fi) ~ ~U The stipulation is a pe'R@l~~~use,lfAd-e.veri.'I( IAJ:tiur . s.P!~{'co scionaole,...in a sense, it is not void, but subject merely to equit':\1516: f7.di.Jctior:i, MQJeoV~fl ~ a~~n~tna can f_~~Ga1ered is not limited merely to ~ - es (Yu~v.re~~&·l')· Ndflt;·flO'Ojl '. Apr.~~~7). actual o~ compensatory ~
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~XllNGlflSHllllENt OF OBUlGATJOt;,.Jb ' \ JI. .~ n aymenf•or erfon'n~C~
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74. Constante an_d Corazon authotized ·1110· in the sale of four lots for the amount of P23,000,000, 5% of which l.4ii~?W~,~eras commission. Artigo then entered into a contract of sale with TT Corp. of"fh'-'o~r lots for the price of P7,050,000. After the sale was consummated, Artigo recei'led from Constante and Corazon P48,893, however, feeling aggrieved because according to him, his total commission should be P352,500.00 which is 5% of the agreed price of the two lots, he sued Constante and Corazon. Citing Art. 1235 of the NCC, . Constante and Corazo contends that Artigo's inaction as well as failure to protest estops him from recovering 111ore than what was actually paid him. Was the contention of Constante and Corazon correct? NO, Artigo's acceptance of partial payment of his commission neither amounts to a waiver of the balance nor puts him in estoppel. This is the import of Art. 1235 which was explained in this wise: "The word accept, as used in Art. 1235 of the NCC, means to take as satisfactory or sufficient, or agree to an incomplete or irregular performance. Henc:;e, the mere receipt of a partial payment is not equivalent to the required acceptance of performance as would extinguish the whole· obligation." There is thus a clear distinction between acceptance and mere receipt. In this case, it is evident that Artiga merely received the partial payment without waiving the balance (De· Castro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115838, [July 18,
Y2:wo
2002]).
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75. LSW placed deposited with ABC a money market l>lacement. Thereafter, a person claiming to be LSW instructed an officer of ABC to pre-terminate · the money market placement, Issue a check representing the proceeds, and glv~ the same to S, who In turn deposited the check to FCC's account. Is the obligation of ABC to pay LSW extinguished? NO, Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the obligation as to the cred itor, if there is no fault or negligence which can be imputed to the latter. Even when the debtor acted in utmost good faith and by mistake as to the person of his creditor, or through error induced by the fraud of a third person, the payment to one who is not in fact his creditor, or authorized to receive such payment, is void, except as provided in Article 1241 . Such payment does not prejudice the creditor, and accrual of Interest is not suspended by it (Allied Banking Corp. v. Lim Sio Wan, G.R. N'o. 133179, [M?rch 27, 2008]).
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Condonation or Remission of Debt
80. D executed a promissory note for P500.00 in favor of C. Later, C died. D contends that he did not borrow from C but that the latter acted as i11termediary to obtain the loan for D from F, C's friend, and that after he was notified of the death oi C, he paid F P200.00 as part payment of the P500.00 . loan, offering at the same time to pay the balance in a few days but F made him understand that he was condoning the debt. Upon the facts, is the alleged remission s ufficiently established? No. D was the sole witness who testified about it. F, the creditor, was not presented to confirm it. The promisso1y note evidencing the debt was never returned by F to C or his legal representative. The partial payment of P200.00 made by D belies the alleged condonation. Moreover, if the said remission were true, · it would benefit only the e~tate of C ang not 0 . I
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The act of generosity of F must have been towards his friend C whose death bereaved him, or the family of the latter. D had no relation of friendship with F. (Villahermosa vs. Medina, [CA] 44 O.G. 442.9; De Leon, 2010, p.367)
81. D borroVl(ed a year ago P2,000 from C. =The da.bt:w tpon&hs. , D is now in possession of the promisSOrYmQle. ls the obligation ofOlt9 pay; ~.eitipgui~~d? , . _.
YES, under - it} f~72 of the NCC, it shall~e presumed th C delivered th~rw!!issory note to .D · voluntarily, an · o1frrE1r/Art. 1271 of the s.arp,.e Code~~i;:>...imQlie~that C'ti~s condo ~ ttf§...obligation. Here, . the following re~sites-~r the implieclr.e.D1i$.~od cQOJ.ajlliilel~~i!i Art. 1271 of t~e ., CG' is present: (1) the document eviden~ Jhe ?redit 'fas de!iv~d b~~e ~rE\9tt0~ to ~ dep,tor; (~l suroJ:l'Ocument is a private document; (3) thar-}!4J~1very was'voluritar;y~-(C1v1l· Law.JR'ev1e\ve~Jura~. 2q?>~ ...p_;i88)
82. A conjugal two-s~rft.Jilding, ~wned. by a hus)>ahd and Wife Jiving ~pai:ately from each other, was leased in favor-ori.e~rtai11 tenant::.,tbut the co(ltract of Jease ~tiputated~$hat the rents would be paid to the husba · a-I he. llhe wifJ S\led fo .l?llrt qf said rentals ii ithe course of the trial, a compromise was a,g~~d upC!n !Jft~pn 1fhe s~ouse.s tp .!the'_effectl,tliat··fhe wife would pay the husband P35,000 in cong'jderat i
~~~~~re~he wai~er .appli~~(~ly
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to the property conjugal properties, as'wejl'as futu1e properties G.R. No. L-19571 , [Dece n~ : 1, 'f965]~ , .
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agre~~'ith refer~nce to all other
~cfer~ sliSTfuGr~ains. (Puzon v. Gaerlan, 1
Confusion o Mer e
Co~. ~ubs~quentl~r~fter:
83. ABC Corp. borrowed DEF the president of _ ABC Corp .. became the president Corp. a11St the major~1 ~ .fm ~s of ABC Corp. became the majority members DEF Cor-pds t't}ef f{ a mer.ge.do!:ctedit~)\ nc}j · e6.tof under Art. 1276 of the NCC? NO, There cannot be a mer~ cre,qit\>r and debtor ~q~eM t i~ 1276 of the Civil Code although a majority of the members of thet,lf~rds,.i5f the two or~iza~ partie~ to the contract are the same persons, if the said entities keep thetr:OWn j>ie~tie~d"e'W!ties. (Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Co. v. Credit Union, G .~~l"t:-14~~ 20, 1960) .. · 84. A and B were co-owners of a piece of property worth P1,00_0,000. For some repairs thereon, B paid P200,000. Because they were co-owners, A had to share in said expenses, and so A owed B P100,000. A sold his share in the property to C and B also sold his share In the property to C. Later B brought this action to recover P100,000 from A. A claimed that since C is now the owner of the property, Cowes himself..,and therefore said merger had extinguished his debt to B. Should A pay B? YES, mere transfer to a third person of rights belonging to both the debtor and.the creditor BUT not the · · credit as against the debt does not result in merger. The rights of creditor and debtor are not merged in one same person by the fact that the things pertainin_g to said creditor and debtor which were the subject of the obligation were transferred to him where said transfer did not include, among the rights and obligations transferred, the credit that the creditor had against the debtor. (Paras, 2008·, p. 457; Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra, G.R. No. 22825, [February 14, 1925])
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CIVIL 'L AW 85. A sued B, as administrator of the estate of X, praying for a personal judgment for P30,000.00 with Interest ·and the foreclosure of mortgage securing said debt. This mortgage was a first lien on a parcel of land in question assessed at P28,000.00. . It appeared that A purchased the land from Y who, 'in turn', purchased the same at a sheriff's sale under an execution upon a judgment against D. The trial court denied the prayer of C. Was the denial correct? YES, when A acquired through Y the equity of X in the very same land conveyed to him (A) as mortgagee, a merger of rights took place which had the effect of extinguishing the debt of X in favor of A. This extinction of the obligation and merger of rights by which A became the owner of the land, occurred when he acquired the rights of Y. (De Leon, 20.10, p.377; Enriquez v. Ranola, G.R. No. 40908, [September 8, 1934], 60 PHIL 561-565) .. Compensation
