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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES National Capital Judicial Region METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT Branch 47, Pasay City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, CRIM. CASE NO. NO. M-PSYM-PSY- 11-13939 FOR: GRAVE COERCION
-versusCAPT. CHARLES DEEN JR. ET AL., Accused. x--------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION Courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing, and the constitutional right to presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused. 1 THE CHARGE Accused Capt. Charles Deen Jr., Ana Zuniga, Patricia Anne Romey and Jennifer Inopea stand charged with Grave Coercion under Article of the the Revised Revised Penal Code, the accusatory portion of the Information, reads as follows: “That on or about 21st day of April, 2010, in PasayCity, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law and by means of threats, intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prevent private complainant Tay Chun Say from taking Philippine Airlines Flight PR-306 bound for Hong Kong by compelling said complainant to disembark the said PAL Flight, thus preventing said complainant from doing something not prohibited by law. CONTRARY TO LAW.”
THE COMPLAINT Private complainant complainant Chun Suy Tay a.k.a Joseph Tay alleged that he is a businessman businessman engaged in international international trading who is regularly regularly travelling abroad. abroad. He is a regular passenger passenger of the Philippine Philippine Airlines Airlines (PAL) for over thirty (30) years. On April April 21, 2010, he was booked on PAL Flight PR 306 of the departure time of 2:45 p.m. bound 1 People
vs. Santos, Jr., G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007. 2007.
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for Hong Kong to attend an important business meeting, to close and to sign contracts in the amount of Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00) and Five Million Dollars ($5, 000,000.00). On his scheduled flight, he checked in at the PAL counter at around 2:00 p.m. He was assigned seat no. 68H on board PAL Flight PR 306. He observed that the front row seats, which were mot business class seats, but the front row mentioned belonged to the economy class that he fully paid, were not occupied and the passengers were not boarding the aircraft anymore. He seated himself in the middle front row seat instead of his assigned seat since the same was vacant, because of his being a frequent traveller, he knows the existing policy, that is announced by PAL management inside the aircraft that if seats in the aircraft are not fully occupied in domestic domestic or foreign flights, passengers are allowed to sit themselves in vacant seats and they will not be charged additional amount for such transfer. He was accustomed to this procedure in the years he has been boarding PAL, as well as in other airlines whether domestic or foreign flights. After he seated himself in the front row middle seat, a PAL male steward of Flight PR 306 approached him and asked for his boarding pass which he immediately gave to the steward. The male steward arrogantly told him to sit somewhere else. He was surprised with the arrogance of the steward and asked him, “Why?” The steward answered that the seat was with additional payment. He was further surprised because this was the first time he was being assessed additional charges for transferring to another seat in more than thirty (30) years that he has been boarding PAL. For justifiable, rightful and valid reasons, he asked the male steward to show him the rules or policy of PAL from the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines or from any appropriate government agency authorizing additional charges so he will pay it immediately. The steward, instead of explaining to him the additional charges and providing him with the document authorizing the imposition of said charges, confiscated his boarding pass. A stewardess came and informed him that he needed to pay additional charges if he wanted to sit in the front row. The crew members of PAL never inform or disclose to him the amount they will charge for taking a seat different from the boarding pass. This additional charge was not informed when he checked in for the flight. They did not show a written policy or rule approved by government agency to justify the assessment or collection of additional fees. This is the first time he was asked to pay additional charges for transferring to another seat in his thirty (30) years boarding with PAL. The male steward shouted and said, “What is your problem?” He replied in clam tone, “I have no problem, you are the one creating problem for me. What is wrong? The male male steward turned his back back and told the other stewards stewards in a very loud voice and threatening voice, “Wala na yun. Off load na siya due to security risk.” For him, such comment is absurd and unjustified because what security risk was the male steward talking about. To make matter worse, it was maliciously and feloniously announced by the pilot over the public announcement system inside the aircraft that, “We apologize. There is a troublemaker on board the aircraft that is creating a problem.” He was humiliated. He was merely requesting for a copy of the policy or regulation of PAL, and now, he was unlawfully humiliated in front of passengers. Thereafter, a stewardess stewardess opened the aircraft door and then the two police officers which he later come to know as Rosendo Jaspe and Joie Basco, appeared and informed him that PAL management accused him for being a security risk, and they were ordered to arrest and remove him from the aircraft and be brought to the police station. Moreover, a PAL employee illegally got and confiscated his passport. He was shocked by the GESTAPO like actions of the PAL employees. He pleaded with the female stewardess, “Tell me how much should I pay you?” The female stewardess arrogantly replied, “Sorry, it is no longer our business. You are now under police custody. We are now turning you over to police for investigation investigation and detention.” detention.” When he was escorted escorted by the police officers, officers,
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they told him they do not know what happened. PAL did not file any formal notice, complaint or memo to the police. PAL wanted the police to investigate and detain him, PAL employees did not disclose their identities except a certain Jenny Lyn Angbeng. Even it was against his will to be removed from the aircraft with humiliation and treatment of a criminal, he forced to accede and quietly went with the police officers to avoid further embarrassment and to avoid causing commotion that would disturb the peace and order inside the aircraft, despite the fact that he was already worried about failing to catch the flight to Hong Kong to attend to his business deal in China. Moreover, when he was being arrested and brought down the aircraft, some passengers jeered as he was publicly announced in the aircraft as troublemaker. It was his most humiliating experience in his life. He was escorted by two female PAL employees, three male PAL employees and the two police officers from the plane to the police office. He was detained at the police office. off ice. When asked by P/Insp Felix what happened, the PAL employees alleged alleged that he violated PAL regulation. Two female PAL employees employees brought a memorandum dated March 8, 2010 relating to guidelines on the chair economy subcharges, charges, regional 20.00 US dollar. He was refused refused for a photocopy. He explained what happned to him was unfair, illegal and felonious, a harassment and so he will take an appropriate action for an undue harm committed against his person and honor. The older PAL employee blurted out, “Do not threaten us. You are the one we want to sue that is why you are being detained and investigated in this police office. So do not threaten us.” When he asked for her name, she ran away with a younger female PAL employee. He has a conversation in Chinese language with a female PAL employee. Police officers asked PAL management if they are going to file a complaint against him. Jenny Lyn Angbeng answered they are no longer interested in filing a complaint and she immediately left. He was then brought by PAL employees to an area in the airport to personally retrieve his baggage. When he got his passport, there was an immigration stamp for his exit even though he never left the country. His passport now contains an irregular immigration stamp that indicated he left for Hong Kong on April 21, 2010 though he did not leave the Philippine territory.
