BATTLE OF SHAKARGARH (WITH SPEC REF TO C ATTKS BY 19 FF REGT) Intro
1.
Gentleman, since its inception, for the last 60 yrs
Pakistan Army has found itself engaged in wars, battles and skirmishes, to thwart the evil / nefarious designs of its adversaries. On internal front, it has been equally involved to defeat the anti state activities of rebellious elms, and currently it has been in a state of cont confrontation with such groups. Notwithstanding the rel ops during various disasters and mishaps of enormous magnitude, it’s current emp in intricate envmts prevalent in FATA and Balochistan is a clear manifestation of its pledge to protect the motherland from any turmoil. 2.
Whenever any crisis has set in, this nation has always
stood up against all odds and seized the opportunity to preserve its raison d’etat. It is only due to this spirit and character that despite its conflict ridden hist, it has emerged as the only Muslim Nuc State. 3.
Notwithstanding, 1971 war beyond any doubt has been
a great tragedy but there are numerous examples of brilliant tac actions which can be quoted from eastern and western theatre of war. Out of these gallant actions, an act of bravery
and tac acumen was performed by the ldrs and the led of 19 FF in Shakargarh Salient of RCC. 4.
I also feel privileged and honoured to narrate the
events and actions of this op which happened in the area of 8 Inf Div. The div I am presently commanding. This brings me to the aim of this presentation; 5.
Aim To critically analyse Battle of Shakargarh with spec
emphasis on C attks by 19 FF Regt to draw pertinent lessons at bn/coy lvl. Scheme of Presentation 6.
I shall fol the seq as flashed:a.
Part I.
Characteristics of Terrain and Opposing
Forces (1) An Overview, 1971 War (2) Types of Border (3) Description of RCC and Shakargarh Salient (4) Op Perspective of RCC (5) Overview of Opposing Forces & Plans (6) Conduct of Def Battle b.
Part II. Battle of Shakargarh (1) Terrain Highlts (2) Opposing Forces
(3) Conduct c. 7.
Part III. Analysis and Lessons Learnt
I have endeavoured to dev this presentation keeping in
mind the lvl of the audience sitting in front of me.
PART– I AN OVERVIEW, 1971 WAR 8.
Comparison of Forces.
Gentleman, before I go over
to terrain highlights, may I give you a very brief overview of 1971 war so as to estb context of my talk. However, the focus of my talk would remain on the action of 19 FF. So therefore, let us see the co relation of forces first:a.
Eastern Theatre of War. In tangible terms India enjoyed marked superiority of forces in the Eastern Theatre of war. The comparison is as flased:Fmns Corps HQ Inf / Mtn Div’s (w/o Tks)
Pakistan
India
Ratio
1 3
3 8
1:3 1:2.6
Inf Bdes Para Bde Inf Bns Armd Regts Indep Armd Sqns Arty Regts Anti Aircraft Regts Paramil Forces (Bns) Mukti Bahini
b.
9 34 1 1 6 1 13 -
28 1 72 6 3 46 4 32 100,000
1:3 0:1 1:2.1 1:6 1:3 1:8 1:4 1:3 -
Intangibles (1) Eastern theatre of war was far away from Western theatre. (2) East Pakistan was surrounded by India from three sides. (3) Sea Blockade also restd the mov.
c.
Western Theatre of War.
One the Western
Theatre of war, India had marginal superiority:Formations Corps HQ Armoured Divs Inf/Mtn Divs Indep Armd Bdes Indep Inf Bdes
Pakistan 3 2 10 2 1
India
Ratio
3 1 13 4 3
1:1 2:1 1:1.3 1:2 1:3
TERRAIN HIGHLTS AND OPPOSING FORCES Types of Border
9.
Before I give you the details of terrain of Shakargarh
salient, it might of interest to you that I refresh your memories by acquainting you with variety of 3245 kms bdry regions we share with India on our Eastern side. Starting from North, Pakistan has four different kinds of bdrys with India and they are as flashed:a.
Line of Actual Contact.
b.
Line of Control.
c.
