Will the Philippines be better off under a federal government? By Paolo Taruc, CNN Philippines Updated 15:19 PM PHT Wed, May 18, 2016 http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2015/03/31/Philippines-federalismdebate.html Metro Manila (CNN Philippines) — The national budget offers a perspective on the expected debate on whether the country will progress faster under a federal form of government, which is one of the main political goals of presumptive president Rodrigo Duterte. This year, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) allocated approximately P428.5 billion to the National Capital Region (NCR), excluding expenses for Congress and the Offices of the President and the Vice President. Metro Manila alone will account for 14.27 percent of the country's P3 trillion-2016 budget. The amount is significantly greater than what other regions receive: The NCR's P428.5 billion is about eight times larger than Caraga's P53.5 billion. The latter, comprising five provinces in northeastern Mindanao, has the smallest budget allocation among all regions. Next to the NCR, Region IV-A falls a distant second with approximately P141.5 billion. Metro Manila's budget is a little over three times that amount. The chicken or the egg? It's not surprising that federalism has constantly been a hot-button issue in view of the seemingly unequal allocation of resources between what critics call “imperial Manila” and the rest of the country. It's a debate akin to the chicken and egg dilemma: Does Metro Manila's economic powerhouse status justify its large share of the national budget? Or is it an economic powerhouse precisely because of the amount of funds it receives in the first place? Those who believe that the region is shouldering the country's economy have some numbers to back them up. Figures from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) published on July 2015 show that Metro Manila had the largest contribution to the country's 2014 gross domestic product (GDP), accounting for a 36.3 percent share. Likewise, NCR's per capita gross regional domestic product (GRDP) during that same year stood at P203,132 — nearly three times the national average (P71,726). Devolution Although the government currently maintains a unitary structure, it still allows the devolution of power through the Local Government Code of 1991. The code is "considered the most radical and far reaching policy that addressed the decades-old problem of a highly centralized politicoadministrative system with most significant political and administrative decisions concentrated in Manila."
U.P. Public Administration and Governance Prof. Alex Brillantes, and Donna Moscare, made that assessment in a paper they presented at the International Conference of the East West Center, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2002. Brillantes and Moscare said under the code, it is the responsibility of local governments to deliver basic services and exercise authority over local issues. These include, among others, hospital services, tourism promotion, the enforcement of environmental laws, and the inspection of food products. There have also been movements for greater autonomy, such as the proposed creation of a Bangsamoro region to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Under the original Bangsamoro Basic Law proposed by President Benigno Aquino III, only 25 percent of taxes from the region will go to the national government. The remaining 75 percent will go directly the region. Subsidiarity Proponents of federalism point to a need for a more efficient government. Among them are Jose Abueva, former president of the University of the Philippines, who said: "Decentralized governance is also related to the principle of subsidiarity: Problems should be attended to at the lowest level in which they can be solved, by the people directly concerned, without elevating the problems for decision at higher levels." "With more power, authority and resources managed by the leaders in the States and their local governments which will be more visible and accessible to the people all over the country, the people will be more aware of the importance of electing good leaders." Brillantes and Moscare argued that federalism will complement the country's diversity: "The federal structure devises a flexible arrangement for varying forms of self-government to suit different circumstances and contingencies." "After World War 2, India, Malaysia, and Nigeria used the federal mechanism to settle ethnic diversity. Pakistan also used the federal design to manage ethno-national diversity after it emerged as an independent state," they added. Federalism Versus Autonomy: Debate and Practice in the Philippines Published on Tuesday, 08 October 2013 07:35 Written by IAG ARCHIVES Hits: 7819 Tweet Follow 562 followers
This paper by Ronald J. May appeared in Autonomy & Peace Review October-December 2007 issue. Ronald J. May is Emeritus Fellow, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program and Convenor, Centre for Conflict and Post-conflict Studies, Asia Pacific, The Australian National University. The Philippines is a unitary state, but one with a high degree of decentralization and a history of experimentation with autonomy arrangements. In recent years there has been a growing belief that federalism offers a means of dealing with ongoing problems of regional dissidence and promoting popular participation in government. In 2005, in her State of the Nation address, President Macapagal-Arroyo announced her intention to initiate a constitutional review and endorsed the federal option. This paper looks briefly at the history of separatism, autonomy and decentralization in the Philippines, traces the federalist idea in the Philippines, reviews the ongoing debate, and suggests that the case for a federal system in the Philippines has yet to be established. Decentralization and autonomy in the Philippines: an overview The colonial experience When the Spanish colonizers arrived in the Philippines in the sixteenth century, Spain’s civil and religious authorities created an hierarchical administrative structure based on indigenous barangays (communities of around 30-100 families, headed by a datu), municipalities, and provinces. In parts of the Philippine islands, particularly in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the Spanish encountered well-organized Muslim communities within established sultanates. Products of their European history, the Spaniards promptly termed these people ‘Moros’ and launched a series of military campaigns against them. In Minadanao and Sulu, however, they met strong resistance from the Moros, and were never able to integrate these islands into the Spanish colonial regime. In other areas, also, indigenous people resisted Spanish rule, either militarily or by withdrawing into the hinterland. Such groups were referred to by the Spanish as ‘infieles’ or ‘tribus independientes’, and later were identified as ‘tribal minorities’ or ‘cultural communities’. When, in 1898, the United States took over the Philippines, following the Spanish-American War, they essentially maintained the administrative structure (and the religiously-defined ethnic hierarchy) established by Spain. In 1901 a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (subsequently renamed Ethnological Survey of the Philippines) was created, to gather information on the nonChristian people of the Philippines (including the Moros) with a view to
‘determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity’ (quoted in Gowing 1977:67). The following year a bill passed by the US Congress ‘recognized the distinction between the Moros, Pagans and Christian Filipinos and the consequent necessity for providing different forms of government for the different people’ (ibid.:72). Under the Americans, a more intensive military campaign against the Moros put an end to hopes of Moro sovereignty. Initially, administration of the Moro homelands in Mindanao and Sulu was placed in the hands of the US Army, though in 1903 an assistant chief of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (a Syrian-born American) was appointed as Agent for Moro Affairs. The same year, a special Moro Province was created, under the supervision of the civil governor of the Philippine Islands and the Philippine Commission (the administrative arm of the colonial regime) but until 1913 headed and predominantly staffed by army officers. The Moro Province comprised five districts (Sulu, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao and Zamboanga). It had a legislative Council, with limited powers, was subject to national laws except in civil or criminal actions involving only Moros and Pagans, and was expected to be fiscally self-reliant. In 1913 the Moro Province was replaced by a Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and control passed from the military to civilian authorities headed by a governor. The districts were renamed provinces and the two non-Moro Mindanao provinces of Bukidnon and Agusan were added. The Department was however seen as a transitional arrangement, with the seven provinces to assume the same status as provinces elsewhere in the country. It was abolished in 1920. Elsewhere, a number of ‘special provinces’ was created, under the secretary of the interior, for the governance of other nonChristian tribes. In the Cordilleras of northern Luzon, where tribal groups, commonly referred to collectively as ‘the Igorots’, had most strongly resisted Spanish intrusions, the American administration in 1908 established a Mountain Province and the administration of the region was reorganized so that, in the words of a contemporary observer, ‘the wild tribes were safely removed from the field of insular [i.e. national] politics’ (Dean Bartlett, cited in Fry 1983). Around this time there was some agitation for the administration of nonChristian tribes to be handed over to Filipino provincial and municipal officials. The American secretary of the interior, Dean Worcester, however argued that despite their ‘common racial origin’, the gap between the Filipino, the Igorot and the Moro was very great, and that to hand over control of the non-Christian tribes to Filipinos ‘would speedily result in disaster’ (Report of the Philippine Commission, 1909-1911, cited in Lopez 1976:113). Nevertheless, from 1914 responsibility for non-Christian tribes,
though nominally in the hands of the secretary of the interior, was exercised increasingly by provincial and municipal authorities. Dissatisfaction with these arrangements resulted three years later in the reconstitution of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. The Bureau was given responsibility for both tribal areas and, until its demise in 1920, the Department of Mindanao and Sulu (which as well as the Moros contained many tribal people, now known as , Lumad). Between 1917 and 1935 the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes retained nominal control over the nonChristian groups, though responsibility progressively shifted to the Philippine Legislature. Following the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was abolished. The administration of non-Christian tribes passed to the Department of the Interior, though the special circumstances in the south were recognized in the creation of a Commission for Mindanao and Sulu. [1935 datus’ petition] The historical arrangements briefly outlined here reflected the perception of the colonial administration that some degree of regionally-based autonomy was needed to safeguard the interests of the Muslim and tribal people of the Philippines. After 1935 the special arrangements lapsed in the drive for national integration. Four decades later, however, regional autonomy arrangements were revived. Muslim and Cordillera autonomy In the late 1960s an Islamic resurgence in the south, coupled with growing tensions associated with massive inmigration to Mindanao from the northern, Christian, provinces and encroachment on traditional Muslim and tribal lands, produced an outbreak of armed conflict, in which the Philippine government, supported by various Christian militias and private armies, confronted Muslim insurgents under the banner of the Moro National Liberation front (MNLF). The principal demand of the MNLF was for an independent Bangsa Moro in the twenty-six [?] provinces of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, though under pressure from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) the demand for independence was eventually scaled down to one of autonomy in the thirteen provinces of traditional Muslim dominance. A major problem was that, by the end of the 1960s, as a result of inmigration, Muslims were a majority in only five of the thirteen provinces. Following a negotiated ceasefire in 1976, the Philippine government of President Marcos and the MNLF signed an agreement, in Tripoli, which provided for autonomy in the thirteen provinces. Disagreements over implementation of the Tripoli Agreement (particularly the Marcos government’s insistence that the proposed autonomy be subject to a plebiscite in the provinces covered by the agreement), however, led to the MNLF’s withdrawal from the peace negotiations. The plebiscite process
nevertheless went ahead, without the participation of the MNLF and its supporters, and two autonomous regional governments were set up in administrative regions IX (Western Mindanao) and XII (Central Mindanao) – though they lacked popular support and adequate resources. The Marcos presidency also saw the growing politicization of tribal Filipinos/cultural communities, particularly in the Cordilleras where an armed insurgency, led by the Cordillera Peoples Alliance and supported by the Communist New Peoples Army, emerged, primarily to resist encroachments on ancestral land. Following the ‘People Power Revolution’ of 1986 a new constitution made special provision to create areas of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao and Sulu (the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, ARMM) and northern Luzon (the Cordillera Autonomous Region, CAR), and assigned to them a range of legislative powers.[1] Self-exiled MNLF leader Nur Misuari returned to the Philippines in 1986 to take part in talks with President Aquino, but the two failed to reach an agreement on the content of the proposed Muslim autonomy. The 1987 constitution provided that Congress legislate an organic act for each region, with the assistance of a regional consultative commission created for this purpose. At least in the case of the ARMM, the implementation of the constitutional provision was a deeply flawed process, but by 1989 an organic act had been drafted and put to a plebiscite in the thirteen provinces and nine cities of central and western Mindanao and Sulu listed in the Tripoli Agreement, on the basis that only those provinces and cities voting to do so would become part of the ARMM. The MNLF (which by then had split into three factions) boycotted the poll, and in the event only four provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi) and no cities voted to join the autonomous region. As with the regional governments established earlier under the Marcos government, the ARMM thus lacked popular legitimacy and, with limited authority and funding, proved largely ineffective. In the Cordilleras, an Interim Cordillera Regional Administration was established in 1986, but there too the consultative process proved acrimonious. An organic law was eventually drafted and submitted to plebiscite in 1990, but of the five provinces and one city in the region only one province (Ifugao) voted for the autonomous region. In 1992, following the election of President Fidel Ramos, negotiations with the MNLF were reopened, with the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) playing a facilitative role. These initiatives culminated in 1996 in the signing of a Peace Agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF. The agreement, which was subtitled ‘The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement’, provided for the creation of a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) covering the area defined
