Melegrito, Mark John C.
Pol. Sci. 192
Plato’s the Republic: An Elitist Image of the Ideal State
Plato was undeniably one of the greatest thinkers of all time. As a writer, thinker and philosopher, his contribution and influence to contemporary knowledge is so colossal that even today, people tend to reflect in Platonic terms unconsciously (Castoriadis, 1994: 130). He, together with Aristotle spearheaded European philosophy (Copleston, 1946: 1). He was born in 427/8 B.C. in Athens in a “distinguished” Athenian family whose ancestors can be traced back as leaders of an Oligarchy (Copleston, 1946: 127). Because of this background, Plato was able to obtain the finest education for an Athenian youth (Sterba, 2003: 4). Due to this upbringing of his, it was later pointed out by several authors that in the Republic and all other works of his, an air of an elitist perspective was evident. Moreover, Copleston additionally argues that Plato‟s bias against democracy is also partly due, not only to his upbringing, but also to the treatment of Socrates, his teacher, in the hands of Athenian democracy (Copleston, 1946: 127). Plato‟s The Republic “is an extended discussion of a wide range of moral, social and metaphysical issues frame as a search for the nature of justice (Sterba, 2003: 5).”
The
dialogues on the state rooted from Socrates‟ and his companions‟ search for the definition of justice. It commenced when Socrates suggested that justice can be more easily seen in a larger context, namely in the state. Thus, after seeing it in the larger and broader perspective, what justice is can then be narrowed down to the individual level (Sterba, 2003: 5). In the Republic, Plato “sets himself to discover the Ideal State, the pattern to which every actual State ought to conform itself, so far as it can (Copleston, 1946: 224).” Such quest for the Ideal State involved Plato to make so many radical claims that tended to be authoritarian and so revolutionary that today, and even before, it had a predisposition to go against the basic rubrics of the society. This paper argues that Plato was not an egalitarian as manifested in his work, The Republic and that he was postulating an elitist perspective. This paper thus tries to answer that general question, “To what extent was Plato an egalitarian?”
The first part of this paper
concerns itself with the definitions of elitism and egalitarianism. The second part focuses on the introduction of the framework for assessing Plato‟s level of egalitarianism. The third part will be composed of a lengthy discussion on the arguments for Plato‟s egalitarianism, and then later facing it off with the arguments for his elitism. And finally, by the end of this paper, a conclusion can be drawn on to what extent was Plato an egalitarian. 1
Elitism and Egalitarianism Defined
Defining Elitism The definition of elitism varies continually across the time line of political theory. Plato and Aristotle defined elitism as the rule of the few who are excellent in ruling. Elitism, in ancient political thought pertains to aristocracy, that is, power is exercised by the selected few. In Aristotle‟s words, aristocracy is “the rule of the few who are the best (Morrow, 1998: 148). And for Plato, elitism means the supremacy of the guardian class among the other two classes, namely the auxiliaries and the artisans and craftsmen (Morrow, 1998: 150).” Elites, those who hold the power in an elitist political system, would refer to the “class whose claim to supremacy has been recognized in customary or legally legitimated processes of hereditary transmission (Morrow, 1998: 148-149).” However, it must be noted that in ancient political thought, the climb of the elites to power is not through hereditary transmission. As Plato relentlessly stressed in the Republic, the guardians, the rulers of the Callipolis, must undergo extensive and exhaustive training and selection before they may be considered as the true and rightful leaders. Medieval and Early Modern elite theorists like Aquinas, Machiavelli and Harrington sees elitism as monarchy (Morrow, 1998: 153). It refers to the rule of one person in a kingdom and exercises power over it. The main difference of the elite theory of the ancient from the early modern is that, in the early modern elite theory, there is a hereditary determination of the elite status. The ascent to power of the elites relies purely in blood and not on extensive education. It is purely based on hereditary grounds (Morrow, 1998: 155). Gaetano Mosca, an elite theorist in Modern political thought, defined elitism as a way of ruling, not based on innate capabilities and talents or on hereditary grounds, but on the number with respect of the ruled and ruling. He said that, In all societies…two classes of people appear - one class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is the directed and controlled by the first (Mosca, 1939: 50 cited in Morrow, 1998: 192).