Working Bdry.
d.
International border, Now the brief description:-
a.
Line of Actual Contact(LAC). It starts from Indra Coli Pass in the north till NJ-9842 towards south along the Saltoro Mtn Range. The dispute arose due to differing interpretations of a provision of the 1949 ceasefire line and subsequent Simla Agreement of 1972. Indian Forces intruded into the areas of Siachen Glacier in 1984 and occupied an area of 2500 Sq Kms. The length of LAC is 65 kms. It is violable and not recognised by any intl or bilateral agreement.
b.
Line of Control (LOC).
It
is
the
dividing
line
between Nothern areas / Azad Kashmir and IHK. It starts from NJ-9842 and runs up to Thaku Chak a
place near Iftikharabad/Munawar, covering a total length of about 740 KMs. This line is recognised by Simla agreement signed in 1972, prior to Simla agreement it was Cease Fire Line. c.
Working Bdry(WB). The
200
kms
long
bdry
between Pakistan and IHK from Thaku Chak in the north to Abhial Dogran in south is termed as Working Bdry. It is a de-facto border between India and Pakistan till resolution of issue of Jammu and Kashmir. ( India considers this portion beyond LOC to be part of intl border whereas Pakistan subscribes to the segment as the working boundary (WB) between Pakistani Punjab and Indian Kashmir. The implications of Working bdry are:(1)
No concrete Pillars are instl however it is marked by placing drums/ temp katcha pillars. (According to Border Gr Rules of 1960/1961 Concrete Pillars can only be instl on Intl border)
(2) No side can carry out fencing along the border as allowed in case of intl border. (However, the Indians have done it in violation to this rule). (3) Def const within 150 ms of the bdry cannot be carried out by any side (However, India and
Pakistan both have done it in violation to this rule). (4) No recce/ log sp ac can fly within 1000 m of WB and no cbt ac can fly within 10 kms. e.
Intl Border. The International Border starts from Abial Dogran and runs south till Arabian Sea, having a total length of 2,240 KMs. It is undisputed internationally recognised except the Sir Creek demarcation which is 100 km long estuary in saline water lands of the Run of Kutch between the states of the Gujarat in India and Sindh in Pakistan.
13. Description
of
RCC
and
Shakargarh
Salient.
Gentlemen now I shall briefly orientate you with the Ravi Chenab Corridor (RCC) in gen and Shakargarh salient in particular:a.
Ravi Chenab Corridor (RCC) is an area between the two famous rivers flowing through Punjab i,e Chenab in the NW and Ravi in the SE. Parmandal
range
across WB lie to its NE and GT rd to its west, with a total frontage of 371 Km. b.
Shakargarh Salient extends from east of Degh Nadi to incl MRL – BRBL
sub link Junc in the west.
Parmandal range to its NE and River Ravi in SE.
Total frontage of Shakargarh Salient is 202 Kms, out of which 58 Kms is WB and remaining 144 Kms is IB. c.
The significant water channels in the area are, Degh Nadi, few nullahs, Bein (which figures out in conduct) and River Ravi.
d.
In Cis-frontier imp comm centres are as flashed, Zafarwal, Darman, Chak Amru, Kot Naina, Dhamtal, Shakargarh, Nurkot, Ikhlaspur, Narowal, Baddomalhi, QSS (Ahmedabad), and Pasrur.
e.
A reasonably well dev comm infrastructure of both rail and rd linked different towns and vills
f.
On transfrontier, area is well populated with large, medium and small size towns like Jammu, Samba, Kuta,
Kathua,
Madhopur,
Mamun,
Pathankot,
Gurdaspur, Batala and Amritsar. e.
Main communication arteries of rd/rail, linking IHK with mainland India passes perilously close to WB through this narrow strip.