in the Tripoli Agreement, and a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) with authority to ‘control and/ or supervise… appropriate agencies of the government that are engaged in peace and development activities in the area [of the SZOPAD]’. Provision was also made for a Consultative Assembly, headed by the chair of the SPCPD and dominated by members of the MNLF, for a Darul Iftah (religious advisory council) appointed by the SPCPD chair, and for the integration of 7500 former MNLF (Bangsa Moro Army) fighters into the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. Potential jurisdictional problems between the ARMM and the SPCPD were avoided when Misuari, having returned from them Middle East, was appointed chair of the SPCPD and subsequently elected governor of the ARMM. However, a crucial provision of the 1996 Peace Agreement was that which required a referendum, to be held within two years of the establishment of the SPCPD, seeking approval to extend the ARMM to cover the area of the SZOPAD. The 1996 Agreement was greeted by many as a major step towards a final settlement of the conflict. But those familiar with the history of the Moro struggle could foresee a number of looming problems. For one, the agreement was specifically with the MNLF. Although the MNLF was the faction of the Moro movement recognized by the OIC (which therefore locked the Philippines government into negotiations with the MNLF), by the mid 1990s the other major faction, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), was almost certainly the more powerful group. The MILF was not a party to the 1996 agreement and had vowed to continue the armed struggle. In December 1997, the chairman of the MILF, the late Hashim Salamat, revived the demand for an independent Islamic state. Secondly, there was considerable popular opposition to the 1996 Agreement among Christian communities within the SZOPAD and among members of Congress. As a result of this, the executive order (EO 371) intended to give effect to the Peace Agreement was a substantially watered down version of the agreement signed with Misuari, which was a source of frustration to the Moro leadership. Thirdly, there was no reason to believe that the mandated referendum – which was put off until August 2001 – would yield a result any different from that of previous referenda on Muslim autonomy. Added to this, the SPCPD/ARMM leadership complained that it did not receive adequate funding to fulfil its goals, and expected foreign capital inflows did not materialize. In March 1999 Misuari warned that if conditions did not improve former MNLF fighters would return to the hills. Moreover, the MNLF leadership of the SPCPD was accused of inefficiency, mismanagement and nepotism, and Misuari’s personal leadership came under attack. In 2001 the required referendum was finally conducted, and predictably only five of the now fifteen provinces and one of the nine cities voted for an
expanded ARMM. Shortly after this Misuari returned to armed insurgency, and is currently serving a prison sentence. The ARMM continues to function, but with little popular support, while the MILF (with whom the Philippine government is currently negotiating) operates as a virtual autonomous region within the autonomous region. In 1997, the year after the Moro peace agreement, the Philippine Congress legislated to create the Cordillera Autonomous Region and another plebiscite was held. The plebiscite again failed to approve the CAR, which continues to operate as one of the country’s seventeen administrative regions. The long saga of attempts to use autonomy arrangements as a means of dealing with ethnic cleavages and ethno-regional separatism in the Philippines thus provides little ground for optimism. It is against this background that from around the late 1990s the idea of federalism began to gain support in the Philippines. Administrative decentralization and the Local Government Code[2] As noted above, the Spanish colonial regime established an administrative structure based on the barangay, with municipalities and provinces between the barangays and the central government. This structure was broadly maintained by the US, though with the special arrangements described above for the Moros and other nonChristian tribes, and the broad features of this system were inherited by the independent republic in 1946. After independence, a measure of decentralization was enacted through the Local Autonomy Act, the Decentralisation Act and other legislation, but the local government units (LGUs – the barangays, municipalities and provinces) were supervised through the Office of the President and governance remained strongly centralized. At the municipal and provincial level, however, politics was frequently dominated by prominent local families. During the Marcos presidency (1966-1986) there were further moves to decentralize: the ‘martial law constitution’ of 1973 ‘guaranteed and promoted’ the autonomy of LGUs; a system of ‘barangay democracy’ was introduced by presidential decree; and a Local Government Code was enacted in 1983. But in practice, even though the Philippine state remained fairly weak, political power was centralized, with patronage networks used to ensure the compliance of local officials. Also, in 1972 the Marcos government created a structure of eleven regions, as a basis for economic planning and general administration. Following the People Power Revolution, a new Local Government Code was enacted in 1991 which provided for a substantial decentralization of responsibility for the delivery of basic services in health, education, social welfare, agriculture, public works, and environment and natural resources,
with a corresponding increase in the allocation of funds to LGUs. Reflecting the new government’s commitment to ‘people empowerment’, the 1991 Code also provided for enhanced participation in local governance by NGOs and POs (people’s organizations) and the private sector generally. Amendments to the Code in 1995 strengthened the decentralization of the system. In the words of the Local Government Code, 1991 ‘the barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in the community, and as a forum where the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallised and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled’. Each barangay has a legislative body (sangguniang barangay) comprising the chief executive (punong barangay), seven elected members and the chair of the local youth organization. The Code also provides for a barangay assembly, composed of all residents of the barangay aged over fourteen years, which is required to meet at least twice a year to consider reports of the sangguniang and discuss problems affecting the barangay; itmay initiate legislation. Formal provision is made for local dispute settlement. At present there are about 45,000 barangays. Above the barangays are municipalities, whose function is stated to be ‘primarily as a general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its territorial jurisdiction’. Each municipality is headed by a mayor and a vice mayor, and has its own legislature (sangguniang bayan) comprising elected members from the municipality’s barangays, the presidents of the municipal league of barangays and youth federation, and three sectoral representatives. The vice mayor presides over the sangguniang while the mayor exercises ‘general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the municipal government’. Although formally responsible to the sangguniang bayan, the mayor has always been a powerful local figure in Philippines politics, and the Local Government Code gives the municipality, and its chief executive, extensive powers. Currently there are 1543 municipalities. Cities in the Philippines are divided into two categories: ‘highly urbanized cities’ and ‘component cities’. Both are described, like municipalities, as serving ‘as a general purpose government’. Each city is headed by an elected mayor and vice mayor. The latter presides over a sangguniang panlungsod, whose composition mirrors that of other local assemblies. The mayor, as chief executive, has powers parallel to those of other chief executives of LGUs. There are 65 highly urbanized cities, which are independent of provincial authority and exercise equivalent functions and responsibilities. Component cities (of which there are many) come under the supervision of the provinces and are similar in structure and function to
municipalities. Provinces are at the top of the LGU structure.There are 79 of them. Each is headed by an elected governor and vice governor and has a legislature (sangguniang panlalawigan) composed of elected members from the provinces, municipalities and component cities, the presidents of the provincial barangay federation and the provincial youth federation, and three sectoral representatives. The vice governor presides over the sangguniang, while the governor appoints all officials and employees whose salaries derive from provincial funds. The provincial governor is a person of significant power and authority in the Philippines, and an important link between the national government and the municipalities. Even at the provincial level, higher offices are frequently dominated by powerful local dynasties, notwithstanding post-1986 legislation designed to reduce the political power of local elite families. Authority to exercise ‘general supervision’ over LGUs resides with the president, but is delegated through the Department of Interior and Local Government. All LGUs have exclusive powers to raise revenue from specified taxes, fees and charges, and may raise loans, accept overseas development assistance, and participate in certain joint-venture business operations. However, the majority of LGU funding (currently around 60 per cent) comes from unconditional block grants from the national government. After a good deal of initial enthusiasm for the 1991 Local Government Code, critics of the decentralization arrangements were quick to emerge. It was noted that provisions for representation of civil society organizations had not always been implemented, that local development councils and other bodies were often ineffective, and that local youth councils were frequently dominated by the children of the political elite (see, for example, Turner 1999). Critics on the left argued that the Code had simply delivered greater power to local dynasties and ‘warlords’. Generally, however, assessments of the decentralization initiatives of 1991 and 1995 have been positive; indeed, in announcing her support for federalism in 2005, President MacapagalArroyo specifically referred to the success of decentralization in the Philippines. It should also be noted that since 1972 the administrative regions established by Marcos – named Region I to Region XI (to which was added Region XII in 1975) – have acquired some degree of local identity, and seem to be referred to increasingly by locality (for example, ‘Region I (Ilocos)’, ‘Region II (Cagayan Valley)’, etc). Moreover, recent additions (there are now seventeen regions) have been given titles (mostly acronyms from the constituent provinces) which identify them with the locality – ARMM, CAR, National Capital Region (NCR), Caraga (Region XIII), CALABARZON and MIMAROPA (Regions IV-A and IV-B, formerly the single region of Southern
Tagalog) and SOCCSKSARGEN (the provinces remaining in Region XII (Central Mindanao) following the creation of the ARMM in 1990). In what little discussion there has been about what might constitute the component units of a federal system, the regions seem to have emerged as the appropriate starting point. The idea of federalism in the Philippines While the Philippines has never had a federal system, the federal idea is not entirely new. During the Philippines Revolution against Spain, the first Philippines Republic established at Biak-na-Bato by revolutionary leader General Emilio Aguinaldo had a federal constitution. The republic lasted only six weeks, its leaders going into exile in Hong Kong, but when Aguinaldo returned the following year to proclaim Philippines independence the Biak-na-Bato federal constitution was revived. The ‘Malolos Constitution’ approved by the Revolutionary Congress in 1899, however, was not federal, though Aguinaldo recognized the separate status of the Moros and proposed that the new government be empowered to negotiate with the Moros ‘for the purposes of establishing national solidarity upon the basis of a real federation with absolute respect for their beliefs and traditions’ (quoted in Canoy 1987:6970). The Moros declined negotiation, and in the event the revolution ended when the United States took control of the Philippines. Several ‘little republics’ set up during the revolution quickly faded away, though the ‘Negros Republic’ survived until [1901?], anticipating statehood within a federal Philippines republic. The US, despite its own experience of federal government, did not pursue the federal idea. Seventy years later, delegates to a constitutional convention set up by the Marcos government voiced some support for a federal system – delegate Antonio de las Alas, for example, argued for a Swiss-style confederation of twenty autonomous states, and Salvador Araneta proposed (under what he called the ‘Bayanikasan Constitution’) a federal republic comprising five states, to be introduced in ten to twenty years.[3] But in 1972 Marcos declared martial law and the constitutional convention lapsed. Following the People Power Revolution, in 1986 a Mindanao People’s Democratic Movement (later renamed Mindanao Independence Movement) emerged, with the declared intention of establishing a Federal Republic of Mindanao, with ‘proportionate cultural representation’ of Christians, Muslims and Highlanders (tribal groups/cultural communities). The movement was led by Mindanao politician and former Marcos oppositionist Reuben Canoy,[4] who in 1986 was involved in an abortive attempt to set up an independent state of Mindanao (see May 1992:137-138).
