The Stability of a Unipolar World William C. Wohlforth Summary I advance three propositions that undermine un dermine the emerging conventional wisdom that the distribution of power is unstable and conict prone. unipolar. 1. The system is unambiguously unipolar. a. The United United States States is the rst leading leading state state in modern modern internat international ional history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic military technological and geopolitical. unipolarity is prone to peace. peace. !. The current unipolarity a. "n important important source source of of conict conict in previ previous ous systems systems is absent: absent: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system. b. Unipolarit Unipolarity y minimi#es minimi#es security security competiti competition on among the other other great great powers. unipolarity is not only peaceful but durable. $. The current unipolarity a. "lre "lread ady y a deca decade de old old b. "s an o%shore o%shore power power separated separated by two two oceans oceans from all all other ma&or ma&or states the United States can retain its advantages without ris'ing a counterbalance. DEFINITIONS Preponderance superiority of one state over another in a particular sector Unipolarity ! a structure in which one state(s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced. )nce capabilities capabilities are so concentrated a structure arises that is fundamentally distinct from either multipolarity or bipolarity and at the same time capabilities are not so concentrated as to produce a global empire. "ipolarity ! a structure produced when two states are substantially more powerful than all others #ultipolar ! a structure comprising three or more especially powerful states Second!tier Second!tier State$ ! Stability ! peacefulness and durability* the idea of a self+reinforcing self+reinforcing e,uilibrium. Durability % To To say that an international international system is durable implies implies that it can e-perience signicant shifts in power relations without undergoing u ndergoing fundamental change. & TI#E'INE /U0TI)0"2 1314+1345 6 7ritain had to share leadership with 2ussia8power gap between these two and 9rance was small 1345 6 7ritain defeats 2ussia in ;rimea*
= 6 ;)? measure pic's 7ritain as an especially powerful actor 13>=+>! 6 a- 7rittanica 8"ssymetrical power portfolios so not considered unipolar 1@1= 6 Aermany as strongest state in
7I)0"2 1@4= 6 6 Unipolarity 8US INT(ODUCTION ;ollapse of the Soviet Union produced the greatest change in world power relationships since ?orld ?ar II* US emerged as sole surviving superpower. 1@@! + entagon drafted a new grand strategy designed to preserve unipolarity by preventing the emergence of a global rival ;ommentators argued that any e%ort to preserve unipolarity is ,ui-otic and dangerous because 8for neorealists unipolarity is the leasr stable of all structures because any great concentration of power threatens other states and causes them to ta'e action to restore a balance. U.S. preponderance is fragile and easily negated by the actions of other states. unipolarity is an FillusionG a FmomentG that Fwill not last longG or is already Fgiving way to multipolarity. T)(EE P(OPOSITIONS T)*T UNDE(#INE T)E E#E(+IN+ CON,ENTION*' WISDO# T)*T T)E DIST(I"UTION OF POWE( IS UNST*"'E *ND CONF'ICT P(ONE. 'ONE'/ *T T)E TOP- T)E S/STE# IS UNIPO'*( ;ompare the current distribution of power with its structural predecessors. 0uantitati1e Compari$on To ,ualify as polar powers states must score well on all the components of power 8?alt#: Si#e of population and territory 2esource endowment
;onclusion: 1@3=s( "merica was a uni,uely powerful hegemonic actor with a much more complete portfolio of capabilities than 7ritain ever had. H2efer to table in the article itself 9 #ea$ure$ of Capability 2Correlate$ of War Inde:6 +DP #ilitary E:penditure$ Po;er Capabilitie$ HThe specifc problem with the ;)? inde- is its implicit assumption that the wellsprings of national power have not changed since the dawn of the industrial age. 8eg. Information age in which US possess decisive advantages +The United States is the only state with global power pro&ection capabilities* it is probably capable if challenged of producing defensive land+power dominance in the 'ey theaters* it retains the world(s only truly blue+water navy* it dominates the air* it has retained a nuclear posture that may give it rst+stri'e advantages against other nuclear powers* and it has continued to nurture decades+old investments in military logistics and command control communications and intelligence. 0ualitati1e Compari$on 7ringing historical detail to bear on the comparison of today(s distribution of power to past systems only strengthens the initial conclusions that emerge from ,uantitative comparisons.
+ower gap in the US( favour is wider than any single measure can capture because the unipolar concentration of resources is symmetrical 8Unli'e previous system leaders the United States has commanding leads in all the elements of material power: economic military technological and geographical. +?hen the leading state e-cels in the production of economic and naval capabilities but not conventional land power it may seem simultaneously powerful and vulnerable. Such asymmetrical power portfolios create resentment among second+tier states that are powerful militarily but lac' the great prestige the leading state(s commercial and naval advantages bring. "t the same time they ma'e the leader seem vulnerable to pressure from the one element of power in which it does not e-cel: military capabilities. The result is ambiguity about which state is more powerful which is more secure which is threatening which and which might ma'e a bid for hegemony.
<. UNIPO'*(IT/ IS PE*CEFU'
Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: 1. 0eading state(s power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics !. It reduces the salience and sta'es of balance+of+power politics among the ma&or states H"rgument is based on two well+'nown realist theories: 87oth theories predict that a unipolar system will be peaceful. egemonic Theory 7alance of ower Theory )o; to Thin= about Unipolarity )e>emonic theory ! especially powerful states 8FhegemonsG foster international orders that are stable until di%erential growth in power produces a dissatised state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in the leading state the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be.
H;onict occurs only if the leader and the challenger disagree about their relative power. That is the leader must thin' itself capable of defending the status ,uo at the same time that the number two state believes it has the power to challenge it. !when the overall gap between the leader and the challenger is small !when the challenger overta'es the leader in some elements of national power but not others and the two parties disagree over the relative importance of these elements. ?both the overall si#e and the comprehensiveness of the leader(s power advantage are crucial to peacefulness. "alance of Po;er Theory ! predicts that any system comprised of states in anarchy will evince a tendency toward e,uilibrium. !as long as the system remains unipolar balance+of+power theory predicts peace. ?hen balance+of+power theorists argue that the post6 ;old ?ar world is headed toward conJict they are not claiming that unipolarity causes conJict. 2ather they are claiming that unipolarity leads ,uic'ly to bi+ or multipolarity. It is not unipolarity(s peacefulness but its durability that is in dispute. +?alt# argued that bipolarity is less war prone than multipolarity because it reduces uncertainty. 7y the same logic unpolarity is the least war prone of all structures )nly options: 7andwagon with the polar power or ta'e no action that could incur its focused enmity.
$. UNIPO'*(IT/ IS DU(*"'E +9our Truest allies: ;anada /e-ico "tlantic acic
+US osition as an o%shore power determines the nature and li'ely longevity of unipolarity +0ocal balances of power may loom larger in the calculations of other states than the bac'ground unipolar structure. <%orts to produce a counterbalance globally will generate powerful countervailing action locally. "s a result the threshold concentration of power necessary to sustain unipolarity is lower than most scholars assume. *lliance$ are $tructural +alliance politics always impose costs and that the impediments to balancing are especially great in the unipolar system that emerged in the wa'e of the ;old ?ar. !" glance at international history shows how difcult it is to coordinate counterhegemonic alliances !alliances are ineKcient at pooling power the sole pole obtains greater power per unit of aggregate capabilities than any alliance that might ta'e shape against it. Ne; (e>ional Unipolaritie$- * +ame Not Worth the Candle !all scenarios for the rapid return of multipolarity involve regional unication or the emergence of strong regional unipolarities. ! To create a balance of power globally
! The advent of unipolarity does not mean the end of all politics among great powers.