y."^ d:o OPUS General Editors
An Introduction to
Christopher Butler Robert Evans
Political
John Skorupski
OPUS books provide concise, original, and authoritative introductions to a wide range of subjects in the humanities
Philosophy
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Jonathan Wolff
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OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Preface
book with me, or have commented on all or part of drafts (in
Introduction
some cases, on many versions) include Paul Ashwin, Richard
Bellamy, AlanCarter,ElaineCollins, IssiCotton, VirginiaCox, Tim Crane, Brad Hooker, Alya Khan, Dudley Knowles, Annabelle Lever,VeroniqueMuiiozDarde,Mike Martin, Lucy O'Brien. Sarah Richmond, Mike Rosen, Mike Saward, Mario
Scannella, Raj Sehgal, John Skorupski, Philip Smelt, Bob Stern, and Nigel Warburton. I am very grateful to them all.
We do not say that a man who showsno interest in politics is a man whominds his own business;we say that he has no business here at all.
(Pericles' funeral oration, in Thucydides, The PeloponnesianWar, 147)
It has been said that there are only two questions in political philosophy: 'who gets what?', and 'says who?' Not quite true, but close enough to be a useful starting-point. The first of these questions is about the distribution of material goods, and of rights and liberties. On what basis should people possess property? What rights and liberties should they enjoy? The second question concerns the distribution of another good: political power. Locke defined political power as 'the right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties'. This probably goes further than we need, but we can see the point. Political power includes the right to command others, and to subject them to punishment if they disobey. Who should hold this power? As soon as we reflect on these questions puzzles emerge. Is there any good reason why one person should have more property than another? Are there any justified limits to my liberty? And what should the relation be between political power and economic success? In some countries few obtain political power unless they are already wealthy. In others, those who gain political power soon find themselves rich. But should there be any connection at all between possession of wealth and enjoyment of political power? Indeed, political power is puzzling enough on its own. If someone has legitimate political power over me then they have the right to force me to do certain things. But how could another person justify the claim to have such rights over me? It often seems outrageous that someone else should tell me what to do,
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2
Introduction 3
Introduction
worse still that they think they are entitled to punish me if I
the question 'who holds wealth?' Why are we interested in this descriptive question? Primarily because the distribution of wealth is relevant to normative questions about justice. (Com-
disobey. Yet there is, of course, another side to this. Perhaps I should also consider howothers might behave-how unpleasant they could make my life-if they were left unrestrained by the
pare the question: 'who holds string?'-inequalities in the pos-
law and the threat of punishment. Reflecting on this, perhaps
sessionof string are of no political interest.)
there is something to be said, after all, for the existence of
Furthermore, questions about human behaviour often seem
political power. Sowecanidentify withboth the anarchist's plea
to straddle the descriptive/normative divide. A sociologist seekmg to explain why people generally obey the law, for example, is
for the autonomy of the individual, and the authoritarian's claims for the power of the state. One task for the political philosopher, then, is to determine
the correct balance between autonomy and authority, or, in other words, to determine the proper distribution of political power. This example also illustrates what is distinctive about
political philosophy. Political philosophy is a normative disci-
pline, meaning that it tries to establish norms (rules or ideal standards). We can contrast the normative with the descriptive. Descriptivestudies attempt to find out howthings are. Normative studies try to discover how things should be: what is right, just, or morally correct. Politics can be studied from both a
descriptive and a normative standpoint. Characteristically, descriptive political studies are undertaken
by the political scientist, the sociologist, and the historian. So, for example, some political scientists ask questions about the actualdistribution of goods within a given society. Who in the United States ofAmerica holds wealth? Whoin Germany holds power?Thepoliticalphilosopher,like all ofus,hasgoodreason to beinterestedin the answersto thesequestions,buthisor her primary concern is elsewhere: what rule or principle should
govern the distribution ofgoods? ('Goods' hereincludes not only
likely to appeal at some point to the fact that many people
believe that they ought to obey. And, of course, factual questions about human behaviour arejust as relevant to norma-
tive issues. For example, there is no point in putting forward a theory of the just society without having some knowledge of human behaviour and motivation. Some theories ofjustice, for example might make unrealistic assumptions about people's capacity (or lack ofcapacity) for altruism. Inshort, studying how
things arehelps to explain howthings canbe, andstudying how they canbe is indispensable for assessinghowthey ought to be. But how can we answer the question of how things ought to be? We know, broadly, how to go about answering purely descnptive questions: we go and look. This is not to say that political science or history is easy, for very subtle and detailed work is often involved. But in principle we do think we know how to do it, even if often we cannot find the information we seek. But what can we do to find out how things ought to be?