In the late 1980s and early 1990s there was some discussion of ‘federalization’, notably in the advocacy of the political group, Unlad Bayan, led by businessman Enrique Zobel, and in a scholarly article by Rizal Buendia (1989). Proposals for a federal system emerged again in the late 1990s. The case for federalism was argued (if at all) largely in terms of resolving the continuing problems of separatism in Muslim Mindanao, though probably the most prominent advocate of federalism was Senator John Osmeña, a member of the clan which has dominated politics in the Visayan province of Cebu for most of the past century[5]. Another advocate was Aquilino Pimentel, like Canoy a Mindanao politician and former Marcos oppositionist, who became minister for local government in the Aquino government and was principal author of the Local Government Code of 1990, before becoming president of the Senate. In 2000 Senators Pimentel, Osmeña and Francisco Tatad proposed a bill to establish federal government and the chair of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, promised to call for a constitutional convention to consider the proposal, but the initiative lapsed. About this time also, political scientist and former university of the Philippines president, Jose V. Abueva published a seminal article which supported a shift to a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a parliamentary government, and presented a draft constitution for such a republic (Abueva 2001; also see Abueva 2000, 2005). Abueva’s proposal was presented to a Mindanao Stakeholders Forum in Cagayan de Oro City in 2001. In Mindanao two civil society organizations, Lihuk Pideral and Kusog Mindanaw emerged to push for a federal system; these gave birth to the national Citizens’ Movement for a Federal Philippines (CMFP), which was launched in Manila in February 2003. Over the following years the idea of federal government has gained ground. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Canadian government, and the German government have sponsored workshops to discuss federalism, and a range of NGOs has supported the idea. Most prominent in the advocacy of federalism has been the CMFP, convened by former Congressman Rey Magno Teves, who is also secretary-general of Kusog Mindanao. CMFP has a national steering committee, assisted by a ‘Resource and Advisory Pool of prominent citizens’ headed by Dr Abueva, and international linkages. Abueva is now founding president of the Kalayaan College in Marikina (Metro Manila), which hosts a Federalism Research Project. CMFP has a website (http://www.cmfp.ph/), which includes a ‘primer on federalism’, a number of pro-federalism articles, and a ‘CMFP Draft Constitution for a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a Parliamentary Government’ (based on Abueva’s 2001 draft, but revised to 14 February 2005), edited by Abueva. Towards the end of the presidency of Fidel Ramos, who succeeded ‘People
Power’ president, Corazon Aquino in 1992, there were proposals for a review (popularly referred to as ‘charter change’ or ‘cha-cha’) of the 1987 constitution. In 1997 a Peoples Initiative for Reform and Amendment gathered the constitutionally required number of signatures (12 per cent of registered voters) to petition for constitutional amendment, but the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Although Ramos had generally been considered a good and effective president, the suggestion of a charter change generated considerable angst, with a range of groups accusing Ramos of seeking to extend his term in office (under the 1987 a president may serve only a single seven-year term), and some even suggesting that he was on the verge of re-imposing martial law.[6] A consultative commission was created in 1999 by Ramos’s successor, Joseph Estrada, primarily to look at issues of national patrimony and economic reform, but little progress was made before Estrada’s term in office ended prematurely with the threat of impeachment. Proposals for charter change were revived by incoming president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2003. ‘Federalism’, she suggested, ‘will empower regional governments….bringing governance and public service closer to the people…reducing corruption and making government more responsive and accountable to the people’[7]. In the presidential election the following year she promised if elected to shift to a federal constitution as part of a wider constitutional reform. Macpagal-Arroyo was supported by House of Representatives Speaker Jose de Venecia, who in 2005 told an international conference on federalism that ‘Federalism is the best antidote to secession and separatism [in the Philippines]’; he described federalism as ‘the wave of the future’, and recommended it for Iraq and Myanmar[8]. In 2004 Constantino Jaraula, chair of the House Committee on Constitutional Amendments, introduced a concurrent resolution calling for constitutional change – specifically including a shift from a presidential and unitary system to a parliamentary and federal system. There followed a period of contention between members of the house, who favoured convening Congress as a constituent assembly, and senators, who mostly demanded a constitutional convention. Eventually, in her state of the nation address in July 2005, President Macapagal-Arroyo suggested that it was ‘time to start the great debate on charter change’. The president went on to say: The economic progress and social stability of the provinces, along with the increasing self-reliance and efficiency of political developments and public services there, make a compelling case for federalism. Perhaps it’s time to take the power from the center to the countryside that feeds it. In August 2005 President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed a Consultative Commission (ConCom) to conduct consultations and studies and propose
constitutional amendments and revisions, ‘principally the proposals to shift from the presidential-unitary system to a parliamentary-federal system of government’[9]. The 54-person commission, chaired by Professor Abueva, reported in December 2005 (see below). There appeared to be a good deal of support for the proposed parliamentaryfederal charter change; nevertheless, as happened with former president Ramos, there was also some strong opposition. President Macapagal-Arroyo has been accused by her critics of ‘cheating’ in the 2004 presidential election (which she won by a fairly narrow margin) and there have been allegations of corruption against her husband. In the cynical climate of Philippine politics, her opponents have accused Macapagal-Arroyo of using charter change as a political diversion and, having failed in an impeachment bid, called on her to step down. Perennial rumours of an imminent military coup surfaced again in the latter part of 2005. In the event, however, these moves have not derailed the charter change process. The debate Why federalism? An annotated CMFP draft constitution, edited by the CMFP’s advisory committee chairman, Abueva, lists six advantages of federalism: First, a Federal republic will build a just and enduring framework for peace through unity in our ethnic religious, and cultural diversity, especially in relation to Bangsa Moro or Muslim Filipinos. Responsive Federalism will accommodate their legitimate interests, end the war in Mindanao, and discourage secessionism. Second, Federalism will empower our citizens by enabling them to raise their standard of living and enhance their political awareness, participation and efficacy in elections and the making of important government decisions. Governance will be improved and corruption will be reduced…. Third, Federalism will improve governance by empowering and challenging State and local leaders and entrepreneurs around the country….the people will be more willing to pay taxes that will finance government programs and services for their direct benefit. Fourth, Federalism will hasten the county’s development….There will be inter-State and regional competition in attracting domestic and foreign investments and industries, professionals and skilled workers, good teachers and scholars, artists, and tourists. A renaissance of regional languages and cultures will enrich the national language and culture. The Federal Government will help support the less endowed and developed regions, and
the poor and the needy across the land…. Fifth, Federalism, together with parliamentary government, will improve governance promoting the development of program-oriented political parties that are responsible and accountable t the people for their conduct and performance in and out of power. Sixth, Federalism will broaden and deepen democracy and make its institutions deliver on the constitutional promise of human rights, a better life for all, a just and humane society, and responsible and accountable political leadership and governance (CMFP Draft Constitution February 2005:4-5). ‘A Primer on Constitutional Reform/FAQ [frequently asked questions]’ by the Institute of Popular Democracy, headed by academic activist Joel Rocamora, asks, ‘Why a federal system of government in the Philippines?’ and ‘What are the advantages of Federal System of Government?’. It answers: The present unitary and centralized form of government of the Philippines is a remnant of its colonial past. It continues to be used as a tool for domination and control…. …the federal system will foster closer dialogue and interaction between the people and regional leaders because the locus of power is physically closer to the people and it provides a list of advantages similar that of the CMFP. The specific expectation that federalism would help solve the Mindanao conflict has been a recurring theme in the discussion. It is an argument that has been made by Pimentel and by Teves, and also by prominent Muslim lawyer and former Congressman Datu Michael Mastura, who described federalism as ‘the antidote to secession’[10]; more importantly it is a view that was endorsed as early as 1997 by MNLF leader Misuari and also by the late MILFleader Salamat[11], and more recently by the Ulama League of the Philippines[12], the chair of the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (Macapanton Abbas), the Mindanao Bishops-Ulama Conference, the attorney general of the ARMM (Jose Lorena), and the newly formed Muslim Movement for Federal Philippines chaired by Farouk Sampao. Lorena, for example, argues that under the present autonomy arrangements the ARMM is treated as a local government under the supervision of the national government, whereas in a federal system it would have sovereignty within its own sphere of responsibilities. The argument has been questioned, however, by Mindanao-based lawyer and academic Benedicto Bacani (see Bacani 2003, 2004). Bacani compares the powers of the ARMM under the present organic law and those under the proposed [CMFP] draft constitution, and concludes that ‘there are features in the Organic law that provide for a higher level of self-determination than in the proposed federal system’; perhaps, he