THE JOINT COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT Accused Capt. Charles Deen Jr., Ana Zuniga, Patricia Anne Romey and Jennifer Inopea asseverated that that the complaint dated July 21, 2010 with supplemental supplemental complaint dated dated October 12, 2010 2010 of private complainant complainant Chun Suy Tay should be dismissed outright for grave substantial defects. Charging them of five offenses constituted constituted duplicity of offense under Rule 110, Section 10 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The factual allegations therein do not state facts and circumstances necessary to constitute any of the crimes charged. The complaint merely alleges baseless and self-serving allegations which, with all due respect, plainly spoke of the frivolous lament of an arrogant passenger whose pride and ego were surprisingly bruised because of the shallow reason that he was not allowed to occupy a Choice Economy Seat (CES)_ which he did not pay for, instead of his actual seat assignment in accordance with existing airline policies. No other conclusion can be made except that the only purpose the complaint against them was filed is to harass them as PAL employees who lawfully and properly did their jobs and duties under the law. The complaint was motivated by sinister or devious design to vex and humiliate them. It was initiated deliberately by complainant Chun Suy Tay for such sinister or devious purposes knowing that the charges are false and groundless. They all refute the
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allegations of complainant. On March 11, 2010, all PAL flight pursers, domestic head cabin attendants (DHCA) and cabin crew were given copies of Cabin Crew Advisory ISS 10-029 directing them to implement and comply with the Choice Economy Seat Surcharge (CESS) policy of PAL, approved by Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) on February 17, 2010. The Advisory stated:
“Background: In line with PAL’s initiatives to generate incremental revenue, Revenue Management introduced the Choice Economy Seat Surcharge (CESS) for bulkhead and emergency emergency exit seats seats for all PR operated operated flights except except MNL/ CEB and JAPAN flights. •
Basic information: Upon check-in, all qualified passengers who shall avail of the choice seats (bulkhead/exit row seats) shall be charged correspondingly correspondingly as follows: Transpacific Transpacific / Australia/Ruh – USD50 Regional – USD20 Domestic – PHP200 + vat All transactions transactions shall shall be done upon check-in. check-in. No transactions transactions inflight. •
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General guideline: Transferring Transferring of passenger to bulkhead / exit row seats shall not be allowed inflight.
Flight Pursers / DHCAs: Please brief your crew accordingly For your guidance and strict compliance.
They alleged that as PAL employees, it is their duty and responsibility to implement such rules and regulations and policies issued by PAL management. All flight attendants, accused flight purser Ana Zuniga and all crew members have the duty, under the law, to ensure that safety measures as well as good order and discipline in the cabin are enforced and maintained at all times throughout the whole flight. On April 21, 2010, few moments after the last passenger had boarded, flight purser Ana Zuniga informed the passengers of flight PR306 of the CESS policy of PAL over the passenger address system as part of her speech before every flight. Thereafter, the external doors of the aircraft of flight PR306 were closed at exactly 1440 or 2:40 p.m. as indicated in flight incident report. The fact that the external doors of the aircraft were already closed following embarkation is important to note since, as will be explained, this will trigger the applicability of the “Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft” otherwise known as the “Tokyo Convention” which among others, grants immunity to the aircraft operator, captain and crew members from suit or liability for acts taken in dealing with unruly passengers such as herein complainant. The Tokyo Convention was signed by the Philippines on September 14, 1963 and it was made effective as part of the law of the land on December 4, 1969. According to accused flight attendant Patricia Anne Romey, while flight purser Ana Zuniga was making her
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speech and about to play the safety video, she approached complainant who was occupying seat no. 31E, one of the Choice Economy Seats (CES) instead of his assigned seat. As part of standard procedure, she asked complainant’s boarding pass. This is contrary to his allegation that a male steward approached him. Accused flight attendant Patricia Anne Romey was able to confirm that complainant Chun Suy Tay was in fact assigned to seat no. 68H as indicated in his boarding pass. She was aware of the CESS policy of PAL, so she politely directed complainant to transfer to his assigned seat (68H). But complainant Chun Suy Tay tauntingly and insultingly retorted: “What if I don’t want to” to her surprise. The arrogance of complainant is highlighted in his complaint where he would justify his unauthorized occupancy of the CES by reasoning that he as a frequent traveller knows that policies of PAL better than the PAL crew themselves. They deny the complainant’s allegations allegatio ns that there is an existing PAL policy which allows the passengers passengers to automatically automatically occupy vacant seats of their choice, for being baseless, baseless, self-serving and utterly false. Taking Taking other seat than the assigned assigned seat on board a plane is against good order, safety and discipline. If at all, passengers must first ask permission from the crew before they are permitted to transfer seats, which permission may be withheld for valid reasons. This is especially true for CES seats for which other passengers pay additional fees to enjoy the wider leg room and space designed to give additional comfort comfort and convenience. convenience. Shocked, accused flight attendant attendant Patricia Anne Romey went to accused flight purser Ana Zuniga to inform the latter of the situation. When accused flight attendant Patricia Anne Romey went back, complainant stood up and followed her at the middle of the galley, where he pointed a finger at her and threatened that he will have her terminated. This was witnessed by accused flight attendant Jennifer Inopea. To help pacify complainant, accused flight attendant Patricia Patricia Anne Romey and flight purser Ana Zuniga explained again to him the PAL’s policy on CESS and the seat he was occupying is CES, for which a corresponding fee was charged. charged. Accused flight purser Ana Ana Zuniga suggested to the the complainant complainant that if he wanted to, he could pay the fee once the aircraft lands in Hong Kong. Complainant Chun Suy Tay did not listen to the explanation, explanation, instead, instead, he become become more more belligerent belligerent and has the audacity to ask why he should pay the additional fee for seat no. 31E when PAL allegedly owed him a lot of money. His arrogance is seen once again when despite being informed of the true existing policies of PAL, he would abuse the crew’s hospitality and in a high handed manner, insist that they produce before him, right then and there, the basis of the additional payment while he defiantly continued to occupy CES no. 31E. With complainant’s arrogance, he did not mind delaying the flight for the other passengers just because he was in a “quandary” as to what and how much the additional charge is. He threatened the crew that he would sue PAL and have all of them terminated. terminated. He demanded for their names names and warned them to just wait for their pink slips (notice of termination). He started shouting that PAL owed him a lot of money, even millions, that he would have one of APL’s aircraft attached and see to it that PAL would have no more planes to fly. The situation had deteriorated to a point that the crew had to inform the situation to the accused Captain Charles Deen Jr. , as the commander of the aircraft. When he approached the complainant, he was not spared with the latter’s overbearing and impertinent attitude, when he inquired what is the problem, the complainant arrogantly retorted, “You are the problem, all of you!” With complainant’s menacing glare and belligerent attitude, it was apparent to Captain Charles Deen Jr. that complainant cannot be reasoned with and his acts are jeopardizing jeopardizing good order and discipline on board the aircraft. Due to complainant’s complainant’s obstinate demand, the aircraft had to be stalled at the parking bay and the flight unreasonably was delayed for almost thirty minutes thereby infuriating infuriati ng other passengers such that the crew even heard some of them howled at complainant “Get out,