Op Perspective Of RCC 14. Gentlemen, RCC and Shakargarh salient stand out as one of the most strategically vital pieces of gr for def of motherland. Any Pakistani thrust launched from the Salient into Kashmir at any pt along the entire 54 miles stretch from
Kathua to Jammu could enable the Pakistan Army to sever the road link between India and Kashmir by advancing just five to fifteen miles inside Indian Territory. On Indian side capture of Shakargarh Salient was imperative to guard her vuln rd link between India and Kashmir by launching a protective mnvr. Overview of Opposing Forces/ Plan 15. Gentlemen, now let us see how both sides planned in RCC. 16. Indian Offn Plan.In 1971 war, Indian 1 corps had the dual task, not only to def the AOR opposite RCC but was also tasked to add depth to her vuln line of comm by launching a protective mnvr in Shakargarh Salient. The resources at the disposal of 1 Corps are as flashed:a.
Indian Army (1 Corps) - Forces (1) 36 Inf Div Comd by Maj Gen Ahluwalia. (2) 39 Inf Div Comd by Maj Gen Prabhu. (3) 54 Inf Div Comd by Maj Gen Pinto. (4) 16 Indep Armd Bde. (5) 2 Indep Armd Bde. (6) 16 Cav ex 14 Armd Bde. (7) 2 Indep Arty Bde. (8) 41 Indep Arty Bde.
17. Indian Army (1 Corps Offn Plan). Offn plan of the en is as flashed:a.
Main Effort. Emp 54 Div (UC Maj Gen Pinto) alongwith 16 IABG less a regt to launch offn b/w Degh and Karir Nadi on axis Mawa – Darman – Zafarwal commencing op at 1900 hrs on 5/6 Dec 71 to clear area upto Zafarwal – Azizpur.
b.
Sdry Effort. By 39 Div (UC Maj Gen Prabhu) less a bde alongwith 2 IABG less a regiment to launch offn b/w Karir Nadi and River Bein on axis – Samba – Delhra – Chak Amru – Shakargarh commencing op at 1900 hrs on ni 5/6 Dec 71 to clear area upto Shakargarh.
c.
Aux Effort. With 36 Div (UC Maj Gen Ahluwalia) less a bde alongwith 14 H (ex 2 IAB) to launch offn on axis Thakarpur - Kotnaina – Shakargarh / Nurkot across river front commencing op on ni 10/11 Dec 71 to clear area up to
line Nurkot-
Shakargarh. d.
Note. ( The delay of 5/6 days b/w Main, Sdry and Aux effort was to embroil / cut the base of own offn ( if launched ) towards Kathua – Madhopur. (However, it did not materialise and taking the
advantage
Indian
planned
offn
to
clear
line
Shakargarh – Nurkot on ni 10/11 Dec ) 18. Pakistan Army (1 Corps) – Forces. Forces aval to 1 Corps were :a.
Def Forces (1) 8 Div, UC Maj Gen Abdul Malik (2) 15 Div, UC Maj Gen Abdul aziz (3) 8 IABG, UC Brig Mohammad Ahmed
b.
Offn Forces (4) 6 Armd Div (5) 17 Inf Div UC R.D Shamim
19. Pakistan Army (1 Corps Def Plan).
Gentlemen,
1
Corps UC Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed was resp for the Def of RCC from Marala HW to MRL sub link (the area which is now being def by 30 Corps) with, a.
15 Div to def area from incl Marala HW to incl Deg Nadi.
b.
and,
8 Div was resp:(1) To def Shakargarh Salient from excl Degh Nadi to incl MRL sub Link Canal in SW.
(2) Capture Dharam enclave on the out break of hostilities. (3) 8 IABG. To act as Corps Res and was loc in gen area Dhamthal. c.
8 Div Def Plan.
The depl plan in response to en
offn plan was:(1) Main Def Effort. 24 Bde was resp to def Zafarwal Sec. Zafarwal was to be def as str pt. (2) Sdry Def Effort. 14 (P) Bde was resp to def Shakargarh Sec as under:(a) 23 FF was depl as lt fwd bn. (b) 19 FF was depl in Shakargarh sub sec as cen fwd bn. (c) 20 PR was depl in Nurkot sub sec as rt fwd bn. (3) Aux Def Effort
.