89. Jose subscribed 160 shares of stock, at par value, in a·company whose authorized capital st ock was P300,000. At the time of the subscription, and without his knowledge and consent, the company increased the ~apital stoc!< to P600,000. Can the company compel Jose to pay for s aid shares? · NO, because not having given his consent to said increase constitutes a novation by changing the principal conditions (Art. 1291, Civil Code). Said increase in authorized capital stock diluted the expected ownership of the subscriber in the corporation amounting to a change in the principal conditions of the agreement. Hence, he is not bound by the contract thus novated and is relieved of the obligation contracted·by him in the Original contract, which became extinguished as a consequence of said novation (art. 1231 , Civil Code); even if he made some partial payments, not having been informed of said increase at the time of having made them. (National Exchange Co .. Ltd. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 27850, December 24, 1927)
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90. A rented a house from B. In the contract of lease, the lessee A was given authority to assign the lease to strangers." Be~ause of this A leased it to C. Is A released from his obligation towards the lessorB? · NO, under Art. 1292 of the Civil Code the only situation where a novation having the effect of extinguishing a prior obligation will be implied, in·the absence of express stipulation, is where the new and old obligations are incompatible in every respect. In the case under consideration the new obligation assumed by the successive entities taking over the lease was not at all incompatible with the continued liability of the original lessee. (Rios v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 23893, March 23, 1926)
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91. D owes~ P1,000,000. F, a friend of D, approaches C and tells him: "I will pay you wha~ D owes you." C agrees. Is there expromision so as to relieve D of his obligation? NO, the mere fact that the creditor receives a guaranty or accepts payments from a third person who has agreed to assume the obligation, when there is no agreement- that the first debtor shall be released from responsibility, does not constitute novation, and the creditor can still enforce the obligation against the original debtor. (Magdalena Estates, Inc. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-18411, December 17, 1966)
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I In this case, the agreement between the parties is the formal expression of the parties rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the parties, it is the law -between them. The MOA stated its terms clearly and leaves no doubt that the amount shall be paid in lump sum and not based on the number of units constructed. ·
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RESCISSIBLE CONTRACTS 94. A entered into an agreement with B for the construction of a three-story dotmitory in strict accordance to the plans and specifications. The General Conditions and Specifications which prescribed the minimum acceptable compressive strength of the building was thereafter delivered to 8. Upon knowledge of B deviating from the said plans and ~pecifications, A conducted several testing which showed that samples failed the required 3000 psi which meant that the building was structurally defective. As a result, A filed a complaint for rescission of the contract. B contends that rescission was not proper, arguing that the applicable rule is Article 1385 of the Civi l Code. Is B correct? ., No, B seems to· be confused over the right of rescission which is used in two different context in the Civil Code. · Under the law on contracts, there are rescissible contracts as enumerated under Article 1381, and dght of rescission under Article 1191. The applicagle.,r,ule is not 1381 in relation to 1385 but 1191 because the construction con:ract obliges B tGrbull~ar.~tiri ,whi~E!~-t~oPligation to pay upon the completion. Article 1191~iJ.o ecenomlc pr~u fee to one of the parties,..Qttt based on the breach of faOfVDyfane of them loat viofates reciprocity. The rig~t to r-nd arose~ failed to follow the stipulated pl~£~d specifications3 ~
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l\ 95. Sometime in 19~9'V~ed,@@di.~ l~fio@sJi!it{jvFini!JJttii$fl.~11drr-'l~~f whom .was X. In
order for X to obtam aA9an, W sold the lot to X. X obtained a loa~ fro"J.... . l':v.. and-1Ttortgaged the same to the latter but X tRil~d',\o pay, tfle loan, hence he rtro)1gage s fore~~~n January 1, 1983, Y sold the. lot to A, wtu:} aid the full pr~. After th~ s.alei ·W \anlf her chft94iled for the annulment of the sale and pa'ftiti~6lof di e lot ag!ins X f!Od Y. T.'1~ sal~ was d~~reCJ to be valid only with respect to the shares an~ ~ an~}VOJ'1.i with fe.$1>.eci t o t~e' shard~of.Jile other heirs, ordering the r~turn of the sc.iU. portion. T~ deblsi~d bs<::z:~1~inal al.'ld e}{vcufbry 011September 4, 1993. ·On December 10, 1998:.;e....ffi" d an actiorUtor resetssiO"n a~ns~ on 1 ~ u n d that he was ousted from the subject lof'·d ue) to e ictionf deprivil)fl mm 'P. aJmos 80 bftfeof. Has the action for .• )~ . rescission prescribe ?. ~ Yes. Article 1389 of provides tlrtatm · o r '.Zust be commenced within four years. The cause\ of. et1on o~ ffi'e A s't:ern~ r: .~ H . v.i g meen ~ste!fi!Sy final judgment from the if) violation .dfotief arr. gamst vipfl9n that comes every sale ownership of the lot that of property or thing und-e~ ·~~le 154-a. or ws .oiv11~N«!~ l th 1oss o'% of the subject 1ot by reason of the judgment, A had~ $JJilt to file all'\ a~lip~.1fqrr~1i:Clss~o ursufrl ~A~ provision of Article 1556'of the Civil Code. And that ~c ~r resGT&sfop; WfflZ:h i$lhlise n a ~'{b~~r€!1:1~nt economic loss suffered by the buyer, was precisely ~aoti,on that the A tooi agai nst . Co!)ie;_qt!erttW: it prescribed as Article 138~ pro.vides in four years from~he a.ct10n ace ue~h1ch islt~~~mber 4, 1993.
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a Deed of Conditional Sale 96. Salvador and the Star Serhicon · lC>r . wherein the former agreed to sfi!:~~ot in .Ga!~a,,,Riza ~latter for the price of P1 M. The down payment payable is P100,000, an'Ci...the ba~~5'!o b aid 60 days after the squatters in the property have been removed. It was ~ifher agre~cl..."ts~on that if the squatters were not removed within six months, t he down payment...§hall be returneCI by the vendor to the vendee. Due to his failure to have the squatters removed, Salvador offered.to return the down payment to SSC but the latter refused to accept the money and demanded that Salvador execute a deed of absolute sale of the property In its favor, at which time it will pay the·balance of th~ price. Incidentally, the value of the land had doubled by that time. Salvador consigned the P 100,000.00 in court, and filed an action for rescission of the deed of conditional sale, plus damages. Will the action prosper? Explain. . No, the action will not prosper. The action for rescissio n may be brought only by the aggrieved party to the contract. Since it was Salvador who failed to comply with his conditional obligation, he is not the aggrieved party who may file the action for rescission but the Star Semiconductor Company. The company, however, is not opting to rescind the contract ·but has chosen to waive Salvador's compliance with the condition which it can do under Art. 1545, NCC.
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CENTRAllO::'.D B .'\R 0 PER..l1.TIONS
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VOIDABLE CONTRACTS
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97. Jackie, 16, inherited a townhouse. Because she wanted to study jn an exclusive school, she sold her townhouse by signing a Deed of Sale and turning over possession of the same to the buyer. When the buyer discovered she was still a minor, she promised to execute another Deed of Sale when she turns 18. When Jackie turned 25 and was already working, she wanted to annul the sale and return the buyer's money to recover her townhouse. Was the sale contract void, voidable or valid? Can Jackie still recover the property? Explain. . ·The contract of sale was voidable on the ground that Jackie is incapable of giving consent at the time of the execution of the sale. (Article 1390 and Article 1327) .