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get out, get out!” out!” Complainant Complainant Chun Suy Tay gave the accused Captain Charles Deen Jr. no other choice choice but to have security security disembark disembark him. Thus, in the the exercise his authority as the commander of the aircraft, accused Captain Charles Deen Jr. radioed the ground security security and directed the the crew to re-open the doors doors of the aircraft. aircraft. There is no truth to the allegation of the complainant that police officers were ordered to arrest and detain him for being self-serving, false and misleading. The truth of the matter, the order given by the Captain was merely to re-open the doors of the aircraft and have the complainant complainant disembarked disembarked or off-loaded. off-loaded. No order of arrest arrest was ever given by the Captain. This is supported by complainant’s admission when he quoted the captain allegedly saying, “Wala na yun off load na siya due to security risk.” They deny the allegation of complainant that the pilot announced over the passenger address system that “there is a trouble maker on board the aircraft that is creating a problem” or any other statement to that effect, for being self-serving, completely false and misleading. Being a pilot for more than 31 years, Captain Charles Deen Jr. knows that statements would alarm or make other passengers passengers anxious and worried, they should not be made on board any aircraft especially over passenger address system. Simple common sense dictates that this will only aggravate the situation. He informed the other passengers why the flight was delayed, by using very general and in standard statement, statement, “Ladies and gentlemen, we apologize for the delay. We have a security problem on board. Please bear with us.” When accused flight purser Ana Zuniga and flight attendant Patricia Anne Romey entered the aircraft, they tried too to ask complainant complainant to returned to his assigned seat, complainant remained adamant and he refused to move. Airport Police Department (APD) and Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel also entered the aircraft. It was the growing impatience of other passengers who were still shouting, “Get out, get out, get out!” that finally made complainant stand up, get his hand carried baggage and leave the aircraft aircraft to which all the forward economy passengers passengers clapped and cheered. In the ordinary course of flight operations, and part of the accused captain Charles Deen Jr.’s usual duty, he executed a Journey Report for PAL flight PR306 and signed, together with accused flight purser Ana Zuniga a Flight Disturbance Complaint Report, both containing a narration of the incident involving the disruptive and belligerent belligerent behaviour of complainant complainant Chun Suy Tay. The complaint on its face is insufficient to create a belief that any of the alleged crimes were committed. The complainant’s complainant’s allegations are vague, ambiguous and insufficient. insufficient. Some of the alleged alleged facts do not specify what each of the herein accused committed. The accused have no direct personal participation or involvement in the incident complained of. A closer look of the complaint revealed that the factual allegations therein do not state facts and circumstances necessary to constitute any of the crimes charged. The complaint itself showed that complainant was not arrested or detained. His statements were contradictory. contradictory. He cannot substantiate his arrest and detention. Complainant Complainant was merely escorted off the aircraft aircraft upon the lawful and justifiable orders orders of the Captain because because of his stubborn and arrogant refusal to follow the instructions of the crew and the Captain. Complainant committed the acts that jeopardized good order and discipline on board the aircraft. After being deplaned, he was brought to an an area area in the airport airport to personally retrieved his baggage. Where was the detention or deprivation deprivatio n of liberty complainant is wailing against? Neither was there any coercion, violence, threats or intimidation used at the complainant in any time. It was the pressure of the other passengers passengers who were clamouring clamouring for him to get out, out, that made him leave the the aircraft. Also, and more importantly, it was the complainant complainant who intimidated and threatened the crew when he promised to have them all terminated. His stubborn refusal to vacate the CES and to transfer to his assigned seat until and unless the basis for the CESS policy is brought to him, right there and then, can even be considered a form of
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coercion which prevented prevente d the flight from departing on time. Complainant committed acts that jeopardized jeopardized good order order and discipline on board board the aircraft aircraft that violated penal penal laws. Complainant Complainant committed the acts of disrespect disrespect against the captain captain in front of the crew and passengers, undermined the captain’s authority as commander of the aircraft. He defied and challenged challenged the instructions instructions of accused flight flight purser Ana Ana Zuniga, as a person-in-charge of the cabin under the Captain’s direct command, not only constitutes behaviour that jeopardized good order and discipline on board the aircraft but worse interfered with her duties as flight purser. purser. The belligerent belligerent and defiant acts acts of complainant complainant while the safety video was being shown compromised compromised good safety on board by preventing other passengers passengers from watching and understanding the safety video. Complainant’s acts in intimidating and threatening the crew members’ career and welfare, not only constitute behaviour that jeopardized good order and discipline, this caused stress and anxiety to the crew that interfered and affected the performance of their duties for the entire flight. flight. The acts of the complainant complainant are punishable as criminal criminal offenses under RA no. 9497, known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. Its Section 81 (b) (9) and (12) of RA no. 9497 provide:
SEC. 81. Penalties. - (a) The Director General, after due notice and hearing, is authorized to impose the following fines and penalties for each violation of this Act: (b) The following penalties may only be imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction after the filing of a proper criminal complaint therein by the Director General and a finding of guilt: XXX
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(9) Any person who, while on board an aircraft, interferes with a crewmember's or flight attendant's performance of their duties, assaults, intimidates, or threatens any crewmember or flight attendant, shall be subjected to imprisonment from one (1) year to three (3) years or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (Php50,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00), or both, as determined by the court; XXX
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(12) Any person who, while on board an aircraft, commits any other act not otherwise expressly covered under clauses (8), (9), (10) and (11) above which jeopardizes the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein, or which jeopardizes good order and discipline on board such aircraft shall be subjected to imprisonment from six (6) months to three (3) years or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (Php50,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00), or both, as determined by the court. [Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo, 14 September 1963, Art. 1(b)]. Accused Captain Charles Deen Jr.’s authority under the law is based on the Tokyo Convention citing Article 6 and 8 thereof.