115 Bde was to def
Narowal Sec with an addl task to capture Dharam enclave. (4) Covering Tps – Changez Task Force. To conduct delaying battle b/w Degh and Bein. Note ( Changez Task Force UC Brig Nisar with 20 L, 33 Cav and 13 Punjab fought covering tps battle b/w Basanter Nullah and Bein River
from 5 to 11 Dec. Delaying Indian offn for seven days against the perceived 72 hrs delay)
PART – II BATTLE OF SHAKARGARH 20. Terrain – Shakargarh. Gentlemen, just to have quick look at the area where Battle of Shakargarh was fought by 19 FF, it is a stretch of 30 kms in length and 20 kms in width. Two famous rivers Ravi and Bein flow in this area from north to south. Tarnah N and River Ravi flow in the east and Bein in the centre of AOO. Shakargarh is connected with Narowal through rd and rly. Rly line and rd terminates at Chak Amru in the north of Shakargarh. Major portion of the battle was fought in north of Shakargarh. Imp vills/ towns in the AOO (are as flashed) Shakargarh,Tehra, Phalware, Chatrana, Chatrana Forest, Pindi Sainyan, Pindi Manan, Chak Amru, Sukol (En Post), Inayatpur, Jalala Bund, Kot Naina, Ikhlaspur, Dinpur Kalan and Dinpur Khurd. 21. Apchs ldg to Shakargarh. 3 x apchs entered into the AOO. These were:-
a.
Chak Amru Apch.
Kuta – Chak Amru - Maryal-
Shakargarh. b.
Ikhlaspur Apch.
Kathua
-
Ikhlaspur
–
Shakargarh. c.
Kot Naina Apch. Gurdaspur - Kukar enclave – Kot Naina – Shakargarh. ( all apch can take div/ div plus with armr bde)
19 FF Def Plan 22. Msn.
The bn msn was “ to def Shakargarh by taking
up def from incl Pindi Manan to lncl Din pur Kalan by Ist lt 28 Nov 1971 with protective dets at:a.
Coy in area Inayatpur.”
b.
Coy at Jalala Bund in area Ikhlaspur.
23. Resources Aval to 19 FF a.
Under Comd (1) Pl ex 21 Balcoh (R&S) (2) 1 x Det ex 226 Sp Coy (COBRA). (3) C Coy ex 2 Wing Chenab Rangers.
b.
In DS (1) Q Bty ex 78 Fd Regt.
24. Depl Plan.
As flashed:-
a.
Ali Coy. Initially to act as part of protective det with a coy of West Pakistan Rangers in area Inayatpur with fall back posn (16 kms) at Pindi Manan incl to Pindi Sainiyan excl facing north as part of left fwd coy of bn main def posn.
b.
Bahadur Coy.
As rt fwd coy in gen area from incl
Dinpur Khurd to incl Dinpur Kalan. c.
Chattak Coy.
Depl as cen fwd coy in gen area
Chatrana vill incl to Chatrana Forest excl. d.
Dalair Coy. Initially depl as protective dets at Jalala Bund with fall back posn as depth coy in gen area vill Phalwari facing east
e.
Bn HQ. At vill Tehra.
f.
Mor Pl. At Chatrana Forest.
g.
Pl ex 21 Baloch (R&S).
To
cover
gap
b/w
Bahadur and Chattak coys. h.
C Coy ex 2 Wing Chenab Rangers.
It was depl
in gen area Afzal Pura facing south from rd Dinpur Kalan excl to Afzal Pura incl. j.
Obs Plan.
Def M fd in front of FDLs over a
frontage of 8 x kms.
k.
Obsn Plan. Listening Posts (LPs) and standing ptl (SP) for early wng in front of fwd coys.
En Attk Plan on Shakargarh 25. Gentleman,
before I dilate upon the offn plan on
Shakargarh, let me very briefly acquaint you with the unfolding of battle up to 13/14 Dec 1971 inside Shakargarh Salient:a.
Indian 54 & 39 Div launched the offn on 5/6 Dec as per plan.
b.
