The three certainties and formalities Introduction Questions on certainties are usually problem-type questions. Frequently all three of the certainties – intention, subject-matter and objects – will be included in one question. The classic form of a question in this area involves a will with a series of gifts, each of which raises a separate issue on certainty; the testator will have just died and you will be asked to advise the executors. The question may be confined to certainty within trusts. However, you may be expected to make a comparison with the rules for certainty for powers, particularly if the question also concerns certainty of objects (see question 3(c)). If you intend to answer a question on certainty therefore, you should also know the distinction between trusts and powers. Some of the cases highlight the distinction between a trust and other transactions such as a gift, and illustrate the application of the rule of equity that 'equity will not construe an invalid gift as a trust'. You should therefore be aware of the requirements for a valid gift. A wide knowledge knowledge of case law is essential for answering answering these problems. Frequently, Frequently, parts of the question may appear to be based directly on one case. Avoid the temptation to start your answer with a reference to the case. Establish the general principle, apply it to the particular problem, and then support it with a reference to the particular case. Sometimes there is a trap in these apparently straightforward questions. If the question seems to fit very obviously into a particular precedent, look out for a later precedent which may distinguish it. See question 1 (a) for an example of this. Apart from this possibility, these problem questions are usually plain sailing if you know the basic principles and some of the cases. It is more important to remember the wording used in a case than the name. If you find names difficult to memorise, you can always write: 'In a decided case. . .'. When dealing with different parts of the question avoid repeating yourself. If you have dealt with certainty of intention in part (a), for example, then do not run through the points again for part (b). The examiner would not want more than a brief reference to the point if it occurred in a different form in part (b) and would not give you marks for regurgitating the same law again. Part (b) will invariably involve a different issue, perhaps another certainty, and you should deal with this at more length. If you think both parts are on certainty of intention and nothing else, then you are probably in trouble and should choose another question. Problem questions are relatively easy to devise and discussion questions are quite rare in this field – unless your examiners happen to be gifted creative writers. We have therefore included three problem-type questions in this chapter. Any essay question which your examiner devised is likely to be straightforward and you could use the
material in these problem questions for it. Generally, these problem questions are gifts to the reasonably well prepared examinee. No such person should get less than a 2(ii) on such a question. Conversely, it is quite difficult to get a first. You would really need to impress the examiner with a detailed knowledge of the cases, perhaps even referring to distinguishing judgments (as in question 1 (a) with the reference to Comiskey v Bowring-Hanbury [1905] AC 84). Not infrequently, examiners have been known to include certainty in 'pick "n" mix'-type questions. Tread warily! Certainty could be mixed in with questions on topics such as constructive trusts, charities or trusts of imperfect obligation. For an example, see question 4 in chapter 9. The formality requirements for trusts are contained in s. 53, LPA 1925. You should be aware of the basic requirements of this section. A more in-depth consideration of the section's application to various transactions is required by Question 4, and the cases on this are complex and difficult for the reasons explained in the Commentary. For further reading on s. 53 and the cases on it discussed in question 4, see the Further reading on s. 53 and the cases on it discussed in question 4, see the Further reading section at the end of this chapter.
Question 1 Lucien, who died recently, left a will appointing Bill and Ben his executors and trustees. The will contained the following dispositions: (a) 'My freehold house to my wife Harriet absolutely in full confidence that she will hold it for either my daughter Tessa or my son James as she sees fit.' (b) 'The income from my blue-chip shares to my trustees Bill and Ben from which they must ensure that my old Uncle Tom has a reasonable standard of living.' (c) 'Three of my five Van Gogh paintings to my trustees to hold one of them in trust for my sister Pearl, whichever she may choose, and the other two in trust for my sister Jewel.' Pearl died before the testator. Advise Bill and Ben as to the validity of these dispositions. Would your answer in (c) differ if Pearl had survived the testator but died before choosing?
Commentary This question is an example of how two parts of a question, (a) and (b), may both include different examples of uncertainty as to words or intention. You should therefore state the general law on this subject fairly fully in your answer to (a), but merely refer to it briefly and apply it in your answer to (b). Both parts (b) and (c) include uncertainties as to subject-matter, and again any general statement of law on this should be made under (b) and avoid repetition of this under (c). It may be appropriate to mention some cases briefly in (a) and discuss them further in (b) and (c), but make sure that they are relevant ones, e.g., Mussoorie Bank v Raynor (1882) 7 App Cas 321, where the words 'feeling confident that she will act justly to our children in distributing the same' were held not to create a trust. However, as well as looking for an understanding of the requirement of certainty of intention, the examiner will be looking for a proper application of the law to the problem set and not a general discussion of cases which are dissimilar. Remember that there are three parts to the question and you should not spend an undue amount of time on one part at the expense of the other parts.
Answer plan (a)
Do the words 'in full confidence' impose a trust or are they merely precatory?
Cases on certainty of words.
If a trust, then a discretionary trust.
If no trust, then operates as an absolute gift to Harriet.
(b)
Possible uncertainty of subject-matter both as to the trust itself and as to the amount to be used for Uncle Tom. Possible that uncertainty as to Tom's share may be resolved by Re Golay, where the court said that 'reasonable income' was capable of objective determination.
(c)
Possible uncertainty as to subject-matter again as to which three of the five Van Gogh paintings. Also uncertainty of subject-matter as to which two Jewel is to have as Pearl, with the power to choose, has died before choosing (Boyce v Boyce).
If Pearl survives the testator but dies without choosing, there is still uncertainty of subject-matter. There are possible, but untried, arguments which might persuade the court to decide differently.