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“ Article 6 1. The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an offence or act contemplated contemplated in Article 1, paragraph paragraph 1, impose upon such person reasonable measures including restraint which are necessary: (a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein; (b) to maintain good order and discipline on board. XXX
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Article 8 1. The aircraft commander may, in so far as it is necessary for the purpose of subparagraph (a) or (b) or paragraph 1 of Article 6, disembark in the territory of any State in which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft aircraft an act contemplated contemplated in Article Article 1, paragraph paragraph 1(b).”
Also, all the accused accused cited the following following provisions provisions of the Tokyo Convention: Convention:
CHAPTER I SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION Article 1 1. This Convention shall apply in respect of: (a) offences against penal law; (b) acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board. 2. Except as provided in Chapter III, this Convention shall apply in respect of offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft registered registered in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the high seas or of any other area outside the territory of any State.
CHAPTER III POWERS OF THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER Article 5 1. The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to offences and acts committed or about to be committed by a person on board an aircraft in flight in the airspace of the State of registration or over the high seas or
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any other area outside the territory of any State unless the last point of takeoff or the next point of intended landing is situated in a State other than that of registration, or the aircraft subsequently flies in the airspace of a State other than that of registration with such person still on board. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3, an aircraft shall for the purposes of this Chapter, be considered to be in flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened o pened for disembarkation. disembarkation. In the case of a forced landing, the provisions of this Chapter shall continue to apply with respect to offences and acts committed on board until competent authorities of a State take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for the persons and property on board.
Article 10 For actions taken in accordance with this Convention, neither the aircraft commander, any other member of the crew, any passenger, the owner or operator of the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight was performed performed shall be held responsible responsible in any proceeding on account account of the treatment undergone by the person against whom the actions were taken. The Tokyo Convention is applicable because the external doors of the aircraft were closed following embarkation. embarkation. The Flight Report Incident as well as the complaint supported this applicability. The frivolous and unfounded complaint will hamper and debilitate public servants from the proper and effective discharge of their official duties. Therefore, the complainant against them must be dismissed for lack of merit.
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND TO DISMISS
Accused Capt. Charles Deen Jr., Ana Zuniga, Patricia Anne Romey and Jennifer Inopea through their counsels Atty. Minerva Pena Miclat-Capulong Miclat-Capu long and Atty. Jose Cabatuando Jr. alleged that on May 19, 2011, an Information for Grave Coercion was filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Muego against the herein accused. Contrary to the findings, there is absolute lack of evidence to support the presence of probable cause for grave coercion against them. Hence, the Honorable Court needs to re-evaluate the evidence and record before proceeding with further trial. Under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, and citing the jurisprudence in Allado vs. Diokno, there is a need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause, and until then, no warrant of arrest should be issued , and if one had been issued, the warrant should be recalled. Under Rule 112, Section 6 (b) in relation to paragraph (a) of the same section of the Rules of Court, the trial court has the power to dismiss the complaint against the accused when on its face it clearly fails to establish probable cause. AT the outset, it bears stressing that Assistant City Prosecutor Jannette Herras-Baggas who first investigated the case dismissed the complaint against the accused for lack of probable cause which was concurred by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Dolores Rillera and approved by City Prosecutor Elmer Mitra. Quite curiously, however, the motion for reconsideration of herein complainant was granted and it reversed the findings in part
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of the first investigating prosecutor. In the same resolution, accused Jennifer Inopea was not among the respondents respondents recommended recommended charged with grave coercion but out of the blue, she was named as an accused. A closer look at the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and jurisprudence on Grave Coercion indubitably shows that the accused lack culpability for this crime. The elements that would justify Grave Coercion, namely: (1) that a person prevented another another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; (2) that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party; and (3) that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had not the authority of law or the right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint shall not be made under authority of law or in the exercise of lawful right( Timoner vs. People 175 SCRA 830; People vs. Camet, CA GR No. 13777, September 22, 1955; People vs. Picunada (CA) 43 O.G. p. 2222). Complainant’s Complainant’ s alleged claim that he was compelled by the accused to disembark from the plane does not constitute grave coercion as penalized under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The salient facts of this case were not disputed by the herein complainant revealed: (1) complainant purchased an ordinary economy seat in an airline manned by the accused; (2) instead of taking his seat (No. 68 H) as appearing in his boarding pass, pass, he insisted in occupying occupying CES No. 31-E, a choice economy seat, for which extra charges need be paid in accordance with the plane’s choice economy seat policy duly approved by Civil Aeronautics Board; (3) that even after he was politely informed of this policy and given the choice of paying later in Hong Kong by the accused (Zuniga and Romey), complainant complainant was, and continued to be argumentative argumentative with and belligerent belligerent to the accused, threatening threatening to have them fired from work and hurling barrage of verbal abuses at them; (4) even the accused Deen, as commander of the aircraft in charge of the aircraft’s security and keeping good order and discipline inside the aircraft, was not spared from the impertinent and overbearing attitude of the complainant when he tried to pacify complainant; (5) complainant inobstinately refused to go back to his seat and