By 7/8 Dec, 54 Div had contacted line SakrorLagwal and 39 Div had secured area up to Chak Amru – Khaira after a tough delaying battle given by Changez tasks force.
c.
By 10/11 Dec 54 Div had captured Dehlara and 39 Div had secured area further south of Chak Amru. Meanwhile Changez task force was ordered to wdr on 11 Dec.
d.
Towards Shakargarh Sec, on 10 Dec, 8 IABG had launched a C attk b/w Kotnaina – Nurkot
on
possible break out by 36 Div towards line Nurkot – Shakargarh (However, this attk went in vaccum as the en had not launched the offn as yet). e.
On 11 Dec, GOC 8 Div ordered re-depl of 14 (P) Bde west of Bein as Flashed:(1) 23 FF (West of Shakargarh) (2) 19 FF ( N & E of Shakargarh) (3) 27 FF (b/w Nurkot – South of 19 FF) (4) 20 PR (Nurkot)
f.
By 14/15 Dec, 54 Div Commenced the offn and captured Barapind Jarpal, where a famous acct of battle by 35 FF was given.
26. Towards Shakargarh Sec en had planned a two pronged attk as fol:a.
115 Bde ex 36 Div (Kotnaina - Shakargarh Apch) (1) Ph – 1. 4 Grenadiers was to attk and capture vill Dinpur commencing op at 1900 hrs on ni 13/14 Dec 71.
(2) Ph – 2. 10 Grenadiers and 1st
Mahar Regts
with armr in close sp were to attk and capture Shakargarh commencing op at 1st lt 14 Dec. b.
87 Bde ex 39 Div (Chak Amru – Shakargarh Apch) (1) Ph – 1. 3/9 Gorkha Rifles were to attk and capture vill Chatrana and Chatrana Forest commencing op at 2000 hrs on ni 14/15 Dec. (2) Ph – 2. 14 Rajputana Rifles and 9
Mahar
Regts sp by armr elms were to attk and capture vill
Phalwari
and
Shakargarh
from
NE
commencing op at 1st lt 15 Dec. 27. Conduct - Battle of Protective Dets a.
Ali and Dalair coys were to act as protective dets and occupy successive delaying lines till joining bn main def posn north of Shakargarh. Both the coys occupied their fwd posn at Jalala bund and Inayatpur by 29 Nov 71.
b.
On 4 Dec at 0600 hrs No1 Pl of Ali Coy attacked sukol post at own initiative and destroyed OP tower. However could not over run the post. On 5 Dec, No.1 Pl/ Ali Coy again attk en Sukol Post from different dir and was able to capture the post alongwith 3 sq miles area upto Tarnah N.
c.
Due to dev of en op on Kot Naina and Chak Amru axis, on 9 Dec 71 both the coys were ordered to imed wdr to main def and by morning 10 Dec 71 both coys were in their respective AOR of bn main def north of Shakargarh.
28. Main Battle of Shakargarh a.
Conduct of Battle (Kotnaina – Shakargarh Apch) (1) At 1900 on ni 13/14 Dec En commenced attk. Coy plus size force of 4 Grenadiers attk rt fwd pl (4) of Bahader Coy at Dinpur Kalan. Attk was repulsed and en left behind 5 dead and 4 POWs. Own cas incl 4 x shaheeds and 7x injured incl OC Bahader Coy who was replaced by Bn 2IC. (2) This pl (4) was rft with Bn Pnr pl by 1800 hrs 14 Dec 71. (3) At 1900 hrs on 14 Dec, en attempted second attk on No 4 Pl at Dinpur. This time the en was successful and pl posn was over run by 1950 hrs. (4) 1st C Attk.
At 2000 hrs, Dalair coy less a Pl
was ordered to launch C attk. Bde HQ had promised provn of few tks for C attk but the same did not arrive in time.