There have indeed many redefinitions of the definition on elitism across the ancient to the modern political thought, but what do stand and is still affixed in the definition of elitism is that elitism is the rule of the few.
2
Defining Egalitarianism Like elitism, egalitarianism too has been defined differently by a number of authors. According to Heywood ( 2004), egalitarianism, from the French word égalité, refers to equality and “ „leveling‟ [the] conditions of social existence which are thought to be crucial to human wellbeing (p. 285).” Its goal is to “establish the legal, political, or social conditions in which people will be able to enjoy equally worthwhile and satisfying lives (p. 285).” It implies that “each person is entitled to be treated equally by the rules of social practice” “by virtue of their common humanity” (p. 285). Another definition of egalitarianism is that, it is “the view that justice requires that we attempt to bring it about that everyone has an equal (or, more nearly equal) and positive (nonzero) amount some good that is not just formal (May, Sistare, & Schonsheck, 1997: 49). This definition asserts of redistribution of wealth between the rich and the poor so as to achieve an equal level of income and welfare. In the same light, Barcalow (2004) also argues that egalitarianism favors “an equal distribution of society‟s economic resources (p. 117).” That is, it advocates economic equality. By this he did not mean to say that people should wear identical clothes and live in identical houses of have identical preferences, for even the most radical egalitarians would disprove of this, but he claimed that the deviation and gap between the poorest and the richest should not be too great (p. 117). Like many redefinitions of elitism, like egalitarianism, despite its many and contracting definitions, the concept of egalitarianism can be broadly yet loosely defined as the advocation of equality.
Framework of Analysis Having defined Elitism and Egalitarianism, I now turn to the framework of analysis in assessing Plato‟s level of egalitarianism. The framework shall come from Barcalow‟s (2004) measures of egalitarianism and Dreinstein and Fouler‟s (1993) kinds of equality. According to Barcalow (2004) there are four ways to measure the level of egalitarianism. These are, first, economic equality as measured by money, income and wealth; second, people‟s level of well-being; third, opportunity; and fourth, power and influence over public decisions (p. 119-120). The first measure, money, income and wealth were associated with the principle of “maximum permissible ratio”. That is, “every dollar that you possess at a moment in time means one dollar fewer for the others to have accumulated up to that moment in time 3
(Barcalow, 2004: 118).” It implicitly means that as a certain group of people increases their wealth, other group of people looses the opportunity of increasing their own wealth. And if this space between the rich and the poor consistently deviates from each other, then in terms of economic equality, it is non-egalitarian. This first measure, money, income and wealth thus espouses that for a particular case to be considered as egalitarian, the level of wealth of the poor from the rich must not be too far (Barcalow, 2004: 118). The second measure, people‟s level of well-being, is closely related to the concept of a Pareto Efficient allocation in economics. It states that an “economic situation is Pareto efficient if there is no way to make any person better off without hurting anybody else (Varian, 2007: 306).”
An implication can therefore be drawn that for a society to be considered as an
egalitarian, one group of people, or even just a single person‟s level of well-being must not be faced with a trade-off to other people‟s level of well-being. To put it in simpler terms, one person‟s increase in the level of his happiness must not be due to the increased accrued pain of other people. Opportunity is the third measure for egalitarianism.
It refers to the “opportunity of
meeting the basic needs, and the opportunity to satisfy one‟s desires and wants (Barcalow, 2004: 119).” A particular political system is then considered as egalitarian if it permits the people the have an equal access to the different forms of opportunity like education, speech, and expression. And finally, the fourth measure according to Barcalow (2004) is power and influence over public decisions (p. 120).