continued to make trouble in the plane, driving passengers to jeer and howl at him to get off the plane; (6) complainant committed all these belligerent and defiant acts while the plane’s safety video was being played; (7) meanwhile, the flight had been unreasonably delayed as the plane had to be stalled at the bay at complainant’s stubborn demands that he be shown a copy of the plane’s choice economy seat policy; (8) due to complainant’s continued disobedience of the accused’s instruction to go back to his seat and fear of even worse trouble during the flight as complainant became more agitated, and passengers’ worsening annoyance over complainant for causing trouble and flight delay, airport security consisting of personnel from Airport Police Department (APD) and Philippine National Police (PNP) had to intervene; i ntervene; (9) still, complainant was unflinching, leaving airport security without a choice but to offload him from the plane; and (10) complainant voluntarily went down with the airport security personnel personnel to the police station. The accused Deen’s act of directing the disembarkation of complainant from the plane on account of the latter’s unruly behaviour that did not only jeopardized the plane’s safety, good order and discipline, but likewise qualified for criminal offenses under Section 81 (b) 9 and 12 of the Civil Aviation Authority Authority Act of 2008 ( RA no. 9497) 9497) was done in the discharged discharged of the accused’s duty as commander of the aircraft, therefore, under lawful authority as provided under Article Article 6 of the Tokyo Tokyo Convention. Without doubt too, complainan complainantt jeopardized the good order and discipline , and the safety of the plane when he (i) unjustifiably fought with the crew while the safety video was on going, thereby, distracting distracting passengers’ concentration; (ii) haughtily disrespected accused Deen, who is a person-in-authority person-in-authority being the commander of the aircraft, in the presence of his crew and
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the passengers; (iii) unwarrantedly defied the lawful instruction of the crew to go back to his assigned seat; and (iv) whimsically held on to a seat, which was not assigned to him, and for which he did not pay for. Evidently, from the foregoing, the third element of grave coercion, that the accused acted without lawful authority, is absent in the case at bar. There is no basis to hold accused Deen for trial. Now, the Tokyo Convention is a treaty which the Philippines is a signatory on September 14, 1963. As such, it forms a part of the law of the land as explained in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Health Secretary Duque, GR No. 173034, October 9, 2007. Consequently, the courts are duty bound to take judicial notice thereof. Accused Deen’s instruction to have complainant offloaded finds legal justification under the provisions of the Philippine Airline’s Basic Operations Operations Manual on Public Liability, Ocurrences on Board, Offenses Committed on Board and Right to Refuse Carriage duly approved by the Civil Aviations Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) on February 15, 2010, after having met the requirements of the Philippine Civil Air Regulations Part 9, 9.3.1.2 ( Implementing Implementing Standards). Standards). In the the absence absence of criminal intent in directing directing the complainant’s complainant’s disembarkation, the accused Deen should not be held liable for the charge of grave coercion. coercion. Neither the other accused Zuniga, Zuniga, Romey and Inopea be charged charged of conspiracy to commit grave coercion with the accused because they mrely implemented in good faith the choice economy seat policy of the plane. In Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830, it was held that where a person acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, no criminal criminal liability liability for grave coercion is committed. committed. Moreover, conspiracy conspiracy must be proved by an overt act. act. Mere presence presence at the scene of the incident, incident, knowledge of the plan and acquiescence thereto are not sufficient grounds to hold a person liable as a conspirator ( People vs. Ballesta, GR No. 181632, September 25, 2008). Conspiracy cannot be established by mere inferences or conjectures (Paredes et al. vs. Calilung, GR No. 156527, March 5, 2007). They disagreed disagreed with the the findings of Assistant Assistant City Prosecutor Muego that “ complainant was compelled to leave by display of force i.e. calling the personnel of the APD and PNP, who took custody of the complainant” because it is inconceivable how could the mere act of calling the police be deemed a display of force. Notably, it is the complainant who was the abusive and obnoxious party in this case. He fully knew well that he had no right to occupy a CES seat, yet instead of listening to the crew’s justifiable instruction to go back to his seat, fought with them and caused trouble in the plane. Under Article 10 of the Tokyo Convention, the aircraft operator, captain, crew members are duty bound to deal with such unruly behaviour, and in turn, turn, they are granted immunity immunity from suit or liability liability for dealing dealing such act. act. The accused are protected by the Tokyo Convention from the suit. To rule otherwise would have “chilling effect” on the proper and effective discharge of their official duties which , to be sure, would compromise the safety, good order and discipline on board a plane – the very evil sought to be avoided for granting such immunity. All told, it is plain and clear that there is no sufficient evidence on record to sustain the finding of probable cause to hold the accused accused for trial for the crime of Grave Grave Coercion. The case must be dismissed. In Santos vs. Orda Jr., GR No. 189402, May 6, 2010, it was held by the Supreme Court, “ We would like to stress that the purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with the crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of the public trial.” They also cited Saavedra Jr. vs. DOJ, 226 SCRA 444 that the duty of prosecutor during preliminary investigation investig ation demands outright termination of criminal prosecution when at the very start, it was bereft of factual and legal bases.
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OPPOSITION OR COMMENT Private complainant complainant Chun Suy Tay a.k.a Joseph Tay through his counsel Atty. Teresita Marbibi argued that accused’s motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to dismiss lacked lacked sufficiency in form and in substance. substance. According to the complainant, complainant, the motion averred factual issues within the purported knowledge of the accused, it should have been verified. verified. The attachments of the motion motion are not certified true copies. The motion failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of the three day prior notice rule in violation of Rule 15, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court providing: “ Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.”
The accused violated Rule Rule 13, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court when they they failed to give copy of their motion to him, to quote: “Sec. 2. Filing and service, defined. Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court. Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.”