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ClV.iLtAW 101. Atty. Florin Justiniano purchased a set ·of Supreme Court Reports Annotated from Law Books Company for a total price of PS,000 which, in addition to the cost of freight of PSOO, makes a totai . of P5,500. Atty. Justiniano made a partial payment of P2,500, leaving a balance of P3,000. The contract provides that the loss or damage after delivery shall be borne by the buyer. After the books were delivered, a fire broke out in the office of Atty Justiniano destroying all his documents Including the SCRA As Atty. Justiniano failed to pay the remaining balance, the company demanded payment of the installments due, and having failed to pay the same, it commenced an action In the trial court for the recovery of the obligation. Will the case prosper? Yes. The ownership of the books purchased on installment were retained by the seller, although they have already been d_elivered to the buyer, under the condition that ownership thereof will be transferred to the buyer upon his full purchase price. It was held that despite the loss of the books in a fjre, the ri sk of loss would be borne by the buyer although he was not the owner yet, not only because such was agreed merely to secure the performance by the buyer of his obligation, but also because in the very contract itself, it was agreed that loss or damage to the books after delivery to the buyer shall be borne by the buyer. (Lawyer's Cooperative Publishing Company vs. Tabora) 102. Alex bought a bike from Mi'}a~bY.!~~uing a,,. p~ itda~~ i . full payment therefor. Before the check mat re~, Alex sold 1'11' buce o ~~b l~~i(.s?ld" tt t'o Jack. Upon presentment of disliOn.oied eaq~e fTe ad alreadyllf~ed his account payment, the Meck issued DY Arex before he ls~u~~' his. check. ~Tina the~ s~ed to recover ~he bl~e om J_ack1tl!~9!6g that she had been unlawful!~~prived of 1t by r(itsdh o.t._~le~ ~~}t!..~n. Will the su1~erq,§~i? No. The suit Wl1~6tprosper becau\tiytiM ~as'1rot"'llnla~lly deprived of \!le~ although she was unlawfully depriv~d~f the. ~.i:1Cutt~iPe§@fit t@faie ~~~/83~ive'W\o~ttle' car was enough to allow Alex to hav~ ri§'nt of ownership. over the car which can be lawfull~ l~ansferred to Anita. Art. 559 applies only to a p s '((who i$.1n.possession m!ood faltp.of tile propertyR,an~t to the owner thereof. Anita, in the probl~ ca~ the bwner, fid. henc , Jae . acquired tfle'title ~C\.ffie--car. Non-payment of the price in a contract 6f~ateidoes not renaer, irieffe tiv.e. 'the obltg~tjon o d11tver:;tpe obligation to deliver a . thing is different fronuhe,gbligatior;i .to p.ay i~,p riae. (EDCA 'Publlshfng Cd~;sa'ntos)
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103. Debbie sold a see~~·IJ.and bar to l~man for.·rtso,000.00 ~he a~ ~~t between Debbie and Eman was that half of t!W pur~hase ~ri~e, or IP~~00.00,~llobe p~}.llp·on delivery of the car to Eman and the bala~_.Cf£1P75,000 O~hEl!ll be .Oi!iUq;@j.eq alrno~ .~)itallments of P15,000.00 each. The <:ar was~~ile~. d ~i Em.1~~,0jl ·1 E n B lthe i a ount · ~.000.00 to Debbie. Less than one month thel'.e]ifter the ca.r ~.. tol i: • . 's _ara~ ffi'no fault on Eman's part and was never reco~ ,1.O! · . p ~ - ld·\lll.« balance of P75.000.00? Yes, Eman is legally'D.G>t'~~to p~-Y;it~f'i'~ · 0 0. Tlle~~rship of the ca_ r sold was 3 acquired by Eman fror"l(t~(!poment _ ~~~fe .. · ing§jlle, 1 e~ownership, Em~n bears the yt\der t e~oaJl.ie Jlf res peri).{Jom ~ in1 . . u( the o~ligation to pay is ·not risk of the loss. of the 11 Co .• extinguished by the loss'O(j~r. (~ffictes·119; 1497
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104. Ricardo sold a parcel tor. ezoo;ooo p. e · .. 'Flo d by a deed of sale. Upon failure of Peping., t~~.!~f'tJrchase price~·cii ~d a complaint for rescission of · contra<'.t on the ground of .P...ep~g~Hure o p;W!:; ~ance. Was the sale made merely executory? L..-' ~ . No, the sale was already consummate
105. Amanda and Byron entered into a contract of sale over a parcel of land in Davao. Amanda delivered the parcel of land. Byron, on the other hand, was bound 1o pay on December 16, 2016. Amanda became incapacitated on December 15, 2016. On December 16, 2016, Byron came to Amanda to pay and Amanda accepted the payment. Is the payment of Byron to Amanda valid? Yes. As a general rule, -payment to the incapacitated is void. However, if the incapacitated has kept the thing delivered or if payment has been beneficial to him, the payment is valid (Article 1241 ).
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- 106. Daenerys bound himself to sell hi s iron throne for 55,000 pesos to Jon Snow. To secure his right
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to the sale, Jon Snow advanced the entire purchase price to Daenerys notwithstanding the provision in their contract that. the iron throne shall ,be delivered on February 27, 2020. Unfortunately, on Februa ry 18, 2020, the subject iron throne was completely destroyed by Cersei, a stranger. Aggrieved by the situation, Jon Snow wanted reimbursement of the price he paid. lshe entitled to recover the full amount of 55,000 pesos? On account of the nature of a contract of sale being reciprocal, the extinguishment of obligations due to the loss of the thing affects the rights of both the vendor and the vendee. If the vendor' obligation is extinguished, the correlative obligation of the vendee to pa y is likewise extinguished . This is consistent with Art. 1262 of the NCC, which states among others that the subject obligations are extinguished since the things is lost without the fault of tpe vendor. Furthermore, it would be juridicall y illogical and unjust to oblige the vendee fo pay ·the price despite complete loss of the thing before its delivery. In conformity with the principle of res perit domino, the owner of the thing shall bear the risk of loss. And absent any delivery from the vendor to the vendee, the law presumes that the ownership of. the thing sold still remains with the former. Hence, Daenerys is bound to return the advance payment of 55,000 pesos to Jon Snow.
107. Arya and P.etyr; executed' a contract oft.sale oRa agg!r.~hereby ' he latter bound himself to pay the purch·~~P?fe of 20,000 pesos ID e.quat:monthJy i'nstall~n.ts. And to ~ec~T his payment, Petyr execUtad:\,3 chattel mortgage over the same dagger. :t! ree months_ ater, and despite persistent de~~$ from Arya, P...etxr failfd 6 iia2 }ttle corresponding ~an - ly installments. Consequently, i\(a~,~· stituted a ac tion ot spec1fi9 ertormance against. eet\U- or the payment of f ..: 1~ l! •• ._ ~~ ~ P tA. I' the purchase. ~ i fie4.>...~l'Y....a ~r? · . .~ No. Arya's actions Were\ imprgper. "Art. 148 of the NCC givl3s the1vendOr o_p,trons on either to exact fulfillments of the btftgat1on, should t~ vendee., fail to pay two or more instatlments, or foreclose the chattel mortgage c~lty,ied therein. l~ either case-, 'the veJJdor, Ar.':/_a, h~~urther action against the vendee, Petyr, to r~c~V'er:,any de~ff€ienfcy. lf~der tfle law; :J:hese rerqediJs.J:lre..-ahernative in nature, and not cumulative. He~Ge ...tne US!3 of1 o ~ bal'.S t tie -0se Df.\.tthe dtb91. H~ncef9rth, Arya's fi rst action of requiring s~ecific p·e~mjnce p ec"ud h~rself , rom fo1eClosn:ig Uie su~~t chattel mortgage. ·
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·t08. Sansa leased her T~12,,9/Epson Prin er to...Bran t
rate of 1JOOO(p j s . s ,.a month for a period of one year with the ~tio dn Bran tQ purchase the s~e printer at he end of the lease contract for 14,000 pesos. Under..theJ~aid contr~ct1 tfle ~kttte-' h~ a~~gre~d o .apply the rental fees for the printer to the total P-.ur.,e_ha§e price of the same.~~ViA ~ Bra witt)-a arance of 2,000 pesos by the end of the year. Unfort1:1rf;\ely, 'Brap as !aifb lts>Jt~ ~hree of tb& tllo'n thly installments, which prompted Sansa to f~"'1i~1e the lease :and ~e riM&-ttiJ Ji. bjedt\ijr oter. Also, Sansa brought an action against Bran fof'the ecovecy of tlj'e,..' ihipaib ~o_!J..t h le;~':\jl!H.(he suit prosper? No. Sansa's suit will noTPJ:QSP.~~for sne ·a~ p Jready repo.vessed~~~~ctg}ect printer. The applicable rule ~4S4 of the same code. Under t~e in this case. i~ Art. 1485-0f-~~);Jpc w~icii maJ<~s reference totkt former prov1s1on, the latter~t@!r be ~pphed contrac s puppru'ng.to-bifeases of personal property with an option to buy, an.d when tfl0Jess~epriv~d the ~session or enjoyment of the thing.
