William E. Carlo • The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence and Matter to Existence

THE ULTIMATE REDUCTIBILITY OF ESSENCE TO EXISTENCE IN EXISTENTIAL METAPHYSICS

by

WILLIAM E. CARLO BOSTON COLLEGE

Preface by

W. NORRIS CLARKE, S.J.

MAR TI NUS

NI J H Q F F

/ THE HA GU E

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T H E U L T I M A T E R E D U C TI T I B I LI L I T Y OF OF E S S E N C E TO E X I S T E N C E IN E X I S T E N T I A L M E T A P H Y S I C S

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THE ULTIMATE REDUCTIBILITY OF ESSENCE TO EXISTENCE IN EXISTENTIAL METAPHYSICS

by W I L L I A M E. C A R L O BO STO N COLLEGE

M A R T I N U S N I J H O F F / T H E H A G U E / 1966

Copyright iç66 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands Al l rights reserved, includin g the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

In Memoriam M s g r .

GERALD B. PHELAN

Priest , Scholar and Metaphysician

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PREFACE

This is an exciting book - at least to those who already know something about the Thomistic metaphysics of essence and existence and who are interested in basic seminal ideas in philosophy. For it appears at a most opportune time in the con temporary development of Thomism. It has now become pretty widely accepted among Thomistic circles that the rediscovery of the act of existence as the central insight of the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas is one of the decisive turning points in the history of Thomism - and of metaphysics itself. All of its repercussions have b y no means been felt yet. Bu t as the implications of the doctrine have slowly worked their way out in the minds of con temporary Thomists in many quarters of the world, it has become apparent that the supposed solid front of all Thomists in holding to the celebrated traditional Thomistic thesis of the real distinction of essence and existence is not quite so solid as the verbal formula would lead one to believe. For the same technical formula, it gradually be came evident, can conceal two considerably divergent interpretations of the relation of essence to the act of existence. In the older, long traditional view, esse (the act of existing, or 'To be ” ) was indeed the supreme act and perfection. Y et essence, if pushed to the limit, seemed to have a certain ontological positivity of its own to contribute (even though only in composition with esse), so that esse could be said to be added on to it from without, so to speak, as actuali zing the perfections conceived to be somehow the contribution of the essence in itself. The notion of essence as real potency, as real recipient principle, entering into relations of something akin to reciprocal causality with respect to esse, could easily be pressed in the same direction, toward what some have come to call the "heavy” or "solid” notion of essence. The stress on the real distinction, the real compositino, of the two as the absolutely essential point to be preserved, rather

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than limitation or participation, is another typical characteristic of the same line of interpretation. I t is this viewpoin t which has ce rtainly been dominant in the great commentators on St. Thomas, who have in large part formed the outlook of the Thomistic school down to the recent present. But it is also noteworthy that, as current studies are revealing more and more, these same commentators - with the excep tion perhaps of Banez - never quite caught the full nov elty and depth of St. Thomas' notion of the act of existence as the source of all perfections, including intelligibility. The other view takes with full seriousness the affirmation that the act of existence is the source of all perfections, both in God and in creatures, and that all diversity and grades of being can only arise by limitation within the act of esse itself and not by anything added on to it. Hence essence must be understood not so much as a real recipient subject whose own potential perfections are being actualized from with out (though this mode of speaking is legitimate at a certain incomplete and superficial level of vision), but rather as a negating principle which contains nothing positive of its own at all (though always attached to a positive) but performs the sole function of limi ting from within the act of esse to which it belongs and which it helps to constitute as a particular determined act of esse distinct from the pure plenitude of esse alone. Thus each particular new existent (=new act of esse) will, because of its internal negating-limiting principle, contain only a certain determined qualitative “ quantum " (to use the author's own perilous but highly suggestive term) of the unique all-embracing perfection of esse. Each new particular finite existent will be thought of, accordingly, not so much as an essence receiving, or being actualized by , an act of existence, as though the essence itself were the subject, actualized from without, but rather as a limited, determined, particu larized act of existence, which becomes a new subject precisely by being fixed through its internal negating principle at one determinate enduring mode of essey becoming a new center and source of its own action, a new limited expression of the total perfection of esse. The trouble, however, with this under-the-surface controversy, is that both points of view, both interpretations of essence, can find enough textual support in St. Thomas to justify being defended respectably as Thomistic. Pure textual criticism, therefore, cannot settle the issue apodictically, though I myself, together with the author, believe that the deepest and most ultimate level of under standing of the essence/existence doctrine in the texts themselves is consistently dominated by the second point of view.

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IX

In the presence of this partial textual ambiguity, contemporary Thomists who believe that St. Thomas' doctrine of essence and existence has something of permanent - not merely historical - value to contribute to the understanding of reality must take the responsi bility of think ing through his basic insigh t consistently on their own and formulating it in new language where necessary, in order to avoid the ambiguities resulting from St. Th omas' attemp t - in his desire to remain as close as possible to the language of his predecessors and contemporaries - to fuse two perhaps not fully com patible perspectives into a single technical formula that partially straddles both. Thomists have so far, however, been a little reluctant to bring the issue clearly out into the open and commit themselves decisively one way or the other. Even those sympathetic to the negative view of essence have feared that too clear-cut a commitment to it might endanger the ven erable traditional thesis of the real distinction between existence and essence, which has always been the hallmark of the Thomistic school. An d ye t the issue m ust be thought through rigorously and consistent ly, no matter what the consequences to technical formulas or contro versial landmarks. Few Thomists known to me toda y have faced this problem and tried to think it through to its ultimate consequences with more lucidity, consistency, and metaphysical daring than the author of the present book. Following up on our joint platform discussion of Fr. Gerald Phelan's pioneering paper along these lines in the 1957 American Catholic Philosophical Convention, I had the privilege, as editor of the International Philosophical Quarterly, of presenting to a wide public the first extended exposition of the author's views in his long article, 'T h e Role of Essence in Existen tial Metaphys ics: A Reappraisal" (December, 1962). This article excited considerable attention at the time, including a long and laudatory comment by one of the leading Spanish Suarezian metaphysicians , J. Hellin, S. J., in Pensamiento (1964, no. 1), who, precisely as many Thomists had feared, took it as a decisive step toward abandoning the real distinction, long the principal point of contention between Suarezians and Thomists in metaphysics. The present work, though incorporating most of the material of the earlier article, goes considerably further. It provides a valuable and illuminating historical test case, in the position of Giles of Rome, against which to measure the authentic Thom istic interpretation of the essence/existence distinction. The special interest of Giles' doctrine is

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that, while apparently holding the same real distinction of essence and existence as St. Thomas, he goes to the furthest extreme conceivable for a Christian philosopher in assigning to essence a reality and onto logical solidity of its own. But the special metaphysical daring of the author comes out in the new chapter he has added on the nature of primary m atter, interpreted as nothing but a limiting or negating mode of esse itself, instead of as some positive ultimate subject really distinct from both form and esse. This seems to me a necessary consequence of the basic position he is defending, and Professor Carlo is not afraid to face it. As he points out, the notion of matter as a positive substratum (though of course in authentic Aristotelianism and Thomism it is indeterminate of itself and cannot exist save as informed and actuated by existing form) is one of the most tenacious holdouts of pure Aristotelianism in Thomism, and one to which the least efforts have been devoted to explicitly and rigorously integrating it into St. Thomas' radically new insight into the primacy of the act of existence. St. Thomas himself, as the author shows, has a number of profound and highly s uggestive texts on matter as non-being of itself and as deficient esse, but he is still for the most part, it seems to me, content to leave the Aristotelian treatment of matter and form intact where there is no pressing need to relate it to his own new metaphysics of esse and creation. And Thomists since that time have paid even less attention to integrating it into a rigorously unified metaphysics of the act of existence. Hence this part of the author's work is sure to prove the most controversial and the most difficult to assimilate into Thomistic metaphysics without notable dislocation of its existing structure, at least with respect to the technical formulas and articulations of the various components of the system. Yet, despite my reluctance to abandon my own long-established and convenient categories, the more I reflect, the more advantages I see in interpreting substantial change as simply a shift from one essential mode of esse to another, within the continuity of esse itself, seen not just as accidentally but as essentially plastic, elastic, transformable, with out importing any new positive metaphysical principle over and above esse plus a graded series of negations. It seems to me - and here I am going beyond the explicit analyses of the author to embark upon my own reflections - that the permanently valid essential of the argu ment put forward by Aristotle for prime matter is the necessity of some essentially indeterminate and determinable principle to explain substantial change. But the two other requirements added on by

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Aristotle himself, those of radic al passivity and rad ical imp erfection of this principle of continuity, seem to me to have been introduced not from the pure logical and metaphysica l exigencies of the argument bu t from two further premisses proper to his own philosophical and cultural outlook: namely, that all perfection, including activity, is rooted in form, the principle of determination and intelligibility, and that the infinite, or the indeterminate in general, can only be a principle of imperfection. Once one eliminates these two extra premisses, the indeterminacy required for substantial change could just as well be that of the one principle of perfection, which does not necessarily have to remain fixed at one essential mode of perfection but can slip, so to speak, under the action of causal influences, from one essential level of limitation to another, as though it were a fundamental energy capable of being molded or channelled in infinitely diverse ways. The repercussions, of course, of this rather radically new way of conceiving of substantial change would have to be carefully worked out and reflected on first before I would be willing to commit myself decisively to this restructuring of the metaphysical architecture of the Thomistic system. But I have found it profoundly challenging and fruitful to make the effort to begin rethinking the problem of change in these fresh new terms. But what of matter as the principle of individuation in the same species, the other key Thomistic doctrine depending on prime matter as a principle? It might seem at first far more difficult to explain the quantitative extension of signate matter as merely a negation or limitation of esse. Yet here again one should not close the door on this new possibility too quickly. Most of the great metaphysicians in history, both western and eastern, have tended to look on matter in the last analysis as more of a negation, a deficiency in being, than a solid positive factor, despite the appearance to our senses. And it seems to me profoundly stimulating and fruitful to the metaphysician to make the effort to try and think spatial distance as really only the defective presence of what we c!all material beings or bodies to each other, and to rethink the multiplicity of parts of an extended material body as nothing more than a deficiency or limitation in the concentration, unity, and power of a form (itself already only a limited mode of esse), as a further relaxing or partial disintegration (as Plotinus would put it) of the pure concentrated unity-presence of esse in its plenitude. Hence I think Thomists and all serious metaphysicians have only to gain by taking up the challenge of Professor Carlo to think through reality in terms of the powerful unified vision he proposes in this book.

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Before concluding, there is one objection I should like to discuss which will surely occur to any careful reader who has grasped the significance of the notion of essence as negative limitation within the act of esse : will not this so weaken the meaning of the real distinction between essence and existence as practically to do aw ay with it, or retain it only in name? For how can a negative limiting principle within the sole positive perfection of esse be said to be really distinct from the latter, to form a real composition with it ? This is indeed a serious objection. But before attempting to cope with it direc tly, let me say that I see nothing sacrosanct or indispensa ble in this technical formula, so th at it must at all costs be preserved for its own sake. It seems to me that it might, if necessary, be let go and leave intact the essential core of the Thomistic doctrine of existence and essence. This essential core consists, to my mind, in the notion of limited acts of existence, of multiple diversely limited participations in the single all-inclusive perfection of the act of existing. And this limitation of the diverse acts of esse must be an objective intrinsic ontological state of affairs within each finite being. How one can best express this ontological state of affairs in technical terms, by the conceptual tools of real distinction and real composition or in some other way, perhaps going no further than to speak of intrinsic limi tation deriving from an extrinsic efficient cause, seems to me a matter of secondary significance, though still worthy of careful attention. But is it in fact necessary to abandon the real distinction if one accepts the notion of essence as negative limit within the act of existence ? It does seem undeniable that the notion of real distinction must be attenuated and refined down to the limit if it is to remain a fit instrument for expressing such a doctrine. Essence certainly cannot be looked upon as another complementary positive - albeit lower - aspect of reality ordered to combine with the higher perfection of the act of existence, as some kind of real recipient with something positive of its own to contribute. Nor does the essence/existence relation lend itself with ease to explicatio n in terms of reciprocal causality, since it is hard to apply the name “cause” in any meaningful way to a negative limiting principle all of whose positivity lies not in itself but in that which it limits. Would it be enough, then, to say merely th at every finite being is an intrinsically limited act of existence, with the limitation explained simply by the restricting action of its extrinsic efficient cause? This hypothesis seems attractive at first sight and deserves to be explored.

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But it has its own drawbacks. We would then run up against the difficulty that the action of the efficient cause is nothing but its actual intrinsic result in its effect, considered as from the agent, not some kind of determinate third e ntity distinct from both the agent and the effect. Hence the negating or limiting principle, that to which the limitation is due, must be actually immanent, performing its function, so to speak, within the finite existent itself. Thus it seems impossible to avoid postulating some kind of objective duality of principles, duality of functions, duality of opposite poles, within the finite existent itself, even though originating from its cause. This can justify, if not act ually demand, something like the terms “real distinction, real composition,” to express it, despite the undeniably dangerous and over “heavy” connotations of the expressions if taken too literally. And this objective dua lity in the being is reflected in our cognitive representation of it b y the fact that it is strictly impossible for us to think or speak of the ontological situation without an irreducible duality of terms : limitedesse, finite-being, participated-perfection, etc. The above considerations may indeed add up to sufficient reasons for maintaining the traditional technical description of finite being as a real composition of essence and the act of existence. Yet the disadvan tages of the terminology still seem to me very great, especially for communication to the modern philosophical mind (though it must be admitted that outside of the Thomistic school no other major philo sophical school seems ever to have accepted it either). At best, the real distinction is a poor way of saying something worthwhile. Perhaps it is stretching human language too far to attempt to express in a single formula the mysterious “composition” of positivity and negation that is at the heart of the finite. Perhaps the only adequate way of expressing the situation is through dialectical language, where we say that the limiting principle or ontological negation within a finite act of existence is both other than what it limits and not other. St. Thomas himself, it should be remembered, much prefers the vague terminology of “ other than ” to exprêss the relation of essence to existence than “ real distinction or composition,” which he uses only with extreme rarity. In conclusion, there are serious advantages and disadvantages to retaining the traditional terminology of the real distinction between essence and existence, if one wishes to think through the primacy of the act of esse as radically as does Professor Carlo in this book. Yet I do not think this position forces one to abandon this long-consecrated technical language, though it certainly would force us to attenuate its

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realism to the limit. I suggest that we may finalfy be led, for the sake of better communication with other philosophers and the avoidance of the almost insuperable ambiguities of the traditional language, to a more modest and less explicit formula something like this: in every finite being there is an intrinsic ontological duality or tension between the perfection of the act of esse and a partial negation or limitation of the same act. How real or really distinct the negating, limiting principle would be, would be left veiled in prudent metaphysical silence, out of respect for the limits of language. A t an y rate, Professor Carlo deserves our gratitude for having invited us, through his challenging book, to the profoundly stimulating and purifying metaphysical experience of thinking through the whole of reality as but varying limited expressions of the one all-embracing perfection of the act of existence. Such an interpretation of Thomism, it seems to me, would make it stand out as the most p owerfully unified metaphysical vision of the world in the whole of Western thought, and one also with the closest spiritual affinities of any to the great religiousmetaphysical world-visions of the Orient. This would make it easier also, I might add, to understand how God, in knowing Himself alone, automatically knows all possible creatures. For each one of these particularized divine ideas, or “possibles,” would be generated simply by the divine intelligence contemplating the single simple infinite Act of existence which is the divine essence in itself, and simultaneously positing an ordered series of negations of various aspects of this primal plenitude, each partial negation delivering a new finite mode of esse, such as, “being, but not eternal, not self-conscious, not living, not omnipresent, e tc.” This is but one of the many fruitfu l applications of a primacy of esse metaphysics thought through consistently. I invite the reader to discover and explore the others for himself. Fordham University

W.

N o r r is

Cl a r k e ,

S.J

FOREWORD

I am indebted to many people, but I should like to acknowledge my indebtedness publicly to some : Professor Etienne Gilson, whose origi nal research sets the background for an y research in this area; R ev. Ar mand Maurer, C.S.B. for his competent help particularly on the ma terial of Chapter II ; Rev. Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., whose work has been a constant source of light and inspiration. I owe most to Dr. Anton C. Pegis, who made me aware of quality work by his own high standards of critical scholarship and historical integrity. He introduced me to this area of research and this particular topic. I am profoundly grateful that he has always been able to see farther ahead than I have. The encouragement and criticism both positive and negative of Rev . W. Norris Clarke, S.J. springing from his profound scholarship has been a source of real stim ulus for this work. I wish to thank him also for the illuminating and original preface. Deep thanks are due to: Dr. John F. Kiley and Dr. James Kelly of Merrimack College without whose help this book might never have been; and m y gradu ate assistants, Mr. Frank Gendreau and Mr. James McGregor w ho gave generously of their time and energies in the com pletion of the manuscript and the proofs, as did Mr. John Donnelly and Mr. John Conolly. Miss Jean McCarthy has been invaluable in the typing and preparation of the manuscript. I should like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all my colleagues at Boston College, to Professors Norman Wells and Donald Gallagher and praticularly the chairmen of the Philosophy Department, R ev. Frederick Adelmann, S.J. and Joseph Flanagan, S.J. for providing an atihosphere of intellectual stimulation and warm friendship most conducive and necessary to work. I wish also to thank the editors of the International Philosophical Quarterly and the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, and the Board of Trustees of the University of Toronto for permission to use certain material. Boston College

W i l l i a m

E.

Ca r l o

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CONTENTS

Preface by W. Norris Clarke S.J

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Forew ord

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Introduction

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I. The problem : The ontological status of e ss e n ce 1. App arently contradictory texts in Thomas Aquinas . . 2. Methodology 3. The historical location of the p ro bl em .....................

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II. Essence as the extrinsic limitation of E s s e 1. Creation and e s s e 2. Contem porary analysis of ens by reciprocal causes . . . 3. Creation and the diversification of esse 4. Un ity and plurality in cr ea tio n A. The uniform ity of the creative a c t B. The composition of the creature 5. The indeterminate nature of b e i n g A. The contraction of b e i n g Being and the origin of plurality Reduction of plurality to co m p o si tio n Composition of genus and sp e c ie s The indetermination of divine e s s e Critique of Thomas Aquinas Composition of potency and a c t Conclusion B. The form of b e in g Conclusion 6. Graeco-Arabian s o u rc e s

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vu x v i 4 8 10 14 18 18 20 22 31 31 36 39 39 40 41 43 46 48 54 56 57 67 67

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CONTENTS

A. Being and un ity in the De C a u s i s B. Conclusion

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III. Essence as the intrinsic limitation of E s s e 1. Essence and the p o s s ib le s 2. Pote ncy, act and e s s e 3. Perfection and e s s e 4. The ultim ate reducibility of essence to esse 5. Causality 6. Analo gy and e s s e 7. Existence and the doctrine of the divine ideas 8. The distinction of essence and e s s e

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87 91 92 96 99 106 106 107 109

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IV. Metaphysical ve rific at ion 116 1. The ontological status of prime m at te r 11 7 2. Hypothes is: the metaphysical articulations of esse and matter 121 3. Matter as a mode of esse 124 4. The plastic ity of e s s e 126 5. Matter as deficient be in g 127 6. The ontological location of prime m a tt e r 131 ................................................................

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Conclusion The rehabilitation of essence The scientific structure of Thomistic m e ta p h y si cs

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137 140 141

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Bibliography In d e x

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148

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of the primacy of existence is a profound achievement of contemporary philosophical research similar to the revolutionary character of the transformation worked in the conceptual framework of Classical Physics by the concepts of Modern Physics. This authentic metaphysical insight has been discovered and explicitly elaborated by contemporary thinkers. But today does not endure. Already it is tomorrow and the mind looks ahead to the fruitful developments and new directions for metaphysical discovery. What difference will the doctrine of the primacy of existence make to metaphysics? Will metaphysics remain like the statue of Francis Bacon, worshipped from afar but without movement or progress? Already, the effort is well underway to rewrite the basic metaphysical doctrines in terms of this new principle. But is it merely a question of re-interpreting the fundamental metaphysical doctrines in terms of the primacy of existence, or do we find that the effort, when forthcoming, re-illuminates the prime principle itself and lays bare aspects of existence, levels of existence, and existential structure which we would otherwise overlook and pass by unheeded? If existence is the primary principle of metaphysics, in what exactly does this primacy consist ? If existence has finally supplanted essence at the metaphysical roof of the universe, in that long development from Plato to contemporary Existentialism, does this mean that the understanding of the relations of existence and essence also need rethinking and rewriting? Can the relations of existence and essence remain the same in the face of such a radical transformation of prima cy? Are we still able to conce ive of essence and existence as ‘ 'separate but eq ual” with existence simp ly “ more equal” than essence? But does not the primacy of existence demand as a logical and natural corollary

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INTRODUCTION

the subordination of essence, even as essence, if not only the existence of essence but all its perfection comes from existence, including that last cherished inheritance, of which no one ever thought it could be dispossessed, the very knowability and intelligibility of essence itself ? Then wh at happens to essence? How can it keep the “ separate but equal” status of one member of a pair of reciprocal causes? What ultim ately is the ontolog ical status of essence ? With in this question is located the basic thesis, the fundamental line of argumentation around which this study revolves? First of all, our fundamental approach is an examination of essence, or perhaps a reappraisal of essence in the light of the recent developments in exist ential metaphysics. In that metaphysical revolution from an essential metaphysics to an existential metaphysics, from a metaph ysics built on the primacy of essence to one which establishes existence as the foun dation of metaphysics, is it possible to leave all else as it was ? Or does the movement of existence to the metaphysical roof of the universe demand a profound metaphysical reorientation? Obviously an essence which was the object of metaphysics, or, at least, its primary component, which possessed some sort of being of its own, enshrined in the invention and popularization of the term esse essentiae, can no longer fulfill the role to which it has become ac customed. The alternatives are an ultimate duality at the origin of metaphysics and the universe, or the subordination of essence to the actual primacy of existence, a development which even some confirmed existentialists seem to contemplate with reluctance. The doctrine of the Primacy of Existence plus the doctrine of Essence as a Mode of Being, implicit in the notion of existence as the Thesaurus of the Perfection of Being, develops naturally to the doctrine of the Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Esse. When we trace the history of metap hysics we find a development from a metaphysics of unity to a metaphysics of being, and from a metaphysics of being as essence to a metaphysics of being as existence. When the doctrine of the primacy of existence is added to the Greek universe of essence, can the metaphysics of Plato, Plotinus and Proclus be left intact ? Does the philosophy of nature of Aristotle still operate independently and autonomously ? Or does the doctrine of the primacy of existence demand a complete re-orientation and revision of the major metaph ysical doctrines ? If we were to attempt such a re-thinking, purely as an experimental approach, what would be the result ? It is an interesting experiment, to

INTRODUCTION

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say the least, and one with profoundly significant results. If we should reinterpret the major metaphysical doctrines in terms of existence, what does happen to essence, substance, matter, form, soul, the un ity of the human composite, analogy, the real distinction and the metaphy si cal basis of the logical structure of genus and species ? Do they remain exactly as they were ? Do insurmountable problems arise due to this re thinking ? Do all these doctrines lapse into self-contradictory formula tions when reduced to existence, or do the major metaphysical doctrines stand out clearer than before, and are many of the baffling and ap parently contradictory elements of these precise doctrines resolved and clarified ? Does the reduction of all the major metaphysical principles to existence as ultimate principle, source and end enable metaphysics to be more than a collection of insights and does it make possible the construction of an existential metaphysics on a truly scientific basis ? The Scientific Structure of a Thomistic Metaphysics depends on the Primacy of Esse and even more so, on the Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Esse. The same is true of matter and the other major metaph ysical doctrines. The doctrine of the Primacy of Existence is a halfway house to the doctrine of the Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence. Existence cannot stand self-sufficiently alongside the Platonic essence but must encompass and include it in the theory of Essence as a Mode of Esse. Our contention is that a whole universe of metaphysical possibilities opens up at this point, all flowing from and implying the doctrine of the Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence. There is still progress in metaphysics ; there is discovery ; there is the excitement of invention and innovation. Whether this is the direction in which the history and science of metaphysics w ill develop, is conjecture. B ut that the science of metaphysics will develop, this is certain !

CHAPTER

I

THE PROBLEM

Recent years have w itnessed certain developments in the interpretation of Thomistic thought. The distinction between an Existential meta physics and an Essential metaphysics seems to have been taken as the starting point for a major metaphysical effort.1 As a philosophical experiment the principle doctrines of Thomistic metaphysics are being 1 E. Gilson, Bei ng and Some Philosop her s, (Toronto, 1952) ; Intro duct ion à la Philoso phi e Chrétienne, (Paris, Vrin, i960); Ch. IX & X; pp. 193, 194 & 205; Le Thom isme (5e éd.; Paris: Vr in, 1947 ), Ch ap. 12 ; J. Ma rit ain , Pref ace to Me tap hysic s (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939) ; and Exis ten ce and the Ex iste nt (New York: Pantheon, 1950) ; J. de Finance, S. J., Être et agir (Paris: Beauchesne, 1945; 2d éd., Rome, i960); G. B. Phelan, “ A Note on the Formai Object of Metaphysics,” New Scho last icism , X V III (1944), 197-201; and “ The Being of Creatures,” Procee dings of the Am eric an Cath olic Phi loso phi cal Ass oci ati on, XXI (1957), p. 118 ff. and the comments (a) and (b) on this paper by W. E. Carlo and W. N. Clarke, S. J. Father Clarke makes this perceptive comment on Msgr. Ph elan’s paper : “ I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that Fr. Phelan’s paper is a significant milestone in the development of Am eri ca n Th om ist ic thou gh t. W ha t he ha s don e is to br ing ou t in the ope n am on g us som e thing that has received but little public recognition among Thomists anywhere and even less over here. This is the fact that behind the common front of Thomistic acceptance of the real distinction between essence and existence in all creatures there lies a rather profound diver gence of opinion on what this doctrine is really trying to say. The divergence concerns the precise role that is assigned to the principle of esse (the act of existence) in its relation to essence, and consequently the very meaning of essence itself.” W. Norris Clarke, S. J., “ Commentary (b),” Proce edings of the A C P A , XX I (1957), p. 128. I can on ly second Fr. Clarke’s remarks. My own reliance on Msgr. Phelan’s paper will be evident, but my debt to his work goes far deeper than this particular study. Also cf. J. Owens, C. Ss. R., Sa in t Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ., 1957). A complete biography wo uld be ne ces sar y to rec ogn ize su ffi ci en tl y the co nt rib uti on of Fr. Ow ens to thes e co nt em  porary developments. We should not overlook of course the work of : A. Forest, La Struct ure Mét aphy sique D u Concret , (Paris: Vrin, 1932, reprinted 1956); W. N. Clarke, S. J., “ W hat is Really Real,” Progres s in Ph iloso phy , ed. J. McWilliams, (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955); W. E. Carlo, “The Role of Essence in Existential M etaphysics: A Reapp raisal,” The International Phi los oph ica l Quarterly, II, 4, Dec. 1962, pp. 557-590; cf. also C. Fabro, Pa rti cipa tion et Causalité, (Louvain, 1961); A. Krempel, La Doct rine De La Rela tion Chez Sa int Thom as, (Paris: Vrin, 1952); N. J. Wells, “ Capreolus on Essence and Existence,” The Modern Schoolman, X X X V II I (1960-61) pp. 1-24 ; An excellent synopsis of the movements we are speaking of can be found in H. James John, S.N.D ., “ The Emergence of the Act of Existing in R ecent Thomism,” IP Q , II, 4, Dec., 1962, pp. 595-620. Mention should also be made of a recent wo rk ex ce ed in gl y ric h in in sig ht, A. Ha yen, S. J. , La Com mun icat ion De V Ê tr e, Vol. II, (Brussels: Desclee De Brouwer, 1959).

THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF ESSENCE

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rewritten from an existential point of view. The transcendentals, truth ,1 freedom,2 the proofs for the existence of God,3 the doctrine of the soul,4 substance,5 analogy,6 causa lity,7 - all these have come in for important and, in some instances, profound changes. But there is one tendency which if uncorrected might vitiate much of this original creative work. I am speaking of the natural inclination of the mind to ontologize essence. I do not mean the extreme forms of this doctrine, the reality of the Platonic forms, a realism of universal concepts, the Avicennian possibles, or all those doctrines in which the mediaeval thinkers gave to essence a being of its own. The esse essentiae of Hen ry of G hent,8 the “ being” of St. Bonaventure which is indiffer ent to individual existence,9 the Common Nature of Duns Scotus which does not exist bu t somehow is,10 even though it is not the logical universal, all these are extreme forms of the philosophical tendency to ontologize essences. With them can be classed the “ Th oug ht” of Descartes, the “Spirits” of Berkeley, the “a priori” of Kant and the “ Idea” of Hegel. But what I have in mind is a much more subtle manifestation of the same philosophical impulse. What I am suggesting is that the notion of essence as a primary philosophical conception must be handled with the greatest caution. In fact it has been suggested that it might be prefer able to substitute a term which w ould not contain the subtle inferences and metaph ysical suggestiveness, as well as positive intelligible content 1 G. Phelan, “ Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum,” Med iaeva l Stu die s, I (1939), 11-2 2; E. Sal mon, The Good in Existential Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ., 1952). 2 W. Carlo, “ Freedom and Human Knowledge,” in The Concept of Freedom , ed. C. Grindel, (Chicago: Regnery, 1955), P- 34 3 J. Owens, C.Ss.R., “ The Conclusion of the Prima Via,” The Modern Schoolman, XXX (1956), 33-53; 109-21; 203-15. 4 A. C. Pegis, “St. Thomas and the Unity of Man,” in Progress in Ph ilos oph y, ed. J. Mc W illi am s (M ilw auk ee: Bru ce , 195 5), pp. 15 3- 76 . 5 J. Maritain, “ On the Notion of Subsistence,” in Progres s in Phi los oph y, pp. 29-46. 6 G. Klubertanz, S. J., “ The Problem of the Analogy of Being,” Rev. of Me tap hysi cs, X (1 95 7 ), 553 - 79 , and his book St. Thom as Aq uin as on Ana logy (Chicago: Loyola Univ., i960); and the writings on analogy of G. Phelan, J. Anderson, A. Maurer, R. Masiello, (see the exhaustive bibliography in Klubertanz’s book for details). All these works, despite their sometimes conflicting conclusions have one thing in common: the attem pt to provide an existential foundation for the Thomistic doctrine of analogy. 7 Joseph O wens, C.Ss.R ., “ The Causal Proposition: Principle or Conclusion?” The Mod ern Schoo lman , XX X II (1955), 159 -71; 257-70; 323-39. 8 J. Paulus, He nr i de Gand: Es sa i sur les tendances de sa métaphys ique (Paris: Vrin, 1938), p. 184. 9 George Klubertanz, S. J., “ Ess e et Exi ste r e in St. Bonaventure,” Med iaeva l Stu die s, V II I (1946), 169-8 8. 10 Etienne Gilson, Je an Duns Scot , (Paris: Vr in, 1952). Also cf. J. Owens, “ The Com mon Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” Med . Stud .y X IX (1957), i ff.

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wh ich Greek Gre ek philo ph iloso soph phyy has pack pa cked ed int o this thi s one.1 on e.1 F or essence has a function in the Greek eternal universe which is incompatible with the Christian universe, at least as it looked to Thomas Aquinas. The Christian doctrine of creation has a position of peculiar philo sophical importance not only because it is an explanation of the origin of things but because it has played a significant part in the historical development development of a metaphysics of being.2Not only did it call a metaphysics of being into existence but it is still the testing stone of a Christian metaphysics. A metaphysics which does not adequately express the central facts of creation is by that fact deficient as a metaphysics, for it does not explain some of the most fundamental facts in the basic structure of the universe. For the Christian, a metaphysics which is still primarily occupied with the origin of plurality and diversity almost to the exclusion of the origin of beings from nothingness, as Albert the Great and Giles of Rome's were, is by that fact an inadequate instrument for the Christian interpretation of reality. Wit W ithi hin n this thi s cont co ntex ext, t, it is neces ne ces sary sar y to emp hasize has ize th at the notio no tion n of essence when measured against the Christian doctrine of creation is found wanting. We intend to demonstrate that its initial presence makes the fundamental note of creation, the productio ex nihil ni hiloo , impossible, for the notion of essence was conceived to explain the Greek eternal universe and its ratio essendi was was to function within such a universe. How, then, can it be translated, unmodified, to a Christian wo rld? rld ? W e have ha ve been so preocc pre occup upied ied w ith an hist hi stori orical cal inte in terp rpret ret ati on of the way in which Christian thinkers using Greek philosophical principles principles attempted to interpret interpret Christian Christian doctrine,3 doctrine,3 that invar iably only the prime distinction between the Greek and Christian world

1 Cf. Gerald B. Phelan, “ The Being of Creatures,” Procee dings of the Am eric an Catho lic Ph ilos oph ica l Ass ocia tion , X X I (1957), (1957), 118 ff. and the comments on this this paper by W illiam E. Carlo and W. Norris Clarke, S. J. Father Phelan suggests the substitution or equivalency of “ modes of being” for essences. essences. 2 E. Gilson Gilson,, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, Chap. 3 ff. “ Nos études du commentaire de saint Thomas ont manifesté une transposition générale de la métaphysique d’Aristote. Tou t le commentaire est finalis finaliséé par l’idée de création” (G. (G. Ducoin, “ Saint Thomas, C ommen tateur d’Aristote,” Arc hive s de philo soph ie, X X [1957], [1957], 430; 430; cf. cf. ibid., ibid., p. 433). 433). “ To ut le progrès de la philosophie se fera donc dans le sens d’une synthèse platonico-aristotélicienne. Et elle se fera par l’idée de création” (A. Bremond, “ La synthèse thomiste de l’ acte et de l’idée,” Gregorianum, Gregorianum, XII [1931], 271). 3 “ Les apologistes apologistes du Ile siècle ont donc entrepris entrepris la tâche immense, et dont l’ampleur réelle ne devait paraître qu’au cours des siècles suivants, d’exprimer l’univers mental des Chrétiens dans une langue expressément conçue pour exprimer l’univers mental des grecs” (E. Gilson, La philo sophie au Moy en Age [Paris: Vrin, 1947], p. 33).


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views vie ws came in for the greate gre atest st emphasi emp hasis. s. Thom Th omas as Aqui Aq uina nass was wa s not no t the first or the only one to point out that the fact of creation demanded an element of newness or novelty in the universe. Things which were not and now are, were produced by Being Itself, Ipsu Ip sum m Esse Es se Subsisten Subs istenss. In an eternal universe, the most basic fact about things was that they were of differe diff erent nt kinds. kin ds. In a cre ated ate d univer uni verse se the most mo st fun dam da m ental en tal aspect of things is that by which they are. are. Metaphysics is going to be concerned with the most ultimate of all characteristics of being, the fact that it is. Thus is. Thus the introduction of esse esse is the distinguishing mark of a Christian metaphysics of being.1 But what about the kind of universe into which this esse esse was to be introduced? Not nearly as much labor and effort has gone into the question of just how much of the Greek universe could be retained. Av icen ic enna na in his mast ma sterf erful ul and origin ori ginal al inter in ter preta pr eta tion tio n of the doctri do ctrine ne of creation in terms of esse, esse, simply added esse esse to the Greek universe and considered that sufficient to explain its novelty. Mediaeval thinkers followed his lead, as they did in so many instances, and thought the addition of esse esse sufficient to make a creature of the eternal essence of Greek philosophy. Even recent thinkers who deplore the Avicennian accidentality of esse esse continue to assert that the primacy of existence still leaves the notion of essence intact within a Christian universe. It (Thomistic metaphysics) does not even reduce his knowledge to a perfect unity, but only to the ambiguity of man’s first knowable, which is a composite of essence and existence. It proceeds only from the viewpoint of existence, leaving intact all starting points in the realm of essenc essence, e, both b oth substantial and accidental.2 ac cidental.2

But is such an operation possible ? Can the eternal essence of Greek metaphysics become contingent by any sort of addition, no matter how complex ? Is essence indifferent to being eternal or created ? Or is it just possible that essence is a philosophical concept which was con ceived to explain an eternal universe and as such has the necessity of eternality stamped upon it? I am suggesting that the same transfor mation which Thomas Aquinas worked in the esse esse of the Liber Libe r de Causis Causis and Avicenna, had to be worked in the essentia transmitted essentia transmitted by 1 F or the Greeks, an explan ation in terms of essence or nature was alw ays considered the last word of the philosopher. The Supreme Act of Being and the ultimate principle of intel ligibility in a thing was thought to be form. The Christian revolution in metaphysics accom plished by Thom as Aquinas was precisely “ to translate all the problems concerning concerning being from the language of essences into that of existences” (E. Gilson, God and Philosophy Philosophy [New Haven: Yale Univ., 1941], p. 67). 2 J. Owens Owens,, St. Thoma s a nd t he Fu tur e of Met aphy sics (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ., 1957)» P- 57 .

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the Arabians from Greek Neoplatonism. The notion of essence qua essence is incompatible with the Christian universe of Thomas Aquinas. i . A P P A R E N T L Y C O N T R A D I C T O R Y T E X T S IN IN T H O M A S A Q U I N A S

One way of effectively posing this problem is by a consideration of wha w hatt seem to be cont co ntra rary ry and confl co nflict ictin ingg formu for mulati lation onss of m eta et a physical doctrines within the works of Thomas Aquinas. How can we explain what appear to be contradictions in the text of Thomas, between betw een esse as esse as accidental, as happening to essence, [accidit is is the word Thomas uses),1 and esse esse as non-accidental,2 non-accidental,2 as that which is is most 1 “ . . . et non intelligitur intelligitur de esse esse quod est actus essentiae essentiae;; hoc enim esse esse habet relatio ex his quae causant ipsam in sub jecto secundum quod esse non refertur refertur ad aliud, sed ad subjectum, sicut et quodlibet accidens” (I . Sent.., Sent.., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1). For St. Thomas esse esse is also praeter essentiam. essentiam. In his own vocabulary praeter essenti am am is equated with accident. “ Solum illud videtur esse praeter essentiam vel quidditatem rei quod non intrat definitionem ipsius ; definitio enim significat quid est res. Sola autem accidentia rei sunt quae in definitione non cadunt. Sola igitur accidentia sunt in re aliqua praeter essentiam essentiam eius” ( Contra Gentiles, I, Gentiles, I, 21). Father Peter Nash affirms the doctrine of the accidentality of esse esse in St. Thomas but at the same time he distinguishes distinguishes it from from the Aristotelian predicamental variety. “ It is the poste riority of esse and esse and not merely its accidentality, which is the real lesson of my former inquiry. A ft er all , St . Th om as hol ds th at esse esse is accidental to essence. The uniqueness of his position wh ich elu des Gile s, is th at he no t on ly dis tin gui sh es suc h ac cid en t fro m the pre dic am en tal v ar ie ty bu t ma ke s i t ge nu in ely prio r to essen ce ‘in the ful l sense of the pr io rit y of an ac t ov er its corresponding potency,’ as Father J. Owens so well puts it, so that the ‘being of the thing is formally determined by the nature only in the way in which act can be determined by a potency, and not at all in the Aristotelian sense of formal determination in which potency is determined determined by act’ ” (P. W. Nash, S. S. J., “ The Accidentality of Es se se according to Giles of Rome,” Gregorianum, Gregorianum, X X X V II I [1957], 105). 105). Father Nash adds, adds, “ The only similarity esse has to accident for St. Thomas is that it is not necessary to essence, even though essence cannot prescind from it. Otherwise, esse is esse is absolutely prior to essence” [ibid. , p. 114). 2 St. Thom as himself, himself, although he uses uses the term accident to clarify the relation of esse to essence, nevertheless criticizes Avicenna for having esse esse added in the manner of an acci dent to essence, since it is as something constituted by the very principles of the essence, (In I (In I V Met aph ., lect. ., lect. 2, n. 558 ed. Cathala). To further complicate the use of esse as esse as accidental we ha ve St . Th om as po sit iv el y de ny in g th at esse is esse is accidental. accidental. “ Est autem e t aliud esse esse hujus suppositi, non inquantum est aeternum, sed inquantum est temporaliter homo factum, quod esse, etsi non sit accidentale, quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est, non tamen est esse principale principale sui suppositi sed sed secundarium” ( Quaestio de Unione Verbi Incarnati , art. 4). Cf. also A. Forest, La structure métaphys ique du concret (Paris: Vrin, 1932), p. 38, n. i. Also on this doctrine F. Pelster, Ar chive s de Ph ilo sop hie , III, c.2 and P. Synave, Bu lle tin Thom iste, Jan., 1926. The doctrine of the accidentality of esse is esse is of course a doctrine common to St. Tho mas’ contemporaries, e.g. e.g. Giles of Rome. This does not mean that for these Christian thinkers esse as esse as the prime contribution of God to the creature was only an accident. It was too basic basic a constituent of the creature creature for that. B ut the y had no term in their their philosophical vocabulary to express an act that apparently was not part of the essence of the thing since it was not included in its definition. This holds true even for Avicenna to whom the doctrine of esse esse as accidental is usually attributed in its crudity. But Avicenna was too sophisticated a thinker for that. He too has very real doubts about the actual accidental status of esse. esse. The same or a similar situation may be found in the dissatisfaction of some theologians with the Thomistic doctrine of grace and the supernatural order as located wi th in the ca te go ry of acc ide nt since it is no t due to na tu re as na tur e, bu t is pr eci sel y su pe r natural. Here again we have a reality called accidental which actually exceeds the substance it perfects.


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fundamental to the thing.1 It is so fundamental, in fact, that a being is called an ens because of its esse, rather than per essentiam. En s denominatur ab esse.2 The same contradiction appears in the notion of essence as that which receives esse, limits esse, the id quod which re ceives esse, and determines it to be in this way or that, a determinate kind of being. On the other hand we have those texts in which Thomas speaks of essence as coexistens rather than ens ,2 as nonesse and finally as nonens. Even form does not seem to have being by right.4 Likewise m atter is that which receives and limits form, the principle 1 “ Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest: cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt” ( S .T .I ., q. 8, a. i). 2 “ Esse duplicitur dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod est copula verbalis significans compositionem cujuslibet enuntiationis, quam anima facit, unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in actu animae componentis et dividentis. Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis, in quantum est ens, i.e. quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura” (Quodlibet IX , a. 3). “ Hoc nomen ens . . . impon itur ab ipso esse” {In IV Metaph., lect. 2, n. 558). Cf. in X II Metaph., lect. 1, n. 2419. “ Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi” {In I. Sent. d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2). “ Ens sum itur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem sive essentiam entis” {De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1). “ Unde in comp ositis ex materia et forma nec materia nec forma potest dici ipsum quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse. Forma tamen potest dici quo est, secundum quod est essendi principium; ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens” {Contra Gentiles, II, 54). For St. Thomas essence is that through which and in which ens has esse. But a thing is not a being because of its form. “ Non tamen denominatur aliquod ens a forma” {I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1). 3 “ Formae autem et accidentia, et alia huiusmodi, non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint, sed quia eis aliquid est; ut albedo ea ratione dicitur ens, quia ea subjectum est album. Unde secundum Philosophum, accidens magis proprie dicitur entis quam ens. S icut igitur accidentia et formae, et huiusmodi, quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam entia; ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata. Proprie vero creata sunt subsistentia” {S.T.I. q. 45, a. 4). 4 “ Potest autem quis dicere quod id quod participat aliquid est secundum se carens illi; sicut superficies quae nata est participare colorem, secundum se considerata est non color et non colorata. Similiter igitur id quod participat esse oportet esse non ens. Quod autem est in potentia ens et participativum ipsius, non autem secundum se est ens” {De Sub. Sep., c. V I, p. 15 0- 15 1) . “ Si ig itu r per hoc quo d dic o non ens re m ov ea tu r solu m esse in ac tu , ips a forma secundum se considerata est non ens, sed esse participans.” {Ibid., p. 151-152). “ . .. illud quod habet esse ab alio, in se consideratum, est non ens, si ipsum sit aliud quam ipsum esse quod ab alio accipit” {De Pot., q. 3, a. 13, ad 4). Cf. also De En te et Es sen tia (ed. RolandGosselin), c. 3, pp. 25-26). That these texts are not convincing to all contemporary scholastics seems to be clear. “ In a famous little treatise, Aquinas has remarked, ‘Essentia dicitur secundum quod per earn et in ea ens habet esse.’ It is in and through essences that being has existence. Hence, being apart from essence is being apart from the possibility of existence ; it is being that cannot exist; but what cannot exist is nothing, and so the notion of being apart from essence is the notion of nothing.” (Bernard J. Lonergan, S. J., Ins igh t [New York: Phil. Library, 1957], pp. 371-372.) This traditional position is in marked contrast to certain recent interpretations of the relations of essence and existence in the structure of being. “ It [metaphysics] not on ly shows him how he himself is of his nature a nothing, bu t also that his intellect is specified and so graded in intelligibility by an essence or quiddity which similarly is of itself a nothing, nam ely, the quiddity of m aterial things. I t makes him conscious of that lack of intelligibility and the need to go beyond it to the act that makes the quiddity intelligible.” (J. Owens, Sa in t Thoma s and the Fut ur e of Meta phys ics, p. 58). So positive a contradiction in two contemporary interpretations of such a basic doctrine in the thought of Thomas Aquinas is, to say the least, v ery interesting. Text s a fter tex t can be added on this point.

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of limitation of form, the principle of individuation of form, and finally it is non-being, nonens.1 Matter does not have an esse.2 However, matter, although pure potency, is in the genus of substance. It actually has an esse and is a similitudo of the Divine Esse.z The being of matter will be discussed later as a problem in its own right. Thus there are two sets of apparently contradictory texts in Thomas Aquinas. There are those texts in wh ich he speaks of essence as some how possessing an actuality of its own, as that which receives esse, as that which limits esse. There is the other group of texts in which Thomas speaks of essence as non-being, as con-created rather than created,4 as co-existent rather than existent. This is the fundamental dichotomy. Is there any way of explaining or reconciling these ap parently opposed positions? 2. METHODOLOGY

These inconsistencies certainly need some explanation; and one is forthcoming. For a prime source of difficulty in any analysis of the doctrine of being in Thomas Aquinas is the historical context within which he expresses what are to be revolutio nary ideas. He is talking to the men of his day. He is using the common metaph ysical vocabulary, the current coin of intellectual exchange. Whenever possible he will appeal to the authority of some definition or formulation which has gained popular acceptance. I t is no accident that Thom as was forced to express an existential metaphysics within the vocabulary of an essential metaphysics. His historical location made it impossible to do 1 “ Similiter igitur id quod participa t esse oportet esse non ens. Quod autem est in potentia ens et participativu m ipsius, non autem secundum se est ens; materia est huiusmodi, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur omne quod est post primum ens quod est ipsum esse, cum sit participa tive ens, habet materiam.” (De Sub. Sep., c. VI, pp. 150-151). “ Si autem non ens removeat non solum ipsum esse in actu, sed etiam actum seu forman per quam aliquid participat esse, sic materia est non ens.” (De Sub. Sep., c. VI, ed. Perrier, pp. 151-152). 2 “ Nam ma teria secundum se neque esse habet, neque cognoscibilis est.” (S.T.I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3). 3 “ . . . quod quamvis materia prima sit informis tamen inest ei imitatio primae formae: quantumcumque enim debile esse habeat, illud tamen est imitatio primi entis; et secundum hoc potest habere similitudinem in Deo.” (De Veritate, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1). “ Sed materia secundu m suum esse actuale dependet a forma in quantum forma est ipse actus ejus.” (Quodl. Ill, I, 1). 4 “ Alii vero posuerunt formas dari vel causari ab agente separato, per modum creationis. Et secundum hoc cuilibet operationi naturae adiungitur creatio. Sed hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia formae. Non enim considerabant quod forma n aturalis corporis non est subsistens, sed quo aliquid est : cum fieri et creari non conveniat proprie nisi rei subsistenti, sicut supra dictum est, formarum non est fieri neque creari, sed concreata esse.” (S. T. I, q. 45, a. 8). “ Unde, secundum Philosophum, accidens magis proprie dicitur ‘entis’ quam ‘ens.’ Sicut igitur accidentia et formae, et huiusmodi, quae non subsistunt, m agis sunt coexistentia quam en tia; ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata. Proprio vero creata sunt subsistentia.” (S.T.I, q. 45 , a. 4).


