Going Beyond otivati oti vation on to
The Powe Po we of V ti he most powerful force of human behavior is willpower. When managers learn to activate willpower, or volition, in themselves and others, companies reap the benefits of purposeful action taking and sec more projects completed. But engaging volition isn't easy. It's a higher attainment than mere motivation. Motivation is the desire to do .something; volition is the absolute com mitm ent to achieving achieving som ething. To To activate activate their willpower, willpower, individuals must pass a mental barrier, a personal Rubicon.' Our research reveals how successful leaders do that and how they use five simple strategies to help lower-level managers accomplish the same. Recently, as researchers have begun to investigate what it takes for managers to follow through on ambitious goals, the study of willpower has reemerged from the disfavor into which it fell after World War 11.^ The reason for management researchers' interest is clear: Motivating managers with carrot and stick is overly simplistic. People commit to action for more sub-
Why do motivated managers
tle reasons.
often fail to follow through?
New research into managerial action taking supports the distinction between motivation and volition. (See "About the Research.") Project managers in the companies studied some large, such as ConocoPhillips and
Because taking sustained action in the workplace requires more
Lufthansa, and others small, such as Micro Mobility Systems rarely fol-
than motivation. It requires the
lowed lowed through when the going got rough. Only 0% took purposeful action
deepp com mitm ent that comes dee comes
to implement goals.^ The rest, despite knowing what they needed to do, simply did not do it.''
from activating willpower.
The reason lies in the difference between motivation and volition. Most managers were motivated. But 10% overcame personal barriers to commitment. There is no set way of doing that. Such managers have in common the intensive inner struggle for certainty in both head and heart regarding what S u m a n t r a G h o s h a l is
professor of strategic leadership at London Business School,
Sumantra C hoshal and Heike Bruc
they really want. Having engaged their will, these managers had
Willpower lets managers execute disciplined action even when
the power to deal with setbacks and persevere through the long,
they lack desire, expect not to enjoy the work, or feel tempted
energy-intensive journey from a vision to its realization.
by alternative opportunities. Consider Dan Andersson, who
Many managers have never experienced volitional action in the workplace. Others who have stumbled into situations that
led Conoco's entry into the gas-station business in a small European country.
freed their willpower wouldn't know how to activate it deliber-
Andersson's task was to build Conoco's retail network and a
ately. But executives can learn how volitional-action processes
supporting organization. The market had been deregulated, but
work, how to marshal their own willpower and how to facilitate
the powerful, state-owned monopoly, witb government officials'
purposeful action taking in lower-level managers.
collusion, had numerous tricks for retaining market share. "Setting up the first station was a pure fight," Andersson
Motivation
Volition
recalls. "A first I was really down
felt bad,
was angry and I was
Motivation often is triggered by external stimuli or expectation of
worried. But then I got going. There is this movie that I used as
reward, but such motivation is susceptible to change.^ More-
picture in my mind. ... It has to do with busting Al Capone in
attractive opportunities may emerge or obstacles may appear
Chicago in 1927 or 1929, and 1 felt we were doing exactly the
that make the reward seem too small. Intrinsic motivation (a
same thing. ... We were getting those unscrupulous competitors
desire driven by an internal need) offers interest and enjoyment,
and con niving politicians and bureaucrats w ho were trying to use
but even those can change.
their dirty tricks on us. Actually,
Volition, however, implies deep personal attachment to an intention. Volitional managers have a powerful need to produce results and aren't driven by rewards or even enjoyment.^
ended up deriving huge energy
from that unfairness." Andersson found a way to cross over to determination, and Conoco prevailed. The ways that the motivation-volition distinction manifests itself vary.'' Volitional manage rs don't wait for further informa
About the Research The study's conclusions are derived from two interrelated research streams. First, we conducted a multiyear qualitative and quantitative study to map purposeful managerial action and its drivers at Lufthansa in Europe and Conoco in the United States. At Lufthansa, we studied a ction taking by 130 midlevel managers who had taken on special change-related projects as part of a corporate initiative. Most were interviewed several times over two-year period to review progress on im plem entation . At Conoco, we condu cted a similar study of a ction tai
tion or external stimuli to get started, having overcome doubts their own way. Their perception is biased; they focus attention and energy on information supporting iheir goals and block out contradictory information. They aren't tempted by other opportunities or distracted by disruptions. Motivation often crumbles at negative feedback, colleagues' resistance or lack of executive interest. Volition, however, is inspired by obstacles. Abandoning the task is not an option.