This measure is presently innate in democratic forms of
government. That is to say, an equal opportunity given among all citizens of the country to choose and vote their leaders, influence public decisions though lobbying, and at same time, an equal chance among themselves to run for office. If a political system possesses this simplistic notion of a democracy, then it maybe generalized that it is egalitarian. Dreinsten‟s (1993) kinds of equality are closely knitted to Barcalow‟s measures of egalitarianism.
Equality, according to him, means that the power that two different people
exercise over a certain object is equivalent (p. 96).
He also asserted that the concept of
equality is of great importance to egalitarians. As Barcalow puts it, Even the most devoted egalitarian usually talks at the view that everyone should be equal to everyone else in all things, or that every inherited inequality be eliminated by state or society or magic (p. 97).
According to him, there are four kinds of equality. And it is worth noting, as have been said earlier that these four are of much similarity to Barcalow‟s measures of egalitarianism. These
4
four are: first, political equality; second, equality of opportunity; third, economic equality; and fourth, equal respect for all human beings (Dreinstein, 1993: 97). Political equality, stresses the great importance for equal rights to participate for all citizens: the right to vote, the right to express one‟s opinions, the right to organize for political goals, and the right to run for office (Dreinstein, 1993: 98).
This kind of equality as he claimed can be seen in all democratic political systems and in all egalitarian societies. The second kind, equality of opportunity, “hold[s] that everyone should have a roughly equal chance to succeed in life, especially economic life (Dreinstein, 1993: 98).” It is not about “equal outcomes, but equal chances (Dreinstein, 1993: 98).” Economic equality, the third kind, means that there is “roughly equal incomes or approximately equal entitlements: equal educational opportunities or health care services (Dreinstein, 1993: 98).” This kind of equality as he stated can only be attained, as expected by some, in socialist political systems. And finally, the fourth kind, equal respect for all human beings “focuses on each individual as a whole person and his or her relationship with others (Dreinstein, 1993: 98).” It includes how people are treated by others in human terms. Combining therefore Barcalow‟s measures of egalitarianism and Dreinstein‟s kinds of equality, the four basic categories which shall be used in assessing Plato‟s extent of egalitarianism are on the basis whether or not he upholds 1) economic equality, 2) equality in opportunity, 3) equality in welfare and respect for human beings, and 4) political equality. Plato as an Egalitarian There are two main arguments that show Plato‟s egalitarian view as presented in the Republic. The first is the proposed communal life of the guardians and the second is the same level of education between men and women. The first argument for Plato‟s egalitarianism is on the communal life of the guardians which appeared at the end of Book III of the Republic in his dialogue with Glaucon. Plato argued that the guardians must live in a single housing provided for them by the city. The Guardians must not own any private property aside from their absolute necessities for if any one of them started acquiring private property, they will inevitably abuse this power and they will no longer rule for the benefit of the city, but for their own gain. And thus, in the city, as Plato envisions it, private properties or any form of luxury should not be the primary concern of the guardians for their task is to rule for the sake of the city and not for their own sakes. 5
This communal way of life of the guardians therefore, relating it to the framework which was earlier presented, possesses the quality of economic equality. The basic contention is that since there is no notion of private property, one man‟s property is consequently, the property of the rest. An equal economic status is thus present among the guardians. The second argument, the same level of education between men and women, was presented in Book V as one of the great waves. This argument of his is in line with the notion of equality in opportunity specifically education.
Plato argued that “women ought to gain
membership in the philosopher ruler class and be chosen based on ability (nature) and not on gender (Baitinger, 2005: 140).” Women must partake in the same level of education - in music and in gymnastics, like the men. The reason for this, as Plato said is that the only difference among men and women is that women bears children while men do not. And this distinction among men and women obviously do not make much difference in the art of ruling. Plato‟s goal for this kind of equal opportunity in terms of education between men and women is for the unity of the state (Sterba, 2003: 5). As Baitinger puts it, encouraging men and women to pursue that in which they are able to excel, based on nature and not on gender, will positively contribute to a thriving and flourishing society (Baitinger, 2005: 140).