Where can we look?
The uncomfortable fact is that there is no easy answer. But, despite this, very many philosophers have attempted to solve these normative political problems, and they have not been
short ofthingsto say.Wewill examine some ofthemost impor-
property, but power, rights, and liberty too. ) The political philosopher will ask, not 'how is property distributed?', but 'what
tant contributions throughout this book, and we will see that.
wouldbea just orfairdistributionofproperty?' Not 'whatrights
by andlarge, philosophers reason about politics in just the way
and liberties do people have?', but 'what rights and liberties
they do about other philosophical issues. They draw distinctions,
should people have?' What ideal standards, or norms, should
they examine whether propositions are self-contradictory, or whethertwo or more propositions arelogically consistent. They
govern the distribution of goods within society?
The partition between normative and descriptive studies, though, is not quite asclear-cut as it might seem. Consider again
try to show that surprising theses can be deduced from more
obvious ones. In short, they present arguments.
4
Introduction
And philosophers argue about politics for good reason. In
political philosophy, unlike many other areas of philosophy, there is no hiding-place. In philosophy, agnosticism ('the English translate their ignorance into Greek and call it agnosticism', said Engels) is often a respectable position. Perhaps I cannotfinda satisfactorypositionon the questionofwhetheror not wehavefree will, so I professno view. In a widercontextthis
hardly matters. But in political philosophy agnosticism is self-
Introduction 5
If we have a state, how should it be organized? Should it be democratic? What does it even mean to say that the state is
democratic? Is there any rationale for preferring rule by the people to rule by an expert: a benevolent dictator? These are the questions pursued in Chapter 3. How much power should the state have? Or, viewed from the other side, how much liberty should the citizen enjoy? Chapter 4 considers the theory that, to avoid the 'tyranny of the major-
defeating. It may not matter if a society hasno officialpolicy on the solution to the problem of free will, but in every society
ity', we should be given the liberty to act just as we wish, pro-
someone (or no one) holds political power, and property is distributed in some wayor other. Ofcourse, any one individual's influence on society's decisions is likely to be minute. But potentially we all have some say, if not by voting then by making our
If we give citizens such liberty, should this include the liberty to acquire and dispose of property however they see fit? Or are there justified restrictions on economic activity in the name of liberty or justice? This is the topic of Chapter 5: distributive
views known through debate and discussion, whether on the
public stage, or by 'underground' means. Those who prefer not to participate will find their political decisions made for them,
whether they like it or not. To say or do nothing is, in practice, to endorse the present situation, howeverrepellent. In the course of this book we shall raise and discuss the main
questions of political philosophy, examining some of the most mfluential answers, from the ancient Greeks to the present day. Each chapter takes on a particular question or controversy. The natural starting-point is political power, the right to command. Why should some have the right to pass laws to regulate the
behaviour of others? Well, suppose no one had such a right. What would life be like? This is the question pursued in the first chapter: what would happen in a 'state of nature' without government? Wouldlifebeunbearable?Or animprovementon how things are now?
Suppose we come to accept that life under government is preferable to life in the state of nature. Does it follow from this that we have the moral duty to do as the state decrees? Or is there another argument that will deliver this conclusion? This is the problem of political obligation, which we shall discuss in Chapter 2.
vided that we do no harm to others.
justice.
The five main chapters of this book take us through topics of enduring concern: the state of nature, the state, democracy, liberty, and property. The final chapter looks briefly at some of the assumptions underlying my choice of topics, and examines those assumptions in the context of recent work in feminist political theory. By this point, with two and a half thousand
years of hindsight, we may have some sort of answerto a question raised, yet not satisfactorily answered, in this Introduc-
tion-howdowedo politicalphilosophy? Onthis topic, ason all those discussedhere, my aim is not to force an opinion on you; I hope insteadto present somematerials that will help you form your own view. Of course it will be possible to read this book and end up as uncertain as before. But we must not underesti-
mate the progress made by advancingfrom muddled ignorance to informed bemusement.