T h e J o u r n e y A c r os s Tbe landscape approaching the Rubicon the personal point of no return differs from the landscape beyond.^ On the near side lies motivation, the state of wishing, choosing, considering, weighing op tions. There's always a way back. On the o ther side, intellect and emotion merge to create commitment. Bridges are burne d; action is relentless. Three phases define the process of creating and leveraging volition: intention formation, the resolution to cross over to willpower, and intention protection. Intention Formation
The perception of an exciting opportunity (something that will make a difference, nothing routine) triggers the first phase. An emotional dimension gives the intention meaning; a purely rational calculation of cost and benefits of purs uing a goal neve
walk w hat Oub oter came to call a m icrodistance. He sensed an
Tbom as Hill was a midlevel manager in a U.S.-based pharm a-
opportunity to develop a small scooter. He had always liked
ceuticals company. Comfortable in his job as head of Central
scooters.
European sales. Hill suddenly faced the possibility of becoming
favorite sister had u sed o ne routinely because of dis-
ability, and the entire fiimily used to join her. So there was an
the Indian subsidiary's general manager. After days of internal battles, Hill asked two colleagues to
emotional link. Ouboter envisioned a lightweight, distinctive-looking microscooter. He built a prototype, intending to start a business. But
debate the pros and cons in his presence. " 1
was
distanced because
tho struggle took place outside of m e , " he recalls. "And yet it m ade
F e w m a n a g e s c o n r o n t c o n c t e d f e e l n g s a b o u t w o r k , a c o s t ly m s t a k e t h a t b lo c k s r e a l commitment. By facing their concerns, volitional managers avoid later hesitations. discouraged by others' dismissive reactions, he ended up putting
the facts and my inner situation crystal clear." The colleagues
the prototype in his garage and forgetting about it. Motivation
continued the discussion until Hill was sure what he wanted.
had not yet become volition.
Impressed, he now uses the process regularly for tough decisions.
Crossing the Rubicon
intention Protection
During the first stage, attention is unfocused, perceptions undirected and judgments unbiased. Gradiuilly, managers acquire the focus that precedes the leap to commitment.
Company distractions can take attention away from purposive action, so volitional managers consciously protect their intentions." Homer recounts Odysseus' escape from sea nymphs whose singing made sailors leap overboard an d d rown . Odysseus wanted io hear the music without dying. He asked his men to bind him to the mast, forbidding them to release him before they had passed the sirens' island. Then he ordered the men to plug their ears with wax. As the singing began, he struggled to release himself, begging to be un tied. But deaf to his entreaties, his men stayed the course, saving themselves, Odysseus and the ship.
Often there's a catalyst. When Ouhoter saw neighborhood children delighting in his long-abandoned scooter, his enthusiasm for a new company rekindled. His wife urged him lo comm it to the venture if had faith in it^or keep quiet and face potential regrets. That conversation was the catalyst. He and d etermined to do whatever it took to cess. Four years later, he was shipping against an original total demand estimate
gave up everything els make his scooter a suc80,000 scooters daily, of 40,000.