(5) Keeping in mind the time constraints, Bn Comd ordered to launch C attk without tks. Dalair Coy less a pl UC Maj Hamid ( later Brig Hamid) , loc 5 miles away from its obj launched timely C attk and recaptured the lost posn by approx 2300 hrs, ni 14/15 Dec 71. b. Conduct
of Battle
(Chak Amru – Shakargarh
Apch) (1) At 2000 hrs on ni 14/15 Dec, 3/9 Gorkha Rifles launched the attk. (2) At this moment 19 FF was under attk from two dir. In south No 4 Pl / Bahader Coy was over run by en and own Dalair Coy less a pl (depth Coy) was on mov for the C attk. Whereas in north en had commenced attk on Chatrana forest. (3) LP and SP of 19 FF could not report en attk and thus en was able to achieve surprise and entered Chatrana forest where it confronted Mor pl depl between and rear of Ali & Chattak Coy. (4) Due to resilient fight put up by mor pl and timely on loc (OL) arty fire en attk was halted at mere 25 yds from the mor posn.
(5) At the same time fresh en tps contacted No 2 Pl / Ali Coy from Chatrana forest on reverse front. Adv en was checked very gallantly by a Bangali Lnk Suleman Sarkar who was performing sentry duty on LMG and kept on firing volley after volley despite en pressure till he ran out of the ammo, but the brave man started throwing Energa grens on adv en. (6) Due to well-timed, well coord and gutsy response by Mor Pl and Lnk Sulaman Sarkar of No2 Pl/Ali Coy, en wdr few hundred yards south and took up re-org posn in Chatrana Forest in between Ali & Chattak Coy. (7) Reading the fast changing battle sit, the CO imed ordered No 12 Pl / Dalair Coy UC Adjt Capt Faryad Ali to occupy Pl C pen posn south of Ali Coy and NW of Chattak Coy in front of the en depl to check the further adv towards the depth of bn. (8) As per en plan a coy of 3/9 Gorkha was to attk Chatrana vill from Chatrana Forest in bn Phase II. Chattak Coy Comd (defending Chatrana vill) was aware of the en presence north and rear of his coy. He info the current sit to Bn Comd who in
turn instr the coy comd to get more info about the en. Coy Comd alongwith CHM and runner started mov toward Chatrana vill where he was engaged by the en fire, on his way back he was surrounded by en and made captive as the en had over run his Coy HQ by that time. (Later when the area was recaptured by successful C attk, bullets ridden dead body of Maj Afzal was found along with body of CHM.) c. Sit at 0100 hrs, 15 Dec 71 (1) En had captured Chatrana vill and forest and was in process of quick re org/consolidation in an area of over 1000 yds facing SW. (2) No 12 Pl/Dalair Coy UC Adjt lost dir to occupy C Pen posn and reached west of Chatrana village where he cfm en presence in vill Chatrana to bn HQ. (3) Own Dalair Coy less one pl had recaptured lost area of Bahader Coy at Din Pur Kalan. (4) Ali Coy and mor pl were intact. (5) Bn Comd was in serious sit, however the audacious CO kept his wits on and decided fol:-
(a) Asked 12 Pl / Dalair Coy UC Adjt to fall back to Bn HQ as rft. (b) Dalair Coy less one pl alongwith pnr pl to fall back to Bn HQ from Dinpur Kalan. (On insistence from OC Bahader Coy 1 x Pl ex Dalair Coy was left in situ). (c) Asked Bde HQ for aval of few tks. (d) Alerted all the elms of bn HQ incl cks / clks swprs, and even civs. d. 2nd C Attk (1) CO waited for tp of tk, Dalair Coy and pnr pl but they were still not in loc. Seeing the criticality of time he imed ordered to launch a two pronged C attk. CO along with elms of Bn HQ to run over the en from rt of village Chatrana whereas Adjt Capt Faryad along with SM Galeen Khan with No 12 pl/Dalair Coy to launch the C attk from left dir. (2) The two pronged C attk commenced at 0200 hrs on on ni 14/15 Dec 71. (3) Soon after the C attk commenced, Capt Faryad sustained a bullet injury on chest and comd was taken over by SM Galeen Khan. Both the C attks
met success and en was evicted from Chatrana vill and was pushed towards Chatrana Forest by 0330 hrs 15 Dec 71. e. 3rd C Attk (1) By 0400 hrs 15 Dec, Dalair Coy less one pl along with pnr pl and tp of tk arrived at Bn HQ. (2) Without any delay Maj Hamid, coy comd was called upon by the CO and ordered to launch C attk on Chatrana Forest. Tk led the C attk up to outer fringes of forest and from then on went in fire sp role and inf charged through the forest. The C attk met success and en was evicted, during the process 23 x en soldiers were made POW by Dalair Coy. It was the second successful C attk by the Dalair Coy in one ni under the dynamic comd of Maj Hamid. (3) When the Dalair Coy was clearing the Chatrana forest they were fired upon by some en tps hidden in BUA of Chatrana vill, Dalair Coy encircled them and made another 30 x POW’s incl a fd offr. (4) By 0600 hrs, 15 Dec due to well-timed and heroic action 19 FF recaptured all the lost area
and def was restored before the cease fire at 1930 hrs on 17 Dec 1971. This was a fine example of dash, initiative and courage on the part of commanders and tps, and goes on to prove that timely C attk, even if vastly inferior in no, can throw back a much larger enemy force from his lodgements. 29. Over View of Losses a.