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109. Mama Sita bought a . Corp. for a price of 20 pesos, · with the following terms of paymeny -- . Million own payment and the balance payable in 60 equal monthly installments with annual 12% interesV Under their Deed of Conditional Sale, the parties have agreed that failure of the vendee to pay three· successive monthly installments shall rescind the contract automatically without necessary judicial action, and all payments made shall be forfeited in favor· of the vendor by way of rent for the use and enjoyment of the subject condominium unit. In the course of the contract, Mama Sita paid religiously for 40 months. However, on the 41 51 and 42"d month, Mama Sita failed to pay. Worried about the consequences of his nonpayment, Mama Sita tried to tender her payment on the 53rd month, but WAMI Builders Corp. refused to receiv~ the payment. Thereafter, the corporation notified Mama Sita, through a letter, about the automatic rescission of their Deed of Conditional" Sale and demanded to vacate the condominium unit. Aggrieved, Mama Sita invoked that the contract cannot be rescinded w ithout prior judicial demand. Can WAMI Builders Corp. rescind the contract? The instant case calls for the application of the Maceda Law which mandates that the vendor or seller on installment may not rescind the contract without giving the vendee or buyer a 30-day grace period within which to satisfy his delinquency in payment for every one year of installment payments. Also, the
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said law re.quires the vendor to serve a 30-day notice of cancellation or rescission of the contract to the vendee. Here, WAMI Builders Corp.'s refusal of the 43rd payment is improper, for Mama Sita is clearly entitled -to a grace period, and her tender of payment was well within the said period. Moreover, the corporation's notice to Mama Sita was likewise defective for the same. was not notarized which is required under the Maceda Law. Hence, WAMI cannot rescind the subject contract.
113. What are the requirements to qualify and avail of the rights under the Urban Land Reform Act (PD 1517)? To qualify and avail of the rights granted by PD 1517, one must comply with the following requisites: 1. One must be a legitimate tenant of the land for 10 years or m6re; 2. One must have built his"home· on the land by contract; and 3. Has resided therein continuously for the last 10 years. (Alcantara vs Reta, G.R. No. 136996, December 14, 2001)
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SAN B EDA C OLLEGE
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or LAw
C ENTRALIZED BAR O PERATIONS
C[VJLLAW. PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUST
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114. Explain the doctrine of de/ectus personarum. Delectus personarum literally means 'choice of the person'. It is because of this delectus personarum that the law gives such wide authority to on~ partner, to bind another by contract or otherwise. Partnership is a relation in which delectus personae is an important element. It is based on trust and confidence between the partners. Hence, no one may be introduced into the firm as a partner without the unanimous consent of the other partners. This element of de/ectus personae, however, is true only in the case of a general partner, but not as regards a limited partner. (Article 1866, NCC)
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(b) How much will A get: 1/3 of P3 million or 1/3 of P1.5 million? Why? A will get only 1/3 of P1 .5 million, the net profit and not 1/3 of P3 million. While it is true that he does not share in the losses, this only means that he will not share in the net losses. It is understood that he share in the losses insofar as these can be accommodated in the profits. It is but fair to compute all the various transactions in determining the net profits or losses (GR No. L-12371 Criado v. Gutierrez Hermanos, GR No. L-12371, March 23, 1918).
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S AN B EDA COLLEGE OF LAw CENTRALIZED B AR O PERATIONS
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i J 119. Tobes, an industrial partner, was authorized to "manage, operate, and direct the affairs, business, and activities of the partnership" and· " to make, sign, seal, execllte, and deliver contracts - upon terms and condit ions acceptable to him duly approved in w riting by the capitalist partner." The firm was engaged In the business of buying and selling merchandise of all kinds. One day, Tobes purchased "on credit" certain goods regularly purchased by the Company, but without first getting the authority of the capitalist partner. Is the partnership bound? Yes, since the transaction, even if "on credif' was a routine one. Moreover, authority to purchase carries with it the implied au.thority to purchase on credit. The requirement of written authority refers obviously to formal and unusual contracts in writing (Smith, Bell and Co. vs. Aznar, 40 O.G. 1882). 120. The plaintiff sued a partnership composed of five {5) general partners for payment of a promissory note. Later, the plaintiff fi led a motion to dismiss the case against one of the partners. The motion was granted. If the defendants lose the case, how much will each of the four remaining defendants pay-1/5 or 1/4 of the debt? Each of the four will pay 1/5 of the debt. Under Art. 1816 of the Civil Code, the partners are liable "pro rata," meaning "joint" (as distinguished frgm.solidar,y). O.Qginally, each of the five (5) partners was liable 1 for 1/5. The discharge from the eon1~raTEi"tidh:i6~ _9?t itbe~1dl
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121 . A, B, and C forrttt l:/partfl,r, h the government to San Juanico bridge\ After the com~letion of the project, the bridges ~.e.Fe turned over by the partners to the gov~f'oment ana tile partriership wa§ ,c(issotved. Tlie s.EJ1plier of the materials subsequently sue'd:"A'iclr the collectiO}l of indebte'dness tb h iiri. A m~~...to,,.-di.s miss the complaint against him on the~ro.-qnd tliat ABd Partr:ier{hjp ~ liable for. th~ det;it. yvj!J, the complaint against lie? Ye~. because despifei t e.1disso}u.!!,9n ~ftth~a~nc:~s'tjp·t~e~1:mrtAarshi~n~erminated but continues . ~ners~·p affa~rs is completa'.q. OissoJution is !~ . ~ge in the relation of the until the winding u~f ac partr:iers caused by a y ~rtne ceasin~ to be a~oefr'a1~~n l\J.rl)'.t~g on\~_gJ!.bt:fsiness (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1828). Winding up i~lrt~ctua roc~~~9f~,ettli g~g:gon~r~ b ~iqess;er affairs after dissolution and the partnership ls~ t _ i ·ate "Wtlen ~u ·ttie ershi~""~ ffairs a e co Rleted. ·
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122. Will the ·dissolution iet e1,artnersh;p CflsFti r e p~n r fQ 1ia1;?il y State the rules. · · . No. The dissolution ofya trfership ~aes.no!Jtse ~it@ · e·existihg}Ha~y of any partner. A partner liabrllty an agreement to that effect is discharged from between himself, the parfrfera·p cre~itor, ~Cftlie person ; r partfl~i~1JY'continuing the business, and such agreement may b~~t~'1~m tie ·cau1Se of dealjmg betv.J~~creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the pe~ pa~ ersn1p bontinµitfg the t:5~n~ss . . . . ·.