Suggested answer (a) In Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148, Lord Langdale MR said that three certainties were required to establish a valid trust, namely, certainty of words (or intention), subject-matter and objects. The essence of a trust is that it imposes a binding obligation on the trustees, and the question to consider here is whether the words used are sufficiently obligatory to impose a trust. Until the Executors Act 1830, courts were very ready to find a trust, as property to which a trust was not attached would remain in the hands of the executors. The Executors Act 1830 changed this, however, and from then on the courts were less willing to find a trust where the words used could be construed as merely precatory. Lambe v Eames (1871) 6 Ch App 597 is generally regarded as the turning-point, where the court refused to construe merely precatory words as creating a trust. In Re Steele's Will Trusts [1948] Ch 603 it was said that the exception to this would be where a testator had used identical wording to that previously held to create a trust. This case has been criticised, however, for replacing a search for the testator's intention with a mechanical application of legal rules; furthermore it ignores the fact that the meaning of words can change over time. There are two conflicting cases where words used were similar to those found here. In Re Adams & Kensington Vestry (1884) 27 ChD 394 a gift 'to the absolute use of my wife. . . in full confidence that she will do what is right as to the disposal thereof between my children' was held not to impose any trust upon the wife but was construed by the court to be an absolute gift to her. In Comiskey v Bowring-Hanbury [1905] AC 84, however, the House of Lords (Lord Lindley dissenting) considered a bequest to the testator's wife of 'the whole of my real and personal estate absolutely in full confidence that she will make use of it as I should have made myself and that at her death she will devise it to such one or more of my nieces as she may think fit and in default to my nieces equally'. This was held to create a trust for the widow for life, remainder to the nieces as she might by will appoint, but otherwise equally between them, as the testator had shown a clear intention to benefit his nieces in any event. In Re Hamilton [1895] 2 Ch 370 it was said by Lindley LJ that each disposition must be construed on its own merits. The disposition in this problem appears to be nearer to Re Adams & Kensington Vestry than to Comiskey v Bowring-Hanbury on the ground that there is no gift over in default. Nevertheless it may be possible to distinguish the disposition in (a) from Re Adams & Kensington Vestry on the specificity of the ultimate beneficiaries – in which case it could be construed as imposing a trust. If there is a trust, it is a discretionary trust for either Tessa or James, and there is
therefore no uncertainty of objects. If the words are held not to impose a trust, then the disposition operates as an absolute gift to Harriet. (b) For a trust to be valid, the subject-matter must also be certain. This includes both the property and the beneficial interests which the beneficiaries are to take. If either of these is uncertain, the trust will fail. In this case, it is possible that both are uncertain. In Re Kolb's Will Trusts [1962] Ch 531 it was said that a reference to stocks and shares 'in the blue-chip category' was insufficiently certain because the term 'blue chip', whilst used to indicate a very good share, has no precise meaning. If so, the trust will fail for uncertainty of subject-matter, which means that all Lucien's shares (and the income therefrom) not otherwise validly and specifically bequeathed, will form part of Lucien's residuary estate. If, however, the reference to blue-chip shares is held sufficiently certain it becomes necessary to consider other parts of this disposition. The wording 'they must ensure' might well be sufficiently obligatory to impose a trust on the income in the hands of the trustees, as it indicates that the trustees were not intended to enjoy the whole of the income beneficially. It would appear, however, that they are not to use the whole of the income for Uncle Tom. Sufficient income for a reasonable standard of living might appear w be uncertain, but in Re Golay's Will Trusts [1965] 1 WLR 969 it was held that 'a reasonable income' was capable of being quantified objectively in relation to a person's lifestyle. Presumably, therefore, a sufficient income relating to Uncle Tom's lifestyle could be ascertained. (c) The problem in this part of the question is again to determine the subject-matter of the trust. There is an initial uncertainty as to the subject-matter of the trust as a whole, that is, as to which three of the five Van Gogh paintings is to be held on trust for Pearl to choose from. This is similar to Palmer v Simmonds (1854) 2 Drew 221, where a gift of 'the bulk of my estate' failed for uncertainty. Additionally, the interests of Pearl and Jewel are uncertain until Pearl has made her choice; death means that no choice can now be made. In Boyce v Boyce (1849) 16 Sim 476, a testator left three houses in his will, 'one to Maria, which she may choose; the others to Charlotte'. Maria predeceased the testator, and the trust for Charlotte, which was dependent upon Maria's choice, was held to fail for certainty of subject-matter. Pearl having predeceased the testator, it is impossible to determine which paintings should be held in trust for Jewel. All three paintings will therefore fall into residue. In the absence of a residuary gift, they will pass, as on intestacy, to Lucien's next-of-kin. If Pearl had survived the testator but died before making a choice, although prima facie there is still an uncertainty of subject-matter, it is possible that this would enable the circumstances to be distinguished from Boyce v Boyce. The Boyce v Boyce situation has an element of ademption about it as the testator is presumed to know that Pearl has predeceased him and is therefore unable to make a choice. However, if the testator has no reason to suppose that Pearl will not choose, and dies in the belief that he has set up
a valid trust, it might be possible for equity to intervene, although it is not clear how. The maxim 'Equity is equality' would not reflect the testator's intentions. One tenuous argument might be that Lucien intended to make Pearl a trustee of the power of selection, i.e., that it is a trust power to select. This would mean that the maxim 'Equity will not allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee' could be applied, and someone else (or even the court) could make the choice. On the wording of the disposition, however, there seems little to favour such a construction.