Oub oter's experience illustrates one essential requirement fo crossing over choice. When there's no choice in reality or in perception there can be no free will, no volition.^ Also essential s acceptance of personal responsibility. The decision to commit comes with the resolve to bear full responsibility. Volitional managers go tbrough inner consensus building to resolve anxiety, conflicted feelings and doubts."* After an idea takes hold, the next step is recognizing and confronting those reservations. Few managers confront conflicted feelings about work, a costly mistake that blocks real commitment. By facing their concerns, volitional managers avoid later hesitations. Willpower's hallmarks are unequivocal determination and the apparently unreasonable belief in success, which help people accomplish feats that others would fmd impossible. But deep commitments cannot be made hastily. Some managers first absent tbemselves from the bustle of day-to-day work
Com panies are full of sirens distractions that take attention and energy away from purposive action. Willful managers modify their environment so as to be impervious to corporate sirens. For example, deliberately creating social pressures (public commitments, challenging deadlines or having relevant stakeholders monitor a manager's activities) can increase the cost of abandoning the goal. Volitional managers also discipline their thought processes. Whenever doubts surface, they refocus. Some do so by asking themselves, "What would happen if I disengaged?" Others take time off to pon der their original purpo se and reaffirm its value. Some recall the promise they made to themselves when they committed. In addition to self-discipline, volitional managers display positive energy. They maintain excitement about the work by deliberately defending themselves against negative emotions, converting adversities into inspiration.'Ouboter experienced adversity. He approached the Smart car-
cars, Ouboter sought out a reliable producer. Unfortunately,
Smart reneged, sending tbis terse rejection: "Thanks for your offer. We wish you tbe best of luck with your scooter." It felt like a punch in the stomach. "That's when I said I'll do it anyway," Ouboter recalls. Having already secured a manufacturer, Ouboter focused on new distribution channels, marketing programs and entry strate-
instincts and needs.''' He believes leaders unwisely focus on strategies to align employees' basic needs say, for money with company goals. When goals are simple, the necessary actions relatively ro utine and unexpected difficulties rare, motivation can lead to action.'^ Managerial jobs, however, are rarely rou tine. Managers have multiple and often conflicting goals, many of which require persist-
h e n e n s t n g p e o p l e f o r a s s i g n e n t s , o s t e x e c u t iv e s p a i n t ro s y p i c t u r e s , d o w n p la y o b s t a c l e s a n d h ig h l g h t b e n e f i s . T h o s e w h o f o s e r d e e p c o m ent o en do he op po si e. gies. The scooter caught on in Japan, tben Europe, then around
ent, long-term action. Their work context is fragmented, with
the world. By December 2000, Oubo ter was selling 80,000 scoot-
high levels of uncertainty and opposition.'*
ers daily, with revenues increasing 1,400% per year. "The Smart
Engaging willpower is a personal, almost intimate, process
cancellation was the best thing that happened," says Ouboter.
that cannot be triggered merely through rewards. Our research
"Tbe pain it caused gave me the unexplainable conviction that
highlights five strategies executives use to help lower-level man-
the scooter will sell, and that's where I got my energy."
agers overcome personal barriers to purposeful action.
So another way volitional managers shield intentions is by protecting their self-confidence.'-' Self-confidence allows man-
Help People Visualize Their Intention
agers to overcome negative feedback and obstacles. An effective
Managers often have problems committing because the goal is vague. Executives can belp by stimulating people to transform their ideas into concrete intentions. Michael Hilti, CEO of Liechtenstein-based construction-equipment maker Hilti until 1994 and since then chairman of its supervisory board, says, "One of my guiding principles for leading people stems firomthe psychoanalyst Erich Fromm: 'If life does not offer a clear vision that one wants to realize, it also does not offer a motive to make an effort.'"
way that managers maintain courage is by recalling earlier experiences problems overcome, successes achieved. Jim Taylor of Conoco did just that. Top management considered Conoco's new carbon-fibers technology pivotal to grow th, and Taylor was designated to build the business. "You have to believe in yourself. Whenever I am in serious doubt and I know that
may lose courage, I activate a
particular memory in my head [when] we went through an extremely bard time and kind of made the impossible happen." 'fhe memory renews his self-confidence. Volitional managers actively generate positive emotions. Initially exciting projects can become boring or difficult, so managers plan events to reenergize themselves. Some reward tbemselves for passing certain mileposts. Others find that, in advanced phases of projects, increasing interactions such as review meetings can keep energy flowin g and shield intentio ns.