suggests, the failure of the present autonomy lies not in autonomy as a framework but in its operationalization (2004:133). What form might federalism take? As revised to 14 February 2005, the ‘CMFP Draft Constitution for a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a Parliamentary Government’ envisages a Federal Republic of the Philippines (Ang Republica Federal ng Pilipinas) with a federal or national government (Gobyerno Federal) and ten states (Estados). The proposed ten states are: Bangsamoro (ARMM); Central and Southern Mindanao (Regions XI, XII); Northern and Western Mindanao (Regions IX and X and Caraga); Eastern Visayas (Region VII); Western Visayas-Palawan (Region IV and part of Region VI); Bicol (Region V and part of Region IV); Southern Luzon (most of Region IV); Metro Manila; Central Luzon (Region III), and Northern Luzon and Cordillera (Region I and CAR). (A later [June 2005] paper by Abueva refers to eleven states, with Northern Luzon and CAR becoming separate states.) It is proposed to establish a federal capital, New Manila, within the Clark Special Economic Zone, north of Manila (fortuitously, in the home province – Pampanga – of President Macapagal-Arroyo). The draft constitution proposes a distribution of powers and functions, with thirty-three subjects listed for exclusive federal jurisdiction, twenty-eight subjects listed for primary state jurisdiction, and another twenty-three areas for concurrent jurisdiction. The CMFP draft constitution proposes a bicameral federal parliament, with a House of the People (Balay Sambayanan), elected mostly from parliamentary districts but in part (60 out of up to 350 members) also on proportional representation from a party list vote, and a Balay Estados or Senate, to represent the states and protect their rights and interests. The senators, it is proposed, will be elected by the unicameral state assemblies (batasang estados) – two to three per state – ‘mostly from among their members’. The draft constitution makes provision for the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system at both levels of government. The chief executives of the states will have the title of ‘governor’. In a paper prepared by Abueva it was suggested that ‘A transition period is needed to enable the Federal Government and the various states to prepare for, and adjust to, the redistribution of powers, functions and tax bases between the Federal Government (National Government) and the several States (Regional Governments) and their local governments’ and that ‘The actual formation of the individual States shall depend upon their relative political, economic, fiscal, and administrative capabilities to govern themselves as autonomous regional governments and territories’. It is proposed that the ‘more developed and ready’ become fully operative in the
first five years following ratification of the revised constitution, and the ‘less developed’ in the next five years. However, the Bangsamoro and Cordillera states (which are amongst the least developed) should be enabled to become operative in the first five years. The CMFP proposed the holding of a plebiscite in 2007 (when national elections are scheduled) to ratify the proposed revision of the 1987 constitution.) The report of the Consultative Commission The Consultative Commission commenced work in September 2005, setting up three committees – on national patrimony and economic reforms, form of government, and structure of the republic – and a sub-committee on transitory provisions, and holding several regional consultations. It reported on schedule in mid December. The Commission has recommended a unicameral national parliament, with the majority of members voted from district constituencies but 30 per cent of members elected on a party list basis. A prime minister is to be elected by all MPs, and will appoint a cabinet, at least 75 per cent of whom are to be MPs. A presidential head of state is to be elected by MPs. On the proposed shift to a federal system, however, divisions emerged within the Commission. It was apparent from the outset that several members of the Commission had doubts about the federal idea, though in November Abueva reported that a ‘clear majority’ of people consulted strongly or very strongly favoured a shift to a federal system after a ten year transition (Zamboanga providing a notable exception[13]). These differences became more apparent in the days preceding the submission of the report. On 9 December it was reported that one commissioner, Camaguin Provincial Governor Pedro Romualdo, had said that ‘The federal structure is a beautiful mechanism for fragmenting the country’. Romualdo argued that resources were lacking and without adequate resources states could not be effective as independent entities; he cited the ARMM as ‘a classic case of failure’ and called instead for a strengthening of LGUs. Other commissioners suggested that if each state could draft its own legislation it would be difficult to harmonize laws nationally – even that autonomous states could ‘seek from outside countries implicated in terrorism activities funding assistance for development’. In the event, it was reported that the commissioners had unanimously agreed ‘to junk the mandatory switch to federalism’ as proposed by Abueva and instead approved ‘a gradual constituent-initiated transition to federalism[14]’. In fact, the Commission’s report makes scant reference to federalism, though
provision is made for its eventual realization. In a section on ‘Autonomous Territories’ (Article XII B), the proposed revision of the 1987 constitution says: SEC. 12. An autonomous territory may be created in any part of the country upon a petition addressed to Parliament by a majority of contiguous, compact and adjacent provinces, highly urbanized and component cities, and cities and municipalities in metropolitan areas through a resolution of their respective legislative bodies. In exceptional cases, a province may be established as an autonomous territory based on area, population, necessity, geographical distance, environmental, economic and fiscal viability and other special attributes. SEC. 13. Within one year from the filing of the bill based upon the petitions and initiatives, Parliament shall pass an organic act which shall define the basic structure of government for the autonomous territory, consisting of a unicameral territorial assembly whose members shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall provide for courts consistent with the provisions of their constitution and national laws. The creation of the autonomous territories shall be effective when ratified by a majority of the votes cast by their proposed constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The autonomous territory assemblies will have legislative power in the following areas (SEC. 16): 1. Administrative organization, planning, budget and management; 2. Creation of sources of revenues and finance; 3. Agriculture and fisheries; 4. Natural resources, energy, technologies and inventions;
environment,
indigenous
appropriate
5. Trade, industry and tourism; 6. Labour and employment; 7. Public works, transportation, except railways, shipping and aviation; 8. Health and social welfare; 9. Education and the development of language, culture and the arts as part
of the cultural heritage; 10. Ancestral domain and natural resources; 11. Housing, land use and development; 12. Urban and rural planning and development; and 13. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the autonomous territory. In the event of inconsistency between national and autonomous territory/local government laws, the former will prevail. No mention is made of concurrent powers. Under ‘Transitory Provisions’ (Article XX, SEC. 15, 16), the proposed revision of the constitution stipulates that within one year and after at least 60 per cent of provinces, highly urbanized cities and component cities have petitioned through their regional assemblies for the creation of autonomous territories, parliament will enact the basic law for the establishment of a Federal Republic of the Philippines, in which the autonomous territories will become federal states. To this end, a constitutional preparatory commission will be appointed by the prime minister to study and determine all constitutional, legal, financial, organizational, administrative, and other requirements necessary or appropriate for a smooth and orderly transition to the Federal Republic. Special provision is made (SEC. 14) for the ARMM to ‘exercise the powers and…be entitled to benefits given to autonomous territories’. There is nothing in the proposed revision of the constitution to suggest how many autonomous territories there should be, or how they should be constituted, and critical issues such as intergovernmental financial arrangements are left for future discussion. Controversially, the national election scheduled for 2007 is now to be held in 2010. In the meantime, members of House and the Senate will become members of an interim parliament, which will elect an interim prime minister, and the president will appoint a cabinet from among the MPs. Amendment or revision of the 1987 constitution may be proposed by a 75 per cent vote of all members of Congress or a constitutional convention; ratification requires a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. Will federalism work? Considering the apparent groundswell of support for a federal system in the Philippines (at least prior to December 2005), it may seem churlish to
question the idea. Nevertheless, for anyone familiar with the history of federal experiments in the latter half of the twentieth century, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the advantages claimed for federal over unitary systems read more like statements of faith than reasoned arguments. This is the more so given the long history of unsuccessful autonomy arrangements in the Philippines, and the already high degree of decentralization (at least on paper) prescribed by the amended Local Government Code. If autonomy arrangements specifically directed to the demands of Philippine Muslims, and arising from negotiations intended to secure a peaceful settlement to the armed conflict, have fallen short of expectations and failed to produce a lasting settlement, what chance is there that the establishment of ten or so states in a federal republic will, incidentally, solve the ‘Moro problem’?[15] Most of the prospective benefits claimed – the ability to use shari’ah law (with safeguards for non-Muslim minorities), the boosting of local cultures, greater popular participation in politics, the possibility of pursuing appropriate development paths, and the promise of fiscal redistribution – are all available under existing political arrangements. If the CAR has twice rejected autonomy, why should federalism be any more attractive? If decentralization to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays has failed to deliver sufficient participation, transparency, accountability, fiscal redistribution, competition, and checks on corruption, why should the creation of another layer of government do so? Although Abueva and Rocamora have made some attempt to rationalize their list of advantages for federalism, the case has not been strongly argued. Social engineering, through a shift from unitary to federal government, will not necessarily change entrenched patterns of political behaviour; indeed (as with the decentralization of 1990) the transfer of powers and functions to states may well strengthen the position of local elite families. Some cynics argue that this has been one source of the demand for federalism. Moreover, some of the bigger, and more intractable, questions have yet to be addressed. The question of how many states and how they are constituted is unlikely to resolved easily (though the CMFP proposals for ten or eleven states provide a good starting point). And, as in federal and federal-type systems everywhere, the question of intergovernmental fiscal relations will be vexed (as it already is under the Local Government Code). The CMFP claims that, ‘The Federal Government will help support the less endowed and developed regions, and the poor and the needy across the land’, but to date there is little historical basis for such optimism. At the same time, some of the opposition to federalism which emerged in the final stages of the Consultative Commission’s work in December 2005 seemed to derive more from ignorance (or more venal motives) than from a reasoned assessment of arguments.