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otherwise than to employ much of the vocabulary and modes of ex pression on which he had been intellectually nourished. No thinker completely escapes the influence of his masters, and Thomas Aquinas was no exception. Aquinas was thinking his way ver y carefully out of a philosophical vocabulary which implied the ontologizing of matter and essence. He was conversin g with his contemporaries in the only language th ey knew. That is why he speaks of matter as a noun so often rather than as an adjective "material,” because for Bonaventure and for Albert it was a substance of sorts. Philosophers who deal in abstractions tend to be heavily dependent on an inherited vocabulary and the formulations and definitions constructed out of it. The attempt to coin a metaphysical vocabulary in a language which had yet to reach such a stage of development would be a laboriously demanding one. But the attem pt to say some thing new within a highly sophisticated, metaphysical vocabulary is more easily accomplished by a modification of that vocabulary which tends to become second nature to a thinker intellectually nourished on it, than by the construction of a radically new set of terms to express novel ideas. Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Martin Heidegger are fine examples. To the individual thinker there is something projective about an abstract formula, the very generality of which makes it possible for different thinkers to mean different things while articulating the same words. It may take a ve ry great deal of serious wo rk for the beginning thinker to realize tha t wh at these formulae meant to him originally was something rather different from what other thinkers read into the self same definitions and formulations. With ultim ate self-awareness the prudent man will be careful and cautious in attempting to re-think metaphysical conceptions of such profundity. But for better or worse the time comes when he must propound these doctrines as he sees them. Something like this, I think, is what happened to Thomas Aquinas. These profound insights which can transform the perspective of an old science or radically construct a new one from its roots and foundations often come, I suspect, at an early age, but they may take decades to work out and exert the influence they should. The young author of the De Ente et Essentia, himself, had such an initial intuition and it took three decades of hard wo rk to elaborate it. Our purpose is to dissect this brilliant intuition from the tried and

12


true formulae in which it was conceived, and to trace out the way it permeated and transformed the whole matrix of metaphysical and theological doctrines on which it was to nourish itself till it had grown into the giant structure of scientific Theology which goes by the name of Thomism, the authentic Thomism of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas had to say what he wanted to say in this vo cabu lary: substance, essence, esse, supposite, nature, form, matter. He was like the man in a foreign country who wants to say something never before expressed in that language. Thomas wanted to say something for which the current Greek philosophical vo cabulary was inadequate. The one set of texts are philosophical concepts couched in the vo cabu lary common to the thinkers of his day. Any num ber of 13th century theologians would subscribe to them as simple formulae. But no one would subscribe to the other set of formulae. No one else in the 13th century would say that a thing is called an ens because of its esse. In fact in the traditional meaning, in the earliest signification of esse in Boethius and the Liber de Causis, esse means to be a form, the act of an essence, as flowing from essence rather than constituting it as essence. This tradition culminates in the mediaeval latin texts of Avicenna in which, for the first time, we have a more or less adequate metaphysical expression of the doctrine of creation wherein esse is an accidental form perfecting an essence, already constituted as essence. This notion of essence as constituted in its own right was to be popularized by Henry of Ghent in his famous formulation of esse essentiae as opposed to esse existentiae. It is significant to note, in respect to this point of Thomas' use of current contemporary vocabulary when he speaks of essence, that this is not a unique procedure. Thomas often uses the common terminology of the day even when the doctrines, technically speaking, are in direct opposition to his own. There are many instances in the text of Aquinas of this type of expression. For instance, we are aware of the fact that Thomas considered the soul as the first act of the living body, as the principle of organization of matter, as constituting with matter the resultant body. He ranges himself alongside of Aristotle and in oppo sition to all those thinkers, Platonically inspired or more directly influenced by Avicenna, for whom both soul and body are to some degree constituted substances. For Bonaventure and Albert the Great, strictly speaking, man is a composite of body and soul. For Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, in technical, precise terms, man is a composite but not of soul and body,


13

for there is no body unless it is constituted by a soul; its principle of organization is the act by which it is. A more correct but still subtly inadequate definition of man would be that he is a composite of soul and matter. But yet this same formulation of man as composed of soul and body, although it implies a dual actuality, a plurality of acts, is nevertheless found scattered throughout his writings. He uses it because it had become a common and accepted mode of expression, even though in strict interpretation, it was in opposition to his own doctrine of the soul as the first act of the body constituting it as a body, and a chal lenge to his thesis of the unity of man.1 It is Thomas' new and original interpretation of esse which affords both the occasion and solution of our problem. Fo r such a re-vision of esse necessarily entails a transformation of the notion of essence and the entire corpus of metaphysical doctrines. In the one set of texts Thomas is speaking to his contemporaries and expressing his own thought in the only language in which he can communicate with them. In the other set of texts he is stating what is peculiarly his own, his original contribution to the science of metaphysics; he is pointing up the divergence between his thought and that of his contemporaries. He uses the current vocabulary to the extent that he can convert it to his own meaning. But when it reaches its elastic limit (of stress and strain), when it can no longer serve as a fit instrument for his ends, then he abandons it and has recourse to what seem to be contradic tions of the very statements he has already made. Giles of Rome is an excellent example of the general Greek formu lations to which most of the Scholastic tradition would subscribe and which Thomas uses because it is an excellent veh icle for the com muni cation of his ideas. It is only when the analysis of doctrines reaches a level of precision and sophistication unknown to the Greek vocabulary that Thomas gives rise to those startling formulations which astonished and irritated his contemporaries and successors. What is this proper and peculiar set of doctrines which Thomas Aquinas is expressing on one side of the dichotom y we have indicated ? How do these doctrines measure up to the standards of a Christian metaphysics? To what extent and in what way do they better express the fundamental facts of the Christian revelation they are attempting to interpret and elaborate ? Our contention is that the Greek notions of 1 “ Quod quidem patet in unione animae et corporis; nam anima naturaliter imperat, et corpus obedit.” [In Me taph ., Proemium; ed. Cathala, p. i).

14

THE ONTOLOGI CAL STATUS OF ESSENCE

essence and of matter are antithetical to a Christian interpretation of reality. 3. T H E H I S T O R I C A L L O C A T I O N O F T H E P R O B L E M

We w ould like to take as the starting point for our discussion the ve ry fundamental problem of the metaphysics of creation as it is found in the famous controversy of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent at the end of the 13th century. The notion of creation has its origin in JudaeoChristian religious thought. Taken over by the philosophers of the Middle Ages, it became the subject of constant disputes as to its correct meaning. Th e classic controversy on the m etaphysical interpretation of creation is, of course, that which occurred late in the thirteenth century between Giles of Rome and He nry of Ghent. Now it is within the doctrine of creation that the notions of being and the real distinction of essence and existence find their proper onto logical location.1 If one studies the doctrine of creation in a particular philosopher one will see in concrete, so to speak, his doctrines of being, essence and existence, and their relations. Creation is the important test for a Christian metaphysics. A variation in the notion of being will result in some change in the explanation of the creative act. In fact, in this classic controversy on the metaphysics of creation in the thirteenth century, the very difficulties which Giles of Rome found in his ex planation of creation were the same ones which Henry of Ghent found such an insuperable obstacle to understanding Giles' interpretation of the real distinction. For Giles of Rome the Christian doctrine of creation demanded the real distinction.2 Astute observer that he was, Henry contended that the real distinction between essence and esse as res et res, as Giles of Rome interpreted it, was incompatible with a creatio ex nihilo,3 for it demands a pre-existing subject. He writes: Non quod ipsi essentiae quasi praecedenti, Deus imprimat esse quo denominetur existens. . . hoc enim falsum est et omnino haereticum.4

1 Giles of Rome, Op. cit., prop. XX , p. 135, 1. 17 - p. 136, 1. 2. Cf. Prop. X IX , II, 7-10 . 2 Quia tota causa quare nos investigamus quod esse sit res differens essentia ex hoc sumitur ut possimus salva re res creatas esse compo sitas posse creari et posse esse et non e s s e quod esse esset res realiter ab essentia differens et superad dita illi.” (Giles of Rome, Theoremata de Esse et Essentia, XIX. ed, Hocedez, Louvain, 1930). 3 Cf. J. Paulus, “ Les Disputes d’H enri de Gand et de Gilles de Romesurla distinction de l’essence et de l’existence,” Arc hives d’ hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge,XV (1940), 347-48. 4 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, 4, 5ôr (Paris, 1518). .........


15

On the other hand, Henry of Ghent's own doctrine of the intentional distinction between essence and esse had this merit, at least, that the whole of the thing could be assigned to the divine causality, not only as a theological necessity, but also with a metaphysical compatibility.1 However, Giles of Rome insists that if there is no real distinction be tween essence and esse, then there can be no creation, because im material substances would exist necessarily. Sed in his verbis maxime venenum latet. Nam voluerunt isti philosophi quod substantiae immateriales essent simpliciter necesse esse, et haberent necessita tem a seipsis, ita quod essent causa suae necessitatis.2

If, Giles of Rome continues, the position of Henry of Ghent is true, that in creatures essence and esse do not differ really, then there is no way in wh ich things can be caused or be destroyed and reduced to nothingness. For destruction is accomplished only through the sepa ration of potency from act. Consequently something which is simple cannot be separated and thus destroyed. Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis utrum secundum rei veritatem substantiae separatae per se existentes possint aliquo modo dissolvi. Dicendum quod si vera esset positio aliquorum magnorum, videlicet quod in rebus causatis non differunt realiter essentia et esse, non videremus viam ad cognoscendum quomodo intelligentiae potuissent de novo causari, nec quomodo possent dissolvi, vel in nihi lum redigi. Non enim sit dissolutio, nisi per separationem potentiae ab actu. Et ideo dissolvuntur materialia, quando materia separatur a forma, ita quod in talibus ipsa essentia habet compositionem et dissolutionem, quia potest una pars essentiae separati ab alia. Sic etiam in intelligentiis, si potest ibi esse dissolutio, hoc est quia potest in eis potentia separari ab actu. Ideo impossibile est quod substantia per se stans, cadat sub corruptione, quia non potest separari eius essentia, cum sit simplex.3

If there is only an intentional relation between essence and esse, then they can never be separated. Esse can neither be acquired nor lost and we are faced not with a created world but with an eternal world which certain ly contradicts the basic notion of creation. 1 “ Si loquamur de primo esse (esse essentiae), illud sola ratione diffe rt ab essentia creaturae . . . . Si loquamur de secundo esse creaturae, illud licet non differt re ab essentia creaturae, non tantum differt ab illa sola ratione in quantum intellectus diversis conceptionibus capit de ea quod est et quod tale quid est substantia vel accidens sed etiam differt ab illa intentione, quia quantum ad tale esse ipsa essentia creaturae potest esse et non esse.” ( Quodl. i, q. 9, folio 7, recto-verso). Cf. J. Paulus, op. cit., p. 342: “ La création n’est pas une génération réelle, mais simplement intentionelle où le sujet ne diffère que logiquement du terme.” Cf. Quodl. X , 7, 154 r a. For the explanation of the intentional distinction, cf. J. Paulus, He nr i de Gan d, Ch. IV, pp. 220 ff., 237 ff. 2 Giles of Rome, op. cit., prop. XXVI, fol. 9or p; J. Paulus, ibid., p. 344. 3 Giles of Rome, op. cit., prop. XXVI, fol. 89V O.

16


Nec valet si dicatur esse et essentiam differre secundum rationem vel secundum intentionem, licet sint idem secundum rem. Nam quae idem sunt re, non possunt secundum rem separari. Non posset ergo intelligentia de novo perdere suum esse, et per consequens, non potuit ipsum de novo acquirere. Quod fuit philosophorum opinio contraria veritati, ponentium talia esse ab aeterno.1

Giles concludes that unless there is a real distinction between essence and esse, neither the production nor the destruction of things can be explained. Therefore, every effect has to have a composition of potency and act which are really distinct from each other, whether we call it potency and act, essence and esse, form and esse, or form and matter. Qui ergo ista realiter non distinguit, nec productionem, nec destructionem secun dum rem salvare poterit. Est ergo omne causatum compositum ex potentia et ac tu realiter differentibus, sive huiusmodi potentiam et actum appellemus essen tiam et esse, sive materiam et formam, sive formam et esse, sive essentiam et actum eius, sive quocunque alio nomine ea nominemus.2

The controversy of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent is thus reducible to a dilemma, and insolvable in that form. But the real distinction and the intentional distinction have been formulated in order to explain one aspect of the doctrine of creation and at the same time to escape a basic difficulty involved in it. Giles of Rome, on the one hand, insists on the necessity of a real distinction between essence and esse. What he wants to explain by this distinction is exactly how God, in His ultimate nature, is to be distinguished from the creatures He has created. For it is His essence to exist, while creatures have to receive their existence from another. According to Giles, without the real distinction there is no way of distinguishing God from creatures. Things would exist of necessity. If there were not a real distinction between essence and esse, they would exist of their essence. Every creature would be God. Henry of Ghent, on the other hand, was just as concerned to dis tinguish God from His creatures. But he was convinced that the real distinction destroyed the Christian doctrine of a creatio ex nihilo. The real distinction is heretical, he has told us, because then God would be giving esse to a pre-existing essence in order to make it exist. Evidently, Henry of Ghent found a difficulty in the real distinction as it was formulated by Giles of Rome. If essence and esse differ really, and if creation is the communication of esse, what is the status of essence ? It must be either eternal or created. The first alternative obviously 1 Ibi d., fol. 9ir. 2 Ibi d.


17

contradicts the very notion of creation, but the second alternative would lead to the notion of a dual creation, which is a metaphysical contradiction. For it would mean that an essence could be created, and hence exist, without existence. Here, precisely, is the aspect of the doctrine of creation which Henry wanted to clarify. Unless God gives essence sim ultaneously with esse, there is no creatio ex nihilo. Therefore, some sort of identification of essence and existence is absolutely necessary. Esse is not something added to essence.1 Essence must be so related to esse that when esse is communicated, essence also flows from the same creative act. One possible way to safeguard the real identification of essence and esse, H enry of Ghent saw, was to maintain the notion of the intentional distinction. For if there is only an intentional distinction between es sence and esse, then God, in communicating that reality which is esse, can be, at the same time, the source of essence also. Thus the whole thing, both essence and esse, comes from the Creator, in a true creatio ex nihilo. But then how can God be distinguished from creatures on the basis of the intentional distinction? Tha t is why this controversy is reducible to a dilemma. Giles of Rome is correct in his criticism of the intentional distinction, bu t Henry of Ghent was pe rfe ctly right in his criticism of the real distinction, at least as posed by Giles of Rome. Giles of Rome cannot answer the objection of Henry of Ghent in regard to the pre-existence of essence in the creative act because of his own metaphysical principles. For Giles of Rome there is something about the creative act which apparently demands the pre-existence of essence. But this peculiar character of the creative action is in turn the result of the fundamental nature of the divine being itself. Thus we are brought to the conclusion that there is something about the divine nature which makes the pre-existence of essence imperative. The answer to the problem of the quasi-eternity of essence in Giles of Rome is to be found in his notion of God as Ipsum Esse, a notion which is strongly influenced by Greek philosophy, especially in the person of Proclus and the Author of the Liber de Causis. We suggest th at the difficu lties which Giles of Rome has with the doctrine of creation flow from the fact that he has accepted to his detriment certain Greek metaph ysical principles from the A uthor of the Liber de Causis, particularly his notion of being itself. 1 et sic omnibus modis oporte bit dare quod res quaelibet habe t esse per suam essentiam ut esse non sit res aliqua addita essentiae.” ( Quodl. I, q. 9, fol. 7r).

CHAPTER

II

E S S E N C E A S T H E E X T R I N S I C L I M I T A T I O N O F E S S E

i. C R E A T I O N A N D E S S E

Once we have by patient historical work understood Thomas Aquinas and his relations to his contemporaries, the next step is a purification of temporal trappings. The perennial philosophy grew up in the world of Greek thought and used its vocabulary. Now we must restate it to free it of the bias given it by the weight of its Greek vocabulary and philosophical principles. As we have already state d the doctrine of creation is the tes ting stone of a Christian metaphysics. To the extent to which it measures up to the exigencies of creation to that degree is a notion of being valid in metaphysics for the Christian thinker. If creation is the emanation of the whole of being from universal being,1 and if creation is not the constitution of a composite thing from pre-existing principles,2as it has been for so many in the Scholastic and even Thom istic traditions (in fact it is implicit in the very vocabulary used to explain the doctrine of creation, even in Thomas Aquinas himself), then the composite creature must be produced in being simultaneously with all its principles as Henry of Ghent so clearly stated. Now the production of esse absolutely, not inasmuch as it is hoc vel tale, is what is meant by the ratio of cre ation.3 Because God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens He can create, which is 1 “ . . . . cum dicitur, prima rerum creatarum est esse, ly esse non importat subjectum creatum; sed importat propriam rationem objecti creationis. Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid creatum, quod est ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens; cum creatio sit emanatio totius esse ab ente universali, ut dictum est. Et est similis modus loquendi, sicut si diceretur quod primum vis ibil e est colo r, qu am vis illu d quo d pro pri e vi de tu r, sit co lo ra tu m” (St. Th om as , S. T. 7 , q. 45, a. 4, ad 1). “ Agen s naturale est causa motus, sed agens divinum est dans esse totu m” {In I. Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3). 2 “ Ad secundum dicendum quod creatio non dicit constitutionem rei compositae ex principiis prae-existentibus : sed compositum sic dicitur creari, quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producitur” (S. T. I, q. 45, a. 4, ad 2). 3 “ Producere autem esse absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem creationis” (S. T. I, q. 45, a. 5). “ ‘Exis t,’ of course, is itself extremely tricky . The word is a verb, but it does not describe something that things do all the time, like breathing, only quieter-tricking over, as it were, in

ESSENCE AS THE EXTRINSIC LIMITATION OF

E S S E

19

properly to produce or cause the esse of things.1 Omne agens agit sibi simile Creation receives its specification from the fact that God is Ipsum Ess e? This gift of being is God's identification tag.4 Moreover, in producing their esse, God also produces the very substance of things. Creatio vero, quae est productio ipsius substantiae rei? Now if creation is the communicatio esseyand ipsum esse is the first effect, what about essence? Where does it come from? It is not pre existing to receive and limit esse as Giles of Rome held. Instead of wait.2

a metaphysical sort of way. It is only too easy to start wondering what, then existing is. The Greeks were worse off than we are in this region of discourse, for our different expressions ‘to be,’ ‘to exist,’ and ‘real’ they made do with a single word, einai. We have not their excuse for getting confused on this admittedly confusing topic.” J. L. Austin, Sens e and Se ns ibi lia , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962 p. 68, note 1. ‘‘Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus: ‘ N ot how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is’ (S 6.44). I believe that a certain feeling of amazement that anything should exist at all, was sometimes experienced by Wittgenstein, not only during the Tractatus period, but also wh en I kn ew him. W he ther this fee lin g has an yt hi ng to do wi th rel igio n is no t cle ar to me. But Wittgenstein did once say that he thought that he could understand the conception of God, in so far as it is involved in one’s awareness of one’s own sin and guilt. He added that he could not understand the conception of a Creator. I think that the ideas of Divine judgment, forgiveness, and redemption had some intelligibility for him, as being related in his mind to feelings of disgust with himself, an intense desire for purity, and a sense of the helplessness of human beings to make themselves better. But the notion of a being making the world had no intelligibility for him at all. W itt ge ns tein once sug ge ste d th at a w ay in wh ich the no tio n of im m or ta lit y ca n ac qui re a meaning is through one’s feeling that one has duties from which one cannot be released, even by death. Wittgenstein himself possessed a stern sense of duty. I believe that Wittgenstein was prepared by his own character and experience to compre hend the idea of a judging and redeeming God. But any cosmological conception of a Deity, derived from the notions of cause or of infinity would be repugnant to him. H e was impatient wi th ‘p ro ofs ’ o f the exi ste nc e of God, and w ith at tem pt s to giv e r elig ion a ra tio na l f ou nd at ion . (N. Malcolm, Ludw ig Wittg enste in, A Me mo ir, p. 70-1). After writing this sentence I learned that Wittgenstein once read a paper on Ethics (at a date not known to me, but probably soon after his return to Cambridge in 1929) in which he said that he sometimes had a certain experience which could best be described by saying that ‘when I have it I wonder at the existence of the world. And I am then inclined to use such phrases as ‘‘How extraordinary that anything should exist!” or ‘‘How extraordinary that the world should exist!’” Ibi d. 1 ‘‘Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius; sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis” (S. T. /, q. 8, a. 1). 2 “ . . . quod creare est proprie causare sive producere esse rerum. Cum autem omne agens aga t sibi simile, principium action is considerari potest ex actionis effect u : ignis enim est qui generat ignem. Et ideo creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse: quod est eius essentia, quae est communis tribus Personis” (S. T. /, q. 45, a. 6). 3 ‘‘Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, manifestum est quod natura essendi convenit Deo infinite absque omni limitatione et contractione; unde ejus virtus activa se extendit infinite ad totum ens, et ad omne id quod potest habere rationem entis” (Quodl. III, 1 , 1 ).

4 “ In spite of the stress which such notable apologists . .. have placed upon the evidence of design which they claim to detect in the universe, I do not myself feel that the theist ought to be much concerned about the issue of this controversy. It is, as I have argued else wh ere, the exi ste nc e of the un ive rse , ra th er th an its ch ara cte r, wh ich for ms the bas is of a philosophical approach to Christian theism” (Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Scie nce [New York: Ronald, 1959], p. 264). Cf. He Who is (London: Longmans, 1943). 5 “ Creatio vero, quae est productio ipsius substantiae rei, reducitur ad potentiam [Dei]” (S.T.I, q. 45, a. 6, ad 3).

20


E S S E

ing from all eternity like the recipient essence of Avicenna, or being produced alongside of esse in a dual creation, (barring these alternativ es which, with He nry of Ghent, we consider the only alternative possi bilities), then essence must rise out of the flood of esse. Essence flows from esse. Esse gives rise to essence.1 The classic formulation used to solve this dilemma (which we described within the context of the controversy of the thirteenth century but which is still the most popular formulation of the problem of the relations of essence and existence in the creative act) is that of ens as containing both essence and esse. According to this common expression, God produces not individual acts of existence, not esses bu t beings, entes or entia. The term of the creative act is an ens, not an esse or an essence but the composite of essence and existence. This ens is capable of proper scientific analysis, a resolution into its fundamental components of essence and existence. 2. C O N T E M P O R A R Y A N A L Y S I S O F E N S B Y R E C I P R O C A L C A U S E S

Essence and existence can be arrived at by an analysis of being, ens, with an awareness of the philosophical implications of creation, into esse by which all things are and essence which accounts for the intelligible structuring of being, the philosophical principle which notes the fact that things are not simply, but they are also in some way, of some kind. Beings are not only, they are also men or dogs or trees. The method of metaphysical procedure now in vogue is to begin with the results of this analysis and consider essence and esse in creatures as philosophical ultimates, ontological atoms, irreducible metap hysical elements, whose explanation is to consist in their mu tual relations. In other words, in the proper role they play in the con struction of a metaphysics they are to be employed as reciprocal causes in the Aristotelian sense. Essence and esse are each causes, the one of the other. Causae ad invicem sunt causae. Esse gives existence to essence and essence receives and limits esse to be “such,” a kind of being. “ It is by being received by the essence th at existence is exercised by the supposit, and it is by being exercised by the sup posit that existence is received by the essence.” 2 1 “ Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibu s praesuppon itur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum” (De Pot., q. 3, a. 4); “ Ipsum enim esse est communissimus effectus, primus, et interior omnibus aliis effectibus” (De Pot., q. 3, a. 7). Cf. Compendium Theologiae, Pars I, ch. 68. 2 “ From all this it is clear that the conception we are here proposing, and the ve ry dis-


E S S E

21

Thus a dichotomy of correlative elements in composition, of two incomplete principles acting on each other respectively according to a reciprocal causality, seems to be the basic role of essence and esse. We are left with a correlation of two real but incomplete co-principles reciprocally opposed.1 Each increase or decrease in esse involves a correlative variation in essence.2 Since they represent irreducibly distinct modes of causality, essence and existence are irreducibly distinct, but the reality of their distinction presupposes their composition.3 Though existence is the supreme actuality of any existing substance, it is not act with respect to all that there is in that sub stance . . . existence does not monopolize the whole actuality of existing substance. Rather, just as essence is in potency to the act of its own existence, so also is the act of existence in potency to the formal act of its own essence.4

Confirmatory evidence of this doctrine and technique, for it is both, can be multiplied ad infinitum. Such profound metaphysicians as Corne-

tinction between existence as received and existence as exercised, is understandable only in the light of the axiom causae ad invicem sunt causae. “ From the side of formal causality, it is by reason of the existence received by the essence - or because the essence is actuated by esse - that the supposit exists. “ And from the side of dispositive causality (material causality), it is on condition that subsistence carries the essence beyond its own order and constitutes it a supposit capable of exercising existence, that the essence receives esse and is actuated by it. “ In other words it is by being received by the essence that existence is exercised by the supposit, and it is by being exercised by the supposit that existence is received by the essence” (J. Maritain, “ On the Notion of Subsistence,” Progress in Philos oph y, p. 37). 1 “ C’est une dichotomie de puissance et d’acte dans l’ordre même de l’existence; il y a limite réelle d’être (ut quo) ; il y a acte ultime d’être (ut quo). Les composants sont corrélatifs; leur causalité respective est réciproque; leur simultanéité même logique est requise de soi. Un composant est par l’autre et l’autre composant est par l’un; l’un est connu par l’autre et l’autre est connu par l’un. Il n’y a pas de ‘disessenciation’ ou de ’desexistentiation’ possible. Il y a conconnaissance de ces deux principes incomplets formant un composé qui n’est que ‘cum his,’ puisque l’existence n’ajoute rien à l’essence comme contenu d’essence” (N.-J. Balthasar, Mo n moi dans l'être [Louvain, 1946], p. 96). 2 “ Rappelons ici que l’essence circonscrit l’ampleur propre de chaque acte d ’exister. Chaque variation croissante ou décroissante de cet acte entraine donc, ipso facto, une variation corrélative de l’essence. C’est ce qu’exprime la formule symbolique: les formes varient à la manière des nombres” (E. Gilson, Le Thom isme, p. 216, n. 2). 3 E. Gilson, Bei ng and Some Phil osop hers , p. 172: “ Ye t it is true that essence is really other than its own existence in virtue of its very act of existing, for, indeed, its act of existing is what enables essence to act as a formal cause, and to make actual being to be such a being. The very common mistake about this fundamental thesis of Thomism is due always to the same overlooking of the reciprocal character of efficient causality and of formal causality. [Italics mine.] . . . Their compo sition alone is what makes up a thing, but th ey both become, so to speak, ‘real’ because ‘to be’ then is to be a ‘being,’ just as ‘to be such’ is to be ‘such a be in g. ’ Ac tu al exi ste nc e, the n, is the eff ici en t cau se b y wh ich esse nce in its tur n is the for ma l cause which makes an actual existence to be ‘such an existence.” ’ 4 E. Gilson, Be ing and Some Phil osoph ers, p. 171.

22


E S S E

lio F abro ,1 Fernand Van Steenberghen,2André M arc,3 and many others past and present repeat this an alysis of ens b y reciproc al causes.4 Msgr. De Raeym aeker places the th eory of reciprocal causes in clear perspective. A t first glance it appears that they (essence and existence) are correlative, and to this we must held fast. It is in their correlation that the whole reality of the particular being which contains them, exists ; and since they are identified with this being, it is in their correlation that all their reality consists. It is impossible to conceive them outside of the mutual relation which binds them together. Undoubtedly, we must distinguish them, but without ever separating them, isolating them, even logically. Hence it is an error to believe that each of these principles can be considered as being real in itself, abstracting from its relation with a corresponding principle. For it would then be necessary to maintain that this relation comes to be added to the reality of these principles; and yet they have no reality outside of their correlation.5

If neither essence nor esse contribute rea lity where does reality come from ? If the y co nstitute reality only in their correlation, what is the source of reality? Two shadows which together constitute a solid? 3. C R E A T I O N A N D T H E D I V E R S I F I C A T I O N O F E S S E

The contemporary analysis of ens into esse and essentia related as reciprocal causes in the construction of being is of course an impressive 1 “ The proportional relation of essence and the act of being - the razione di essere, the proportion of being, in Fr. F abro’s terminology - here becomes the formal object which determines the course of metaphysical reflection, the order of its problems and solutions.” (C. Fabro, La nozione meta fisica di part icipa tion e secondo S. Tomaso d’ Aq uin o (Milan, 1939): pp. 135-138. (Quote is from H. J. John “ Recent Thomism ,” IP Q ). II, 1962, p. 603. 2 F. Van Steenberghen, Ontology, New Yo rk, J. F. Wagner, 1952. “ Its methodology (metaphysics) does not start with limitation nor with God from the fact that a finite be in g is the su bj ec t of tw o irre du cib le at tr ib ut io ns .” T. Ga lla gh er, The Contemporary Status of the Notion of Existence and Its Limitation In Thomistic Metaphysics, Unpublished Dissertation, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1958. 3 “ The proportion of essence to esse, and inversely, the adaptation of the latter to the former - in short, their m utual correlation,” Andre Marc, S. J. “ L’idée de l’être chez Sain t Thomas et dans la scolastique postérieure,” Arc hive s de Ph ilos oph ie, X , 1933. Les essences peuvent etre envisagées de deux points de vue. Le Premier, le point de vue prédicamental, est celui de la détermination quidditative : à cet égard, chaque être est ce qu’il est et n’est que ce qu’il est ; il s’oppose à tous les autres êtres. Le second, le point de vue transcendental, considère les essences à titre de degrés et de modes de la perfection d’être, c’est-à-dire comme les différentes participations de l’être, l’essence étant alors inséparable de Vesse. A cet égard, il faut dire que Y esse n’est pas seulement reçu par l’essence, mais qu’il est aussi spécifié par elle, bref qu’il y a une causalité réciproque des deux principes de Yens. L’essence n’est plus définie en premier lieu comme la puissance et la limite de l’acte d’être, elle en est d’abord la mesure formelle, et cela jusques et y compris en Dieu (13). B. Montagnes, La doctrine d'a nalo gie, Louvain: Publications Universitaires 1963, p. 166. 4 The question which remains after reading A. W ingell’s article is that essence and existence are ultimate, reciprocal principles constructing the universe by their interactions. Cf. A. Wi ng ell , “ Vi ve re Vi ve nt ib us est ess e,” Mod ern School man , (38), 1961; p. 120. “ He (St. Thomas) beheld in the universe the essentially differing levels of natures or essences endow ed with corresponding , i.e, fitting, lev els of existenc e (tfss^).” De Ma lo, q. 2, a. 9 ; I—II, q. 61, a. 1. Cf. Sr. M. Annise, C.S.C., “ Historical Sketch of the T heory of Participation ” , New Scho last icism , XXVI, 1952, pp. 49-79. 5 L. DeRaeymaker, The Philosophy of Being, Herder, London, 1954, p. 104-5.

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argument for the distinction of creatures from God, of composite being, i.e. composed of essence and existence, from Simple Being, Ipsum Esse Infinitum. This, of course, has been the reason for the popularity of the doctrine of the Real Distinction between essence and existence, although there have been, at every age, critics who have seen in the Real Distinction a challenge to the validity of the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of creation, from Henry of Ghent to Francis Suarez. The doctrine of the Real Distinction between essence and esse involves a doctrine of the Extrinsic Limitation of Esse. This principle of limitation extrinsic to esse has as a consequence a fundamental meta physical duality or dichotomy which cannot be glossed over by speak ing simply of a Real Distinction of essence and esse. But why did Giles of Rome formulate his peculiar doctrine of the relations of essence and existence as the Real Distinction between essentia and esse ? An analysis of the role of essence in the structure of the creature is illuminating. This notion of essence as the extrinsic principle of limitation of esse was introduced into the interpretation of St. Thom as' doctrine of cre ation in terms of essence and existence and determined and dominated future interpretations of Aq uinas' doctrine down to our day in favor of the doctrine of Essence as the Extrinsic Principle of Limitation. This doctrine introduced by Giles comes proximately from the Liber de Causis and remotely from Plato through Plotinus and Proclus. Giles has introduced an interpretation from a Greek metaphysics of unity into the philosophical explanation of creation. Both he and Thomas Aquinas agree on the theological exigencies. The whole thing comes from God. Bu t when it comes to explaining this theological doctrine in terms of the metaphysical principles which develop it, they disagree veheme ntly. Does Thom as Aquinas say th at bo th un ity and dive rsity flow proxim ately as well as remotely from God in spite of metaph ysical principles which were the same as Giles of Rome's ? Or are his meta physical principles different from Greek philosophy and adequate to the task of explaining the Christian doctrine of creation without compromising it by the Greek doctrine of Being as essence ? Here I think is the real reason why Giles of Rome formulated his doctrine of the Real Distinction of essence and existence the way he did. He needed essence really distinct from esse as the principle of extrinsic limitation of esse, and in so doing he set the pattern for later discussion and formulations within the Scholastic schools right down to the present day.

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Recent research in the philosophy of Giles of Rome has focused principally upon two problems : his doctrine of being and the relation of essence and existence. Attention has also been given to the question of his philosophical antecedents, especially the respective importance of the influences of Thomas Aquinas and Neoplatonism on his work. An examination of his notion of creation in the light of his doctrine of being can clarify the metaphysical foundations of the doctrine of Reciprocal Causes as applied to essence and esse, and the more basic doctrine of Essence as the Extrinsic Principle of Limitation of Esse which it involves. Such an examination can also provide proper historical perspective for the re-evaluation of the role of essence in existential metaphysics. The value of the history of philosophy in our treatment is only for philosophy itself. The history of philosophy can be controlled and employed by philosophy itself in the handling of a sp eculative problem. There is good precedent for such a technique. Aristotle in his day and Gilson and Fabro in ours, have shown how illuminating can be the use of historical cases, as instances of the development of principles with which the speculative philosopher is concerned. Our purpose is speculative rather than historical, but it is invariably bound up with the historical transformations of the doctrine under consideration. The doctrine of creation is important because it was largely in the attempt to explain creation that Giles formulated his notion of being, essence and existence and their relations. The controversy which we have already examined, on the distinction of essence and existence between Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent exemplifies this. Both the Real and Intentional Distinctions were formulated to elucidate the doctrine of creation. According to Giles, without the Real Distinction there is no way of differentiating God from creatures, like Him, they would exist of necessity and by their ve ry essence. Henry of Ghent, on the other hand, was convinced that the Real Distinction destroyed the doctrine of a creation ex nihilo, because it entails the pre-existence of essence to the creative act. As we have seen, he argued that unless God gives essence simultaneously with existence, there is no creation ex nihilo. Consequently, a real identification of essence and existence is absolutely necessary. Essence must be so related to existence that when existence is communicated, essence flows from the same creative act. In his commentary on the Liber de C ausis, Giles of Rome attempts to answer the charge that he holds the doctrine of a pre-existing essence. Giles defines creation as a communication of esse, and he distin-


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guishes in the constitution of each creature between the existence which is communicated and the essence in which it is received. But if creation is primarily a communication of existence, what part does essence play in the creative act ? According to Giles, as to our own contemporaries, essence, as the recipient of existence, limits, diversifies and m ultiplies it ; the unity of being is thus owing to the agency of God, and divers ity and multiplicity to the essences of creatures. But although we can see the function of essence as accounting for diversity and multiplicity, the question of its ontological status is still ve ry much open for discussion. If, how ever, in the ve ry first act of creation the creature is present as the limiting principle, it would seem that creation is not ex nihilo. This objection has been raised by Thomas Aquinas even before He nry of Ghent. He states that dive rsity is due to the creative causality and not to creatures. Giles quotes at length a text from Thomas' commentary on the Liber de Causis, in which Aquinas denies the possibility of an essence being present in the first act of creation. Thus far Giles seems to have no difficulties in his analysis of the relations of creation and being. But if he asserts the presence of a two fold principle in things, essence and esse, and yet creation is occupied precisely with esse, then what about essence ? It is this difficulty which causes Giles to attempt to clarify a doctrine which he suggests is not to the liking of all philosophers. He poses this objection: perhaps someone might doubt whether, in the first action in which God institutes and causes a thing, it can be true in some way that diversity is due to the recipient and unity to the agency of God. Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis utrum in actione prima qua Deus res instituit et causat, veritatem habere possit aliquo modo, quod diversitas sit ex parte Dei agentis.1

We are told th at according to some (and Thomas Aquinas seems to be among them),2 what he is sayin g is not true in respect to the first action of God, according to which things are caused and produced in being or esse. For in this instance, they say, the entire diversity is due to God. Dicendum quod secundum quosdam in Deo veritatem non habet quod hie dicitur, quantum ad actionem primam, secundum quam res causantur, et in esse producuntur: ibi enim (ut aiunt) tota diversitas est ex parte Dei.3

1 Giles of Rome, op. cit., prop. XVIII, fol. 62r. 2 Saint Thomas, In Lib rum de Ca usis , lect. 24, pp. 291-292. 3 Giles of Rome, op. cit., prop. XXIV, fol. 8iv f.

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Now Aquinas, in his commentary on the Liber de Causis, describes what he calls a twofold action of the First Cause; one, acco rding to which it ins titutes the thing, i.e. creation; the other, according to which it governs the thing it has instituted. But the assertion of the Liber de Causis that diversity is due to the recipient does not apply to the first action which is properly creation ; for if the diversity of effects is necessarily reduced to a diversity of recipients, then the conclusion follows that there are some recipients which are not from the First Cause. Therefore it is necessary to hold that the original diversity of things is due not to the recipients, but to the First Cause alone, not because in it some diversity is present, bu t because it is “ cognizant of diversity/" For it is an agent acting from knowledge and, therefore, it produces diverse grades of things for the completion of the universe. Diversitas receptionis ex duobus potest contingere : quandoque enim ex agente sive influente, quandoque autem ex recipiente. Quia enim diversitas causae causat diversitatem in effectibus, necesse est ut si agens est diversum et recipiens unum, quod diversitas receptionis causetur ex agente, non ex recipiente. Sicut aqua quae ex frigido congelatur et ex calido dissolvitur. Si autem e converso agens fuerit unum et recipiens diversum, erit diversitas receptionis ex parte recipientis, non ex parte agentis; sicut patet de sole qui indurat lutum et liquefacit ceram.1

An examination of this te xt of Aquin as, wherein he is tre ating of the same point raised by Giles makes it clear that it is none other than Thomas Aquinas himself whom Giles has in mind at this point. For Aquinas tells us, in com menting on the ver y same proposition that Giles is examining, tha t d iversity of reception can happen in two w ays, on the part of the agent or on the part of the recipient. Since the diversity of the cause is the reason for diversity of the effect, therefore, if the agent is many and the recipient one, then diversity is caused by the agent and not by the recipient. This happens, for example, when wa ter is frozen by cold and dissolved by heat. But if, on the other hand, the agent is one and the recipient many, then diversity will be due to the recipient, and not to the agent; just as the same sun hardens mud and melts butter. Now it is clear that the F irst Cause is a perfect unity, having no dive rsity. B ut those things which receive the influence of the First Cause are diverse. Therefore, diversity of reception is not due to the First Cause, but to the diversity of the recipients. However, this does not hold for the first creation of things ; otherwise there would be some creatures which God does not produce. Therefore the diversity of things must come from God and not from the recipient. 1 Saint Thomas, op. cit., lect. 24, p. 291.


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Manifestum est autem quod causa prima est una, nullam diversitatem habens. Sed ea quae recipiunt influentiam causae primae sunt diversa. Diversitas ergo receptionis non est ex causa prima quae est bonitas pura, influens bonitatem rebus omnibus : sed est propter diversitatem recipientium. Est autem attenden dum quod duplex est actio causae primae. Una quidem secundum quam instituit res, dicitur creatio. Alio vero secundum quam res jam institutas regit. In prima igitur actione non habet locum quod hic dicitur. Quia, si oportet diversitatem effectuum reducere in diversitatem recipientium, oportet dicere quod sint aliqua recipientia quae non sint a causa prima; quod est contra illud quod dictum est sup ra .. . . omnes habent essentiam propter causam primam. Unde oportet dicere quod prima diversitas rerum secundum quam habent diversas naturas et virtutes, non sit ex aliqua diversitate recipientium sed ex causa prima. Non quia in ea sit aliqua diversitas, sed quia est diversitatem cognoscens. Est enim agens secundum suam scientiam, et ideo diversos rerum gradus producit ad comple mentum universi.1

This entire text , w ith its similes and examples intact, has its parallel in the commentary of Giles of Rome on the same proposition of the Liber de Causis.2 Giles gives us the reason for Thomas Aquinas' criticism, and it is an excellent summary of the position which Aquinas has just outlined. They add that according to the intention of this author, this diversity of the recipient cannot be referred to the first action, because then it is necessary to posit some recipients which are not from the First Cause, which is against what is said above in the eighteenth proposition, namely, that all things have essence on account of the First Being.3

The objection which Giles of Rome is considering is precisely this: if in the very first act of creation the creature somehow is present as the limiting principle, would not that destroy the Christian doctrine of creation? (Thomas Aquinas says it would.) If in the first creation of things the essence is there to receive its esse, what happens to a creatio ex nihilo ? Bu t Giles quotes this objection only to reject it, arguing tha t essence must be present in the first action of creation or else one cannot account for multiplicity. Existence is diversified only by its reception in the recipient nature. He tells us that although there is nothing uncaused by God (thus safeguarding a creatio ex nihilo), even in this first action 1 Ib id. , p. 292. 2 Cf. Giles of Rome, op. cit., prop. XXIV, fol. 8iv D, E. Utraque enim modo videmus diversitatem in rebus. Nam aliquando passum est unum; tamen quia agentia sunt differentia, ideo est ibi diversitas et contrarietas, ut eadem aqua congelatur, a frigido et dissolvitur a cali do. Aliquando vero converso ponitur esse unitas ex parte agentis, et d iversitas ex parte passi, ut ab eodem sole induratur lutum et liquescit cera. Saint Thomas, Ibi d., 291-2. Cf. L. Geiger, La Partic ipa tion dans la phil osop hie de Sa int Thoma s d'A qu in , Le Saulchoir, Paris, 1942; pp. 301-302. n. 1. Also P. Nash, Giles of Rome, Auditor and Critic, p. 7. 3 Giles of Rome, op. cit., prop. XXIV, fol. 81 v E.

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by which things are created in being or esse, there is some plurality and a certain diversity on the part of the recipients. Giles reaffirms his doctrine : Sciendum autem quod quamvis nihil sit quod non sit causatum a Deo, verum tamen est aliquo modo etiam in actione prima Dei secundum quam res per creationem producuntur in esse, quaedam diversitas ex parte recipientium.1

After defending the confo rmity of his teaching to Christian doctrine, Giles prepares to justify his conclusion philosophically. It would seem that for Giles to say that diversity comes from God and leave it at that would be to dodge the metaphy sical question and resort to a type of Theologism. He is looking for a philosophical answer to a philosophical question. He continues: We teach that God is Ipsum Esse Pu rum, i.e., Esse not received in another. However, nothing can go out from God through creation which is a simple esse, but every effect has esse received in essence. For in this way God causes things by communi cating being or esse to them. Dicemus enim quod Deus est ipsum esse purum non receptum in alio. Nihil tamen potest a Deo exire per creationem, quod sit simplex esse; sed omne causatum est habens esse receptum in essentia. Hoc enim modo Deus causat res, communicando scilicet eis esse.3

For if the question is raised why some things through creation have more being and some less, some a more noble being and some a less noble being, the answer should be that this is due to the diversity of the natures of the recipients. For it lies in the power of God to produce this nature or that ; but from the very fact that He produces this nature, He communicates to it only as much being as that nature can receive. For according to the present order of things, being or esse is determined only by reception in a determinate nature.4 1 Henry of G hent uses very strong language regarding the doctrine of Giles of Rome: Non quod ipsi essentiae quasi praecedenti, Deus imprimat esse quo denominetur existens. . . . hoc enim falsum est et omnino haereticum. Quodlibet I I, 4, 5ôr. Cf. J. Paulus, Les Dis pu tes , p. 327, also 332. “ Adm ettre l’antériorité de l’essence puissance, vis-à-vis de l’être, compromet la création ex nihilo.” J. Paulus, op. cit., p. 334. Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet X, 7, 153V. 2 Giles of Rome, op. cit., prop. XXIV, fol. 8iv F. 3 Ibid . 4 In potestate enim Dei est producere hanc naturam vel illam, sed ex quo producit hanc naturam com municat ei tantum de esse quantum p otest recipere illa natura. Secundum enim hunc ordinem quam videmus esse non determinatur, nisi ex eo quod recipitur in determinata natura. Sic etiam unum esse ab alio esse distinguitur, quia in alia et alia natura recipitur. Ibi d. Cf. Theoremata, II, p. 8 , 11. 11 ff. ; p. 9 , 1. 5. Henry of Ghent, however, denies this. J. Paulus , Les Dis put es, p. 337. La conception de Gilles qui assimile la création à une génération et la participation de l’être à celle d’un accident quelconque compromet en réalité la notion chrétienne de la création. L’être n’est plus créé de nihilo mais tiré de l’essence-puissance qui


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Giles of Rome then sums up his conclusion: therefore in this first action of God, as in the very action of the creation of things, ipsum esse, and also other perfections which are received in nature, will have a diverse being or esse due to the recipient natures. In hac ergo prima actione Dei, ut in ipsa actione creationis rerum, ipsum esse, et etiam alia quae recipiuntur in natura, habeb unt esse diversum ex parte natu rarum recipientium.1

In the creation of things, God gives to every nature only as much being as it can receive. The fact th at He gives more to one and less to another, and to each a diverse esse, results from the diversity of the recipient natures. For in creating, God acts as He acts in knowing and in understanding Himself to be imitable in m any ways by creatures. Through His divine knowledge, He can produce many and various natures; in producing them He will communicate esse to every one. Therefore, the whole, both nature and esse, will be from God. But the fact that esse is diverse will result from its reception in diverse natures. Giles tells us that God is like a sea which offers itself to every vase. However, no vase can contain the whole of it. According as it is a greater or lesser vase, it receives more or less of the waters of the sea. So in the creation of things, God offers His whole Esse to every nature. However, every nature participates that esse according to the capacity of its substance. Giles of Rome concludes that in the very first creation of things there is uniformity on the part of God and a diversity on the part of the recipients. In communicating being (esse) itself, God offers Himself to every produced nature which participates as much of that being or esse as it can.2 Creatures have nothing which is not borrowed. Wh at th ey have, they have received entirely from God, but these natures themselves contri bute something as regards the mode of havin g. Fo r although all perfections present in effects are from God, they are there in the way their nature requires. Therefore, although God causes the whole, both nature and esse, He makes an esse determinate by impressing it on a determinate natur e.3 Giles' reason for this seems to be tha t God as précède, et si Gilles réplique que Dieu créé ici en même temps la puissance et l’acte, c’est donc que c’est l’essence qui est proprement créé, ou mieux le composé des deux. Or quod etsi hoc ille intendat, adhuc non potest proprie salvare creationem. Pour établir ce point, Henri est amené à développer sa propre conception de la création. 1 Op. cit., prop. XXIV, fol. 8iv G. 2 Ibi d. 3 Ibid .