For Plato, a paramount consideration of the happiness of the whole state must be realized and one way of achieving this is giving the same opportunity of education to the women. These two arguments on Plato as an egalitarian include two of the four basis for egalitarianism. These two are economic equality, as presented in the communal way of life of the guardians, and equal opportunity, as espoused by the same level of education between the guardian men and women. However, it can also be drawn that the two arguments failed to satisfy the other two, namely equality in welfare and respect for human beings, and political equality.
And therefore, in terms of the satisfaction for the grounds of egalitarianism, it can be
concluded that some elements of Plato‟s claims are egalitarian but this claims are weak in proving his egalitarianism.
Consequently, the next section of this paper shall present the
arguments of him as being an elitist.
Plato as an Elitist There are four main arguments that revolve around the claim that Plato was an elitist. The first is the division of classes in the Callipolis, the second is concerned on the murky biases of education among the classes, third is the role of women in the degeneration of the state, and fourth is Plato‟s prejudice against democracy.
6
In Book II, Plato divided the state into three different classes. These are the artisans, (those occupying the bottommost class ), the auxiliaries (the military class), and the guardians (the rulers of the state and the highest class). The basic assumption of this division of classes is that people‟s natures innately differ from one another. People are born with a specific nature that predestines them to what class they would later belong and their appropriate role in the state. This therefore implies that movement upward between the class of the artisans to the class of auxiliaries or guardians is not permissible. Social mobility is not permitted. The class of the artisans is forever deemed to be ruled over and shall remain in subordination to the dictates of the governing class, the guardians. However, movement downward the hierarchy, as Plato said, is possible. That is, despite of a child having guardians as parents, sometimes, if this child was born without the proper virtue of a guardian, namely wisdom; this child will belong to the lower class of the auxiliaries or to the class of the artisans. The first argument therefore challenges the concept on the equality of opportunity because Plato claims that each man is, because of his nature, deemed to a specific class were he properly belongs. The second argument on Plato‟s elitist perspective is the unequal opportunity to education among the classes.
For Plato, the wisdom of the state resides in the small class of
rulers or guardians and courage in the state are to be found in the auxiliaries. He claims that these two classes must only be the ones that necessitate of being educated for he believes that a courageous or wise farmer would make no difference in defending or ruling the state. They lack the proper knowledge and proper nature in ruling and therefore, they must leave the process on political issues to the well-educated and more knowledgeable guardians (Barcalow: 2004: 168). Their mere virtue is the temperance to be governed upon by the guardians. In addition, going back to argument on education, Sriraman and Steinthorsdottir (2007) said that education, especially the field of mathematics, has been criticized for its academic elitism. This is because only those who have the economic resources are able to afford courses and degrees which are mathematical like engineering, accounting and the hard sciences (p. 92). Education, the way they see it, represses the poor even more because they, despite their talents and capabilities, can not afford it (p. 93). In the same light, when Plato was discussing the proper education of the guardians, he said that one of characteristics of a guardian must be good in mathematics. Therefore, it is evident that the second argument obviously does not advocate the equality of opportunity for only the gifted few, specifically the guardians and the auxiliaries, has the opportunity to be educated in music and in gymnastics. 7
The third argument revolves around the role of women in the degeneration of the state. Despite of Plato claiming that women must have the same level of education as men, it must be stipulated that Plato was actually inconsistent in his claims for he later stated that generally, women are weaker compared to men in the same class. Exemplifying it, a guardian woman will undoubtedly be of higher status than an artisan man or an auxiliary man, but a guardian woman compared to a guardian man is undeniably weaker. The more obvious bias of Plato against women is magnified in Books VIII and IX. He claimed that the degeneration of the Callipolis to timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and finally tyranny is due to the mixture of a guardian man to that of an auxiliary woman. This happens when the woman inculcates in the mind of his son the love for honor, money, freedom and then a complete monopoly of power. This evidently fails the concept of equality of welfare and equal respect due Plato‟s sexist representation of women. And finally, the fourth argument which challenges Plato as an egalitarian is his detestation of democracy. Disregarding the fact that Plato might have carried with him a grudge on the death of his teacher, Socrates, in the hands of Athenian democracy, this argument begins with Plato‟s assumption that wisdom in the state inherently resides in the small class, the guardians. In a democracy, the majority of the rulers are composed of the artisans and Plato strongly asserts that these people are incapable of ruling for their impulses and decisions are unrestrained and merely addresses their own selfish interests. Plato‟s claim against democracy goes back to the first assumptions of the Republic that only few were given the gift of wisdom and ruling. And if the artisans, the lowest of the three classes were to rule, the state will surely perish and eventually suffer from anarchy and disorder.