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of the partnership incurred . The individual property of a ctecea:l;,f'!!rtner shall be while he was a partner, but subjeCft~.2tpay~r!l oJl;il~ep°'ca@te debts. (Art. 1835)
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123. X. transferred his two (2) parcel children to enable them to build their residence. One year after the trans{;f.'~~ti;k,~~~s ~children of X) resold said lots dividing the proceeds among themselves, treating the same as capital gains and paying proper income tax therefor. In April 2017, the Commissioner of BIR required the petitioners to pay corporate income tax. The Commissioner's tf'!eory is that they formed an unregistered partnership or joint venture, which theory was sus~ined by the CTA. Is the decision proper? Why? . No. There was no partnership. To regard the petitioners as having formed an unregistered partnership ·· would result in oppressive taxation. Their original purpose was to divide the lots for residential purposes, but they were compelled to resell. Art. 1769 (3) provides that "The sharing of gross returns does not Itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest In any property from which the returns are derived. There must be an unmistakable intention to form a · partnership or joint venture.
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124. X and Y entered into a contract of partnership where they intended to operate a fishspond, not to engage in a fishpond business. Is there a need to comply with the requirement that an inventory be attached to the public instrument? Why? . No. While it is true that Art. 1773 provides that a contract of partnership is void, whenever immovable property is contributed thereto, if an inventory of the said property is not made, signed by the parties, and attached to the .public instrument; however, in this case, the purpose of the partnership is operation of a fishpond. Since there is no real right involved or the fishpond itself was not contributed, the requirement that an inventory signed by the parties must be attached to the contract need not be complied with.
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128. What is the doctrine of apparent auth1,>!Yt? One who clothes another with apparent~uthority as hi gent and holds him out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent to the prejudice of innocent third persons dealing with such person in good faith and in honest belief that he is what he appears to be. (Cuison vs. CA, G.R. No. 88539, October 26, 1993) 129. When may an act of an agent be binding upon the principal even if he acted beyond the scope of his authority? Explain. Under Art. 1898 and 1910, an agent's act even if done beyond the scope of his authority, may binq the principal if he ratifies them, whether expressly or tacitly. It must be stressed though that only the principal, and not the agent, can ratify unauthorized acts, which the principal ·must have knowledge of. The principal must have full knowledge at the time of ratification of all material facts and circumstances relating to the unauthoriz~d act of the person who assumed to act as agent.
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'130. When may an agent sue in his own name? Explain. An agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the following elements concur: (a) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction; (2) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; (3) the transaction did not involve a property of the undisclosed principal. Art. 1883 provides that if an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of action against the persons with whom the agent has contracted; neither have such persons against the principal. In such case, the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has contracted, as if the transaction were his own except wpen the contract involves things belonging to the principal. The provisions of this article shall be understood to be without prejudice to the actions between the principal and the agent. (V-Gent Inc. v Morning Star Travel and Tours, Inc. G.R. No. 186305, July 22, 2015).
135. What Is the concept of trust de son tort? . Atrust de son tort (constructive trust) is a form of implied trust created by equity to meet the demands of justice. There is a constructive trust when a property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the .person obtaining it, is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1456) 136. Distinguish Resulting Trust from Constructive Trust . a. As to intent, in resulting trust, the intent of the parties to create a trust is presumed or implied by law from the nature of their transaction. In constructive trust, the trust is created irr~spective of or even contrary to the intention of the parties ta promote justice, frustrate fraud, and to prevent unjust enrichment.
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As to the reckoning point for the prescriptive period, in resulting trust, the 10-year prescriptive period shall be counted from the time repudiation is made known to the beneficiary. In constructive trust, the 10-year prescriptive period shall be counted from the time the constructive trust arise~
137. What is the Trust Pursuit Rule? -
Equity will pursue the property that is wrongfully converted by the fiduciary, or otherwise compel restitution to the beneficiary. A trust will follow the property through all changes in its state and form even into the hands of a transferee other than a bona fide purchaser for value, provided its product or proceeds are capable of identification (Estate of Margarita Cabacungan v. Marilou Laigo, G.R. No. 175073, Augusf15. 2011)
138. Can a Trustee claim title over the property held in trust by acquisitive prescription? Whether the trust is express or implied, as a general rule, the trustee cannot acquire absolute ownership over the trust by acquisitive prescription. However, if (1) he repudiates the right of the beneficiary, and (2) such act of repudiation is brought to the knowledge of such beneficiary, and (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, he may be able to acquire,,absolute ownership over the trust but only (4) after the lapse of the period fixed by law (ten:o/9ar~rom the• ime tf1e ~ptrdia,tion is made known to the beneficiary in cases of~p[fss or resultin trust jyh!le~n ye~rs ft0~m~onsnvctjve trust arises). These requisites must be st~!,<2JIYJ9~mplied with only i~;spress.;fruSts {So to vs Teve,S', G.R. No. !,,:-389>18, October 31, 1978). In ~l~~ w.ists, there is a clear implication that ttie or.QLnary rule~rding acquisitive pr~scription ar~~P,~ca~le. · .>
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139. Distinguish com~ · '!.14m from a contracr orcleposit. ~ Commodatum is a GQn;tract wherein the!bailor dellverS< to the bailee a no ~""cor;i~umable thing so that the latter may use it foi'~~e~in tir]e ClJ:ld rauJQ.Jt w~ereas in~deposit,. a 1er5iQ.(i'rFl~ves a thing belonging to another with the obll9Wor of safely l<{eepirig it .and of returning the sarc~ ay if the p in.cipal does n '~'Ra - ~ ~e ~Jnk~ ·n~orooration v. Yujuico, Gr. No. 163116, June ~9. 20 ~ . , "' {
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141. Distinguish Equity o~~ption fr., om Right{
ror
~em ·
tion. . Equity of Redemption is"thUight of'p tnortgagor to r.edee~~the rpo J ageo property after his default in the performance of the~dftid~ of th~ mortgage within ; e 90-:1120 GlaY:fferiod from the date of service pf the order of .foreclosur~~eviiieereafter but before the copfi~a1~f the sale. Right of Redemption is the right of mortgagor to red .. ~e mortgagEkl property,r~~;('Ye'8r from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. The rig~ t8~li.dtMtion exists onl(!h t e• ~(jf the extrajudicial foreclosure of the )qcept only where the· mortgagee is the mortgage. No such right is rec~ i · a judiciaLtor.eel Philippine National Bank or a ban • ~,g ~~A· · •. uerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. ·No. 128567, September 1, 2000) ~
V
· 142. What is the significance of the benefit of Excussion? The creditor must exhaust all the property of the debtor and must resort to all available legal remedies against the debtor before proceeding against the guarantor. (Art 2058, NCC) ~43.
Is the writ of possession for extra judicial foreclosure valid even though no notice has been sent to debtor-mortgagor? Yes. The writ of possession is valid even without prior notice given to the debtor-mortgagqr, In extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135, the pro~eeding upon an application for a writ of possession is ex parte, non-litigious.and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is sought (Mallari v. GS/S, G.R. No. 157659, January 25, 2010).
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--· CIV&LL.AW 144. A stipulation rn a contract of pledge wherein the pl~dgee could purchase the things pledged at the current purchase price if the debt was not paid on time constitutes pactum commlsorlum? No, the stipulation does not constitute a pactum commisorium. What is prohibited by Art. 2088, dealing with pactocommisorio, is the automatic appropriation by the creditor or pfedgee in payment of the loan at the expiration of the period agreed upon . Where there is express authorization of the pledgee to purchase the things pledged at the current market price, the contract would not come within the prohibition, that is, there is no automatic appropriation of the thing upon default (Warner, Barnes & Co v. Buenaflor and Macoy, (C.A.) 36 O.G. 3290) .
may treat as
b. c. d.