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Universal Cause possesses a certain indétermination ;1 consequently it is only from a determinate nature that a determinate esse can be pro duced.2 The doctrine of Giles of Rome may be summarized as follows : in the first creation of things there was a uniformity on the part of God communicating esse to natures and diversity on the part of the reci pients of that esse. Although it was in the power of God to produce diverse natures, the fact that He communicates to them a diverse esse and other diverse perfections is due to the diversity of the natures themselves.3 In looking back over these texts several questions suggest themselves to us. Giles is very careful to attribute the causality of the creative act exclusively to God: a real creatio ex nihilo demands God as a unique cause. But why does he insist on the fact that in the very first creation of things, the creature is somehow present as the limiting principle ? Is the objection of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent valid when they argue that if essence is there to limit esse in the initial moment of the creative act, then a true creatio ex nihilo is impossible ? Let us examine the reason which Giles of Rome offers in justification of his stand. God, in accordance with His nature, acts “ uniform ly.” He appears of necessity to offer Himself in the infinite totality of His being to every creature alike. It is the essence of the creature which determines what proportion of this infinite “ ocean” of esse it is to receive. Giles of Rome admits that even this essence comes from God. But why then does he insist on its prerogative of determination in the ve ry first moment of creation ? 4 Are his opponents correct in con clud1 Op. cit., prop. XXIII, fol. 78v K. 2 Quod vero arguebatur in contrarium, videlicet quod ipsum intelligere habet intelligentia a Deo, dici debet quod totum habet intelligentia a Deo, et naturam, et esse et agere. Tamen ipsum esse et agere, et intelligere possunt considerari dupliciter, vel secundum se vel secundum quod sunt quid contractum. Secundum se quidem sunt a producente. Secundum autem quod sunt quid contractum habent ex recipiente, ex quia intelligere dicit determinatum modum agendi. Universale autem regimen rerum quandam indeterminationem et quandam univer salitatem importare videtur. Ideo illud ratione determinati modi, potest attribui deter minatae naturae. Aliud autem ratione universalitatis, si competit intelligentiae erit ex uni ve rsa li cau sa. Li ce t erg o totu m fa ci at Deus et na tu ra m et esse, ca us at tam en de ter m ina tum esse imprimendo ipsum determinatae naturae. In determinata enim non nisi determinatum esse habet produci, quod (quia ratione determinatae naturae contingit) naturae ipsi potest attribui. Ibid . 3 Aliquo ergo modo quantum ad esse communicatum naturis, et quantum ad perfectiones superadditas in prima creatione rerum fuit uniformitas ex parte Dei producentis, et diversitas ex parte recipientium. Erat quidem in potestate Dei producere diversas naturas, sed quod communicaret eis diversum esse, et diversas perfectiones quales eis communicavit, hoc ideo erat, quia sic requirebat diversitas naturarum. Op. cit., prop. XXIV, vol. 821, I. 4 Cf. J. Paulus, Le s Dis put es, p. 332. Il est superflu de noter le caractère embarrassé et point toujours cohérent de ces responses. . . . Giles will never say explicitly that essence is


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ing that his theory of limitation involves a quasi-divine, quasi-eternal function of essence, - a certain real ity of its own of the possible essence ? In order to understand this, we must examine the doctrine on which it depends, namely, the Uniformity of the Divine Action. 4.

UNITY AND PLUR ALIT Y IN CREATION

Giles is careful to attribute the causality of the creative act ex clusively to God: a real creation ex nihilo demands God as a unique cause. Nevertheless he insists on the fact that in the very first act of creation the creature is somehow present as the limiting factor. His basic metaphysical principles com pel him to assert this. In creation existence is communicated in a uniform wa y to all things, so that its differentiation must be due to its recipient essences. The role of diversification has to be attributed to the creature rather than to the Creator because God necessarily offers Himself in the infinite totality of His Being to every creature alike. It is the essence of the creature which determines what proportion of this infinity of existence it is to receive. Thus creatures are the cause of plurality; multiplicity results from their introduction into the universe. The reason for the quasieternity of the Aegidian essence is not very difficult to discover. Giles of Rome repeats it constantly throughout his commentary on the Liber de Causis. Why does essence have to be present in the first creation of things ? Giles has already to ld us tha t it has to be there to account for plurality. The reason that the role of diversification has to be attributed to the creature rather than to the Creator, is because God acts with absolute uniformity. That the uni form action of the Creator demands a factor of limitation seems to be the reason for the quasi-eternity of essence. a

. THE UNIFORM ITY OF THE CREATIV E ACT

Giles of Rome offers for our consideration two possible solutions for the presence of diversity in reality. At times the recipient of the action, the ‘'passive factor’’ as he calls it, is one, and thus diversity and produced before esse. He does not assert that there is dual creation. There is a simultaneity in the production which precludes an act of exem plarity prior to the commun ication of esse. The wh ole be ing is pro du ced fro m no thi ng . Gil es ins ist s, no t esse and essence separately. Henry of Ghent realizes that G iles insists on the composite as the term of creation, bu t he points up the inconsistency of this position in line with the quasi eternity of essence. Cf. J. Paulus, op. cit., P. 33 7 .

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contrariety must be due to the fact that the agents are different. For example, we find that the same water is frozen by cold and dissolved by b y heat. he at. B ut at other oth er times tim es we find fin d th at the un ity it y is on the part pa rt of the agent and diversity is due to the recipient or passive factor, as when by the very same sun mud is hardened and wax is liquefied.1 This is why the divine goodness is likened to the sun, precisely because bec ause of its uniformity uniformity of action. Just as the sun, neither reasoning nor choosing, diffuses its rays on all bodies alike, so the divine goodness sends down the rays of its total goodness upon all existing things, according to their different capacities. In short we are told that, according to the course of nature, God acts uniformly on all things and offers Himself totally to all. Secundum ergo naturae cursum, Deus uniformiter agit in omnia et totius et totaliter se offert omnibus.2

Giles concludes concludes the phrase “ according to the course of of nature '' because if God wished, He could do otherwise. He could so ordain it that all diversity would not be due to the recipients, because He can cause diversity withou t any contribution on their part.3 For as Giles Giles states states on another occasion : Stultum est enim secundum nostrum intellectum velle limitare divinam poten tiam.4

The significance of this uniformity of the divine action in the meta physics of Giles of Rome is brought out more clearly when we consider the fact that Thomas Aquinas would never accept this solution of the problem of diversity in the creative action. His doctrine on this point is clear and emphatic. In the De Potentia Poten tia he poses Giles' position in the 1 Nam si ab una causa tantum produceretur aliquid, nunquam hanc varietatem in pro ductione illa salvare possemus. Giles of Rome, op. cit. cit. prop. XX, fol. 69V. Z. Utraque enim modo videmus diversitatem in rebus. Nam aliquando passum est unum, tamen quia agentia sunt differentia, ideo est ibi diversitas et contrarietas, ut eadem aqua congelatur a frigido et dissolvitur a calido. calido. A liquando vero e converso ponitur esse unitas ex parte agentis, et diver sitas ex parte passi, ut ab eodem sole induratur lutum, et liquescit cera. Op. cit., cit., prop. XXIV, fol. ilv D. 2 Ib id. , fol. 8iv. E. 3 Unde Dionysi Dionysius us quarto quarto De Di vin e N ominib us us dicit, quod sicut sol non ratiocinans neque preeligens radios suos diffundit in omnia corpora, ita quidem et bonitas divina omnibus existentibus proportionabiliter immittit radios totius bonitatis suae. Secundum ergo naturae cursum, Deus uniformiter agit in omnia, et totius et totaliter se offert omnibus. omnibus. Omnia tam en de ipso capiunt secundum exigentiam suae capacitatis. Dicimus autem secundum naturae cursum, quia si velle t Deus posset aliter agere, agere, adeo quod non tota dive rsitas esset ex parte recipientium. Potest enim hunc premovere absque ullis eius praecedentibus meritis. Sed de hoc agere presens negotium non requirit. Ibi d. 4 Op. cit., cit., prop. 4, fol. igr 00.


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form of an objection. The cause of diversity, the objection states, can not be God, because He is one and simple. Therefore we must look to the recipient of the action for the cause of diversity. Praeterea, in rebus invenitur diversitas, prout una res est alia perfectior. Hujus autem diversitatis causa non est ex parte Dei, qui est unus et simplex. Ergo oportet hujus diversitatis causam assignare ex parte materiae.

In answer to this objection, Aquinas states that God does not produce things from a necessity of nature, but rather from the order of His wisdom. wisd om. The refo re, the dive di ve rsit rs ityy of things thi ngs does not no t come from ma tter, tte r, but bu t from the order orde r of the th e divin div inee wisdom wis dom which wh ich estab es tablish lish es diverse div erse natures for the perfection of the universe. . . . dicendum quod Deus non producit res ex necessitate naturae, sed ex ordine suae sapientiae. Et ideo diversitas rerum non oportet quod sit ex materia, sed ex ordine divinae sapientiae; quae ad complementum universi diversas naturas instituit.2

Since God is the cause of being, He is the cause of all the differences of being be ing ; cons co nseq eque uentl ntlyy He is the cause caus e of the entire enti re m ult itude itu de of beings. being s. Oportet autem illud quod est causa entis inquantum est ens, esse causam omnium differentiarum entis, et per consequens totius multitudinis entium.3

Thomas Aquinas reiterates and emphasizes his position. We should hold, hold, he says, that from the One First B eing the multitude and diversity of creatures proceed, not because of the necessity of matter, nor because of the limitation of potency, nor potency, nor because of goodness, nor because of the demands of goodness, but from the order of wisdom, so that the perfec tion of the universe might consist in the variety of creatures. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod ab uno primo multitudo et diversitas creaturarum processit, non propter materiae necessitatem, nec propter bonitat em, nec boni tatis obligationem; sed ex ordine sapientiae, ut in diversitate creaturarum perfectio consisteret universi.4

Contrary to the teaching of Giles of Rome, Aquinas tells us that the diverse grades of creatures are established by one principle with no prior difference contributed by the thing.5 1 Saint Thomas, De Pot ent ia, ia , Q. Ill, a. I. obj. 9. 2 Saint Thoma Thomas, s, ibid., ibid., ad 9. 3 Saint Saint Thomas, Thomas, op. cit., cit., Q. Ill, a. 16, ad 4. 4 Saint Saint Thomas, Thomas, ibid., ibid., resp. 5 Ex ipso enim enim ordine universi universi potuisset ejus ratio apparere, quod ab uno principio, principio, nulla meritorum differentia praecedente, oportuit diversos gradus creaturarum institui, ad hoc quod universum esset complementum (repraesentante universo per multiplices et varios modos creaturarum quod in div ina bonitate simpliciter simpliciter et indistincte praeexistit) sicut et ipsa perfectio domus et humani corporis diversitatem partium requirit. Saint Thomas, ibid.

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Both the solutions which, as we saw above, Giles of Rome offers us in his commentary on the Libe the Liberr de Cau C ausis sis,, are are to be found in Tho mas' own commentary on the Liber Libe r de Caus Ca usis is,, in his treatment of the same proposition with which Giles is here concerned.1 But, whereas Giles chooses the second solution as typical of the divine action, Thomas Aq uina ui nass chooses the first. firs t. It is im i m porta po rta nt to note not e th at here, under und er Giles' Gil es' direct scrutiny, Aquinas states unequivocally that diversity is due to the creative causality and certainly not to creatures. But again Aqui nas' objection has little effect. Giles is following his own metaphysical principles which do not seem to be Thomistic.2 To explain further what he means by this uniformity of action, Giles of Rome takes an example from the sphere of politics. The intention of the legislator, he tells us, should be to lead the polity to unity and peace. However, unity and peace would never be achieved if qua legislator did not keep his relation to all things a the legislator qua uniform one. Diversity occurs only on the part of the citizens, for those who wh o are of greate gre aterr merit mer it and who wh o labor lab or more on beha be half lf of the rep ublic ub lic should be honored. If, therefore, the legislator acts uniformly and honors the citizens more or less according to their merit, then he governs as he should and all are provided for as they deserve. This also holds true for the First Cause. Et hoc est in regimine primae causae, quia ipsa quantum est de se habet uni formiter ad omnia, et solum est ibi diversitas secundum merita recipientium, ideo regimen suum est decorum et pulchrum in fine pulchritudinis.3

Giles of Rome extends this simile of uniformity and diversity in the political order to God and the things He has created. For the First Cause is related uniformly to all things, and diversity exists only in accordance with the desserts of the recipients. We see the effect of this unity expressing itself in a uniform act, in its total gift of self to the creature. For God offers Himself wholly to every creature, so that He is prepared to communicate to every thing His whole being and every mode of being.4 The First Being communicates Itself wholly to every thing as much as that thing can receive. 1 Saint Thomas. In Lib rum de Ca usis , prop. 24, pp. 291-2. 2 Cf. E. Hocedez on on this point. Theoremata, Theoremata, Introd. sec. sec. VIII , “ Influences Néoplatoni ciennes,” pp. 72-3. Also P. Nash, “ Giles of Rome,” The Modern Schoolman, Schoolman, Nov. 1950, p. 9. 3 Giles Giles of Rome, Rome, op. cit., cit., prop. XX, fol. 7or R. 4 Dicendum quod in esse esse creato invenimus varios modos essendi, essendi, propter quos ipsa ipsa creata determinantur ad diversa praedicamenta, et ad diversa genera entis. Et quia quodlibet crea tum determinatur ad aliquod genus entis, cuilibet creato competit specialis modus essendi, et nulli creato potest communicari omnis modus essendi, etiam loquendo de modis essendi per


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Primum enim ens a quo regulantur omnia, sine invidia communicat seipsum totum cuilibet rei quantum quaelibet res de ipso potest capere.1

Should someone doubt that the uniformity of the divine action were characteristic of the creative act as well as of the divine governance, Giles of Rome states his mind very carefully on this point. N ot only in the conservation of things, where a diversity of natures is already present, but in the very first creation of things, in the act of communi cation of esse, there is to be found a uniformity on the p art of G od who offers His whole self to every produced nature. But diversity is due to the recipient nature, which participates that esse as much as it can. There is no doubt at all but that Giles of Rome intends to locate this uniform ity of the divine action in the creative act itself, and not merely in the act of conserving natures already created: Ergo in prima creatione rerum, licet non tantum quantum in ipso regimine, ubi iam supponitur diversitas naturarum, sumitur aliquo modo, ut quantum a communicationem ipsius esse, uniformitas ex parte Dei communicantis, qui se totam obtulit cuilibet naturae productae, et diversitas ex parte recipientium, qui de illo esse participationem susceperunt quantum potuerunt de illo capere.2

In conclusion, we are told tha t in some way in the ve ry first creation of things, there was uniformity on the part of God in regard to the esse communicated in natures, and diversity on the part of the recipients. Aliquo ergo modo quantum ad esse communicatum naturis, et quantum ad perfectiones superadditas in prima creatione rerum fuit uniformitas ex parte Dei producentis, et diversitas ex parte recipientium.3

God is so generous and so liberal that He offers himself wholly to every creature, just as the sea does to every vessel. However, because vessels do not have equal cap acities th ey do not receive eq ually the waters of the sea. Similarly, because created things are not equal, some varying in ca pacity as th ey do, some receive more, some less of the divine goodness.4 Inasmuch as God is an infinite ocean of goodness, He qnos ea ipsa creata determinantur ad diversa praedicamenta, et ad diversa genera entis, quae vi de mu s in cre atu ris . De us erg o qu an tu m es t ex se, of fer t se to tu m cu ili be t rei , it a quo d paratus est com municare cuilibet totum esse, et omnem modum essendi. Sed nihil totum esse creatum recipere, quia nihil creatum unum, et idem potest in se comprehendere omnem modum essendi, quae videmus in creaturis. Propter quod producta a primo diversificant in tali esse. Et quaelibet res producta a primo accipit specialem modum essendi ab eo prout requirit natura sua. Op. cit., prop. IV, fol. i7v FF. 1 Op. cit., prop. XII, fol. 40V C. 2 Op. cit., prop. XXIV, fol. 82r H. 3 Ib id ., fol. 82r I. 4 Nan Deus ita largus et ita liberalis est, quod se totum offert cuilibet creaturae, sicut enim mare quantum est ex se offertur totum cuilibet vasi, tamen quia vasa non sunt aequalia, ideo non aequaliter recipiunt de aqua maris, sic quia res creatae non sunt aequales, sed quaedam sunt maioris capacitatis quam aliae, et quaedam minoris, ideo quaedam recipiunt plus, et quaedam minus de divina bonitate. Op. cit., prop. XX, fol. 69 v X.

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offers himself wholly to each and every thing, pouring himself upon each completely. The reason why any particular thing is not complete and perfect, and does not have an abundance of this goodness, is due entirely to the diversity of the recipients. Everything receives not as much of the goodness of God, as God offers to it, but only according to the measure of its disposition and capacity.1 No caused thing can receive that infinite ocean of perfection in its entirety. If an infinite quantity of water should offer itself to a little vessel, that little vessel could not take the whole of that infinite quantity of water, but would participate some small part of it. So the divine goodness offers the whole of itself to each caused thing. However no effect can receive the whole of it. But each of the effects participates the First Goodness in different ways, each according to its own mode.2 There is no doubt but that for Giles the divine characteristic of unity seems to be dominant in the creative action of God. Such unity on the part of God becomes ever more involved in the very structure of the universe God has created. This becomes evident as we follow Giles of Rome in his analysis of creatures. b

. T H E C O M P O S I T I O N OF T H E C R E A T U R E

Wh en Giles turns from God and His cre ative action to the term and product of that activity, the creature, we notice that production necessarily involves composition. In fact, the essential characteristic of the creature is to be composite. Every creature is a composite in some w ay or other. Giles of Rom e, in his explanation of creation, tra vels from a First Principle, which is absolutely simple, to the first creature, wh ich is a real p lurality, whose simplicity is not absolute. The hierarchy of the universe runs down from a First Cause which is an absolute unity through various grades of plurality. For Giles of Rome there is a very real problem in the doctrine of creation, the problem of the one and the many, the transition from unity to plurality. And plurality may be reduced to composition, for where there is no composition there is no plurality.

1 Quod Deus est quoddam infinitum pelagus bonitatis, et offert se totum cuilibet rei, et quantum est de se in omnia influit influxione completa, sed quod quaelibet res non sit com pleta, et perfecta, et non habeat abundantiam huius bonitatis, hoc est ex diversitate recipien tium, quia non quaelibet res capit de bonitate Dei quantum Deus ei offert, sed solum secun dum mensuram suae capacitatis et dispositionis. Op. cit., prop. XXXII, fol. yôv &. 2 Op. cit., prop. XVII, fol. 6ov A.


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Omnis plurificatio secundum esse et quaelibet distinctio per absoluta ex compo sitione sumit originem. In quo enim nulla est compositio, nulla talis plurificatio esse potest.1

Having confined the problem of the origin of plurality to its obvious limits within a Christian universe, Giles of Rome examines the struc ture of the first of creatures, the pure Intelligences, to discover the source of their plurality. How precisely is the multiplication of Intelli gence accomplished? The answer is that the being of Intelligence is finite, limited and particularized because no Intelligence has in itself the whole of being. Ipsum esse, in itself, is one and simple. However, it is received in Intelligences according to particular modes and not according to its total being. The principle of diversity is, as we have seen, the recipient.2 Plu rality arises with the Intelligences because it first is received in a superior Intelligence according to a more perfect mode and then in an inferior Intelligence according to a less perfect mode. Th is follows the general law tha t the plura lity of things depends upon the recipient which receives m£-according to its own proper mode. Therefore, although ipsum esse of itself is simple, it is diversified and partitioned in Intelligences. And because one Intelligence receives being according to one mode, and another according to another mode, Intelligences are thus diversified and become diverse forms and diverse intelligible substances.3 Thus in its gradual procession from the one First Being, esse is multiplied in Intelligences, and a multitude of Intelligences is produced. If a multitude of simple and perfect Intelligences is possible, and if the esse in them can be multiplied, then esse of this type can be multiplied much more in other beings which are more composite and less perfect. This is so because in them esse is received in a more participated and more contracted fashion. Giles has finally, by a characteristically devious and prolix argumentation, reached his conclusion. Giles of Rome agrees completely with the author of the Liber de Causis that

1 Cf. P. Nash, Giles of Rome, p. 13 : “ Giles’ exclusivene ss on this point (his doctrine of particularity) confirms the suspicion that his main problem in the constitution of existent bei ng s is the Plat on ic one, de eodem et diverso .” 2 Quidquid recipitur in rebus compositis trahitur ad modum compositorum, et quantun cunque de se sit unum potest plurificari propter ea in quibus recipitur. Esse est huiusmodi. Ib id. , fol. 14V I. 3 Si ergo volumus hoc referre ad diversitatem substantiarum exponatur, videlicet, quod quamvis esse de se sit unum, tamen quia diverso modo recipitur in intelligentiis, ideo sunt diversae formae, id est diversae naturae, sive diversae substantiae intellectuales, vel diversae intelligentiae. Op. cit., prop. IV, fol. 17V DD.

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although being in itself is one, plurality is achieved b y the fact that it is diversified in Intelligences.1 This, then, is what the creature signifies for Giles of Rome: it is essentially a composite. It is distinguished from God by reason of the plurality present in its inherent constitution. Not only is composition the distinguishing mark of the creature, but the amount of division, or, conversely, unity, is the basis for the hierarchy of perfection among creatures. Those composites which more nearly approach the divine perfection are precisely those which possess more of unity and less of plurality. Thus, the angelic Intelligence, which is the nearest to an absolute unity in the created universe, is the most perfect of creatures and takes its position at the head of God's creation. In fact, it is upon the very nature of the creature as a composite that its creaturehood rests, for it needs parts for its being and also an agent to unite those parts. The world we are looking at, then, is one which is composed of a God who is absolutely simple, a perfect unity, and creatures who are fundamentally and primarily a composition and a plurality. But the problem that remains is: how exactly does a world which is a plurality of composites proceed from an absolute unity which is the first principle of reality ? Ipsum esse in itself is one and simple. However, it is received in Intelligences according to particular modes and not according to its total being.2Multiplication of being is accomplished by a certain parti cularization of being. Giles of Rome tells us that esse can be multiplied in beings because in them esse is received in a more contracted fashion. This contraction seems to involve the reciprocal relations of nature and esse. What is the nature of this contraction? What is being for Giles if it can be contracted in this way ? As we have just seen, the process by which a uniform divine action is differentiated and plurified in creatures is what Giles of Rome calls “ contraction .” T he doctrine of the limitation of the recipient is de manded by the uniformity of the divine action. And the explanation of this uniformity of action will follow upon the understanding of this limitation or contraction of being which finds its ontological locus within the creative act. A detailed examination of this contraction of 1 Bene dic tum est quod quam vis sit unum esse de se, tamen quia divers ificatu r in intelligentiis, factae sunt diversae formae, id est diversae naturae intellectuales, Ib id. , fol. i7v FF. 2 Ulterius autem quamvis intelligentia non possit recipere totum esse increatum, quia ens qui est huiusmodi esse est ubique totus, et nulla res ipsum Deum capit. Ib id. , fol. i6v Z.


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being will give us an understanding of wh at the divine uniform ity is for Giles. Therefore our next step will be to investigate the creative operation as Giles of Rome explains it, in order to arrive at some under standing of this limitation in its metaphysical function. 5.

T H E I N D E T E R M I N A T E N A T U R E O F B E IN G

The uniformity of the creative action is due to the indeterminate nature of existence. An undetermined existence must be determined, contracted and limited by the composite structure of essence, which is a composition of potency and act. This, of course, does not explain the presence of plurality, but simply attempts to locate it on a more basic ontological level. This contraction of existence by essence is accomplished through a determination modeled on that of genus and specific difference in definition. Existence, wholly indeterminate, is contracted by being received within a determinate genus and species. Genus and species are the mechanism of contraction within essence itself. The actuality that an essence possesses of itself is an imperfect actuality because it ex presses a composition of poten cy and act. In the last analysis, an essence can contract existence because it is itself composite. Giles of Rome thus pushes the problem of plurality back beyond the simple limitation of essence to a structural composition within essence itself. This serves to confirm his view of the creature as basically and essentially a composite. A. T H E C O N T R A C T I O N O F B E I N G

So far, the argumentation of Giles of Rome has followed these lines : in the first moments of creation, essence has to be present to receive esse if there is to be plurality in the created world. Why does diversity demand essence as its principle? Because, as Giles has emphasized, there is a unity and uniformity about the act of communication of esse which demands a recipient if any differentiation is to be possible. Th at is wh y creatures are the cause of plurality, and their introduction into the universe results in multiplicity. Giles is perfectly logical. If God acts in such a uniform fashion, then a recipient is necessary in creation. Eve n though its presence causes difficulty w ith the traditional doctrine of a creatio ex nihilo, as Thomas Aquinas has pointed out, the conclusion is unavoidable. Otherwise how could we account for plurality? However, the question that arises at this point is : what does Giles of

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Rome mean by this uniformity or unity on the part of God ? Thomas Aquin as has state d cle arly th at in creation diversity comes from God alone, not from creatures. Giles of Rome denies this. Evidently Giles' metaphysics of creation is different from that of Thomas Aquinas. What does Giles of Rome mean by the uniform ity of the divine action ? We can bette r understand the uniform ity of the cre ative action if we watch it at work in the construction of the creature. There is a way in which it must be contracted and limited by its reception in essence. This contraction by essence is accomplished through a determination modeled on that of genus and specific difference. An esse, somehow indeterminate, is contracted by being received within a determinate genus and species. B E IN G A N D T H E O R I G I N O F P L U R A L I T Y

Giles seems to realize that his interpretation of the problem of the One and the Many in terms of being is not quite compatible with the view of the author of the Liber de Causis. It seems that the prime intention of the author of the Liber de Causis is not to treat of being. Rather, starting with being which in itself is something one, he pro ceeds to explain how it is multiplied in the separate intelligences, and how the diversity of Intelligences comes about. At least, this is how the problem poses itself to Giles. Tamen non videtur sua intentio principalis sic determinare de esse, sed ex esse quod in se est quid unum, vult descendere quomodo plurificatum est in intelligentiis, et facta est diversitas intelligentiarum.1

Giles of Rome proceeds to solve this problem of unity and plurality, but on his own terms. He uses being as a more fundamental notion than those of unity and plurality, a notion in which it is possible to reconcile and unify them. But how precisely does Giles do this ? We are told that creation is the communication of being. In being, all beings are united and a plurality of beings is the result of the multi plication of esse in things. Et quia in esse uniuntur omnia entia, et ex esse plurificatum in entibus facta est multitudo entium.2

What does being mean for Giles of Rome and what is its exact function in creation if he is to reconcile the one and the m any ? 1 Giles of Rome, op. cit., prop. IV, fol. 2 Ibi d., fol. i3r A.

13V

A, B.


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R E D U C T I O N O F P L U R A L I T Y T O C O M P O S I T IO N

Giles of Rome in his attempt to solve the problem of the one and the many in terms of being, explains that God embraces all perfections just as lig ht contains all colors. Just as colors are contractions of light, so all beings are contractions of ipsum esse. Now if beings are contrac tions of ipsum esse, how, precisely, is esse contracted and multiplied ? Esse is first multiplied only through the composition of finite and infinite, that is, through the composition of esse and form, or of esse and nature. For example, in the angelic Intelligences, nature is infinite and esse is finite. Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo non multiplicatur esse, nisi per compositionem finiti cum infinito. Dicendum quod Intelligentiae sunt compositae ex finito et infinito, id est compositae ex forma et esse, sive ex natura et esse. Natura enim in eis est infinita, esse vero infinitum.1

In what way does this esse become finite ? How does the composition of esse and form result in the limitation of esse? Esse appears to be limited by the very fact of its union with matter. Just as it is impossible for a form in matter to possess as much perfection as if it were a separate form, so it is impossible for esse to possess the fullness of its perfection when it is received in form, because it is limited by the capac ity of the form in which it is received.2 1 Op. cit., prop. IV, fol. i5r M, N. Secundum hoc ergo omne creatum compositum est ex finito et infinito quia compositum est ex esse, quod est finitum, et ex n atura, quae est infinita, id est indeterminata, Op. cit., prop. V, fol. 2ir Q. Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis quomodo si in intelligentiis est multitudo, multitudo illa est ibi quasi sit res vera. Dicendum quod in intelligentiis est multitudo illa est ibi quasi sit res ve ra . Di cen du m quo d in in tel lig en tiis est mu lti tu do , qu ia in qu ael ibe t illa rum est na tu ra et esse. Op. cit., prop. V II, fol. 27v Q. On this point of the distinction between finite and infinite in proposition four of the Libe r de Ca usi s, cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, Le De En te et E sse ntia , pp. 146-149 where he traces the source of the distinction between essence and existence to this distinction of finite and infinite in the Libe r de Ca usis. Cf. also Saint Thomas in Librum de Causis, lect. IV. Saint Thomas interprets this distinction as Giles of Rome does, a distinction bet we en essen ce and esse. 2 Et impossibile est quod tantae perfectionis sit forma in materia, quantae esset si esset separata. Albedo ergo in materia non est infinita albedo, quia non habet omnem perfectionem albedinis. Sed si esset albedo separata, quia illa non contraheretur neque particularetur per materiam recipientem, haberet omnem perfectionem albedinis. Esset ergo infinita albedo. Sed non esset infinitum ens, quia licet haberet omnem perfectionem albedinis, non tamen haberet omnem perfectionem entis. Immo eo ipso quod esset albedo, esset determ inata ad de terminatam speciem coloris, et non recipiret esse in sua totalitate, sed tantum reciperet de esse quantum requireret talis coloris species. Illa itaque albedo, secundum hunc modum loquendi, esset infinita forma, sed haberet finitum esse, et per consequens, esset composita ex finito et infinito. Sed licet albedo non sit talis, intelligentiae tamen sunt tales, quia sunt formae per se existentes non receptae in materia. In eis ergo est forma infinita, sive natura infinita, quia natura in eis habet omne complementum quod pertinet ad perfectionem suae speciei. Esse tamen earum est finitum quia non recipitur in eis totum esse, sed tantum de esse recipiunt quantum potest capere illius natura. Ib id. , fol. i5r N - 1 5 V O. Cf. Op. cit. fol. i8r HH.

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The analogy which Giles of Rome draws between matter and form and esse is not merely a literary comparison. Esse is received in form just as form is received in matter. The lim iting function of form has a definite resemblance to the limiting function of matter. Giles of Rome finds that a twofold finitude or limitation can be attributed to the created thing. One comes from the form, and, if the thing is material, another limitation or contraction can be attributed to it because of matter. It is due to its form that a created thing has a finite esse, and because of matter it has a finite form. Form limits esse the way matter limits form. Just as if colors were separate (i.e., existed as Platonic forms), whiteness, due to its species, would be finite ens, but if it is received in matter, it becomes a finite form.1 Therefore whiteness, if it were separated, would be an infinite whiteness; likewise, no separate form, according to the present disposition of things, is determined to a special mode of that form. But the fact that it is determined and contracted is due to the matter in which it is received. Thus God, because He is not esse received in another, is infinite esse. And so, Intelligences, because they are forms existing per se, are in some way infinite forms. However, because they are determined to a certain genus of being, they are finite beings, and they have a finite esse. It is significant to note again that esse must be limited and determined by its reception in form, just as form is limited, determined, and made finite by its reception in matter. Sic albedo si esset separata, esset infinita albedo, et quaelibet forma separata, secundum hunc ordinem quem videmus, de se non determinatur ad specialem modum illius formae. Sed si determinatur et contrahitur, hoc est ratione materiae in qua recipitur. Sic ergo Deus, quia non est esse receptum in alio, ideo est infini tum esse. Sic et intelligentiae, quia sunt formae per se existentes, sunt quodam modo infinitae ad certum genus entis, sunt finita entia, et habent finitum esse .2

Giles of Rome is thoroughly consistent in reducing plurality to composition.3The initial composition in the plurification of esse, as we have just seen, is that of essence and esse A It is through form that esse 1 Dicendum quod rei creatae potest competere duplex finitas, sive duplex limitatio. Una ex parte formae; et si sit illa res materialis, potest ei competere alia limitatio, et alia con tractio ex parte materiae. Ex forma quidem habet res creata quod sit finitum ens, sed si sit materialis habet etiam ex materia quod habeat finitam formam ut, sicut dicebatur, si colores essent abstracti, albedo ex sua specie haberet quod esset finitum ens, sed ex eo quod recipitur in materia habet albedo quod sit finita forma. Ib id. , fol. i6v Z. 2 Ib id. , fol. i6v Z. Cf. Theoremata, I, p. 3, 11. 17-26, p. 4, 11. 1-10. 3 Cf. Theoremata, II, p. 5, 11. 13-15. 4 Diversitas ergo secundum genus in unitate analogiae absque compositione esse et essen tiae fieri non potest. Theoremata, 11, p. 9, 11. 22-24.


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is contracted.1 The contraction of being is accomplished by the limiting function of essence. But how does essence achieve this contraction ? Is there an inner mechanism in the structure of essence which might help us to understand this contraction of a uniform esse ? C O M P O S I TI O N O F G E N U S A N D S P E C I E S

Ap paren tly Giles of Rome, himself, is not satisfied with the ex pla nation of limitation simply in terms of essence. It sounds in a way like “begging the question.” Since esse is multiplied because it is received in different intellectual natures, and since Intelligences are multiplied only because th ey have a different esse, then the only reason that esse is multiplied seems to be just because esse is multiplied, an excellent formulation in terms of reciprocal causes. Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis quia videtur ex hoc peti quod est in principio. Nam si esse plurificatur quia recipitur in alia et alia natura intelligentiarum, cum intelligentiae non sint plures nisi quia habent aliud et alius esse, ergo non plurif icatur esse nisi quia plurif icatur esse.2

How does Giles of Rome avoid this “ vicious circle” of reciprocal causes? If the reason why esse is multiplied is its reception in essence, and the reason why things of the same essence, such as Intelligences, are multiplied is because of the different esse they have received, then obviously some further explanation of the function of limitation is called for. Giles accomplishes this by showing a further composition with in essence itself. Forms are like numbers. Just as there cannot be two different num bers equal in un ity, so there cannot be two forms wh ich have received esse in the same mode. No two forms, of their own nature, are de termined to receive esse in the same mode. Form requires a certain mode of perfection by reason of its determination to a certain genus and a certain species. Because there is one mode of perfection in one species and another in another species, they receive esse according to different modes. Giles of Rome has resolved the difficulty he posed for himself by asserting that a thing by reason of its nature and essence is determined to a certain genus and to a certain species. Esse which is received in essence and contracted by essence is in that process de 1 Et quia res per formam et qu antitatem sine materiam suam collocantur in genere, bene dictum est, quod res, causata per suam formam, habet quod sit determinatum ens. Giles of Rome, Sup er Lib rum de Cau sis, prop. IV, fol. i6v Z. 2 Ib id., fol. 15V. P.

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termined to a certain genus and specific difference. This seems to be the core of his argument. Dicendum quod res per naturam suam et per essentiam determinatur ad certum genus et ad certam speciem. Neque sunt duae species aeque perfectae in genere. Immo semper una habet rationem privationis respectu alterius, et est imper fectior ea; et ideo formae sunt sicut numeri. Nam sicut non sunt duo numeri formaliter differentes aeque distantes ab unitate, vel habentes aequales unitates, sic non sunt duae formae determinatae ad certum genus, et ad certam speciem, et ad talem modum perfectionis quae de sui natura non determinentur ut reci piant esse alio et alio modo. Et quia alius modus perfectionis est in una specie et alius in alia, ideo ex forma et esse facta est prima multiplicitas entium, ex forma quidem requirente talem modum perfectionis, et ex esse recepto in forma secun dum illud modum .1

Although Giles clearly says that the composition of genus and difference is logical, not metaphysical, still he treats of it here as if it were on the metaphy sical level. In accordance with a three-fold plurali ty we find a threefold mode of composition, the composition of matter and form, the composition of genus and difference, and the composition of essence and esse. These compositions exist in a hierarchical order. For the composition of matter and form presupposes the composition of genus and difference. And the composition of genus and difference is intimately connected with the composition of essence and esse. Secundum autem hanc triplicem pluralitatem inveniemus triplicem composi tionis modum, quia vel est compositio ex materia et forma, vel ex genere et differentia, vel ex esse et essentia. Et hae compositiones se habent per ordinem. Nam compositio ex materia et forma praesupponit compositionem ex genere et differentia. Compositio autem ex genere et differentia numquam separatur a compositione ex esse et essentia.2

This becomes more significant when we realize that if form and its esse were identical and no composition of essence and esse were present, that form would be pure ac t and there w ould be no po ten tialit y in it ; and therefore the ratio of genus could not be found in it. Thus it is necessary that a thing which is composed of genus and difference, also be com posed of essence and esse. Si ergo forma esset suum esse et non esset in ea composito ex essentia et esse, forma ilia esset actus purus, et in ea non esset potentialitas aliqua, et per consequens in ea ratio generis sumi non posset. Oportet itaque rem illam quae est per se in genere, et quae est composita ex genere et differentia, esse compositam ex essentia et esse.3

1 Ib id. , fol. 15 V. P, Q. 2 Theoremata, II, p. 6, 11. 1-16; p. 7, 3 Ibi d., p. 7, 11. 1-15.

11.

1-15.


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Now this composite structure of essence is responsible for the contraction of esse. The composition of genus and difference has a precise function. Giles of Rome states that a thing is contracted by being enclosed between genus and species, which define or set limits to a thing. Genus and species are termini between which the essence of the thing caused is enclosed, just as in the definition of man as rational animal, the whole essence of man is enclosed between a certain genus and a certain difference. This is precisely th e reason, Giles asserts, that a being is finite, because it is enclosed between a certain genus and a certain difference. Thus it is that the expression containing the proper genus and the proper difference of something is called definition or fin itio, because it contains the fines, the terms or limits of the thing. Essentia autem omnium causatorum refertur ad duo, ad genus scilicet et ad differentiam. Genus autem et differentia sunt termini inter quos clauditur essentia rei causatae ; ut si definitio hominis sit animal rationale, tota essentia hominis claudetur inter tale genus, et talem differentiam. Ex hoc ergo est aliquod ens finitum, quia clauditur inter certum genus et certam differentiam. Et inde est quod oratio continens proprium genus et propriam differentiam alicuius dicitur definitio eius, quasi finitio quia continet fines et terminos rei.1

It is not merely the abstract essence which is the locale for the determination of genus and specific difference, but Intelligences them selves, Giles avers, in their ontological capacity as creatures, undergo this process of determination. Since the Intelligence does not possess esse in its infinity, but has a special mode of being, it is necessarily contracted to a determinate predicament or category. Nam cum intelligentia recedat a simplicitate primi et non habeat esse in sua infinitate, se habeat specialem modum essendi, de necessitate contrahitur ad praedicamentum determinatum .2

An d not only the Intelligences, bu t the essence of any caused thing is finite, because it is determined to a certain predicament and to a certain difference of genus. Ergo essentia cuiuslibet causatae est finita quia est determinata ad certum praedicamentum et ad certam differentiam generis .3

1 Supe r Lib rum de Ca us is, prop. XVII, fol. 57r B. 2 Op. cit., prop. VII, fol. 25V C. 3 Op. cit., prop. XVII, fol. 57v E, F. Cf. also Op. cit., prop. IV, fol. i7 v FF : Dubitaret forte aliquis quare esse totum creatum intelligentia non potest recipere. Dicendum quod in esse creato invenimus varios modos essendi, propter quos ipsa creata determinantur ad diversa praedicamenta, et ad diversa genera entis. Et quia quodlibet creatum determinatur ad aliquod genus entis, cuilibet creato competit specialis essendi, etiam loquendo de modis essendi per quos ea ipsa creata determinantur ad diversa praedicamenta, et ad diversa genera entis, quae videmus in creaturis. Deus ergo quantum est ex se, offert se totum cuilibet rei, ita quod paratus est comm unicare cuilibet totum esse et omnem modum essendi. Sed nihil potest

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Just as differences, because they are more contracted, are formal in respect to genus, so all other perfections, because they are more con tracted than esse, are formal in respect to being itself. Imaginabamur enim quod sicut differentiae, quia sunt magis contractae, se habent per modum formae respectu generis, sic omnes aliae perfectiones, quia sunt magis contractae quam esse, se habent per modum formae respectu ipsius esse.1

T H E I N D E T E R M I N A T IO N O F D I V I N E E S S E

This contraction of being is not the determination of the concept of being, but occurs unmistakably on the ontological level of the creative act. When the First Cause pours out esse upon the world of natures, there are three elements that must be distinguished: the nature that receives esse, the First Cause pouring forth esse, and finally the esse that flows from the First into nature.2As we have seen, some thing indeterminate about this esse that flows from the First necessi tates its determination through the recipient nature. B ut if this is what it means to be a finite, determined esse, then a being which is not determined to some genus or to the difference of some genus, is essentially infinite. That is why God is infinite being: He is not esse receptum in alio? He is undetermined and uncontracted. The essence of any effect is finite because it is determined to a certain predicament and to a certain difference of genus, neither of wh ich can ap ply to God.4 God is infinite or not lim ited because He is totum esse creatum recipere, quia nihil creatum unum, et idem potest in se comprehendere omnem modum essendi, quae videmus in creaturis. Propter quod producta a primo diver sificant in tali esse. Et quaelibet res producta a primo accipit specialem modum essendi ab eo prout requirit natura sua. 1 Op. cit., prop. XVIII, fol. 62r S. Es se is thus not most formal for Giles as it is for Saint Thomas Aquinas. Cf. Saint Thomas, De Pote ntia , 7, 2, ad 9. 2 Imaginamur enim quod semper influentiam va dat a superiori ad inferius, ut si prima causa influit esse ipsi naturae, est ibi tria considerare, videlicet naturam recipientem esse, primam causam influentem esse, et esse influxum a primo in naturam. Op. cit., prop. V, 2ov N. 3 Et secundum hoc virtus Dei est infinita essentialiter, quia essentialiter huiusmodi virtus est ipsa divina essentia quae non determinatur ad aliquod praedicamentum nec ad differentias aliquorum praedicamentorum. Op. cit., prop. XVII, fol. 57r B. Sic ergo Deus quia non est esse receptum in alio, ideo est infinitum esse. Sic et inielligentiae quia sunt formae per se existentes, sunt quodammodo infinitae formae, quia tamen determinantur ad certum genus entis, sunt finita entia, et habent finitum esse. Op. cit., prop. IV, fol. i6v Z. 4 Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis, quia videtur quod intelligentiae etiam sint finitae formae, quia sicut determinantur ad certum genus entis, ita determinantur ad certam speciem. Sed species idem est quod forma. Quae ergo sunt in determinata specie, sunt limitatae formae. Dicendum quod Deus non dicitur infinitum esse, quia se extendat ultra esse, ita quod competat ei non esse. Sed ideo dicitur infinitum esse quia non contrahitur ad aliquod genus entis, sed competit ei omne esse, et omnis perfectio. Ib id. , prop. IV, fol. i6v &.


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undetermined, that is, He is not determined by definition. For only the First Cause is entirely infinite and not determined to some genus of being. Consequently, whatever does not have a special mode of being bu t possesses an infinite ocean of esse containing every esse and every perfection, is contracted to no predicament and is determined to no genus.1 If there were something which possessed so much perfection that it wo uld not be determined to any genus of perfection, it would be an infinite ocean of substance possessing in itself the perfections of all genera. Such a thing would be infinite because it would have no limitation or terminus of perfection, not because of a lack of perfection, but on account of an excellence of perfection. Such an infinite being is God Himself who is not determined to any genus of perfections.2 In concluding our investigation of the contraction of being, we are told that because in definition there are two elements, namely genus and difference, the First Cause cannot be known by an intellect because it is not determined to a genus nor contracted by a superadded differ ence.3 Not only is the esse which is received in natures indeterminate, bu t somehow the Divine Esse Itself may be called undetermined and indeterminate.4 A thinker of the stature of Giles of Rome does not insist on a point of doctrine unless the logical sequence of his thought demands it. And the reason wh y Giles places such emphasis on the characteristic un iformity of the divine action is now clear. The uniformity of the divine causality in the communication of esse demands that the recipient essence contract and limit this esse. But the function of the limitation of essence is reducible to a determination of genus and specific difference 1 Imaginamur enim quod sola prima causa sit omnino infinita, et ut non determ inata ad aliquod genus entium. Nam ipsa praedicamenta diversos modos essendi nominant. Cui ergo non competit specialis modus essendi, sed competit ei esse quod est pelagus infinitum in quo reservatur omne esse et omnis perfectio ad nullum praedicamentum contrahitur, et ad nullum genus determinatur. Sed quia huiusmodi est primum principium. Ideo ipsum ad nullis praedicamentum contrahitur et ad nullum genus determinatur. Op. cit., prop. VI, fol. 23V K. 2 Nam si esset aliquod quod tantum haberet de perfectione, quod non determinaretur ad aliquod genus perfectionis, sed esset quoddam pelagus infinitum substan tiae, et haberet in se perfectiones omnium generum, non solum quae sunt, sed etiam quae possunt esse et etiam, si dici potest, ultra quam esse possunt, tale quid esse infinitum quia non haberet finem et terminum perfectionis, non propter perfectionis carentiam, sed propter perfectionis excel lentiam. Tale quid infinitum est ipse Deus qui non determinatur ad aliquod genus perfectio num. Op. cit., prop. XVI, fol. 55r V, X. On the phrase pelagus inf in itu m substa ntiae cf. St. John Damascene, De Fi de Orth., I, 9. 3 Ibi d., prop. VI, fol. 23V J, K, L. 4 Utrum autem possit tantum elevari intellectus causatorum supra naturam suam quod vi de at ips am di vi na m ess ent iam , et per con seq uen s vi de at ips am div in am ess ent iam , et per consequens videat rem indeterminativam et infinitam, licet forte videat eam modo deter minato et finito, praesens speculatio non admittit. Ib id. , fol. 23V N.

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within the structure of essence itself. This determination, whatever else it may be, is an effort by Giles of Rome to explain in some ultimate fashion the presence of plurality, an effort reminiscent of Proclus' experiment with the henads. Like that experiment, it is but one step in the series of an indefinite regression, as we shall explain. Not only is there something indeterminate about esse, but the uniformity of the divine action seems to flow from a certain indéter mination of the divine nature. The infinity of Ipsum Esse is equated with an indeterm ination, a lack of determination. For Giles of Rome, then, the plurality of beings is comprehended within the un ity of Ipsum Esse as certain contracted beings. This is accomplished just as the genus embraces whatever is in the species, and the species, whatever is in the individual. God creates by giving to essence the esse by which it is. This union of essence and esse seems to have the effect of contracting ipsum esse (always in terms of some strange sort of dynamism present within the Porphyrian tree), to the limited existence possible within the restricting environs of genus and species. C R I T I Q U E O F TH O M A S A Q U I N A S

It is significant to note that just as the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas is opposed to that of Giles of Rome on the eternity of essence and also on the doctrine of the uniformity of the divine action, so it is opposed to the theory of limitation of the divine action. Difference does not contract genus in the ontological order, according to Thomas Aquin as, the way matter contracts form. Fo r him, such a technique of contraction differs from creation, as he understands it, as logic differs from metaphysics. For Aquinas, being cannot be contracted as genus is contracted through difference. He is quite explicit on this point. Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differen tia additur generi, vel accidens subjecto, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens.1

Esse is not divided by differences the way a genus is divided, but only as it is the esse of this or that. Si vero (esse) non dividatur differentiis sicut genus, sed per hoc quod est huius vel illius esse, ut veritas habet, magis est manifestum quod non potest esse per se existens nisi unum.2

2 Saint Thomas, De Verita te, i, i, c. 3 Saint Thomas, Sum ma Contra Gent iles, lib. II, cap. 52, ed. Leonine, p. 145.


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Being is related to those things which are contained under being in a ve ry different fashion from the way that animal or an y other genus is related to its species. For the species adds to the genus, as man does to animal, some difference which is outside the essence of the genus. For animal signifies only the sensible nature in which rational is not contained. But those things which are contained under being do not add something besides being which would be outside its essence.1 There is, however, a way in which being can be contracted, accord ing to Thomas Aquinas. And the conditions are the same as those on which Giles of Rome insists. For being can be contracted by applyin g it to some quidd ity or nature.2 Through the addition or subtraction of differences, definitions vary. Sicut enim unitas addita, vel subtracta variat speciem numeri, ita in defini tionibus differentia apposita vel subtracta.3

It is important to notice that, within the context of definition, Thomas' vocabulary is exactly like that which Giles of Rome uses with in the ontological fram ework of the creative act. According to Thomas, there is a twofold limitation of form. One, as the form of the species is limited to the individual; this is accomplished by matter. Another, as the form of the genus is limited to the nature of the species. This limitation of form, however, is not accomplished by matter, but through a more determinate form from which the difference is taken. For when the difference is added to genus, it contracts it to the species. This type of limitation is found in spiritual substances inasmuch as they are forms of determinate species. Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est limitatio formae. Una quidem secun dum quod species limitatur ad individuum, et talis limitatio formae est per materiam. Alia vero secundum quod forma generis limitatur ad naturam speciei, et talis limitatio formae non fit per materiam, sed per formam magis

1 Ad q uartum dicen dum, quod ens alio modo se habet ad ea quae sub ente continen tur, et alio modo animal vel quodlibet aliud genus ad species suas. Species enim addit supra genus, ut homo supra animal, differentiam aliquam quae est extra essentiam generis. Animal enim nominat tantum naturam sensibilem, in qua rationale non continetur; sed ea quae continentur sub ente, non ad dunt aliquid supra ens quod sit extra essentiam ejus. Unde non oportet quod illud quod est causa animalis in quantum est animal, sit causa rationalis in quantum huiusmodi. Oportet autem illud quod est causa entis in quantum est ens, esse causam omnium differentiarum entis, et per consequens totius multitudinis entium. Saint Thomas, De Pot ent ia, III, 16 ad 4. 2 Ea vero quae addunt aliquid supra ens, contrahunt ipsum; sicut substantia, quantitas, qualitas et alia huiusmodi. . .. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia, quantitas et qualitas, et ea quae sub eis continentur, contrahunt ens applicando ens ad aliquam quiddita tem, seu naturam. Saint Thomas, Sum ma Theologiae , I , Q.V, a. III, obj. 1, ad 1. 3 Ib id. , a.V, resp.