The push for federalism, largely as a response to ethnic or regional tensions, is enjoying something of a renaissance, from Solomon Islands to Iraq – though there is little evidence that those espousing it have referred to the literature on failed federalism in the second half on the twentieth century (see, for example Franck 1968; Hazlewood 1967; May 1970; etc). Whether or not the Philippines will be a federal republic in 2010 remains to be seen. Certainly the CMFP’s proposals that there be a transitional period to develop support for the idea, and that the achievement of statehood be geared to individual states’ capabilities (though likely to prove contentious) are to be commended. In the meantime, if the issues do not get lost in the personalistic politics that has characterized the Philippines for some decades, there should be some interesting debates. -------------------------------References Abueva, Jose V., 2000. ‘Transforming our unitary system to a federal system: a pragmatic, developmental approach’. (Downloaded from CMFP website.) Abueva, Jose V., 2001. ‘Towards a Federal Republic of the Philippines’, IBP [Integrated Bar of the Philippines] Law Journal 27(2):1-30. Abueva, Jose V., 2005. ‘Some advantages of federalism and parliamentary government for the Philippines’. (Downloaded from CMFP website.) Araneta, Salvador, 1962. ‘Our constitutional heritage’, Philippines Law Journal 37(3):439-444. Bacani, Benedicto R., 2003. ‘Federalism vs. autonomy: roadmaps to peace’. ARMM Roundtable Series No.6. Cotabato City: Notre Dame University. Bacani, Benedicto R., 2004. Beyond Paper Autonomy. The Challenge in Southern Philippines. Cotabato City: Center for Autonomy and Governance, Notre Dame University College of Law. Buendia, Rizal G., 1989. ‘The prospects for federalism in the Philippines: a challenge to political decentralization of the unitary state’, Philippine Journal of Public Administration 33(2)121-141. Canoy, Reuben R., 1987. The Quest for Mindanao Independence. Cagayan de Oro: Mindanao Post Publishing Company.
De Guzman, Raul P., Reforma, Mila M. and Panganiban, Elana M., 1988. ‘Local government’, in de Guzman and Reforma (eds), Government and Politics in the Philippines. Singapore: Oxford University Press, pp. 207-240. De Venecia, Jose, 2005. ‘Federalism as the wave of the global future. Statement of Hon. Jose de Venecia, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, Republic of the Philippines. Third International Conference on Federalism at the E u r o p e a n Parliament, Brussels, 3 March 2005’. Unpublished paper. Franck, T.M. (ed.), 1968. Why Federations Fail. An Inquiry into the Requisites of Successful Federalism. New York: New York University Press. Fry, Howard T., 1983. A History of the Mountain Province. Quezon City: New day Publishers. Gowing, Peter G., 1977. Mandate in Moroland. The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920. Quezon City: Philippine Center for advanced Studies, University of the Philippines System. Hazlewood, A. (ed.), 1967. African Integration and Disintegration. Case Studies in Economic and Political Union. London: Oxford University Press. Lopez, Violeta B., 1976. The Mangyans of Mindoro: An Ethnology. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press. May, R.J., 1970. ‘Decision making and stability in federal systems’, Canadian Journal of Political Science 3(1):73-87. May, R.J., 1992. ‘The wild west in the south: a recent political history of Mindanao’, in Mark Turner, R.J. May and Lulu Respall Turner (eds), Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise. Quezon City:New Day Publishers, pp.125-146. May, R.J., 2002. ‘Governance and social safety nets in the Philippines’ in OECD, Towards Asia’s Sustainable Development. The Role of Social Protection. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, pp.91-113. Rood, Steven, 1991. ‘Decentralization, democracy and development’, in David G. Timberman (ed.), The Philippines. New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp.111-135.
Santuario, Edmundo, 2001. ‘Federalism: antidote to separatism?’ and ‘A crisis needing a surgical solution’, Bulatlat 10, 11 (20-26 April and 27 April- 3 May) [available at http://www.bulatlat.com/ archive/]. Sosmeña, Gaudioso C., 1991. Decentralization and Empowerment. Manila: Local Government Development Foundation. Tapales, Proserpina Domingo, Cuaresma, Jocelyn C. and Cabo, Wilhelmina L., 1998. Local Government in the Philippines: A Book of Readings. Quezon City: Center for Local and Regional Governance and National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines. Turner, Mark, 1999. ‘Philippines: from centralism to localism’, in Turner (ed.), Central-Local Relations in Asia Pacific. Convergence or Divergence? Houndmills: Macmillan Press, pp.97-122.
[1] The eight areas listed covered administrative organization; sources of revenues; ancestral domain and natural resources; personal, family, and property relations; urban and rural planning; economic, social, and tourism development; educational policies; preservation and development of cultural heritage; and ‘ such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region’. Responsibility for the preservation of peace and order within the regions was also given to the local police agencies. [2] This section draws on previously published material in May (2002). For a more detailed account see Turner (1999), de Guzman et al. (1988), Osmeña (1991), Rood (1998), Tapales et al. (1998). [3] For an account of the Bayanikasan Constitution see Lina AranetaSantiago on inq7.net posted 28 July 2005 ( http://news.inq7.net/viewpoints/ index.php?index=1&story_id=45090). Also see Araneta (1962). [4] Canoy’s case for Mindanao’s independence, together with a copy of the proposed constitution, are set out in Canoy (1987). [5] Other members of the Osmeña clan also supported federalism, notably former Cebu governor and presidential candidate Emilio ‘Lito’ Osmeña, who founded the regional political party PROMDI and at one stage called for an independent Republic of Cebu. [6] General Ramos had been head of the Philippine Constabulary under President Marcos but, facing arrest, had switched sides to the Marcos opposition in 1986, helping to precipitate the revolt on EDSA. [7] http://www.newsflash.org/2004/02/be/be002800.htm. [8] See de Venecia (2005), summarized at http://www.congress.gov.ph/press/details.php?pressid=611.
[9] ‘Executive Order No.453 Creating a Consultative Commission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution in Consultation with Various Sectors of Society’, 19 August 2005. EO 453 was amended by EO 453A in October to increase the maximum membership from fifty to fiftyfive. [10] Quoted in Santuario (2001). [11] According to IslamOnline.net, Misuari has become ambivalent on the subject, and MILF spokesman Eid Kabalu does not support federalism. See http://islamonline.net/English/News/2005-08/28/article02.shtml. [12] See, for example, Philippine Daily Inquirer 3 November 2004, p.A19. [13] See www.news.ops.gov.ph/archives2005/nov09.htm. Zamboanga – a predominantly Christian area in a region of traditional Muslim influence – had been strongly opposed to the terms of the agreement negotiated with Misuari in 1996. [14] The quotations here are taken from the Consultative Commission’s website, which provided a daily news coverage of the Commission’s work (see http://www.concom.ph/news/). [15] Bacani (2004:134) similarly asks: ‘If the Bangsamoro state is established with the other states in a Federal Philippines, will not the unique reason for its existence as fought for by the Moros for many years be lost in the broad sweep of a national federal set-up? If autonomy cannot be made to work in one region – the ARMM – how can the federal system bring development to eleven or more states? In these times of scarcity and need, when not enough budget support can be given the ARMM, will the Bangsamoro state further lag behind as resources are siphoned off to more developed regions?’ http://www.iag.org.ph/index.php/blog/444-federalism-versus-autonomydebate-and-practice-in-the-philippines Federalism: Its Advantages and Disadvantages { February 11, 2007 @ 4:30 pm } · { Political and Government Systems } February 7, 2007:Wednesday Federalism: Its Advantages and Disadvantages Lea Baluyot First what is federalism? Federalism is defining as the allocation of power between the national government and regional government. A system of government in which the power is divided between a central authority and constituent political units. Is it advisable for a country like us to adapt this kind of government? According to Jose Abueva, former president of University of the Philippines and a professor of public and administration we should take federal kind of government. He said that the Philippines would take a period of no less than 10 years to make a successful transition to federalism, involving a period of consolidation of several regions and intensive socioeconomic development in
each of consolidated regions. Advantages of federal government are the following: (1) It ensures that government remains close to the people because the state government argue that they are more in tune with the daily needs and aspirations of people especially relevant to small and isolated places. (2) It encourages development of the nation in a decentralized and regional manner and allows for unique and innovative methods for attacking social, economic and political problems. (3) It provides a barrier to the dominance of the majority, while the disadvantages are the following: (1) It can lead to duplication of government and inefficient, overlapping or contradictory policies in different parts of the country. (2) It can lead to inequality between the states and lead to unhealthy competition and rivalry between them. (3) It cal lead to over-government that will result to corruption. I have cited both faces of federal government in order to inform all of you that federal government is a good system of government and a good example of successful federal kind of government is the United States of America. But the question here is do we really need it? Is it advisable for our country to change the government into federal? On my point of view, we do not need here a change of government all we need is to strengthen the centralized government. And also it’s very expensive to have a federal kind of government. We have no enough funds because we are still paying our debts. We have already LGU’S and NGO’S to monitor the needs of people that have a power equal to the national government. We are making our situation complicated if we change our present government into federal. Lastly, the Philippines is a third world country and according to survey last September 16, 2006 we have 25 only of the world’s 193 countries have federal political system, and 3 out of 25 is belong in Asia. It only indicates that a third world country like us is not ready and cannot afford the federal government. https://bpspolitics.wordpress.com/2007/02/11/97/ Are Filipinos ready for federalism? By: Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco - @inquirerdotnet Philippine Daily Inquirer / 12:25 AM March 13, 2015 The campaign pushing Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte to run for president in 2016 rides on the advocacy for the Philippines to shift to a federal form of government. But supporters of the extremely popular mayor seem to think that the shift can happen easily, as if it were as simple as changing outfits. Unfortunately, this is not the case. For many countries, such as the United States, Malaysia, Australia and Germany, federalization was actually a state-building effort. Each began as a loose collection of disparate political entities that gradually, and with painful upheavals, transformed themselves into a unified nation-state through the process of federalization. ADVERTISEMENT