He contended that the court’s order dated May 26, 2011 stated, “ Finding the information dated dated May 19, 2011 filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina F. Muego to be sufficient in form and substance, let a warranty of arrest be issued against the accused Capt. Charles D. Deen Jr., Ana Zuniga, Patricia Anne Romey and Jennifer Inopea” cannot anymore be subjected of a motion for judicial determination determination of probable cause and to dismiss , the Honorable Court have determined already probable cause that exists warranting the issuance of warrant of arrest. The said order become final and executory. The said order was not assailed promptly, and the accused posted the bail for their provisional liberty. Accused should now be arraigned as they failed to appeal the Resolution to the DOJ. Pursuant to Section 5 (a) , Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, the judge of trial court is mandated to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether probable cause exists and pursuant to its own findings, either dismiss the case immediately if there is no probable
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cause. Even before the effectivity of this Rule, the High Court enunciated the following ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul (151 SCRA 462), to wit, “ The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct re-investigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the court must be secured” (Citing Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural bank Inc. (327 SCRA 588); Solar Team vs. Judge How, 338 SCRA 511; People vs. Odilao, GR No. 155451, April 14, 2004). Before the RTC issues a warrant of arrest under Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court in relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must make a personal determination determination of the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.” Considering that the order dated May 26, 2011 stated the issuance of warrant of arrest against all the accused, the herein Presiding Judge has performed her work. She already determined the existence or non-existence of probable cause. The Office of the City Prosecutor Prosecutor of Pasay City id not commit grave grave discretion in issuing issuing the resolution dated dated May 19, 2011 in finding probable cause. cause. There is no grave abuse abuse of discretion by the Honorable Honorable Court in issuing the order dated May 26, 26, 2011. The determination determination of probable probable cause cause was supported by sufficient evidence. evidence. For the private complainant, probable cause meant such set of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested (Webb vs. De Leon 247 SCRA 652). In determining determining probable cause , the average man weights facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause cause needs only to rest on evidence showing showing that more likely than than not a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction ( People vs. Aruta 288 SCRA 626). What is the purpose of judicial determination of probable cause when the prosecutor’s Office already performed its job of executive determination of probable cause warranting the crimes of grave coercion as in fact an information information had been filed in court? In the decided cases, the Supreme Supreme Court delineated the role, function and rationale of the executive determination of probable cause and the judicial determination of probable cause, to quote: “The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information information in court is an executive function (Hegerty vs. CA 456 Phil 542), one that properly pertains at the first instance of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice (Punzalan vs. Dela pena, GR No. 158543, July 21, 2004). For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in th determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion (Joaquin Jr. vs. Drilon 361 Phil 900). By grave abuse of discretion, is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility (First Women’s Credit Corp. vs. Hon. Perez et al., GR No. 169026, June 2006) citing Estrada vs. Desierto, GR No. 156160, December 9, 2004). The determination of probable cause
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to issue warrant of arrest is a judicial function. Probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances circumstances that would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, a judge before issuing a warrant of arrest, must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime was committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. Otherwise, the judge merely determines the the probability, if not the certainty certainty of the guilt of the accused accused and, in so doing, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. The judge simply personally review the prosecutor’s initial; determination of probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence (People vs. CA et al., GR No. 126005, January 21, 1999). These two roles, functions and stages were performed by the Office of the Prosecutor and the Honorable Court. Complainant charged the accused with several crimes such as unlawful arrest, illegal detention, grave coercion, unjust vexation and falsification, only one charge was filed in court. There is basis for the filing of charge against accused Inopea. While it is true the WHEREFORE WHEREFORE or the dispositive portion failed failed to name accused Jenny Inopea, the same is not controlling as the substance of the body of the resolution and its concluding statements / findings provides the ratio decidendi or substance of the resolution dated May 19, 2011. For the complainant, all the elements of grave coercion were established by the resolution dated May 19, 2011 of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office. The allegations in the motion were refuted on Reply-Affidavit of the complainant. complainant. The grounds for disembarkation disembarkation must be proven proven in a full blown blown trial because these are evidentiary in nature. The applicability of the Tokyo Convention necessitates a determination of both the legal and factual issues in a full blown trial. The Tokyo Convention does not apply because the aircraft involved is PAL, allegedly on flight is registered under the Philippines, thus Philippine law applies. Assuming for the sake of argument that aircraft was on flight ( this is not an admission that complainant was found security risk, nor an admission that the aircraft was on flight); without those facts, being priorly proven by substantial evidence, Tokyo Convention applies, accused cannot yet put up this defense. Section 81 (b) 9 and 12 of the Civil Aviation Aviation Authority Authority Act of 2008 ( RA No. 9497) cannot help them. The arguments adduced by the accused need trial on the merits. merits. As correctly correctly ruled in the resolution dated May 19, 2011 of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office, Office, the presumption of regularity of official duty under under Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence applies only to government officials or government employees. He prayed that the motion for judicial determination determination of probable cause and to dismiss be denied.
ISSUES (1) Whether or not the motion for determination of probable cause and to dismiss is insufficient in form because because it lacked verification, it failed to comply with Rule Rule 15, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court and it violated Rule 13, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court. (2) Whether or not this Court can still determine probable cause despite the issuance of warrant of arrest. arrest.
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(3) Whether or not the motion for determination of probable cause and to dismiss this case should be granted.
APPLICABLE APPLICABLE LAW Art. 286. Grave coercions. coercions. — The penalty of arresto mayor mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong. If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from so doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.
RULING As the issues in this case are intertwined, this Court begs for leave to discuss them all jointly in order.
The motion for determination of probable cause and to dismiss is sufficient in form.