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determinatam, a qua sumitur differentia. Differentia enim addita super genus contrahit ipsum ad speciem; et talis limitatio est in substantiis spiritualibus, secundum scilicet quod sunt formae determinatarum specierum .1

Thus the form of the genus may be contracted by a more determinate form signified by the difference. But this constitutive difference is taken from the form of the thing itself, not from another form.2 Genus and species do not signify different forms, but only one form. It is the same form that gives animality to a man and also makes him man, whereas the soul of another anim al makes it only to be animal. Thus it is that the universal animal is one in number only by reason, since man and ass are not animal by one and the same form. Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum quod in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, genus sumitur a materia, et differentia a forma. I ta tamen quod per materiam non intelligatur materia prima, sed secundum quod per formam recipit quoddam esse imperfectum et materiale respectu esse specifici, sicut esse animalis est im perfectum et materiale respectu hominis. Tamen illud duplex esse non est secundum aliam et aliam formam, sed secundum unam formam, quae homini dat non solum hoc quod est esse animal, sed hoc quod est esse hominem. Anima autem alterius animalis dat ei solum esse animal. Unde animal commune non est unum numero, sed ratione tantum, quia non ab una et eadem forma homo est animal et asinus.3

Genera and species are distinctions of reason, not an ontological determination of one form by another. When matter is removed from spiritual substances, there remains genus and difference. These remain, however, not like matter and form, but like, in spiritual substances, wh at is common to itse lf and to more imperfect substances, as compared to what is proper to itself. Subtracta ergo materia a substantiis spiritualibus, remanebit ibi genus et dif ferentia non secundum materiam et formam, sed secundum quod consideratur in substantia spirituali, tam id quod est commune sibi et imperfectioribus substan tiis, quam etiam id quod est sibi proprium .4

In a text of the De Spiritualibus Creaturis, Thomas gives a compre hensive analysis of the function of genus and species in the structure of essence. He poses the problem in typically clear-cut fashion. In the community of the universal, it is necessary to distinguish those things 1 Saint Thomas, De Spi rit ua lib us Cre atur is, I, i, obj. 2, ad 2. 2 Sic etiam essentia generis et speciei differunt secundum signatum et non signatum, quamvis alius modus designationis sit utrobique, quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per m ateriam determinatam dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam quae ex forma rei sumitur. Saint Thomas, De En te et Es sen tia , Cap. II, p. 11, 11. 13-18. 3 Saint Thomas, De Spir itu ali bu s Crea turis , I, 1, ad 24. 4 Ibid .


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which are contained in the universal from the universal itself. In ev ery creature which is contained in some common genus, there must exist a composition of what is common in it and of that by which this com munity is limited. Moreover, a spiritual created substance belongs to some genus. Therefore, necessarily, in the spiritual created substance there exists a composition of the common nature and of that through which the common nature is contracted. An d this appears to be a composition of form and matter. Thomas Aquinas answers his own objection by drawing the basic distinction which we saw above. Something may fa ll under a communi ty in two ways ; in one way, as the individual lies under the species, and in another, as the species is under the genus. Therefore, whenever many individuals fall under a common species, the distinction of the many individuals is accomplished through individual matter which is over and above the nature of the species. And this distinction is found in created things.2But, when there are many species under one genus, the forms by which these species are distinguished from each other need not differ really from the form of the common genus. For through one and the same form, this individual is located in the genus of substance and in the genus of body, and this holds true even in regard to the most proximate species. Quando vero sunt multae species sub uno genere, non oportet quod formae quibus distinguuntur species ad invicem, sint aliud secundum rem a forma communi generis. Per unam enim et eamdem formam hoc individuum collocatur in genere substantiae et in genere corporis, et sic usque ad specialissimam speciem.3

Thomas gives his reasons for the assertion that genus and species apply to one and the same form. F or if this individual were constituted a substance by some other form, then, of necessity, the individual forms, according to which it is located in lower genera and species, would be accidental forms. This is evident because the accidental form differs from the substantial; for the substantial form constitutes a substance while the accidental form is added to an already existing 1 In commun itate autem universalis oportet quod id quo distinguuntur ea quae continentur sub communi sit aliud ab ipso communi. In omni ergo creato quod continetur sub aliquo genere communi, necesse est esse compositionem ejus per quod commune ipsum restringitur. Substantia autem spiritualis creata est in aliquo genere. Oportet ergo quod in substantia spirituali creata, sit compositio naturae communis, et ejus per quod natura communis coarctatur. Haec autem videtur esse compositio formae et materiae. Ib id. , obj. 9. 2 Ad nonum dicendum, quod sub aliquo communi est aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo sicut individuum sub specie; alio modo sicut species sub genere. Quandocumque igitur sub una communi specie sunt multa individua, distinctio multorum individuorum est per materiam individualem, quae est praeter naturam speciei; et hoc in rebus creatis. Ib id. , ad 9. 3 Ibi d.

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substance. If the first form, through which it is located in a genus, makes an individual to be a substance, then all other forms are added to the individual subsisting in act. Consequently they will be accidental forms.1 The composition of genus and difference, then, does not stand for the plurality of forms or for any real composition within the structure of essence. It serves to distinguish, not one form from another, but a more perfect form from a less perfect form. That some individual is an inanimate body and another is an animate body is not due to the fact that the animate individual possesses some form over and above its substantial form. Rather it is due to the fact that this animated individual has a more perfect form, through which it not only subsists and is a body, but also lives, whereas the inanimate individual has a more imperfect form through which it attains not to life, but only to substance and corporeality. Non enim ex hoc contingit quod aliquod individuum sit corpus inanimatum et aliud corpus animatum, per hoc quod individuum animatum habet formam aliquam, cui substernatur forma substantialis corporis, sed quia hoc individum animatum habet formam perfectiorem, per quam habet non solum subsistere et corpus esse, sed etiam vivere. Aliud autem habet formam imperfectiorem, per quam non attingit ad vitam, sed solum ad subsistere corporaliter.2

Thomas Aquinas also finds that the unity of the genus is characterized by a certain indetermination and indifference. Fo r that which is signified by the genus is not some nature, one in number, in diverse species, to which is added some other thing which is the difference determining it, as form determines matter which is one in number. But what the genus signifies is some form, although not determinately this or that one. The difference expresses in determinate fashion what is signified by the genus in an indeterminate way. The unity of the genus depends on the comm unity of the form signified, and this unity ma y be removed by the addition of the difference which destroys the indéter mination causing the unity of the genus. Quamvis autem genus significet totam essentiam speciei, non tamen oportet quod diversarum specierum quarum est idem genus, sit una essentia, quia unitas

1 S i enim secundum aliquam aliam formam hoc individuum habeat quod sit substantia ; de necessitate oportet quod aliae formae supervenientes, secundum quas collocatur in inferioribus generibus et speciebus, sint formae accidentales ; quod ex hoc patet. Forma enim accidentalis a substantiali differt, quia forma substantialis facit hoc aliquid; forma autem accidentalis advenit rei iam hoc aliquid existenti. Si igitur prima forma, per quam collocatur in genere, facit individuum esse hoc aliquid; omnes aliae formae advenient individuo sub sistenti in actu ; et ita erunt formae accidentales. Ibid. 2 Ib id .


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generis ex ipsa indeterminatione vel indifferentia procedit. Non autem quod illud quod significatur per genus sit una natura numero in diversis speciebus, cui superveniat res alia quae sit differentia determinans ipsam, sicut forma deter minat materiam quae est una numero. Sed quia genus significat aliquam formam, non tamen determinate hanc vel illam quam determinate differentia exprimit quae non est alia quam illa quae indeterminate significatur per genus. Et ideo dicit Commentator in duodecimo Metaphysicae quod materia prima dicitur una per remotionem omnium formarum sed genus dicitur unum per communitatem formae significatae. Unde patet quod per additionem differentiae, remota illa in determinatione quae erat causa unitatis generis removet species per essentiam diverse.1

The genus includes the species imp licitly and indis tinctly.2 The nature of the genus is indeterminate in respect to the species.3 What ever is in the species, is in the genus as not determined.4 Likewise, the genus contains the specific difference in the same implicit and in distinct fashion.5 In fact, the genus signifies indeterminately the whole of what is contained in the species.6 There is certainly no doubt as to what Thomas Aquinas means. The composition of genus and specific difference is a composition of reason alone. . . . . sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali esse dicatur, non est sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus intellectibus. Intellectus enim animalis est sine determinatione specialis formae exprimens naturam rei.7

An d this is why, in direct opposition to Giles of Rom e, Thom as Aquin as says that there cannot be a real contraction of form except by matter. The intelligible form is present in the intellect without any con traction of this type. Huiusmodi autem non est potentia materiae primae. Nam materia prima recipit formam contrahendo ipsam ad esse individuale. Forma vero intelligibilis est in intellectu absque huiusmodi contractione. Sic enim intelligit intellectus unum quodque intelligibile, secundum quod forma eius est in eo. Intellegit autem intellectus intelligibile praecipue secundum naturam communem et universalem. Et sic forma intelligibilis in intellectu est secundum rationem suae communitatis.8

1 Saint Thomas, De Ent e et Ess ent ia, Cap. II, p. 19, 1. 14-p. 20, 1. 11. 2 Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae secundum quod significatur per modum totius ut nomine hominis vel animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum quod in individuo est. Op. cit., Cap. Ill, p. 23, 11. 25-28. 3 Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectu individui, sicut natura generis respectu speciei. Op. cit., Cap. II, p. 20, 11. 12-13. 4 Haec autem determinatio vel designatio quae est in specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia speciei existens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit; immo quicquid est in specie est in genere ut non determinatum. Op. cit., Cap. II, p. 11, 11. 19-p. 12, 1. 1. 5 . . . sed implicite continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam. Op. cit., Cap. II, p. 22, 11. 22-23. 6 Sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum id quod est in specie. Op. cit., cap. II, p. 16, 11. 1-2. 7 Op. cit., Cap. II, p. 19, 11. 1-5. 8 Saint Thomas, De Spir itu ali bu s Crea turis, I, 1, resp.

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Giles of Rome is well aware of Thomas' doctrine on this point. He knows that the essence of a spiritual substance is neither determined to a genus nor contained in a genus in the same way that sensible bodies are. Bodies are in a genus because they have a nature composed of two natures, of potency and act, or of matter and form, so that in them genus and species are properly found. For from the whole, considered as the potential part, there is taken the genus, and from the formal part there is taken the difference, as the concept “ animate d," w hich is the difference, is taken from soul. “Animated” signifies the soul itself, just as the concept “white” signifies nothing else but whiteness itself. For the concrete and the abstract signify the same thing. They differ only in their way of signifying it. So it is, that since the difference is taken from the formal part, there where there is no formal part, but only pure form, properly the ratio of difference cannot be found.1 Giles of Rome agrees with Thomas Aquinas that in those beings which are pure forms, there cannot properly be found the ratio of genus and difference.2But then how is it that Intelligences can be contracted and 1 Quantum ad essentiam quidem invenimus, intelligentias aliquid participare de infinitate, quia non eodem modo determinantur ad genus, nec eodem modo sunt in genere sicut ista sensibilia corporea. Nam huiusmodi corpora sunt in genere, quia haben t naturam compositam ex duabus n aturis, ex potentia scilicet et actu, sive ex m ateria, et forma, ita quod in eis sumi tur, et proprie genus, et proprie differentia. Nam a toto, ut habet rationem potentiae sumitur ratio generis, a parte autem formali sumitur ipsa differentia, ut animatum quod est differen tia sumitur ab anima, nec aliud significat animatum nisi ipsam animam, sicut nec album aliquid aliud significat quam ipsam albedinem. Concretum enim et abstractum, eandem rem significant. Differunt autem solum in modo significandi. Si ergo differentia sumitur a parte formali, ubi non est pars formalis, sed est ipsa forma, ibi proprie non potest sumi ratio differentiae. In intelligentiis ergo, quae non sunt compositae ex materia, et forma, sed sunt formae per se stantes non proprie potest sumi ratio generis, et differentiae. Giles of Rome, Sup er Lib rum de Ca us is, prop. XVII, fol. 57v F, G. 2 Si ergo in ipsis intelligentiis acciperemus rationem generis et differentiae, differentia ibi accepta non posset dicere partem naturae, cum natura in eis sit simplex et non habeat p artem et partem, nec sit composita ex duabus naturis. Differentia ergo ibi accepta, et genus ibi sumptum non differunt ita quod unum eorum diceret partem, et aliud totum, sed quodlibet diceret totum propter quod differentia illa directe subiiceretur generi, et esset ibi nugatio, si coniungeretur generi, et si ordinaretur praedicamentum ex talibus generibus, et differentiis. Tunc huiusmodi differentiae non caderent a latere, sed caderent in recta linea praedicamentali, cum dicerent totum, sicut genera. Non proprie ergo ibi potest sumi ratio differentiae et per consequens, nec proprie ratio generis, quia quod non proprie habet differentiam non est proprie genus. Ib id. , fol. 57v G, H. ; Non enim sic est essentia in potentia ad esse, sicut genus dicit quand am p otentiam respectu speciei, quia com positio speciei ex genere et d ifferentia est secundum rationem ita quod genus non est res aliqua realiter differens a quaelibet sua specie ; et differentia ut praedicatur et ut implicat totum, non est realiter differens a genere, sed esse est realiter differens ab essentia. Nam si genus separatur a qualibet specie et a qualibet differentia, hoc est secundum intellectum tantum, quia per intellectum possum intellegere quidditatem generis non intellecta aliqua specie vel differentia aliqua ; secundum rem tamen talis separatio esse non valet, quia genus non est res aliqua realiter differens a qualibet


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determined to some genus? Giles has already committed himself to this doctrine and in direct contradiction of Aquinas he tells us that in Intelligences in some way the ratio of genus, or difference, and of species may be found. Sumetur tamen ibi aliquo modo ratio generis, differentiae, et speciei.1

For although the nature of Intelligence is not composed of two natures, it is neither pure act nor pure potency, because in diverse ways it implies both actuality and potentiality. Therefore, from the whole nature, inasmuch as it has the aspect of potentiality, is taken the ratio of the genus, and from the same whole nature, inasmuch as it has the ratio of actuality, is taken the ratio of the species. And so the difference differs from the genus in the same way that the species differs from the genus. For species does not differ from a genus really, so that one signifies a part of the thing and the other signifies the wdiole thing. Rather it differs only according to reason, because that same whole which genus signifies after the manner of a part and after the manner of potency, the species signifies after the manner of the whole, as after the manner of potency and act.2 Giles of Rome, however, insists that there is a more fundamental composition within the structure of essence, a composition of potency and act within the recipient form itself. Materia ergo dicit simpliciter potentiam, et esse dicit simpliciter actum, sed forma dicit medium inter potentiam et actum et aliquo modo utrumque .3

The genus signifies a form midway between potency and act. Nam genus dicit formam mediam inter potentiam et actumA It is this mixture of potency and act that determines a thing to some genus.5 In fact the specierum; sed essentia potest esse realiter non coniuncta alicui esse quia essentia creata realiter potest destitui omni esse ut quod nullo modo habeat aliquod actuale esse. Propter quod omnino concluditur quod realiter differt a suo esse. Ergo quia potest essentia creata intellegi absque eo quod intellegatur esse, non est suum esse. Theoremata, XII, p. 68, 1. 9-p. 70,1. 8. 1 Sup er Lib rum de Ca us is , prop. 17, fol. 57V H. 2 Nam ipsa natura intelligentiae licet non sit composita ex duabus naturis, tamen non est actus purus, nec potentia pura, diversis enim respectibus actualitatem et potentialitatem importat. Ex tota ergo natura, ut habet rationem potentialitatis sumetur ratio generis, et ex eadem tota natura prout habet rationem actualitatis sumetur ratio speciei. Differentia ergo differt ibi a genere quasi eodem modo quod differt species. Nam sicut species non differt a genere realiter, ita quod unum d icat partem rei, et aliud totum, sed solum secundum rationem. Quia illud idem totum quod dicit genus per modum partis, et per modum potentiae dicit species per modum totius, ut per modum potentiae et actus. Ib id. , fol. 57V H. 3 Giles of Rome, Theoremata, XII, p. 72, 11. 3-6. 4 Compositio autem ex genere et differentia numquam separatur a compositione ex esse et essentia. Nam genus dicit formam mediam inter potentiam et actum. Theoremata, II, p. 7 5 Ibid .

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reason why God is not determined to some genus is because in Him there is no mixture of potency.1 Spiritual substances have a composition of essence and esse, and within essence, a further composition of po tency and act.2 It is this composition of potency and act th at determines the perfection of things; the more act the more perfect, the more potency the more imperfect.3 CONCLUSION

It is interesting to note how Giles of Rome reduces even the per fection of things to a composition of their nature. In short, then, the contraction of being to a determinate genus and species is accomplished because of a certain composition within the recipient nature itself. The problem of creation is literally for Giles of Rome the problem of the one and the many. When we ask why genus and species should be the mechanism of contraction within essence, we find that it is because they signify an initial composition within essence itself. The actuality that an essence seems to possess of itself is an imperfect actuality because it somehow expresses a composition of potency and act. Why is it that essence can contract esse and thus cause multiplicity? In the last analysis, because it is itself a composite. Giles of Rome thus pushes the problem of plurality back beyond the simple limitation of essence to a structural composition within essence itself. This serves to confirm his view of the creature as basically and essentially a composite. What Giles of Rome is doing here is similar to what Proclus attempted to do 1 Immo tota causa quare Deus non est determinatus ad aliquod praedicamentum, est quia in eo nulla est potentialitas admixta, sed est quaedam perfectio pura per se stans. Quicquid autem habet potentialitatem admixtam est determinatam ad aliquod genus praedicamentale. Perfectio ergo divina non est apta nata recipi in aliquo, nec est determinata ad aliquod genus. Sup er Lib rum de Ca usi s, prop. XX II, fol. 73V E. 2 In prima autem divisione non omni creata comprehenduntur, nam in substantiis spiri tualibus non est compositio ex materia et forma, sed bene in eis sunt duae aliae compositiones. His autem tribus compositionibus videlicet ex materia et forma, et essentia et esse, et uni ve rs ali ter ex po ten tia et ac tu pos sum us a da pt are omn es p ra ed ict as di ve rsi tat es. Op. cit., prop. XX V, fol. 8 4 V C. 3 Non enim unum albissimum est albius alio albissimo, et quod dictum est de albo et nigro intelligendum est de perfecto et imperfecto, de actu et de potentia. Nam perfectio sumitur ex actu et imperfectio sumitur ex potentia, si ergo actus et potentia opponuntur. Illud erit actualius quod est potentia impermixtius. In entibus ergo reperitur major et minor permixtio potentialitatis. Si ergo est aliquis actus nulli poten tialitati permixtus, ibi non est dare magis et minus. Unus enim actus purus non potest habere plus de actualitate quam alius actus purus. Op. cit., prop. XXII, fol. 7 1 V L. Cum ergo ex hoc una intelligentia sit simplicior alia, quia est propinquior primo, et minus habet de potentialitate admixta, ideo virtus recepta in intelligentia superiori, quae plus habet de actualitate, et minus de potentialitate, erit actualior. Ibid .


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with his doctrine of the henads, namely, to explain one plurality in terms of a more fundamental one, a type of explanation that can go on ad infinitum.1 The texts of Thomas Aquinas which we have examined indicated to us just where he would locate Giles' problem. Giles of Rome models the procession of being on the structure of definition. As aware as he is of exactly what he is doing, there comes a moment in the development of his thought when the very structure of definition intrudes in the creative act with disastrous consequences. No one can say that Giles of Rome was not formally aware of the technical distinction between the order of metaphysics and that of logic.2 On the other hand, the texts of Giles of Rome are unintelligible save in terms of some sort of substitution of cognitional levels. In fact the difficulties of Giles of Rome become very understandable when subjected to a criticism based on the views of Thomas Aq uinas.3 But let us look to Giles him  self for enlightenment on this score. If the uniformity of the divine action is due to a certain indetermination of esse, then the question logically follows : what does Giles of Rome mean by this indeterminate nature of esse ? Why should esse and even God Himself as Ipsum Esse be undetermined ? B. T H E F O R M O F B E I N G

It is because being is indeterminate in itself that it must be diversi fied by the composite structure of the recipient essence. Now God Himself is Pure Being of Existence, undetermined to any category and not contracted to any genus of being. Giles of Rome conceives the Divine Being after the model of a Platonic separate form, which exerts formal causality. In demanding a recipient essence in the creative act, Giles of Rome demonstrates an apparent inability to distinguish 1 Proclus’ doctrine of the henads arose from the difficulty which the Greek mind alw ays had in bridging the transcendence of the One and the plura lity of Being. The One is obviously so much of a unity that it seems impossible that its first emanation could partake of multi plicity. Platonists right down to Avicenna have experienced this difficulty. The very reason for the existence of these henads seems to be this transition from unity to multiplicity at its ultimate point of origin. Needless to say the significance of this doctrine in Proclus is not that he improves on the Plotinian solution, for his distinction only serves to carry the problem one step further back in what would eventually be an infinite regress, but in the fact that he saw the weak point in this argumentation on the transition from unity to plurality, just as Giles of Rome apparently does. Cf. Proclus, Elem ents of Theolog y, prop. 21, p. 24; prop. 97, p. 86. For this history of the doctrine of the henads, cf. Dodds, op. cit., pp. 259-60. 2 C f. supra n. 62. 3 Cf. the distinction of Giles of Rome between a logical genus and a natural genus. De Compositione Angelorum, q. 1.

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properly between the roles of efficient causality and formal causality in the production of existence. The Form of Being seems to exercise a formal causality. This is the reason why a kind of extrinsic material cause is needed to receive the form of being. This material recipient is precisely the determinate essence, the extrinsic principle of limitation. Our complex problem has finally resolved itself into one last question. It is because there is something indeterminate about being that it must be diversified by the composite structure of the recipient essence. But what is the reason for this indetermination of Ipsum Esse Subsistens? For it is from this metaphysical phenomenon that our other problems flow. If we can understand this indetermination of Esse, then at least the difficulties of Giles of Rome in the face of the basic doctrine of creation will make sense. It is interesting to note tha t P lato's doctrine of separate Forms is the background within which Giles of Rome explains how God, Who is Being Itself, embraces all other perfections. Giles himself tells us the source of his doctrine in an unequivocal text. Although there is not an order of gods modeled upon an order of abstractions, as Plato held, Plato's doctrine helps us to understand certain truths. His visis, dicamus quod licet non sit ordo deorum secundum ordinem abstracto rum, ut posuit Plato, iuvamur tamen per haec dicta Platonis ad intelligendum aliquas veritates.1

An d what is the nature of this truth? Namely, that in accordance with the doctrine and principles of Plato, there is one true God who is Ipsum Esse Purum , not determined to some predicament nor contracted to some genus of beings. Furthermore, because that Esse is accordingly not limited but is a certain endless ocean, all esse is contained in it and consequently all perfections are contained in it. And these perfections are not contained there in a participated and contracted fashion, but in a more perfect and indeed infinite way. . . . . Propter quod secundum quod est dare unum verum Deum qui est Ipsum Esse Purum non determinatum ad aliquod predicamentum, non contractum ad aliquod genus entium. Et quia illud Esse est sic non limitatum, sed est quoddam pelagus interminatum, in illo Esse continetur omne esse, et per consequens in illo Esse continentur omnes perfectiones. Sed non continentur ibi perfectiones istae participative et contractae, sed excellenter et infinite.2

1 Ibi d., fol. 8r S. 2 Ib id. , fol. 8r S, T; Cf. Giles of Rome, De Eccl esia stica Potestate, Lib. Ill, cap. q, p. 151, ed. Scholz.


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It would seem that according to Giles of Rome, Plato erred not so much in positing the universal form as a reality distinct from the individual, as in distinguishing a multiplicity of these forms by reason alone and calling them realities.1 For these perfections all participate in the Divine Being. A thing is apprehended in one w ay b y our intellect as being, in another way as life, and in still another way as intelligence. Therefore, First Being, the source of every being, and First Life, the source of all life, and First Intelligence, the source of all intelligence, are not so many gods, but one and the same God.2There are many such logical differences but they do not differ really as the Platonists held. Esse ergo primum a quo est omne esse, et vita prima a qua est omne vivre, et intelligentia prima a qua est omne intelligere, non sunt plures Dii, sed unus et idem Deus, est ergo dare plura talia prima differentia secundum rationem, et secundum nostrum modum intelligendi, non autem differunt realiter, ut Platonici posuerunt.3

Perfections, therefore, seem to be in Ipsum Esse as an abstract genus embraces the species beneath it. For Giles of Rome, the Being of God somehow resembles a separate Form of Plato. Not only is the Divine Being modeled on the Platonic Form, but it seems to behave like the Form of Being. At the outset, Giles told us exactly what he means by creation. Now, in one of his dubitationes, he supposes that someone might doubt that being is a result of creation, while living, understanding and other perfections come from form, the result of a formation. For Giles this presents little difficulty. Something is said to be produced through the mode of creation which is produced with nothing presupposed, but th at is said to be produced through the 1 Esse ergo primum a quo est omne esse, et vita prima a qua est omne vivere, et intel li gentia prima a qua est omne intelligere, non sunt plures dii, sed unus et idem Deus. Est ergo dare plura talia prima differentia secundum rationem, et secundum nostrum modum intelli gendi, non autem differunt realiter, ut Platonici posuerunt. Op. cit., prop. XVIII, fol. 6ov H. This position which Giles of Rome is advancing is exactly the doctrine that Saint Thomas Aq uin as ass igns to the au tho r of the Lib er de C aus is : Et quia auctor huius libri non concordat cum Platonicis in positione aliarum naturarum separatarum idealium, sed ponit solum pri mum. In Lib rum de Ca usis , XVI, p. 269, XII, p. 257; XVIII, p. 267. 2 Huiusmodi ergo perfectiones quae sunt in causatis, multiplicatae et sparsae et imper fectae, sunt in Deo unitive, simpliciter, et perfectae. Dicamus ergo quod aliqua causata participant de bonitate primi quantum ad esse tantum. Aliqua vero quantum ad esse, et viv er e. E t al iqu a qu an tu m ad esse, vi ve re et int elli ger e. It a quo d esse cau sat oru m dic itu r esse ab intelligentia quae est intelligentia prima. Esse ergo, vivere et intelligere in rebus causatis potest dicere perfectiones realiter differentes et varia. Nam esse rerum carentium vita, est realiter differens a vivere. Nam vivere est idem quod esse in viventibus. Est tamen realiter differens ab esse quod est in non viven tibus. Sic vivere in c arentibus intelligentia, est realiter differens ab intelligere. Sed licet sic sit in causatis, in Deo tamen esse, vivere et intelligere unam et eandam rem dicunt, differentem tantum secundum nostrum modum intelligendi. Giles of Rome, Sup er Lib rum de Ca usis , prop. XVIII, fol. 6ov H. 3 Ibi d.

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mode of form or through the mode of information, which is produced with something presupposed. Now, because among perfections the first perfection is being, and because being presupposes no other perfection, it is said to be produced through the mode of creation; but all other perfections, because they presuppose being, are said to be produced through the mode of information.1 Creation, then, should be the pro duction of being with nothing presupposed, and if there is something presupposed, then the action is reduced to that of formal causality wh ereby a form imprints its likeness upon a recipient matter.2 In demanding a recipient essence in the creative act, Giles of Rome demonstrates an apparent inability to distinguish properly between the roles of efficient and formal causality in the production of esse. The Form of Being seems to exercise a formal causality. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, is very clear and unambiguous in speaking of the role of formal causality in the production of esse. Esse does not have a formal cause. Sed forma non habet sic esse per aliam formam ; unde si sit aliqua forma subsis tens, statim est ens et unum, nec habet causam formalem sui esse ; habet tamen causam influentem ei esse, non autem causam moventem, quae reducit ipsam de potentia prae-existenti in actum.3

The resemblance which the Divine Being has to the Platonic Form is confirmed by Giles. In fact, when he deals with the question of abstract being, he distinguishes two kinds : th at which receives it abstractness from the intellect as uni versais are abstrac t, and tha t which is abs tract according to real existence in the way that Plato posited the idea of things. The first type of abstract esse is not God, but the second type is, i.e., Esse Purum in actual existence. Propter quod notandum quod esse simpliciter dicitur illud quod est a contractione et materialitate abstractum, non determinatum ad aliquid genus entis. Hoc autem esse potest dupliciter sicut abstractio dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo secundum intellectum, sicut universalia dicuntur esseabstracta. Alio modo secundum realem existentiam, secundum quod Plato posuit ideas rerum. Cum ergo quaeritur quomodo Deo competat esse simpliciter, hoc est universaliter sive abstracta secundum intellectum solum, quia tale esse non est substantia, cum ipsa universalia non sint substantia, et ad tale esse facit intellectus, quia intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus. Deus autem per se maxime existit et nihil est quod faciat ad eius esse, scilicet seipso est. Et ideo tale esse sic abstractum non est Deus, sed est esse simpliciter et abstractum ab omni contractione quia est esse purum secundum actualem existentiam et rei veritatem .4

1 Ib id. , fol. Ô2r Q. 2 Cf. J. Paulus, Les Dis put es, p. 341. 3 Saint Thomas, De Spi rit ua lib us Crea turis, Q.I, a. 1, ad 5. 4 Giles of Rome, In I Sen t., Par. I, d. 8.


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Giles of Rome depends on Plato for his notion of God. God compre hends the perfections of all things because He is Ipsum Esse Purum. He embraces all perfections as the Form of Being includes all its partici pants. In that Form of Being is found the perfection of all other forms as well. According to Giles, that is what Plato should have seen but did not. To watch a Christian interpret God in terms of a Platonic Form is an interesting but not unusual sight in the history of philosophy. If Giles is accurate in the evaluation of his debt to Plato in regard to the notion of God, then his doctrine of being must in some way reflect this philosophical allegiance. For Giles of Rome, it is by reason of its essence, through which a thing is located in a predicament, that it is being.1 Any creature is ens through its essence. Dicebamus enim supra, quod per idem ut per essentiam suam est quodlibet creatum ens, unum et res praedicamenti .2

Not only essence, but more precisely form constitutes a thing as being.3 Not only the First Being but all other beings are ens per essentiam suam A Everything but the First is not its esse, but it has essence really differing from esse. For through the one principle (essence) it is ens and through another principle (esse) it is existens. Omne quod est citra primum non est suum esse sed habet essentiam realiter differentem ab esse et per aliud est ens et per aliud existens .5

There seems to be a basic dichotomy between being and existence.6 Created things have being through their essence, but they exist by reason of esse superadded to this essence or nature.7

1 Dicemus enim quod per illud idem ut per essentiam suam, per quam res est per se in predicamento, habet etiam quod sit per se ens et sit una. Giles of Rome, Theoremata, XIII, p. 80,11. 15-17.

2 Op. cit. XIV, p. 90, 11. 18-20. 3 Sciendum ergo quod quaelibet forma da t rei quod sit ens et dat ei quod sit una. Op. cit., XIII, p. 78, 11. 14-16. 4 Quidquid ergo additur essentiae rei facit cum illa essentia unum per accidens, et per consequens ens per accidens. Non solum ergo esse ipsum Primum sed etiam omne quod est citra Primum sicut est unum per essentiam suam sic etiam est ens per essentiam suam, accipiendo ens per se. Op. cit., XIII, p. 81, 11. 11-16. 5 Op. cit., XII, p. 66, 11. 13-15. 6 For Saint Bon aventure, also, being and existence are not to be identified; such a dicho tomy is not unique in the history of philosophy. Existere dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae. Saint Bonaventure, I I Sente nces, 3, 1, 2, 3, resp., ed. Quaracchi. vo l. II , p. 10 9- 11 0. Cf. G. Kl ub er ta nz , “ Ess e et Exis ter e in St. Bonaventure,” Med iaeva l Stud ies, 1948, pp. 169-188. 7 Om ne quod est citra Prim um, ne fiat processus in infinitum , est ens per essentiam suam sed existit per esse superadditum essentiae vel naturae. Theoremata, XIII, p. 78, 11. 1-3.

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Nam ut patebit in propositione sequenti, omne tale est ens per essentiam suam sed non potest existere nisi ipsi essentiae superaddatur esse. Si ergo omne quod est citra Primum est ens per essentiam, et existit per esse, cum essentia sit aliud ab esse, oportet quod omne tale per aliud sit ens et per alius existens .1

Just as matter is formally extended through quantity, so essence for mally exists through esse. And as matter and quantity are duae res, so essence and esse are duae res, really different.2 Dicemus ergo quod sicut materia formaliter extenditur per quantitatem, sic essentia formaliter existit per esse. Et, sicut materia et quantitas sunt duae res, sic essentia et esse sunt duae res realiter differentes .3

Giles speaks of being in terms of essence, form and intelligibility. Esse contributes nothing to the intelligibility of things, it confers existence.4 It is through the actuality which they have from form that material substances are intelligible, but through the actuality which they have from esse, they are said to exist. Therefore they can be understood, but they cannot exist, without esse; however, they can neither be understood nor exist without form.5 For Giles of Rome, then, being is form. To be is to be an essence of some kind. But what about existence ? What is the ontological status of esse in a metaphysics where ens is denominated by essentia ? Giles' texts are cautious in their wording. He is certainly conscious of the problem involved. Bu t in accordance with the mo vement of his thought they follow one necessary direction, a direction which becomes clear upon the examination of any group of texts relating to esse.6 Just as matter, which is in potency to form and actualized by form, is really different from its form, so form and essence which is in potency to esse and acquires esse is really different from its esse? The essence of the creature of itself is unformed but it is formed and perfected through esse. 1 Op. cit., XII, p. 77, 11. 16—2i. 2 Cf. E. Hocedez, Theoremata, Introduction, p. 35. 3 Op. cit., XXI, p. 134. 4 Actua litas autem ipsius esse nihil facit ad hoc quod res sint intelligibiles, sed facit u t res existant. Op. cit., XI, p. 60, 11. 18-20. 5 Omnes materiales substantiae per actualitatem quam habent a forma sunt intelligibiles, sed per actualitatem quam habent ab esse dicuntur existere. Possunt ergo intelligi sed non existere sine esse, attamen nec intelligi possunt nec existere sine forma. Op. cit., X, p. 52, 11. I_ 5 * 6 Cf. P. Nash, Giles of Rome, Diversum est esse, et id quod est , p. 91. 7 Sicut ergo materia quae est in potentia ad formam et per agens fit actu sub forma, est realiter differens a sua forma, sic ipsa forma et ipsa essentia quae est in potentia ad esse et per agens acquirit esse est realiter differens a suo esse. Theoremata, XII, p. 72 ,11 17-22.


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Si ergo secundum Augustinum omne mutabile ex aliqua informitate formatur . . . et quia non solum secundum intellectum, sed etiam secundum rei veritatem, quaelibet essentia creata est mutabilis, quia de non esse potest acquirere esse, . . . oportet quod . . . realiter essentia creaturae de se sit informis, sed formetur et perficiatur per esse.1

Esse seems to be something formal in respect of that in which it is received. Sic etiam in proposito, si esse recipitur in aliquo et mediante esse recipitur vivere, et mediante vivere, rationale, esse erit quid formale respectu eius in quo recipitur, et vivere erit quid formale respectu rationalis .2

An d we are inva riab ly told th at which is receiv ed is form. Ratio ergo praecedens quia arguebat via receptionis procedebat modo formalis quia semper illud quod recipitur est forma .3

Finally we have a text where Giles of Rome comes closest to a precise definition of esse. Es t enim esse quasi forma, et perfectio naturaeA Giles has read Thomas Aquinas too carefully to state baldly that esse is form, bu t the whole weight of his thinking forces him in th at direction. He anticipates the difficulty. Nam sicut materia non potest actu existere sine forma sic nec forma potest actu existere sine esse. Et si quaeras quid sit esse et nos quaeremus quid sit forma. Et si dicas quod forma est quidam actus et quaedam perfectio materiae, et nos dicemus quod esse est quidam actus et quaedam perfectio formae .5

Of course things have to be through their essence, for if a thing was not ens per essentiam suam then we would have an infinite regress. For if we ask concerning some thing whether it is ens per essentiam suam or through something superadded, as esse for instance, then we must ask concerning that which is superadded, by reason of what is it ens ? In order to prevent an infinite regress we must stop at something first, so we say that anything is ens per essentiam suam A 1 Giles of Rome, In I I Sen t., dist. Ill, p. i, q. i, a. 2. Cf. Saint Augustine, De Gen. ad litt. I, 15, 29. 2 Sup er Lib rum de Ca usis , prop. I, fol. 3V T. 3 Ibi d. 4 Op. cit., prop. IX, fol. 35r X. 5 Theoremata, XIII, p. 82, 11. 13-18. 6 Quia si vellemus accipere ens per accidens, non esset inconveniens quod sicut quae adduntur essentiae faciunt cum essentia unum per accidens, ita etiam faciunt ens per accidens et praedicatur de eis ens, modo accidentali. Possumus enim dicere quod si, per se loquendo, res non esset ens et una per essentiam suam, quod fieret processus in infinitum. Quaeremus enim de aliqua re utrum sit per se ens et una per essentiam suam vel per aliquid superadditum essentiae; quod si dicatur quod dicitur res ens et una non per essentiam suam sed per aliquid superadditum, quaeremus de illo superaddito per quid sit ens et unum. Vel ergo est abire in infinitum vel standum est in primis, ut dicamus quod quaelibet res per se est ens et una per

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It is significant that in a work where the problem of the origin of plurality is discussed so thoroughly, there should be a complete lack of texts referring to the divine ideas. The reason why Giles, in the Commen tar y on the Liber de Causis does not refer to the divine Inte llect to explain the presence of plurality in the universe, as Thomas Aquinas would, is, precisely, because in the commentary on the Liber de Causis, creation for him seems to be not a work of reason but of nature. This is perfectly consistent with and confirmatory of his notion of God as Forma essendi. If God, in creating, acts like the Form of Being, then He does not act freely, He does not act from Intellect and Will. We do not imply that Giles of Rome has no doctrine of the divine ideas, but only that it is not there that he looks to the ultimate explanation of the origin of plurali ty as Thomas does. In the exemplary causality exercised by God, Thomas tells us, things do not participate the divine Nature by a communication in form according to the same ratio of genus and species, but only ac cording to analogy.1 Although there is a resemblance, there is not an absolute adequation of the creature to God. Therefore, even though the unity of God lacks every trace of multitude and composition, it is not necessary that such should be the unity of the creature.2 The production of such a unity would not be creation, but simply generation. For in generation an effect proceeds ex natura, and consequently only one esse would be produced.3 Because nature is a univocal cause, its effect proceeds uniformly.4 Bu t creation implies freedom and thus it is not necessary that an absolute unity be produced, as in a work of nature. For God does not act from a necessity of nature but from Intellect and Will.5 As an intellectual agent, God can produce a multi plicity because He can think many things since He is not determined

essentiam suam. Bene ergo dictum est quod in principio propositionis dicebatur, videlicet quod omnis res quantumcumque sit quid creatum vel quantumcumque sit citra Primum ne fiat processus in infinitum est ens per essentiam suam. Ibid . For this argument based on an infinite regress cf. Averroes, In I V Met a., 2, to 3, 67 BC. 1 Ad tertium dicendum quod non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter communicantiam in forma secundum eamdem rationem generis et speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens per essentiam, et alia per participationem. Saint Thomas, Sum ma, I, IV, 3, obj. 3, ad 3. 2 Ibi d. , resp. ; Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet sit quaedam similitudo creaturae ad Deum, non tamen adaequa tio; unde nos oportet, si unitas Dei caret omni multitudine et compositione, quod propter hoc oporteat talem esse creaturae unitatem. Saint Thomas, De Potent ia, III, 16, ad 7. 3 Ib id. , ad 9. 4 Saint Thomas, Summ a I, VI, 3, resp. 5 Saint Thomas, Contra Gentiles, lib. II, cap. 23.


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ad unum .1 An operation of nature, on the other hand, must be prede termined by a pre-existing intellect, which is why everything that acts through nature has a determinate esse.2 Since, therefore, the divine Esse is not determinate but contains in Itself the whole perfection of being, I t cannot act through a necessity of nature lest, perhaps, it cause something indeterminate and infinite in being, which is impossible. God, therefore, does not act from a necessity of nature, but a determinate effect proceeds from His infinite perfection according to a determination of Will and Intellect. Secundo, ex ratione naturalis agentis, ad quod pertinet ut unum effectum producat ; quia natura uno et eodem modo operatur, nisi impediatur. Et hoc ideo quia secundum quod est tale, agit; unde quandiu est tale, non facit nisi tale. Omne enim agens per naturam, habet esse determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi, non potest esse quod agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte causaret aliquid indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo ; quod est impossible, ut ex superioribus patet. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae; sed effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius.3

It is important to note how well from the point of view of Thomas, his criticism of the eternal, necessary universe of Greek philosophy would seem to apply to Giles of Rome. The uniformity of the divine action is directly reducible to the determinatio ad unum of a being acting under the necessity of its nature. This fact illumines all of the difficulties which Giles of Rome experi ences in his doctrine of creation. If creation is a work of nature then the principal doctrines we have seen become intelligible. If God behaves like a Platonic Form, then, as Thomas says, there would be something indeterminate about Ipsum Esse, and if there is something indeter minate about esse, then God in communicating esse, acts uniformly, and thus the essence must necessarily be present to determine and limit His action. Thus the entire sequence of doctrines, the Quasi-eternity of essence, the Limitation of the recipient, the Uniformity of the creative 1 Ibi d., cap. 42. 2 Dicendum quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum agere per vo lu nt at em , non per ne ces sit ate m na tu rae , ut qui da m ex ist im av er un t. Qu od qui dem , apparere potest tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex ipso ordine causarum agentium. Cum enim propter finem agat “ intellectus et natura,” necesse est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminetur finis et media necessari ad finem ab aliquo superiori intellect u ; sicut sag ittae praed eterminatur finis et certus modus a sagittante. Unde necesse est quod agens per intellectum et vo lu nt at em , sit pri us age nt e per na tu ram . Un de cum pri mu m in ord ine age nt ium sit Deu s, necesse est quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat. Saint Thomas, Summ a I, XIX, 4, resp. 3 Op. cit., I, XIX, 4, resp.

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action, the Indeterminate nature of esse, and finally the Form of being, all fall into an intelligible pattern. Giles of Rome does not make this difficulty for himself, he does not disagree with Thomas, his quondam master, for the sake of argument, he is forced by the logical rigor of his metaphysical principles to do what he does. It is because his notion of being is what it is th at he is forced to conclude the quasi-eternal prerogative of determination of essence. An examination of the meta physical doctrines of Giles of Rome justifies the criticism made in the thirteenth century by Henry of Ghent that his doctrine would suppose the pre-existence of essence to esse. In the concluding portion of this section of our study, we shall turn to the Liber de Causis itself, for there we shall find one of the sources of the historical influences that have moulded the metaphysical position of Giles of Rome. For his difficulties with the doctrine of creation in his commentary on the Liber de Causis spring precisely from the fact that he is attempting to interpret creation in terms of metaphysical principles that were never meant to do the work that he calls on them to accomplish. The simple fact is that these principles have their origin and proper function in the eternal and necessary universe of Proclus and in that of Plotinus before him. If it is true that Giles conceives of creation in terms of formal causality, the difficulties which he experiences in expressing this doctrine are understandable. If God is the Form of Being in a Platonic sense, then, as Thomas says, there would be something indeterminate about Being Itself, and thus God in communicating existence, acts uniformly, and an essence must necessarily be present to determine and limit this action. Consequently, the entire sequence of Giles' doctrines, i) the quasi-eternity of essence, 2) the limitation of the recipient, 3) the uniformity of the creative action, 4) the indeterminate nature of existence, and finally, 5) the form of being, all fall into an intelligible pattern. In demanding a recipient essence in the creative act, Giles of Rome demonstrates an apparent inability to distinguish properly between the roles of efficient and formal causality in the production of esse. The Form of Being seems to exercise a formal causality. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, is very clear and unambiguous in speaking of the role of formal causality in the production of esse. Esse does not have a formal cause. Sed forma non habet sic esse per aliam formam ; unde si sit aliqua forma subsis tens, statim est ens et unum, nec habet causam formalem sui esse; habet tamen


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causam influentem ei esse, non autem causam moventem, quae reducit ipsam de potentia praeexistenti in actum.1

CONCLUSION

Giles does not disagree with Thomas, his former master, for the sake of argument. He is forced by the logical rigor of his metaphysical principles. Because his notion of being is what it is, he must assume the quasi-eternal prerogative of determination of essence. Therefore, an examination of the m etaphysica l doctrines of Giles of Rome justifies the criticism made in the thirteenth century by Henry of Ghent that his doctrine would suppose the pre-existence of essence to existence, although Giles himself denied it, and at the same time explains the role of essence as the extrinsic principle of limitation of esse to account for plurality. This is precisely why essence must be pre-existing, like the Avice nnian possible, to account for its function as the extrinsic princi ple of limitation. If God comm unicates esse in creation then the essence whose fun ction it is to lim it esse must be extrinsic to the esse which it limits. How else could it receive and determine the esse which comes to it in creation. This doctrine has endured to our own day. But the ontological foundations of this pre-existing essence, this possible being which exists only when it receives esse, but somehow “is” in order to receive esse and limit it, its ontological foundations are, I repeat, extremely shaky. 6. G R A E C O - A R A B I A N S O U R C E S O F T H E D O C T R I N E O F E S S E N C E A S T H E E X T R I N S I C P R I N C I P L E O F L IM I T A T IO N O F E X I S T E N C E

The Liber de Causis is the source of the metaphysical principles of Giles of Rome's doctrine of creation. It is also possible that he was influenced by St. Albert's commentary on that work. When Giles gives essence an actua lity of its own apart from existence in the creative act, he seems to be modeling this act after that by which the Separate Intelligence of the Liber de Causis determines the effect of the First Cause. Essence limits existence for Giles the way the Separate Intelli gences limit and specify the primal effect of existence to produce a plurality of beings. Essence does for Giles what the secondary cause does for the author of the Liber de Causis : it produces multitude. The Liber de Causis is one of the primary channels by which the 1 St. Thomas, De Spi rit ua lib us Crea turis , I, i, ad. 5.