It would essentially be the reverse in our case. Consequently, we face a much harder, more complicated, and possibly harsher version of federalization. It is thus disconcerting that purported advocates of federalism seem oblivious to the gravity of this sociopolitical reform. They quickly harp on the promise of enhanced local autonomy without even considering the readiness of the local leadership to assume the big responsibility of local governments under federalism, as if the fitness of the current crop for this form of government were already a given. Note that one of the most important lessons in the discourse on the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law is the recognition of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao as a failed experiment. The lesson being: Increasing the autonomy of local governments will ultimately amount to nothing if local leaders are incompetent and incapable of properly utilizing expanded powers and resources. In fact, the overdependence of local government executives on the Internal Revenue Allotment and the continued existence of central-government largesse, or pork barrel funds, signify the stark reality that the development perspective of local leaders has not reached the level of sophistication necessary to sustain a federal government structure. Political dynasties constitute the unequivocal proof that the quality of our local leaders is still below par as far as federalism is concerned. According to a groundbreaking study by the Asian Institute of Management Policy Center in 2012 titled “An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress,” lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the communities governed by political dynasties. It would thus not be unfounded to conclude that federalizing with political dynasties still firmly entrenched in power would actually condemn the affected communities to perpetual poverty. It would certainly be justified to be concerned that federalizing with the quality of local leadership still at an untenable state would only make socioeconomic development more inequitable than it is. With these trepidations in mind, it is indeed very difficult to conceive of Filipinos as primed and ready for federalism. Still I maintain that the switch to a federal form of government is a constitutional reform that we can all rally behind. But we have to disabuse ourselves of the idea that the switch will be as effortless as turning on a light switch. Indeed, the primary task in the pursuit of this goal is to improve the quality of local leadership. Ardent believers of federalism can actively push for the enactment of these pieces of legislation: the Anti-Political Dynasty Law, the Freedom of Information Act and the Political Party Development Act of 2014. There are other ways of uplifting leadership standards for our governors and mayors. Nevertheless, these three laws are particularly vital because they impose structural reforms that can instigate drastic improvements to the way local
governance is currently conceived and delivered. However, I must emphasize, too, that the transition to federalism also requires the elevation of the electorate to a higher level of political consciousness. First and foremost, Filipinos must have a clear understanding of what this massive sociopolitical undertaking entails. And the best way to commence with this task is to abandon the populist approach that some supporters of federalism are taking. The obvious danger here is that rhetoric and sound bytes, while good for catching the media’s attention, could make a caricature of the advocacy and thus diminish its potency. I suggest a clinical and academic approach that would facilitate a circumspect and level-headed discussion on federalization among all sectors of Philippine society. Accordingly, I envisage a community congregation organized for such a purpose through the barangay-assembly apparatus and moderated by genuine promoters of federalization. Admittedly, dissecting the intricacies of federalism does not exactly fall within the powers of the barangay assembly under the Local Government Code (LGC). But this mechanism is still the most convenient way to gather ordinary citizens and give them the opportunity to speak out and be heard. After all the LGC itself considers the barangay a “forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered.” The desired result is for all Filipinos between Batanes and Tawi-Tawi to see themselves not as passive observers in the sidelines but as continuing stakeholders in the establishment of federalism in the country. Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco, a practicing lawyer, is the author of the book “Rethinking the Bangsamoro Perspective.” He conducts research on current issues in state-building, decentralization and constitutionalism. Read more: http://opinion.inquirer.net/83276/are-filipinos-ready-forfederalism#ixzz4PzPaEw1u Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook Will federalism address PH woes? Pros and cons of making the shift At least 3 presidential and vice presidential candidates in 2016 are pushing for a change in the Philippine system of government Pia Ranada and Nico Villarete Published 9:30 AM, January 31, 2016 Updated 2:18 AM, February 01, 2016 214 31K
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Some candidates in the 2016 national elections have been vocal about their support for federalism.
Presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte, and vice presidential bets Alan Peter Cayetano (his running mate) and Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr, in particular, have been championing it. Supporters of federalism say it will evenly distribute wealth across the country instead of the bulk going to "imperial" Manila. Detractors, like presidential candidate Grace Poe, say it will further entrench political dynasties in the regions and create confusion over responsibilities. Read on to find out more about federalism and its perceived advantages and disadvantages. What is federalism? It is a form of government where sovereignty is constitutionally shared between a central governing authority and constituent political units called states or regions. In basic terms, it will break the country into autonomous regions with a national government focused only on interests with nationwide bearing: foreign policy and defense, for example. The autonomous regions or states, divided further into local government units, will have primary responsibility over developing their industries, public safety, education, healthcare, transportation, recreation, and culture. These states will have more power over their finances, development plans, and laws exclusive to ther jurisdiction. The central government and states can also share certain powers. How is it different from what we have now? We presently have a unitary form of government. Most administrative powers and resources are with the national government based in Metro Manila. It's Malacañang that decides how much to give local government units. The process is prone to abuse, with governors and mayors sometimes having to beg Malacañang for projects they believe their communities need.
How local government units spend their budget has to be approved by the national government. In federalism, the states will have the power to make these decisions with little or no interference from the national government. Examples of federal countries: United States, Canada, Australia, Brazil, India, Malaysia.
PROS
Locals decide for themselves. Regions have their own unique problems, situations, geographic, cultural, social and economic contexts. Federalism allows them to create solutions to their own problems instead of distant Metro Manila deciding for them. The states can establish policies that may not be adopted nationwide. For example, liberal Metro Manila can allow same-sex marriage which the state of Bangsamoro, predominantly Muslim, would not allow. In the United States, some states like Colorado and Washington have legalized recreational marijuana even if other states have not. This makes sense in an archipelago of over 7,000 islands and 28 dominant ethnic groups. For decades, the national government has been struggling to address the concerns of 79 (now 81) provinces despite challenges posed by geography and cultural differences. With national government, and thus power, centered in Metro Manila, it's no surprise that development in the mega city has spiralled out of control while other parts of the country are neglected.
More power over funds, resources. Right now, local government units
can only collect real estate tax and business permit fees. In federalism, they can retain more of their income and are required to turn over only a portion to the state government they fall under. Thus, local governments and state governments can channel their own funds toward their own development instead of the bulk of the money going to the national government. They can spend the money on programs and policies they see fit without waiting for the national government's go signal.
Promotes specialization. The national and state governments can specialize in different policy domains. With most administrative powers now with the regional governments, the national government can focus on foreign policy, defense, and other nationwide concerns, like healthcare and taxation. States have more autonomy to focus on economic development using their core competencies and industries. The state of Central Luzon can focus on becoming an agricultural hub. The state of Mimaropa, home to Palawan, can choose to use eco-tourism as its primary launch pad.
Possible solution to the Mindanao conflict. The creation of the state of Bangsamoro within a federalist system may address concerns of separatists
who crave more autonomy over the administration of Muslim Mindanao.
Decongestion of Metro Manila. Through fiscal autonomy for state governments, federalism will more evenly distribute the country's wealth. In 2015, 35% of the national budget went to Metro Manila even if it represents only 14% of the Philippine population.
Lessens dependence on Metro Manila. When there is political upheaval in Metro Manila, other regions that have nothing to do with the chain of events are left waiting for the resources that ony the national government can release. With federalism, regions work independently of Metro Manila for most concerns.
Brings government closer to the people. If detractors say federalism will only make local political dynasties more powerful, supporters give the argument that, in fact, it will make all local leaders, including those part of political dynasties, more accountable to their constituents. State governments will no longer have any excuse for delays in services or projects that, in the present situation, are often blamed on choking bureaucracy in Manila. Assuming more autonomy for regions leads to economic development, there will be more incentive for Filipinos to live and work in regions outside Metro Manila. More investors may also decide to put up their businesses there, creating more jobs and opportunities to attract more people away from the jam-packed mega city.
Encourages competition. With states now more self-reliant and in control of their development, they will judge themselves relative to how their fellow states are progressing. The competitive spirit will hopefully motivate state leaders and citizens to level up in terms of quality of life, economic development, progressive policies, and governance.
CONS
Possibly divisive. Healthy competition among states can become alienating – creating rivalries and promoting the regionalism that some say already challenges the sense of unity in the country. It could enflame hostilities between ethnic groups in the country like Tagalogs, Cebuanos, Bicolanos, Ilocanos, Tausugs, and Zamboangueños.
Uneven development among states. Some states may not be as ready for autonomy as others. Some states may not be as rich in natural resources or skilled labor as others. States with good leaders will progress faster while states with ineffective ones will degrade more than ever because national government will not be there to balance them out. But in some federal countries, the national government doles out funds to help poorer states. A proposed Equalization Fund will use a portion of tax from rich states to be given to poorer states.
Confusing overlaps in jurisdiction. Where does the responsibility of state governments end and where does the responsibility of the national government begin? Unless these are very clearly stated in the amended Constitution, ambiguities may arise, leading to conflict and confusion. For instance, in times of disaster, what is the division of responsibilities between state and national governments?
May not satisfy separatists in Mindanao. Separatists are calling for their own country, not just a state that still belongs to a larger federal Philippines. Federalism may not be enough for them. After all, the conflict continues despite the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. How the Philippines would look when federal In some proposals, there will be 10 or 11 autonomous states. Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr envisioned 11 states plus the Federal Administrative Region of Metro Manila. Here's how the Philippines will look like as laid out in Pimentel's 2008 Joint Resolution Number 10.