S p r e a d i n g V o l it io n a l A c t io n Can volition be triggered or must it be an individual's choice? How can leaders stimulate committed action taking in their organizations? Most executives recognize that employees drive organ izational
People need a vivid picture of the goal in order to activate their emotions and protect tbeir intention through the actiontaking phase .'^ Vivid pictures help simplify long-term goals and make them tangible. Later, if doubts arise, the pictures stimulate perseverance. Senior executives can help managers create such pictures. Conoco's Taylor, for ex ample, needed help deciding w hich of many potential carbon-fiber products to focus on. The material was full of possibility hard as steel, light as plastic, unbreakable, noncorrosive. Taylor was sure his division could produce large quantities at a lower cost than comp etitors ctjuld (thanks to new production technology developed with DuPont}. But where to begin? The turning point came in a strategic business review with
"Slowly I realized I wanted a bridge," says liiylor. "! wanted a
Molleney consulted S chumacher, his former mentor. "I hear what
bridge to be made out of carbon fibers light as plastic, hard as steel, a bridge that would neither break no r rust. That becam e my
you say," Schumacher observed, "but I also hear what your gut says. Listen to it before you decide; otherwise you'll be uncom-
personal hook."
fortable and won't be able to fully stand behind your decision." Molieney stayed at
The insighl was liberating. By mid-2002, Taylor had a facility,
SAir.
"After deciding to stay and do the liq-
a process protected by 38 patents and a team of 200. Although
uidation, I wanted to make it the best it could be for the peo-
after the Phillips merger, management shut the division because
ple."
He put all his creativity, effort and energy info it, making
o p p i n g r u le s c a n c o u n t e r a c t t h e p a t h o o g e s o f w i l p o e r t h a t a r s e f r o m t h e v e r y s t r e n g of com e n t . S o m e to p a n a g e r s c r e a te m o r e e x i b l e , s o c i a l s t o p p i n g e c h a n i s m s . of market un certainties, the company co iilinues to be recognized
sure employees found alternative employment and the ones who
as world leader in certain carbon technologies.
stayed remained motivated. "The process pushed me to my per-
Leaders should help managers create concrete mental models
sonal limits," Molleney concedes, "but I never regretted that I had
of ways to pursue vivid pictures. Mental models keep managers
agreed to take on the task. It was worth doing although the
alert so they notice even small things that might help them move
only reward was the feeling that it was the right thing."
quickly toward tbe goal. Ou boter found the picture he needed in
Schumacher helped Molleney face his ambivalence about
Smart-car slogans: "Reduced to the Maximum," "The Future of
leaving his colleagues and recognize be was leaning toward the
Mobility."
choice that conflicted with his feelings. Helping managers con-
recalls,
saw the whole world with this special lens.
... I noticed even the smallest things that helped me implement
front amhivalence doesn't mean helping them sacrifice them-
my dream."
selves to others, but encou raging them to consider their emo tions so they can stand behind their decisions. If Molleney had been a
Encourage People To Confront Their Ambivolence
different man, the introspection could have generated a different
Engagement of willpower involves the intellectual dimension coming together with the emotional one to create an intention richer than a purely rational goal. That doesn't imply irrationality. The difference lies in what leaders get managers to ask themselves. Instead of e ncouraging questions like "What's in it for me? Is it reasonable?" executives seeking true com mitm ent push p eople to ask, "What's the downside? Does it feel right? Do really want it?" That way, managers engage their emotions, and emotions lead to deeper comm itment.
commitment.
Forcing people to confront their ambiva lence is a more diffi cult way of w inning people over than offering rewards and results in fewer projects. But it's ultimately less risky than halfhearted acquiescence. It helps people see whether they really can offer head and heart.
The head of an IBM suhsidiary, whom we'll call Sven Olafson, is such a leader. In the early 199()s, Olafson observed that, of the many projects begun enthusiastically, only about were completed satisfactorily. IBM had a sounding board that prioritized activities, authorized new projects and allocated resources. Olafson noticed that proposals brought to the sounding board were overly optimistic and focused only on business aspects.