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notion of being as essence and the doctrine of the extrinsic determina tion of esse by essence entered mediaeval thought. In our examination of the historical origins of Giles' doctrine of creation, we make no pretense to trace all the influences on his thought. As the conclusion of this part of our stud y we intend to investigate simply the sources of the doctrines which we have seen in Giles of Rome, to be found in the Liber de Causis itself, with special reference to their Proclean background. Wh en we turn to the Liber de Causis we find within it a metaphysical synthesis which Giles of Rome has appropriated in his own commentary on that work. The major steps in his doctrine: the quasi-eternity of essence, the uniformity of the divine action, the limitation of the recipient, the indeterminate nature of being, the form of being, all these are integral and essential parts of the teaching of the Liber de Causis. The occasions of opposition between Giles of Rome and Saint Thomas are precisely those points of doctrine wherein Giles follows the author of the Liber de Causis and consequently must part company with Aquin as, who clearly is at odds with these specific teachings. It seems to us that it is because Giles is so faithful to the basic doctrines of the Liber de Causis th at he is involved in difficulties with the doctrine of creation. It is no easy matter to construct a synthesis of the doctrine of the Liber de Causis wherein the logical sequence and the systematic articulations are perfectly demonstrated in the development of the thought of its author. I t was for good reason that his work was known as the “obscure” Liber de Causis. However, there is a systematic view of reality with its own laws and inner development, and possessed of an internal consistency, to be found within the thirty-some-odd propo sitions of this work, a doctrine that is basically that of Proclus, but which shows a development th at is definite ly not Proclean. The natural movement of the structure of the Liber de Causis begins with the Firs t Cause and follows the course of its influence and contribution to the rest of reality, through the Intelligences and Souls to the world of sensible Nature.1 The First Cause is pure unity because it is simple with an ultimate and absolute simplicity. 1 The conspectus of the universe of the Libe r de Ca usis which we are examining is bound to be basically Neoplatonic, for there is a very fundamental relationship between the Lib er de Causis and the Elem ents of Theology of Proclus. This Saint Thomas has pointed out in an oftquoted text. Cf. Saint Thomas, In Lib rum de Ca usis , lect. i, p. 196; also supra, chapter 1, note i. The peculiar vocation of Proclus was the systematising, with almost mathematical precision, of the Enn eads of Plotinus. His Elem ents of Theology is as exact an epitome of the


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Primum est dives per se ipsum quo non est dives magis. Et significatio ejus est ejus unitas, non quia unitas sit sparsa in ipso, immo est unitas ejus pura, quoniam est simplex in fine simplicitatis.1

It is a pure unity in which there is not multitude of any kind whatso ever .2I t is fixed and constant in its pure un ity.3 The One creates unities and gives unity to others. It is the cause of unity, and those things which do not possess their un ity of themselves but of another are its effects.4 An examination of this com munication of unity, this causal relation ship between pure Unity and participated unity, is of paramount fundamental tenets of Platonism as can be found within the covers of any Neoplatonic treatise. Starting with the fact of multiplicity, Proclus shows that there must be a transcen dent One to explain it. This One, as identified with the Good, is the radical source of the many. Through participation, the conferring of unity as an effect, the many shares in the One and this according to a specific pattern: first Intelligence, then Soul, and Nature, each possessing less unity, and in consequence, less perfection, due to the general notion of causality by wh ich it is imp oss ible for the eff ec t to be equ al to, or gr eat er than , its cau se. Th e tra ns iti on from unity to plurality is accomplished through the Intelligence which is a unified multiple, an identity in duality. Cf. Proclus, Ele men ts, prop. 3, p. 4; prop. 5, p. 4; prop. 8, p. 8. Refer ences to the Elem ents are to the edition of E. R. Dodds, Oxford, 1933, Greek text and English translation with commentary. The Elem ents was translated into Latin by W illiam of Moerbeke in May, 1268. Cf. M. Grabmann, Di e Proklosü berset zungen des Wilh elm von Moerbeke und ihre Verwertung in der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters, pp. 78ff. On the translation of William of Moerbeke cf. C. Vansteenkiste. “ Procli Elementatio Theologica translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke. Notae de methodo translationis,” Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, Sept. 1952, pp. 503-516. Saint Thomas quotes copiously from it in his commentary on the Libe r de Ca usis . Cf., Ele men ts, pp. xxxi, xlii. For a general interpretation of Proclus cf. L. Rosan, The Philoso phy of Pr ocl us, New York, 1949. For the Plotinian doctrine of the One cf. Enn ead s, III, 9- 4; V , 5, 4; VI. 6, 13. 1 R. Steele, Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, Fasc. XI I , Questiones Supra Librum de Causis, Nunc Pr imum Edidit Robert Steele, Accedit Liber De Causis, Oxford, 1935; prop. XXI, p. 178. Another text of the Libe r de Ca usis is that of O. Bardenhewer, Di e pseudo aristotelische Schri ft Ueber das reine Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Lib er de Cau sis, Freiburg i.B., 1882. Neither of these are critical editions. According to Bardenhewer, the Lib er de Causis was written by an Arab in the ninth or tenth century, not an Arab version of a Greek original, but an original Arab writing, in which the author utilized very probably an Ar ab tra ns la tio n of the Elem ents of Theology of Proclus. Finally, between the years 1167 and 1187, it was translated into Latin at Toledo by Gerard of Cremona. This is the Latin text w ith wh ich the sc ho las tic s wer e ac qu ain ted . Th ese fa ct s seem to ha ve bee n su bs ta nt iat ed b y more recent research. Cf. H. Bedoret, “ L’ auteur et le traducteur du Lib er de Ca usi s.” Revue Néosco lastiq ue de Ph ilos oph ie, Vol. 41, 1938, pp. 519-33. Cf. also Steele, op. cit., Introd. Bedoret holds that Alfarabi 949/50, fulfills the evidence of Bardenhewer. On Alfarabi cf. I. Madkour, La place d’ Al F ar ab i dans Vécole philo sophiq ue musulm ane, Paris, 1934; also S. Munk, Méla nges de phi losop hie jui ve et arabe, Paris, 1859. 2 Steele, op. cit., prop. XX , p. 177; prop. IV, p. 164. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 4, p. 5. 3 Steele, op. cit., prop. XX, p. 177. 4 Illud ergo in quo est unitas fixa non dependens ex aliquo est unum primum, sicut ostendimu s ; et illud in quo unitas in ven ta ex alio est praeter unum primum verum. Si ergo est ex alio, est ex uno primo adquisita unitas. Provenit ergo inde, ut uni puro vero et reliquis unis sit unitas iterum, et non sit unitas nisi propter unum verum quod est causa unitatis. Jam ergo manifestum est et planum quod omnis unitas post unum verum est adquisita creata ; verumtamen unum verum purum est creans unitates, faciens adquirere non adquirens, sicut ostendimus. Op. cit., prop. X X X II , pp. 186-7. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 3, p. 4.

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importance for an understanding of Giles of Rome. The author of the Liber de Causis tells us that a cause is in its effect after the mode of the effect. First esse is in the Intelligence in an intelligible mode, and Intelligence is in Soul in an animal mode, and Soul is in sense in a sensible mode. Et illud quidem non est ita, nisi quia unumquodque primorum aut est causa aut causatum. Causatum ergo in causa est per modum cause, et causa in causato per modum causati. Et nos quidem abbreviamus et dicimus quod res agens in rem per modum cause non est in ea nisi per modum qui est causa ejus. Sicut sensus in anima per modum animalem, et anima in intelligentia per modum intelligibilem, et intelligentia in esse per modum essentialem, et esse primum in intelligentia per modum intelligibilem, et intelligentia in anima per modum animalem, et anima in sensu per modum sensibilem.1

Things do not receive what is above them according to the mode of the thing received but only according to the mode in which they can receive it. Quapropter fit quod intelligence secunde proiciunt visus suos super formam universalem que est in intelligentiis universalibus, et dividunt eam et separant eam, quoniam ipse non possunt recipere illas formas secundum veritatem et certitudinem earum, nisi per modum secundum quem possunt recipere eas, scilicet per separationem et divisionem. Et similiter aliqua ex rebus non recipit quod est supra eam nisi per modum secundum quem potest recipere ipsum, non per modum secundum quem est res recepta .2

This limitation of a cause by the effect in which it is received holds good even for the First Cause. For although the First Cause exists in all things, each thing receives it according to the mode of its potency or capac ity. Th e purpose of the limitation of cause by effect seems to be to account for the diversity of reception. The First Cause cannot account for the diversity of the act of reception; the recipient is the cause of diversity. It is because of the recipient tha t the thing received is diver sified. But why is it that the recipient must account for diversity? This seems to be due to the fact that the First Cause is one ; it is not diverse. The First Cause is found in all things according to one disposition. It exists in one mode. 1 Steele, op. cit., prop. XII, pp. 171-2. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 103, p. 92. 2 Steele, op. cit., prop. X, p. 171. As the basis of the doctrine of contraction in Proclus we find that since the First Good is nothing but Good, when you add something to it, then you diminish its Goodness, changing it from the Good unqualified to a particular good. For that added character, which is not the Good but some lesser thing, by its co-existence has diminished the Good. Proclus, Elem ents of Theology, prop. 11, p. 12. On limita tion cf. also, Dodds, op. cit., pp. 246-7.


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Quod est quia quamvis causa prima existât in rebus omnibus tamen unaqueque rerum recipit eam secundum modum sue potentia. Quod est quia ex rebus sunt que recipiunt causam primam receptione unica, et ex eis sunt que recipiunt eam receptione multiplicata. . . . Et diversitas quidem receptiones non fit ex causa prima, sed propter recipiens quod, est quia suscipiens diversificatur ; propter illud ergo susceptum est diversificatum. Influens vero existens unum non diversum, influit super omnes res ex causa prima equaliter. Res ergo sunt causa diversitatis influxionis bonitatis super res. Proculdubio ergo non inveniuntur res omnes in causa prima per modum unum. Jam autem ostensum est quod causa prima invenitur in omnibus rebus per modum unum. Ergo secundum modum propin quitatis cause prime, et secundum modum quo res potest recipire causam primam, secundum qualitatem illius potest recipere ex ea et delectari per eam. Quod est quia non recipit res ex causa prima et delectatur in ea, nisi per modum esse sui .1

There seems to be a unity on the part of the First Cause that re quires limitation by the recipient in order to be diversified. The First Goodness pours goodnesses on all things by one influx, though each thing receives of that influx according to the mode of its power and its esse. It pours goodnesses only in one mode, by one common influx, and the goodnesses are diversified from the concourse of the recipients, some of which receive more than others. Quod est quia causa prima est fixa, stans cum unitate sua pura semper, et ipsa regit res creata omnes et influit super eas virtutem vite et bonitates secundum modum virtutis earum receptibilium et possibilitatem earum. Prima enim bonitas influit bonitates super res omnes influxione una ; verumtamen unaqueque rerum recipit ex illa influxione secundum modum sue virtutis sui esse. Et bonitas prima non influit bonitates super res nisi per modum unum, quia non est bonitas nisi per suum esse et suum ens et suam virtutem, ita quod est bonitas, et bonitas et virtus et ens sunt res una, fit quod ipsum influit bonitates super res influxione communi una. Et diversificantur bonitates et dona ex concursu recipientis. Quod est quia recipientia bonitates non recipiunt equaliter, immo quedam earum recipiunt plus quam quedam, hoc quidem est propter magnitudinem sue largitatis .2

Plurality arises, in the world of the Liber de Causis, from the recipien t and this determination of the uniform action of the First Cause is accomplished by recipients acting as secondary causes. Within the concomitant action of causes, a determination takes place. Esse, animal and man, all contribute to the production of a thing, but esse is the first to be received in it and the last to leave it.3Likewise, the first being giv es being to all its effects per modum creationis, but first life and first Intelligence act per modum formae Being appears to be somehow .4

1 Steele, op. cit., prop. XXIV, p. 180. 2 Op. cit.f prop. XX, p. 177. Op. cit. yprop. I, pp. 161-2. On secondary causes, cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 56, p. 54. 3 4 Steele, op. cit., prop. XVIII, p. 176, Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 101, p. 90.

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the substratum (stramentum) for these concomitant causes and to be limited and determined by them. Proclus' theory of causality plays an important part in this doctrine of the Liber de Causis. Proclus says that in their activity primary causes extend their influence further down the scale of reality than the secondary causes consequent upon them. For example, what Soul causes is caused also by Intelligence, and what Intelligence causes is caused also by the Good, but not co nversely.1 Thus plurality is achieved through the limitation of secondary causes, and the more causes involved, the more composite the product.2 Essence appears to do for Giles of Rome what secondary causes do for the Liber de Causis. Just as, for Giles of Rome, essence exercises some causality in the extrinsic limitation of esse in the creative act, so the secondary causes limit and determine the First Cause. These texts of the Liber de Causis certainly appear to be the source of the doctrines of the uniformity of the divine action and the limitation of the recipient in Giles of Rome. The fundamental neoplatonic doc trines which they contain are at home in the metaphysics of Giles of Rome. Th at w hich is one must act w ith a uniform action. This is the charac ter of the First Cause with which the author of the Liber de Causis is primarily occupied. It is its unity that sets the First Cause apart from and distinguishes it from the remainder of the universe, a universe that has as its fundamental characteristic, multiplicity and composition. The organization of the universe in the Liber de Causis thus parallels that which we noted in Giles of Rome, for according to him, the creature is primarily and necessarily, before all else, a composite thing. Now, turning to the rest of creation, or rather, as the Liber de Causis expresses it, to all that which is other than the One,3 we see that the universe is arranged according to the familiar Neoplatonic hierarchy. The One, Intelligence, Soul, and finally Nature, are the fundamental units of reality in order of dignity. Therefore, things other than the One begin with Intelligence, and it is in this grade of reality nearest to the One in power and dignity that we shall meet with multiplicity in the Universe. Intelligence flows immediately from the First Cause, and, as is to be expected, there is a definite resemblance between offspring and parent. 1 Proclus, op. cit., prop. 57, pp. 54-6. f 2 Op. cit., prop. 58, p. 56. 3 Steele, op. cit., prop. X X X II , p. 172, Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 1, p. 2.


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Intelligence possesses unity and simplicity.1 It stands fixed according to one disposition .2 Intelligence is an undivided substance, and there fore it is not subject to time from which division flows.3 It is simple and not composite.4 Now although this unity which Intelligence enjoys is strengthened by goodnesses which it receives from the First Cause, it is this factor which disrupts what would perhaps be absolute unity.5 For there is plurality present in Intelligence on account of the fact that it receives goodnesses from the Firs t Cause.6 For its un ity is from another and therefore it is not the One,7 but there is some composition in it for it is composed of finite and infinite.8It is composed of esse and form.9It is a one having multitude and a multitude in unity.10 It is in this wa y th at u nity and multiplicity arise in the Intelligences. Intelligence is created immediately by the First Cause, but the beings which receive goodnesses do not receive them equally, for each thing receives of the First Cause only according to the mode of its potency.11 Each thing receives of it according to the mode of its capacity and possibility.12 Thus diversity arises from the recipient and not from the First Cause.13 Things are the cause of diversity.14 This, then, is the mode of activity and productivity of the First Cause. It acts in a uniform way in accordance with its nature, as befits the One and absolute Unity. Plurality and diversity arises from its effects and primarily and principally from the first effect, Intelligence.15 Thus, in spite of the fact that there is some plurality present in Intelli gence, because every effect of the One has to have some composition to distinguish it from the One, this plurality is a minimum one. Although it is with Intelligence that plurality enters the universe, Intelligence 1 Steele, op. cit., prop. VII, p. 167; prop. IX, p. 168; prop. IV, p. 164, Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 28, p. 32. 2 Steele, op. cit., prop. VI I, p. 167; prop. VI, p. 166. 3 Op. cit., prop. VII, p. 167, Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 171, p. 150. 4 Steele, op. cit., prop. IV, p. 164. 5 Op. cit., prop. VII, p. 167. 6 Ibid. \ prop. XIX, p. 176. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 3, p. 4. 7 Steele, op. cit., prop. X X X II, p. 187. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 3, p. 4. 8 Steele, op. cit., prop. IV, p. 164. On the notion of finite and infinite cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 102, p. 93. For Plotinus and the origin of this notion in Plato cf. E. Bréhier, Pl oti n Enn éade s, VI, p. 8 ff. Cf. also M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O. P., op. cit., pp. 146-8. 9 Steele, op. cit., prop. IX, p. 170. 10 Op. cit., prop. VII, p. 167. 11 Op. cit., prop. XXIV, p. 180. 12 Op. cit., prop. XX, p. 177. 13 Ibid . Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 3, p. 4. 14 Steele, op. cit., prop. XX, p. 177. 15 Op. cit., prop. IV, p. 164.

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itself is too simple to be a true composite. Despite the composition necessary to it that it fulfill its proper role in the structure of the universe, it is still properly speaking, not a composite.1 The author of the Liber de Causis insists that it does not have parts that a true composite must possess. That is the reason why Intelligence cannot be generated.2 It has no parts from the union of which it might be pro duced.3 Th at is also the reason why it is incorruptible: it has no parts into which it might be separated.4 As a consequence of the simplicity of Intelligence it must be eternal;5 it cannot be subject to time. The Liber de Causis states explicitly that Intelligence forms itself for it sets its own limits to the unity it receives from the One. It is its own cause. Intelligence is cause and effect at the same time.6T hat is w hy it is, in a literal sense, eternal. It would have to be separated from itself in order to be generated or destroyed, for when the cause of the formation of a thing is itself then it is inseparable from its essence.7 The simplicity of Intelligence is so absolute that it precludes any coming to be or going out of existence. Intelligence possesses a completion by which it exists in virtue of itself, namely through its essence. It is a form.8 This is what the author of the Liber de Causis means when he calls it stans per seipsam and stans per essentiam.9 It would seem that when Giles of Rome posits essence as quasi eternal, and, when he gives to it an actuality of its own in the creative act, he is conceiving this act in terms of the function of Intelligence in the limitation of the One. Essence receives and limits esse in a manner resembling the wa y Intelligence receives and limits Unity. The metaphysical movement of the thought of Giles of Rome seems to be modeled on that of the Liber de Causis. We have already suggested th at the reason for the quasi-eternal prerogative of limitation of essence in Giles of Rome is to be found in 1 The Intelligen ce which, thou gh simple, is still composite, resembles the spiritu al sub stances of Giles of Rome which, even though simple, have within essence a further composition of potenc y and act th at enables it to plurif y a uniform esse. Giles of Rome, Theoremata,II , p. 7; XII, p. 72, II. 3-6. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 171, p. 150. 2 Steele, op. cit., prop. XX IX , p. 183. 3 Op. cit., prop. XX V I, p. 181; prop. XX V II, p. 182; prop. XX V III, pp. 182-3. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 47, p. 46. 4 Steele, op. cit., prop. VII, p. 167. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 52, p. 51. 5 Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 171, p. 150; prop. 169, p. 150. 6 Steele, op. cit., prop. XXVI, p. 182. 7 Op. cit., prop. XXV, p. 181; prop. XXVI, p. 181. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 45, p. 46; prop. 46, p. 46. 8 Steele, op. cit., prop. XXV, p. 181; prop. VII, p. 167. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop.99, p. 88. 9 Steele, op. cit., prop. XX V I, p. 182; prop. X X IX , p. 183.


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his conception of the nature and operation of the First Cause. It is because of the indeterminate nature of Ipsum Esse flowing from the First Cause that the uniformity of the divine action, the limitation of the recipient and the quasi-eternal prerogative of determination of essence follow logically in the thought of Giles of Rome. Since these same doctrines are to be found in the Liber de Causis, it will be well for us to examine at greater length the notions of the First Cause and Being in the Liber de Causis, in order to confirm our judgment of Giles of Rome. For it appears that fundamentally it is these notions which underlie his conception of the metaphysical structure of the universe. Although, properly speaking, for the Liber de Causis, as for Neo platonic writers in general, the First Cause is unknowable and unnameable, we can, however, name God from his effects. The proper attitude of the First Cause for the Liber de Causis is not easy to deter mine. We shall, therefore, examine the titles which it possesses in order to arrive at an understanding of what the first name of the First Cause is. It is in this investigation that the similarities between the First Cause of the Liber de Causis and the Creator of Giles of Rome become evident. The conception of the Firs t Cause found in the Liber de Causis is an important key to an understanding of the peculiar behaviour of the God of Giles of Rome. Now in the Liber de Causis the First Cause is known by a multitude of names. He is pure Goodness,1 the first Infinite,2 the Pow er of Powers,3 truly One,4 Pure Being.5 Et intelligentia est habens helyatin quoniam est esse et forma, et similiter anima est habens helyatin et natura est habens helyatin ; et cause quidem prime non est helyatin, quoniam ipsa est est esse tantum.6

It is of prime importance to mark the hierarchy existing among these attributes in order that it might lead us to that name which is most appropriately predicated of the First Cause. The First Cause is pure Goodness.7 It is Goodness without end or limits.8 In fact, it is infinite and individual through its Goodness, 1 Op. cit., prop. IX, pp. 169-70; prop. XX, p. 177. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 12, p. 15. 2 Steele, op. cit., prop. XVI, p. 174; prop. XVII, p. 175. Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 92, p. 82. 3 Steele, op. cit., prop. XVI, p. 174; prop. XIX, p. 170. 4 Op. cit., prop. XXXII, p. 187; XVII, p. 175. 5 Op. cit., prop. IX, p. 170. 6 Ib id. , Saint Thomas and Giles understand He lya tin (or ylcachim, an earlier transcription) as matter from the Greek vXrt /. Bardenhewer has shown that it comes from ôXôrrjç the whole or totality. On ôXorrjg cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 66-74, PP- 63-71. Cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O. P. op. cit., pp. 148-9, and O. Bardenhewer, op. cit., section 8. 7 Steele, op. cit., prop. XX, p. 177. 8 Op. cit., prop. XXII, p. 178.

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through the greatness of its largesse.1 But the attribute of Goodness is reducible to Unity, for the First is wealthy per se due to its pure U nity ,2 for it is simple with an ultimate and absolute simplicity. Res autem simplex una, que est bonitas, est una, et unitas ejus est bonitas, et bonitas ejus est res una.3

The good of a thing is not only reducible to its unity, but the First Cause in virtue of its office as Prime Good, acts like Unity, for it pours goodness upon all things by one influx, in a single mode. In fine, we are told that Goodness is unity.4 There also seems to be a dependence of the attribute of Infinity upon Unity. For a power has as the measure of its perfection nothing else but its unity. The Liber de Causis tells us that a united power is more infinite than a multiplied power. Omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam virtus multiplicata. Quod est quia infinitum primum, quod est intelligentia, est propinquum uni vero puro ; propter illud ergo factum est quod in omni virtuti propinqua uni vero est infinita plus quam in virtute longinqua ab ea.5

Unity is also the measure of Infinity per se, and not only inasmuch as Infinity is a perfection of Power. In fact, it is the division or lack of unity of a power which is the reason for its finiteness, and as a conse quence it is Unity which is the basis of both Infinity and Power. Quod est quia virtus quando incipit multiplicari tunc destruitur unitas ejus, et quando destruitur ejus unitas tunc destruitur ejus infinitas, et non destruitur infinitas ejus nisi quia dividitur. Et illius quidem significatio est virtus divisa, et quod ipsa, quanto magis adgregatur et unitur, magnificatur et vehementior fit et efficit operationes mirabiles : et quanto magis partitur et dividitur, minoratur et debilitatur et efficit operationes viles. Jam ergo manifestum est et planum quod virtus, quanto magis adproximat uni vero puro, fit vehementior ejus unitas, et quanto vehementior fit unitas est infinitas in ea magis apparens et manifestior, et sunt operationes ejus operationes magne, mirabiles et nobiles.6

For the First Cause is the first pure Infinite,7 a purity that implies unity. In formulating an order among these attributes, then, we have an order of dependence and increasing fundamentality, Power, Infinity, 1 Op. cit., prop. XX, p. 177; prop. IX, p. 170. 2 Op. cit., prop. X X , p. 177, XX I, p. 178; cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 13. p. 14. 3 Steele, op. cit., prop. XXI, p. 178. 4 Ibi d. 5 Op. cit., prop. XVII, p. 175, Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 61, p. 58. 6 Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 95, p. 84. Steele, op. cit., prop. XVII, p. 175. 7 Steele, op. cit., prop. XVI, p. 174.


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and Goodness are all reducible to Unity. The divine names are founded on Unity. God is the Pow er of Powers, the First Infinite, and Pure Good ness, because He is truly One. I t is Un ity which is the most fundamental and far-reaching of these attributes of the First Cause. All this of course agrees v ery well w ith the fundamental metaphysical notions of Proclus and Plotinus. Consequently, we can say that the author of the Liber de Causis follows faithfully in the footsteps of the Neoplatonists and their metaphysics of unity.1 But this is not all. There is another notion that challenges the One in point of metaphysi cal priority, namely the notion of Being. The First Cause is also Pure Being, and this attribute appears to rival Unity in fundamentality. For Goodness seems to be also dependent upon Being as well as on Unity. The First Cause is First Goodness through its ens and its esse. Likewise we are told that: Ens primum et Bonitas sunt res una .2 Prime Being and Goodness are but one and the same thing. Being also under lies and is superior to Infinity in the First Cause. Quod est quia si entibus fortibus non est finis per suam adquisitionem ab infinito primo puro propter quod sunt entia infinita, et si ens primum ipsum est quod ponit res quibus non est finis, tunc ipsum proculdubio est supra infinitum .3

1 After establishing the existence of the One, and showing that the m any participate in the One, Proclus shows why the One communicates itself to the many. He proffers the motiva ting force of procession as the Good, a transcendent principle like the One and thus a possible rival of the One, for if the Good is that on which all things depend, then it must be the pri nc ipiu m and First Cause of all things. Cf. Proclus, Eleme nts of Theology, prop. 13, p. 14. It belongs to the Good to conserve all beings. But unity also holds together and conserves the being of each thing. Thus the Good makes the participant one and holds it together according to unity. Unity, too, by its presence makes each thing complete. Thus unity is good for all things. But if unification is in itself good, and all goods tend to create unity, then the Good un qualified and the One unqualified merge in a single principle, a principle which makes things one and in so doing, makes them good. Goodness then is unification, and unification is goodness; the Good is One and the One is primal Good. Proclus makes this reduction of Goodness to Unity: “ For if it belongs to the Good to conserve all that exists, and it is for no other reason that all things desire it, and if likewise that which conserves and holds together the being of each thing is unity, since by unity each is maintained in being, but by dispersion displaced in being, then the Good, wherever it is present, makes the participant one, and holds its being together in virtue of this unification. And secondly, if it belongs to unity to br in g and ke ep eac h thing tog eth er, b y its pre sen ce it ma kes eac h thin g com ple te. In thi s w ay , the n, the sta te of un ific ati on is goo d for all th in gs .” Op. cit., prop. 1, p. 2. This text is significant. Proclus means that the proper name of the First Cause is Unity, for even the function of Goodness is to conserve all being precisely through the conferring of unity. The proper function of Goodness which lies in the completion of a being is reducible to a unity wh ich , b y ho ldi ng a be ing toget her , en abl es it to be. U n ity is bas ic to bei ng and som eho w causes it. Being, then as an effect of unity, must take on the character of a whole, which is precisely where its goodness lies. These ideas play a very important part in enabling us to understand the metaphysics of the Lib er de C aus is and Giles of Rome. Cf. P. Na sh, “ Giles of Rome, Auditor and Critic of St. Thomas,” The Modern Schoolman, Nov. 1950, p. 13. 2 Steele, op. cit., prop. X X , p. 177. E t bonitas prima non influit bonitates super res omnes nisi per modum unum, quia non est bonitas nisi per suum esse et suum ens et suam virtutem, ita quod est bonitas, et bonitas et virtus et ens sunt res una. Ibid. 3 Op. cit., prop. XVI, p. 174.

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In order to discover then what the First Cause is in the Liber de Causis, it is necessary to examine the relations of the two notions, Being and Unity, both of which seem to underlie the divine Goodness, Power and Infinity. Being and Unity are the fundamental attributes of God. But which is His first name ? Is the First Cause basically the One or is it properly Being ? A. B E I N G A N D U N I T Y IN T H E D E C A U S I S

It is true that the Liber de Causis calls the First Cause Pure Being and First Being,1 and finally, it gives to it that name so familiar to students of Thomas Aquinas, Ipsum Esse. But not only the First Cause is being. Proposition four of the Liber de Causis begins: Prima rerum creatarum est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud .2

Being is a creature and indeed the first of all creatures. The second hypostasis of Neoplatonism is the first creature for the Liber de Causis for it tells us that the first created being is Intelligence. Ens autern primum creatum, scilicet intelligentia, hab et finem, et virtuti ejus est finis secundum quem remanet causa ejus .3

It says very clearly that being is nothing else than thought : Et non intelligo per esse nis i cognitionem A There seems to be little doubt, then, that both Intelligence and the First Cause are being. Being before eternity is the First Cause, Being with eternity is Intelligence, and Being after eternity bu t abo ve time is the Soul.5 The point that demands investigation involves these two statements. The First Cause is being. Intelligence is being, first created being. Th e Neoplatonists had taught, however, th at the Firs t Cause was the One which transcends Be ing and Intelligence. Ye t again, the One is prior to the Intelligence, for the Intelligence, though unmoved is yet not unity; in knowing itself, it is object to its own activity. Moreover, while all things, whatsoever their grade of reality, participate unity, not all participate Intelligence, for to participate Intelligence is to participate knowledge, since intuitive knowledge is the beginning and the first cause of all knowing. Thus the One is beyond the Intelligence.6

1 Ib id. , prop. XVIII, p. 175; prop. II, p. 162. Res omnes sunt entia propter ens primum. Prop. XVIII, p. 175; Ens primum dat causatis suis omnibus ens. Ib id. , prop. IX, p. 170. 2 Op. cit., prop. IV, p. 164. 3 Op. cit., prop. XVI, p. 174. 4 Op. cit., prop. XXIV, p. 180. 5 Op. cit., prop. II, p. 162, Cf. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 88, p. 80. 6 Proclus, op. cit., prop. 20, p. 22; prop. 13, p. 14. The One must transcend every multi plicity, and Being and Intelligence are both multiple, prop. 5, p. 4; prop. 89, p. 82. Cf. Plotinus, Enn ead s, VI, 6, 13.


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For the Neoplatonists, Being is equated with Intelligence. True Being is Intelligence. All things proceed from the Intelligence and the whole cosmos has its being from Nous, an eternal world from an eternal Intelligence, Intelligence is being and the source of all beings.1

The Liber de Causis, faithful to Proclus, does call the First Cause the One. However, when it calls the First Cause Pure Being, it is doing something that Proclus, in his Elements of Theology does not do.2 It is strange to find the One and the Good, which to Proclus is necessarily above being, identified with it, especially in a work that is so largely Proclean in its antecedents.3 However, upon examination, it becomes clear th at the Liber de Causis is still fundamentally Proclean in its doctrine on this point. According to the Liber de C ausis, it is not the First Cause but Intelligence that is properly being.4 1 Op. cit., prop. 171, p. 150. Saint Thomas was aware of the fundamental difficulty involve d in the identification of the One and Being. He knew that one of the tenets of Neoplatonism wa s the tra ns cen da nc e of the One as ov er ag ain st Be ing . In Lib rum de C au sis , lect. IV, p. 214. The One and the Good is itself not a being, it is above being. Causa autem prima secundum Platonicos quidem est supra ens inquantum essentia bonitatis et unitatis, quae est causa prima, excedit etiam ipsum ens separatum, sicut supra dictum est, sed secundum rei verita tem causa prima est supra ens inquantum est ipsum esse infinitum. Op. cit., lect. VI, pp. 229-30. In stating the reasoning behind this historical conclusion, Saint Thomas offers an explanation as accurate as if, like Plotinus and Proclus before him, he had consulted the Rep ubl ic of Plato : “ In the order of those things which are predicated of things (the Forms), he placed the One most common and the Good more common even than being, because the Good or One is found to be predicated of something concerning which being is not predicated, eviden tly of prime matter. Pla to joined prime matter to non-being, not distinguishing between matter and privation. Moreover, he attributed unity and goodness to matter, inasmuch as it has an ordination to form, for the Good is not only predicated of an end, but of that which is for an end. So, therefore, as the highest and first principle of things, the Platonists advanced the One itself and the separate Good itself. But after the One and the Good, nothing is found so common as being; and therefore they posited separate Being itself, indeed created, as participating goodness and un ity in number, th ey placed it first among all created things” . Op. cit., lect. IV, pp. 213-14. 2 Proclus does not call the One being. He does use the phrase “ Prime Being,” t o TiQœrœç ov but by it he means that being within the triad of Intelligence. For Proclus, even “ Prime Being” has a composition of finite and infinite, something that the One could never have. Elem ents of Theology, prop. 102, p. 93: prop. 89, p. 83. On being in Proclus cf. prop. 87-96. pp. 81-87. For Plotinus too, the One is before being and engenders being. In the One there is not the slightest vestige of being. Plotinus, Enn eads , VI, 6, 13. The One is not any being and is before all beings. Op. cit., Ill, 8, 9. Being cannot be affirmed of the One. Ibi d. , 8, 10. On the relation of the One and Being in Plotinus Cf. E. Gilson, Be ing and So me P hilos ophe rs, pp. 21-27. 3 “ Psycholog ically speaking, one can philosophize as a Neoplatonist and believe as a Christian; logically speaking, one cannot think, at one and the same time, as a Neoplatonist and as a Christian.” E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 31. Cf. Dionysius, De Divin is Nomin ibu s V, P. G. Ill, 816A. We have a parallel between Dionysius and the Libe r de Ca usi s on this point. Dionysius calls the First Cause being but only because it is the Cause of Being. Being is its first and fundamental effect. On the hypothesis that Libe r de Cau sis is the work of Alfarabi it is understandable why God is called esse because according to Alfarabi God is Pure Esse . Cf. Gilson, La Philoso phi e au Moy en Âge , 2nd ed. 1944* P- 34-8. 4 For Proclus as well as Plotinus, Being seems to be identified with Intelligence, undoubtedly a heritage from Plato himself for whom the ideas or forms alone were true being worthy

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Et causa prima est supra res intelligibiles sempiternas et supra res destructibiles, qua propter non cadunt super eam sensus neque meditatio neque cogitatio neque intelligentia. Et ipsa quidem non significatur nisi ex causa secunda quae est intelligentia, et non nominatur per nomen causati sui primi nisi per modum altiorem et meliorem, quoniam quod est causatum est causa iterum, verumtamen per modum sublimiorem et meliorem et nobiliorem, sicut ostendimus .1

Immediately after noting the transcendence of the First Cause, the author of the Liber de Causis states that it is signified by Intelligence and named with the name of its first effect: Nominatur per nomen causati sui primi. Being is not the proper name of the First Cause. It is the proper name of Intelligence. The proper name of the First Cause, is still the One. It is transcendent, not because it is Infinite Being as Giles of Rome or Saint Thomas would have it, but because it is the One and the Good. To settle all doubts we repeat a text we used earlier but now with a new significance. By esse the Liber de Causis means know ledge. Quod est quia non recipit res ex causa prima et delectatur in ea, nisi per modum esse sui. Et non intelligo per esse nisi cognitionem, nam secundum modum quo cognoscit res causam primam creantem, secundum quantitatem illam recipit ex ea et delectatur in ea, sicut ostendimus.2

According to the Liber de Causis, then, being can be described in the following way: to be is to be known, to be a form, to be a composite, to be many. As with Plotinus and Proclus before him, Being is still the proper name of Intelligence.3 of the name, the object of true knowledge. But Proclus, in his discussion of Intelligence, made a triad of it, in accordance with his theory of causality. He placed Being beyond both Intelligence and Life, since next to the One it is the most universal cause and thus the highest participant. Being has a triadic precedence over Intelligence. Though the first principle of the universe is still the One, and though Being is the proper name of Intelligence, Being has achieved a primacy as over against Intelligence, due to the recognition of its greater commu nity. Proclus, Elem ent s, prop. 138, p. 122; prop. 101, p. 91; prop. 87, p. 80; prop. 62, p. 58. Cf. Plotinus, Enn ead s, V, 9, 8., where he identifies Being and Intelligence. 1 Steele, op. cit., prop. VI, p. 166. 2 Op. cit., XXIV, p. 180. Proclus makes the same identification of thought and being. Ev ery Intelligence gives rise to its consequents by the act of intellection. Its creative activ ity is thinking, and its th ought is to produce. It produces by existing and its existence is thought. It produces by the act of thinking. Proclus, op. cit., prop. 34, p. 38. Cf. Plotinus, En ne ad s, III, 8, 8. 3 “ It is here that the Platonic method, w hich is for Saint Thomas Aquinas the cornerstone of Platonism, makes itself apparent. And it is this method, so widely practiced by his con temporaries, that Saint Thomas has singled out with a steady insistence throughout his wr itin gs and wi th rem ark abl e ela bor ate ne ss in his co m m en ta ry on the Libe r de Ca usis . W ha t is thi s me thod ? It is the me thod of mo del ing the pro per tie s of ex ist in g bei ng s on the abstractions of the human intellect. In other words, it is the method of thinking that being takes its characteristics as being from what it reveals of itself in the state of being thought.” A. C. Peg is, Intr oduc tion to S ain t Thoma s Aq uin as , New York, 1948, p. xviii. For a scholarly treatment of this entire field cf. the work of the same author, “ Cosmogony and Know ledge,” Thought, Dec. 1943; June, 1944, Sept. 1945. Also Sa int Thoma s and the Greeks, Aquinas Lecture for 1939, Marquette U niversity Press, Milwaukee, 1939; “The Dilemma of Being and Unity,” Ess ays in Thom ism, New York, 1942, pp. 179-83.


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Now the procedure of Giles of Rome is just the reverse of this. For him, God is Ipsum Esse of Himself.1 Being is the proper name of the First Cause. He asserts that by the name “First” is meant something which is Ipsum Esse, through which everything else receives esse. God Himself, since He is the First Being and because He is Ipsum Esse, is the cause of all other beings. Et quia intelligimus nomine Prima aliquid quod est Ipsum Esse, et omnia alia per ipsum accipiunt esse, Ipse ergo Deus, quoniam est Primum Ens, et quia est Ipsum Esse est causa omnium entium .2

Thomas Aquinas, in his own comm entary on the Liber de Causis, has explained how, for Christians, Being supersedes the Neoplatonic One as the first principle.3 For Giles of Rome, as for the Christian, the First Cause is Being, and Being is the proper name of God and His most fundamental attribute. In fact, it is in virtue of this divine prerogative that He holds the title of Creator, for by it He is the cause of all other being. Because God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens, therefore He is able to create. For it is precisely in a communication of esse tha t the doctrine of creation is located. A creature is being because He communicated esse to it. God is by His nature Being, and the Intelligences are beings because God made them as He made all of His creatu res.4 Saint Augustine expresses this position ex ac tly: Quid enim est nisi quia tu es ? This is just the reverse of what happens in the text of the Liber de Causis, for in that work being is properly the first creature of God and the First Cause receives the name Being on its account.5 In our analysis of the Liber de Causis we have seen the source of the major steps of Giles of Rome's doctrine of creation. The Liber de Causis tells us that diversity is due to the recipient and not to the First Cause. And why is it that the recipient must account for diversity? 1 Cf. supra, ch. II, p. 57 ff. 2 Giles of Rome, Sup er Lib rum de Ca us is , prop. Ill, fol. 12 r Y. 3 Saint Thomas notes that the Libe r de C aus is though certainly based upon the Elem ents of Theology of Proclus, does not agree with the Platonic position of the plurality of separate forms, but posits only one Form. In Lib rum de Ca usis , lect. XII, p. 257; also lect. XVI, p. 269. A ris totle (ac cor din g to St. Tho ma s) and Ch ris tia n Do ctr ine also po sit one fir st pri nc iple instead of a plurality of forms. Op. cit., I ll , p. 210; XV III , p. 276. Dionysius does the same thing for he makes all the other Platonic forms to become properties or attributes of Being. Op. cit., IV, p. 214; X, p. 248. For since God is Being Itself, Ips um Ess e, all the perfections of be ing are at tr ibu ted to Him . Th is, in bri ef fas hio n, is how for Sa in t Th om as the Ch ris tia n substitutes Being for Un ity as the proper name of the First Cause. E. Gilson, Be ing and Some Phi losop her s, pp. 30, 34. 4 Saint Augustine, Confessions, XI, 5, 7. Cf. E. Gilson, Bein g and Some Philosop her s, p. 24, wh ere this te xt is quo ted . 5 On the reversed relations of Being and the One in Plotinus and Saint Augustine Cf. E. Gilson, Bei ng and Some Philo sophe rs, p. 24, and by the same author, Intr oduct ion à V E tu de de Sa int Au gu sti n, pp. 260 ff.

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Because the First Cause is Pure Unity, its action somehow partakes of that unity. The metaphysics of unity of Proclus and the Liber de Causis seems to have a strong influence on Giles of Rome. The characteristic phrase, stans per essentiam, of the author of the Liber de Causis by which he expresses the contribution th at being makes in its own production, its self-causality by reason of which it is, literally, eternal, seems to have a similarity to the essence of Giles of Rome which also has an act uality of its own. Wh en Giles of Rome gives the quasi-eternal essence an actuality of its own in the creative act, he is modeling this act after the manner in which Intelligence limits the One. Essence limits esse for Giles the wa y Intelligence limits un ity to produce beings. Essence does for Giles what the secondary cause does for the author of the Liber de Causis. It produces plurality. Finally, in the doctrine of being of the Liber de Causis lies the reason for Giles' difficulty. The notion that being is form explains ve ry cle arly the action of God as Forma essendi. If God is acting like a separate form, then of course a recipient matter is needed to determine and limit its formal causality. In the Liber de C ausis, the only reason that creation differs from information, is simply that esse is the first effect in a thing and the last to leave it. But it still exercises a formal and not an efficient causality. Giles, unlike the Liber de Causis, has a metaphysics of being, in that the First Cause is properly being, but for him being appears to have a close resemblance to what it is for the Liber de Causis. The words of a modern historian of philosophy, speaking of the relations of Saint Augustine to Plotinus express accu rately the relations of Giles of Rome to the Liber de Causis. Son Dieu est bien le Dieu chrétien qui crée l'être, mais c'est un Dieu suprême ment être au sens platonicien du terme, qui crée de l’être au sens platonicien du terme. Rien, au fond, de plus naturel. Augustin ne pouvait concevoir la création, qui est le don de l’être, qu’en fonction de sa conception de l’être. Son Dieu créateur est donc Celui qui “ est ce qu’il est’ ’ cause première de “ ce que les êtres sont.’ ’ 1

It appears that Giles of Rome in his doctrine of creation depends, for his principles, on Proclus through the Liber de Causis. As the result of the present investigatio n, we can see tha t his un iverse possesses a remarkable similarity in metaphysical character to that of Proclus and his basic metaphysical principles are drawn directly from the Liber de Causis: the quasi-eternity of essence, the uniformity of the 1 E. Gilson, Intr oduct ion à L' Etud e de Sa int Aug ust in, p. 266.


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divine action, the indeterminate nature of being, and especially the formal character of esse. CONCLUSION

We are now in a position to draw certain general conclusions con cerning the doctrine of creation of Giles of Rome in his commentary on the Liber de Causis. Henry of Ghent has accused Giles of teaching that essence pre-exists the communication of esse in the creative act. This is a valid criticism because although Giles of Rome does not say this explicitly, he does insist that essence must be present at the first moment of creation in order to account for plurality. It is the necess ity of explaining the origin of multiplicity that causes Giles to posit essence as the necessary explanation for diversity in creation, despite the fact of Saint Thomas' warning that it makes a creatio ex nihilo impossible: an admonition Giles of Rome had before him when he wrote his comm entary on the Liber de Causis. Giles of Rome did not manufacture this difficulty for himself. He was not heedless of the admonition of his former master. But he was forced by his basic metaphysical principles to posit the quasi-eternal prerogative of determination of essence. These fundamental doctrines follow upon each other with a rigorous necessity. Essence must be present in the first moment of creation because plurality is produced by the limitation of esse by essence. Limitation must be due to the recipient essence, precisely because God acts with a uniformity of action. This uniformity of the creative action is due to the indeterminate nature of esse. An undetermined esse must be determined, contracted and limited by the composite structure of essence, a composition of genus and species, and more fundamental still, a composition of potency and act. This, of course, does not explain the presence of plurality but simply attempts to locate it on a more basic ontological level. The reason for the indeterminate nature of esse is that God acts in a manner similar to the form of being [forma essendi ), a doctrine for which he acknowledges his indebtedness to Plato. Esse according to Giles of Rome is conceived as a kind of form or essence. Indeed he tells us th at a thing is a being because of its essence : the terms ens comes from essentia. Given Giles' notion of being, the quasi-eternal prerogative of determination of essence must follow, as Henry of Ghent saw so clearly. Finally, the doctrine in the Liber de Causis that being is a form

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explains the action of God as Forma essendi. If the First Cause acts like a separate form, then a recipient matter is needed to determine and limit its formal causality. In the Liber de Causis, the only reason that creation differs from information is simply that existence is the first effect in a thing and the last to leave it. But it still exercises a formal and not an efficient causality. The doctrine of Saint Thomas Aquinas is at odds with Giles of Rome on every one of these basic metaphysical principles. Saint Thomas states very clearly that the presence of essence in the first moment of the creative act would destroy the very notion of a creatio ex nihilo, because som ething would be before it was created. Saint Thomas also denies that in creation the recipient is the principle of limitation and states that diversity must come from God alone. Likewise, according to him there is nothing undetermined about the D ivine N ature because it is Pure Act, the most determined of all things for it has no trace of potentiality, and furthermore esse cannot be determined by something more formal than itself. Nor can being be contracted the way genus is contracted by its specific differences. God is not the Forma essendi for Saint Thomas, because, according to him, esse (which, in its purity, is the divine essence), does not function as a formal cause. Saint Thomas states his mind very clearly on this point. It is in a work of nature, not of reason and intelligence that the cause acts uniformly and is determined ad unum. If, in creation, God acted as a Form, ex naturaythen something indeterminate would be produced. (An infinite cause, operating uniformly, naturally generated one, indeterminate effect). But this is impossible, Saint Thomas claims, because creation is a free action, a work of the Divine Intellect and Will, not a work of nature. Certainly, in this precise contradiction of metaphysical doctrines there is little trace of the student-master relationship between Giles of Rome and Saint Thomas Aquin as. The relations of Giles of Rome to the Liber de Causis become clearer when compared to the relations that existed between Saint Augustine and Plotinus. Saint Augustine w as engaged in the impossible attem pt of interpreting creation in terms of Greek philosophy.1 His good fortune lay in the fact that his theological acumen dominated his philosophical instruments.2 Likewise Giles, in his doctrine of creation, never over steps the limits of correct theology, but that is not due to his philoso1 E. Gilson, Intro ductio n à VE tu de de Sa int Au gu sti n, p. 263. 2 Op. cit.t p. 269.

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phical principles. Like Saint Augustine, his philosophical instruments would lead him some place else if their natural movement was not curbed and guided by an exact theology.1 The real master of Giles of Rome in his solution of this problem is the author of the Liber de Causis. On each point of his metaphysical argumentation, he draws on the ideas of the Liber de Causis in oppo sition to the teaching of Saint Thomas. His fundamental notion of being bears strong resemblance to th at of the Liber de Causis. The universe in which Giles' notion of being is most at home is the eternal, necessary world of Greek philosophy organized in terms of the One and the Many.1 The conclusion of the present section of this study is that the source of the difficulties which Giles of Rome has with the doctrine of creation may be traced to principles he finds in the Liber de Causis. In his explanation of creation he is utilizing metaphysical principles which can never perform the task he asks of them. As a matter of fact they were formu lated to explain the eternal and necessary universe of Greek philosophy. When we speak of the dependence of mediaeval doctrines on Christian doctrines we are not implying some general cultural influence. We mean the articulations of precise doctrines. In Greek philosophy it is essence which makes beings to be the kind of things they are. And in the Christian universe essence still keeps that function of limiting and determining a primal unity, such as the One of Plotinus or the God of the Liber de Causis and Avicenna. The all-pervasive doctrine, explicit and implicit, of essence as the extrinsic principle of limitation of esse flows from the Greek notion of being as a form wh ich can be without existing. This doctrine comes from Neoplatonism as modified by the Arabian monotheists, Avicenna and particularly the Liber de Causis. It was proximately the author of the Liber de Causis who influenced Giles of Rome, who in his turn, placed his stamp from the beginning on the age long controversies on the relations between essence and existence. The function of essence as the Extrinsic Principle of Limitation of esse came to Giles from the analysis of the doctrine of creation in the 1 It is interesting to note that the similarity of their problems lead Saint Augustine and Giles of Rome into similar difficulties, as is to be expected when the metaphysical principles of an eternal, necessary universe are used to explain its very antithesis, the created universe. For Saint Augustine had the same difficulty in locating matter ontologically as Giles of Rome had with essence. Op. cit., p. 265.