Cost of federalism
Shifting to federalism won't come cheap. It would entail billions of pesos to set up state governments and the delivery of state services. States will then have to spend for the elections of their officials. Attempts at federalism in PH
There was an attempt during the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. One of her campaign promises was to reform the 1987 Constitution. A consultative commission she created recommended federalism as one of the goals of the proposed charter change. But the attempt failed because of opposition from various sectors who believed Arroyo wanted to use the reform to extend her term limit. (Note that shifting to a federal government does not necessarily mean an extension of term limits for the sitting president. Such an extension would only take place in a shift to a parliamentary government.) In 2008, Pimentel Jr and Bacolod City Representative Monico Puentevella filed joint resolutions to convene Congress into a constituent assembly with the goal of amending the constitution to establish a federal form of government. – Rappler.com
http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/120166-federalismpros-cons-explainer IS FEDERALISM FEASIBLE IN THE PHILIPPINES? FEBRUARY 23, 2015 / JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, LLM, DCL .entry-meta .entry-header “Federalism is a system of government in which the same territory is controlled by two levels of government. Generally, an overarching national government governs issues that affect the entire country, and smaller subdivisions govern issues of local concern. Both the national government and the smaller political subdivisions have the power to make laws and both have a certain level of autonomy from each other. The United States has a federal system of governance consisting of the national or federal government, and the government of the individual states” (Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute). Federalism is a proposed system of administration for the Philippines and a revision of the current 1987 constitution. In 2008, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. proposed Joint Resolution No. 10, which would have created eleven autonomous regions out of the Philippine Republic, establishing eleven centers of finance and development in the archipelago. According to the proponent, “by creating eleven federal states and by converting Metro Manila as a federal administrative region, we immediately establish 12 centers of power, finance and development throughout the country.” Its Explanatory Note states the following: XXX XXX XXX Whereas, the Constitution provides for a unitary system of government where the country’s development programs are centrally determined, planned, funded and implemented by the national government in Manila; Whereas, the concentration of such enormous powers in Manila has created only one center of finance and development in the country resulting in a highly centralized system of government; Whereas, the highly centralized system of government has brought about a spotty development of the nation where preferential treatment has been given to localities whose officials are friendly with or have easy access to an incumbent administration; Whereas, this lopsided arrangement has spawned a host of problems including massive nationwide poverty to runaway insurgencies and rebellions that feed on the societal inequalities in the nation; XXX XXX XXX Resolution No. 10 proposes to revise of 14 of the 18 Articles of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the addition of two new articles. It sought to
adopt a federal presidential bicameral form of government. This proposed bill was backed by 13 Senators who are Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Manuel Villar, Jr., Edgardo Angara, Pia Cayetano, Juan Ponce Enrile, Francis Escudero, Jinggoy Estrada, Gregorio Honansan II, Panfilo Lacson, Francis Pangilinan, Ramon Revilla, Jr., Rodolfo Biazon, and Juan Miguel Zubiri. Proposed administrative divisions are eleven States plus one federal administrative region for which Federal Administrative Region of Metro – Manila would have been patterned to the US Washington, D.C., and would have been the seat of the Federal government. The eleven States with Capital are Northern Luzon (Tuguegarao),Central Luzon (Tarlac City), Southern Tagalog (Trece Martires City), Mimaropa (Mamburao), Bicol (Legazpi), Eastern Visayas (Catbalogan), Central Visayas (Toledo), Western Visayas (Iloilo City), Northern Mindanao (Cagayan de Oro), Southern Mindanao (Davao City) and Bangsamoro (Cotabato City). Other major proposals are the election of senators based on states; the election of senators representing overseas voters; the election of the state governor and the vice-governor as a team; the abolition of the Judicial and Bar Council which screens nominees to the judiciary. House Concurrent Resolution No. 15 was filed by Rep. Monico O. Puentevella on May 7, 2008, which supported Senate Resolution No. 10 backed by 16 senators. Unlike the Nene Pimentel Senate Resolution, he included the option of holding a constitutional convention, but excluded the People’s Initiative mode. Congressman Prospero Nograles, a self-proclaimed advocate of federalism, on May 1, 2008, announced: “This federal system of government is close to my heart as a Mindanaoan leader and I’m sure most of the leaders in Mindanao will agree that we have long clamored for it. Senate Resolution 10 is a pleasant surprise because the Senate has a long history of opposing any move to amend the Constitution.” The joint Senate resolution called for the creation of 11 federal states in the country, by convening of Congress “into a constituent assembly for the purpose of revising the Constitution to establish a federal system of government.” President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo supported Senate Joint Resolution No. 10. Among her reasons are: 1. to bring about the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity; 2. to give opportunity to the whole country in availing the reform effects of federalism; 3. to give local officials more authority in order to perform better. Leftists and militants criticized the President’s support to be a mere ploy for her term extension to perpetuate in power as well as the removal of the protectionist provisions in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In 2008, former President Fidel Ramos said “the moves to amend the Constitution and change to a federal form of government must come only after 2010 to dispel speculations that President Arroyo is bent on staying in
power beyond her term”. In the same year, Senators Panfilo Lacson and Jinggoy Estrada threatened to withdraw their signatures on Resolution No. 10 and to re-think their position on Federalism since Malacañang has poisoned the resolution with its “malevolent” design to push for Charter Change. This month, the shift to a federal form of government in the Philippines is being pushed by Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, who is aspiring to run for President in 2016. In League of Cities in the Philippines et al. v. COMELEC et al., G.R. No. 176951, February 15, 2011, the petitioners expressed concerns that the share of legitimate cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) would decrease if the 16 “illegitimate” cities would be included in the computation. It can be deduced that there are many places in the country that are poor. The petitioner’s opposition showed the disunited provinces, cities, municipalities competing and fighting against each other for higher national taxes allotment share. This same scenario will happen with federalism, the rich places will oppose the poor ones, because they are not economically, politically, and socially equal. The choosing of the eleven Philippines States and the Capitals will be hotly contested causing dissension and disorder among local leaders and politicians. Many municipalities that applied for cityhood did not pass the income requirement in the Local Government Code that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. The Supreme Court noted that “Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality.” This is far from reality. Our country’s development policies and welfare programs are centralized and focused in Metro Manila where the national government is situated. Our country’s financial development is centered in Metro Manila. Special privileges were given to public officials who have easy access to any incumbent administration. The huge disparity of attention, privileges and treatment given to Metro Manila cause economic and social problems to places outside it. There is widespread countryside poverty. Poor people in the provinces are forced to be rebels who engage in illegal activities like extortion and robberies. Because of the inherent economic and social inequalities among the regions, cities, municipalities and towns as well as the Filipino people in such places, for example, the market value of the lands in the provinces outside Metro Manila are cheap which meant lower income incapacity of the people living there, Federalism will not succeed in the country as of today. The places outside Metro Manila have been neglected by
the national government. Evident is the mass local migration of the people from poor provinces to Metro Manila to find employment. There are very little jobs generated in poor places in our country. The people in those places principally derive income from the national government as government employees. The businessmen in poor places do not get much government support that they do not thrive profitably. Without the local business sectors helping to uplift the economy of the poor provinces and municipalities, most of the people will be jobless and will remain poor. They will reproduce as an alternate of not doing any productive. This means the increase of population in the community. They are unable to provide the basic necessities for their children. The government, lacking resources, cannot provide sufficient services to them. With more population in a poor place, more crimes are inevitable. With more crimes, there will be chaos, cruelties, injustices, miseries, and unhappiness of the majority of the Filipino people. Add to more crimes, are the rampant graft and corruption in the government that compounded the sufferings of the poor people in the country. Poverty causes corruption and lawlessness, manifestations of the eroding effectivity of the Rule of Law.
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The pressing problem that should be addressed by national leaders is improving the economy not changing the system of government. Our 1987 Constitution is good except for few provisions that need amendment. Content – wise, it is better than Resolution No. 10 sponsored by Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. Key principles of the proposed Federalism can be introduced in the 1987 Constitution, by piecemeal legislation, to wit: The 24 Senators should be increased to 54 Senators. The Senate must be proportionally represented by 18 Regions thus three senators must each come from NCR, CAR, Region I, Region II, Region III, Region IV – A, Region IV – B, Region V, Region VI, Region VII, Region VIII, Region IX, Region X, Region XI, Region XII, Region XIII, ARMM and BANGSANGMORO. The Senators should be elected nationwide by popular vote. The 292 congressmen and 54 senators must elect the President and Vice – President among themselves. Elective public officers must be college graduates. Voters must be college graduates. Candidates with pending and / or decided criminal cases whatever be the imposable penalties are disqualified to run for public offices. Convicted public officers in graft and corruption cases including plunder cannot be granted an absolute pardon by a President. Appointment of Supreme Court, Sandiganbayan and Appellate Court Justices are made by the votes of the majority of the members of bicameral congress. Application is open to all qualified lawyers addressed to JBC subject to background investigation and processing of application by JBC that will transmit the qualified nominees to the Office of the President, which in turn, it will submit the shortlist of nominees, of not more than ten, to bicameral congress for voting. Public interview and opposition will be conducted by the
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Committee on Justice prior to the actual voting. JBC nominates the trial court judges only for appointment by the Office of the President. Abolition of first level courts and second level courts. All trial courts are uniformly called District Trial Courts nationwide. Its sole purpose is for reception of evidence and rendition of decision. The Judges are classified according to rank e.g. by seniority, high case disposal, low case reversal on appeal, that determined their salaries and allowances. Supreme Court hears constitutional cases only. It entertains appealed cases with charge of grave abuse of discretion of trial court or appellate court that it will render administrative liability of gravely abusive Judge. Supreme Court cannot issue any Temporary Restraining Order or Permanent Injunction in the exercise of its Power of Judicial Review. 10. Creation of Administrative Investigation Committee of complaints against impeachable officers whose offenses are not culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust that will conduct investigation, report and recommendation for imposition of appropriate penalties by bicameral congress within two months. Summary procedure is adopted. Simple majority of those who participated in the impeachment proceedings is required to convict an impeachable officer. Impeachment proceedings should be summary procedure. Judicial affidavits and position papers are taken in lieu of trial – type hearings. Impeachment should be finished within 3 months in closed – door or public – type proceedings. Judgment is immediately issued. Bicameral congress can introduce changes to the Economic provisions of the Constitution upon the vote of its simple majority members only without the ratification of the people in an election called for such purpose. Reduction of the basic rights of the accused and addition of the rights of the State as the offended party and the victims in crimes. The presumption of innocent should be replaced with presumption of guilt. Only heinous crimes have adversarial proceedings. Others crime are by modified summary procedure with judicial affidavits and position papers. #FEDERALISM https://yueb.wordpress.com/2015/02/23/is-federalism-feasible-in-thephilippines/ Federalism in the Philippines? By Jon Joaquin All of a sudden the buzzword in Mindanao is federalism. To a large extent, this is due to the proposed enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which principally outlines the sharing of wealth and political power between the central and regional governments. Many political leaders in Mindanao – especially Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte – are taking their cue from this and are saying that if the Moro people can be given autonomy, why not the rest of the country through a federal form of government?