b.
Own (1) Shaheed
-
13 (1xOffr,12xOR)
(2) Wounded
-
30 (2xOffrs, 2xJCOs, 26xOR)
(1) Killed
-
73
(2) Wounded
-
09
(3) POW’s
-
70 (3xOffrs,1xJCO,66xOR)
En
PART – III ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNT Analysis and Lessons Learnt 30. As a defender while conceiving a def plan one must be able to visualize how the def battle takes place. The visualization of en’s cap will enable the defender to
ascertain the bias of def, anti tk def, formulate the obsn plan, obs plan and make sure that aval firepower is optimally utilized. As a comd you must remember that the attk will always have an initial advantage of initiative, str ratio and choice of pt of application. Then starts the duel b / w two thinking minds with the obj of defeating each other. As Clauswitz said that def is the stronger form of warfare, the def must ident his strs. The str of def lies after having absorbed the initial disadvantage making use of the flexibility that comes to his hands after the en has cmt itself. Another imp factor that you must understand is ident of correct time and place of decisive action by the bn and bde comd. If these two things are correctly conceived then the def can bring the en to the killing zone of his own choice by taking appropriate measures, in the process causing attrition to the en and conc max possible fire power at that place and time of his own choosing then the attacker is doomed to lose. In nutshell, if you as a def aprc and analyse the terrain better, coord good obs and obsn plan, carryout sound vis of en, ident correct time and place of decisive battle, you can snatch that initial advantage from the en, disturb his design, attrite him through bold and offn application of resources and bring him to the place of your choosing and then give him that final blow, there is no reason why
the en can’t be defeated. This all will req the ability of jnr ldrs to handle unforeseen sits, willpower and endurance by all ranks to stand the mental as well as phy stress. With this premise let’s go over some of the lessons which if carried home can become instinctive reactions at the time of crisis:a.
Deliberate Planning, Prep and Knowledge of Terrain. On being given orders to occupy defs on 28 Nov, CO carried out deliberate planning as regards to depl of his coys on gr and laying of obs sys, posting of security elms etc. He also had advantage of knowledge of the terrain owing to initial task as bde res. This deliberate planning and thorough prep for battle lead the way for victory of 19 FF despite some flaws like failure of Standing Ptl and Listening Post to info about en’s adv towards Chatak Coy and loss of dir by 12 pl of Dalair Coy which was being led by Capt Faryad.
b.
Comd, Con and Flow of Info. Once the bn is depl over extended frontages and under the fog of the battle
and
sketchy
info
is
being
shared
by
undercomds, then it is perceived that comd and con becomes little difficult. However, in case of 19 FF, the timely info was passed on to bn comd which enabled him to take quick and right decisions.
d.
En Attk Plan and Exec. En had planned to attk Shakargarh with two bdes on either of the flanks of 19 FF. However, the exec did not commensurate with the planning. En attks lacked boldness, conc of effort and desired impetus. GM, if you recollect the conduct of the battle, the en had some serious voids in their attk plan. Instead of going with bde attks, she resorted to bn and coy lvl attks. Though the attks were multi directional yet en was strong no where.
e.