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Liber de Causis and it is within the context of the origin of plurality and the distinction between creator and creature that the subsequent discussions and bitter controversies on essence and existence have their definitive formulation and determining background, but more of this presently. We chose Giles of Ro me's doctrine of creation and being because we are convinced that it was his formulation of the doctrine of the Re al Distinction of Essence and Existence w hich has set the guide lines for all later discussions of not only the Real Distinction but also Be ing and Creation. He makes the perfect foil for the correct understanding of that set of apparently contradictory texts we find in Thomas Aquinas. We could have chosen Cajetan, Suarez or John of St. Thomas to illustrate our point. It is the self-same metaphysics of Unity disguised as a metaphysics of Being, namely a metaphysics of Essence, which is controlling in the formulation of the various problems and solutions of the Relations of Essence and Esse, particularly in terms of reciprocal causes.

CHAPTER III

E S S E N C E AS T H E I N T R I N S I C L I M I T A T I O N O F E SSE

To recapitulate, the fundamental metaphysical structure of being for Thomas Aquinas is a v ery different one from that of Giles of Rome just examined. F or Aquinas, esse has a profounder and more basi c role in the constitution of being. Esse is more intimate to any thing than the essence which determines it.1 In fact the name ens is taken from the act of being.2As we have seen, a thing is not ens because of its essence but because of its actus essendi. It is the name res that expresses the essence of a being.3 Ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem sive essentiam entis.4

According to Saint Thomas being is denom inated by esse.5 This is of course a radical divergence from the roles that essence and esse play in the metaphysics of Giles of Rome, and the scholastic tradition of which he is both progenitor and rep resentative. There ens, properly, does not even include esse.6 For Aquinas essence is that through which

1 Saint Thomas, I I Sen t., i, i, 4, c. . esse autem magis intimum cuilibet rei quam ea per quae esse determinatur; unde et remanet, illis remotis, ut in Libr o de Ca usis , prop. 1, dicitur. Unde operatio Creatoris magis pertingit ad intima rei quam operatio causarum secundarum.” 2 “ Ens sumitur ab actu essendi.” Saint Thomas, I Sen t., dist. VIII, q. 1, a. 1 ; dist. XXV, q. i, a. 4; Contra Gentiles, I, c. 25 ; II, c. 54. Cf. De Verita te, q. 1, a. i ; In Boet. De Hebdom ., c. II. 3 Saint Thomas, De Verita te, q. 1, a. 1. 4 Ibi d. 5 “ Unde in compositis ex materia et forma nec materia nec forma potest dici ipsum quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse. Forma tamen potest dici quo est, secundum quod est essendi principium; ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens.” Saint Thomas, Contra Gentiles, II, 54. 6 “ Verum quia ens per se dicit unum per se et non includit esse, immo per se ens significat genera praedicamentorum, oportet quod per illud idem per quod res in praedicamento sit ens per se; et quid hoc est per essentiam suam.” Giles of Rome, Theoremata, XIII, p. 83, 1. 6-p. 84,1. i.

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and in which ens has esse.1 But a thing is not a being because of its form. Non tamen denominatur aliquod ens a form ai In fact, properly speaking, forms should not be called beings at all but rather co-existents. Sicut igitur accidentia et formae, et huiusmodi quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam entia; ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata. Proprie vero creata sunt subsistentia.3

This is diametrically opposed to Giles, for whom essence, as we have seen, seems to possess a definite actuality of its own by reason of which it has a claim to being. Ergo cum essentia de se dicat actualitatem aliquam praeter esse, ex essentia et esse una natura tertia conflari non potest. Dicebatur enim supra quod ipsa essentia aliquam actualitatem importat, licet illa actualitas non sit tanta quod sine esse potest existere.4

But though essence does have some degree of actuality, this is not sufficient for existence, Giles of Rome tells us.5 Although of itself essence has some actuality, it cannot be in act without esse.6 Giles, of course, is insistent on the point that essence does not pre-exist esse, even though he can present no alternative.7 For Saint Thomas, on the other hand, nothing has actuality unless inasmuch as it is, for ipsum esse is the actuality of all things even of forms themselves. 1 “ .. .. sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per earn et in ea ens habet esse.” Saint Thom as, De Ent e et E sse nti a, Cap. I, p. 4 , 11. 15-16. 2 Saint Thomas, I Sen t., dist. X X III , q. 1, a. 1. 3 Saint Thomas, Sum ma Theologia e, I, 45, 4, resp. 4 Giles of Rome, Theoremata, VI, pp. 28-9. 5 “ Dicere itaque possumus quod, licet essentia in qua suscipitur esse dicat de se aliquam actualitatem, quam non dicit materia quia materia est potentia pura in genere entium, illa tamen actualitas quam importat essentia non est tanta quod sufficiat ad hoc quod sit in rerum natura. Oportet igitur ab ipso agente aliquam actualitatem et aliquod complementum superaddi ipsi essentiae, ad hoc quod essentia existât et sit in natura rerum; illa autem actualitas et complementum dicitur esse.” Op. cit., V, p. 21, 11. 1-8. 6 “ Sic etiam, cum esse sit actus formae, agens naturale prius dat formam quam causat esse. Habet enim forma quandam potentialitatem respectu formae. Ipsa enim forma, ut in praece dentibus dicabatur, licet de se dicat quandam actualitatem, non tamen dicit tantam actuali tatem quod possit esse actu sine esse. Ipsum ergo esse dat quandam actualitatem formae.” Op. cit., VII, p. 37, 11. 9-16. Cf. Op. cit., X X I, p. 30, 31; X, p. 57, 58. 7 “ Sed nunquam una et eadem essentia numero modo subest uni esse, modo alii. Unde essentia non praeexistit ipsi esse, licet materia praeexistat formae.” Op. cit., VI, p. 26, 11. 17-20. . . . nec etiam ac tus imprim itur actu i vel idem sibi ipsi quia tunc res producta esset antequam fieret sed actus imprimitur potentiae. Op. cit., V, p. 24. 11. 11- 13. “ Dicebatur enim quod materia potest praeexistere formae sed essentia non potest praeexistere suo esse. Et quia materia potest praeexistere, potest transmutari ad formam ita quod immediatus terminus transmutationis poterit esse forma. Sed essentia non praeexistit ipsi esse; ideo non poterit transmutari ad esse, ita quod sit immediatus transmutationis terminus.” Op. cit., VI, p. 29, 30.


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Nihil enim habet actualitatem nisi inquantum est. Unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum et etiam ipsarum formarum .1

For Thomas Aquinas, God alone is ens per essentiam suam because He is Ipsum Esse. But Giles of Rome, while accepting this formula of Aquinas in his usu al manner, gives it a ver y different interpretation. For him, anything is ens per essentiam suam, but because the essence of the created thing does not signify a complete act but is in potency to esse, therefore essence is not enough for a thing to exist in act unless there is superadded to it some esse which is the act and completion of essence. This is how being taken in itself differs from existence.2 Giles, having stated his position very exactly, explains how it is that he can use Saint Thomas' formulae even though his own doctrine is so very different. Verum quia nominibus utimur ut volumus, multotiens pro eodem accipitur ens et existens, secundum quem modum loquendi multotiens invenitur quod Primum est ens per essentiam suam, caetera vero sunt entia per participationem. Nam cum Primum essentialiter habeat esse, caetera vero participent esse, accipiendo ens ut includit esse, et ut est idem quod existens, ipsum Primum est ens per essentiam, caetera vero per participationem.3

It seems to us that the current technique of treating essence and existence as Aristotelian reciprocal causes is still a continuation of the doctrine of the Liber de Causis of Essence as the Extrinsic Principle of Limitation resulting in the Aegidian doctrine of the Pre-existing Essence and the Avicennian doctrine of the Reality of the Possibles. For the Avicennian theory of the possible essences continues still to exert a tangible influence on our notions of being. Being traditionally has been divided into actual and possible and just recently the claim of the possible essence to the title of being has again been upheld. But possible being is simply no being.4 Essences considered in them selves are in potency and potential being cannot exert causality. " . . . . quia quod est potentia, nondum est ; unde nec agere potest." 5 What is in potency is not ye t, consequently it cannot act as a cause. To 1 Saint Thomas, Sum ma Theologia e, I, 4, 1, obj. 3, ad 3. 2 “ Redeamus ergo ad propositum et dicamus quod quaelibet res est ens per essentiam suam. Tamen quia essentia rei creatae non dicit actum completum sed est in potentia ad esse, ideo non sufficit essentia ad hoc quod res actu existât nisi ei superaddatur aliquod esse quod est essentiae actus et complementum. Existunt ergo res per esse superadditum essentiae vel naturae. Patet itaque quomodo differat ens per se acceptum et existens.” Theoremata, XI II , p. 83-84. 3 Ibid . 4 “ Impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod non habeat esse . . . ” (De Veritate, q. 21, a. 2). 5 “ . . . quia quod est potentia, nond um est; unde nec agere pot est” (Cont. Gent., I, 16).

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operate is a function of that which possesses esse. Thus essence must be considered in a new light. This means simply that essence is merely a mode of being or a mode of esse.1 Now this formulation seems to us to have far reaching repercussions, beginning with esse itself and echoing all the way down to the doctrine of matter. Perhaps a very fundamental approach to the nature of metaphysical knowledge is under consideration here. In the interior and profound depths of being we can discern a fundamental ontological structure, that by which a thing is and that by which it is what it is. When investigated, these terms of a careful analysis satisfy certain funda mental exigencies of ultimate reality. But if we shift from the static architectonic structure of ens to the mysterious metaphysical move ments accomplished in the ve ry depths of being, a co mpletely different picture of the relations of essence and existence is necessitated by what we know of esse itself. If esse is prior to essence, how are they related? Simply as concepts, the result of an intellectual analysis of ens, or as causal principles functioning in the ontological order? But in a se quence of causes the prior causes the posterior ontologically and explains intellectually the subsequent causes. The Aristotelian notion of reciprocal causes fails at this point. What we call essence must be an in trinsic lim itatio n or determination of esse. It cannot be extrinsic. This Ultimate Reduction of essence to esse has as one of its advantages the fact that the dynamism of sub sistence need not be provided b y another act. Esse alone channeled by essence, supplies all the energies of the substance. Esse and subsistere are not in absolutely different orders.2 The transition from esse to subsistere is accomplished through the specification, in function of its role of intrinsic limitation, by essence. We have here not a multiplication or addition of acts, of esse plus subsistere, but one self-same act mani festing its dynamism in a specified, contracted way.3 Because of the hierarchical location of the human knower as the lowest of intellectual beings he needs a plurality of inadequate notions to grasp and express the complex intelligibility of what is in last analysis a single act of to be, an exis ten t. Esse is existence in its rich nudity. Subsistere is achieved 1 De An im a, q. i, a. i: “ modus ipsius esse.” 2 “ Subsistence plays (but in an absolutely different order) a role analogous to an ‘ultimate disposition,’ or is, so to speak, a kind of ultimate disposition for the exercise of esse. This involution of causes is at the core of the problem” (J. Maritain, “ Subsistence,” p. 37). 3 “ Verbi gratia esse significat aliquid completum et simplex sed non subsistens; substantia autem aliquid subsistens significat sed alii subjectum” {De Pot ., q. 1, a. 1).


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by the role th at essence plays in the specification of esse. Essence is located somewhere in between these points of polarity of being.1 i. E S S E N C E A N D T H E P O S S I B L E S

The relation of essence to existence is not an irreducible paradox. Essence is not a true possible as opposed to a being of reason.2 Some contemporary Scholastics would imply “that the term 'being' as ap plied to actual and possible being is used in two radically and intrin sically different senses which, though related by dependence and analo gy of extrinsic attribution cannot be reduced to any one single meaning applicable to all by proper and intrinsic ana logy." 3 Bu t this contradicts an existentialism which finds in existence the source of all perfection, and consequently essence.4 How can essence be called being by an analogy of extrinsic attri bution unless somehow there is an essence to be so called ? The essence is thereby considered as a possible with some claim to being in order to have being predicated of it by a so-called extrinsic attribution. Bu t if possible being is no being, then essence is simply specified existence or nothing at all. The possible essence of which some contemporary scholastics speak, for instance, is simply an intentional being and exists only in the mind by a mental divorce from esse. Quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis Between esse and esse intentionale there is no alternative except the never-never land of Platonic Ideas and Avicen nian essences.6 .5

1 “ Our concept of being, so far as it is incapa ble as such of the divine sim plicity, is situated bet we en esse and substantia: between the actuality ‘to be’ and the subjective receptivity of that which receives being- its potential ground” (Bernard Ke lly, The M etaphysical Background of Analogy [London: Blackfriars, 1958], p. 7). 2 “ Wh at is a true possible as opposed to a being of reason?” (W. N. Clarke, “ Wh at is Really Real?” in Progress in Ph ilos oph y, p. 71). 3 “ But we are implyin g that the term ‘being’ as applied to actual and possible being is used in two radically and intrinsically different senses which, though related by dependence and analogy of extrinsic attribution, cannot be reduced to any one single meaning applicable to all by proper and intrinsic analogy” (Ibid., pp. 68-69). 4 “ But the situation changes radically when it is a question of an absolutely ultimate and transcendent predicate such as being. Here we are in the presence of a participle which expresses an activity or state so absolutely primary and fundamental to its subject that it constitutes the very subject itself as real subject, so that without it there simply would not be an y su bj ec t at all ou tsid e the min d to ta lk ab ou t. Doe s no t the pe cu lia r i nt ell igi bl e co nt en t of such a participle render impossible a non-existential noun use of itself which pretends to speak of a subject as though it were somehow still real or present, while amputating intel lectually the very act which renders the subject intrinsically real or present at all in any proper sense?” (Ibid., p. 68; cf. p. 61). 5 St. Thomas, I Sen t., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7. 6 After such a statement confirming the non-being of essence, how can one then speak of essence and existence as reciprocal causes? For the one flows from the other and

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Instead of talking about “possible being,” i.e., in terms of a con ception of second intention like “possibility,” or schematic meta physical notions like potency and act, the discussion of the problem of the possibles should be transposed and formulated in terms of more immediate metaphysical principles of essence and existence. When formulated thusly in its proper metaphysical terms, the problem be comes clear. A “possible” is an essence without existence. Possible being is a relic of the Greek essence. The doctrine of the Possibles is so critical because it can serve as a fulcrum to shift a metaphysics in an existential or essential direction and even to degrees of existent iality or essentiality. In fact the problem of metaphysics has been always to incorporate existential elements with in a metaphysics of essence or to incorporate essential elements with in a metaph ysics of existence. Eve n a me taphysics which recog nizes the primacy of esse still has difficulty in rooting or grounding essence within an existential order. If such grounding is impossible or ineffective, as in contemporary Existentialism, essence must be elimi nated from philosophy or reduced to some arbitrary “project.” If, on the other hand, philosophic insight demands the retention of essence to explain ontologically so many basic aspects of reality, intelligibility and order, then the procedure is to place essence side by side with esse and attemp t b y a system of reciprocal causal relations to weave essence more deeply into the heart of a metaphysics, to accomplish by the multiplication of proportions and relations some sort of union. 2. P O T E N C Y , A C T A N D E S S E

As in all other sciences we find in metaphysics both ontological and schematic principles. By schematic principles I mean those whose primary purpose is to organize or unify the multifarious data of the science (like the atomic theory in physics), rather than to capture more directly some aspect of reality. To our mind potency and act are principles of this order. Strictly speaking, in an immediate ontological fashion, potency and act are not. There are simply instances of potency and act; essence and existence in the existential order; matter and form in the essential order; and substance and accident in the oper ational order. There simply is no potency and act as such. Potency and essence is the specification of existence, limiting it to those perfections it carries within itself, its ontological riches. Even the existential thinker is capable of falling victim to the formula tion of essentialism and consequently modifying his existentialism more or less.


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act are principles to explain the mutual relations of cause and effect. As such th ey are used to explain the cau sal relations between a cause and its effect.1 Pote ncy and Act, as schematic principles permitting the organization of reality on different levels, can be reduced to the dynamism of esse, which manifests itself as perfection and to the Limitation of esse on the different levels of reality: essence and existence; matter and form; substance and accident. The fact that substance is the source of the dynamic act of the accident rather than the reverse shows up a weak ness in the universal schematization of po tency and act, at least as it is employed by Thomas Aquinas. For theoretical symmetry, substance should be potency to the act of accidental form, as it would be for an essentialistic thinker such as Bonaventure. The ordering of being according to act and potency is still a meta physics of unity masquerading as a metaphysics of being, namely, a metaphysics of essence. But act is a concept of second intention located within the order of essence to explain the perfection of essence. Pure Act is a conception of essence which possesses all the perfection belong ing to essence. Created essences are mixtures of potency and act. This is still a metaphysics of unity, - a God who is one and simple and a creature which is a plurality, a many. The transition from unity to plurality is traditionally accomplished by the doctrine of the Divine Ideas. But as we will show the doctrine of the Divine Ideas is itself reducible to Ipsum Esse Subsistens. All act is act because of esse ; act is ultimately reducible to esse. God is Pure Act because He is Ipsum Esse Subsistens. He is not Ipsum Esse because He is Pure Act, at least in terms of metaphysical priority and fundamentality. B y the use of the doctrine of potency and act to explain the relations of essence and existence in immaterial substances, Thomas Aquinas is trying to say that the creature is still a unity even though created and failing of the absolute unity of the Divine Being. The formulation of a doctrine of essence and existence from the raw materials of Boethius and the Liber de Causis carries implicit in the vocabulary and termi nology it employs a metaphysics of unity and composition. If the creature is composed, in the language of the Liber de Causis, of “ finite and infinite,” of essence and existence, how can it still remain a natural unity ? 1 “ In natura rerum corporearum materia est ut potentia respectu formae et forma est actus ejus; et iterum natura c onstituta ex materia et forma est ut poten tia respectu ipsius esse, inquantum est susceptiva ejus” [De Spir. Creat., a. i).

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The Aristotelian doctrine of potency and act, as Fathers Fabro and Clarke have pointed out is an appropriate doctrine.1 A being is itself and yet capable of becoming something else. Both these elements exist side by side within the unity of substance. So Thomas transposes them to show tha t even though a creature creature falls short short of the divine unity as a result of creation, it is still one. one. This state of affairs can be explain ed doctrinally within the principles of Thomas Aquinas by the unity conferred on a being by its esse. We can imagin ima ginee Thom Th omas as Aqui Aq uina nass faced fac ed w ith the comp co mplex lex problem pro blem of saying something new in the language of his predecessors and con temporaries. All the vocabulary was there at hand, and a very ade quate system of terminology it was. Except that he wanted to say something which had never been said before in that vocabulary. From Ar isto is totle tle he had ha d substa sub stance nce,, accide acc ident, nt, ma tter, tte r, form, form , po tenc te nc y and act. act . From Boethius, Dionysius, the Liber Libe r de Causis Caus is and Avicenna he had even the terms essence and esse esse and existentia. existentia. His vocabulary is not

1 “ The first requisite requisite for unravelling unravelling the complex threads which interweave to m ake up the Thomistic act and potency doctrine is to recognize that it contains two distinct elements. The first is a composition of two correlative metaphysical principles called act and potency, first introduced by Aristotle to explain the process of change. The second is the relating of these two principles to each other in terms of a theory of infinity and limitation, which, it must be admitted by all, cannot be found explicitly in Aristotle. The historian of St. Thomas must trace the origins of both these elements and not take it for granted that because the tw o are inseparably united in Thomistic metaphysics they must also have been so joined from their first appearance in in the history of thought. (W. Norris Clarke, “ The Limitation of Act by Potency,” New Sch olas ticis m , Vol. XXVI, 1952, p. 172). We see here em erg ing in sha rp reli ef the irre sist ible te nd en cy of the cla ssi ca l Gr eek min d (and one of its its great weaknesses weaknesses)) - reflected in its art and in a thousand different cultural manifestations - to iden tify perfection with clear-cut limited form, form, to iden tify intelligibility as such with the human mode of intelligibility, i.e., with definition by distinct, clearly deli mited concepts. In such a perspective, where finite essence is taken as the type of perfect bei ng , it is cle ar th at the rel ati on s bet we en bei ng an d no nb ein g wil l be qui te dif fer en t fro m those between esse esse and essence in the Thomistic outlook. ( Ib ( Ib id . id . p. 177). “ . . . throughout the early works of St. Thomas, up to to and exclusive of of the Contra Gentiles, Gentiles, the limitation principle is never found expressed in terms of act and potency but exclusively in its traditional Neoplatonic form or a close paraphrase, e.g. “ Ev ery a bstract or separated form is infinite.” His standard practice is then to deduce the real distinction distinction of essence essence and existence from from this principle principle in in terms of participant and pa rticipated. Only as a last stage does he say that wherever there is a relation of received and recipient there must be a com position of act and potency. Thus act and potency take on the aspect of limitation only as a kind of post factu m consequence, consequence, so to speak, not as a first p rinciple.” {Ibid. {Ibid. p. 192). “ It is only from the Sum ma Contra Gentiles Gentiles on that he appears to realize the possibility of fusing both the limitation principle and act and potency into a single synthetic principle. Now for the first time we find appearing the w ell-known formulas quoted so often in Thomistic textbooks, such as, “N o act is is found found limited except by poten cy” ; “ An act existing in no subject is limited by nothing” etc. Here too for the first time we find explicitly stated the reason for the transposition of the compositions resulting from participation into act and potency; because only in terms of act and potency can the intrinsic unity of any composite bei ng be m ain ta in ed .” {Ibid. {Ibid. p. 192-3).


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new, but what he was to do with it, the ideas to be expressed in this traditional vocabulary, was a real innovation. The testimony of his contemporaries and immediate successors indicate their bafflement and frustration. They knew very well that he was trying to do something new. One after another accused him of innovation. Perhaps much of the annoyance, at times bitterness, flowed from the fact that they did not know what he was doing. Even basically sympathetic interpreters took upon themselves the task of correcting his doctrine and bringing it Libe r de Causis Cau sis or more into conformity with Aristotle or Plato or the Liber Aver Av erroe roe s or Augu Au gusti stine ne,, and so on. We W e know kn ow now th at w hat ha t Thom Th omas as Aquin Aq uin as had ha d to cont co ntrib ribute ute was wa s a new metaphysical perspective revolving in some way around the prima cy of esse. esse. Perhaps his first problem in the re-writing of all the meta physical doctrines to fit rigorously into the perspective he envisioned was wa s t h at of the prop er locati loc ation on of esse as esse as he understood it. Certain of his predecessors had, after surveying the philosophical vocabulary availa ble, settl se ttled ed on form as the most mos t adequ ad equate ate expres exp ressio sion n of w hat ha t th ey meant by esse, esse, although they were not completely at ease with such an adequation. However they were not ready to add a completely new doctrine to the brilliant achievement of their predecessors. W ith it h Thom Th omas as Aquin Aq uin as, howe ho wever ver,, the break bre ak came, cam e, and come it had ha d to, if progress was to be made. But he was faced with the same problem of locating esse. esse. What was it after all: substance, accident, matter, form, potency? All of these presented insurmountable problems. But wha w hatt abo ut act ac t ? It was wa s prob pr obab ably ly the most mo st abst ab stra ract ct of all al l concep con cep tion s and had the further advantage of a lack of precise definition. It was a relative or correlative correlative notion employed to explain change and secondary causality. Besides its rather scan ty connotation it possessed possessed a very wide denotation so that one more philosophical entity might be added to it with w ith out ou t disrup dis rup ting tin g the whole wh ole and causin cau singg too much mu ch reactio rea ction. n. B u t of course the most fundamental reason was that there was a natural intelligible affinity between act as communicating the richness and perfection of form and substance by its relative opposition to potency and its correlative composition with potency to form a natural unity. Looking over the selection of philosophical terms and the ideas they served to communicate, Thomas Aquinas chose actus essendi for the point of articulation of his innovatory metaphysics with the Neoplatonic metaphysics and the Aristotelian physics. Act was the traditional notion which best expressed what he meant by esse,  but act for Aqui nas is not as basic a notion as esse.

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Fabro’s dependence on the notions of potency and act to explain essence and existence can be looked at in different frameworks of development and perspective. Perhaps he is asking the theory of poten cy and act to do what it was never meant to do. Potency and act are intelligible and explained in terms of esse esse and essence, not vice versa. This is a difficulty in Father Fabro’s definition of esse esse as intensive, emergent act, defining the more intelligible by the less intelligible. We have an intuition of esse esse in the existential judge ment grasping the object of metaphysics. Potency and act are schem atic notions drawn from an analysis of change in the Philosophy of Nature. Esse Ess e as act is according to Fabro an extension of the Aristotelian principles principles to an area of reality w hich Aristotle h ad never contemplated. But potency can be rooted in esse esse as the amount of esse esse and the difference of esse added esse added to it provides the difference between the genus and the species. Ess e can be limited in various ways. It can diminish and it can augment. But potency means the lack of some esse it esse it could have or should have, but a positive being which possesses possesses perfection and because of its mode of esse esse can include all possibilities below it or all the modes of perfection of esse esse contained in that esse. esse. A thing is potential only because it is somehow actual, only because it has some being bei ng or esse, esse, but not all the being or esse esse it could have and which a var v ar ie ty of causa cau sall inter in teract action ion s w ill pro vid e for it, some elim inated ina ted b y the absence of certain causes and some present by reason of the presence of certain causes. 3. P E R F E C T I O N A N D E S S E

The Divine Wisdom has constructed an order of things based on the degree of perfection in beings, ranging from the imperfect to the per fect.1 In the nature of things God is the Thesaurus of all perfection and different natures participate the Divine Perfection according to differ ent grades.2 Forms, both m aterial and immaterial, differ differ from from each other because one is more perfect than another according to the ratio of its proper nature, inasmuch as the proper ratio ratio or intelligible struc1 For the Thomistic vocabulary of the perfect and the imperfect see L.-B. Geiger, O.P., La par ticip atio n dans la philo soph ie de S. Thomas d’ Aq ui n (Paris: Vrin, 1942), appendix B, pp. 469-72. 2 “ Et sic quicquid quicquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis invenitur secundum quod est aliquis aliquis ordo ordo creaturae ad Deum ut ad principium et causam in qua praeexistunt excellenter et virtualiter omnes rerum perfectiones” (S. T., I, I, q. 13, a. 5).


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ture of a species consists in a certain grade of perfection.1 The fact that creatures are of different species necessitates their unequal degrees of perfection. There can be no formal distinction without inequality.2 For the forms which determine the diverse natures of beings, and by reason of which things are what they are, are nothing else, in the last analysis, but diverse qualities of perfection. An increase in the degree of perfection results in a change in species.3 The greater the perfection a thing possesses, the h igher a kin d of thing it is. The further the creature is removed from God, the more radically imperfect it is. We are accustomed to take these terms perfection and imp erfection as very general and non-technical ones. For instance we tend to inter pret potency and act as more technical terms than perfection and imperfection, when actually they are all to be taken as technical metaphysical terms signifying degrees or proportions or modes.4 The perfect is the finished, the complete, the actual; the imperfect is the unfinished, capable of receiving further actuality. A basic identity or reduction can be found between the im perfect and the poten tial and the perfect and the actual.5 But this identity can be reduced to a more fundamental and basic identity. For esse is the most perfect of all things.6 And the perfection of every thing comes to it from its esse? 1 “ . . . ita in formis tam materialibus quam a materia separatis una est perfectior alia secundum rationem propriae naturae, inquantum scilicet propria ratio speciei in tali gradu perfectionis consistit” {De Substantiis Separatis, c. VI). 2 “ Mais poser des créatures d’espèces différentes, c’est nécessairement poser des créatures de perfection inégale. Par où les choses multiples et distinctes qui expriment la ressemblance divine peuvent-elles en effet se distinguer? . .. Or, il n’y a pas de distinction formelle possible sans inégalité.” E. Gilson, Le Thom isme , 5th éd., p. 216. “ But this act uality is always, in our experience, only that of a particular essence: “ the forms from which it is really distinct and to which it is only lent, set a limit upon its capacity for indefinite expansion, compelling it to adapt itself to their formal status, and to insert its perfecting only in the line of their perfection.” 26. Cornelio Fabro, C.P.S., “ Un itinéraire de S. Thomas,” Revue de ph iloso phie , X X X IX (1939), 302. quoted by H. J. John, S.N.D., Ib id. , p. 605. 3 “ Or il n’y a pas de distinction formelle possible sans inégalité. Les formes qui déterminent les natures diverses des êtres, et en raison desquelles les choses sont ce qu’elles sont, ne sont rien d’autre, en dernière analyse, que des quantités diverses de perfection; c’est pourquoi l’on peut dire avec Aristote que les formes de choses sont semblables aux nombres auxquels il suffit d’ ajouter ou de retrancher une unité pour en changer l’espèce” (E. Gilson, Le Thom isme , pp. 216-217). 4 “ Unumquodque perficitur secundum modum suae substantiae: ex modo igitur perfectio nis alicujus rei potest accipi modus substantiae ipsius.” CG . II, 55. 5 “ Cum ergo operatio naturae procedat ab imperfecto ad perfectum et ab incompleto ad completum, imperfectum est prius perfecto secundum generationem et tempus, sed per fectum est prius imperfecto substantia. . . . Sed, licet in rebus generabilibus imperfectum sit prius perfecto et potentia prior actu, considerando in aliquo eodem quod prius est imper fectum quam perfectum et in potentia quam in actu, simpliciter tamen loquendo oportet actum et perfectum prius esse. . . . ” {De Principiis Naturae, cap. 4). 6 “ Hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum” {De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 9). 7 “ Omnis enim nobilitas cuiuscum que rei est sibi secundum esse” {Cont. Gent., I, 28).


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Act uality also flows from being.1 Esse, in fact, is the actuality of all acts and because of this it is the perfection of all perfections.2Every essence is actualized by its esse.3 Ipsum esse is the ultimate act that can be participated by all things.4 This phenomenon by which God gives more being to one thing and less to another is nothing new in theological tradition. The order of per fection was reducible to being according to St. Augustine . . . . dedit esse amplius, aliis minus .5 The creature, then, is characterized by a certain deficiency in the degree and mode of being. Esse autem rerum creatarum deductum est ab esse divino secundum quandam deficientem assimilatio nem Creation is not only an exodus, it is also a descent. No creature receives all of the divine perfection but they all receive being in vary ing and diminishing degrees.7 To put it in the crudest and crassest terms, it is the amount of esse that decides the grade of perfection.8By the very fact that creatures are not Ipsum Esse Subsistens but take their origin ex nihilo, they have within themselves the shadows of possibility and imperfection.9 .6

1 “ Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest: cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt . . . ” Thom as Aq uin as , 7 , q. 8, a. i. “ Omne ens inquantum est ens est actu.” 7 , q. 5, a. 3. 2 “ Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propterhoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum” ( De Po t ., q. 7, a. 3, ad 9). 3 “ Sicut autem ipsum esse est actualitas quaedam essentiae, ita operari est actualitas operativae potentiae. Secundum enim hoc utrumque eorum est in actu : essentia quidem secundum esse, potentia vero secundum operari” ( De Spi r. Creat, a. 11). 4 “ Ipsum esse est actus ultimus qui participabilis est ab omnibus, ipsum autem nihil participat” (De Anima, a. 6, ad 2). 5 “ .. . dedit esse amplius, aliis minus. . . . ” (St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei , XII, 8). Cf. De Im m. An ima e, XII, 9 and De Tr in ., V, 2, 3. 6 In lib. de D ivi n. No min ., c. I, lect. I (Opuscula, ed. Mandonnet, t. I, p. 232). 7 “ La création n’est pas seulement un exode, c’est aussi une descente: Nulla creatura recipit totam plenitudinem divinae bonitatis, quia perfectiones a Deo in creatura per modum cujusdam descensus procedunt” (Cont. Gent., IV, 7. ad Nulla creatura,” E. Gilson. Le Tho mis me, p. 219). “ Dans cette progression, chaque espèce dépasse en perfection la précéd ente; la raison pour laquelle la divine sagesse produit l’inégalité des créatures est donc cellelà même qui l’incline à en vouloir la distinction, c’est-à-dire la perfection plus haute de l’univers” (Le Thomisme, p. 217). Is it possible to translate this metaphysical fact of perfection into the language of essence and esse to see whether it can be explained on a metaphysical as well as theological level ? 8 “ St. Thomas tries to solve the difficulty by the idea that form does not actually give, bu t on ly det erm ine s the na tu re of esse” (H. Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World [Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksells, 1952], p. 170. Cf. S. T., I, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3; q. 13, a. 1, ad 2; q. 45, a. 4. “ Meyer in The Philosophy of St. Thomas, p. 105, had pointed out that St. Thomas is here following an Aristotelian line (the form gives esse) and also a Neoplatonic (existence by participation in esse). In the former case esse receives its contents from form, which in the latter case is secondary. Ess e then decides the grade of perfection” (H. Lyttkens, op. cit., p. 170). 9 “ Creatura, ex hoc quod est ex nihilo, habet in se tenebras possibilitatis et imperfectionis” (De Pot., q. 4, a. 2; Ib id. , ad 14 et ad 2). Cf. A. Forest, La structure métaphys ique du concret, p. 27. “ Cum dicitur: omnis creatura est tenebra vel falsa vel nihil in se consider ata, non est


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Thomas Aquinas' Fourth Way of proving the existence of God, with the analogy it introduces, demonstrates the degrees of being which demand a maxime ens as compared to those things which are magis et minus entia. Even if the causality exerted by this maxime ens is the efficient causality which is proper to being, there is yet a real conti nuity of being moving from the lesser to the greater and eventually to the maxime ens. The descending hierarchy of perfection culminating in a universe which contains the deficient and the evil within it, m ay be impossible of explanation but we would like to suggest that the laws of meta physical causality whereby no effect can equal its cause makes it impossible for God in His Goodness to communicate Himself totally. But this decreasing series of perfections approaches in the indefinite ness of material goods to the diminishing point between the infinite and the indefinite. 4. T H E U L T I M A T E R E D U C I B I L I T Y O F E S S E N C E TO E S S E

It is our contention that St. Thomas' doctrine of being bears the interpretation not only that essences are modes of being, but also that they are intrinsic modifications of esse. But when this doctrine is coupled with that of the non-being of essence, what happens to essence ? It is nonens because it is other than ipsum esse which it receives from another. That which participates esse has to be nonens. Forms are coexistents rather than beings. They are concreated rather than created. Essence is the intrinsic modification of the dynamism of actual exercise of the act of being. Why not describe essence then as the place where esse stops, bordered by nothingness ? After all, for Thomas, esse is even the source of all cognoscibility and all in telligibility. Unumquodque, quantum habet de esse, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate.1 We should be mindful that he made this statem en t intelligendum quod essentia sua sit tenebra vel falsitas, sed quia non habet esse nec lucem nec ve rit at em nisi ab ali o ; u nde si c on sid ere tu r sine hoc quo d ab alio ha be t est nih il et ten eb ra et falsitas: [De Ver ., q. 8, ad rationes vero ad 2). 1 Cont. Gent., I, 71. St. Thomas, to follow the technique we traced in our analysis of the relations of esse and perfection, similarly reduces knowa bility to actuality : “ .. . quia secun dum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, in quantum est actu” ( S .T ., I, q. 5, a. 2). En s and verum are likewise reducible to actu ality which holds a proportionate relation to know ability : “ Unumquodq ue cognoscibile est secundum quod est actu et non secundum quod est in poten tia, ut dicitur in XI Meta ph. Sic enim aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub cognitione cadit, prout actu est.” (S.T. I, q. 87, a. 1). This actuality is invariably, as we saw in the case of perfection, identified with esse: “ . . . ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in quidditate.” (I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; cf. De Ver ., q. 1, a. 3, sed contra). St. Thomas uses Aristotle

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in the face of a contemporary thought for which, without exception, essence was the source of all intelligibility as Giles of Rome bears witness. He certainly had his reasons for so radical a conception and they are are to be found in his ultimate metaphysical doctrine of the relations of essence and esse. Esse should not be considered as the abstract concept of being, greatest in extension but with a minimum, impoverished comprehen sion. Is it possible that the notion of Ipsum Esse Subsistens contains only the precision that God is, with no further intelligible content? Are we stretching the fact of God's existence into a intellig ible aspect of His nature? Does existence have the intelligible content necessary for the derivation of an entire metaphysics? The esse of Thomas Aquinas is a Thesaurus of perfection including within itself all modes of being. The intelligible barrenness of the concept of being, correlated in modern times with its universal extension, follows only if being is conceived as a genus.1 Esse possesses within itself all perfection. It is the Thesaurus of the riches and intelligible values of actu al essence.2 Th at is why esse is identified with perfection and perfection is ultimately reducible to esse by Thomas Aquinas, as we saw earlier. Esse possesses within itself all perfections of every mode of esse. Vivere in viventibus est esse.s Intelligere in intelligentibus est esse. Even the complex intelligibilities and perfections of intelligence is a mode of esse. Even the term similitudo which we would expect to be applied only to essence is applicable as author ity for this reduction: “ .. . sicut est dispositio rerum in esse, ita et in veritat e.” {In I I Met aph. , lect. 2, 298). Cf. Cont. Gent., I, 62; also on this point see the article of Gerald B. Phelan, “ Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum” (note 2 above). “ It makes him conscious of that lack of intelligibility and the need to go beyond it to the act that makes the quiddity intelligible.” (J. Owens, Sa int Thomas and The Fut ure of Met aph ysics , p. 58). 1 “ Et sic quicquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis invenitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum ut ad principium et causam in qua praeexistunt excellenter et virtualiter omnes rerum perfectiones.” ( S .T . I , q. 13, a. 5). “ Manifestum est quod primum ens, Deus, est actus infinitus, utpote habens in se totum essendi plenitudinem, non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis vel speciei.” {De Spir. Creat., a. 1). 2 “ Can we be quite certain that the words act of being are not in some way contradictory? However we may define the word act, it is evident that I cannot speak of the act of being unless I am ready to give up the idea of conceiving anything resembling a subject of the act, a someone who fulfills the act. We should have to admit that this subject itself is, and that wo uld sen d us b ac k ag ain to a b ein g wh ich is an ter ior to the ac t of bein g. We mu st the n, la y it down as a principle that the act of being is itself this same subject, bu t th at in some way it is its own creator. Let us admit that we can really think of this creation of self by self. But there does not appear to be anything there which could be regarded as capable of assuming specifications according to various differing modes, of which one would be what we call existence.” Gabriel Marcel. The Mystery of Being, II, Faith and Reality, p. 30. 3 “ Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus.” {I Sent., d. 33, 1, a. 1, ad 1).


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to esse. All esse is a similitudo of the Divine Esse. Even matter is a similitudo of Ipsum Esse Subsistens.1 God is the metaphysical source of the intelligibility of things precisely as Ipsum Esse not Summa Essential If the Thomist did not know that God was Ipsum Esse Subsistens he would be greatly restricted in the metaphysical technique open to him. He could of course move from the being of things to a First Cause wh ich carried in Itse lf in some way the explanation of the to ta lity of beings. Such an approach could trav el from entia to ens per se, or even from the kinds of things to a source of their intelligibility, i.e., from essences to the Summa Essentia. Such procedures, although they would serve to explain the fact of being, and the fact of the organization of being, would however serve to reduce an alogy to a one way thoroughfare. B ut if an alogy operates not only on the leve l of ens and essentia but also, and this more profoundly, in the very depths of esse, then the metaphysical habitus in its voyage from existents to Ipsum Esse Subsistens finds a certain metaphysical commutation possible. He not only goes from finite, contingent acts of existence to Existen ce Itself, but he can return bearing all the riches of further perception that such a metaphysical insight affords. If in God His Essence is identical with His Existence , as Ipsum Esse, if he possesses all the wealth of reality and the sum of the perfections of being, then this knowledge of the relative ontological statu s of essence and existence in the Godhead, serves to extend our vision and give added dimension to our comprehension of the peculiar relations of essence and existence in the creature. This does not mean that our initial metaphysical intuitions and conceptions are vitiated but only that they are widened and deepened. The relation between our know ledge of creatures and our knowledge of God is like a reversible reaction, each enriching and modifying the other, culminating in that scientific equilibrium which is the deepest satisfaction and the contemplative peace of the intellectual habitus. This doctrine of the non-being of essence and the ultimate reducibili ty of essence to esse is, we think a logical consequence of the interpre tation of essence as a mode of being. Essdasknowable in its limitation is 1 “ Ex hoc vero quod dixit quod divinitas est esse omnium, ostendit quod a Deo in omnibus quaedam divini esse similitudo reperitur.” ( Cont. Gent., I, 26). 2 God, as Creator, is Ip su m Ess e Subs isten s. Therefore it follows that the Procession of Persons still play a part in the comm unication of esse according to some modes. “ .. . dicendum quod etiam processiones Personarum sunt causa et ratio creationis aliquo modo, ut dictum est.” St. Thomas, Sum ma Theologia e, I, q. 45, a. 7, ad 3.

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called essence and form.1 Precisely because it is a limited esse it can be grasped by a finite intellect. There is a certain proportion between the cramped, circumscribed human intellect and the limited character of the being it apprehends. The vocabulary of adaptation of esse to essence is again forced upon us by the ontological locus given to essence considered in itself and apart from the mind in which it is conceived and the real esse it specifies.2 The elimination of essence from the metaphysical picture by the modern existentialist is both an inability to reduce it to existence and an indication of the incompatibility of the Greek essence with an existentialism. This comes back to saying that “existence and non existence cannot be treated as terms which are patient, if we may so express it, of being looked at simultaneously in a picture." The ultimate reduction of essence to esse should not be confused with the identification made by Henry of Ghent and Francisco Suarez.3 Their arguments are useful and of compelling cogency in showing some kind of reduction, as Father Joseph Owens had pointed out in his usual capable fashion in the case of Suarez.4 But the identifi1 “ . . . constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur per formam, congruit per ordinem” (S.T., /, q. 45, a. 7). 2 “ Particu larly does the author seem right in noting (p. 115), against what we wrote in the first draft, that the act of existing ‘is of itself perfectly adapted and accommodated to the essence which is its formal principle; so perfectly that it can be joined to no other essence in the actuation of the latter.’ Whence it follows that it ought to be considered ‘an impossibility for one essence to be joined to another essence in a common actuation, hence in an act of existing in so far as it is the actuation of the essence’ ” (J. Maritain, “ On the Notion of Sub sistence,” Progres s in Ph ilos oph y, p. 29, n. 1). For the author to whom Maritain is referring in this passage, see the articles of H. Diepen, O.S.B ., “ La critique du Baslisme selon saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Rev. thomiste, L (1950) nos. 1-2. The ultimate reducibility of essence to esse provides a natural, intrinsic proportion between essence and esse. If essence is a mode of esse, then the essence varies with the degree, or to put it crudely, the amount of esse. Essences are as it were quan ta of existence. There is therefore no need of an artificial adaptation or accommodation of essence and esse as reciprocal causes, related as metal to mold or the interlocking pieces of a jig-saw puzzle. Such a proportion flows naturally from the very structure of being, intrinsic to esse. 3 “ Dicendum ergo est eandem rem esse essentiam et existentiam ” (Suarez, Di sp . Me tap h., X X X I , Section 6, 23); “ . .. essentiam creatam . . . non distingui realiter ab existentiae, ita ut sint duae res seu entitates distinctae” ( Ib id ., XX X I, Section 6, 1). 4 “ What the Suarezian Dis cus sio n accomplishes in an entirely convincing manner, how ever, is to show definitively that essential being and existential being cannot be distinguished in reality outside the mind. . . . Suarez has presented his arguments with such pitiless cogency that the case of the real identity of essential being and existential being should have been closed forever. The Suarezian Dis cu ssio n shows with incontestable rigor that when the terms of the problem are posed as essential being and existential being both types of being really coincide... In the present revival of interest in the metaphysical doctrine of St. Thomas, the case of Suarez is perhaps the best object lesson in what happens when the T homistic essence is represented as any kind of essential being or even conceived as having some kind of proper be ing in its ow n rig ht, wh eth er suc h bei ng is loo ke d up on as rea l or as on ly in te nt ion al .” Father Owens is of course well aware that on a profounder metaphysical level such an identification is not absolute. “ By the same token, the Suarezian Dis cus sion leaves entirely


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cations of Henry of Ghent and Suarez, if looked upon under the aspect of a reduction, are pointed in the opposite way. They are both meta physics of essence and if there is any reduction it is of existence to essence, just the reverse of the argumentation we have employed and the conclusion we expect to reach. Examples and illustrations are of use in metaphysics not so much for their power of direct and intuitive illumination as for their capacity to communicate those intelligibilities which so often remain incompre hensible in abstract and technical formulation. When we state that essence is not tha t which limits existence extrinsically, th at it is not an id quod , but that it is the intrinsic limitation of esse, the point at which existence stops, bordered by nothingness, exact comprehension may not be forthcoming. But if we were to use the typical example which the thirteenth century was accustomed to employ in explanation of the relations of essence and existence, then the state of affairs might be come clearer. Let us then compare esse to an infinite ocean of being, and essence to the vessel or container in which it is received. Each essence receives as much esse as it can contain just as each pitcher receives only as much of the waters of the ocean as it can hold within its limits of circumscription. This analogy of Giles of Rome expresses, we think rather adequately, not only the view of the thirteenth century but much of contemporary scholastic thinking on the relations of essence and existence. Although existence does give actuality to essence, it is essence as a reciprocal cause that limits, circumscribes and determines it. To essence belongs the capa city of contracting esse. However, in order to express what we mean by essence or the intrin sic limitation of existence, let us modify our metaphor. Let us consider existence as if it were a liquid poured from this same pitcher simul taneously with a sudden drop in temperature. Under freezing conditions it becomes a solid before it strikes the ground. The liquid existence is possessed of its dimensions, its own limitations. The shape it assumes is the determination of its own substance. Essence is not something extrinsic to existence which limits and determines it in the way that a pitcher shapes its recipient liquid, but essence is rather the place where existence stops. There is nothing in wa ter which is not water. There is nothing in an existent which is not existence. Essence is the untouched the profound metaphysical doctrine contained in the Thomistic texts; namely tha t the essence of a creature is other than either its real or its cognitiona l being. . .. Bu t Suarez exhibits no knowledge that such a doctrine ever existed and no notion that it could even be possible” (J. Owens “ The Suarezian Discussion on Essence and Being,” The Modern Scho olma n, X X X IV [1957], 189-191.