Under Rule Rule 15, Sections Sections 1 to 10 of the Revised Revised Rules Rules of Court which is suppletory to the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, there is no necessity that a motion must be verified. The notice of hearing rule is not applicable in this case as can be gleaned by the Court’s order dated June 27, 2011. The movant Atty. Minerva Capulong, defense counsel, was holding a copy of the motion at that time so it did not surprise Atty. Teresita Marbibi, private prosecutor anymore. She was able to oppose and argue orally on Atty. Minerva Capulong’s Capulong’s oral motion to defer arraignment arraignment for the purpose of filing a motion to quash or to dismiss the case . Consequently, there is no need to set such motion for a hearing day because Atty. Teresita Marbibi was notified of such motion in open court and she was given ten (10) days to file her comment and / or opposition. The rule on notice of hearing is relaxed in criminal cases. Where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the cases. Litigations should be, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities( technicalities( Goldloop Properties vs. CA 212 SCRA 498). The granting of motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing or proof of service thereof is merely an irregularity in the proceeding which cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case (People vs. Leviste 255 SCRA 247). There are are cases cases that cured the the defect of the three day notice rule 393) and such as when the party receive the notice (Sunga vs. Lacson 23 SCRA 393) filed a motion ( Llanto vs. Dimaporo 16 SCRA 599). This Court’s order order dated July 14, 2011 directing directing defense counsels counsels Atty. Minerva Capulong and and Atty. Jose Cabatuando Cabatuando Jr. to furnish furnish copy of their motion motion to private
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prosecutor Atty. Teresita Teresita Marbibi Marbibi rendered rendered the issue on alleged violation of Rule 13, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court moot and academic.
This Court can still determine probable cause despite the issuance of warrant of arrest. arrest.
In Crespo vs. Mogul 151 SCRA 462 (1987), the Supreme Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case should be addressed addressed to the trial court that has the option to grant or deny the same. This rule applies to a motion to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused ( Odin Security Agency, Inc. v. Sandiganbayan, Sandiganbayan, 365 SCRA 351). 351). There is no law proscribing the Court to take a second look at a motion to determine probable cause, after the issuance issuance of a warrant of arrest. arrest. The only qualification qualification is that the action action of the trial court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law (Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575). 575). In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss must be based upon considerations other than the judge’s own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial court court judge judge must be convinced convinced that there there was, was, indeed, indeed, no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge’s own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution’s word for its supposed insufficiency. insufficiency. Therefore, this Court is not bound by the findings of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office in this case. The purpose of judicial determination determination of probable cause is to paraphrase paraphrase the decided cases of Hashim of Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216; Trocio vs. Manta, 118 SCRA 241 (1941); and Salonga vs. Hon. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), that is, to secure an innocent person against hasty, faulty and, therefore, oppressive proceedings; to protect him from an open and extensively publicized accusation of crimes; to spare him the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial; and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. To explicate the enormous power of this Court to determine probable cause, it was held in SSS vs. DOJ et al., G.R. No. 158131, August 8, 2007 , that the prosecutors’ prosecutors’ finding are not conclusive. conclusive. “ In dismissing petitioner’s petition, the Court of Appeals held: This Court has no power to determine whether probable cause to warrant prosecution exist or not. x x x [T]he determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of [respondent Martels] should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutor x x x. In this Petition, We are being asked to assume the function of Public Prosecutor by determining whether probable cause exists or not. Such is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform x x x. “ This is a misstatement of the law. This Court and the Court of Appeals possess the power to review findings of
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prosecutors in preliminary investigations ( See Ladlad vs. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172070-72, June 1, 2007; Principio Principio vs. Barrientos, Barrientos, G.R. No. 167025, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 639). 639). Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutor’s prosecutor’s findings, (See Acuña vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, 450 SCRA 232) courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutor’s findings are supported by the facts, or as in this case, by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary, exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of this Court’s review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted (See NBI-Microsoft Corporation vs. Hwang, 460 SCRA 428) 428) and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution � See Ladlad vs. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172070-72, June 1, 2007). This 2007). This Court wishes to emphasize that the determination of probable cause by the Office of the City Prosecutor is merely delegated to it under the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
Independent Assessment of the Case
The motion for determination of probable cause and to dismiss this case should be granted.
This Court entertains reasonable doubt as to the veracity veracity of the charge charge of of Grave Coercion.
First, the complaint-affidavit is unsubstantiated. It consisted of mere allegations of private complainant complainant Chun Suy Tay. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof (De Jesus vs. Guerrero III et al., G.R. No. 171491, September 4, 2009). A llegations, llegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court � Manzano vs. Perez, Sr., 362 SCRA 430, 439 (2001).
Second, the complaint-affid complaint-affidavit avit did not specify specify who commit commit the alleged acts of grave coercion coercion as stated in the information information as none of the herein accused accused were ever identified and named therein. His police blotter at NCR Police Center for Aviation Security , Pasay City named only Jenny Lyn Lyn Angbeng as respondent. respondent. There is doubt as to the participation of each of the accused in the crime imputed against them because of the absence of a clear and positive identification identificatio n by the herein complainant. The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for, even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt 2 � People vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 478). In that regard, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake
2 People
vs. Esmale, G.R. Nos. 102981-82, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 578.
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cannot be accorded any evidentiary force3 (People vs. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000, 328 SCRA 185). The intervention of any mistake or the appearance of any weakness in the identification simply means that the accused's constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, thereby warranting an acquittal, 4 (People vs. Raquel, G.R. No. 119005, December 2, 1996; 265 SCRA 248, 259) even if doubt may cloud his innocence5 � Pecho vs. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996, 262 SCRA 518, 533) Indeed, the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to every individual is forever of primary importance, and every conviction for crime must rest on the strength of the evidence of the State, not on the weakness of the defense � People vs. Pidia, G.R. No. 112264, November 10, 1995, 249 SCRA 687, 702).