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WILLS AND SUCCESSION
149. What is the importance of distinguishing heirs on the one hand and devisees or legatees on the other hand? It is important to distinguish heirs and devisees and legatees • in cases of preterition (Art. 854) because it annuls the institution of heir, but the devises and ·legacies' shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious, • In cases of imperfect or defective disinheritance (Art. 918) because it annuls the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited, but the devises and legacies shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime, and
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in cases of after-acquired properties (Art. 793) which states that property acquired during the interval ·between the execution of the will and the death of the testator are not, as a rule, included among the properties disposed of, unless it should expressly appear in the wi.11 itself that such was the intention of the testator. This only logically applies to l~gatees and devisees, and not to the institution of heirs.
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150. What is the form of a notarial will? a holographic will? Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
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Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscrib"ed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
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152. What is orie exception to the rule of lex loci celebrationis that can be found in the law on succession? An exception to said rule are joint wills. Joint wills executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in tt}e Philippines, even though they may be authorized by the laws of the country where ttiey may have been executed (Art. 819). Joint wills are those which contain in one instrument the will of. two or more persons jointly signed by them, either for their reciproc;al benefit or for the benefit of a third person · (Art. 818).
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CIV.IL LAW 153. Alice married Bong and they had 2 children, Carlo and Danielle. Alice disinherited Bong, her husband; for having attempted against the life of Alice's brother, Gerry. Alice died with and gave Her friend Rio a legacy of P400,000. The.hereditary estate is P900,000.00. Was the disinheritance valid? Distribute the estate accordingly. No. Bong was invalidly disinherited for there was no sufficient cause for the disinheritance. Under Article 921, there could be a valid disinheritance if the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the lif~ of the testator, his or her descendants, or ascendants. Here, there was no conviction and the attempt against life was not made against Alice's descendants or ascendants, but to her brother. Bong shall still receive his share. · Article 888 provides that the legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and mother. Carlo and Danielle are entitled to P450,000 of the estate which shall be divided between them. Thus, each of them shall receive P225,000. Bong, the husband, shall receive P225,000 which is equivalent to the share of one legitimate child as provided under Article 897. The remaining P225,000 shall be given to Rio as legacy.
Furthermore, the Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation provides that if the testator revokes a will with a present intention of making a new one immediately and as a substitute, and the new will is not made or is invalid, it will be presumed that the testator preferred the old will, instead of intestacy and the old one will be admitted to probated in the absence of evidence overcoming the presumption , provided its contents can be ascertained. · In this case, since there was no new will made by Fernando, he intended his second will which does not institute his friends as heirs to prevail, provided that its contents can be ascertained.
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156. Evelyn made a will instit1,1ting her mother, Rose, as the sole heir of her estate and disinheriting her father, John, for having attempted against her virtue. In the same will, Evelyn forgave her father for such acl Evelyn died without any issue. John seeks to receive his part of the estate claiming that sne has been forgiven by Evelyn in the will thus, revoking the disinheritance. ~a·n John receive any part from the estate? No. John cannot receive any part form the estate for he has been validly disinherited by Evelyn. Article 920 (1) provides that a parent or ascendant can be disinherited on the ground of attempt against the virtue of the testator. A disinheritance can only be revoked by subsequent reconciliation between the pa~ies as provided under Article 922 and by the making of a new will making the disinherited heir an instituted heir. Reconciliation is the mutual restoration of feelings to the status quo. A pardon given by the testator in the very same will wherein he provides for the disinheritance is not equivalent to reconciliation; there only is a sort of moral force or spiritual influence which forgives in the name of morality. Nor was there a new will made in the present case. Therefore, John's disinheritance is still valid and he cannot receive any part from the estate. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated).
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CWBllAW
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In this case, the net estate must be divided among Karla, Leo, Lea, and Morno in the proportion of 2:1:1:1. Morno shall inherit in his own right, while Karla, Leo and Lea shall inherit by right of representation. Therefore, the shares of the heirs shall be as follows: Karla P600,000 Leo · P300,000 Lea P300,000 Momo P300,000 Net Estate P1 ,500,000
Mo mo Net Estate (c) If all of Don Bern~ t Leo, and Lea, shall
representation.
Therefore, the net estate shall be distributed as follows: Momsy and Popsy P-1,000,000 or PS00,000 each Wifey P500,000 less the legacy of P100,000 =P400,000 Baby P500,000 · Beshie P100,000 Net Estate P2,000,000
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161 . A designated his c hildren X, Y, and Z as his universal heir in. his will . .It was stated that X is entitled to 1'/4 of the free portion, 1/4 would be given to Y and 1/2 to Z. Unfortunately, X predeceased A wheri the plane where X was a passenger crashed landed in the Pacific Ocean. Due to grief A, had a heart attack and s ubsequently died leaving an estate of P240,000. What will ~ appen to X's share if X is survived by his children .X1 and X2? . How shall the estate be distributed? The children of X, X1 and X2, shall be entitled to X's legitime by right of representation while X's share in the free portion shall accrue to Y and Z by right of accretion. X1 and X2 shall divide the legitime of X eqt1.ally. Y and Z shall divide X's in proportion to their share in the institution which in this case will be 1:2. The distribution will be as follows: y
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164. D, a wealthy b·u sinessman, during is lifetime dona ted the following amounts to the following people: 1) A car worth P1M to his Son, A after the latter passed the medical board exam; 2) A house & Lot worth P1.5M as a wedding gift to his daughter Band her husband; and 3) A Rolex watch worth 250,000 to his best friend F on F's 50th birthday. D's health subsequently deteriorated due stress and fatigue. 0 succumbed to his illness leaving a net estate of P6M. How should the estate be distributed if in his will, D instituted as his sole heirs S (D's spouse), A, and B and gave a legacy of P250,000 to his best friend F. First, the value of the properties :subject to collation must be added to "the net estate in the following manner: ' ·. ' NET ESTATE 6,000,000 Car to A 1,000,000 H&L to B (half, Art. 1066) 750,000 250,000 · Rolex Watch to F TOT AL 8,000,000
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,,
... . The legitime of A and B will be half of P8M dividep equally among them and S, the surviving spouse will get an amount equivalent to the share of one child which is P2M. The value of the properties they received as donation that is subject to collation shall be subtracted to their respective legitimes in the following manner: 2,000,000 Legitime of A (1,000,000) (Value of Car) 1,000,000 Total Legitime of B (Half the value of the H&L)
2,000,000 (750.000)
1,250,000 Legitime of S (equal to legitime of 1 child)
2,000,000
To A, Son
To B, Daughter
To F, Best Friend
Note: M, the 2nd wife, can still be disinherited but it must be done expressly by H in a will under the ground of giving cause for legal separation (Art 916, Art. 921 pai".5}.
Legends: LCD = Legitimate Children and Descendants ICD = Illegitimate Children and Descendants SS = Surviving Spouse LPA =Legitimate Parents or Ascendants IP = Illegitimate Parents AC ·= Adopted Child
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Art.
1/2; 1/4 (CIVIL CODE, 892, par. 1).
Art.
a.Divide by the # of LCD, whether they survive alone or with concurring CH. b. The remaining 1/2 shall be at the free disposal of the testator. a. The legitime of the SS shall be taken only from the free portion (CIVIL CODE, Art. 892). b.ln case of legal separation, the surviving spouse may inherit if it was the dece~sed who had given cause for-the sam~ (CIVIL CODE, Art. 892). .
1/2; 2 or LCD; SS
more Same as that of each LCD (CIVIL CODE, Art. 892, par. 2).
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ICD
1/4 (CIVIL 893).
CODE,
Art.
1/2; 1/8; 1/4 (CIVIL 899).