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intrinsic limitation of esse, the crystallization of existence, bordered by nothingness. This is why Thomas can speak of essence as non-being. This is why it is not so much created but rather con-created. This is why it is a co-existent rathe r than an existe nt. Essence is the intrinsic principle of limitation of esse, the “surface tension” restricting, delimiting and containing, all at once, the existen tial energies to this particular level and, to put it crudely, “ amount” or degree of perfection. Despite the obvious difficulties entailed in attempting to express what is basically a qu alitative phenomenon in crude qu antitative terms, let us try another example at the risk of appearing naive. Although the imagination plays no more than a supporting role in metaph ysics,1 (according to Thomas we never have a concept no matter how abstract but that some image however inchoate and inadequate, rises to the forefront of consciousness) let us imagine, then, existence as a stream rushing down the mountain side. Again, for our purposes it is frozen by a sudden drop in temperature. An axe at this point can help us to explain what we mean by essence as the intrinsic limitation of existence. If we cut the stream into several pieces or blocks thev will differ only by the pattern left by the blade of the axe. There is nothing in the blocks but frozen water or ice. But one is distinguishable from another by the place where they stop, the myriad grooves and raised surfaces left by the blade of the axe. This is what we mean when we say that essence is the intrinsic limitation of existence. It is not that which limits esse, it is the limitation of esse ; it is not that which receives, determines and specifies esse, it is the very specification itself of existence. The term habens esse is another relic of the Greek philosophical voca bu lary with its essentialistic co ntext which Thomas inh erited at the ve ry start of his philosophical career. He had to say wh at was to be said in this vocabulary. But habens esse means simply for Thomas that in creatures their essence is not existence simply, their essence is not simply to exist as is the case with the Divine Esse. Instead of being Ipsum Esse Subsistens, creatures are finite, limited esses . It is the fact 1 “ Sicut enim dicit Boethius, lib. De Tr in ., c. n , col. 1250, t. ii. in his quae sine materia sunt, oportet non ad imaginationem deduci: quia hoc plurimum officit in divinis” (/ Sen t., d. 33, q. i, a. i, ad 2). 2 “ Est autem mu ltiplex modus essendi rerum. Quaedam enim sunt, quorum natura non habet esse nisi in hac m ateria individuali; et huiusmodi sunt omnia corporalia. Quaedam vero sunt, quorum naturae sunt per se subsistentes, non in materia aliqua, quae tamen non sunt suum esse, sed sunt esse habentes ; et huiusmod i sunt subst antiae incorpo reae, quas angelos dicimus. Solius autem De i proprius modus essendi est, ut sit suum esse subsistens.” (/, 12, 4 c ).


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of the finite limited character of the created esse which is indicated by the habens esse. If we take literally the words habens esse then the implication is that something has esse, either as ens or essentia, but the doctrine of creation demands that essence be constituted simultaneously with the communication of esse in the creative act. This is precisely what Thomas is indicating when he says, i(Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo praeexistenti.” {De Pot., Ill, i, ad 17). The controversies of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent show ver y clearly th at such an interpretation carries a Platonic influence with God conceived as the Form of Being which needs a matter to act upon, a matter which is precisely the possible essence. The embarrassing fact of the apparently contradictory texts on Thomas' notion of essence can be handled in two ways. We can of course place the texts side by side and say: Of course, essence is a mode of being and communicated with esse in the creative act, but it is also that which receives and has esse and seems to. account for a plurality of beings. But this to our mind is simp ly to set both horns of the dilemma of the doctrine of creation, when interpreted in terms of essence and existence, side by side and accepting this as a solution, the contem plation of the profound mystery between. Unless we can somehow reduce essence to esse so that in the commu nication of esse in the creative act we see essence as the limitation, the intrinsic limitation, the ver y sp ecification itself of esse, then we cannot reconcile the dilemma involved in creation. This is not to eliminate essence or make it so much surplus meta physical baggage, but it is to explain it metaphysically, not as an ulti mate Platonic Form hovering with ghostly determination in the Platonic heaven until it is given existence, and possessing being of itself in someway before it exists, essence, however, still performing its fundamental role as essence. We still know essences, but we can now explain them as the intrinsic limitation of esse. Esse as moulded and determined intrinsically is then conceptualizable and known in the concept, and called essence. But essence itself is not what is most fundamental in reality. All its perfection, even its intelligibility and knowability comes ultimately from esse, the perfection of all per fections, the act of all acts.

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5. CAUSALITY

The fundamental capacity of causality escapes imagination and is rooted in the metaphysical structure of a thing. The source of dyna mism is below and beneath, more basic than the peripheral sensibles as grasped by the imagination in the unity provided by quantity. It is no less than the dynamism of the act of existence of a thing that is the primal source of the metaphysical energies overflowing and pouring out in causal acts. We must be ver y careful not to ap ply the Aristotelian psych olo gical paraphernalia too anthropomorphically to the Divine nature. God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens and He acts as an efficient cause communicating esse to creatures. In other words, He produces existents by a free act of efficient causality. What justification is there for the explanation of essence and esse in terms of reciprocal causes ? If the causal principle is properly the conclusion of a demonstration which roots its major in being, why use the posterior to explain the prior ? How can we use the notion of cause to explain the principles of being ? Is not this a bit like a reversal of the accustomed positions of that well-know n animal a nd its convey ance ? 1 6. A N A L O G Y A N D E S S E

The very term “modes of being" implies a variation on a theme, a modification of a unitary reality. Being is somehow one if it is to be varied and modified; not the logical un ity of the concept of Be ing of Cajetan; not even the unity of order for a metaph ysical computation of “ degrees of bein g" according to B. Mon tagnes; but degrees of being implies that there is something, somehow one, which can be reduced from more to less, to certain metaphysical levels of being. The explanation of the analogy of being by a series of essences, the principles of difference of things, cannot provide the unity needed. If there are degrees of esse which vary by their essences, even then, it seems they must be alike by their esse; not by some vague use of the phrase “modi essendi" to link essences as somehow, in some general way, being, bu t the precise and ex act significance of the term. Things differ by their essences, they are one by their esse. But, if so, how? 1 Cf. J. Owens, “ The Causal Proposition - Principle or Conclusion?” , The Modern Scho olma n, XX X II, May, 1955; p. 339.


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Only the doctrine of “ Esse as the Thesaurus of all perfection'’ can provide the superabundant store of perfection to be limited in individu al essences. If being is a form which is limited by matter, is the same thing true? It would seem so. But in this case does not esse need essence in order to become limited, finished and perfect because it possesses the indetermination of the concept or form of being, not esse ? This specification is involved in the articulations of efficient cau sality, the production of the creature by God. In this way, just as essence is reducible to esse, so formal causality is reducible to efficient causality as an aspect of its efficacy. God as efficient cause is also the exemplary cause of things. The esse He communicates makes a thing to be, the esse He communicates in a limited mode makes a thing to be a kind , to exist in this way, to be possessed of an essence. Just as essence flows from esse as the intrinsic principle of limitation and/or determination, so formal causality is the limitation and determination of efficient causality to the production of this kind of being. The unity and plurality of things are certainly fundamental meta physical facts of the universe. But they are not the most basic and foundational aspects of reality. Things are one because of their esse. God is Simple because He is Ipsum Esse. Creatures are composite only because th ey are lim ited esses that unite with other limited esses in secondary causality, and can, consequently, be separated. Unity and plurality have to be based on and rooted in being and ultimate ly in esse. In a metaphysics of being as esse we can explain all the facts of the universe including unity and plurality. Unity and plurality cannot of themselves found a metaphysics. They must be rooted in being, not unity but the one, not plurality but the many; one what? one being; many what ? many beings. P lurality is the result of the limitation of esse. Not of an extrinsic limitation which means separability and thus composition, but an intrinsically limited being which as we said before needs other beings for its perfection, thus forming a composite due to the role of secondary causes in contributing their esse for the establish ment and constitution of composite productions. 7. E X I S T E N C E A N D T H E D O C T R I N E O F T H E D I V I N E I D E A S

The traditional method of explaining the origin of plurality is through the doctrine of the Divine Ideas. But the doctrine of the Divine Ideas takes one just so far in explaining the origin of plurality and then it fails. How is a multiplicity of Divine Ideas rooted in the

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Divine Essence ? To push the origin of plurality back to the rationes, the respectus, or intelligible aspects of the Divine Essence which the Divine Intellect perceives as imitable in a variety of modes by creatures is, it would seem, merely to relocate the point of confrontation between a unitary Divine Essence and the Divine Intellect which perceives it as imitable. The basic rationes which seem to underlie the plurality of the Divine Ideas and a Simple Divine Essence is still a traditional Greek formulation of the One and the Many! Using the model of the human intellect as a foundation for the doctrine of the Divine Ideas, as Tho mas Aquinas explains the historical origin of the doctrine in the De Veritate, would seem to introduce plurality into being through a lesser being, an esse intentionale of sorts. Although this might be effective with a created intellect, can it be much more than a metaphor when applied to a Being for Whom to Know is to Be. The rationes or respectus which Aquin as speaks of in the Summa, in a certain summation and crystallization of his doctrine, seems to be still the traditional Greek formulation of a metaphysics of essence, an Augustinian Summa Essentia of which creatures are the Bonaventurian reflections. But if God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens, how does He serve as the foundation for a plurality of essences, whether Divine Ideas or created essences ? How is the Divine Essence imitable in an indefinite variety of ways reducible to the proper name of God, Ipsum Esse Subsistens ? Here again the doctrine of the Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Esse explains the apparent dilemma. If Ipsum Esse is the Thesaurus of perfection then to look on esse as imitable in this way by this creature and in that way by that creature is to say that essences are modes of esse. Esse perceived in the Divine Ideas as limited to this mode, or to that finite determined essence, is still to look upon essences as existential quanta. There is also a problem of how this projection of the Divine Ideas, this essence, is joined to its esse. Does the union of essence and esse take place outside the creative act and posterior to it, or does it form a secondary stage within the creative act ? First God gives esse and then He communicates essence to it? Or does He produce an essence qua essence and then give esse to it ? In either case we have a dual creation or the production of a being out of nothing in steps, - with one of the steps seemingly a halfway house from nothing to existence through essence, which is not nothing but does not exist until it receives esse but somehow is with a being of its own as essence. By making the created essences of things collapse back upon the


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Divine Ideas we do not solve the problem of the ultimate origin of essence, rather, by pushing it back to the Divine Ideas we simply place the burden of explanation on a Simple Divine Essence which is reduci ble in its turn by metaphysical analysis and causal priority, at least in the vocabulary of Thomas Aquinas, to Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Thus the explanation of essence must ultimately be in terms of esse and precisely located in the creative articulations in efficient causality of Ipsum Esse and the created, finite, limited esse it produces, namely the creature. The real danger in explaining the relations of creatures to God is not atheism but pantheism, the ties between Ipsum Esse and finite esses are much profounder than any differences. But as long as we remember that esse is communicated through efficient causality and not formal causality there is no danger of pantheism, of making God the Form of the World as William of Auvergne was tempted to do. The relations of Ipsum Esse and finite esse are always articulations of efficient causality. 8. T H E D I S T IN C T I O N O F E S S E N C E A N D E S S E

The whole question of the “ distinction" between essence and exis tence is located within a metaphysics of unity and has to be reformu lated in other terms to make sense within a metaphysics of existence. If things are simple and composite than how do esse and essence fit into such a metaphysics ? Are the y m erely units which can be multiplied and divided to account for the plurality of immaterial substances or the distinction of creatures from the creator ? If something is absolutely one, then essence and existence must be identified. If something is composite, then it follows that they are separable and distinct. But in a metaphysics of esse a being is one because of its esse and two beings have more than one act of existence. If unity follows being, wh at does it mean to ask the question : Is there a distinction between essence and existenc e ? W hy does Giles of Rome hold a doctrine of the real distinction between essence and esse ? ; to distinguish the creature from God as the composite is distinguished from the simple ? ; to explain the creatibility of the creature ?; to account for the corruptibility of the finite material thing ? ; or to account for a plurality of creatures by the diversification of esse; by an extrinsic determination ? Only secondarily is it because God is Infinite Being and the creature is a finite being.

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Contemporary Scholastics invariab ly are repeating the context of the discussion of the Distinction of Essence and Existence as set by Giles of Rome. Even when they recognize the primacy of esse they still use essence and esse as counters in a system of multiplication which serves to distinguish God from creatures as Unity from plurality, the One and the many, rather than as Infinite Being from Finite Being. The common perspective on the role of essence in the history of metaphysics is that it serves to multiply creatures, and, added to esse or vice versa, makes the composite possible. Thus the distinction between essence and existence pro vides a workable formula to distin guish or explain the difference between a God Who is absolutely simple and the creature which is fundamentally a composite, some of whose parts are separable and thus corruptible. This is extre mely useful and, we repeat, the common framework of thinking for the doctrine of the Real Distinction. However, all this can be reduced to and explained by a Metaphysics of Unity. The Neoplatonist Proclus and the Arabian author of the Liber de Causis could provide this rigorous argument. In fact, as we have seen, they do! But at other points this argument begins to disintegrate. None of these thinkers have ever explained satisfactorily the transition from unity to plurality. The presence of the many was a problem for Greek philosophy from the Pre-socratic thinkers to its last famous champion, Proclus. The doctrine of the henads is a case in point. Even in a Metaphysics of Essence which is a Metaphysics of Unity disguised as a Metaphysics of Being, the problem persists with, for example, Avicenna's famous axiom, “ ab uno, unum." Things are not their esse, they are “composed" of essence and esse. Wha teve r Thom as Aquinas meant by this formulation he obviously did not mean the same thing that Giles of Rome or Cajetan meant. His notion of being militates against it. He uses the Greek formula because it does serve to distinguish the creature from God, but not in terms of being so much as in terms of unity and plurality. It is because creatures are composite that we can distinguish them from the perfect simplicity of Ipsum Esse Subsistens. However, a duality at the heart of metaphysics is intolerable. This was the profound and fundamental reason for the attacks on the real distinction between essence and existence as formulated by Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Suarez. All of these thinkers saw that the real distinction between essence and existence endangered the doctrine of creation, and particularly the unity of creation.


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But if essence is conceived as the intrinsic principle of determination of esse, then diversification, plurality and multitude can be explained without positing an eternal or pre-existing essence or jeopardizing the distinction between God and creatures, between Ipsum Esse Subsistens and finite esses. When Duns Scotus and Francis Suarez made existence a mode of essence, they recognized the impossibility of a duality of principles at the foundation of metaphysics. They were forced to reduce esse to essence as a mode of essence. The phenomenon of the transliteration of doctrines in different and even opposing philosophies is a fact of philosophic experience and attests to the perennial nature of philosophical problems and conclu sions. Often the same doctrines and insights arise, but on different philosophical levels. The history of the controversies on the relations of essence and esse has a significant message to teach us. Namely, that the roof of the universe can be occupied by only one principle, Ipsum Esse Subsistens and that the roof of metaphysics can be occupied by only one principle, esse. As all creatures flow from God, so all other principles flow from esse in the creative act. Creation is not a marriage, a joining of esse and essence, but a true birth. Esse is posited within its intelligible dimensions, limited intrinsically by its essence, a true existential Quantum. The entire controversy on the Distinction of Essence and Existence beginning with Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent and developing through an infinitude of variations possible to both the profound and the agile mind is but another application of what may be called Moments of Tension in the history of philosophy. Just as Proclus conceived the doctrine of the Henads as a point of confrontation between un ity and plurality, blunted and dulled by the multip lica tion of minor “ones" or henads tapering off into unity by the very indefiniteness of their multiplicity, a shading from unity to plurality wh ich really consists only in pushing the problem back one step further and hoping it will then disappear. But no matter how tenuous and vague the plurality, it must still be accounted for. Likewise, the history of the discussions of the Real Distinction is based upon another such Moment of Tension in which the data of the problem, the facts of creation, although theologically no problem (for there the facts are clear), philosophically seem unexplainable in terms of the metaphysical principles and the formulations used precisely to explain them. Both sides, or should we say all sides, of the controversy

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accept to their detriment the posing of the problem by Giles of Rome which he took from Greek philosophy via the Liber de Causis. Essence is the ultimate principle of metaphysics. To be is to be a form; to be is to be an essence. Eve n w ith the recognition of the ultimate fundam entality of existence in the explanation of the doctrine of creation, essence never quite loses its heritage from the Greek eternal universe and this is why Suarez, devastatingly critical as he is, still has little in the way of a constructive contribution to make, other than the same reduction of esse to a mode of essence. Our contention is that this dilemma will never be solved until we recognize the Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Esse. The doctrine of the primacy of being, the Primacy of Esse is not enough. For essence still retains its inheritance of being in some way or other, a “separate but unequal status," which still gives us a fundamental duality in the structure of the creative act and indeed in the object of metaphysics. But if we recognize that essence is a mode of esse, that it flows from esse in the efficient causality of the creative act, that it and all its perfections are reducible to esse by metaphysical analysis, then there is no dilemma of the Real Distinction as Thomas Aquinas' vocabulary, when pruned and isolated, explains to us, (this and no more). Essence is really other than esse precisely because it is the limitation of esse, the intrinsic limitation of esse. In the creature, its essence is not its esse because esse as esse is not identical w ith limitation. Considered withou t limitation it is the to tality of perfection, Ipsum Esse, God Himself. The formula : In the creature its essence is other than its existence, is really no problem and presents no difficulty to the doctrine of the Ultimate Reducibility of essence to existence. It means simply this, the creature is a limited and finite esse as compared to the creator Who is infinite Esse. The creature is distinguished from the creator on the basis of its limited finite nature, not on the basis of some constitutive plurality or composition as compared with the Simplicity of the creator, a compo sition which follows upon and is the result of the finitude of esse, a finite esse seeking to remedy its own limitation and imperfection by the appropriation of further esse in secondary causality. According to Thomas Aquinas, even the separate substances, the composition and plurality of which have been so difficult to explain, are finite beings and in need of Ipsum Esse, some sort of union with God. In a metaphysics of Unity disguised as a metaphysics of being, Esse, somehow one, is distinguished from the creature by its simplicity. The creature is set off from the Creator by its composite structure of essence and existence. It is a plurality.


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In a metaphysics of esse, essence needs only a subordinate relation of efficient causality to demarcate God from creatures. The creature is a limited esse or a being or esse with an essence. It is because the finite being as finite does not possess esse perfectly, because, although it particip ate s being (esse), it does not participate it according to every mode of being. The creature does not receive the whole perfection of being, but it has an imperfect esse. Perhaps it would be more precise to sa y it is an imperfect esse, or even more precisely, it is constituted as a certain level of perfection, a particular magnitude of esse, an existential quantum, a degree of being. Limitation is an essential characteristic of the creature. The creature is a limited or finite being. Even though the essence of the creature is the intrinsic limitation of esse, and constituting with its esse its sub stance, there is nevertheless no possibility of identifying its essence with its existence, the creature with esse or even its own esse. Because it is the limited and finite character of the created being that forever stands in the way of infinity, of the superabundance of esse, of that identification of essence and existence which occurs only in God, and in the object of metaphysics considered by the human reason. In the case of no finite being can its essence be existence or even its own existence. Precisely because its esse is limited to this specific and particular mode of being, this kind of thing, it is never possible to identify essence, the intrinsic principle of limitation with esse. It would be equally impossible to iden tify a limited esse with Ipsum Esse Subsistens or Infinite Esse. When one surveys the history of the problem of the relations of essence and existence one is struck by the awesome complexity and vast net of ram ifications in which more than one thinker has become entangled. Surely, if the dilemma could have been resolved in terms of essence it would have been so by the efforts of such gifted thinkers as Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Francis Suarez, Vasquez and many more, the catalogue of whose names and distinguished titles would fill volumes. But what has been the result of such labors. The mountains have been in labor and given birth to the awesome complexities of the real distinction, the log ical distinction, the in tention al distinction, the modal distinction, the distinction between essence and existence, between esse essentiae and esse existentiae, between esse essentiae and existence, between essence and esse existentiae, with every apparent possibility exhausted and every ingenuity exercised. But the net result has been in inverse

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proportion to the genius and energies expended. Why is this so ? If it were possible to solve this problem in this metaphy sical setting and on these terms, surely there would have been results from such a glistening array of intellectual artillery. Instead the net result has been another of those moments of tension which we have seen in the history of philoso phy, similar to the Henads of Proclus, in which the unity of metaphysi cal being is achieved by some sort of multiplication of relations, a criss-crossing, webbing, and re-weaving of a complicated set of rela tions so complex that they must add up to a sort of unity. This is an inverse approach to the problem of the One and the Many from that which Proclus took. Proclus began with a Unity and tried to explain plurality. The metaphysics of essence through the doctrine of reciprocal causes begins with a fundamental plurality which makes secure the distinction of the creature from God and then attempts to weave the unity of being out of a fundamental ontological duality b y a doctrine of reciprocal causes. Essence gives to being that it is of a certain type or kind. Esse gives to essence its existence. This seems to work until we come to ask the question of the ontological status of essence. Then the whole structure seems to disintegrate giving evidence to the sh aky underpinning on which it has been based. In the problem of the relations of essence and existence there is no “ distinction" because distinction occurs only between two intelligible polarities or two essential determinations. Likewise there is an analytic reducibility by the metaphysics of essence to esse from whence it flows, bu t not an identification, because “identification" involves a perfect agreement of similitude or at most a uniqueness of similitude, but distinction and identification occur always between intelligible, determined aspects of entities, namely their essences or essential determinations.1 It is a very significant fact that Thomas Aquinas (although he had a detailed doctrine of Distinction as he demonstrates on other occasions and in other contexts, for example, the Trinity), however, avoids this 1 Cf. on this point J. Hellin, “ El ‘ Ess e P len um ’ Y La Esencia” , Pen samie nto, 20 (1964) no. 78 in a discussion of my article on this topic (Cf. W. E. C arlo, “T he Role of Essence in E xistential Metaphysics: A Reappraisal,” Int ern atio nal Philos oph ica l Quarterly, 2 (1962); pp. 55 7 ~59 °Father Hellin translates the doctrine of the “ Red ucibility” of essence to esse as an “ Identifi cation” of essence and esse in a Suarezian sense. W hen Fr. Hellin says that the whole reality of the essence is due to existence, this for Suarez means only that essence exists by esse and reality is the fact that it is, not tha t it is an essence, - only th at it is an actual or real essence The fact that Suarez uses the language of similitude exclusively, “identification,’’indicates to our mind that he is working completely within the order of essential determinations. See the superb articles of Fr. Hellin, Pen sam ien to, 1956, p. 157SS., and 1957, p. 2iss.


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vocabulary comp letely when he comes to discuss the relation s of essence and existence. Only once does he use the verb “ distinguitur,” to our mind in a general sense, although he uses real distinctions and logical distinctions in technical fashion in other contexts and with great skill. But distinction does not apply to the relations of essence and esse precisely because esse is superintelligible. This is why accord ing to Aquinas the only correct way of speaking of the relations of essence and esse, ta king into account the precise character of the modes of being involved, is by the expression “essence is other than esse,” as we have seen above. What is of prime significance in regard to the doctrine of the Ultimate Red ucibility of essence to esse, is tha t certain baffling problems such as matter, form, the human soul, the doctrine of analogy, the nature and autonomy of logic, the ontological status of logical entities, can all be clarified and explained scientifically by a reduction to principles and causes; in this case the cause of causes is esse. (The doctrine of the Unity of the Human Composite and the doctrine of Divine Ideas are excellent cases in point).

CHAPTER

IV

METAPHYSICAL VERIFICATION

In constructing a Thomistic metaphysics, every major doctrine, beginning with the Object of metaphysics and developing its scientific structure through the doctrines of Analogy, Potency and Act, the Limitation of Being, Essence and Existence, and the Transcendentals, Un ity, Tr uth and Goodness, - we repeat, e very major doctrine is reducible to esse. This is precisely the basis for the scientific structure of Thomistic metaphysics. It is this Reduction to esse which serves as the unifying principle of the science, just as the Atomic Theory in Physics, the Periodic Series in Chemistry and the theory of Ev olution in Biology are theories of Total Organization of these sciences and help them to achieve the unity and organization and the predictive power which characterize full-fledged and mature sciences. Of course a theory of total organization is useful for unifying the multifarious data of the science but it does not, of itself, provide the ontological footing for the science unless it somehow is linked to and arises from the ontological causes and/or principles with which the particular science is engaged. But since esse is not only the principle to which all these doctrines may be reduced, but also the source from which ever y metaphysical en tity, whatsoever, flows, and to tally so, matter, form and soul flow from esse. In fact, the only reason why they are reducible to esse by a scientific analysis and synthesis is because they flow from esse causally. The ontological foundation of every metaphysical doctrine is esse, because every metaphysical entity whatsoever, flow s from esse, arises at some “moment” or “stage,” primal or secondary, in the procession of creatures from Ipsum Esse Subsistens and then returns to Subsistent Esse Itself. Let us as a meta physical experiment see whether the doctrine of the Ultim ate Reducibi lity of Essence to Esse can be verified by an examination of the theory of Prime Matter, the subject of many philosophical vicissitudes.


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i. T H E O N T O L O G I C A L S T A T U S O F P R IM E M A T T E R

To recapitulate, contemporary developments in the theories of the metaphysical relations of essence and esse have carried esse to a position of primacy over essence. Thinking on these basic metaphysical princi ples has gone on to root all the perfection of being in esse rather than essence. In fact, the logical result has been efforts to reduce the perfection of essence as essence to esse. As we have seen, a good deal of interest has been generated in attempting to establish the precise ontological significance of those texts that refer to essence as “non being.” 1 Alon g with the in ability of the doctrine of Possible Being to ju st ify a being of its own, the doctrine of Prime Matter is having difficulties with its own claim to ontological status. This claim has for a long time been considered a dubious one and there have alw ays been thinkers who have had difficu lty with the cryp tic formulation of the doctrine of matter in both the classical texts and the manual tradition.2

1 Cf. Cha pter I, note i.

2 C o n t r a d i c t o r y s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s : The apparently contradictory nature of the traditional interpretation of matter has disturbed a great many thinkers. A French philosopher put the ma tter well. “ .. .the more deeply they scrutinize their idea of matter and of the properties that represent it, the darker that idea becomes and the more it looks as though it wa nt ed to esc ape them .” (D ’A lem bert, Disc ours prél imin air e de VE ncyc lopéd ie, quoted by E. Gilson & T. Langan, Mode rn Ph ilos oph y, (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 314. This same difficulty persists to the present and shows up in contemporary writings. “ Likewise we speak of matter, that is, matter in the substantial order, as though it were something, even though by definition it is ‘not something.’ ” (J. Owens, “ St. Thomas and Elucidation,” New Scho lasti cism, XXXV, 4, Oct., 1961). In 1867 S. Tongiorgi could write of matter what has so often been said of essence, that it is somehow indifferent to existing. Ergo materia est ind iffer ens essentia liter ad existe ndum . (S. Tongiorgi, Inst itut ione s Phil osop hica e, New York, 1867, p. 157). While P. Hoenen can describe matter as “ potential being without qualification,” E. Gilson presents the problem in his customary competent fashion. “ Of all the kinds of poten tiality, the first to present itself is the potency to substantial being. What is ‘that which can become a substance?’ This pure ‘possibility of being a substance’ is called prim e matter. Taken by itself and separately, it cannot be conceived for the simple reason that it possesses no being of its own. Nu llu m esse habet, Averroes says of it. That it is nothing of itself does not prove that it is incapable of existing. Prime matter exists in the substance from the very moment that the substance itself exists, and by virtue of the act which makes it exist. This act which constitutes the substance is the form. From and by the form, substance receives whatever is positive in its bein g, sin ce, as we ha ve said , it is in an d b y the for m th at its act -of -b ein g pe ne tra tes it. Th is also remains true of matter: forma dat esse materiae. Prime matter is the very possibility of substance. I t is to the form of the substance that matter owes whatever actual being it has.” (E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, New York: Random House, 1956, p. 177). Hampus L yttke ns tells us that “ the idea of materia prima, the general basis of all things, is difficult to grasp. Being absolutely indefinite, and accordingly intellectually inaccessible and incomprehensible, matter can only be conceived if characterized by form. A mysterious

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The notion of prime matter as it was considered in the 13th century falls short of a clear, concise statement and definite ontological location. St. Bonaventure in traditional Augustinian fashion along with such thinkers as Albert the Great and Richard of Middleton gave to prime matter a form of its own, however attenuated and abortive. We may be opposed to this doctrine but at least we can understand it in order to disagree positively. For in this theory matter has a substantial constitution which affords it a very precise ontological location, even though we might consider such substantiality an insuperable obstacle to the ultimate, substantial unity of a composite of which such a element is thus introduced in creation.” (Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World , Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksells, 1952, p. 166). Hugh R . King echoes this confrontation with my stery in the understanding of the doctrine of Prime Matter. “ Even while it lived, the doctrine of prim a materia remained a subject of mystery and controversy. For in so far as anything has some recognizable character, capable of analysis and therefore exhibiting in discourse some universal characteristic, it is ipso facto informed; and insofar as it is informed it is a ‘this’, a substance, and hence not prim a materia. (Hugh R. King, “ Aristotle W ithout Pr ima Ma ter ia,” Jou rn al of the H istor y of Idea s, X V I I I , i, January, 1957, pp. 37 o - i ). Some thinkers insist on the clear-cut separation of existence from both matter and form. “ The ver y possibility of the real existence of many form ally diverse or numerically distinct bei ng s res ts up on the sep ara tio n of ex ist en ce fro m bo th m att er an d for m (Le ona rd J. Es lic k, “ What Is the Starting Point of Metaphysics?” Mode rn Schoolm an, May, 1957, p. 261). Pure potentiality and the Thomistic Philosophy of Nature, through the analysis of substantial change, can indeed show that m atter, in its primary and ultimate nature, is pure poten tiality. As a p oten tia l and in de ter mi na te pr inc ipl e, it ca nn ot sim ult an eo us ly be the int rin sic pr inc ipl e wi th in a bei ng wh ich ma kes it ac tu al ly to ex ist . (Ibid., p. 260). “ It is impossible to deny th at the notion of primary matter.. . must be considered as a fiction, i.e. an intrinsically contra dictory n otion .. . The notion of primary m atter, the result of a regressive process of abstraction, is not only a ‘limit-concept’ (Grenzbegriff) but an overstepping of the possibilities of concep tual thought (Grenzüberschreitung des begrifflichen Denkens” (A. Wenzl, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademia, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, 1958, 1; quoted by N. Luyten, O.P., “ Matter as a Potency,” The Concept of Matter, ed. E. McMullin, Notre Dame, 1965, p. 127). In his skepticism as to the ontological reality of prime matter, Krempel reduces it to a function of efficient causality. This seems to be basically a reduction to the relations of poten cy and act which are schematic principles that operate within causality. “ La causalité matérielle se trouve transformée de la sorte, en causalité efficiente. Les termes matière et forme se réduisent à deux relations d’une substance unique la première vis-à-vis des substances futures que l’avenir peut en déduire; la seconde vis-à-vis des substances précédemment pro ductrices de la substance présente. L a causalité unique et suprême de D ieu n’est pas affectée par cette substitution qui s’assimile, au reste, le principe thomiste d’individuation en repor tant la décision sur l’individu à son origine” (A. Krempel, op. cit., p. 609). “ En somme, nous transposons la causalité matérielle en causalité efficiente. E n même temps, nous interprétons les termes: matière et forme - tout comme: puissance et acte, en général - de plusieurs relations logiques fondées de la même entité réelle compacte. Une substance corporelle s’appelle: matière, vis-à-vis des substances futur es possibles qu’elle peut produire en sacri fiant sa propre existence; elle s’appelle: forme - actualisation vis-à-vis de sa propre origine; forme - acte, vis-à-vis de l’état présent. (Dans l’hylémorphisme authentique aussi, la matière, pour autant qu’elle est actualisée dans un corps existant, n’est pas matière, puissance substa ntielle, à l’égard d ’un corps passe - c omme telle elle a joué son rôle - ni matière, puissance, à l’ égard de la forme présente - ce serait renier son actualisa tion surven ue - elle fait un iquemen t droit à son nom de matière puissance, vis-à-vis des formes fu tures possibles, forma rum edu cibi lium (Ib id., p. 606-7). “ Or, dans un changement accidentel, il revient cer-


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principle is a constituent element. But when we turn to what we might call the Aristotelian, Averroistic or even Thomistic theory of matter, certain difficulties do arise. I am not referring to the basic philosophi cal purpose of the doctrine. That is evident. It does serve to insure the substantial unity of the composite, human or otherwise. But the comprehension of the intelligible content of the theory is not quite as clear-cut and definite. Wha t is pure po tentiality, stripped of all determ ination, deprived of all form? Y et it combines with form, exerting a real causal efficiency in order to limit it. This principle is in the genus of substance but it tainement au même, de voir dans le subiectum le collaborateur matériel, comme le veut l’hylémorphisme classique, ou un collaborateur efficient. (Au reste, rien ne s’oppose à ce que l’on retienne les termes: subiectum et matière, d’autant moins qu’ils n’exercent pas seulement une efficience, mais la reçoivent. Cette efficience se caractérise par une apparente immobilité ou résistance. En effet, on appelle: matière ce qui coopère de façon apparemm ent passive avec la cause efficiente de ce nom, tel le bois avec le menuisier, le corps avec le chirur gien, tout en reçevant, en même temps, l’effet.” {Ibid., p. 605). Other thinkers would claim that matter is the actual being itself which contains the con ditions for further development. “ For this reason there are philosophers who are very skeptical about hylomorphism as the systematic theory holding that all corporeal beings are composed of prime matter and substantial form. On the other hand, however, they are quite willing to recognize Aristotle’s great merit in having introduced the hylomorphic way of thinking in general. According to this general hylomorphic way of thinking, matter is the actual being itself which contains the conditions for further development and thus is the “ material cause” in a broad sense with respect to all kinds of actualizations.” (J. Peters, “ Matter and Form in Metaphysics,” New Sch olast icism , Vol. X X X I, 1957, p. 456-7). Not knowing just what to do wi th m at ter J. Peter s red uce s it to for m. B ut he does illu st rat e an d rec ogn ize the int ole ra ble position of matter as a principle which neither is nor can be conceived when examined from the point of view of being. And he does this despite what is a basically phenomenological method. “ There is the constant danger th at hylomorphism will be regarded as a dualism in wh ich a tim eles s m att er rec eiv es (thoug h in su bs ta nt ial un ity) su pra -te mp ora l for ms th at have their origin from elsewhere - as the human artist gives form to an adjacent matter. A ga in st thi s du alis m we sha ll ha ve to be on our gua rd , ce rt ain ly fro m the vi ew po in t of an ontology which acknowledges t hat the corporeal, as regards both m atter and form, is created. The doctrine of the essential interrelation of matter and form, in which both are considered to be ontic aspects of the corporeal being and so identified with each other in the concrete in spite of and even in their very opposition, is a safeguard here against the aberrations which take matter and form more or less as independent beings.” {Ibid., p. 483). Matter even enjoys a metaphysical priority over the constituted substance with its own act of existence. “ . . . but in a corporeal substance the composition of matter and form enjoys a metaphysical (not temporal) priority over the composition of the thus-constituted sub stance with its own act of existing. It should not be forgotten, however, that we are not here describing two different moments of the same composition, but two different orders of composition.” (E. Gilson, Bei ng and Some Phil osoph ers, p. 173). Father Gerard Smith cloaks a profound insight in wit and metaphor. “There is no objection to poking fun at Aristotle’s description of prime matter provided you see his point. He is saying that there is a factor in any being of a specific kind which is thoroughly unintelligible except in its expectancy of substantial form, and here’s the point: to that expectancy (of substantial form) which is prime matte r. . . Now if incon gruity is a factor in fun, we have in prime matter the funniest incongru ity there is .. . L augh if you will at the incongruous ability of what is not even dust (it is prime matter) to assume a form by which a material composite can adore God. But don’t laugh at the description of that ability ( neque quid, neque quantum, neque quale. . .) as if it were a poor description. Try yourself to describe a formless ability to be of any material kind of being. Your description will either be Aristotle’s or it will be as nonobjective as the

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does not exist except under form. It is so completely bare of intelligibili ty that even God does not know matter : He does not have a divine idea of matter except in the composite, under form. Matter is pure potentiality but it receives and determines form. It exerts causality but it does not exist. It is non-being or nihil. But in other texts it has a form of its own. It is without qualification but it is a similitudo and has a being of a sort, a weak esse and an incomplete esse. It is almost nothing, yet it is a being. These apparently contra dictory texts are the same kind which we find in the doctrine of the possible essence.1 This section of our study textually will investigate the uneasy ontological status of prime matter. child’s picture of Pharaoh’s army crossing the Red Sea: no sea, because it has receded; no army because it has passed. A complete blank. In other words, if you don’ t care to use Arist ot le’s description of prime matter, you can’t say anything intelligible at all about generation and corruption, at least not intelligible in terms of kinds of beings.” G. Smith, S. J., The Phi losop hy of Bein g, New York, The MacMillan Company, p. 53). Consequently when a contemporary manual of Scholastic philosophy gives a definition of matter like the following, it is not eliminating the problems but only crystallizing them. “ Prime matter is defined as an incomplete substance which as the first and undetermined subject constitutes, together with the form, the physical essence of a body” Hickey, Sum mul a Phil osoph iae, Dublin, 1904, p. 137). Calling prime matter an incomplete substance is not dissolving the difficulty but only including it in the formulation of the problem, a problem which seems, historically to have beg un wi th Ar is to tle ’s pu pil an d succ esso r, Th eop hr as tus . Th eop hr ast us fir st ask ed the question as to whether matter is being or not-being? “ It m ay also be noted that A ristotle’s pupil and successor, Theophrastus, in his short metaphysical treatise takes up the question wh eth er “ m at te r” (uln) is bei ng or no t-b ein g, and wh eth er or in w ha t sense Be in g ca n be predicated of it. This, if any, is the point where the Tradition begins - and begins with a genuine Aristotelian problem and concept of matter.” (F. Solmsen, “ Aristotle and Prime Matter: A Reply to Hugh R. King,” Jou rn al of the Hist ory of Idea s, XIX, 2, April, 1958, p. 247). “ It should of course not be assumed tha t Theoph rastus depends spe cifically on the passage in de gen. et corr. The relation of matter to Being ousia) is repeatedly brought up in the Metaphysics (e.g., VIII, 1) {Ibid.). The doctrine of prime matter is not clear-cut and complete in Aristotle. F. Solmsen in his br ill ian t text ua l an aly sis of Ar ist ot le ’s do ctr ine ma kes this poi nt . “ As Ar ist otle som etim es uses the term ‘Materia Prima’ for approximate matter, it is possible that he did not at all times hold the concept of ‘prime matter’ with equal firmness or clarity of conviction. Yet be yond thi s mere po ss ibi lit y we can ha rd ly go ” [Ib id., p. 245). But for Aristotle, even though he identifies matter and the so-called elements (322bl), ultimately it seems to have only potential existence. “ Inev itably ‘m atter’ of which Aristotle in the Meta phys ics speaks as “ that w hich in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain qu antity nor assigned to any of the categories by which Being (to ov) is determined. [Ib id., p. 244). Consequently the “ hold of ‘prime m atter’ on Being and reality is precarious” even in Aristotle’s doctrine of prime matter. {Ibid., p. 243). 1 There is no scarcity of apparently contradictory Thomistic texts on matter and being. Having in mind the doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Albert in which matter has a form of its own and is consequently to some extent a constituted substance or body which the human soul caps and completes as an informing principle, St. Thomas is quick to assert that matter is pure potentiality and unformed. But he goes further and refuses to admit being of any kind to prime matter. Although matter can be conceived in itself, materia secundum se esse non possit {De Veritate, 3, 5, ad 3). Matter is non-being. . .sic materia est non ens. “ Si autem non ens removeat non solum ipsum esse in in actu, sed etiam actum seu formam per quam aliquid participat esse, sic materia est non ens ” {De Substantiis Separatis, VI, ed. Perrier, pp. 151-152). “ Quod autem est in potentia ens et participat ivum ipsiu s, non autem secundum se


12 1

If we begin the experiment of rethinking the basic principles of metaphysics in terms of the doctrine of essence as the limitation of esse and ultimately reducible to esse, then the correlative doctrines of the non-being of essence and the non-being of first matter face us. The solution to the problem of the possible essence as we have seen is a comparatively simple one. Possible being is no being. The possible essence is literally no being, no essence, nothing at all of itself. The only thing that exists is a Being which could cause it. 2. H Y P O T H E S I S : T H E M E T A P H Y S I C A L A R T I C U L A T I O N S OF E S S E A N D MATTER

However, when we come to understand the precise ontological laws of first matter we have a very knotty situation to resolve. One of the things which it might be interesting to point out in more precise fashion is the way in which matter articulates with esse. In fact, simply as an hypothesis to be tested we might state that any attempt to ex plain the ontological location of prime matter without reducing it to a mode of esse is ultimately fruitless and eventually ends in the kind of discussion that consists in repeating over and over again the simple elements of the definition of prime matter. It is pure potency. It is absolutely undetermined. It is the substratum that makes change possible. Added to an abstract form it accounts for individual differen ces, etc. est en s; materia est huiusmodi, ut supra dictum est ” [Ib id., p. 150-1). Matter cannot exist in itself. It does not have an esse. “ Nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque cognoscibilis est (I, 15, 3, ad 3). W ha t we kn ow of m at ter in its elf an d the con dit ion s und er wh ich we kn ow it, ma ke an interesting point of comment. St. Thomas says “ quod quamvis materia secundum se esse non pos sit, tamen potest secund um se considerari', et sic potest habere per se sim ilit ud ine m ” (De Veritate, 3, 5, ad 3). On the other hand in the Sum ma Theologiae , he tells us, as we saw above, “ Na m materia secun dum se neque esse habet, neque cognosc ibilis est [I, 15, 3, ad 3). Al l kin ds of que stio ns com e to our min d as we rea d te xt s such as thes e. If m at ter is non bei ng , h ow can it rec eiv e and lim it f orm ? H ow can it exe rcis e ma ter ial ca us al ity wh en it i s n ot ? Saint Thomas tells us that potential being is not, and consequently it cannot act, it cannot exert causality. “ .. . quia quod est potentia, nondum est', unde nec agere potest ” (Cont. Gent., 1, 16). W ha teve r the pro ble ms in vo lv ed and howe ver th ey are to be sol ved , it is also true th at there are texts in which St. Thomas certainly seems to be giving matter some sort of being of its own. Matter seems to possess a weak esse, a debile esse, but an esse nonetheless. “ . . . quod quamvis materia prima sit informis, tamen inest ei imitatio primae forma: quantumcumque enim debile esse habeat, illud tamen est imitatio primi entis; et secundum hoc potest habere similitudinem in Deo.” [De Veritate, 3, 5, ad 1). It is certainly textually correct that “ forma dat esse materiae” and that “ materia secundum suum esse actuale dependet a forma. . but at the same time St. Thomas seems to be saying that matter has an incomplete esse, but again, esse nonetheless and however qualified. “ Sed materia habet esse ex eo quod s ibi advenit, quia de se habet esse incompletum” [De Pr in cip iis Natur ae, ed. Pauson, cap. I, p. 80, 11. 8-12). Not only does matter have an incomplete esse, but it is the most incomp lete being of all. “ Ma teri a prim a inco mplet issim um inter omnia enti a” [De Spi rit . Creat., a. 1).

12 2


But to explain the nature of prime matter and to locate it ontologically is to deal with a problem that lies on the frontier not so much of natural science and a philosophy of nature but on the frontier of the philosophy of nature and metaphysics. At least this is the way I read those texts of St. Thomas which constantly and recurrently speak of matter and esse in the same breath. To explain matter and to locate it ontologically is to see it metap hysically as a “ deficient esse,” a debile esse, a weakness at the heart of being but one for which there is a remedy just as there is for the limited nature of the human intellect. Motion and change are the attainment of perfection of further esse, and thus represent the achievement of higher or lower, superior or inferior essences. Essence is determined by “existential quanta/' not higher as best absolutely, for even the lower m ay articu late more p erfectly in the return of the total universe of being to Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Since matter is a mode of being we should be able to explain the doctrine of matter with all its application without using the term matter itself, but substituting a metaphysical language of esse plus some adjective or group of descriptive modifiers in lieu of a definition. I cannot think of a single metaphysical principle which would be violated in such an experiment with this notion of matter as a mode of esse. The question as to the ontological location of prime matter arose in Aristotle and Theophrastus, not as an isolated phenomenon bu t as one aspect of a general and characteristic tendency of Greek philosophy. Monsignor Gerald B. Phelan has expressed this tendency in a particu larly felicitous phrase. “The efforts of Greek thinkers ... gave rise to the various devices adopted by the Atomists, Plato, Aristotle, right down to Plotinus, to give some form of non-being droit de cité in the metropolis of philosophy." 1 1 G. B. Phelan, “ The Being of Creatures,” p. 118. Certain contemporary thinkers who are wel l aw are of the his toric al vic iss itu de s res ult ing fro m the at te m pt to at tri bu te bei ng to the non-existent, nevertheless have not quite been able to solve the problem to their own complete satisfaction. D. J. B. Hawkins states the problem clearly. “ Ontologically nothing is simply nothing. There seems to be a corollary th at eve rything we can th ink about is real in some sense. Y et thi s ma ke s the no tio n of re al ity thin alm os t to the va nis hin g po in t” (D. J. B. Ha wk in s, Be ing and Becom ing, New York, 1954, p. 33). But after such an explicit statement he feels called upon to add and qualify. “ Ye t proba bility is more than mere possibility, and even possibility is more than nothingness” {Ibid., p. 34). Then he continues to show how this position can be attenuated still further. “ Powers and habits seem to have a special kind of reality of their own, halfway between nonentity and full activity” [Ibi d., p. 35). Y et Pro fess or Gil son in one of the few fort hr ig ht sta te m en ts on thi s top ic est abl ish es the uncompromising choice that faces the realist philosopher, a choice which contemporary Scholastic epistemologists seem reluctant to make. There is only one realism worthy of the name. It is that which consists in attributing existence to what exists and refusing it to


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The test case problems of the doctrine of matter, the experimental facts that the conception of matter is ordinarily employed to explain, would include historically: the substratum underlying change, individuation, indetermination and pure potency, abstraction, exten sion and so on. The notion of matter was formulated historically to explain the fact of change. To be more precise, it was formulated to explain the basic continuity underlying change. The absence of some such enduring or “ perduring” principle, it appears, would seem to reduce change to a combined annihilation and creatio ex nihilo. The continu ity of weight and dimension, or their mathem atical equivalents of mass and space, seems to indicate by a concrete, empirical verifica tion, the necessity of such a principle. This evidence has been embodied in the law of conservation of matter and its reformulation in terms of mass and, more recently, energy. These functions would seem to posit a separate principle such as prime matter. Undoubtedly these evidences everything else. And there is only one idealism which consists in refusing existence to what exists and attributing it to what does not exist. “ Il n’y a qu’un réalisme digne de ce nom. C’est celui qui consiste à attribuer l’existence à ce qui existe et à la refuser, à tout le reste. Et il n’y a qu’un idéalisme qui consiste à refuser l’existence à ce qui existe et l’attribuer à ce qui n’existe pas” (E. Gilson, Réa lisme Tho mist e, p. 230). It was precisely this confusion of knowledge and being which St. Thomas found in the Platonists. “ . . .secundum Platonicorum suppositiones, qui, universalium abstractionem ponentes, quanto aliquid est abstractius et universalius tanto prius esse ponebant .” ( In lib. de Cau sis, ed. Saffrey, prop. 2; p. 13). And of course the antidote is a precise one, and of prime importance for an understanding of the doc trine of prime matter. “ No n enim necesse est ea quae intell ectus separa tim intelle git separ atim esse habeant in rerum naturae.” {De Sub. Sept. 2, ed. Lescoe, 8, p. 43). W he n ph ilos oph ica l pr inc ipl es do no t cor res pon d wi th bein gs, the temp ta tio n is to ont ologize them and produce a logical composite of multiple principles rather than a being whose unity flows from its esse. Esse is not like the dye which permeates all the cells of the tissue, or a glue or cement (to use a favorite example of Giles of Rome) which suffuses through the cracks to keep the article of furniture in one piece. Rather (if we have to use metaphors at all), esse is more like the magnetic field which can be converted by the dynamo into the electricity to light and heat a city. All other principles are modes and modifications of esse, including matter as well as form, an esse which embraces them all. W ith ou t a m eta ph ys ics of exi st en ce ho w cou ld Ar ist otle loc ate m at ter ac cu ra te ly wit hin the world of being? I t was unintelligible so it could not be being. To be was to be a form. But it was involved in the causal interactions of substances, which function conferred upon it a reality of sorts. To posit a matter and form completely separate from existence is to relapse into the Greek emanation in which plurality arose by an external and extrinsic recipient. But this is Greek philosophy not Thomistic thought. Granted that we must in some way explain the phenomenon of individuation and the numerical plurality of individuals, must we do so by the addition of distinctly new and separate principles ? Does the multiplicatio n of principles really explain the comp lexities of reality or merely reformulate the problem in ever more abstract terms ? If we can explain the stark basic facts of existence and experience by the complex behavior of the primary principle are we not more adequately satisfying the demands both of reality and ideal science? We are not doing away with these principles, we are reintegrating them more tightly within a metaphysics of authentic esse. The difficulties of the possible essence and the pure potency of first matter stem in part from the difficulties of thinking about non-being with an intellect whose first and adequate object is being, as we shall see later.