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But what is federalism, and why do its supporters believe it is the answer to the problems of the country? First a definition: According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, it is “a political system that binds a group of states into a larger, non-centralized, superior state while allowing them to maintain their own political identities.” “Certain characteristics and principles are common to all successful federal systems: a written constitution or basic law stipulating the distribution of powers; diffusion of power among the constituent elements, which are substantially self-sustaining; and territorial divisions to ensure neutrality and equality in the representation of various groups and interests,” the dictionary adds. There are many forms of federalism, with the US model perhaps being the most familiar to Filipinos. It is unclear what the recent Mindanao Leaders’ Summit on Federalism, organized by Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, is advocating, but it is useful to remember that in 2008 then-Senate Minority Leader Aquilino “Nene” Pimentel Jr. had proposed a resolution that sought to adopt a Federal Presidential Bicameral form of government. Joint Resolution No. 10, which had the support of 13 senators, would have created 11 autonomous regions and 11 centres of finance and development in the Philippines. Under the proposal, there would be 11 states plus one federal administrative region – Metro Manila – as the seat of the federal government. The other states would be Northern Luzon (with Tuguegarao as capital), Central Luzon (Tarlac City), Southern Tagalog (Tagaytay), Mimaropa (Mamburao), Bicol (Legazpi), Eastern Visayas (Catbalogan), Central Visayas (Toledo), Western Visayas (Iloilo City), Northern Mindanao (Cagayan de Oro), Southern Mindanao (Davao City), and Bangsamoro (Marawi). At the House of Representatives, Rep. Monico O. Puentevella filed House Concurrent Resolution No. 15 on May 7, 2008, which supported Senate Resolution No. 10. One of the staunchest advocates of federalism, former University of the Philippines President Jose Abueva, formed the Citizens’ Movement for a Federal Philippines (CMFP) to campaign for a shift to a federal of government. In a paper titled Some Advantages of Federalism and Parliamentary Government for the Philippines (Revised for June 29, 2005), he listed eight advantages of the federal system: The Federal Republic will build a just and enduring framework for peace through unity in our ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, especially in relation to Bangsa Moro or Muslim Filipinos and our lumad/indigenous peoples. Decentralization and devolution cannot move further under the old unitary system despite avowed goals expressed in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code. The Federal Republic will empower our citizens by enabling them to raise
their standard of living and enhance their political awareness through their participation and efficacy in elections and the making and carrying out of government decisions at the regional and local levels. 7 8
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The Federal Republic will improve governance by challenging and energizing state and local leaders, entrepreneurs, and citizens around the country to take hold of their destiny. Federalism will release them from the costly, timeconsuming, stifling, and demoralizing effects of excessive central government controls and regulation in our traditional unitary system. The Federal Republic will thus stimulate and hasten the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural development. Federalism, together with parliamentary government, will improve governance by promoting the development of strong, united, disciplined, and program-oriented political parties that are responsible and accountable to the people for their conduct and performance in and out of power. Metro Manila State will have a unified political structure that will integrate its various cities and municipalities under the state assembly that combines legislative and executive powers and authority. Unlike the state assemblies of the other states, the mayors in Metro Manila will constitute the Metro Manila State Assembly. The Metro Manila Governor and State Cabinet will direct and coordinate the various metropolitan functions and services. Gradually, the Federal Republic and its parliamentary government will broaden and deepen democracy. The CMFP had proposed the holding of a plebiscite early in 2007 to ratify the proposed revision of the 1987 Constitution, so that the election in May 2007 would be for the officers in the 1987 Constitution as revised. Unfortunately, it is precisely the need for amendments to the Constitution that doomed the proposal. There was massive opposition to Charter Change (Cha-Cha) because most people believed it would open the Constitution to other amendments – specifically the removal of term limits for elected officials, which would benefit then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. She was then already becoming unpopular because of charges of corruption and of cheating in the 2004 Presidential election, and she was widely believed to be positioning herself to be the country’s leader even after her term’s end in 2010. Jon Joaquin is the Associate Editor of EDGE Davao, the newest daily newspaper in Mindanao. E-mail Jon at
[email protected] http://pilipino-express.com/editorialopinions-sp-161843661/povphilippines/2723-federalism-in-the-philippines.html
http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2016/05/22/1585630/understandingfederalism Understanding federalism BREAKTHROUGH By Elfren S. Cruz (The Philippine Star) | Updated May 22, 2016 - 12:00am 0 80 googleplus0 4 Like76 Although the topic of federalism has been discussed since the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there are still many areas that are not clear even to political analysts. In the interest of full disclosure, I will state now that I have always been in favor of a federal system of government and I have written several columns in the past about this topic. However, today I want to focus on clarifying certain issues. There is a wrong impression that the choice is between a unitary form of government – which we have now – and a federal form of government. There are actually three choices for forms of government – unitary, federal, confederate. Federalism is actually the middle choice between centralization and confederation. In a unitary form of government, there is one level of government – the national government. All other forms of government are subordinate to the central government. In both federalism and confederalism, there are two levels of government. In a confederation, however, the central government is subordinate to the regional governing bodies. In a federal form of government, there is a clear division of authority between national government and the state or regional government. The central government will remain more powerful than the state because of its authority over national concerns. Close ad X For example, in a federal government, the national government retains sole power in the areas of foreign affairs, national defense, monetary and fiscal policies and constitutional issues. The central government will, therefore, continue to have sole power to make treaties, control the armed forces, and a common currency. The Constitutional bodies will remain – Supreme Court, Central Bank, and Comelec. A brief look at American history might shed some light on this issue. The original United States was actually a confederation of 13 states. When the US Constitution was being drafted, a Federalist Party was organized to support a stronger central government while maintaining the 13 states. A group called the Anti-Federalists wanted a weaker central government. The final US Constitution invoked federalism which was considered as being in the middle of the political spectrum between a confederacy and a unitary government.
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PubMatic Ad Ends The American Civil War (1861-1865) was between the South who wanted a confederacy and the North who wanted to retain the federal union. That is the reason why the Southern states that seceded from the United States of America called themselves the Confederate States of America. The other issue that must be clarified is that the choice of having a presidential and parliamentary form of government is a different debate than
choosing a unitary or federal government. Just for emphasis, a parliamentary or presidential form of government can be instituted in a federal, unitary or confederate form of government. There are also three choices that are available – parliamentary, presidential and a combination of the two. United States is an example of a presidential form; Japan and the United Kingdom have a parliamentary form; and, France has a combination of both presidential and parliamentary. Division of powers In a federal form of government, the constitution must prevail. Therefore, the division of powers between the federal and regional form of governments must be clearly stated in the constitution. The constitution must also provide for powers that are not explicitly stated in the constitution. In Germany and the United States, the powers that are not specifically granted to the federal government are retained by the states. Other countries, like Canada and India, are different in that powers not explicitly given to the states are retained by the federal government. In the granting of powers to the state, there are also two ways. If all the states have the same powers, this is called “symmetric federalism.” In a federal form of government where some states are given different powers or some possess greater autonomy, this is called “asymmetric federalism.” This is often done when it is clear that a state or region possess a distinct culture. In the case of the United Kingdom, Scotland has been given greater autonomy than England, Wales or Northern Ireland. In Spain the regions dominated by the Basques and the Catalans have more powers than the other Spanish regions. In the division of powers, India has four lists of powers – Union List, Concurrent List, State List, and Residuary List. I am not advocating that we copy the India model. But I am presenting it here as a possible basis for discussion. In the Union List, there are approximately 100 areas which is reserved for the federal government. Some of the areas are defense, armed forces, atomic energy, foreign affairs, citizenship, airways, currency, foreign trade, interstate trade and commerce, banking, customs, elections and the Supreme Court. In the State List, there are more than 60 items on the list. Some examples are police, local governments, public health and sanitation, land tenures, fisheries, trade and commerce within the state, public markets and gambling. The Concurrent List has more than 50 items where uniformity is desired but not considered essential. If there is any conflict between the laws made by the federal and state government, the legislation by the federal government shall prevail. Some items on this list are criminal law, marriage and divorce, adoption, forestry, labor unions, education, administration of justice except Supreme Court and High Courts. In the United States, the federal government sets the minimum wage but the individual states have the right to enact its own minimum wage which,
however, must be higher than the federal minimum wage. The shift to federalism, even with Charter change, will be an evolving process and not an overnight change as some people wrongly envision. Even in the United States, the delineation of powers between the national and the state governments is continuously changing. There are advantages and disadvantages to instituting federalism in the Philippines. There will be losers and winners in any shift to a different form of government. So we need to have a vigorous national debate. But the first step is to understand what federalism really means and while Charter change will formalize the structure, the process of federalizing can actually begin without Charter change. Summer creative writing classes for kids and teens Young Writers’ Hangout: May 28 (10:30am-12nn) and June 4 (1:30pm-3pm). Classes will be held at Fully Booked Bonifacio High Street. For registration and fee details, 0917-6240196 /
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