Three Mile Island The nuclear accident casestyle study Click to edit Master subtitle Prepared by: Group 2 (4BENC) Prepared for: Engr. Siva Kumar A/L Subramaniam Subject: BENU4583 - Engineering Ethic 4/22/12
Members •
Latifah (Leader)
1. Introduction 2. Violation Code of Ethics
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Marhaizan
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Sin Ni
3. Guidance to Prevent The Event From Happening
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Sabta Ali
4. Ethical Theories
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Basha Abas
5. Analysis of Issues
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Muhamad Syakir
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6. Flowchart
Safiy Hafifi 7. What Should People Involved Do Differently?
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8. Conclusion
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Introduction
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Type energy: Nuclear Location: Nameofcapacity: ofsource Susquehanna power River Three in Mile Pennsylvania, Island Power 16 Power Others: TMI consist 1,plant: 700 of two Megawatts nuclear or plants enough TMI-1 toUSA supply and,Plant km (TMI) fromhomes the state capital, Harrisburg, a city of 90000 300,000 TMI-2 4/22/12
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Both Nuclear The function plants power isof900 plants theMW(e) nuclear generate unit fuelwith electricity is topressurised heat water by using and water steam convert turbines. reactors it to steam. designed by Babcock and Wilcox. The second unit of the site started commercial operation on December 30, 1978. 4/22/12
TMI-2
TMI-1
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Accident began about 4.00am on March 28, 1979 when failure in secondary building. 4/22/12 End of chapter
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What happened to TMI2?
Core Are Extremely overheated Stop functioning
PORV Failed Openeto close d
Pressure increased Stabilized
Failure There for in fuel the secondary overheated, coolant was building suck zirconium back to cladding relief •• Nuclear PORV Main the Instead feedwater is the opened core ispump toisexperiencing reduce the running pressure alevel lost caused ofpressurized by coolant supply byruptured accident the Pressure Once Operator are pressure in no just primary indicator judge stabilized, system the tostop coolant show increased the PORV coolant by level should level inelectrical in closed reactor fuel tank pallet andthe coolant making was ½pressurized of overflow corethey melted caused the reactor to is coolant andstop mechanical water from failure relief to core pressurizer, supplied since was coolant. high But assumed it didtank notthe coolant overheated 4/22/12 fully covered End of chapter
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What happened to TMI2?
Engineers shall undertake assignments only when qualified by education or experience in the specific technical fields involved. (2a) •
In the case, the operators are not trained to understand the nature of the PORV indicator and to look for alternative confirmation that the main relief valve was closed. There was a temperature indicator between the PORV and the pressurizer that could have told them the valve was stuck open, but this temperature indicator was not part of the "safety grade" suite of indicators, and the operators had not been trained to use it. It is 4/22/12that it located at the back of the desk also meant
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Violation Code of Ethics (NSPE)
If engineers’ judgment is overruled under circumstances that endanger life or property, they shall notify their employer or client and such other authority as may be appropriate. (1a) •
In this case, critical human factors problems were revealed in the investigation about the industrial design of the reactor control system's user interface. A lamp in the control room, designed to illuminate when electric power 4/22/12 was
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Violation Code of Ethics (NSPE)
Engineers may express publicly technical opinions that are founded upon knowledge of the facts and competence in the subject matter. (3b) •
The NRC officials believed (without concrete analysis) that the hydrogen bubble could explode, through such an explosion was never possible since there was not enough oxygen in the system. They had ordered evacuation and that a meltdown was conceivable.
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Violation Code of Ethics (NSPE)
Section III (9)(e) Engineers shall continue their professional development throughout their careers and should keep current in their specialty fields by engaging in professional practice, participating in continuing education courses, reading in the technical literature and attending meeting and seminars.
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The TMI management system
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Guidance to Prevent The Event From Happening
Setion III (1)(a) Engineers shall acknowledge their errors and shall not distort or alter the facts.
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The nuclear power plant’s management should acknowledged their fault on the arisen of misunderstanding problem.
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Guidance to Prevent The Event From Happening
Section II(1) Engineer shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
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The NRC has primary responsibility and regulatory authority for health and safety measures as they relate to the operation of commercial nuclear plants.
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Guidance to Prevent The Event From Happening
Utilitarianism Ethics (design deficiency) •
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No procedure to identify and manage the meltdown event and the operating staff is not trained for it. Global control board weakness in indications of order instead of position without specific warning. Existing emergency operating procedure 4/22/12 is difficult to use and not suitable.
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Ethical Theories
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Ethical Theories Duty Ethics •
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NRC officials failed to fulfill their duty – stirred public fear by making false statement . The plant operators’ failed to carry out their duty in handling and mitigating the accident . The management’s duty is not fulfilled by not providing proper training to the plant operators (unsystematic management system). The local and state authorities’ duty have been carried out by preparing the residents’ evacuation process and cooperate with the NRC authority. 4/22/12
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Ethical Theories Right Ethics •
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People that live near the power plant - the right to live in safe environment. The operators’ in the plant - the right to have a safe working environment and to live. The local and state authorities’ right – defend population safety by questioning nuclear power plant’s safety procedure. 4/22/12
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Ethical Theories Virtue Ethics •
The plant operators’ incompetency in accident handling and not able to make wise decision.
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The power plant’s management does not carry out their responsibility by ignoring operators’ training which is the main element in preventing accident.
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Factual issue: 1. 2.
3.
TMI-2 reactor's fuel core. Gas in containment building was move to waste gas decay tanks. Hydrogen gas is created because chemical 4/22/12 reaction
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Analysis of Issues
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Analysis of Issues Conceptual issue: 1. 2.
No "China Syndrome" Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) statement.
Moral issue: 1.
2.
Better understanding on the safety nuclear energy. 4/22/12 End of chapter
Public awareness increase.
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Flowchart
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Continue
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Flowchart
From previous
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All the people involved in the accident should have done differently in avoiding the accident from happen in the plant, as described below: •
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Engineers – Participate with continuing education course and seminars Management - Identify workers performance, staffing requirements, revamping operator training, improved instrumentation and controls Government – Strengthen and reorganize the 4/22/12 safety enforcement. End of chapter
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What Should People Involved Do Differently?
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Conclusion 1 2 3 4 5 6
Accident was caused by EQUIPMENT failure and HUMAN ERROR to handling the situation Loss of coolant to the reactor led to producing heat and melting the fuel rod. Small amount radioactive released to environment
But, NO injuries or deaths involved in this accident and the experts concluded the amount of radioactive released is NOT hazardous to living thing To cleanup cost around a BILLION dollars to company and took almost 10 YEARS to complete
Today, But, To After Loss cleanup NO incident, nuclear ofinjuries coolant cost reactors NO around ortodeaths new theare a Accident was caused by reactor reactors involved still BILLION led important to be to in producing this built dollars for accident andour toleads heat equipment failure and to source and company and a very the melting of experts large energy, andthe took evolution concluded fuel but almost rod. they to human error to the Small the are 10safety amount SLOWLY YEARS amount improvement oftoradioactive becoming completeof handling the situation decommissioned areleased majority released isof to NOT nuclear environment until hazardous plants. find a secure to way livingtothing handling nuclear energy
After incident, NO new reactors to be built and leads to a very large evolution to the safety improvement of a majority of nuclear plants. Today, nuclear reactors are still important for our source of energy, but they are SLOWLY becoming decommissioned until find a secure way to handling nuclear energy
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Thank You The Three Mile Island Accident By Group 2 (4BENC) 2010/2011 UTeM
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