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are strong ones and need philosophical explanation. But need we ex plain them by what some have accused of being a Platonic form. In other words are we ontologizing a separate causal principle under the necessity of explaining such experiential facts ? Do we need to multiply principles and do we need more principles than essence and existence to explain any ontological status? We are of the opinion th at such an interp retation of prime matter is much more faithful to Aristotle and Averroes than it is to Thomas Aquinas. This analysis of prime matter is the same kin d of metaphy si cal phenomenon which we have already seen in the theory of the possible essence. It would seem that matter can be rooted more fundamentally in the metaphysics of being than we have been ac customed to doing. Why is it that when we attempt to extend meta physical principles to cover all of the reality to which they properly apply, we always stop short at chan ge ? As soon as it is a question of explaining change we prescind from the principles of being and fall back upon the Aristotelian theory of matter and form. But Thomas Aquin as was not aware of such lim itations on the doctrine of being. He speaks of change as the movement from esse ad nonesse. He actually defines motion as actus existentis imperfecti in potentia. Why do we al most invariably ignore the large number of texts in which Thomas Aquinas seems to be attempting to explain change in terms of esse? Such an effort is actually very fruitful. If we look on matter as a mode of esse and attempt to reinterpret the several basic problems of reality which matter was conceived to explain, we find that they can be explained quite precisely and signifi cantly in terms of esse. And what is even more significant, St. Thomas himself attempted just such an interpretation, as confirming texts clearly indicate. 3. M A T T E R A S A M O D E O F E S S E

The Aristotelian doctrine of prime matter is a partial view of veri table existence and the role it p lays in physical change. When Aristotle arrived at the idea of prime matter by a progressive process of ab stracting all positive determinations from the substratum underlying change, is it possible that, as he peeled away form after form, he arrived at a reality that was, but was not conceptualizable ? If by some conceptual or logical technique Aristotle prescinded from the intelligible in the Thomistic substance, would he not be brought


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face to face with a privation or deprivation rooted in esse? If the developmental maturation of being, interpreted as a series or a set of intelligibles, based upon esse tendere, is removed, then the interior existential dynamism is not by th at fact eliminated from being. Matter too, must be rooted in being in a Thomistic metaphysics. It cannot be ontologized as simply another Platonic form as it seems to have been for Aristotle. This implies a metaphysical view of reality in which a primal esse manifests itself in two basic limitations or bifurcations of which the first is essence and existence, the second matter and form. And just as essence and existence are not reciprocal causes but essence is reducible to existence, so matter is the limitation of form, the place where form stops, in what is basically an immaterial universe.1 Aristotle's theory of form and matter is still the same Platonic universe of ideas and world of flux located within the concrete substan ce. But the question in a Thomistic metaphysics, as we have seen above, is to reduce matter to an ontological locus as an articulation and limitation of esse.2 It has been considered quite an accomplishment of recent years, and correctly so, that Thomists have come to a realization of the significance of the doctrine that form gives esse to matter. It has been of great help in the solution of the problems arising from the relations between the soul and its body. If the human soul is the principle of existence for its matter, then no incompatibility exists between the immo rtal and necessary nature of the soul and the fact tha t it is united to a body. For the soul can easily be the principle of existence for matter if it has existence of itself.3 Bu t what does it mean to say tha t form gives existence to matter ? Does it mean that matter somehow is, like the possible essence, but does not exist till its union with form. Or does it simply mean that form as the concrete existent is that in which matter has existence as a privation of some sort? A further question that is provocative of thought is this one. How does the fact that there is one esse make the 1 Cf. on this doctrine W. Carlo, “ The Role of Essence in Existen tial Metaphy sics,” pp. 584-589. 2 “ Moreover, this whole ontological structure is, in each substance, but the unfolding of an individual act-of-being created and continually kept in existence by God’s power. In and b y its form , the cre at iv e Ess e penetrates substance to its very matter, and the subject to its ve ry ac cid en ts ” (E. Gils on, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas , p. 177). 3 Cf. A. C. Pegis, “St. Thom as and the Unity of Man,” in Progress in Ph ilos oph y, ed. J. McWilliams, Milwaukee, 1955, pp. 153-176. Cf. C. Fabro, Pa rtic ipa tion et Cau sal ité, p. 632.

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human composite a natural unity if it is still composed of both matter and form unless matter as well as form is reducible to the self-same esseï 4.

T H E P L A S T I C I T Y O F E S S E

Matter does not seem to be some principle standing apart from form, bu t is rooted in the concrete thing as an aspect of the individual by reason of its perfectibility. Esse has an elasticity about it. It is per fectible, it can develop. The child grows and the pupp y in time becomes the adult dog. But they were always what they were. With in the limits of the same essence or species an accretion of existence seems to be possible. Saint Thomas' discussion of Aristotle's argument for the indeterminateness of matter per viam predicationis (1denominative) makes sense only in a metaphysics of esse. In a meta physics of essence such as that of Aristotle, a subject which is neither a substance nor a form cannot be located within being. It has no ontologi cal status. This is why some look on Aristotle's argument as a vicious circle. In an essentialistic metaphysics in which to be is to be an essence, a matter without qualification or character is precisely a monster. But in a metaphysics of esse there is a reality below and beneath essence which is not of itself determined or lim ited but is still the ve ry founda tion of the real and the source of essence and all that lies within it. Within esse precisely we find a reality which is both transcendent and inclusive because it embraces all the determinants of the categories since it is perfection as unlimited. Esse thus provides an ontological status for matter outside of form but still within being as the phe nomenon of the “elasticity of esse.” The fundamental facts of change whose explanation demanded the postulation of the theory of matter and form, involve in some way a plasticity on the part of being. Esse must be plastic, permutable, elastic in structure. Things, each of which is an existent, a concrete act of esse, share in the dynamism, the causal efficacy of Ipsum Esse Subsistens. The whole universe of esse is an elastic thing, each component acting on the other, the constituents sharing their basic acts of existence. Each thing desires esse. It is in this that the ratio of the good consists. The apple offers up its existence to the aggrandizement of the individual act of animal existence in nutrition. Material things are subsisting on the bare perimeter of reality. They need outside aid for their operations. My act of existence can modify, as efficient cause, the act of existence


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of the apple or the tree, which in turn are plastic to the assumption of this mode of being or of that. The whole universe in its total perfection approaches, within the limits of creaturehood, the infinite perfection of Ipsum Esse Subsistens.1 The movement of the material being to add to its esse has a very illuminating parallel for St. Thomas with the amplitude of the intel lectual being. . . . quia cum (anima) sit infima in ordine intellectualium substantiarum, sicut materia prima est infima in ordine rerum sensibilium.2

Just as knowledge is a remedy for the imperfection of the lowest of the intellectual substances whereby it takes within itself the forms or principles of perfection of other things, likewise when St. Thomas says materia prima is the lowest in the order of sensible things, is he also saying that the lowest in the order of sensible things, whatever that may be, is prime matter? The role of matter in the amplitude of human knowledge is more basic than may app ear at first glance. After all, this is the mode of perfection of a material being. If man had no matter and the bodyconsequent upon it, would he be able to change, to grow and expand and become more perfect? Matter is not act or form. It is not privation. It differs from them by reason.3 It is potency, a passive potency in traditional vocabulary, the ability of a being to become something other, by an increase or decrease of esse. Matter as potency, then, might be called the “ elasticity or plasticity of esse.” 5. M A T T E R AS D E F I C I E N T B E I N G

Defects seem to flow from matter.4 The nature of matter seems to require defects.5 That a body is corruptible, fatigable and possesses defects of this kind follows from the necessity of matter. 1 “A nd in the same way, the ver y fact th at form also transcends matter ( materia est propter formam), is the fundamental cause of becoming - this becoming as the continuous w ay to bein g-m ore, to int ens er ac tu al ity and pa rt ici pa tio n of “ to be .’ ’ (J. Pe ter s, “ Ma tte r and Form in Metaphysics,’ ’ p. 479). Also on this point “ .. .est materiae corporalis ut recipientis et subiecti ad aliquid altius elevati ” (Cont . Gent., II, 68). 2 De An im a, I, 8, resp. 3 “ Materia differt a forma et privatione secundum rationem” {De Prine. Nat., Opuscula, ed. Perrier, I, n. 5). 4 “ . . .dicendum quod corruptibilitas est ex defectibus qui consequuntur corpus humanum ex necessitate materiae: et maxime post peccatum, quod subtraxit auxili um gratiae” {De Anima, I, 8, ad 9). 5 “ . . . et {homo) subjacet defectibus secundum quod natura materiae requirit ” {De Anima, I, 8, resp.).

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. . . sed quod hoc corpus sit corruptible, fatigabile et huiusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessitate materiae. Necesse est enim corpus sic mixtum ex contrariis subjacere talibus defectibus. . . . Sciendum tamen est, quod in remedium horum defectuum Deus homini in sua institutione contulit auxilium justitiae originalis. . . 1

This notion of deficiency or defect is rooted in being or to be more precise, its absence or lack. The fact that a being is produced or created determines it to be finite. For due to the very fact that it is produced ex nihilo, it has some defect and it is in potency for it is not pure act and so must be finite.2 Matter in its ultimate signification revolves around a 'lack of being/' Since the material being is not being itself but only by particip ation, it lacks some being and so has matter.3 If matter is neither form, nor privation, nor evil,4 but is still in some basic way reducible to esse then perhaps it is esse as limited, as, to put it crudely, existential quanta approaching but not completely, one of the Primal Modes or Stages of esse as unfolding, i.e. essence. Matter is not esse itself, nor the determination or limit of esse, nor the absence of esse purely and simply, but "the esse itself as somehow deficient/' but deficient precisely in what is not owed to it by its nature, by the kin d of thing it is, but in wh at it could receive from secondary causes. The dynamic energies of esse, somehow incomplete and able to receive further grants of esse and to become more than it is and in the process to be another kind of being or more perfectly being within its own kind, - this explains the phenomenon of reality the Greeks explained by the notion of matter. A lim ited esse, on the horizon of eternity is what man is, capable of receiving further esses in his movement towards his own perfection which is at the same time the return of creatures to God, of all lim ited esses to Infinite Esse whence they sprang.5 1 Ibi d.

2 “ . . .dicendum quod ipsa ratio facti vel creati repugnat infinito. Nam ex hoc ipso quod fit ex nihilo, habet aliquem defectum, et est in potentia, non actus purus ; et ideo non potest aequari primo inf in ito ut sit in fin itu m .” {De Potentia, i, 2, ad 4). “ .. . dicendum, quod omnes particulares defectus hominum causantur ex corruptibilitate et passibilitate corporis, superadditis quibusdam particularibus causis. . . ” ( I  I I , 14, 4). 3 [De Sub. Sep ., c. VI, p. 150-1). 4 “ Ad secundum dicendum quod nullum ens dicitur malum inquantum est ens, sed inquantum caret quodam esse : sicut homo dicitur malus inquantum caret esse virtutis, et oculus dicitur malus inquantum caret acumine visus” (1 , 5, 3, ad 2). 5 “ One explains nothing by man, since he is not a force but a weakness at the heart of bei ng , a co sm olo gic al fa ct or , bu t also the pl ace wh ere all cos mo log ical fac tors, b y a mu ta tio n wh ich is ne ve r fini she d, cha ng e in sense an d hi st or y. ” (M. Me rle au- Po nt y, In Pr ais e of Phil osoph y, p. 44).


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When we speak of matter as a "deficient esse,” this definition on the metaphysical level satisfies all the basic needs of the traditional formulations of matter as well as the exigencies of an existential meta physics. Like the doughnut wh ich includes the hole within its definition, even though the hole is nothing, the doughnut might be called a deficient or material cruller. In a general sense privation is only the negation of form in a subject.1 But more precisely it is the absence of a form that should be present.2 Privatio n is predicated only of a deter minate subject.3 But the being plu s the absence of being it could receive from another add up to matter. For matter is a "being in potency” and the fact that it is not in some respect act is called privation, and that through which it is actualized is called form.4 But matter is that in which both form and privation are understood.5 There is a purely logical relation between the individual matter and the sub stantial form.6 While prime m atter is a being of reason,7 with the characteristics of the universal concept, according to some thinkers, something which in itself is non-being, is considered by the intelle ct as a certain being just as in the case of negations, privations etc. For when being is predicated in these instances it signifies the truth of the proposition and not the essence of the thing existing outside the mind, and so defects are said to be, not because they have esse in re

1 “ Cum privatio nihil aliud sit quam negatio formae in subiecto” {In I Phys., lect. 15 ; ed. Leon., II, n. 7). 2 “ Privatio nihil aliud est quam absentia formae quae est nata inesse” {In I De Caelo et Mu nd o, lect. 6, ed. Leon., III, n. 6) 3 “ Negatio non determinat sibi subiectum. . ., sed privatio non dicitur nisi de determinato subiecto” {De Prine. Nat., Opuscula, ed. Perrier, I, n. 4). 4 “ Ad hoc ergo quod sit generatio, tria requiruntur: scilicet ens potentia, quod est materia; et non esse actu, quod est privatio; et id per quod fit actu, scilicet forma. . .” {De Prine. Na t., III, p. 82, 11. 3-5, 12-13). 5 “ Ex dictis igitur patet quod materia differt a forma et a privatione secundum rationem. Materia enim est id in quo intelligitur forma et privatio.” {Ibid., Ill, p. 84, 11. 11-13. “ Licet materia prima non habent in sua ratione aliquam formam sive privation em. . . nunquam tamen denudatur a forma et privatione” ; {De Prine. Nat. Opuscula, ed. Perrier, I, n. 6). 6 “ Nos recherches sur la relation entre la matière individuelle et la forme présente, chez saint Thomas, aboutissent donc à ce résultat: il y a une relation purement logique entre la matière individuelle et la forme substantielle; une relation accidentelle entre le corps et l’âm e. Ve nons -en, à la relation de la matière à la forme p assée. Impossible de la supposer réelle” (A. Krempel, La Doctr ine de la Rela tion, p. 59-60). 7 “ The R-principle here will still be the individual m atter-substratum of the individual change (however we are to describe it) ; the C-principle is still the generic notion, applicable to qualified as well as unqualified changes. Hence, the ‘indeterminacy’ we associate with it can only be the ‘indeterminacy’ of a generic concept (material cause) in relation to specific in stances (e.g. this man). It is not the ‘indeterminacy’ of a concept signifying an entity that is itself ontologically featureless” (E. McMullin, “ Matter As A Principle” , The Concept of Matter, P. 193 ).

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bu t because the intellect composes privation with a subject as a kind of form.1 This is what we mean when we say that being plus the absence of being add up to matter. But matter is not privation as we pointed out earlier. It is in a way rooted in something positive. Because the being lacks esse, it can gain esse. This is what is meant by matter, ens in potentia, a deficient esse, a debile esse but one which has a remedy for its imperfection.2Essence is the prima ry limitation, a mode of esse, essence 1 “ Aliquid quod est in se non ens, intellectus considerat ut quoddam ens, sicut negationes, et huiusmodi {In 5 Met aph. , lect. 9, ed. Cathala, n. 896). “ Ens dicitur dup liciter: uno modo quod significat essentiam rei extra animam exis tentis; et hoc modo non potest dici ens deformitas peccati quae privatio quaedam est; privationes enim essentiam non habent in rerum natura. Alio modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis ; et sic deformitas dicitur esse, non propter hoc quod in re esse habeat, sed quia intellectus componit privationem cum subiecto sicut formam quandum” {II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3). 2 Fr. Luy ten, by suggesting a deficiency of substantial determination locates matter in form, but St. Thomas says precisely and specifically that matter is not form nor is it the lack of form, th at is to say, privation. I t is only if we locate the inadequacy within being, and more accurately esse that we can have an explanation of matter on the correct metaphysical level. “ This pure indetermination of primary m atter must be seen in its connection with deter mination. We might call it the constitutive or fundamental inadequacy of substantial deter mination. Expressed in a more concrete way: a material reality is what it is in such a wa y tha t it bears in itself the possibility of simply not being what it is. In this sense it is meaningful to say that any determination one considers of itself implies inadequacy. It w ould not m ake sense, of course, to posit this inadequcy apart from the determination, no more than it would m ake sense to speak about the limit of a surface entirely apart from the surface itself. It would be irrational to say that the limit is not real on the grounds that it cannot be examined sepa rately from the surface. To maintain that primary matter is unreal because its pure potentiality cannot be shown apart from the determinate thing is, therefore, unjustified. And so one may conclude that there is no absurdity in admitting a real pure indetermination, provided one does not posit it as a reality existing in itself, but rather as a constitutive deficiency of the given material thing. It is a deficiency, that is, it indicates the possibility of this thing’s be com ing an oth er thing , in wh ich la tter thing it wil l ag ain ha ve the mea nin g of fu nd am en tal deficiency; it is thus a sort of hallmark of the thing’s former - and future - non-being.” (N. Luyten, “ Matter and Potency,” The Concept of Matter, p. 128). Father M cMullin’s criticism of this notion of “inad equacy ” or “ deficiency” is well taken here if it is a criticism leveled at the notion of matter as the absence of a formal determination, a privation, somehow required and possessing a claim on nature. This I think is the point of his criticism. But his argument cannot be leveled at the notion of an inadequacy or imper fection or deficiency on the level of esse. For inferior and imperfect beings have more or less of esse by their location in the hierarchy of creation. In fact essence and consequently nature flows from these existential quanta or “ spiritual magnitudes” (as St. Thomas speaks of qualities in quantitative terms). Therefore, this deficiency of esse is prior to any claim on nature that privation might hold, because it is prior metaphysically to the very constitution of the nature. “ . . .connected w ith this point is another - you suggest that the fact that a thing may become something else is a defect of the thing or an “inad equacy ” or “ deficiency.” This, once more, raises a real difficulty because it seems to imply that it is an inadequacy or deficiency of the acorn that it can grow into an oak. Does not this linking of potency with inadequacy seem to lead to a radically Platonic view of the universe in which changeability is necessarily a defect? In a universe of growth and process, surely potency cannot as such be equated with inadequcy. It is proper for the acorn to become an oak. In fact, if it does not bec ome an oa k, the for m of the aco rn its elf has som eho w or oth er com e to no th in g.” (E. McMullin, “ Comment” on the paper of Fr. N. Luyten, Ib id. , p. 134). However, on the level of esse, inferior and imperfect beings do have a remedy for their imperfection in their move-


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as imperfect esse. Matter signifies a secondary limitation, this imperfect being as deficient when a point is reached in the descent of creatures from God at which the esse does not correspond to, is more or less than, one of the Primal Stages of being expressed by the doctrine of the Divine Ideas.1 6. T H E O N T O L O G I C A L L O C A T I O N OF P R I M E M A T T E R

Let us now repeat the basic argument of this section of our study which we introduced as an hypothesis but which we will now restate as our conclusion. Any attempt to explain the ontological location of prime matter without reducing it to a mode of esse is ultimately fruit less and eventually ends in the kind of discussion that consists in repeating over and over again the simple elements of the definition of prime matter. It is pure potency. It is absolutely undetermined. It is the substratum that makes change possible. Added to an abstract form it accounts for individual differences, etc. But to explain the nature of prime matter and to locate it ontologi cally is to deal with a problem that lies on the frontiers not so much of natural science and a philosophy of nature but on the frontiers of the philosophy of nature and metaphysics. At least this is the way I read those texts of St. Thomas which constantly and recurrently speak of matter and esse in the same breath. To explain matter and to locate it ontologically is to see it me taphys ically as a “ deficient e s s e a debile esse, a weakness at the heart of being, but one for which there is a remedy just as there is for the limited nature of the human intellect. Motion and change are the attainment of perfection of further esse, and thus the achievement of higher or lower, superior or inferior essences. For essence is determined by “existential quanta/' Not higher as best absolutely, but even the lower may articulate more perfectly in the return of the total universe of being to Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Attem pting to explain prime matter exclus ively on the leve l of the ment towards perfection as we have seen. Motion and change are the attainm ent of perfection of further esse, and thus the achievement of higher or lower, superior or inferior essences. Not higher as best absolutely for even the inferior and lower may articulate more perfectly in the return of the total universe of being to Ip su m Ess e Subsi stens . 1 “ Una et eadem forma, secundum quod con stituit materiam in actu inferioris gradus, est media inter materiam et seipsam , secundum quod constituit eam in actu superioris gradus. Materia autem prout intelligitur constituta in esse substantiali secundum perfectionem inferioris gradus, per consequens, intelligi potest ut subiecta accidentibus.” {De Anima , 2. g; cf. a. ii, ad i8). The secondary mode or the form of the individual is somewhere in between or midway between matter and the form of the species.

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philosophy of nature is like attempting to explain the origin of the universe b y one of the co ntemporary cosmological theories like H oyle's theory of the Continuous Creation of Hydrogen Atoms, or LeMettre's “ Big B ang" theory of the Explosion of the Primeval Atom, or Gamow's Equilibrium Modification of LeMettre's theory of the origin of the universe.1 Bu t the y all miss the point. How do you e xplain the primitive stuff with which they start if not by a doctrine of creation. The choice is simple. It is a choice between creation or literally nothing. Likewise the choice between an explanation of prime m atter purely in terms of a philosophy of nature means that prime matter is going to be reduced to nothing but the fact that a thing can change. B ut this is a conclusion of common sense and not an explanation by causes, a scientific explana tion in terms of the metaphysics of esse. (We are eliminating at this point the interpretation of matter as pure potentia, the ontologizing of matter as a separate philosophical principle by an essentialistic meta physics) . In the con tradictory texts we have seen, St. Thomas on the one hand is attempting to deal with matter on the level of the philosophy of nature as an explanation for change, abstraction, individuation, extension and so on. But when he is working within the context of wh at kind of being is prim e matter? and in what way does it exist?, he knows very well that he is asking metaphysical questions of being and conducts himself accordingly. This is the only explanation 1 Cf. For a discussion of these theories, cosmological we might call them, an d their artic u lation with the Christian doctrine of creation, W. Carlo, “To ward a System atic Philosophy of Science,” St. John 's Univ ersit y Stu die s, Philosophical Series I, New York, i960; pp. 5~5 ° ; see particularly, pp. 31-39. In our constant emphasis on the articulations of the philosophy of nature and m etaphysics, and at this point, the articulations of celestial physics and metaphysics, we do not intend in any way to violate the automony of these separate disciplines, or perhaps distinct would be a be tter wor d. Fa th er Jo sep h Ow ens in a pre cise an al ysi s st at es the dis tin ct ion an d re sp ec tiv e funct ions of these differen t sciences. “ In distinguishin g his two tables, the solid one he wrote on and the “ nearly all empty space” table he knew as a physicist, Edd ington failed to stress that his knowledge of his scientific table was con structed from his knowledge of the ordinary table. The scientific construct was the result of understanding the ordinary table in quantita tive terms. The same ordinary table can also be understood scientifically (in the traditional sense of knowledge through causes) in terms of substantial principles, form and matter, as is done in natural philosophy. It can also be understood in terms of entitative principles, essence and being, as is done in metaphysics. They are all different accounts of the same thing, given on different levels of scientific (again in the centuries-old meaning of “ scientific” ) investigation. All these different accounts are necessary for a well-rounded understanding of sensible things. None of these accounts can afford to despise any of the others, nor to seek to substitute for any of them, nor to interfere with any of them. Each has its own role to play, a role that only itself can play. The Aristotelian matter is a principle for explaining things on the level of natural philosophy. On that level it has its own predicates, predicates that still have to be used today in the properly balanced explanation of nature.” (J. Owens, C.Ss.R., “ Matter and Predication in Aristotle,” The Concept of Matter, p. 113).


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that makes sense in the light of those crucial texts wherein St. Thomas, unlike many present day Scholastics and Thomists, does interpret matter in terms of esse. Unde hoc ipsum esse in potentia quod habet materia prima, esse a primo essendi principio, quod est maxime ens.1

sequitur derivatum

How precisely does prime matter relate to esse derivatum ?, but it does relate in some way. There is an articulation between matter and esse. Oportuit communicari creaturae ut per virtutem causae primae operantis in ipsa, aliquod esse simplex, vel materia produceretur.2

The connection between esse and matter seems here to be one of apposition. W e have already seen many t exts wherein St. Thomas seems to be interpreting m atter in terms of esse and wherein the articulations of motion, change and esse seem to be his precise preoccupation. But the list can be added to indefinitely.3 Perhaps we might even go one step further and point out that a metaphysics of esse can supply an ontological explanation and location for prime matter with which a metaphysics of essence would find it difficult to compete. I used the word theory of the doctrine of matter and form not be cause for Saint Thomas matter is provisional or hypothetical, or that he considered it other than an established philosophical doctrine, a veritable knowledge of reality, but primarily because of the conflicting and contradictory nature of the secondary sources. Many Scholastic thinkers hold opposing and contradictory viewpoints and it is this state of indecision, doubt and, at times, acute philosophical embarrass ment that made theory a term suitable to the occasion to my thinking. The doctrine of prime matter should be an explanation on the level 1 {In VI II Phys., 2, 97 4 ). Cf. A. Hayen, S.J., op. cit., p. 74. 2 {II Sent., i, i, 3, c). 3 “ .. .quia potentia ad esse non solum accipitur secundum modum potentiae passivae, quae est ex parte materiae, sed etiam secundum modum potentiae activae, quae est ex parte formae” {De Pot., 5, 4, ad 1). “ Esse secundum se, non est finitum nec infinitu m quia non est quantum, nisi in quantum subjacet motui, vel ut est rei quantae.” {In VIII Phys., lect. 21). “ Et ideo aliter dicendum quod ex infinitate temporis non ostenditur habere infinitatem nisi illud quod tempore mensuratur vel per se, sicut motus, vel per accidens, sicut esse rerum quae motui subjacent, quae aliqua periodo motus durant, ultra quam durare non possunt.” {De Po t., 5, 4, ad 1). “ In rebus compositis ex materia et forma, genus sumitur a materia, et differentia a forma, ita tamen quod per materiam non intelligitur materia prima, sed secundum quod per formam recipit quoddam esse imperfectum et materiale respectu esse specifici.” {De Spirit. Creat., I, ad 24). The esse of material things seems to fall short of the esse of the species. “ Materia, secundum se considerata, secundum modum suae essentiae habet esse in poten tia, et hoc ipsum est ei ex aliqua participatione primi entis.” {De Sub. Sep., 6, 45). Materia secundum suam substantiam est potentia ad esse substantiale.” {In I Phys., 15, 131).

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of causes and not merely on the level of common sense knowledge of effects, results and conclusions. Likewise we can reason to a substratum underlying change, a principle within the nature of the ens mobile, and we can then go a step farth er in scientific explanation in reducing matter to a mode of esse. The reasoning or demonstration does not possess the artificial certitude and necessity of mathematics, but it is still a necessary and certain explanation on the level of more and more basic causes and principles. Many lines of converging evidences unite to give us the philosophical doctrine of prime matter. One of the most difficult aspects of prime matter, among a veritable host of difficulties, is its basic definition, descriptive or generic. St. Thomas calls matter ens in potentia. It is a pure potentia. But does he mean that there is a pure potency existing as prime matter like the external matter of Aristotle, or does he refer to the simple fact that a substance which is already in existence, still possesses the capacity of being further perfected? It is, bu t it is not all that it could be. It is capable of adding to its original grant of esse the esse it receives in accidental modifications from secondary causes. When St. Thomas calls matter “ens in potentia/' does he mean “ens in potentia ,” or does he mean <(ens in potentia?" It would seem that he is referring simply to the developmental aspect of an already existing substance - the fact that it is capable of further perfection. It is true that it is the aspect of potentiality, of insufficiency of the existent substance, that is called matter, but it seems to me that this is as far as Thomas Aquinas would go in asserting the being of prime matter as a philosophical principle in its proper metaphysical location. When we term matter substance we mean only the ver y po tency its elf which is nothing but an imper fection of the existing substance, in the order of substance. Nec aliud dicimus materiae substantiam quam ipsam potentiam quae est in genere substantiae. Nam genus substantiae, sicut et alia genera, dividitur per potentiam et actum, et secundum hoc nihil prohibet aliquas substantias quae sunt in potentia tantum esse diversas, secundum quod ad diversa genera actuum ordinantur.1

Matter, as far as I can judge, is a relative term and one which can apply to everything which is capable of receiving a causal efficacy, which consists in a modification of its original grant of esse through an accide ntal increase or loss of esse. Sicut autem omne quod est in potentia potest did materia, it a omne a quo aliquid habet esse, sive substantiale sive accidentale, potest did forma .2 In conclusion, then, b y matter we mean an ens in potentia, that is, an existent which is capable of per1 De Sub. Sep ., 6, 146-47.

2 De Pr inc . Na t., 1


135

fecting itself or being perfected by the reception of esse to the ag grandizement and completion of its original esseyprecisely because it lacks esse. Matter is not simply mode or limitation but it is a secondary mode or limitation. Essences are the primal stages of esse, and make things to be the kind of things they are. But within this primal stage there is a secondary stage which enables a thing to be more or less what it is, to increase in being without becoming other than what it is. It is this phenomenon associated with change and matter which Saint Thomas is indicating when he uses the term debile of esse to signify matter ontologically. Of course it is always in a determined being that the desire for further determination is found through the appetite of the material being for esse. In omnibus causis agentibus ordinatis, id quod est ultimum in generatione et primum in intentione, est proprius effectus primi agentis. . . In omni autem actio ne esse in actu est principaliter intentum et ultimum in generatione; nam eo habito, quiescit agentis actio et motus patientis. Est igitur esse proprius effectus primi agentis, scilicet Dei. Et omnia quae dant esse, hoc habent in quantum agunt virtute divina.1

Matter is not privation of form because the material being is fully constituted as the kind of being it is. It has its proper form. But it can yet develop to become more or less what it is. The bo y can become a doctor, lawyer or Indian chief, without ceasing to be the kind of thing he is, without ceasing to be man. He possesses the perfection of his own proper form. He is not deprived of a perfection due to him by his form, such as would be if he were blind or dumb, when he is not a butcher, baker or candlestick maker. Tha t is why Saint Thomas speaks of mat ter as a negation of being, a deficient esse, and a debile esse, and definitely not as a privation or negation of form. If the material being does not become another kind of thing then it does not take on a completely new formal perfection. The whole weight and bias of metaph ysical interpretations of matter has been in the direction of insuring some distinction between matter and being, in order to insure the rights and privileges of the immaterial, the spiritual, so much so, that the continuity of being and matter has been neglected, leading to the perverse situation in which reality is conceived as a fundamental plurality and the different knowledges as mutually exclusive and independent. But the derivation of essence and matter from esse as modes of esse, and the metaphysical reduction of essence and matter to esse in a scientific and causal explanation serves 1 C.G. Ill, 66, adhuc i.

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METAP HYSICA L VERIF ICATI ON

to guarantee the unitary nature of reality and the un itary nature of the sciences which study it, with metaphysics as the integrative knowledge because its proper object includes in a general way, all beings and therefore all the objects of the other sciences, not in their own proper rationes but in its own proper object.

CONCLUSION

The ultimate reduction of essence to esse gives a primal unity to meta physics, which the dichotomy of essence and esse could not provide for this highest of the human sciences.1 It achieves the unity that Greek philosophy with its dying breath in Proclus attempted to reach, the ideal of science. With the ultimate reducibility of essence to esse, the two notions of metaphysics as ens qua ens, the abstract knowledge of a formal object, and as the knowledge of the First Cause of Being (the Aristotelian Sep arate Substances) coalesce. The assertion of the primacy of existence to essence is a halfway house on the way to the doctrine of the ultimate reducibility of essence to existence. The theory of the existential judgment with its adverbial expression of essence seems to support an interpretation of essence as simply the mode of esse.2 1 “ Finally, there is manifested repeatedly in the history of human thought the longing for a general science that will in some satisfactory way assess the relative place of each of the particular sciences and allow the work of all to be seen in some kind of unity and harmony. This will have to be a science that regards all things from the widest possible viewpoint, and so be able to judge the respective functions of the sciences which treat of particular groups or aspects of things. Such a general science would be able to show the limits and the realtive bea rin g of ev er y scie nce , its elf no t ex ce pt ed , and so wo uld ac t as an an tid ote ag ain st the temptation of the expert to interpret everything merely from the restricted viewpoint of his own competence, even though that competence be metaphysics itself. Such a general science alone can satisfy, as far as is possible in this life, the unifying tendency of the human intellect, wh ich is no t co nt en t un til it sees a un ive rsa l pri nc ipl e of ord er in some w ay pe rv ad in g all the objects th at are presented to it. On ly then is the order sought by speculative wisdom attained. There, then, are the needs which are waiting to be filled by an appropriate metaphysics.” J. Owens, St. Thoma s and the F utu re of Meta phys ics, p. 28-29. 2 “ The doctrine of creation is bound to mod ify the notion of metaphysics itself, in that it introduces into the realm of being a first cause to whose causality everything is strictly subjected.” E. Gilson, Bein g and Some Philo soph ers, p. 156. “ Eve n within the orbit of the Thomistic interpreters, no such finality is apparent. Among those who claim to be explaining the doctrine contained in the Thomistic texts, there has in fact been endless disagreement th roughout the centuries, and perhaps never more so than at the present time. The Thomistic writings, far from closing all metaphysical efforts, have rather given rise even within their own boundaries to intense and centuries-long labor in the

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CONCLUSION

Likewise the doctrine of creation is explained in typically Christian fashion because everything is strictly subject to the First Cause in the dynamism of metaphysical principles rather than as a theological premise. Every function which essence at present fulfills will still be served by essence as finited esse. The intelligible structure of the universe will remain intact but it will rise more immediately from its primary principle, be reducible more directly to the very source of its intelligi bility and, in fine, essence, will be woven more intim ately into the ver y fabric of an existential metaphysics. We have a descent, hierarchical in persp ective, from Plato's essences, abstract in nature and separate from the things of which they are the essences, to Aristotle's essence, existing somehow within the thing of which it was the source of intelligibility, directly to the doctrine of the ultimate reducibility of essence to esse in which the footloose and rootless Aristotelian essence which had somehow been jammed meta phys ically into the concrete, individual thing, actu ally takes ontological root in the very foundation of being. In other words a unity of the plurality of metaphysical principles is achieved. The concept existence is 2nd intention, that by which ens is ens (a being is called ens because of its esse). Therefore ens is a concept because it grasps existence in its lim itation, as it were “ clothed in the intelligibile necessities" of essence. But by existence we signify the act of existence b y which a thing is, as grasped in the existential judgment. That is why every single judgment, one term or otherwise, expresses the existential act which lies at the root of essence and gives it its intelligibility and perfection, inasmuch as essence is a mode of esse. There is quite a difference between a descriptive metaphysics and an explanatory one. We can state on the basis of observation that an accident is ens ab alio but then the task remains of explaining this metaphysical fact in terms of being and existence, by the dynamic, inner movements of esse. Metaphysics is an explanatory science by its nature, but it is ex planatory of reality and the other knowledges by which the intellect appropriates this reality. In its own structure as a science and in its critical evaluation of its own concepts it is necessary to see these not only as the formulation and crystallization of metaphysical obserattempt to arrive at their authentic meaning. ... It (Thomism) is a doctrine that has to be re-thought and re-lived through the changing problems and differing outlook of each suc ceeding generation.” J. Owens, St. Thomas and the Fut ure of Me tap hysi cs, pp. 8-9.

CONCLUSION

139

vatio ns bu t as intricate, articulating members of the metaphysical movement of esse. Mere theory and the reality explained coalesce, a phenomenon that can only be approximated in the other knowledges. The laws of being are at the same time the laws of the unification of knowledge or what we call theory. The doctrine of the ultimate reducibility of essence to existence serves this purpose of internal organization and explanation for the science of metaphysics. Although the function of essence as the principle of limitation in an existential metaphysics might on superficial examination appear to be a purely negative one, on closer scrutiny this appears to be incorrect. Essence is not a positive being apart from the existence of which it is the limitation, but it is definitely a positive principle of philosophy when understood as the intrinsic lim itation of esse. Its function can be designated by affirmative terms, contraction, refraction, channeling of perfection, specification, determination. In each instance the point is that the existential energies of existence do not achieve what we term "kind" or "type" unless by the function of this essential limitation. The existential dynamism channeled through its precise degree of perfection is this kind of being. We can look upon the essence as displaying and showing forth the riches and intelligible perfections of esse. An essence actually existing, with all its intelligible perfections, might be called a limited esse. But the danger of such terminology is that of forgetting the phenomenon of limit and identifying essence with existence, misinterpreting its primary function of lim itatio n and the production of a finite being, whose existential perfections achieve this kind of being. Essence is the intrinsic principle of limitation but still somehow positive because the creature is not just a part of God as finite esse might be a part of ipsum esse but due to its limitation, determination, its function of intrinsic specification, it becomes this "kind of being" with the perfection of such and such a mode. Thomas Aquinas knows that the creature is not God, but just what is the characteristic which distinguishes the creature from God or wh ich makes the creature to be other than God ? Ob viously there can not be anything in the creature which is not in some way in God ("eminently" is as good a technical term as any) due to the fact that what is in the effect must be also in some way in the cause. But what positive effect could the creature have which is not, somehow or other, a diminution or limitation of the Divine Perfection, some characteristic which exists in its superabundance in God? Obviously for Aquinas there is none ! This is the diffic ulty in rooting the creaturehood of the

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CONCLUSION

creature in composition as we saw above. It might serve to distinguish the creature from a God Who is Pure Unity, Utter Simplicity, but the question ultimately arises as to how the creature acquires a charac teristic which is not in God, namely plurality, for He is Unity Itself. This is precisely the Greek dilemma and solvable only in terms of a metaphysics of being which provides a continuity between God as Being and the beings He makes to be. However, this is not a meta physics of essence which provides a continuity of similitude or likeness in which resemblance provides the necessary causal continuity. Bonaventure and Duns Scotus have shown the ultimate result of just such a metaphysical attempt. The difficulty with a metaphysics of essence is that essence would be an interpretation of all rea lity in terms of kinds of perfection limited to such and such. But what would such a notion of being or essence be when ap plied to the Infinite Cause of all things; God would be "all kinds,” by some kind of "ne gative theology. ’ ' Wh at sort of comp atibility is there be tween the notion of essence and Infinite Being ? Plotinus, Proclus, the author of the Liber de Causis and Scotus Erigena saw this inadequacy of essence to serve as the first principle of reality and an explanation of the Divine Nature. F or this same reason Thomas Aquinas reinterpreted the universe in terms of existence. This is a decep tively simple hypothesis with a God as Ipsum Esse and as a result the Thesaurus of Being, Intensive Act as Fabro puts it, possessing all the perfections of all kinds of being, all essences within Itself because all are ultimately reducible to esse. All essences are modes of esse. Essence is the intrinsic principle of limitation intrinsic to esse. Before existence nothing happens. After existence all that happens does so. T H E R E H A B I L IT A T I O N O F E S SE N C E

Essence is not absorbed into esse and eliminated from metaphysics. Nor is it in the creature identified with esse, something that is true only of God. The created essence is not its esse, it is the intrinsic limitation of esse, the prism through which the intelligible riches and perfections of esse are refracted and contracted to this kind of being. This limitation is the result of the creative act pouring out in less and less perfection until it reaches the least perfect of material beings. Essence is not esse, nor is it its esse. It is precisely the limitation of esse which restricts esse to this kind of thing and consequently con ceptually knowable and definable.

CONCLUSION

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T H E S C I E N T I F IC I C S T R U C T U R E O F T H O M I S T IC IC M E T A P H Y S I C S

Esse Es se certainly certainly has multiple and different significations. It can mean the operations of things or their substances or the act of substance or essence. But Aquinas knows very precisely what he means by esse. esse. The fact that it can be used legitimately within Thomas' own thought is becaus bec ausee essence, essen ce, substa sub stanc nce, e, ens, ens , matter, form, accident, operation, analogy, the transcendentals, can all be reduced to esse, esse, are all modes of esse. esse. That is what metaphysics is all about. Metaphysics acquires its scientific structure from the fact of the Ultimate Reducibility of all metaph ysical doctrines doctrines to being, all entities to esse, esse, essence and matter in particular.

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II.

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INDEX

A egi d ia n es se nc e, 31 , 89 Dionysius, 32, 79m, 94 A lb e rt th e G re at , 6, 11 , 12, 67, 120 Divine Esse A lf ar a bi , 69, 79m indetermination of, according to Giles, analogy, 3, 5, 64, 101, 106-107, 116, 141 46-4 8, 57.58 and critique (Thomistic) of indeterminate esse, 106-107 A ri st otl e, 2, 12, 20, 23, 94, 95 , 96, 97 , 99, divine Esse, 48-53 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 138 Divine Ideas, 64, 93, 107-iog, 115, 131 A to m is ts , 122 Duns Scotus, 5, n o, in , 113, 14 0 A ug us ti n e, 8 in ., 82, 84, 85 n. , 98, 108, 120 A ve rr oe s, 95 , 11 7 , 124 ens, A v ic en n a , 7, 8n. , 12 , 57 ., 85, 94, 11 0 contemporary analysis of, 20-22 A v ic en n ia n po ss ib le s, 5, 67, 89, 91 Erigena, Scotus, 140 esse essentiae, 2, 5, 12, 113 Bacon, Francis, 11 esse existentiae, 12, 113 Berkeley, 5 essence, Boethius, 12, 6in., 93, 94 co-existens, 9, 10, 103 Bonaventure, 5, 11, 12, 108, 120, 140 ens per essentiam suam, 61, 62, 63, 83, 89 Cajetan, 86, 106, 110, 113 extrinsic principle of limitation, Chap. II passim, 89, 107, 139-140 Capreolus, 113 Clarke, W. Norris, 94 Greek universe of, 2, 6, 7, 112 composition, intrinsic principle of limitation , Chap. III passim, 139-140 and plurality, 41-43, passim as limited esse, 9-10, 102, 107, 138-139 and genus and species, 39, 40, 43-46, 52, limiting principle, 9-10 5 3 » 54 me taphy sics of, 2, 86, n o , 126, 139 and act and potency, 54-56 contraction of being, 39, passim mode of being, 2, 3, 90, 99, 112, 137, 140, 141 b y ge nu s an d sp ec ies , 39, 40, 43-46, 83 b y a c t an d p on te n cy , 54-56, 83 n on -ens, 9, 99 contradictory texts, n on -esse, 9 essence and essence and existence esse in St. Thomas, 8-10 relation of, matter in St. Thomas, g-10 real distinction, 3, 14-17, 23, 24, 61, 86, matter in secondary sources, 117-ng, 132 iog-115 intentional distinction, 15-17, 24, 113 creation, logical distinction, 113, 115 and d iversification of esse, 22-31 modal distinction, 113 and esse, 18-20 as reciprocal causes, 2, 20-22, 24, 38, natural necessity for Giles, 64, 65 43, 86, 89, 90, 92, 103, 106, 114 testing stone of Christian metaphysics, 6, 14, 18 existence, as accidental, 8, 12 De Raeymaeker, 22 extrinsic limitation of, Chap. II passim, Descartes, 5, 11 89, 107, 139-14°

INDEX

as form, 12, 13, 62, 63 intrinsic limitation of, Chap. I ll passim, 139-140 metaphysics of, 2, 109, 113 m o d e o f e ss en ce , m - 1 1 2 as non-accidental, 8 plasticity of, 126127 pr im acy of, 1, 2, 3, 92, 112, 13 7 similitudo of Divine Es se , 101 source of all cognoscibility, 99, 105 Thesaurus of Perfection of Being, 2, 100, 107 Existentialism, 1, 92, 102 Fabro, 22, 24, 94, 96, 140 Form of Being, God as the, 57-67, 82, 83, 84 as exercising form al causa lity, 58, 60, 66 as a Platonic Form, 57, 58, 60, 61, 66 freedom, 5 Gamow, 132 Gerard of Cremona, 69 Giles of Rome, 13, 1 4  1 7 , Chap. II passim, 87, 88, 89, 100, 103, 105, 109, n o , i n , 11 3 Gilson, 24, 122 God, as Infinite Es se , 42, 46, 47, 48, 57, 58 as Thesaurus of Perfection, 96, 108, 140 Hegel, 5 Heidegger, 11 helyatin, 75n, henads, 48, 57n, n o , i n , 114 Henry of Ghent, 5, 12, 1 4  1 7 , 18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 30, 66, 83, 102, 103, 105, n o , i n , 1 13 Hoyle, 132 intensive act, 96, 140 Intentional Distinction, 1 5  1 7 , 24, 113 Ip su m Es se , 17, 19, 28, 29, 37, 38, 41, 48, 57. 59, 61, 65, 75, 78, 8in., 88, 89, 93, 98, I O I , 107, 108, 109, 112, 140 Ip su m Es se Su bs ist en s, 7, 18, 58, 93, 98, 100, 101, 104, 106, 108, 109, n o , i n , 113, 116, 122, 126, 127, 131 John of St. Thomas, 86, 113 Kant, 5 King, Hugh R., 118 Krempel, A., 118 Le Mettre, 132 Li be r de C aus is , 7, 12, 17 , 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 34, 37, 40, 41, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 78, 84, 85, 86, 89, 93, 95, n o , 113, 140

149

Being and Unity in, 7883 Logical Distinction, 113, 115 Lyttkens, Hampus ii7n. Marc, Andre, 22 matter, A ri st ote li an doc tr in e of , 124 , 125 contradictory texts in St. Thomas, g10, 132 in secondary sources, 117119 debile esse, 120, 121, 122 1 2 7  1 3 5 , 141 genus of substance, 10 as limiting principle of form, 9, 120, 121 as mode of being, 90, 124 126 ontological location of, 1 3 1  1 3 6 ontological status of, 1 1 7  1 2 1 , 122, 126 as principle of individuation, 9 pure petentiality, 120-121, 131, 134 Modal Distinction, 113 Montagnes, B., 106 Neoplatonism, 24, 77, 78, 79, 85, 95 Owens, Joseph, 102, 106, 132m Pegis, A. C., 5, 125 Peters, J., 119 Plato, i, 2, 23, 58, 59, 60, 61, 73, 79m, 83, 95, 122, 138 Plat onic forms, 5, 42, 65, 8in. 9 1, 105, 124, 125 Plotinus, 2, 23, 57m, 66, 68, 69, 77, 79m, 80, 8in., 82, 84, 85, 122, 140 Porphyry, 48 Proclus, 2, 17, 23, 48, 56, 66, 68, 68-69n., 69m, 7on., 7m ., 72m, 73m, 74, 75, 76, 77m, 78m, 79m, 8on., 81, 82, 110, h i , n 4, 137, 140 Real Distinction, 3, 1 4  1 7 , 23, 24, 61, 86, 109115 Reciprocal causes, 2, 2022, 24, 38, 43, 86, 89, 90, 92, 103, 106, 114 Richard of Middleton, 120 Scotus, see Duns Scotus, Solmsen, F., 119 soul, 3, 5, 12, 13 Steenbergen, F. Van, 22 Suarez, F., 23, 86, 102, no , i n , 112, 113,

ii4n.

substance, 2, 5, 141 Summa Essentia, 101, 108 Theophrastus, 119 Thesaurus of Perfection of Being, Es se as, 2, 100, 107 God as, 96, 108, 140 Tongiorgi, J., 117m transcendentals, 5, 141 truth, 5

150

INDEX

Ultimate reducibility of essence to esse, 2, 3, 99-J05, 108, 112, 115, 137-141 uniformity of creative act, 29-56, 38, 39, 40 , 47 , 48 , 5 7 , 65 , 7 1 , 72,83 unity, metaphysics of, 2, 23, 77, 86, 93, 109, 110, 112 unity of human composite, 3, 13, 115

V as que z, 11 3 W il li am of Auv er gn e, 109 W il li a m of M oe rb ek e, 69 W it tg en st ei n , 19

William E. Carlo • The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence and Matter to Existence

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