Third, all the elements of Grave Coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code are not established established which which are: are: (1) that a person person is prevented by another another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; (2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; intimidation; and (3) that the person who restrains restrains the will and liberty liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise exercise of any lawful right. right. There is reasonable reasonable cause to believe that it was complainant complainant who caused disturbance inside the aircraft. He took a different seat from his boarding boarding pass. In doing this, he violated the PAL’s CESS policy. policy. The complaint affidavit showed that he got entangled verbally with a male steward who told him that his seat has an additional payment which surprised him because it was the first time he was assessed additional charges for transferring to another seat. 6 He considered it as a problem.7 It was a problem that caused trouble inside the aircraft because his complaint complaint alleged that a pilot made made a public announcement announcement inside the plane that “We apologize. There is a troublemaker on board the aircraft that is creating a problem.” This court notes that there was no mention mention of the troublemaker, troublemaker, yet it was the complainant who got humiliated, meaning, he admits being the one alluded to as a troublemaker. troublemaker. Otherwise, he will will not feel humiliated at all, and so there there is no reason for him to disembark disembark from the the plane. The complaintcomplaint- affidavit affidavit did not not give the the particular particular name of the female stewardess stewardess who said, “Sorry, it is no longer longer our business. You are now under police custody. We are now turning you over to police investigation and detention.” detention. ” These alleged words were not stated in the information informatio n against the accused as none appeared to have uttered those words. Moreover, complainant was escorted by the police officers. 8 Nowhere in his complaint-affidavit complaint-affidavit stated that accused Capt. Charles Deen Jr., Ana Zuniga, Patricia Anne Romey and Jennifer Inopea conspired and confederated together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law and by means of threats, intimidation, intimidation , prevented prevente d herein private complainant from taking Philippine Airlines Flight PR-306 bound for Hong Kong by compelling him to disembark the said PAL Flight. Instead, he quietly went with the police officers to avoid further embarrassment and to avoid causing commotion that would disturb the peace
3 ;
Natividad vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40233, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346; People vs. Beltran, L-31860, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 246, 250; People vs. Manambit, G.R. Nos. 72744-45, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 344, 377; People vs. Maongco, G.R. Nos. 108963-65, March March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 562, 575. 575. 4 People vs. S alguero, G.R. No. 89117, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 357; Natividad vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L-40233, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346. 5 Perez vs. S andiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 76203-04, December 6, 1989, 180 SCRA 9; People vs. Sadie, No. L-66907, April 14, 1987, 149 SCRA 240; U.S. vs. Gutierrez, 4 Phil. Phil. 493 (1905). 6 Paragraph 6 of Complaint-Affidavit dated July 21, 2010. 7 Paragraph 8 of Complaint-Affidavit Complaint-Affidavit dated July 21, 2010. 8 Paragraph 13 of Complaint-Affidavit Complaint-Affidavit dated July 21, 2010.
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and order inside the aircraft.9 Convincingly, Convincingly, he disembarked disembarked upon his own volition. volition. He left peacefully from the plane. His disembarkation was due to him, and his taking a different seat from his his boarding pass without paying for it, rather he argued argued with a male steward as to what is the basis of additional charges when he was not immediately shown document document authorizing such charges, charges, can be considered as the proximate proximate cause. “He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused” applies to the herein complainant complainant as to why he was was refused to be boarded boarded by PAL. His presence presence in the aircraft, causing a public disturbance disturbance and delaying the flight, is inimical to the interest of both the other passengers and the plane. Therefore, it was justified that he be off loaded which he did not protest at all. Had there been violence, threats or intimidation, said complainant could have produced verifiable proofs like a medical certificate showing that he sustained physical injuries because he resisted while being forcibly disembarked disembarked from the plane or affidavit affidavit of a witness like like his seatmate in the plane to support his assertions. Absence of these proofs, this Court cannot overturn the constitutional constitutional presumption of innocence innocence enjoyed by all the accused as of this moment. Complainant Chun Suy Tay only learned from the police officers that PAL management accused him as a security risk and they were ordered to arrest him, remove him and bring him to the police station.10 This a hearsay evidence. His allegations are contradictory with the affidavit of his witnesses PO2 Joie Basco and PO2 Rosendo Jaspe who have no personal knowledge of the incident that happened inside the plane. His complaint and the the affidavit of his witnesses did not not state the attendance attendance of force, violence or intimidation intimidation by herein accused to make them liable for grave grave coercion.
Lastly, herein complainant alleged that he is bound for Hong Kong on PAL Flight PR 306 on April 21, 2010 because he will attend important business meeting and to close and sign two contracts in the amount of Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00) and Five Million Dollars ($5, 000,000.00), yet this Court observes that he bought the economy class plane ticket. Common observation observation and experience dictate that a big shot businessman businessman who will sign Fifteen Million Dollars ($15, 000,000.00) 000,000.00) contracts will board either a business class or first class plane accommodation, accommodation, and not go to an economy class then take a Choice Economy Seat without prior permission, much more without payment, and when asked for transfer of seat with alternative to pay, will argue with the steward and demand the document authorizing additional charges. charges. This casts doubt as to the credibility of the complainant. “There is no standard by which the weight of conflicting evidence can be ascertained. We have no test of the truth of human testimony except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience.”
Considering that the elements of grave coercion are absent in this case, this Court will not discuss anymore the applicability of the Tokyo Convention and its implication with the authority of the aircraft’s captain to impose reasonable measures against the passengers passengers who may jeopardize good order and discipline discipline on board the aircraft as well as the disputable presumption of the regular performance of official duty. However, in passing, this Court sustains the view of Assistant City Prosecutor Janette Herras-Baggas of Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office.
9 Paragraph
14 of Complaint-Affidavit Complaint-Affidavit dated July 21, 2010. 11 of Complaint-Affidavit Complaint-Affidavit dated July 21, 2010.
10 Paragraph
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The prosecution’s prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot cannot be allowed to draw draw strength from the weakness weakness of the evidence of the defense. A strong possibility of guilt guilt is not insufficient. insufficient. The filing of a criminal criminal case does not mean an outright culpability of the accused. accused. It must pass the criteria of accuracy, reliability and credibility.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, this Court resolves to GRANT GRANT the instant motion. This case is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Pasay City, August 1, 2011.
ELIZA B. YU Presiding Judge Copy furnished: Pros. Luis Christopher Ballelos OCP-Pasay City Hall of Justice Atty. Teresita Marbibi Private Prosecutor Marbibi and Associates Law Office Units 505-506 Vellagio Tower Leon Guinto St. Cor. , Malate, Manila Atty. Minerva Miclat-Capulong Atty. Jose Cabatuando Jr. Defense Counsels PAL Legal Affairs Department 8th Floor, PNB PNB Financial Center Pres. Diosdado Macapagal Ave., Ave., CCP Complex, Pasay City Chun Suy Tay Private complainant 10A Washington Tower, Marina, Asia World Property, Paranaque City Capt. Charles Deen Jr. Ana Zuniga Patricia Anne Romey Jennifer Inopea Accused 8th Floor, PNB PNB Financial Center Pres. Diosdado Macapagal Ave., CCP Complex, Pasay City