Consider how Thomas Schumacher helped Matthias Molleney. Molleney was human resources executive vice president of SAir Group, parent of Swissair. Affer Swissair declared bankruptcy, Molleney got a job offer elsewhere. Then be was asked to handle the SAir liquidation dism issing the employees, negotiating termination pay, fighting a pilol lawsuit and ultimately firing himself.
Prepare People for Obstacles
When enlisting people for assignments, most executives paint rosy pictures, downplaying obstacles and highlighting benefits. Those who foster deep commitment often do fhe opposite. Usually when frontline managers accomplish tasks with disciplined effort, there's a senior leader in the background who has establisbed steps to prevent superficial commitment.
Olafson introduced a new proiect-prioritization process. Proposals bad to include information on husiness gains, business risks, personal advantages and personal disadvantages. Managers presenting project proposals had to answer, "What would it cost me personally to undertake tbis?" "What do I have to stop
Strategies for Volitional Action Managers who successfully move from mere mo tivation to the d edication th at creates purposeful action tak ing go thro ugh three stages: inten tion fo rma tion, crossing the Rubi con (crossing the point of no return) and intention protection.
Intention Formation • Identify opportunities
Crossing the Rubicon Deal with doubts and anxieties
• Create an em otiona l link
• Exercise conscious choice
• Visualize the intentio
• Take personal respon sibility
initiating the project despite the personal costs. After approval, the sounding board's head would ask project backers once more whether they were certain ahout proceeding with a project. Two results: Far fewer projects were started; of projects were successfully completed.
and responsibility. Pius Baschera, Hilti's CEO since 1994, says, "We've found that implementation has improved and that it has a significant statistical relationship with leadership, customer satisfaction and market success
Intention Protection decisive effects on everyday behavior that count. First, we don't • Regulate cog nition backpedal into justifications, blam • Manage emo tions ing or denial. And second, many • Protect self-confidence of our managers try to reach the stars and then accept that you may not get there. Our managers have learned to want a challenge. The stars activate their willpower, while realistic goals would bore and even demotivate them. It's not always easy ... but I'd rather lead a company w here I have to restrain p eople than one where have to 'help' continuously with a whip." • Control the context
Help People To See and Exploit Choices
Build In Stopping Rules
The raw malerials for intention formation are attractive opportunities. But many managers are prisoners of routine.'^ They react to demands instead of weighing what they should be doing or want
The problem with willpower is that it blinds people and ham pers disengagement. Hence, many volitional managers persist in action taking even when the undesirability of a project becomes manifest. Others fall so much in love with projects that they cannot disengage after success. Stopping rules can counteract the pathologies of willpower tliat arise from the very strength of personal comm itmen t. Such rules must give sufficient rope to ma nagers, yet not so much that they can hang themselves.
nities. They feel squeezed in n arrow corsets of expectations. Othe rs perceive opportunities hut exclude them because they cannot imagine shaking habits. Senior leaders, in systematizing work, often reinforce habituated activity and prevent people from taking the first step toward comm itment: perceiving opportunities. Giving people freedom to choose is critical. Executives also must help managers develop the confidence necessary for experimenting with ideas. In 1984, Michael Hilti launched an initiative to enhance his manag ers' ability to commit deeply to projects. "I want our ma nagers to take responsibility for what they do," he explains. "One of the central co nditions for this is that they love what they do. he second is that they arc aware they have choices. The ihird is that they commit without reservations." Managers go through a three day training on five aspects of Hilti philosophy: significance of rules, the break with old ha bits, the freedom to choose (love il, change it or leave it), the swing of life (expect both setbacks and positive experiences) and Cotoyo (commit to yourself). Implemented at a cost of $16 million and used for nearly 20 years, the initiative revolutionized the company's culture and contributed to the burst of new products that