Change of Op Task. 19 FF was initially asg the task to act as bde res. However, in Nov 71 unit was asg the task of def Shakargarh Sec. 19 FF was able to perform the changed task successfully due to their advantage of their presence in the area for 8 months. Ideally speaking under the prevailing envmt no bn will be purly for def or offn roll.
f.
Personality of the CO.
Study of mil history is
testament to the fact that all battles have been impacted by personal style and comportment of comds. Lt Col Shafique SJ, a war veteran of 1965 war, with attributes of professional excellence, courage, determination and mental robustness led 19 FF by setting personal example who was capable of
responding to the unforeseen sits and leading his tps resolutely through the adverse conditions of B fd. g.
Aggressiveness in Def.
Best form of def is
characterized by aggressive spirit and vigorous behaviour of the def. The def battle has to be seen to begin where you can improve your posture, display the will to fight and deliver a fatal blow during main def battle. As en is in new area, is disoriented, imbalanced and fatigued so this is the time to seize the opportunity with aggressive spirit. Cadence, beat and attitude is the recipe of aggressive spirit. h.
Stress Bearing Capacity. A hard contested battle would always stretch you to extreme limits of physical and psychological pressures. Under the sit of immense pressure, despite the cas of coy comds of Bahadur and Chatak coys and Adjt, the remaining offrs and men of 19 FF in gen and Dalair coy in particular displayed high lvl of stress bearing capacity. The attitude of fighting till last man last bullet should become instinct for ldrs and led. Def must not succumb to initial reversal but always strive resolutely to recover and re-gp to give another tough fight to the attk.So the pt to remember here is that whatever is the nature of physical and psychological
pressures during peace time exs, you the jnr ldrs should conceive the ways and methods to put undercomd through demanding sits where they are able to survive the stress for 72 hrs and still fight in the face of strong opposn. j.
Role of Jnr Ldrs. Jnr ldr have always played a very crucial role in the outcome of any battle. This would be even more applicable in any future conflict. During any conflict with the en, ups and downs are basic ingredient of the battle. Only those comds and jnr ldrs who can keep their wits about in the face of intimidating
sits
and
exhibit
resilience
while
confronting adverse sits, likely to confront them frequently, can take right decisions and lead their outfits to the ultimate success. Jnr Ldrs who have conviction in the rightness of their obj, are self assured, proud to be led by excellence of their comds and fearlessly vigorous to disregard any threat to their life are recipe of success in the profession of arms. During the exec of 2nd C attk, Capt Faryad sustained bullet injury and the comd was imed taken over by SM Galeen Khan, who led the action to success
l.
Aval of Res.
Res at all lvls provide flexibility to
local comds to react promptly and restore the sit. While planning any def battle comd must keep adequate res at his disposal in order to react imed w/o waiting for help from higher HQ. Though Dalair Coy was cmt in def of depth loc, yet the Bn Comd took the risk of up sticking two pls to exploit the opportunity to evict the en from his defs w/o waiting for the bde res. This calc risk proved very beneficial and the C attk was a success. 30. Now, before I conclude lets hear the views of Maj Gen (Retd) Shafique then CO 19 FF and Brig ( Retd) Hamid then Coy comd Dalair Coy. CONCL 31. There are always lessons to be learnt from the past battles and the conflicts. Taking a realistic stock of our failings of the past also helps us to realize the inadequacy of our present preparation for the test of war. It is important to ask ourselves as where do we stand today vis-à-vis our state in 1971?
Is the state of our leadership, character, efficiency,
discipline and training and preparation significantly better, marginally better, at the same level or have we deteriorated even further?
It is time that we answer this question with
courage, maturity and honesty if we have to redeem our
honour and self respect. If we are truly conscious of this, we are bound to be successful in any future war, Insha Allah. I thank you all gentlemen. Now if you have any question, I will be privileged to answer.