CODE,
Art.
1/2 (CIVIL CODE, Art. 901/.
a. The legitime of the SS shall be taken from the free portion. b. The remaining 1/4 shall be at the free disposal of the testato.r . a. The legitime of the SS and ICD shall be taken from the free portion provided that the total legitime of such ICD shall not exceed the free portion, and that the legitime of the SS must · first be fully satisfied (CIVIL CODE, Art. 895 par. 3). b.The remaining 1/8 may be .freely disposed of by the testatot (CIVIL CODE, Art. 899). a.If there are more than 1 ICD divide equally among them. b.The remaining 1/2 shall be at the free disposal of the testator.
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1/3 (CIVIL 894).
ICD
CODE,
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1/3;
1/2; 1/2
SS
(CIVIL 900).
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Art.
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The remaining 1/3 shall be at the free disposal of the testator (CIVIL CODE, Art. 894). a.One third (1/3) if marriage is in articulo mortis and the testator spouse died within 3 months after the marriage. b.One half (1/2) when they have been living as husband and wife for more than 5 years before marriage in articulo mortis c. If.marriage is not in articulo mortis, SS shall inherit 1/2 of the . estate d.The remaining one half 1/2 in (b) and (c) herein shall be at the free disposal of the testator
1/2 IP
(CIVIL 903).
CODE,
IP;
SS LPA/IP of the adopted; Adopters to the same AC; LCD
Entire estate; Excluded
1/2; 1/2 2 or more LCD;
'Arcenas v. Cinco, G.R. No. L-29288, November 29, 1976 Corisider SS as 1 LCD, and then divide estate by total number.
SS LPA;
SS LPA; ICD ICD;
SS LPA;
SS; ICD
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1/2; 1/2 1/2; 1/2 1/2; 1/2 1/2; 1/4; 1/4
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I IP; SS
-
1/2; 1/2 (The law is silent. Aoolv concurrence theory)
SS; BS/NN 1 LCD; SS; ICD 2 or more LCD;
SS; ICD SS; BS/NN
1/2; 1/2 First, satisfy the legitime. If estate would be insufficient , reduction must be made according to the rules on legitime. The legitime of LCD and SS shall always be first satisfied in preference to that of the ICD. First, satisfy the legitime . In case of exces.s in the estate, distribute such excess in the proportion 2:2: 1, in accordance with the concurrence theory.
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1/2; 1/2 Right of Representation applies.
1/2
LPAand IC BS/NN
LCD; ICD; SS LPA/IP; Ado ter
SS; · Ado ters ICD; Ado ters ICD; SS; · Ado ters · Ado ters alone Collateral alone
Entire Ordinary rules of intestate succession.
(FAMILY CODE, Art. 190)
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-· LAND TITLES ANO DEEDS -
Citizenship Requirement 166. Can a foreign· national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respond(3nts were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a privci.te land, they could apply for registration' in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to _prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved. (Republic vs. CA and Lapifia, GR. No. 108998, August 24, 1994)
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falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Elvira are likewise void. While it is true that a forged deed · can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes, the rule does not apply in the case of purchasers in bad faith . The circumstances surrounding this case point to the absolute lack of good . faith on the part of the Burgos siblings. The evidence shows that the Rufloes caused a notice of adverse claim to be annotated on the title of Elvira even before the subject property was sold to the Burgos siblings. Thus, the action for cancellation of title will prosper as the latter did not acquire own~rship over the subject property (Rufloe vs. Burgos, G.R. No. 143573, January 30, 2009).
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171. Mario Ebio is the lawful owner of a parcel of land consisting of 406 square meters covered by ta:x declarations in his name. Said parcel of land was an accretion of Cut-Cut Creek. Subsequently, the City Government of Paraiiaque planned to build an access road along Cut-Cut Creek which would traverse Mario's land. May the City Government of Parai'iaque order Mario to vacate the property? No. The City Government of Paraiiaque has. no right over the alluvial prope-rty .as the same does not. form part of the public domain . Alluvial deposits .along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property m1:1st register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons (Office of the City Mayor of Paraflaque vs. Ebio, G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010). · ·
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172. Josephine Wee·filed an applicatiori for original registration of a parcel of land which she was allegedly sold to her by Felicidad Gonzales. Felicidad opposed the registration on the ground that Josephine's deed of sale was forged. During the pendency of Josephine's application, a certificate of title was issued in the name of Felicidad over the subject property. The application of Josephine was subsequently denieQ. Josephine appealed the decision, arguing that Fellcidad's title was null and void for being procured through fraud. Will the appeal prosper? No. It a well-known doctrine that the issue as ·to whether title was procured by falsification or fraud as advanced by petitioner can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a cpllateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged , or diminished in a collateral proceedin.g. An application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. The title may be challenged only in a proceeding for that purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already registered in the name of another person. After one year from its registration, the title is incontrovertible and is no longer open to review. The remedy of the petitioner is toifile a separate proceeding such as an actio~ for specific performance or for recon~eyaf\~e (~ee vs. Mardo, G.R. No. 202414, ·June 4, 2014) .
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173. Federico Q(OS e is the reJistered of a •of and. to exercise. attributes of()¥111lshlp over the §tftHt. lf'll\Na~f]tel! from doing so b l ·t!)°(t tenants of the subject land. ~( fpderico filed an~lo11 tdr'fkbveif6~2~ssession ~~crinst the tenants. The taii@ !h'ro!!9~~~Janef'thu's-V0id._The trial court tenants assaile~~ric~@ oltiJ.nS ruled in favor o~
q titl e~oL~ b~~hr~~e~~\ · r
Samb~an
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acfi~0itectiy
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174. Spouses o" t!c of a daughter of the spouses, was found e for iJ ·(ti ·g ture«" o e pare s .-..a. Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor covering th: .e1;:t ,. eqt{eofly · taln certificate of title In her favor. eAt.1bJect lbhll fi1d her? A., May her siblings reco~ Yes. In order that° the ho e , ,a~ertifi~ Rit..;value · ed~r . ~i e..qf the regi stration of a voluntary instrument may be conside · 1191 r in g&dl ait nd f r. . a _ he"instrument registered should not be forged. Indubitably, there or.e.,; t tioned '_sale did not convey any title. to Myrna. Consequently, she cannot tak ·re.fug~tf.ttie prQt!l<;ti~Jl)I;! · by the Torrens system on· titled lands . (Sps. Bemales vs. Heirs of Samba~R:--G~o~~ . ry 15, 2010). .
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175. Juan Tabayag is the registered land. After his death, his daughter, Nancy, forged a Deed of Sale in her favor to make It appear that her father sold the subject property to her before his death. Pursuant to this forged Deed of Sale, Nancy was granted a Free Patent over the land. Nancy's brother, Juan, file~ a complaint for annulment of document and reconveyance against Nancy. Will the action prosper? · · Yes. A title emanating from a free patent which was secured through fraud does not become indefeasible, precisely because the patent from whence the title sprung is itself void and of no effect whatsoever. lndefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation . . Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring ownership (Lorzano vs. Tabayag, G. R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012). .
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·116. Mari~ filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of agricultural land situated in Cavite. Said land was acquired by him and his predecessors-in-interest pos~essing the same in more than 30 years. According to him, it would not matter whether the. land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private property through prescription. Is his contention correct? ' Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does· not require that the lands should have been alienable and disppsable during the eritire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmati9n of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act (Heirs of Malaban
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179. A and B acquired housing units in a subdivision. After 2 years, cracks ·s tarted to appear on the ·floor and walls of their houses. A and B requested the developer to take remedial action. Despite the construction of a retaining wall, the condition of their .housing ·units worsened. They asked the developer to shoulder the repairs but it denied, explaining that the structural defects could have been caused by the earthquake and the improvements introduced to the units that overloaded the foundation of the original structures. May the developer be held liable for the damage sustained by the structures?