Some executives put the responsibility for deactivation in the hands of the project initiators. The managers themselves define critical events that, sh ould they occur, would trigger initiative termination. But stopping rules must be part of initial commitments and not introduced in medias res. Especially with highly innovative projec ts, it's difficult to define concre te denctivation criteria. To prevent the demoralizing effect of introducing stopping rules after committed action taking has commenced, some top managers create more flexible,social stopping mechanisms. Lars Kolind, CEO of Denmark's Oticon, developed a socially embedded stopping rule that w orks we l in his decentralized and entrepreneurial hearing-aid company. Managed almost exclusively through projects, Oticon allows employees to initiate projects they feel committed to. I'he initiator, however, must persuade the required number of colleagues to join the team voluntarily and must get at least one senior m anager to agree to be a sponsor. The stopping rules kick in if the initiator gives up, if team mem
to turn on a dime are exciting ideas that easily capture corporate leaders' imagination. Occasionally they catapult a company to success, but durable corporate progress is built on disciplined and relentless execution of specific tasks. Unfortunately, persistence is underemphasized in the behaviors and actions of top management. Persistent action taking relies on willpower. It needs deep personal commitment to specific initiatives and managers' energetic efforts to achieve the desired results. Managers have to engage in a way that enables them to achieve their goals against all obstacles. {See "Strategies for Volitional Action.") Our research also raises a broader question. Most executives try to build people's commitment to the overall company, rather than to specific projects." But company loyalty is increasingly difficult to achieve and sustain. Besides, general c om mi tm ent, even if achieved, does not necessarily lead to purposeful action on specific tasks. The best way to build effective organizational commitment is to build it bottom-up, on the foundation of personal ownership of and c omm itment to specific initiatives and goals. In the world of mobile employees, frontline entrepreneurship and constant, unavoidable organizational restructuring, it is that kind of commitment that corporate leaders must develop if they want to build a bias for action in their companies. REFERENCES
Julius Caesar's popularity w as a threat to the R oman S enate, which ordered him to disband his army, then camped north of a small stream called the Rubicon. An ancient law forbade any general from crossing the Rubicon and entering Italy proper with a standing army. Despite knowing it was treason, Caesar deliberately crossed over on Jan. 11 49 B.C. Once he ha d done so, there was no turning back; civil war was inevitable. From that point, Caesar had a single objective: to win the war. 2. Before W orld War II, Germany was the center of academic research on psychology. Freud and Jung had left a legacy of talented psychologists. Narziss Ach was one of the most eminent. His experiments clearly showed the distinction between motivation (the state of desire) and volition (the state in which motivation is converted to unwavering, resolute commitment). Unfortunately, the language of volition and will became a central tenet of Nazi ideology, although the Nazis based their views not on volilion psychology but on philosophy, especially Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. After the war, Ach's ideas on volition were cast aside along with the discredited ideology. However, Ach's concept of will was different from the Nazis'- Unlike Schopenhauer, who saw it as distinct from and superior to reason, Ach viewed the engagement of the human will (volition) as the strongest force of human behavior, a force that existed with and beyond reason and was characterized by commitment beyond m otivation or the m eetin of superficial desires. See N. Ach , "Uber den Willensakt und das Temperament: Eine Experimentelle Untersuchung (On the Act of the Will and Temperament: An Experimental Study)" (Leipzig: Ouelle & Meyer, 1910). H. Heckhausen analyzed the use of the words will and volition in
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J. Kuhl, "Action C ontrol: The Maintenance of Motivational States," in "Motivation, intention and V olition," eds. F Halisch and J . Kuhl (Berlin and Heidelberg; Springer-Verlag, 1987), 279-291. 2. H. Leventhal and K.R. Scherer. "The Relationship of Emotion to Cognition; A Functional Approach to a S emantic C ontroversy," Cog nition and Em otion 1 (March 1987): 3-28: and S.E, Taylor and S.K. Schneider, "Coping and the Simulation of Events," Social Cognition 7 (1989); 174-194.
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5. J. Kuhl, "Volitional Mediators of Cognition Behavior Consistency: Self-Regulatory Processes and Action Versus State Orientation," in "Action Control; From Cognition to Behavior," eds. J. Kuhl and J. Beckmann (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985). 101-128. 6. H. Mintzberg, "The Nature of Managerial Work" (New York: HarperCollins, 1973), 28-35 and 178-179. 7. See P. Senge, "The Fifth Discipline; The Art and Practice of the Learning O rganization" (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 1 990), 14 1-14 5 .
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