For him, the perfect state is the
aristocratic state that is ruled by the few people who are best in ruling. Moreover, democracy according to Plato is the “worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all lawless ones,” since “the government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either any great good or any great evil when compared with the others, because in such a state the offices are parceled out among many people (Copleston, 1946: 234). It is a bad from of government because under democracy, the masses who are “stupid and foolish” partakes in the decisions making (Barcalow: 2004: 169).
This final argument thus clearly
challenges the concept of equal opportunity and political equality which are essential in assessing the level of egalitarianism.
8
Conclusion Plato‟s the Republic presented a vivid and clear representation of an ideal state. As Morrow (1998) puts it, it is “ideal in a double sense: it existed in his imagination, and it is perfect (p. 56).” In the process of Plato‟s search for this utopian vision of the state, he came across many radical claims that have proven to be non-egalitarian, and is in fact, elitist.
As the
preceding arguments have shown, the four arguments on Plato as an elitist have strongly proven that Plato was not an egalitarian. The four arguments have shown that Plato‟s claims failed to satisfy three of the four grounds namely equality in opportunity, equality in welfare and respect for human beings, and political equality.
The concept on economic equality has
however been missed due to the fact that in Plato‟s ideal state, the rulers‟ concern must be on ruling and not in acquiring private property. Economic equality in the Republic is therefore only applicable when we are referring to the happiness of the state as a whole. This is the only ground that Plato satisfied in terms of his egalitarianism. And thus, comparing the number of grounds on egalitarianism that Plato satisfied, it is conclusive to say that Plato was more of an elitist than an egalitarian. The other arguments on Plato‟s egalitarianism with regards to the same opportunity to education to that of men has loopholes which was covered by the fourth argument that challenges Plato‟s egalitarianism. It is therefore conclusive to say that Plato was, in the strictest sense, strongly a non-egalitarian.
9
Bibliography
Baitinger, K. (2005, March 21). Plato's Women: Postmodern Pitfalls. Retrieved August 21, 2009, from www.nobleworld.biz/images/Baitinger.pdf
Barcalow, _. (2004). Justice, Equality and Rights. Canada: Wadsworth.
Castoriadis, C. (1994). The Rising Tide of Insignificancy. The Rising Tide of Insignificancy (The Big Sleep) . Retrieved August 21, 2009, from http://www.notbored.org/corneliuscastoriadis.html
Copleston, F. (1946). A History of Philosophy (Vol. I (Greece and Rome)). New York: Double Day.
Dreinstein, J. R., & Fouler, B. R. (1993). An Introduction to Political Theory: Toward the Next Century. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.
Heywood, A. (2004). Political Theory. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
May, L., Sistare, C., & Schonsheck, J. (Eds.). (1997). On Recent Arguments for Egalitarianism. Retrieved August 21, 2009, from www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~jnarveso/articles/egalitarianism.pdf
Morrow, J. (1998). A History of Political Thought. New York: New York University Press.
Sriraman, B., & Steinthorsdottir, O. B. (2007). Excellence and Equity in Education and Talent Development: Components of Hegelian Dialectic. Retrieved August 21, 2009, from Mediterranean Journal for Research in Mathematics Education: www.math.umt.edu/srisaman/69_MJRME2007.pdf
Sterba, J. P. (2003). Social and Political Philosophy. Canada:: Wadsworth.
Varian, H. R. (2007). Intermediate Microeconomics. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
10