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Yes. Considering the nature of the damage sus \ained by the structures, the developer is still liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under the said doctrine, expert testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an allegation , of negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in chargG; and c) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. There being no contributory fault on the part of A and B, there can be no other conclusion except that it was the fault of the developer for not properly compacting the soil, which used to be an old creek. The developer's argument that the damage could have been sustained because of the 1990 earthquake wau not substantiated. Records show that the petitioners had raised their concerns as early as 1988 - before the earthquake occurred in 1990 (Geromo vs La Paz Housing And Development Corporation, G.R. No. 211175, January 18, 2017). ·
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180. While crossing the railroad track, a PNR train suddenly turned up and rammed the jeepney driven by X, resulting to his death. At the time of the accident, there was .no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing. The "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop" signage was already faded while the "Listen" signa~e was partly blocked by another signboard. PNR argued that the driver start€~P> owing hl s Hern to 'rn.JQotorists of the approaching train 'tfow~~~r.1 a.l ~O m4lters away, X suddenly crossed when it w~ 400 meters away frCit)Jtlfl'.i.e the tracks.'\tt.{i ~river immef!Jatet~ sf~pe&en:'lfha..J.ium,esib avoi(f hitting ¥he jee ney but it did not instant~.Qoie to a comptet stop. z: a. Is PNR Co]l?or:1ion liable? A 1\.1 A . ~ b. May the dontn..nr.ff last clear C\l'ana'bl''!J?f>tilcrir1'ftli5':ase? · c. May contribtJ!.o/)f;negl(~ , C$~Lnf!:~ ~thfilpf'mb:JclYV'V
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a. Yes, PNR is the exi:ieoted o it, the nature of its business,\O_t & Jstall €{ny unto~ard incideht PNR failed to lt)stall(sa~t-y,railroad bars to prevent motorists from ci"oss~g th~ tra~s· iO...qrder tp give way to an lapP.rcrachi~g train. Aside from the absence of a crossln9J ba thj\ "StoP,~ook .and Listen'' signage i~sta'iled in the area was poorly maintained, hence.,.. lriac!equ~tet~9 aleh t~~ publip Of_the tmp~ndh1.g dcrn§~~ reliable signaling device in good conditiorr··nptivst a ailapidM.::d""'StoR, 11.:.ooK~ne !tj_sten"' sig~ge-~ needed to give notice to the public. It is th~resP,onsi~ility of ~he railrofi(;j. company fo use re~~able care to keep the signal devices in worklrig ot ddr. Fa 11.JrE? to do so w~"lsi.fuwm..JOdjcagbn o!'.Qegl~ence (Philippine National
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b. No, the doctrine al ap · le o chance provides that ~g{IQ c n is ap1 ~~y later in point of time than where both parties\ir,e.H'"~ligen~ that of the other, ot\v~ere'it is i~o IE e.'.i ollete · se f~ ~::-'}egligence brought about the occurrence of the inclt'le, l\he one Wfrl;, ~dthettast clear op h tty'lo avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, ~ ~d?~ble Wit~tl)e :co sequen~ds ari ~ · Effefrom. The proximate cause of the collision was PNR!~e92j@~ce in ;}isulin th.~motori t~n ~estrians alike may safely crpss . the railroad track. The---a'i-ls iting ar1vel'.:ana· pas;;e ~~ of-"l:he jeepney did not have any t ~unfortunate inciCl ~ befell them. Likewise, they did not participation in the occu~ exhibit any overt act manifest~dt ~ard for their, o~a e .. :fhus, absent preceding negligence on the. part of the respondents, the'ii06fffne/bf).fa t-ct~arGb~nce cannot be applied (Philippine National Railways _Corporation vs. Vizcara, Gt:}fo0.190022.~ruary 15, 2012.) .
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c. There was no contributory negligence on the part of the jeepney driver. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection . The driver, relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, had no reason to anticipate the impending danger. He proceeded to cross the track and , all of a sudden; his jeepney was rammed by ·the train being operated by the petitioners. Even then, the circumstances before the collision negate the Imputation of contributory negligence on the part of the respondents. What clearly appears is that ~he accident would not have happened had the petitioners installed reliable and adequate safety devices 'along the crossing to ensure the safety of all those who may utilize the same (Philippine National Railways Corporation vs. Vizcara, G.R. No. 190022, February 15, 2012.)
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181. DPWH awarded a contract-for the improvement of a road in favor of G Company. G subcontracted T for the supply of the· materials and labor. In furtherance of their agreement G executed a deed of assignment assigning to T 10% as retention fee taken from the fee collected from DPWH. During the processing of the retention fee, T learned that D unilaterally rescinded the contract. The court upheld the finding that the parties are in pari delicto because the arrangement was illegal. May T claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses despite knowingly entering an illegal contract? According to Article 14 12 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to an illegal contract cannot recover from one another and are not entitled to an affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The doctrine of in pari delicto is a universal doctrine that holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid; or damages for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the otherlll (Gonzalo v. Tamate, Jr., G.R. No. 160600, [Januar}t 15, 2014], 724 PHIL 198-209)
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185. May an employee; who was tenninated upon a valid cause but without due process, recover nominal damages? Yes. The law and jurisprudence allow the award of nominal damages in favor of an empl.oyee in a case where a valid cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails to observe due process in dlsmissing the employee. Financial assistance is granted as a measure of equity or social justice, and is in the nature or takes the place of severance compensation. Nominal damages "may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recog nizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right." The amount of nominal damages to be awarded the employee is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
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CENTRALIZED B AR OPERATIONS
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.into consideration the relevant circumstances (LIBCAP MARKETING CORP. v. BAQUIAL G.R. No. 192011; June 30, 2014). 186. Must a causal conn.e ction exist between ·the injury received and the violation of the traffic . regulation for the legal presumption of negligence to arise? Yes. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, a causal connection must exist between the Injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that thei violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the Injury or that it substantially contributed theri;ito. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without l~gal consequence unless it is a contributing _ ,.cause of the injury. Negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a ~raffle statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief whe~ in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intra9table so as i 1,.1ttal rooted in fact (Tison vs Sps. Pomasin, G.R. No. 173180, August 24, 2011).....i~mil~
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She executed a will In administratrix -of her entire nu111nr1.t.111elr, which Is recognized )GJ8rily living with her father. p{alsory_helr under Philippine
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s of the will, as proyided for by must apply. A was, at the time .............,.....,, nsylvania, USA Therefore, under ~~~~MliiQ~f!~~~.r will, is the law of Pennsylvania, USA 'e ide for legitimes and that the entire estate 10
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189. A, an American citizen, married B, a Filiplna. During their marriage, B acquired a parcel of land with the Deed of Sale stating that the property Is conveyed. in favor of "B married to A". Subsequently, they separated and I;' sold the property to C without the knowledge of A. A then prayed for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. B contends that being an American, A was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership In the land. · · Can A have a right of ownership in the land? No. A cannot have a right of ownership in the land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain: Aliens are prohibited from acquiring private lands in the Philippines. Hence, A, who is an alien,
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cannot hold the lot so acquired, in view of the prohibition in the Constitution as to the sale to aliens of residential lands. He acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of the purchase (Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 93, G.R. NQ. 74833 January 21, 1991). Is A's consent necessary for the disposition of the land? No. When an alien husband and a Filipino wife buys a land in the latter's name, the land does not become conjugal property and the sale or disposition of such land does not need the consent of the alien husband. A has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohipition (Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 93, G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991). .. .•
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Even assuming arguendo that the English law was properly pleaded and proved, the foreign law would still find no applicability. When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle embedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action (Bank of America, NT & SA vs. American Realty · Corporation, 321 SCRA 659, G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999).
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